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Seventy-five percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas and most are involved in agriculture. In the 21st
century, agriculture remains fundamental to economic growth, poverty alleviation, and environmental sustainability. The World Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development publication series presents recent analyses
of issues that affect the role of agriculture, including livestock, fisheries, and forestry, as a source of economic
development, rural livelihoods, and environmental services. The series is intended for practical application,
and we hope that it will serve to inform public discussion, policy formulation, and development planning.
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ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF THIS SOURCEBOOK

onsensus is developing about what is meant by
“innovation” and “innovation system” (box O.1).
The agricultural innovation system (AIS)
approach has evolved from a concept into an entire subdiscipline, with principles of analysis and action; yet no
detailed blueprint exists for making agricultural innovation
happen at a given time, in a given place, for a given result.
This sourcebook draws on the emerging principles of AIS
analysis and action to help to identify, design, and implement the investments, approaches, and complementary
interventions that appear most likely to strengthen innovation systems and promote agricultural innovation and equitable growth.
Although the sourcebook discusses why investments in
AISs are becoming so important, it gives most of its attention to how specific approaches and practices can foster
innovation in a range of contexts. Operationalizing an AIS
approach requires a significant effort to collect and synthesize the diverse experiences with AISs. The information in
this sourcebook derives from approaches that have been
tested at different scales in different contexts. It emphasizes
the lessons learned, benefits and impacts, implementation
issues, and prospects for replicating or expanding successful
practices. This information reflects the experiences and
evolving understanding of numerous individuals and
organizations concerned with agricultural innovation,
including the World Bank. (For a complete list of the contributors, see the acknowledgments.)

C

The sourcebook is targeted to the key operational staff in
international and regional development agencies and
national governments who design and implement lending
projects and to the practitioners who design thematic programs and technical assistance packages. The sourcebook is
also an important resource for the research community and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and may be a useful reference for the private sector, farmer organizations,
and individuals with an interest in agricultural innovation.
This overview begins with a discussion of why innovation is vital to agricultural development, how innovation
occurs, and why complementary investments are needed to
develop the capacity and enabling environment for agricultural innovation. It concludes with details on the sourcebook’s structure, a summary of the themes covered in each
module, and a discussion of the cross-cutting themes
treated throughout the sourcebook.

INNOVATION AND AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT

Agricultural development enables agriculture and people to
adapt rapidly when challenges occur and to respond readily
when opportunities arise—as they inevitably will, because
agriculture’s physical, social, and economic environment
changes continually (box O.2). Some changes occur with
unpredictable force and suddenness; since June 2010, for
example, rapidly rising food prices have pushed about 44
million people into poverty, and another 10 percent rise in
1

Box O.1 Innovation and Innovation Systems Defined

Innovation is the process by which individuals or
organizations master and implement the design and
production of goods and services that are new to them,
irrespective of whether they are new to their competitors, their country, or the world.

An innovation system is a network of organizations,
enterprises, and individuals focused on bringing new
products, new processes, and new forms of organization into economic use, together with the institutions
and policies that affect their behavior and performance.

Source: World Bank 2006.

Box O.2 The World’s Need for Agriculture, Agricultural Development, and Innovation

In one way or another, agriculture is integral to the
physical and economic survival of every human being.
The United Nations forecasts that the global population
will reach more than 9 billion by 2050. To feed everyone,
food production will have to increase 70 percent. Helping the world’s farmers and fishers to achieve this target
is challenging in itself, but beyond providing food,
agriculture sustains the economies of most countries in
significant ways, especially in the developing world.
Across Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, agriculture
accounts for three-quarters of employment and onethird of GDP; 75 percent of the world’s poor live in rural
areas and have an economic link to agriculture. For very

poor households, agricultural development not only is a
defense against hunger but also can raise incomes nearly
four times more effectively than growth in any other sector. These circumstances help to explain why agricultural development is such a powerful tool for reducing
global poverty and eliciting economic development.
Agricultural development demands and depends on
innovation and innovation systems. Innovation is widely
recognized as a major source of improved productivity,
competitiveness, and economic growth throughout
advanced and emerging economies. Innovation also plays
an important role in creating jobs, generating income,
alleviating poverty, and driving social development.

Sources: Author; OECD 2009.

the food price index could impoverish 10 million more people. Food prices are expected to remain volatile for the foreseeable future.
Other changes emerge more gradually, but are no less
significant. Agriculture is more vulnerable to the increasing
effects of climate change than any other economic sector,
and it uses almost 80 percent of the world’s freshwater—a
vanishing resource in some parts of the world. A changing,
less predictable, and more variable environment makes it
imperative for the world’s farmers and fishers to adapt and
experiment. They require more knowledge that contributes
to sustainable, “green” growth—as well as a greater capacity
to help develop such knowledge.
Like climatic variability, globalizing markets for agricultural products, far-reaching developments in technology,
and equally transformative evolution in institutions
(including new roles for the state, the private sector, and
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civil society) have also been altering agriculture’s social and
economic landscape over the past few decades (World Bank
2007b). Agriculture increasingly occurs in a context where
private entrepreneurs coordinate extensive value chains
linking producers to consumers, sometimes across vast distances. A growing number of entrepreneurial smallholders
are organizing to enter these value chains, but others struggle with the economic marginalization that comes from
being excluded from such opportunities.
In this context, markets, urbanization, globalization, and
a changing environment not only influence patterns of consumption, competition, and trade but also drive agricultural
development and innovation far more than before. More
providers of knowledge are on the scene, particularly from
the private sector and civil society, and they interact in new
ways to generate ideas or develop responses to changing
agricultural conditions (World Bank 2006).
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If farmers, agribusinesses, and even nations are to cope,
compete, and thrive in the midst of changes of this magnitude, they must innovate continuously. Investments in
public research and development (R&D), extension, education, and their links with one another have elicited high
returns and pro-poor growth (World Bank 2007b), but
these investments alone will not elicit innovation at the
pace or on the scale required by the intensifying and proliferating challenges confronting agriculture.
HOW AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION OCCURS

Agricultural innovation typically arises through dynamic
interaction among the multitude of actors involved in
growing, processing, packaging, distributing, and consuming or otherwise using agricultural products. These actors
represent quite disparate perspectives and skills, such as
metrology, safety standards, molecular genetics, intellectual

property, food chemistry, resource economics, logistics,
slash-and-burn farming, land rights—the list is far too long
to complete here.
For innovation to occur, interactions among these
diverse stakeholders need to be open and to draw upon the
most appropriate available knowledge. Aside from a strong
capacity in R&D, the ability to innovate is often related to
collective action, coordination, the exchange of knowledge
among diverse actors, the incentives and resources available
to form partnerships and develop businesses, and conditions that make it possible for farmers or entrepreneurs to
use the innovations. Box O.3 provides examples of how
innovation has occurred in agriculture.
Agricultural innovation systems

Research, education, and extension are usually not sufficient
to bring knowledge, technologies, and services to farmers

Box O.3 Examples of Agricultural Innovation and Innovation Processes

The instances of agricultural innovation listed here
came about in different ways. In some cases, markets
heightened the pressure to innovate, and the private
sector played a decisive role in driving the subsequent
innovation. In others, public sector interventions, such
as policy, R&D, and other incentives, drove the innovation process.
■

■

■

■

■

Cassava-processing innovation system, Ghana.
Research-led development and promotion of new
cassava products with a private sector coalition.
Cut flower innovation system, Colombia. Continuous
innovation in response to changing markets, using
licensed foreign technology and coordinated by an
industry association.
Medicinal plants innovation system, India. Mobilization of traditional and scientific knowledge for rural
communities, coordinated by a foundation.
Small-scale irrigation innovation system, Bangladesh.
Promotion by a civil society organization of a
low-cost pump to create markets; innovation by
small-scale manufacturers with the design of pumps
in response to local needs.
Golden rice innovation system, global. Complex
partnership of multinational companies, interna-

■

tional agricultural research organizations, universities, and development foundations; complex but
creative institutional arrangements over ownership;
innovation targeted to poor (nutrient-deficient)
users.
Potato, Peru. Facilitation by an international
research center of the development of new indigenous potato products with a coalition of researchers,
smallholders, and multiple private actors (including
supermarkets, traders, and restaurants).

In each case, the drivers of innovation and growth
were different and the role of research and extension varied, but in all cases the actors used similar approaches to
address their challenges and innovate. The challenges
included meeting stringent quality standards, remaining
competitive, responding to changing consumer tastes,
and addressing technological problems.
The actors’ ability to improve their interactions and
strengthen their links to one another proved crucial to
their success. All of the cases illustrate the importance
of taking collective action, having the benefit of facilitation and coordination by intermediaries, building a
strong skill base, and creating an enabling environment
for innovation to take place.

Sources: Adapted from Bernet, Thiele, and Zschocke 2006; Hall, Clark, and Naik 2007; World Bank 2006; A. Hall, personal
communication; R. Rajalahti, personal communication.
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and entrepreneurs and to get them to innovate. Innovation
requires a much more interactive, dynamic, and ultimately
flexible process in which the actors deal simultaneously with
many conditions and complementary activities that go
beyond the traditional domains of R&D and extension.
These conditions and complementary interventions have
not been consistently addressed to date; new, additional
ways and means of doing so are needed.
An AIS approach looks at the multiple conditions and
relationships that promote innovation in agriculture. It may
offer a more flexible means of dealing with the varied conditions and contexts in which innovation must occur. It
considers the diverse actors involved, their potential interactions, the role of informal practices in promoting innovation, and the agricultural policy context.
The AIS principles of analysis and action integrate the
more traditional interventions (support for research, extension, and education and creation of links among research,
extension, and farmers) with the other complementary
interventions needed for innovation to take place. Such

interventions include providing the professional skills,
incentives, and resources to develop partnerships and businesses; improving knowledge flows; and ensuring that the
conditions that enable actors to innovate are in place.
Figure O.1 presents a simplified conceptual framework
for an AIS. The figure shows the main actors (typical agricultural knowledge and technology providers and users, as
well as the bridging or intermediary institutions that facilitate their interaction); the potential interactions between
actors; and the agricultural policies and informal institutions, attitudes, and practices that either support or hinder
the process of innovation.

EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN KEY COMPONENTS
OF THE INNOVATION SYSTEM

Agricultural research, extension, education, and training are
key components of an AIS. The following sections summarize approaches that have been used to strengthen these
components, what they achieved, and continuing concerns.

Figure O.1 An Agricultural Innovation System

Consumers
National
agricultural
research system

Agroprocessors
Exporters
Producer
organizations

Bridging and coordination
organizations

Farmers

Input suppliers
National extension and
business development
services

Standards
agencies

National education and
training organizations

Land agencies
Credit agencies

Government policy and regulatory framework
Informal institutions, practices, behaviors, and attitudes
Source: Modified from Rivera et al. n.d.
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Agricultural research

A strong science and technology system—encompassing
basic, strategic, and adaptive agricultural science as well as
sciences outside agriculture—is widely regarded as contributing to innovation and sustainable, equitable agricultural development. Development cannot occur without
knowledge, much of which must be generated and applied
nationally and often more locally. For this reason, sustaining
food production and rural livelihoods while reducing
poverty depends to a great extent on how successfully
knowledge is generated and applied in agriculture and on
whether the capacity to produce such knowledge is
improved.
Aside from budgetary constraints (box O.4), many public research organizations face serious institutional constraints that inhibit their effectiveness, constrain their ability to attract funds, and ultimately prevent them from
functioning as a major contributor to the innovation system. The main constraints associated with many national

research organizations result from strong path-dependency
in institutional development and slow institutional and policy change, such as the lack of consensus on a strategic
vision, ineffective leadership and management, a continued
emphasis on building centralized national agricultural
research structures rather than on creating partnerships,
the loss of highly qualified scientific staff, and weak links
with and accountability to other actors involved in innovation processes (World Bank 2005).
Over the years, research organizations have attempted
to address these various constraints. Most of these efforts
have centered on shifting investments away from physical
infrastructure, equipment, human resource development,
and operating funds and toward improvements in the
management of public research organizations—for example, through better planning, improved financial management, greater accountability, and more relevant programs
for clients (developed with oversight from multistakeholder
boards or through better research-extension linkages).

Box O.4 Trends in Financing Agricultural Science and Knowledge Systems

Global public investments in agricultural science, technology, and development have increased significantly
over the years, rising from US$16 billion (reported in
1981) to US$23 billion in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars in 2000 (figures from Beintema and Elliott
2009; 2000 is the latest year for which comparable
global data are available). The increase is somewhat
deceptive, because it has been concentrated in just a
handful of countries (Pardey et al. 2006). More recent
data indicate that investments in science and technology continue to increase.
Government remains the largest contributor to public agricultural research, accounting for an average of
81 percent of funding (of more than 400 government
agencies and nonprofit institutions in 53 developing
countries sampled). Only 7 percent of funding is provided by donors as loans or grants. Funding supplied
through internally generated funds, including contractual arrangements with private and public enterprises,
on average accounts for 7 percent of the funding for
public agricultural research. Nonprofit organizations,
which collect about two-thirds of their funding from
producer organizations and marketing boards, are also
more active than government agencies at raising income

from internally generated resources, which include contracts with private and public enterprises (26 percent).
The private sector spends an estimated US$16 billion
(in 2005 purchasing power parity dollars) on agricultural research, equivalent to 41 percent of the global
investment (public and private). Almost all of these
private investments are made by companies pursuing
agricultural R&D in high-income countries. In addition,
several international research centers focus on agricultural R&D to produce international public goods.
Investments in R&D, including research and advisory services, have been the World Bank’s major strategy
to improve agricultural productivity and innovation
(World Bank 2009b). The World Bank alone invested
US$4.9 billion (US$5.4 billion in real million dollars,
2010 = 100) into agricultural R&D and advisory services over the 20 years from 1990 to 2010. The World
Bank’s annual commitments to agricultural research,
extension, education, and training have ranged from
US$100 million to US$800 million. The very low commitments by governments and donors to agricultural
tertiary education since the early 1990s are an especially
worrying trend (World Bank 2007a), because they imply
that a capacity for innovation is not being sustained.

Sources: Author.
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Much effort has focused on increasing client participation and on the financing and overall development of pluralistic agricultural knowledge and information systems
(World Bank 2005). Table O.1 captures the main differences
and changes in emphasis in World Bank investments to

support innovation. Box O.5 describes recent reforms in
agricultural research and extension organizations.
Approaches to international cooperation in agricultural
R&D continue to change as well. Growing capacities in large
national agricultural systems such as those of Brazil, China,

Table O.1 Defining Features of the Three Main Frameworks Used to Promote and Invest in Knowledge in the
Agriculture Sector
Defining feature
Actors

National agricultural
research systems
Research organizations

Outcome

Technology invention and
transfer
Organizing principle
Using science to create new
technologies
Mechanism for innovation Technology transfer
Role of policy
Nature of capacity
strengthening

Resource allocation, priority
setting
Strengthening infrastructure
and human resources

Agricultural knowledge and
information systems

Agricultural
innovation systems

Farmer, research, extension,
and education
Technology adoption and innovation

Wide spectrum of actors

Accessing agricultural knowledge

New uses of knowledge for
social and economic change
Interaction and innovation
among stakeholders
Enabling innovation

Knowledge and information
exchange
Linking research, extension,
and education
Strengthening communication
between actors in rural areas

Different types of innovation

Strengthening interactions between all
actors; creating an enabling environment

Source: World Bank 2006.

Box O.5 Recent Reforms in Public Agricultural Research and Extension

■

■

■

■

Increasing the participation of farmers, the private
sector, and other stakeholders in research governing
boards and advisory panels to attain real influence
over research decisions and priorities. The participation of women farmers is particularly important,
given their crucial role in rural production systems,
the special constraints under which they operate
(for example, time constraints), and their range of
activities and enterprises, including marketing, processing, and food storage.
Decentralizing research to bring scientists closer to
clients and better focus research on local problems
and opportunities.
Decentralizing extension services to improve
accountability to local users and facilitate clients’
“purchase” of research services and products that
respond better to their needs. Matching-grant programs for farmer and community groups allow
them to test and disseminate new technologies.
Establishing competitive funding mechanisms that
involve key stakeholders, especially users, in
promoting demand-driven research, setting priorities, formulating projects, and screening pro-

■

■

posals. Competitive funds have increased the role
of universities in agricultural R&D in some countries. Continuing challenges include limited engagement with the private sector, sustainability of
funding, the bias against strategic R&D, and the
heavy transaction costs.
Promoting producer organizations to reach economies of scale in services and market activities,
increase farmers’ ability to demand better services, and
help producers to hold service providers accountable.
Mixing public and private systems by enabling
farmer organizations, NGOs, and public agencies
to outsource advisory services, identify the “best
fit” for the particular job, and recognize the
private-good attributes of some extension services. For example, approaches based on public
funding that involve local governments, the private sector, NGOs, and producer organizations in
extension service delivery may be most relevant to
subsistence farmers, whereas various forms of private cofinancing may be appropriate for commercial agriculture, extending to full privatization for
some services.

Sources: World Bank 2005, 2007b, 2010.
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India, and South Africa hold huge potential for increased
South-South cooperation, especially given the number of
smaller developing countries that lag behind these agricultural research giants. These realities, among others, have
impelled the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)—a global partnership of organizations that fund and conduct research for sustainable
agricultural development—to examine and revise its
approach to agricultural R&D through a change management process initiated in 2008.
Besides giving high priority to effectiveness, accountability, cost-effectiveness, and staff quality, research supported by the CGIAR will be based on the development of
results-oriented research agendas directed toward significant and compelling challenges.1 The CGIAR will give particular attention to enabling effective partnerships, because
the complexity of scientific advances, socioeconomic developments, and environmental impacts, along with the
higher costs associated with new lines of research, make
partnerships essential for producing and delivering international public goods in agriculture. The CGIAR’s contribution to agricultural development through research and
knowledge management must be integrated with the wider
development goals and activities of other actors, notably
countries, international and regional development organizations, multilateral organizations, advanced research institutes, and the private sector.
Agricultural extension and advisory services

Like R&D, agricultural extension and advisory services have
passed through similar cycles of challenge and reform. The
public services that dominate extension services are plagued
by widespread problems: limited funding, insufficient
technology, poorly trained staff, weak links to research, and
limited farmer participation (World Bank 2005). Because
previous approaches have been ineffective, most extension
programs are moving away from centralized systems
and trying to improve links with research and farmers
(World Bank 2007b). Most programs widely acknowledge
the need to build social capital among farmers, pay greater
attention to the needs of women and youth, and facilitate
better links to markets.
Despite widespread agreement on the need for change, it
is clear that no single extension model is universally relevant. New models need to be developed, based not only on
general principles but also on analyses of the specific farming systems and social conditions they are expected to
address. New models are more important than ever, because
extension services are shifting their focus and changing

their roles to improve service provision and act as brokers to
the more diverse set of clients seen in an AIS.
The role of information and communications technology (ICT) in producing and disseminating knowledge has
expanded exponentially. ICTs offer striking opportunities to
change how agricultural science, innovation, and development occur by enabling a variety of stakeholders to interact
and collaborate in new ways to enhance the innovation
process (box O.6).
Agricultural education and training

Education and training institutions are especially significant
in an AIS because they develop human resources and at the
same time serve as a source of knowledge and technology.
The absence or decline of these institutions leaves a large
gap in a country’s innovation capacity. Even so, government
and donor investments in agricultural education and training (AET) have dropped to almost nothing since the early
1990s (World Bank 2008).
For AET, the primary constraint (among many) is that
institutions have not kept pace with the labor market’s
demand for knowledge and practical competencies,
especially in agribusiness, business and program management, and the problem-solving and interpersonal skills
crucial for actors to function in an AIS. Despite this poor
performance, global experience shows that it is possible
to build productive and financially sustainable education
systems (World Bank 2007b). Besides the AET system in a
number of developed countries (Denmark, Japan, the
Netherlands, and the United States), developing countries
such as India, Malaysia, Brazil, and the Philippines have
established productive AET systems.
LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT INVESTMENTS FOR
INCREASING INNOVATION IN AGRICULTURE

As shown in box O.4, investments in science and technology
have been a steady component of most strategies to improve
and maintain agricultural productivity. The high returns
and pro-poor growth emerging from investments in public
agricultural research, advisory services, and education
reflect a growing spectrum of initiatives to improve the
response to clients’ demands, work with farmer groups,
communicate better with partners, and collaborate with the
private sector. Yet efforts to strengthen research systems and
increase the availability of knowledge have not necessarily
increased innovation or the use of knowledge in agriculture
(Rajalahti, Woelcke, and Pehu 2005). As noted, complementary investments are needed to build the capacity for
SOURCEBOOK OVERVIEW AND USER GUIDE
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Box O.6 The Role of Information and Communications Technology in Knowledge Exchange and Innovation

For innovation to take place, effective bridging mechanisms are often needed to facilitate communication,
translation, and mediation across the boundaries
among the various actors in agricultural research and
development and between knowledge and action.
Such facilitating and bridging mechanisms can
include diverse innovation coordination mechanisms
such as networks, associations, and extension services,
but also ICT.
ICTs offer the opportunity to improve knowledge
flows among knowledge producers, disseminators, and
users and, for example, among network partners; support the opening up of the research process to interaction and more accessible knowledge use; and more
cost-effectively widen the participation of stakeholders
in the innovation and governance process. ICTs have
more often been associated with providing advanced
services to number crunching and data management,
geospatial applications, knowledge-based systems and
robotics, and improved farm equipment and processes,
but less often been considered for connecting diverse
innovation communities—whether at the local, subsectoral, and national level.

ICTs that serve as information “collectors,” “analyzers,” “sharers,” and “disseminators” are already
positively affecting agricultural interventions in
developing countries. Affordable mobile applications,
in particular, provide linkages to previously isolated
actors: information on prices, good farming practices,
soil fertility, pest or disease outbreaks, and extreme
weather has expanded farmers’ opportunities to capitalize on markets, react to unfavorable agricultural
conditions more effectively, and better interact with
public service agents.
Satellite imagery and aerial photography have
increased the capacity of scientists, researchers, and
even insurance providers to study farm conditions in
remote areas and assess damage from climatic challenges like drought. Increasingly affordable technologies like radio frequency identification tags and other
wireless devices are improving livestock management,
allowing producers to monitor animal health and trace
animal products through the supply chain. A persistent barrier to innovation, the lack of rural finance, is
also lifted by digital tools.

Sources: Author, drawing on Manning-Thomas 2009; World Bank 2011.

innovation across the spectrum of actors in the AIS and to
develop an enabling environment for innovation to occur.
This sourcebook reviews and assesses experiences with
those complementary investments. It outlines the needs,
opportunities, and priorities for such investments and
offers specific tools and guidance to develop interventions
in different contexts. As emphasized in the next section—
which offers more detail on the sourcebook’s contents and
organization—this sourcebook reflects work in progress
and an evolving knowledge base. The emerging principles
it contains will change as practitioners learn and develop
creative new approaches to innovation for agricultural
development.
SOURCEBOOK MODULES

The content of this sourcebook is presented in line with the
project cycle or phased approach that practitioners use
(table O.2). Modules 1 through 4 discuss the main investments related to innovation capacity (coordination and
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organization of stakeholders, agricultural education and
training, and research and advisory services). Module 5 is
concerned with the incentives and resources needed for
innovative partnerships and business development, and
module 6 describes complementary investments that create
a supportive environment for innovation. Module 7 provides information on assessing the AIS and identifying and
prioritizing prospective investments, based partly on what
has been learned from monitoring and evaluating similar
efforts. A glossary defines a range of terms related to agriculture, innovation, and development.
Each module generally has four parts:
1. The module overview introduces the theme (a particular
area of investment), summarizes the major issues and
investment options, and points readers to more detailed
discussions and examples in the thematic notes and innovative activity profiles that follow the overview. The
overview provides substantive contextual information for
each topic, including lessons from earlier approaches in
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Table O.2 Sourcebook Modules
Module number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Title
Sourcebook Overview and User Guide
Coordination and Collective Action for Agricultural Innovation
Agricultural Education and Training to Support Agricultural Innovation Systems
Investment in Extension and Advisory Services as Part of Agricultural Innovation Systems
Agricultural Research within an Agricultural Innovation System
Incentives and Resources for Innovation Partnerships and Business Development
Creating an Enabling Environment for Agricultural Innovation
Assessing, Prioritizing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Investments in Agricultural Innovation Systems

Source: Author.

national agricultural research systems and agricultural
knowledge and information systems.
2. Thematic notes discuss technical and practical aspects of
specific investment approaches and programs that have
been tested and can be recommended (sometimes with
provisos) for implementation and scaling up. The notes
review the considerations, organizing principles, questions, performance indicators, and lessons that would
guide the design and implementation of similar
approaches or programs.
3. Innovative activity profiles describe the design and highlight innovative features of recent projects and activities
related to the area of investment described in the module. The profiles pay close attention to features that contributed to success and that technical experts can adapt
for their own operations. The activities and projects
described here have not yet been sufficiently evaluated to
be considered “good practice” in a range of settings, but
they should be monitored closely for potential scaling
up. Their purpose is to ignite the imagination of task
managers and technical experts by providing possibilities
to explore and adapt in projects.
4. References and further reading offer resources and additional information.
THEMES COVERED IN THE MODULES

Each sourcebook module covers a theme related to assessing
and designing investments in a particular area integral to
the AIS. The discussion that follows gives readers a broad
idea of the content and concerns of the modules. The nonagricultural and cross-cutting issues treated in each module
are presented as well.
Building the capacity to innovate (Modules 1–4)

For an innovation system to be effective, the capacity of its
diverse actors must be built and strengthened; many actors

will increasingly possess a special mix of skills that contribute to the AIS in particular ways. Stronger technical
skills are very important, but they must be complemented
with functional expertise, because the new ways of working
within an AIS require a range of skills: scientific, technical,
managerial, and entrepreneurial skills and skills and
routines related to partnering, negotiating, building consensus, and learning.
Coordination and collective action for
agricultural innovation (Module 1). Coordination
and organization of stakeholders may serve many purposes, such as building coherence and setting consensusbased priorities, strengthening the sharing of knowledge
and resources, strengthening collaboration through joint
processes and products, and reducing transaction costs
and reaching economies of scale in extension and market
activities. Without organizations (or brokers) to address
social and resource imbalances and transaction costs,
prospects for participating in innovation processes and
systems are limited, especially for poor people. Effective
platforms help to organize stakeholders with different
assets, knowledge, and experience.
Module 1 discusses the capacities and resources
required to organize and coordinate stakeholders, providing examples and lessons from previous efforts. The
corresponding areas of investment include innovation
coordination bodies (which can be national, multisectoral,
or specific to the agriculture sector), subsector or industry
associations or networks, producer organizations, productive alliances, and self-help groups to foster innovation. A
range of policies and institutions is also needed to support
coordination and collective action at different levels of
governance in the AIS.
Agricultural education and training to support AIS
(Module 2). Agricultural innovation is a product of the
capacity, resources, and interactions that are brought to
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bear by actors from the wide range of fields related to food
and agriculture. The capacity to generate new ideas, knowledge, technologies, processes, and forms of collaboration
depends on an extensive array of skills—not only the
expected technical, fiscal, and managerial competencies but
also complementary skills in such areas as entrepreneurship,
facilitation, conflict resolution, communications, contractual
arrangements, and intellectual property rights. Universities,
research institutes, and other learning institutions will have to
reposition themselves to acquire and inculcate these skills.
The critical functions of research, teaching, extension, and
commercialization must be far more closely integrated. Module 2 reviews approaches to reorienting agricultural education and training to better serve the needs of a diverse cadre
of AIS actors. The examples and lessons describe long-term
reform processes, curriculum reform, technician training
approaches, as well as on-the-job training.
Investment in extension and advisory services as
part of AIS (Module 3). Better knowledge sharing and
better use of available information and knowledge for
desired changes are at the center of innovation processes.
Extension and advisory services can become nodes for
exchanging information and services that help to put
knowledge to use; then they become well positioned to
facilitate and support multistakeholder processes. Module 3 describes key principles for developing demanddriven, pluralistic advisory services (including the technical, entrepreneurial, and organizational aspects of this
process) capable of supporting the heterogeneous client
base of an AIS. The module reviews investments to support the shifting roles of advisory systems within an AIS,
including the provision of market-centered advisory services and brokering services.
Agricultural research within an AIS (Module 4).
Agricultural research systems are the source of new knowledge and the resulting products, services, and management
practices that enable productivity to grow. Locating agricultural research within an AIS is a means of heightening
the performance of research systems through improved
articulation with demand, more effective, better-differentiated international and national institutional partnerships, and better market integration. Module 4 provides
guidance on how research systems in three innovation
contexts (agriculture-based, transitional, and urbanized
economies) can function more effectively. The module
reviews investments in mechanisms for articulating
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demand and developing interfaces with other actors (for
example, through codesign, innovation platforms,
alliances and consortia, and technology transfer and
commercialization), giving special attention to the potential for public-private partnerships and regional innovation systems. The module also provides considerable detail
on the incentives and instruments needed for research system reforms to succeed.

Incentives and resources for innovative
partnerships and business development
(Module 5)

Economic change entails the transformation of knowledge
into goods and services through partnerships and business
enterprises. Strong links between knowledge and business
development are a good indication of the vitality of an AIS.
Partnerships for business development often require appropriate incentives to create such links, particularly to engage
the private sector in R&D, technology transfer, and joint
business activities (with producers). Module 5 provides lessons and examples of many potential interventions that promote private sector contributions to innovation either
through service provision, technology commercialization, or
other business-related innovation (through business support). The module describes key instruments for supporting
technology commercialization (the establishment of technology transfer offices, incubators, and science parks); for
supporting business (the provision of innovation funds, risk
capital, and other resources to initiate and sustain novel
partnerships); and for forming clusters, which enable stakeholders from a particular subsector or value chain to benefit
from economies of scale, geographic proximity, and complementary public investments.
Creating an enabling environment for agricultural
innovation (Module 6)

Farmers and entrepreneurs will not take the risk of innovating in unfavorable conditions. Researchers will not engage in
long-term activities that are not aligned with the regulatory
system (for example, researchers will not develop innovative
plant-breeding processes if they cannot protect the resulting
intellectual property). In many instances, innovation and
business development do not occur without complementary
investments to create a supportive environment. Module 6
discusses the roles of innovation policy and governance
mechanisms, regulatory frameworks (for quality and safety,
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intellectual property, and biosafety), and market development in fostering agricultural innovation. It also describes
investments (in infrastructure or financial services, for
example) that have synergistic effects with other instruments
such as innovation funds. Given the resource limitations and
numerous choices, investments in an enabling environment
must be prioritized and sequenced with great care.

Assessing, prioritizing, monitoring, and evaluating
investments in agricultural innovation systems
(Module 7)

AIS investments must be specific to the context and respond
to the stage of development in a particular country and
agriculture sector, especially the AIS. Given that optimal
human and financial resources are rarely available, an incremental approach is advisable. The scale of operations is also
likely to vary from local or zonal to subsectoral or national.
This variation requires investments to be assessed, prioritized, sequenced, and tailored to the needs, challenges, and
resources that are present.
The identification and design of appropriate interventions begin with a good understanding of the level of development and the strengths and weaknesses of the AIS. The
status of an AIS and its critical needs can be assessed in several ways and at several levels. Module 7 reviews and provides lessons and examples of tools for assessing AISs, such
as AIS frameworks, organizational assessments, NetMap,
and benchmarking.
Investments are prioritized based on the needs that are
identified, but setting priorities is also a political process
involving negotiation to build a consensus. Scoping and
consultation can help stakeholders to develop a shared
perspective on goals and challenges and to identify specific needs, opportunities, and priority interventions.
These processes ideally engage a diverse group of stakeholders from within and outside the sector through
platforms, committees, alliances, and scenario and foresight exercises.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of an AIS are essential for assessment and prioritization, as they allow
insights on impact and change. As technological, institutional, policy, and other innovations arise through interactions between networks of stakeholders in an innovation
process, M&E should encompass quantifiable assessments
(of economic benefits, productivity increases, and so on)
and nonquantifiable assessments (of learning by doing,
institutional reorganization, capacity building, and so on).

This module reviews traditional and other methods that
help practitioners to assess and understand learning
processes, institutional change, changes in capacities, and
other outcomes and to include the various stakeholders in
the M&E process.
Nonagricultural and cross-cutting issues

Although the sourcebook focuses on innovation in agriculture, it draws on experience and lessons from other sectors,
not least because so many “nonagricultural” issues impinge
on agriculture and innovation. Such issues include rural
finance, business development, innovation policies, and the
governance of innovation, among others.
The sourcebook addresses three major cross-cutting
themes—the role of the public and private sector, climate
change, and gender—as appropriate (and when examples
have been identified). These issues are briefly introduced
in box O.7.
THE SOURCEBOOK AS A LIVING DOCUMENT

To the extent possible, the modules in this sourcebook
reflect current knowledge and guidance for investments to
support innovation systems in agriculture. Their content is
based on the expert judgment of the authors and thematic
specialists, as well as reviews by experienced specialists. Yet
important gaps in knowledge remain, and new knowledge
will emerge from approaches that are just now being
devised and tested. For example, impact assessment methods and good M&E practices for an AIS are two areas in
which much more knowledge is needed. Future iterations of
this sourcebook will also benefit from additional examples
of integrated AIS investments to strengthen innovation
capacity in related areas such as education, research, advisory services, and brokering, among others.
This sourcebook is intended to be a living document
that remains open to dialogue and new, imaginative
approaches to innovation for agricultural development.
Its primary home is not on the bookshelf but online
(www.worldbank.org/ard/ais), where it will be updated
and expanded as new experience is gained and new
approaches and initiatives arise. The authors strongly
encourage readers to update, verify, and offer feedback on
the information here. Readers are encouraged to adapt
key principles and relevant guidelines to their individual
agricultural projects and programs—and to share the
results widely.
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Box O.7 Cross-Cutting Themes Addressed in This Sourcebook

The role of the public and private sector. The public sector is expected to remain an important provider and/or
funder of R&D, education, and extension services in
developing countries, where 94 percent of the investment in agricultural R&D still comes from public coffers (World Bank 2007b). Yet if markets now drive
much of the agenda for agricultural R&D and new
actors are more prominent in agriculture, what is the
proper role of the public sector? Each module examines
the roles of the public and private sector with a view to
answering that question.
Climate change and green growth. Climate change
adaptation and mitigation are key goals of an agricultural knowledge system. Technical as well as organizational innovations (for example, the use of climate-smart
and green technologies, coupled with inclusive and effec-

NOTE

1. In contrast to the CGIAR’s origins in the 1960s and
1970s as a mechanism for funding research divided largely
along commodity and geographic lines. For more information on the change management process and on how the
CGIAR has changed as agriculture, approaches to R&D, and
approaches to funding R&D have changed, see www
.cgiar.org.
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MODULE 1

Coordination and Collective Action for
Agricultural Innovation
OV E RV I E W

Javier Ekboir, Institutional Learning and Change Initiative (ILAC)
Riikka Rajalahti, World Bank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ctors in an agricultural innovation system (AIS)
innovate not in isolation, but through interacting
with other actors—farmers, firms, farmer organizations, researchers, financial institutions, and public
organizations—and the socioeconomic environment. In
other words, agricultural innovation is an organizational
phenomenon influenced by individual and collective
behaviors, capabilities for innovation, and enabling conditions. Interaction, coordination, and collective action are
based above all on the actors’ capacity to identify opportunities for innovation, assess the challenges involved, and
access the social, human, and capital resources required for
innovating, learning, and sharing information. Better coordination can improve the design and implementation of
innovation policies by allowing more actors to voice their
needs and concerns, resulting in more inclusive policies
and faster diffusion of innovations. Stronger interaction
and coordination can also induce all actors in an innovation system, particularly public research and extension
organizations, to be more aware of and responsive to the
needs and concerns of other actors, especially resourcepoor households. Despite such advantages, interaction and
coordination have been difficult to achieve for the same
reasons that hinder collective action: opportunistic behavior; lack of trust, incentives, and capacity; and difficulties in
setting and enforcing rules. Interaction and coordination in

A

the innovation systems of developing countries are hampered as well by segmented markets, different technological
regimes, lack of collaboration cultures, inappropriate
incentives, weak channels of communication, and insufficient innovation capabilities.
Effective interaction, coordination, and collective action
are based on existing capabilities, appropriate incentives,
and the empowerment of individuals; thus they rely on voluntary action. Coordination and interaction can emerge
spontaneously or be induced by specific public or private
programs. Effective coordination requires (1) a committed
and capable leadership; (2) appropriate incentives; (3) an
enabling environment, in which important stakeholders
that coordinate their activities have the mandate, culture,
and freedom to participate; (4) stable support programs;
(5) efforts to strengthen the capabilities for innovation and
collective action; and (6) adaptation of public organizations to participate more effectively in innovation
processes. The organizational innovations (committees or
councils, platforms or networks, and diverse associations)
reviewed in this module show that many innovations are
not planned in detail beforehand; instead, they result from
the adaptation of organizational structures in response to
emerging problems or opportunities. They also show that
creative and committed individuals guide the adaptation
and that an enabling environment allows the organizations
to change.
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RATIONALE FOR INVESTING IN
COORDINATION AND COLLECTIVE
ACTION FOR INNOVATION

Many different actors in an AIS generate and disseminate
innovations, including farmers, firms, farmer organizations,
researchers, financial institutions, and public organizations.
These actors do not innovate in isolation; rather, they
innovate through interacting with other actors and the
socioeconomic environment. Their interactions take different forms, such as consultations to define innovation
policies, joint research activities, or participation in or facilitation of innovation networks and value chains (box 1.1).
Agricultural innovation is increasingly recognized as an
organizational phenomenon influenced by individual and
collective behaviors (World Bank 2006). These behaviors, in
turn, depend on the individual and collective capabilities
possessed by the actors, on culture,1 incentives, routines,
and the environment (Ekboir et al. 2009).
The importance of interaction, coordination, and collective action in innovation systems has been recognized
for more than two decades (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992;
Nelson 1993). Common reasons for AIS actors to interact
and address issues collectively include improved identification of opportunities for and challenges with innovation;
leveraging of human and capital resources; learning and
information sharing; and (obviously) economic and/or
social benefits. Interaction and coordination may also
improve the design and implementation of innovation

policies by allowing more actors to voice their needs and
concerns, resulting in more inclusive policies and faster diffusion of innovations.2 Stronger interaction and coordination also induce all actors, especially public research and
extension organizations, to be more aware of and responsive to the needs and concerns of other actors, especially
resource-poor households. Box 1.2 illustrates the benefits
arising from one type of interaction: learning alliances (see
also IAP 4 in module 4). The more general economic,
social, and environmental benefits of investing in coordination, interaction, and collective action for agricultural
innovation and in building organizational capabilities are
summarized in the sections that follow.

Fostering economic growth

Better-connected actors with stronger innovation capabilities help to solve coordination problems among potential
partners, build trust for collaboration, build up innovation
capabilities, and develop a better understanding of the
needs and capabilities of other actors in the AIS, especially
marginalized groups. Other economic benefits of coordinating more capable actors include the following:
■

Lowering the cost of searching for and using technical
and commercial information, easing the identification of
emerging technical, social, and economic needs and
opportunities, facilitating experimentation on alternative

Box 1.1 Main Terms Used in This Module

Innovation network. A diverse group of actors that voluntarily contribute knowledge and other resources
(such as money, equipment, and land) to jointly develop
or improve a social or economic process or product.
These networks are also known as innovation platforms.
Farmer organization. An organization integrated
only by farmers seeking solutions to production or
commercial problems.
Value chain. The set of linked activities conducted by
the different actors that a firm organizes to produce and
market a product.
Organization. A group of actors that collaborate
over a sustained period. An organization can be either

formal or informal. Collaboration may take different
forms, including frequent exchanges of information,
joint priority setting for policies and programs, and
joint implementation of innovation projects.
Innovation brokers. Teams of specialists that
combine a strong background in science with knowledge of business and commercialization and/or
the creation of innovation networks. Innovation brokers are also known as change agents or technology
brokers.
Innovation capabilities. The skills to build and
integrate internal and external resources to address
problems or take advantage of opportunities.

Source: Author.
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Box 1.2 Role of Learning Alliances in Enhancing Interaction and Improving Innovation
Capabilities in Central America
A learning alliance is a process-driven approach that
facilitates the development of shared knowledge among
different actors. Learning alliances contribute to
improved development outcomes because lessons are
identified and learned more quickly and because
stronger links among research organizations and other
actors in the AIS improve the focus on research and
development practices.
Since 2003, international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), a national university, the
International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT),
and the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) have come together to explore how learning
alliances can improve links between research and
development actors. The learning alliance has worked
with 25 agencies as direct partners, and through their
networks it has influenced 116 additional organizations. Over the years, the alliance fostered change in

organizations working with 33,000 rural families in
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua by
significantly changing the partners’ attitudes and practices. As they became better connected, organizations
working on similar topics improved their access to
information and knowledge of rural enterprise development and their access to improved methods and
tools. Attitudes shifted from competition to collaboration. Partners experienced how working together
enhanced their capacity to serve rural communities
and attract donor funding. The increased effectiveness
of the partners’ projects and the development of more
strategic new projects indicate how development practices and knowledge management improved. These
shifts have contributed to a more efficient innovation
system, as seen in the shared use and generation of
information, joint capacity-building programs, and
large-scale, collaborative projects.

Source: Author, based on CIAT 2010.
Note: CIAT = Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical.

■
■

■

solutions, opening market opportunities, and developing
competitive capabilities.
Integrating more effectively into innovation networks.
Developing new skills and more effectively using human,
social, physical, and financial resources, thus fostering
economic growth.
Participating in the development and diffusion of innovations, including action-research projects and new
approaches to extension.

Producing public goods

Individuals and organizations with facilitation and/or brokering skills (in other words, with the capacity to promote
interaction) produce three important public goods. First, by
linking public, private, and nonprofit actors, they facilitate
the identification of emerging trends and improve policy
dialogues and the design and implementation of innovation
and agricultural policies at the global and domestic level.
Second, by interacting more actively with researchers, they
help researchers to generate more relevant scientific information. Third, by interacting with extension organizations,
they can help extension services to become more receptive

to the needs of nonpublic actors and help them to use technical and commercial information, thus strengthening their
innovation capabilities.
Reducing poverty

Poor households usually have limited human, social, physical, and financial resources (Neven et al. 2009). Individuals and organizations with facilitation and/or brokering
skills can help these households to pool their limited
resources among themselves or with other actors (for
example, NGOs or supermarkets) to achieve economies of
scale, enter new markets, or access new resources, such as
technical information or credit (World Bank 2006).
Although the direct impact of farmer organizations on
poverty seems relatively modest (see TNs 2 and 4), organizations can have important indirect effects on poverty by
fostering economic growth, creating employment, preventing buyers from benefiting at the expense of suppliers,
building innovation capabilities, and protecting marginal
groups (such as women or landless farmers) from further
marginalization (for example, see IAPs 4 and 6). They can
also negotiate with authorities on behalf of their members,
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increasing the public resources invested in poverty alleviation and affirmative action programs.

Improving environmental outcomes

Innovations that improve the sustainable use of natural
resources are usually developed and diffused by networks
with a diverse set of partners and capabilities (IAP 1). Their
diversity facilitates access to a large pool of technical information, the implementation of participatory and actionresearch programs, effective diffusion activities (such as
farmer-to-farmer extension), and collective action for the
management of common resources. Individuals and organizations with stronger capabilities and facilitation and/or
brokering skills can also help to articulate environmental
demands that are often excluded from national policies.
These demands are often linked to poverty alleviation,
because poor households tend to live in unfavorable and
fragile environments.

CONTENT OF THIS MODULE

After looking in detail at past experiences with coordinating
and fostering collective action for innovation (such as
through formal and informal coordination agents and/or
organizations), this module describes the conditions,
instruments, and incentives for coordination and discusses
ways of building innovation capabilities in groups of actors
in an AIS. It also briefly reviews key policy issues; new directions, priorities, and indicators that can help to monitor
progress and assess the results of investing in interaction
and coordination; and the conditions and capabilities that
improve the chances of success.

PAST EXPERIENCE

Despite their advantages, interaction and coordination have
been difficult to achieve for the same reasons that hinder collective action: opportunistic behavior; lack of trust, incentives, and capacity; and difficulties in setting and enforcing
rules. Interaction and coordination in the innovation systems
of developing countries are also hampered by segmented
markets, different technological regimes, lack of collaboration cultures, inappropriate incentives, weak channels of
communication, and insufficient innovation capabilities.
Interacting in a sustained way has proven difficult, particularly among research and educational institutions,
which have an important role to play in facilitating access to
scientific information, generating information that is
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needed but does not yet exist, and preparing professionals
with strong skills in disciplines required by innovating
actors.3 To play this role, researchers must interact intensively with other actors in the innovation system. While in
recent years public research institutes and universities in
developing countries have been pressed to open up to the
needs of other stakeholders in the innovation system, few
have been able to adapt because they do not have the
capabilities and incentives to interact with nonacademic
agents, have weak research capabilities, and resist change
(Ekboir et al. 2009; Davis, Ekboir, and Spielman 2008).4,5
Similarly, most farmers and NGOs have weak links with
public organizations and governments, including the traditional research, extension, and regulatory agencies as well as
local authorities and financing organizations.
The sections that follow review the main elements of
effective interaction, coordination, and collective action,
starting with the conditions for effective interaction and
coordination and the instruments and incentives needed.
The main types of coordinating bodies and organizations
are described, and the crucial need to build innovation and
organizational capabilities in new or existing organizations
is discussed.

Conditions that foster the effective interaction
and coordination of actors for collective
action and agricultural innovation

Interaction and coordination for collective action and agricultural innovation can be successful only if (1) the AIS
actors perceive that the benefits of contributing to a common effort are bigger than the associated costs; (2) they have
the appropriate human and social resources to participate in
collective action; and (3) they feel that they can influence
the processes in which they participate. Interaction and
coordination may emerge spontaneously. An effective value
chain, in which actors collaborate (often without formal
contracts) to supply a particular product to a market, is an
example of spontaneous coordination. Coordination may
also arise from deliberate interactions, such as a multistakeholder forum where innovation policies are discussed.
Effective interaction, coordination, and collective action
are based on existing capabilities and on appropriate incentives and empowerment of individuals, and thus they rely
on voluntary action.6 Because effective interactions and trust
seldom emerge spontaneously, programs that support intermediaries and build innovation capabilities are often necessary to facilitate the process. Box 1.3 lists factors essential to
effective interaction and coordination.
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Box 1.3 Factors Essential to Interaction and Coordination for Agricultural Innovation

Every innovation is a new combination of resources,
particularly ideas, skills, information, different types of
capabilities, interorganizational learning and knowledge, and specialized assets. Organizational innovations
are as important as product or process innovations.
Individuals or organizations may facilitate the
exchange of resources and the coordination of actions
to develop innovations. This process among heterogeneous actors may increase the diversity of resources and
ideas that are available. The greater the variety of these
factors available to innovators, the greater the scope for
them to be combined in different ways, producing
innovations that can be both more complex and more
sophisticated. But variety is not enough for effective
innovation. It is also necessary to have the incentives
and capacity to search the pool of ideas and know how
to combine them. In other words, incentives and innovation capabilities determine how actors innovate.
Effective coordination for innovation occurs when
(1) a committed and capable leadership promotes the
collaboration; (2) one organization offers appropriate
(often new) positive and negative incentives to individuals from cooperating organizations (such as researchers
or farmers); (3) important stakeholders that coordinate
their activities have the mandate, culture, and freedom to
participate; and (4) individuals participating in the collaboration do not change often (a relatively common
problem with high-level civil servants).
Other factors are also essential to interaction and
cooperation:

■

■

■

■
■

■

■

Interactions and cooperation are not costless or easy
to implement; therefore, they have to be managed
with a clear view of the outcomes being sought and
the associated costs.
Interaction and collaboration thrive only if they are
based on trust, which fosters greater commitment,
more thorough knowledge sharing, and better conflict resolution.
Motivated, capable, and autonomous facilitators are
essential for inducing collaboration. Well-connected
facilitators and collaborators pull promising new
entrants into their networks and collaborate with a
wide assortment of partners, exposing them to more
experiences, different competencies, and added
opportunities. In rapidly changing industries, facilitators lacking such connections fail to keep pace.

■

Facilitators work effectively only when financing is
sustainable and stable. Private actors will rarely pay
for services that are initially difficult to define and
whose real value can be determined only after the
intervention finishes. For this reason, public funds
should be made available to support coordinators of
innovation processes and the implementation of
institutional and organizational innovations.
Inducing actors to alter their behaviors may require
changes in laws and regulations. Given the uncertain
nature of innovation processes, such changes should
be introduced after they have been tried in pilot projects and after different actors (private firms, public
research organizations, and relevant stakeholders
such as the main ministries, regulators, and NGOs)
have been involved in policy design, consultations,
strategizing, and implementation. It is also important to invest in preparing high-quality information
to support decision making, such as background
studies commissioned from national or international
think tanks and experts, sectoral dialogues between
employers and employees’ unions, and high-level
steering groups (see module 6, TN 1 and TN 2).
Interaction and coordination require adaptive management to help participating actors to change their
behaviors as new actors join the informal organization and the innovation process matures. Adaptive
management cannot be implemented well without
monitoring and evaluation systems that focus more
on processes than on outcomes.
Many public research and higher education organizations in developing countries have incubator programs to foster the emergence of private firms and
other organizations. Before expanding these programs, it is important to assess their capabilities to
manage innovation programs and, if their capabilities
are weak, to consider creating new, dedicated agencies,
not necessarily within the public sector. Also consider
divesting from obsolete schemes and institutions.
“System failures” are prevalent, caused by weak incentives for collaboration, conservative organizational cultures, lack of trust among potential partners, regulations
and programs that hamper interactions, and ineffective
financing for innovation. By diminishing these failures,
facilitators or collaborators promote collective action,
the production of public goods for innovation, and the
development of the innovations themselves.

Sources: Authors, based on Fountain 1999; Axelrod and Cohen 1999; Hakansson and Ford 2002; Fagerberg 2005; Powell and
Grodal 2005; Klerkx and Leeuwis 2009; Klerkx, Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010.
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Instruments and incentives for interaction,
coordination, and organization of actors for
agricultural innovation

Effective coordination and organization of actors for agricultural innovation can be supported with different instruments, including building capabilities for innovation (TN
4); joint priority setting or technology foresight exercises
(TN 1), joint research and/or innovation programs, efforts
to foster the emergence of innovation platforms (module 4,
TNs 1 and 2) and value chains (TN 3), the creation of venture capital (module 5, TN 6), and support for establishing
innovation brokers (module 3, TN 4). Innovation councils
and advisory committees involving different ministries can
coordinate policies, joint priority setting, and technology
foresight exercises, which are often supplemented with temporary stakeholder consultation arrangements (see module
7, TN 3). Innovation forums and market and technology
intelligence can create common visions among agents, thus
fostering coordination.
If they do not provide proper incentives for organizations
and especially individuals, coordination initiatives result
only in formal interactions that have little effect on the AIS.
Individuals respond to the incentives offered to them.
When organizations do not introduce incentives to support
external collaboration and coordination, their members
(whether researchers, employees, or farmers) simply continue their normal activities. For example, it has been very
difficult for research and education organizations in developing countries to participate in innovation processes.
Effective participation of nonacademic actors in the governing bodies of research organizations can induce research
organizations to interact better with nonacademic agents.
For this to happen, the nonacademic actors must have a
good understanding of the dynamics of innovation and
research (Ekboir et al. 2009). When the agricultural technology institutes are part of the agriculture ministry and the
latter has little interaction and no formal links with the
offices in charge of general scientific and innovation policies
(research councils or other ministries), agricultural research
and innovation policies can be divorced from other science
and technology policies. This separation has two important
consequences. First, the incentives offered to researchers
often discourage interactions with farmers, especially when
these incentives value indexed publications over participation in innovation processes. Second, incentives for innovation are often designed in ways that prevent farmers from
using them. For example, it is common to offer tax incentives for private investments in research and innovation, but
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for most farmers and small companies the tax deductions
are too small to finance research or innovation projects.
At the macro level, policies can facilitate coordination by
setting new incentives and rules by which agents operate. At
other levels of the AIS, successful coordination of actors
requires innovation capabilities (discussed later) and appropriate incentives, such as effective markets (which create
opportunities to benefit from innovations) and innovation
funds (see module 5, TN 2). At lower levels, actors in the AIS
coordinate their actions in response to public incentives
(such as social programs financed by local or international
donors), market opportunities (such as high-value agriculture), or problems that affect whole communities (such as
the management of natural resources). Programs to promote collaboration at the lowest levels of the AIS include
funding innovation brokers (see module 3, TN 4), extension
agents, and incubators; fostering the emergence of innovation networks (TN 2); providing resources for coordination
activities (such as face-to-face meetings), and building
actors’ capabilities so that they can better search for and use
technical and commercial information. Finally, because
innovators and brokers cannot innovate in an unfavorable
environment, physical and communications infrastructure
should be developed, institutions must be strengthened, and
regulations must be updated periodically to adapt to new
technologies and market requirements (see module 6 on the
enabling environment for AIS).
Types of coordinating bodies and
organizations in the AIS

Aside from the traditional coordinating activities led by ministries of agriculture, a wide array of coordinating bodies
contributes to agricultural innovation. Coordinating bodies
and other forms of organizing actors (either individuals or
organizations) are becoming increasingly important owing
to the challenges imposed by globalization, emerging technologies, the increasing complexity of science, new forms of
innovation, and global issues such as climate change, access
to clean water, and poverty reduction. These bodies do not
necessarily belong to the public sector but often have links to
the highest levels of government (vertical coordination).
Interaction and coordination increasingly are promoted and
supported by different agents at the specific level in which
they operate. Almost any agent can coordinate an innovation
process if it has the personal, financial, and social resources
to do so.
Over the years, formal and informal structures that
coordinate actors within and between different levels of the
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AIS have emerged in almost every country. Informal organizations (for example, innovation networks or value
chains)7 are increasingly recognized as important sources
of innovation, because they complement and bond to formal organizations through a dense web of personal relations (Hakansson and Ford 2002; Robinson and Flora
2003; Christensen, Anthony, and Roth 2004; Vuylsteke and
van Huylenbroeck 2008).
Formal organizations, such as a firm or a national research
council, have a leadership structure defined in by-laws. Formal, dedicated structures with set agendas do not guarantee
that actors are coordinated effectively, however. Informal
organizations lack formal structures but possess all the other
features of organizations, such as shared cultures and communication codes, governance structures, incentives, and
routines. Informal organizations have coordinators or leaders
(Simon 1981) who emerge from the organization’s internal
dynamics, the relative strength of the partners, and the
socioeconomic environment. For example, individual smallholders negotiate with buyers from a disadvantaged position,
but they may gain bargaining strength when they organize
themselves, even if their organization does not have legal status. Without the organization, leadership in the value chain
rests with the buyers; with the organization, farmers can better influence the chain (Hellin, Lundy, and Meijer 2009).
Interaction and coordination may be strengthened by
creating new organizations or strengthening existing ones
(see the discussion on building innovation capabilities).
Both approaches have different challenges. Table 1.1 summarizes the main types of coordinating bodies and/or
organizations that operate at different levels of the AIS.
Given the diversity of coordinating bodies, organizations,
instruments, and the roles they play8 (discussed next), it is
important that decision makers at the highest level, such as
ministers or donors, avoid—to the extent possible—
imposing particular approaches and allow the catalyzing
actors to search for the best instruments for the particular
processes they coordinate.
At the macro level (national). Several countries have
embarked on improving overall innovation system governance at the national level. Governance concerns the
mechanisms by which decisions are made in an organization, whether public, private, or nonprofit. Governance has
several dimensions, including power, culture, incentives,
leadership, and coordination. In the governance of a
national innovation system, special attention is given to
the systems and practices for setting priorities and agendas, designing and implementing policies, and obtaining

knowledge about their impacts. Some developed countries (Finland and the Republic of Korea are examples)
have set up national science and/or innovation councils at
the highest possible level. These councils engage ministers
(such as the prime minister and finance minister) and
representatives from universities, public research organizations, and industry in developing policy guidelines and
facilitate coherence, consensus building, and coordination throughout the system. Similarly, several countries
(Chile, the Netherlands, South Africa, Thailand, and the
United Kingdom are examples) have created science and
technology councils or other organizations, consisting of
public and private research organizations, private firms,
funding agencies, sectoral organizations, and farmer
organizations to proactively promote coordination in the
innovation system.9
A thematic note (module 6, TN 2) discusses the role of
innovation system governance in greater detail, offering
examples and guidelines on actors, structures (such as
councils), and capacities needed for good governance. Thailand’s National Innovation Agency is discussed in box 1.4 as
an example of the challenges, objectives, evolving functions,
and learning associated with innovation system governance.
At the meso level (sectoral, regional, or provincial). At the AIS level, governance has been improved by
creating formal but effective spaces for dialogue at different
levels of the AIS, building up the actors’ organizations and
their capabilities, and improving formal and informal
regulations (intellectual property rights regimes, the judiciary system, customs, and markets) that reduce transaction
costs associated with interaction and collaboration. These
governance systems typically aim at improving participation of stakeholders from producers to consumers; improving transparency and openness associated with decision
making on funding and priorities; improving responsiveness and accountability to stakeholders; facilitating consensus building and coherence of policies, strategies, and
activities; and building a strategic vision (Hartwich, Alexaki, and Baptista 2007).
Most efforts to coordinate innovation at the higher levels
of the agriculture sector have centered on establishing formal apex research councils. In several countries—examples
include Australia, Brazil, Ghana, India (box 1.11 in TN 1),
and Mexico—these formal research councils or forums
assist the government in designing and implementing agricultural research policies, setting priorities and agendas,
coordinating the division of labor; managing large parts of
public budgets for research, monitoring and evaluating
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Table 1.1 Examples of Coordinating Bodies, Potential Participants, and the Levels at Which They Operate
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Actors that participate
in the coordination

Type of
coordination

Countries where
it can be found

Councils of ministers or
advisory councils to the
president or ministries
(through policies and
regulations)

Ministries, science councils,
public bodies, private firms,
farmers, farmer
organizations, NGOs

Spontaneous when
actors follow the
rules; formal when
ministries coordinate
policy making

Canada, Finland, Rep. of
Korea

Research and Innovation Council, Finland,
http://www.aka.fi/en-gb/A/Science-insociety/Strategic-Centres-for-Science-Technologyand-Innovation/Background-to-CSTIs/; National
Innovation Agency,Thailand, www.nia.org.th

Science and innovation
councils

Public and private research,
private firms, funding
agencies, sectoral and
farmer organizations

Formal and informal

Brazil, Chile, European
Union, Finland, India,
Mexico, South Africa,
United States

Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, Mexico,
http://www.conacyt.gob.mx/Paginas/default.aspx

Structure

Examples of coordinating bodies

Macro (national) level

Meso (sectoral, regional, or provincial) level
Agricultural
science/research
councils

Mostly public, but the newer
types with public, private,
farmer, civil society
participation

Formal and informal

Australia, Austria,
Bangladesh, India,
Netherlands, Norway

Indian Council of Agricultural Research,
www.icar.org.in; Latin American and Caribbean
Consortium to Support Cassava Research and
Development; Australia Rural Research and
Development Council, www.daff.gov.au/
agriculture-food/innovation/council; Bioconnect,
Netherlands, www.bioconnect.nl

Coordinating bodies (for
several sectors or
specialized in the
agriculture sector)

Public and private research,
private firms, funding
agencies, sectoral and
farmer organizations

Formal and informal

Argentina, Australia,
Chile, Mexico,
Netherlands,
Thailand, United
Kingdom

Asociación Argentina de Productores de Siembra
Directa, www.aapresid.org.ar; Fundación para la
Innovación Agraria, Chile, www.fia.cl; Medicinal
Herbs Board/Association, India

Innovation networks

Private firms, farmers, farmer
organizations, NGOs,
funding agencies, researchers

Informal

All countries

Papa Andina, International Potato Center,
www.papandina.org; Bioconnect, Netherlands,
www.bioconnect.nl

Value chains

Private firms, farmers, farmer
organizations, NGOs

Informal

All countries

Numerous examples exist; no specific example is
given here

Product marketing
organizations

Private firms, farmers, farmer
organizations

Formal

Colombia, Israel, Kenya,
New Zealand

Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia,
www.cafedecolombia.com; Fresh Produce
Exporters Association of Kenya, www.fpeak.org

Public-private
partnerships

Private firms, farmers, farmer
organizations, research
organizations

Formal

Almost all countries

Bioceres, Instituto Nacional de Tecnología
Agropecuaria, Argentina;
http://www.bioceres.com.ar/trigo_biointa/trigo_b
_regalias.html

Innovation parks

Private firms, research
organizations

Formal and informal

Almost all countries

Waikato Innovation Park, New Zealand,
www.innovationwaikato.co.nz

Incubators

Private firms, farmers, farmer
organizations, research
organizations

Formal and informal

Almost all countries

International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics, Agribusiness Incubator, India,
www.agri-sciencepark.icrisat.org

Micro (farmer) level

Source: Authors.

Box 1.4 Thailand’s National Innovation Agency

Thailand’s National Innovation Agency (NIA), established in 2003, supports the development of innovations to enhance national competitiveness and gives
significant attention to agriculture and other biological sciences. Operating under the overall policy guidance of the Ministry of Science and Technology, in
2009 NIA had a budget of about US$10.8 million. NIA
is unusual in that it offers direct financial support to
private companies for innovation-related projects. In
2009, it supported 98 “innovation projects” initiated
by private companies. The agency essentially shares
the investment risks associated with innovative,
knowledge-driven businesses through technical and
financial mechanisms. NIA’s main strategies are the
following:
■

■

Upgrade innovation capability, with a focus on biobusiness, energy and environment, and design and
branding. NIA encourages the development of startups and supports commercialization of research.
Promote innovation culture within organizations of
all types. NIA operates an innovation management
course for executives, National Innovation Awards,
an innovation ambassador scheme, an Innovation
Acquisition Service, and a Technology Licensing
Office.

■

Build up the national innovation system. Although
NIA is in an ideal position to propose measures to
enhance policy coherence across ministries, its portfolio suggests that it focuses more on discrete and
disguised subsidies for firm-level innovation.

One challenge is that NIA’s definition of its role as
“coordinating industrial clusters both at policy and
operational levels, promoting innovation culture, and
building up innovation systems, with a broader aim to
transform Thailand into an innovation-driven economy” appears to overlap with the mandates of the
newly established Office of Science, Technology, and
Innovation (STI), the National Economic and Social
Development Board, National Science and Technology
Development Agency, and Office for SME Promotion.
Of particular note is the government’s assignment of
the mandate to draft Thailand’s 10-year science, technology, and innovation policy to the STI rather than the
NIA. In 2010 the NIA was upgraded by government
decree from a project within the Ministry of Science
and Technology to a public organization. Its new board
comprises representatives from key government agencies as well as the private sector, and it is currently
chaired by the executive chairman of Bangkok Bank.

Sources: Wyn Ellis, personal communication; NIA, www.nia.or.th; Brimble and Doner 2007; Intarakumnerd, Chairatana, and
Tangchitpiboon 2002.

research programs, and often coordinating and creating
improved links between public agricultural research and
extension organizations. Research may also be coordinated
at the regional level (IAP 5 presents an example related to
cassava). However, the effectiveness of these councils varies
greatly. Many have a narrow representation of stakeholders,
consisting primarily of ministerial representatives or
researchers, and their research prioritization is not necessarily consultative or does not rely on rigorous evidence. They
often have little influence on the policy process and how
research is conducted. For further details, see TN 1.
Given the predominance of national innovation councils
and agricultural research councils, there are few “true” agricultural innovation councils, mandated to coordinate and
prioritize investments in agricultural innovation. Notable

exceptions include the Australia Agriculture and Rural
Development Council (box 1.10 in TN 1) and Chile’s Fundación para la Innovación Agraria (FIA, Agricultural Innovation Foundation; IAP 3).
As few countries have national councils specifically
mandated to coordinate agents in the AIS, most agricultural innovation is coordinated at the subsectoral level via
product marketing companies and associations, such as the
Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (box 1.5)
and the Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation, or farmermanaged foundations, such as Mexico’s Produce Foundations (IAP 2).
Marketing or commodity boards were the first type of
coordinating bodies to be created and have been common
in both developed and developing countries for many
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Box 1.5 Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya: A Sectoral Coordinating Body

Horticulture is the fastest-growing agriculture subsector
in Kenya, earning roughly US$1 billion in 2010. The
Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK),
established in 1975, serves as the premier trade association representing growers, exporters, and service
providers in the subsector (fresh cut flowers, fruits, and
vegetables). FPEAK is part of a larger Kenya Horticulture Council formed in 2007 through a merger between
the Kenya Flower Council and FPEAK. The Kenya Horticulture Council’s role is to enhance the effectiveness
and efficiency of resource use and service delivery to
Kenya’s horticultural industry.
FPEAK provides a focal and coordination point for
the horticulture export industry. A recognized partner
of the leading agricultural legislation, certification, and
research bodies and development partners in Kenya, it
provides technical and marketing information and
training, acts as an information center, and runs active
lobbying and advocacy programs to enhance the sector’s competiveness.
FPEAK structure. FPEAK is registered as a company
limited by guarantee. Its elected board of directors consists of members actively engaged in the export business.
The FPEAK secretariat is responsible for administrative
functions and providing services to members. FPEAK
operates independently of and receives support from
partners.
Who qualifies to be a member? To become an ordinary member, an exporter must have been in business

for six months. Affiliate membership is open to firms
and/or individuals serving the industry. These include
airlines, consultants, certification bodies, input suppliers such as seed suppliers, packaging manufacturers, chemical companies, and clearing and forwarding
firms.
What are FPEAK’s strategic goals and activities?
■

■

■

■

■

■

FPEAK has developed and implemented the protocol for Kenya Good Agricultural Practices
(Kenya-GAP), against which growers can be
audited and certified, a process that has involved
wide stakeholder consultation.
FPEAK’s information service disseminates news on
technical issues, trade, official regulations, and market requirements.
FPEAK receives trade inquiries from overseas buyers
and passes them on to members.
FPEAK offers training programs by specialists. For
example, farmers, including smallholders, are trained
in GAP and standards compliance in partnership
with exporters who are members of the association.
FPEAK agronomists visit members’ farms and production sites upon request to advise on readiness for
compliance, in particular to Kenya-GAP and GLOBAL
GAP (which sets voluntary standards for the certification of agricultural products).
FPEAK coordinates members’ participation in trade
events and assesses emerging markets.

Source: FPEAK, www.fpeak.org.

decades. After the wave of deregulation in the 1980s, many
developing countries abolished or privatized marketing
boards, but several public marketing boards remain. There
is no generally agreed definition of a commodity board.
Usually they are formal bodies in which different actors
involved in the production, transformation, and marketing
of a product discuss issues of mutual interest and sometimes regulate their activities. They may also finance or
implement supporting activities such as managing research
(either in their own institutes or by contracting external
researchers), implementing generic advertising campaigns,
and proposing legislation related to a product. In some
cases, they also regulate production. Commodity boards are
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a diverse group of organizations representing an array of
goals, structures, and challenges. Examples include India’s
National Dairy Development Board (box 1.6), the New
Zealand Dairy Board, Kenya Tea Board, Ghana Cocoa
Board, and the Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation.
At the micro level (organizing farmers). At the micro
level, farmers form local producer organizations or join private firms and other actors in innovation networks
and value chains. Farmer organizations are joined only
by producers who seek solutions to particular production or
commercial problems (TN 4).10 The creation of new organizations for small-scale farmers, especially cooperatives,
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Box 1.6 Indian National Dairy Development Board

The Indian National Dairy Development Board
(NDDB) was set up in 1965 by Parliament as a national
institution governed by a board of directors to promote, finance, and support producer-owned and
-controlled dairy organizations and support national
policies favoring their growth. The board’s work and
scope expanded under Operation Flood, a program
supported by the World Bank from 1970 to 1996.
NDDB places dairy development in the hands of milk
producers and the professionals they employ to
manage their cooperatives. The board also promotes
other commodity-based cooperatives and allied
industries. The government tasked NDDB with preparing a National Dairy Plan for meeting a projected
demand for about 180 million tons of milk by
2021–22. The plan is being implemented with World
Bank support.
In 2009, India’s 1.3 million village dairy cooperatives
federated into 177 milk unions and 15 federations,
which procured an average 25.1 million liters of milk
every day. In 2010, 13.9 million farmers were members
of village dairy cooperatives. The following are the
NDDB’s main areas of focus:
■

■

Support cattle and buffalo breeding, animal health
programs, and biotechnology research to improve
milk productivity.
Add value by testing and transferring product,
process, and equipment technologies as well as services for analysis of dairy products and milk quality
sampling.

■

■

■

Create self-reliant and professionally managed cooperative institutions, responsive to members’ economic and social expectations, through cooperative
development and governance programs to
strengthen capacities of the primary members, management committee members, staff of village Dairy
Cooperative Societies, and the professionals and
elected boards of Milk Producers’ Cooperative
Unions. Women’s Development and Leadership
Development Programs are a central activity.
Technical and professional skills training at Regional
Demonstration and Training Centers of NDDB,
Union Training Centers, and the Mansingh Institute
of Technology. Programs are designed for dairy
cooperative boards, chief executives, managers, field
staff, and workers.
Technical assistance and engineering inputs for
clients such as milk producers’ and oilseed growers’
cooperative unions and federations and central
and state government. Services offered by NDDBqualified engineers include setting up and standardizing dairy plants, chilling centers, automatic bulk
milk vending systems, cattle feed plants, and infrastructure for agro-based industry projects.

NDDB’s coordination role has come in for some
criticism. Although the board is strengthening cooperative dairies, which supply about 70 percent of marketed processed milk, it has not improved the capacity
of the informal dairy sector, based on village vendors,
which produces some 80 percent of the milk in India.

Sources: http://www.nddb.org; Rasheed Sulaiman, personal communication.

has had mixed results (TN 2). Many were initiated by
external agents such as NGOs or research institutes. When
the new organizations ran into financial problems, the
inclination was to provide them with additional support.
This intervention isolated them from potential partners
and, in some cases, from markets, creating a vicious cycle
of dependence on funders (Hellin, Lundy, and Meijer
2009). Additionally, when organizations responded to the
objectives of their funders or were captured by elites, they
provided little benefit to the intended beneficiaries. New
organizations tended to benefit their stakeholders mostly
when the organizations could adapt their objectives and

operating routines in response to unforeseen needs and
opportunities, especially unexpected market and social
developments; could participate actively in networks of
specialized actors; and could try several institutional
arrangements and routines until they found a configuration that enabled them to fulfill their mission (Ekboir et al.
2009; TN 4 and IAP 2).
Coordination of actors in the AIS at the meso and
micro levels can also be strengthened by creating self-help
groups, such as farmer groups (IAPs 1 and 4). Through the
creation of rural productive alliances, which bring commercial buyers together with producer organizations,
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small-scale producers tap into vital resources for reaching
important markets (IAP 6).
Farmers may form regional associations to conduct
applied research (like the regional associations of no-till
farmers in Brazil, described in IAP 1), provide services,
lobby decision makers, or influence the agenda of public
research institutes (like the Mexican Produce Foundations
described in IAP 2). Sectoral organizations that facilitate
market access to large numbers of small-scale farmers by
setting standards, providing technical and financial assistance, and consolidating their output are another common
form of coordination at the subsectoral level (TN 1).
Innovation networks are groups of agents (including
farmers, private firms, and possibly researchers and farmer
organizations) that voluntarily coordinate their actions and
contribute knowledge and other resources to develop jointly
or improve a social or economic process or product. The
membership of innovation networks changes often in
response to new challenges or opportunities (see TN 2, particularly on the Papa Andina network). In contrast, value
chains are networks with a commercial focus, one actor (a
supermarket or broker, for example) that “organizes” and
commands the chain, and a relatively narrow, stable membership. The strengths of value chains often result from the
development of organizational innovations (especially the
coordination of actors along the chain) that enable the creation of new business models (see TN 1 and IAP 6).
The importance of innovation brokers is increasingly
recognized. Innovation brokers are teams of specialists
that combine a strong background in science with knowledge of business, marketing, and/or the creation of innovation networks. Innovation brokers support linkages
among actors in the AIS and help farmer organizations
and private firms to manage research and innovation projects. They teach courses on the management of innovation,
assess the actors’ innovation capabilities, propose actions to
strengthen them, and may accompany the implementation
of the recommendations. Innovation brokers may also help
governments and donors to develop their own innovation
capabilities and to explore new instruments to foster innovation. NGOs, specialized service providers, or public
organizations (including research or educational institutions) can play this role.

Building innovation capabilities in coordinating
bodies and organizations

Given the challenges of developing new organizations, it
may be more feasible to strengthen organizations that
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already exist. Collaboration can be reinforced by transforming the actors so that they can contribute better to
innovation processes. For example, collaboration with foreign agroprocessing and trading companies to expose the
agriculture sector to different business cultures and provide access to new markets has been very effective. Another
effective strategy is to visit other innovators (whether
local, domestic, or foreign), especially when the visitors
have strong innovation capabilities and the visits are part
of a program to share the information with other innovators at home. Virtual platforms have also been useful when
actors in the AIS have the capabilities to use them. Innovation brokers can help marginalized groups to develop
these capabilities.
Whether one establishes new or strengthens existing
organizations to support coordination, innovation capabilities are essential (box 1.1). Innovation capabilities depend
both on individual traits (creativity, for example) and on collective factors, such as collective learning mechanisms and
organizational cultures. In other words, innovation capabilities depend not only on innovative individuals but also on
internal features of the organization, especially incentives, cultures, organizational spaces for experimentation, coordinating
structures, and collective action (box 1.7).
Innovation capabilities cannot be bought or built easily,
and their development requires important investments and
strong leadership over long periods, as exemplified by
Whirlpool, a company that transformed itself from selling
commoditized appliances in mature markets to generating a
stream of breakthrough innovations that multiplied the
company’s revenue 20 times in just three years (box 1.7).
Given the complexity and major investments required for
such a large set of interventions, it is unlikely that many
countries and donors will implement programs of similar
scope, particularly in the case of agricultural innovations,
which are often developed by networks of actors—that is, by
organizations with very weak hierarchies.
Often, however, an external event or a few key interventions can trigger a virtuous cycle that builds up innovation
capabilities (box 1.8). Innovation capabilities should be
built within organizations (farmer organizations, civil society organizations, and private firms), in innovation brokers,
in supporting organizations (such as research institutes and
ministries), and in the enabling environment. Programs to
broaden organizational capabilities should be adapted to
particular configurations of actors, problems to be solved,
and socioeconomic and institutional environments.
Building organizational capabilities for innovation is
particularly challenging for several reasons. First, the main
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Box 1.7 A Traditional Company in a Mature Sector Builds Innovation Capabilities

Instilling innovation as a core competence at Whirlpool
took a massive, broad-based effort over several years,
involving major changes to leader accountability and
development, cultural values, resource allocation,
knowledge management, rewards and recognition systems, and a whole host of other management practices
and policies.
Here are just a few examples of these changes:
■

■

■

■

The appointment of vice presidents of innovation at
both the global and regional level.
The creation of large, cross-functional “innovation
teams” in each region employed solely in the search
for breakthrough ideas.
The introduction of a companywide training program aimed at developing and distributing the
mind-set and skills of innovation.
The appointment of more than 600 part-time
“innovation mentors” and 25 full-time “innovation consultants,” who act as highly skilled advisers
to new project development teams around the
world.

■

■

■

■

The creation of “innovation boards” in each region
and each major business unit, made up of senior
staff who meet monthly not just to review ideas and
projects, set goals, and allocate resources but to oversee the continuing innovation capability-building
process.
The organization of big communication events
called Innovation Days, where innovation teams
showcase their ideas to other Whirlpool people, the
media, and even Wall Street analysts. Sometimes
these events are also held in suburban shopping
malls as a way of collecting feedback and additional
ideas from potential users.
The creation of a comprehensive set of metrics to
continually measure the company’s innovation performance as well as its progress in embedding innovation as a core competence.
The establishment of a sophisticated IT [information
technology] infrastructure called Innovation E-Space,
which integrates all of Whirlpool’s people into the
innovation effort and allows them to track progress
on innovation activities across the corporation.

Source: Quoted directly from Skarzynski and Gibson 2008, 7.

Box 1.8 Actions to Build Organizational Capabilities

■

■

■

■

Assess the main organizations in the AIS, analyzing
at least three issues: whether each organization is
necessary, what capabilities it needs to fulfill its mission, and how those capabilities can be built.
Introduce new incentives so that existing organizations, especially public research institutes and universities, can better innovate and integrate into
innovation networks (see the remaining points and
modules 2 and 4).
Create awareness among decision makers of the
importance and nature of organizational capabilities
and of the need for sustained efforts to build them.
Implement training and mentoring programs on
the management of agricultural innovation; tailor
these programs to the specific needs of important

■

■

■

■

■

stakeholders, including top managers, directors,
policy makers, funders, and field staff.
Create multistakeholder forums to discuss innovation policies and programs.
Promote the emergence of innovation brokers and
new types of interactions for innovation, such as
public-private partnerships or innovation networks
(module 3).
Explore new models of extension to promote organizational innovations (module 3).
Support organizations that seek to provide services
such as farmer-led research, extension, credit, and
the provision of inputs in rural areas (module 3).
Support exchanges between foreign and domestic
organizations.

Source: Authors.
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factors that influence organizational capabilities are not well
understood. Second, organizations are strongly conservative
(Christensen, Anthony, and Roth 2004), especially public
organizations that operate under the rules of the civil service. Third, because interventions to build a capacity to
innovate must suit the particular needs of each organization, the design and implementation of projects to achieve
this goal require that the implementing agencies themselves
possess strong capabilities to innovate.
KEY POLICY ISSUES

The key policy issues surrounding the organization of actors
for innovation—the need for coordination, collective action,
and stronger innovation capabilities—concern the kinds of
institutions needed to foster innovation, the roles of the
organizations involved (including reforms or actions that
help organizations and marginalized groups to participate
more fully), and the sustainability of innovation programs.
Institutional and enabling considerations

An enabling environment (module 6) is a prerequisite for
effective coordination and is developed more easily when
governments, donors, and the other actors in the AIS have a
clear understanding of innovation processes. When such
processes are financed by governments or donors, the latter
often try to influence the process; governments may also
resent having to negotiate policies and priorities with other
actors. Finally, coordination is more effective when laws,
regulations, and interventions by external stakeholders
(especially governments and donors) facilitate transparency
and accountability to all stakeholders in the innovation
process.
Roles of the private and public sectors
and civil society

The private sector has been and is expected to continue
being the source of most innovations (Fagerberg 2005). For
commercial agriculture in particular, the private sector will
likely continue to lead innovation, including organizing
value chains and developing agricultural equipment and
inputs. To develop these innovations, private firms organize
networks with farmers, traders, and eventually strong
research teams (TN 1). Usually these teams have been
located in developed countries, but a few strong teams from
developing countries have also participated. Public research
and extension agents have coordinated the emergence of
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innovation networks, but mostly in exceptional cases. The
private sector or nimble NGOs are better equipped to coordinate the development and diffusion of technical and commercial innovations that adapt to rapidly changing technical or economic conditions, such as value chains for
high-value products, or environmental innovations that
require collective action, such as the management of water
resources or forests.
The public sector (including the central, provincial, and
local governments) can support innovation by (1) setting
up an institutional environment conducive to innovation,
including regulations, sanitary services, and intellectual
property regimes; (2) financing programs to support innovation, including support for coordination of actors, support for venture and angel funds, financing research and
extension embedded in innovation programs, and strengthening innovation capabilities; (3) allowing innovators to
experiment with alternative approaches to achieve the project’s goals; and (4) building up the infrastructure, especially
transportation networks and public research and extension
institutions.
The nonprofit sector should coordinate innovation
processes that open opportunities for marginalized groups
and represent their interests in policy dialogues. Public
organizations may feel threatened when nonpublic actors
assume a leading role in fostering innovation and try to
change how public organizations interact with the AIS.
Social responsibility may induce private actors to create
organizations to develop innovations without commercial
value, like projects with environmental or poverty alleviation goals, but the public sector will continue to have a
major responsibility in these areas.
Reform of research and educational organizations

Given the organizational inertias that characterize public
institutions, policy makers should carefully assess whether
to invest in (1) transforming traditional organizations,
(2) supporting existing actors, or (3) creating new institutions that complement traditional ones. The reform of
public research and educational organizations should start
by identifying the roles they should play, considering that
others in the AIS also produce technical and scientific
information. It is necessary to understand how public agricultural research institutions can complement private
research and innovation (for example, a public institution
can study relatively unknown plant varieties and develop
new material with useful traits that private seed companies
can then use in their breeding programs). Once the roles
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have been defined, the resources needed to fulfill the new
mandates must be identified—especially investments in
physical, human, and social capital—and plans must be
prepared to attain those resources. Finally, new incentives
must be defined for managers and researchers so that they
can better integrate into innovation processes. For example,
the incentives should not prioritize scientific publications
over interactions with actors in the AIS or the generation of
other types of scientific output, such as new agronomic recommendations; additionally, the incentives should allow
researchers to develop long-term research programs.
A complementary approach is to provide resources and
incentives directly to innovative researchers and professors
so that they can join innovation networks. This approach
somewhat resembles the awarding of funds directly to
researchers, a process that can have the unintended consequence of bypassing their institutes’ formal resource allocation structures.
Social and local considerations,
including gender and equity

Because innovation capabilities, physical assets, and
power are not distributed equally, the best-endowed
actors can benefit the most from emerging opportunities.
In hierarchical societies in which coordination must
include social leaders, greater coordination can award
even more power to dominant local groups or individuals.
Local conditions, especially cultural issues, similarly
influence coordination. Some cultures forbid interaction
between certain ethnic groups, but simply forcing them to
interact directly may not be as effective as acting through
intermediaries.
Even though social marginalization is a key aspect of
poverty, it is difficult to create and sustain coordination
organizations that include marginalized actors, especially
women and landless farmers. Such organizations are often
opposed by civil servants, politicians, middlemen, or
wealthier farmers who see their power challenged (World
Bank 2009). Affirmative action measures, reinforced by disincentives for wealthier actors, help to reduce gender and
income disparities in coordination organizations and can
include the following:
■

■

Fostering the emergence of organizations of women and
poor households, such as those used in microfinance
programs.
Setting aside seats on boards of organizations for representatives of marginalized groups and ensuring that

■

■

the representatives possess the skills (literacy, for
example) to participate. Often capacity building is
needed as well to prevent the most powerful stakeholders from capturing coordinating organizations (World
Bank 2009).
Fostering the emergence of networks that focus on innovations appropriate for marginalized populations, such
as the no-till package developed in Ghana (IAP 1)
(Ekboir, Boa, and Dankyi 2002).
At a more general level, institutionalizing gender and
pro-poor policies and planning functions in governments, projects, and organizations, and opening women
and disadvantaged farmers’ desks to guide practitioners
in mainstreaming affirmative action in planning, budgeting, and implementation.

Sustainability of innovation programs

Actors can coordinate spontaneously in response to a
need or opportunity, or they may be induced by specific
public policies and programs. It is easier to strengthen
forms of coordination that have survived for a certain
period, because the actors involved have solved many of
the barriers to collective action. Existing organizations,
especially informal ones, can profit greatly from programs
that build their capabilities and link them with other
actors in the AIS. Forms of coordination imposed by
external partners usually command more resources but
often are less sustainable. They run a greater risk of
becoming only formal structures and may lose their
autonomy and effectiveness. Failure rates are high in new
organizations because collectively agreed rules must be
defined and effectively enforced. In some cases, the transaction costs of establishing an organization outweigh the
benefits, especially in markets with low transaction costs,
such as those for undifferentiated commodities (Hellin,
Lundy, and Meijer 2009).
For an organization to be sustainable, its stakeholders
must develop organizational capabilities and have incentives to contribute to the common effort. They must
effectively influence the organizations they participate
in, and they must also perceive the benefits of participation. When this happens, stakeholders often invest their
financial and political capital to ensure the programs’
continuity. These conditions apply not only to organizations at the “base” of the AIS (such as farmer organizations or value chains) but also to organizations seeking to
coordinate the AIS at the “top,” such as research councils
or innovation brokers.
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NEW DIRECTIONS, PRIORITIES, AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR INVESTMENT

As discussed, agricultural innovation may be coordinated by
strengthening existing individuals and organizations or by
setting up entirely new actors and organizations. The common denominator of these approaches is the need to provide incentives, apply appropriate instruments, and build
innovation and organizational capabilities. Because effective
collaboration among innovators is so difficult to implement, however, it is likely that new types of organizations
will need to be supported, as described next.
Improving governance of the AIS

A number of factors impinge on the efficiency of governance in a national innovation system11 in general and an
AIS in particular—in other words, on the extent to which
policy processes have the greatest effect with a given use of
resources (OECD 2005). The evidence indicates that efficient governance depends on certain qualities, which
include the following:
■

■

■

■

■

Legitimacy. The policy actors and approaches adopted in
policy processes have to be appropriate and widely
accepted for the tasks at hand.
Coherence. The strands of innovation policy and associated policy instruments must fit together.
Stability. Innovation requires sufficiently stable framework conditions, institutions, and policy.
Adaptive ability. As the environment for innovation and
innovation itself keeps evolving, governance actors need
to be able to adapt.
Ability to steer and give direction. A related capability is
the governance system’s ability to provide direction to
actors and steer the innovation system as a whole. This
capacity requires commitment and leadership by policy
makers at the highest level.

Governance of the AIS can be improved by creating formal
but effective spaces for dialogue at different levels of the AIS
(local, sectoral, and national), building actors’ organizations
and their capabilities, and improving formal and informal
regulations that reduce transaction costs (such as intellectual
property rights regimes, the judiciary system, customs, and
markets). At higher levels of the AIS, investment is needed to
establish and strengthen effective and responsive coordinating bodies for agricultural innovation, such as innovation
councils and subsector-specific bodies that can contribute to
collective identification of opportunities and challenges and
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help to align and allocate limited resources to key innovation
issues (see details in TN 1). IAP 5 describes a regional
approach to coordinate innovation actors in the cassava
subsector, particularly researchers. IAP 3 focuses on the
Foundation for Agricultural Innovation (Fundación para la
Innovación Agraria, FIA), a ministry-affiliated foundation
with independent governance that coordinates and incentivizes agricultural innovation in Chile.
Farmer and nonprofit organizations respond mostly to
their funders, whose interests may not coincide with the
needs of local stakeholders, especially if they are marginalized groups like women or landless rural households. It is
important to provide some means for these groups to influence the AIS. Possibilities include arrangements for ensuring good governance and accountability and for training
managers and members about their respective roles in their
organizations and in the AIS. It is also important to keep
external interventions in NGOs and civil society organizations to a minimum, allowing them to evolve as needed.

The rise of networks

TN 2 in this module examines the nature and dynamics of
innovation networks, which are becoming more prevalent
as the complexity of innovations grows and rapid economic
and technological change forces agents to innovate at a
faster pace. Innovation networks have developed important
technical, commercial, and organizational innovations that
have had major economic and social impacts. IAP 1 reviews
the emergence and evolution of the innovation networks
that developed no-till technologies for small-scale farmers
in South America and Ghana. Where they have been
adopted widely, these technologies have increased farmers’
incomes, reduced food insecurity, diminished labor requirements for the production of staples, allowed poor rural
households to engage in new income-generating activities,
and enhanced the sustainability of agriculture in marginal
and well-endowed areas. Although programs to diffuse notill have been documented in more than 60 countries, massive adoption has occurred only in the handful of regions
where diverse actors formed innovation networks to
develop organizational and technical innovations adapted
to local conditions.

Innovation brokers: promising, but
challenging to implement

Innovation brokers can play a valuable role in an AIS. Several types have evolved, but few have survived without
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support from governments or donors (Klerkx and Leeuwis
2008).12 Innovation brokering services are affected by
severe information uncertainties. Individual actors cannot
know the commitment and the capabilities of potential
partners in advance. A conflict of interest may exist if the
funders’ requirements do not coincide with the needs of
the other actors in the AIS. Giving the funds to users to pay
for the brokering services may reduce the conflict, but
effective controls are needed to make sure that funds are
used appropriately and that actors follow the brokers’ recommendations. Similarly, users often do not know the
nature and quality of services offered by innovation brokers. They are reluctant to pay for services that are difficult
to define beforehand and highly uncertain.

Organizing around value chains

Small-scale farmers’ access to modern marketing chains,
often organized by supermarkets, is analyzed in TN 3. Chains
provide more stable incomes and sometimes higher profits
for their adherents, but participating in chains requires commercial and technical skills. Recent research has found that
in the long term few smallholders can survive in these chains
as suppliers; only the more affluent smallholders, better
endowed with natural resources, infrastructure, access to
credit, and social capital, tend to participate. Despite poor
rural households’ limited access to the markets supported by
modern value chains, the chains can bring important benefits to rural economies by creating many permanent and
temporary positions on the farm and in associated services
such as input supply, sorting and packaging, and transport.
More dynamic local economies also create small business
opportunities, such as food stalls and professional services.
As mentioned, rural productive alliances, which are economic agreements between commercial buyers and formally
organized producer organizations, enable small-scale producers to reach those markets. The agreements create favorable conditions and incentives for buyers and smallholders
to establish mutually beneficial and sustainable relationships
(IAP 6).

Supporting farmer organizations
and self-help groups

Farmer organizations can participate in the financing,
development, and diffusion of innovations, manage public
and private funds and programs for innovation, collaborate
in the design of innovation policies, coordinate other
actors in the AIS, and influence research and extension

organizations. TN 4 reviews the conditions that help
farmer organizations to emerge and consolidate. It gives
particular attention to the technical and market conditions
that make farmer organizations a more effective means of
coordinating AIS actors than other institutional arrangements, such as value chains and innovation networks. It
also reviews factors that reinforce farmers’ ownership and
sustain their organizations.
IAP 2 examines the emergence and evolution of Mexico’s
Produce Foundations, which are civil society organizations
that influence the design and implementation of research
and innovation policies and programs. Soon after the federal government created the foundations in 1996, a few
farmers pushed for their foundations to be independent of
the government; they succeeded, and the remainder eventually followed suit. The foundations created a coordinating
office that interacts with the government and promotes
organizational learning. The experience in Mexico shows
how a number of interacting factors support successful
organization building. IAP 2 also analyzes the interplay
between deliberate strategies to build organizations and
strategies that emerge organically from the innovation
process.
IAP 4 describes another form of organization—highly
federated self-help groups for the poor established by the
Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty in Andhra Pradesh.
Each tier in the organization of self-help groups functions
as a financial intermediary and provides specialized services
to members (and other stakeholder groups) in a variety
of sectors.

Building capabilities for coordination among
individuals and organizations

As noted, building capabilities for coordination requires
strong leadership and sustained, major investments. Investments can encompass support for physical, human, and
social capital (basic education; management and entrepreneurial skills; learning to participate in social, innovation,
and economic networks; and development of financial
capacity), short- and long-term consultancies, formal
courses, long-term mentoring, support for innovation brokers, the creation of dedicated bodies (innovation councils
or programs to fund innovation), and the transformation of
public universities and research and extension organizations
(discussed in box 1.8). Transforming public universities and
research and extension organizations is particularly problematic but not impossible. Employees have job security,
governments are reluctant to pay locally competitive
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academic salaries that exceed civil servants’ salaries, and it is
challenging to hire good, experienced professionals to work
under difficult conditions (Davis, Ekboir, and Spielman
2008).13 In response to these challenges, many countries have
created new public organizations with different conditions
and adequate working resources. Alternatively, investments
could create the conditions to induce the best employees of
existing organizations to participate in innovation networks
regardless of their institutional association. Another major
problem that hampers efforts to build capacity for coordination in developing countries is the frequent rotation of capable civil servants. A major effort should be made to build the
capabilities of nonpublic organizations, including political
parties, private firms, and civil society and farmer organizations, so that they can influence the policy dialogue despite
changes in government.
Organizing around a common vision of major issues

Coordination is facilitated when potential partners share a
common vision of their problems and opportunities. This
vision can be created through foresight exercises, studies
and consultancies, gathering and processing of technological and market intelligence, sectoral dialogues, and interministerial committees. Because the common vision needs
to be updated in response to technical, social, and economic
change, these activities must be implemented periodically
and include a broad array of stakeholders, not just those
directly linked to the processes being analyzed (Skarzynski
and Gibson 2008).
Setting agendas and priorities

Priorities for collaboration should be defined with participatory approaches and updated periodically, but not too
often, which would disrupt the development of trust
required for effective collaboration and implementation of
long-term activities. Investments should also build the
capabilities of all stakeholders so that they can participate
actively in innovation processes with which they may be
unfamiliar, such as policy design or the boards of research
organizations.
MONITORING AND EVALUATING
INVESTMENTS AND SCALING UP

The impact of organizational innovations on the AIS is
notoriously difficult to measure, owing to the complex
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dynamics of innovation. Not only does every AIS have
many actors with differing goals, but the outcomes of their
formal or informal cooperation may not appear until
many years have passed. Another issue in assessing outcomes is that monitoring and evaluation can be used for
different, often conflicting, purposes, like learning and
accountability.
Although it is difficult to define valid indicators for monitoring organizational innovations and their impacts, two
principles are valuable to consider. First, the monitoring system should be a learning tool. When a project is defined, several critical assumptions are made, representing an explicit
or implicit theory of how stakeholders’ behaviors are
expected to change over the project’s life. The monitoring
system should be designed to (1) test these assumptions
early in the project’s life and adjust the interventions if the
assumptions are proved wrong, (2) identify unforeseen
problems or opportunities as early as possible in the project’s life (Spitzer 2007), and (3) measure changes in stakeholders’ behaviors and provide feedback to stakeholders so
that they can learn faster.
Second, many indicators, especially those intended to
measure ill-defined processes such as organizational
innovations, cannot be measured quantitatively. In such
cases, qualitative indicators, such as stakeholders’ opinions, are appropriate measures that can be tracked with
specially designed techniques (such as Likert or rating
scales).
The monitoring system should also cover at least four
areas:
■

■

■

■

Organizational strengthening. Assess the organization’s
ability to improve its governance, culture, and finances
and expand its membership.
Organizational learning. Assess the organization’s ability
to perform its normal activities better.
Exploration of new instruments to fulfill the organization’s mandate. Assess the organization’s ability to
search for new ways to reach its objectives or to define
new objectives.
Changes in the AIS according to the underlying theory of
change. Assess the responses of the actors involved
directly or indirectly in the project, especially the evolution of their interactions.

Finally, some potential indicators of organizational innovation are listed in table 1.2, along with their corresponding
sources of information.
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Table 1.2 Indicators of Organizational Innovation
Indicator
Process indicators
1. Leveraged investments: additional time and resources invested by
the organizations’ members in joint activities
2. Consolidation of innovation networks and value chains
3. Improvements in the innovation capabilities of farmer
organizations (for example, changes in governance, learning
routines, and experimentation)
4. Changes in the resources invested in building organizational
capabilities
5. Number of programs and resources invested in organizational
innovation
6. Number and types of innovation programs targeted to
marginalized groups
Output indicators
7. New products or processes introduced by actors in the
organization (or by the organization itself)
8. Strength of the value chains (volume marketed, additional
income generated, number of farmers benefiting directly,
number of rural jobs created)
9. Changes in value chains, especially in the number of
intermediaries, their relative strength, and other institutional
changes (from stakeholder platforms and other methods)
10. New partnerships created (number, diversity, types, goals,
achievements)

11. Expansion of the networks (such as the number and type of
partners, effectiveness, innovations adopted)
12. Changes in curricula that prepare professionals in
organizational innovation
Outcome indicators
13. Number of partnerships that survived after three years
14. Changes in the participation of farmer organizations in
innovation processes
15. Improvement in the condition of marginalized groups (women
and landless farmers) thanks to their participation in innovation
programs
16. Changes in the performance of value chains after three years
17. Changes in asset ownership and market participation induced
by organizational innovations after three years

Source of information or tools
Surveys of value chains
Surveys of innovation networks
Case studies
Surveys of partners in innovation networks and value chains
Case studies
Surveys of members, stakeholder interviews
Review of public programs, survey of funders
Review of public programs, survey of funders
Review of public programs, survey of funders

Surveys of the organization’s stakeholders
Surveys of supermarkets, brokers, wholesalers, farmers
Trade statistics
Surveys of supermarkets, brokers, wholesalers, farmers
Trade statistics
Review of programs that foster the creation of organizations for
innovation
Participatory rural appraisal
Surveys of actors in the AIS
Surveys of innovation networks, stakeholder interviews
Case studies
Surveys of educational organizations
Surveys of partnerships
Case studies
Surveys of partners in decision-making processes
Stakeholder interviews
Case studies
Surveys of partners in decision-making processes
Stakeholder interviews
Surveys of supermarkets, brokers, wholesalers, farmers
Trade statistics
Case studies
Surveys of farmers and other stakeholders in innovation processes

Source: Authors.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 1

National Coordination and Governance
of Agricultural Innovation
Riikka Rajalahti, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

any countries could benefit from better coordination of agricultural innovation at the national sectoral level, where broad science and innovation
policies, strategies, and activities are defined. This note
describes the potential benefits and elements of an organization that successfully coordinates national innovation in agriculture. Ideally, a nationally mandated but independently governed agricultural innovation council or committee
(consisting of diverse stakeholders) coordinates the development of a strategic vision for agricultural innovation. It also
coordinates and formulates the corresponding agricultural
innovation policy (to be increasingly integrated into general
science-innovation policy), designs agricultural innovation
priorities and agendas, and monitors and evaluates innovation
programs and their impact. In theory responsibilities for policy making, financing, and implementation should be separate, but experience varies in practice. Many innovation councils are advisory and policy-making bodies with no mandate
to channel funds, whereas others have been more effective at
inducing coordination of policy when they control innovation
funds. This note reviews lessons emerging from the three
commonly applied modes of coordinating innovation for
agriculture at higher levels to date: the national agricultural
innovation council or committee, competitive innovation/
research funds, and coordination by theme or subsector. New
approaches could make all three options more effective at
contributing to coordination and implementation of agricultural innovation policies, strategies, and agendas.

M

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

Many countries are gradually addressing challenges to coordinating innovation within specific agricultural subsectors.
Even so, far greater impetus is needed at the national level to
34

address coordination and collective action for agricultural
innovation as part of the wider sphere in which science and
innovation policies, strategies, and activities are defined.
Ideally, interventions to improve national coordination and
governance of the AIS seek to improve the participation of
stakeholders, including end users such as producers and
enterprises; improve the transparency and openness of decisions related to funding and priorities; improve responsiveness and accountability to stakeholders; build consensus; and
develop consensual, coherent policies, strategies, and activities that reflect a strategic vision of innovation for agriculture.
The lack of appropriate coordination and governance for
agricultural innovation at the national level is a chronic
problem for many countries. As pointed out in the module
overview, most efforts to coordinate agricultural innovation
at the national level have focused on establishing formal
apex research councils, as in Australia, Brazil, Ghana, India,
and Mexico, to govern multi-institutional national agricultural research systems. They develop national research
strategies and plans; link research to broader agricultural
policy discussions; channel funds to priority research areas
and thus coordinate research across institutions; promote
collaboration and exchanges among the various parts of the
national agricultural research system; and coordinate external links (Byerlee and Alex 1998). In several cases, though,
design of the councils has reduced their impact. For example, Brazil’s national (and most important) agricultural
research organization, EMBRAPA,1 is also the formal head
of the national agricultural research system and transfers
resources from its budget to other research organizations.
Because of these multiple roles, several stakeholders in the
AIS do not see EMBRAPA as an unbiased coordinator. For
many years Mexico’s office for coordinating national agricultural research and extension systems2 had no instruments to induce coordination, and its attributions and roles
had not been defined clearly; not surprisingly, it was largely
ignored by the actors it was supposed to coordinate.

Despite their presence, national innovation councils and
agricultural research councils rarely operate as true agricultural innovation organizations or councils, with a mandate to
coordinate and prioritize investments in agricultural innovation at the highest level. This thematic note discusses
measures that enable coordination processes to improve,
adapt to changing circumstances, and rely on the growing
array of stakeholders to improve the governance and impact
of agricultural research and innovation. It begins by reviewing the characteristics and norms shaping a “true” organization for national coordination and governance of research
and innovation (mandate and management structure,
resources, and operating practices and values). The potential benefits of such an organization, the policy issues that
impinge on its successful operation, and the many lessons
emerging from previous efforts are all discussed in the sections that follow.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

An organization to foster national (sectoral) coordination
and governance of agricultural innovation would be nationally mandated but independently governed. The general
outlines of the mandate, governance structure, activities,
resources, and practices of an effective national coordinating organization are presented next to provide an idea of the
kinds of investment needed.
Organization and mandate

The coordinating organization would be formal and independently governed and managed as defined by its bylaws.
The effectiveness, legitimacy, relevance of, and confidence in
a coordinating organization depend on how effectively it
reaches out to stakeholders from diverse areas of the economy. The composition of the organization should reflect the
diversity of its stakeholders. The range of stakeholders in
matters of agricultural policy such as innovation is likely to
be very wide, including farmers and other actors associated
with agricultural innovation (research, education, extension,
and farmer organizations; private firms; and NGOs), rural
territories, and consumers. Representatives from outside the
agricultural sector can add diversity and value to discussions.
All should have a voice and be included in decision-making
concerning agricultural innovation strategies and programs.
A skilled management team (a secretariat, for example)
would execute the activities identified by the organization’s
board. A typical mandate and set of activities would be the
following:

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

Coordinate the development of a strategic vision for
agricultural innovation.3
Coordinate and formulate agricultural innovation policy, which will be increasingly integrated into general
science-innovation policy.
Link agricultural innovation to broader agricultural policy and science-innovation discussions.
Continue to contribute to the development of a strategic
vision of the agricultural sector.
Coordinate and design agricultural innovation priorities
and agendas.
Coordinate the division of labor and channeling of
funds4 to priority innovation areas.
Monitor and evaluate innovation programs and their
impact.
Promote collaboration and exchanges among the various
parts of the innovation system, including external
linkages.

Ideally, innovation policy making, innovation financing,
and implementation are separate functions. Agricultural
innovation councils or committees should not be responsible for executing innovation programs, which is the task of
science, technology, and innovation organizations.5
Funding, infrastructure, and capacities

Formal, dedicated structures with set agendas do not in
themselves guarantee effective coordination of—and action
by—actors. At a minimum, coordinating organizations will
need operating funds, physical infrastructure, and communications infrastructure (ICTs, for example) to enable transparent and open communication and support effective
coordination and governance. Coordinating organizations
will also need to build capacity among actors and encourage
them to address issues collectively. Box 1.9 summarizes the
capacities and skills needed for innovation coordination
and governance to be effective at a higher level.
Operational practices

The practices of an organization that coordinates national
agricultural innovation will be guided by such values as
transparency, responsiveness, accountability, consensus, and
coherence within and between the organization’s activities.
Transparency is achieved if all information regarding
decisions on funding, priorities, and operations is open and
freely available. This openness implies that central and
regional governments and agricultural development agents
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Box 1.9 Capacities and Skills Needed in Coordination and Governance of Agricultural Innovation

Governance capabilities are defined as the ability to
■

■

■

Recognize system characteristics (strengths, weaknesses, problems, development potential)—which
requires facilitation and analytical skills.
Define the focus and the topics for political action
(agenda setting)—which requires skills in communication and consensus-building.
Encourage diverse players (through consultation
and participation) to coordinate their activities in

■

■

■

and beyond their policy field—which requires skills
in facilitation, negotiation, and consensus-building.
Implement these policies—which requires policy
capacity.
Learn from previous experience (such as evaluation
results)—which requires learning, intelligence, and
accountability.
Make adjustments over the complete policy cycle.

Source: Adapted from Ohler et al. 2005.

will actively communicate and deliver key messages to
stakeholders about what they do and the decisions they take.
They should use language that is accessible to the general
public. Openness also implies that potential beneficiaries
such as farmers and processors have equal access to information and funding opportunities (Hartwich, Alexaki, and
Baptista 2007).
Those who govern organizations and societies, as well as
the institutions and processes they establish, must be
responsive to stakeholders. They must prove in some way
that they are acting in response to stakeholders’ priorities
and generating outputs that meet their needs. Accountability means that the organization will be fiscally responsible
and use efficient mechanisms to avoid corruption. Regular
reporting on the efficient and effective use of project and
program funds, along with evaluations of outputs and
impacts, will help to prove that funds are used in the best
and most correct way. In complex innovation systems, many
actors are involved in setting priorities and using funds, but
generally the agents that disburse the funds are held
accountable (Hartwich, Alexaki, and Baptista 2007).
Differing interests need to be taken into account to balance regional and subsectoral development, and the institutions involved in agricultural innovation need to reach a
broad consensus on which tasks are of general interest and
who will play what role in those tasks. Now that the range of
tasks required to achieve innovation-led growth in agriculture has grown so large, the need for coherence among those
tasks has become more pronounced. Coherence aids in
coordinating and forming critical masses for innovation,
and it also enables innovating agents to be competent—to
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focus on their own clearly defined share of the work. Coherence requires strong and effective leadership to ensure that
roles and tasks are articulated, understood, and shared as
agreed (Hartwich, Alexaki, and Baptista 2007).
Australia has developed a multistakeholder, multidisciplinary agricultural research and development council with
a focus on agricultural innovation (box 1.10). Chile’s FIA
plays the roles of innovation coordinator, promoter of innovation, and technological broker, interacting with several
actors in the AIS, including farmers, private firms, financial
institutions, technological institutes, and universities (IAP
3). Despite Chile’s competitiveness and innovativeness, its
agricultural sector currently is not fully aligned with the rest
of the national innovation system and associated policy
coordination.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The reasons commonly cited for AIS actors to interact and
address issues collectively include improved identification
of opportunities and challenges related to innovation, better
leveraging of human and capital resources, better learning
and information sharing, improved implementation and
results, and economic benefits. Coordination may also
improve the design and implementation of innovation policies. Stronger coordination induces all actors, especially
public research and extension organizations, to be more
aware of and responsive to the needs and concerns of other
actors, especially resource-poor households. More actors in
the innovation system can voice their needs and concerns
in the process of designing and implementing innovation
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Box 1.10 The Rural Research and Development Council of Australia

Since 1994, the Government of Australia has developed
rural research and development priorities that reflect
the national understanding of critical needs for investment in agricultural, fisheries, forestry, and food industry research and development. A shared approach to
priority setting among state and territory governments,
industry, and research funders and providers enables
issues of common concern to be explored in a coordinated, cost-effective way.
The priorities complement national research priorities and guide Australia’s Rural Research and Development Corporations and Companies (RDCs). As the
government’s primary vehicle for funding rural innovation, RDCs are partnerships between government
and industry, created to share funding, strategic planning, and investment in research and development and
the subsequent adoption of outputs (see TN1 in module 4). The RDCs significantly influence the work of
research providers and investors in related fields.
The Rural Research and Development Council was
appointed in 2009 by the Minister for Agriculture,

Fisheries, and Forestry to be the government’s independent, strategic advisory body on rural research and
development. Its principal goal is to provide high-level
advice and coordination to improve the targeting and
effectiveness of government investments in rural
research and development. The Council’s 10 members
represent research, academia, farmers, and the private
sector. The Council works closely with RDCs, industry,
research providers, state and territory jurisdictions, and
government agencies to strengthen rural research and
development through improved collaboration, facilitation, and prioritization of investment and performance
measurement and reporting.
Given its recent establishment, the council’s effectiveness has yet to be rigorously evaluated. Even so, the
enhanced focus on research and development at the
national level is expected to improve the productivity,
profitability, sustainability, and global competitiveness
of Australia’s agricultural, fisheries, forestry, and food
industries, with benefits for individual rural businesses,
the environment, and the wider community.

Source: Rural Research and Development Council (http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/innovation/council).

policies, resulting in more inclusive policies and faster diffusion of innovations.
POLICY ISSUES

The policy issues involved in developing an organization
responsible for coordinating agricultural innovation on a
national level resemble the policy issues that apply to coordination more generally. They include policies to promote the
organization’s sustainability and effectiveness and to reflect
the needs of all stakeholders, including marginalized groups.
Beyond the creation of formal coordinating bodies,
effective coordination of stakeholders depends on stable
financing and incentives for participating organizations and
employees. Careful attention must be paid to developing
stakeholders’ capacity to contribute to shared goals, influence the organizations they participate in, and benefit from
their participation in ways that encourage them to continue
participating. Effective and relevant coordinating organizations will include a wide swathe of stakeholders, differing by
geographical location, subsector, gender, and type of institution (public, private, and civil society).

To enhance transparency, it is better for the functions
of innovation policy making, financing, and program
implementation to reside in different organizations. Policy making is ideally the mandate of coordination and
policy-making bodies, such as councils, whereas financing is the mandate of ministries and special agencies,
leaving the implementation of innovation policy programs to research-innovation entities such as research
organizations, universities, and private companies,
among others.
Formal coordinating organizations at the national level
may be set up or facilitated by public, private, or civil society actors. In practice, the public sector often takes the lead.
It is essentially in the public interest to guarantee that
society’s resources are allocated to priority issues, identified
collectively.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PRACTITIONERS

The lessons and recommendations emerging to date center
on three commonly applied modes of coordinating
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innovation for agriculture at higher levels. The first is the
national agricultural research council or committee. The
second is the establishment of competitive or noncompetitive project-based innovation/research funds, with their
associated governance and management structures. The
third involves coordination by theme or subsector, which
can be effective at generating innovations that reflect users’
needs and government policies and strategies.
Research councils: too many roles, too few
stakeholders, and stark funding and capacity needs

Most research councils or forums play an important role in
research, development, and policy design, and they often
collect large parts of public budgets for research. It is
important to separate the design of policy from the implementation of agricultural research and innovation, but
experiences and practices related to funding vary among
research and innovation councils. In practice few apex
councils function independently of the ministry in charge
of agriculture and the agricultural research system. Many
have become large research institutes in themselves. In still
other cases, apex councils are advisory bodies without a
mandate to channel funds, following the principle that
ministries and agencies allocate funds (box 1.10). Both
arrangements typically lead to failure (Byerlee and Alex
1998). However, some organizations have been more effec-

tive at inducing collaboration and coordination when
equipped with control over incentives, such as innovation
funds (IAP 3 and module 5, TN 2). The Indian Council of
Agricultural Research (ICAR) functions as a national agricultural research council and executes research as well, as
outlined in box 1.11. Although it has operated as a typical
research-oriented council, it is transforming itself to operate more effectively as part of the wider Indian agricultural
innovation system. With the state agricultural universities,
it is implementing the National Agricultural Innovation
Project (NAIP) and pursuing specific activities to catalyze
and manage change in India’s agricultural research system:
■

■

■

■

■

Strengthening communications ability and information
capacity (enhancing dialogue and interaction with the
public at large, the farming community, and the private
sector, as well as among all key functionaries in the ICAR
system).
Forming business development units and offering intellectual property rights (IPR) management.
Undertaking systemwide organizational and management reforms, including improvements in monitoring,
evaluation, and financial management.
Undertaking visioning, technological foresight, and policy analyses.
Renewing links with the state agricultural universities,
which have tended to be isolated from ICAR’s research.

Box 1.11 Structure and Mandate of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research

The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR),
established in 1929, is an autonomous organization
under the Ministry of Agriculture. With 97 institutes
and 47 agricultural universities, ICAR is the national
apex body for coordinating, guiding, and managing
research and education in agriculture. The members
come entirely from the public sector. ICAR has two
bodies: (1) the General Body, the supreme authority of
ICAR, headed by the Minister of Agriculture and (2)
the Governing Body, the chief executive and decisionmaking authority of ICAR, headed by the DirectorGeneral, ICAR. The correspondingly broad mandate of
ICAR includes:
■

■

■

■

■

Plan, undertake, aid, promote, and coordinate education, research and their application in agriculture,

agroforestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, home science, and allied sciences.
Act as a clearinghouse of research and general information in its areas of competence through its publications and information system.
Institute and promote transfer of technology
programs.
Provide, undertake, and promote consultancy
services.
Look into the problems relating to broader areas of
rural development concerning agriculture, including
postharvest technology, by developing cooperative
programs with other organizations such as the
Indian Council of Social Science Research, Council
of Scientific and Industrial Research, Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre, and the universities.

Source: http://www.icar.org.in/en/aboutus.htm; World Bank 2006c.
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Many councils consist of representatives from government or research agencies, with few other stakeholders. It
has been challenging to ensure representation of the wide
spectrum of developing country farmers, which includes
large-scale farmers or plantations producing traditional
export products, small-scale farmers that supply supermarkets and fast-food restaurants (usually the better-off members of this group), large-scale farmers who sell through
local or wholesale markets, and small-scale farmers who
produce for their own consumption or sell a small surplus
in local markets. These groups operate in innovation systems
that barely intersect.
This lesson is being learned, however. A movement is
underway to broaden the representativeness of governance bodies (by stakeholder group, geographical location, and discipline), improve the transparency of decision making, reduce bureaucracy, and use more rigorous
and diverse prioritization tools. Box 1.12 describes
mechanisms and processes to integrate additional stakeholders, particularly producers, in research priority

setting and planning, based on an example from
Uruguay. A related lesson is that effective agricultural
research councils recognize that they are major stakeholders in, and must form an integral part of, national
innovation councils.
The effectiveness of many councils is limited not only
by a narrow constituency but by a lack of resources. Scarce
financial resources restrict councils’ influence on stakeholders, the policy process, and the way that research is
conducted. For councils to be more than formal constructs, they must command resources, have continuity,
be seen by other actors in the AIS as honest brokers, and
those actors, especially top government officials, must be
willing to listen to their advice. Coordination at the highest levels of the AIS has been hampered by the fact that
formal coordinating structures (research and innovation
councils) generally operate in an environment that gives
other organizations in the AIS no complementary incentives to foster innovation. Government directives and
agreements reached among organizations often cannot be

Box 1.12 Mechanisms to Articulate Producers’ Needs in Uruguay

Producers have a significant role in the financing, governance, and research priority setting of Uruguay’s
main agricultural research institute, the Instituto
Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria (INIA). Formal mechanisms foster producers’ participation in
identifying, prioritizing, and planning research: Producers are active members of the board of directors,
regional advisory councils, and working groups. They
are involved in planning primarily through wide participation in identifying and analyzing problems. Specific mechanisms to articulate producers’ demands
and transfer technology have been developed as well,
such as experimental units for validation and demonstration.
The five regional advisory councils, set up in 1990,
act as “antennae” for capturing local demands in the
area served by each experiment station. The councils
are an important forum for regular exchanges of views
and close contacts between producers and INIA staff.
INIA also created working groups for major commodities at each regional experiment station to strengthen
farmers’ role in guiding commodity research. In these
groups, INIA staff and farmers discuss research plans
and results for specific commodities and production

systems. Meetings are open to all producers interested
in attending, as well as other stakeholders (extensionists, representatives from industry, and policy makers).
The working groups have become a very useful mechanism for formally incorporating inputs for research
planning, monitoring, and evaluation.
INIA also has close links with its clients through a
specialized unit for diffusing technology. For instance,
INIA has a long-term agreement with a producer association to demonstrate new intensive cropping and
livestock production technologies. The arrangement
has validated promising technologies at the commercial level, facilitating their transfer and providing feedback to reorient research, and it has been expanded to
support new technological developments in extensive
livestock production.
Round tables are a third means of incorporating
producers’ demands into national research programs.
Composed of specialists from INIA, other public
research institutes, the university faculty of agronomy,
and representatives from different stages in the agroindustrial chain (from producers to consumers), the
round tables operate as self-directed work groups to
identify relevant vertically integrated problems.

Source: Allegri 2002.
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implemented because the representatives of national
organizations cannot force provincial or local chapters to
change their behavior when the only tool at their disposal
is reasoning.
Another vital lesson is that capacity-building programs
are often needed to build skills in collaboration, competition, and negotiation, particularly among individuals who
lead the coordination and governance process. For details,
see the module overview.
Project-based research and innovation funds:
governance and management issues

The introduction of project-based (including competitive)
funding schemes for agricultural research and technology
transfer has in many instances been associated with changes
in the governance of national agricultural innovation systems. At one time, national agricultural research agencies
received an all-inclusive lump sum based on a broad
research mandate and could set research priorities quite
independently. More recently, priority-setting responsibilities have shifted owing to major changes in how society
views science and to the introduction of competitive science
and technology funding schemes.
The extent to which a project-based fund influences priority setting differs greatly between agriculture-specific and
general project-based funding schemes. Specific, projectbased science and technology funds tend to define agricultural research needs up front, before calling for proposals,
whereas general science and technology funds are somewhat
more open. For general science and technology funds, it is
usually academic relevance that matters most in the selection procedure; in specific, project-based schemes, it is economic relevance (World Bank 2006b). Project-based funds
can contribute positively as well as negatively to the governance of agricultural research (box 1.13).
The good practice for governing and managing projectbased research funds is to maintain separate units for policy
setting, technical evaluation, management, and governance.
The main governing responsibility in project-based research
funds should reside with a governing board that ideally consists of a distinguished group of senior decision makers. The
good practice for appointing members to the board is to
strike a balance among the stakeholder groups pertinent to
the grant scheme and the wider innovation system. At a
minimum, the board should consist of representatives from
government, research organizations (including universities), extension, farmers, and the private sector. All too
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often, boards can be taken hostage by one interest group
that dominates discussions and skews decisions in favor of
its constituency at the expense of others. Similarly, boards
can be held hostage by politicians. This practice is particularly damaging given the complex and multisectoral nature
of funding for agricultural innovation systems. A governing
board is typically supported by a technical advisory committee mandated to provide technical input for planning
programs and setting priorities and a technical review panel
mandated to evaluate, score, and rank proposals and make
funding recommendations. A secretariat manages programs
and carries out daily operations. Table 1.3 summarizes the
principal characteristics of project-based competitive science and technology funds (many of which are closed) in
five countries. For further details on innovation funds, see
module 5, TN 2.
In Latin America, many science and technology funds
specific to agriculture—especially funds focusing on adaptive agricultural research and technology transfer—have
acknowledged the need to improve client orientation and
participation. These funds have adopted strategies that
involve farmers in identifying and prioritizing innovation
needs and in developing, selecting, implementing, and
funding subprojects. To reach their clients, funds have
adopted decentralized strategies or are in the process of
doing so. Although stronger client participation and orientation are generally considered positive, they may also have
drawbacks (such as a bias toward short-term research, a lack
of equity, and significant transaction costs).
Thematic or subsectoral coordination: the value of
delegating to networks

Owing to the difficulties involved in establishing effective
national coordination of agricultural innovation, many
countries have implemented formal structures to coordinate
actors at different levels of the AIS. The module overview
mentions several examples, including associations, commodity boards, and networks. The delegation of research
governance to networks is increasingly seen as a means of
resolving problems endemic to traditional research funding
processes. It can reduce the state’s direct influence on funding policies, respect the independence of scientific institutions, foster vigorous scientific institutions, and ensure
scientists’ strong commitment to users’ interests. One example of this new type of research-innovation council is
Bioconnect, a research-oriented, multistakeholder network
for organic agriculture in the Netherlands (box 1.14).
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Box 1.13 Effects of Competitive Science and Technology Funds on Research Governance

Competitive funds can contribute positively to governance, leading to
■

■

■

■

Improved identification and prioritization of agricultural research needs, particularly with the more specific, competitive funds. (Note that general science
and technology funds, in contrast, usually do not
prioritize research needs beforehand. Because these
funds leave much of the initiative of selecting
research topics to individual researchers, the agricultural research agenda may not take into account
the needs of AIS actors or emerging opportunities
for innovation.)
Improved formulation of research project proposals.
The introduction of competitive funding schemes
requires a strong project culture within agricultural
research and technology transfer agencies; some
take time to adjust to the new rules and regulations.
Universities seem to have more experience with
competitive funding schemes.
More transparent selection of agricultural research
projects. All project proposals are reviewed by external reviewers. Research projects that are approved
and selected for financing are listed publicly. Many
competitive funds have project databases that can be
consulted online.
Improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of
project implementation. In most agricultural
research and technology transfer agencies, M&E
has long been a weak spot. Internal reporting
mechanisms are rare, and sanctions are seldom
applied for failure to report on progress. Competitive funding schemes, with their more stringent
reporting requirements, have introduced innovations in M&E.

Competitive funds can also lead to governance
problems:
■

■

■

■

By lacking sufficient objectivity. Particularly in small
science communities, it can be very difficult to organize impartial reviews of research project proposals.
A solution may be to mobilize foreign reviewers, but
this alternative remains quite costly to organize and
manage without good access to ICTs.
By using a limited time horizon and funding only operational costs. Competitive science and technology
funding schemes, which usually fund only short-term
projects (two to four years), are not necessarily the
best instrument for funding long-term agricultural
research activities, such as plant breeding and strategic
research. The same problem arises because most project-based funds do not finance researchers’ salaries or
investments in equipment and infrastructure.
By being relatively inflexible in adjusting project proposals and implementation. Strict adherence to selection transparency and procedures can jeopardize
efficient selection and implementation of agricultural innovation projects. Simple mistakes in budgets or incomplete documentation sometimes result
in outright rejection of project proposals.
By not fitting within existing bureaucratic procedures.
Government agencies often find it extremely difficult to administer a research grant within their
bureaucratic procedures. For example, resources
often cannot be transferred to the next financial
year. A way to avoid this problem is to administer
the research grant through a nonprofit foundation.
Although this procedure adds to the overall administrative costs of an innovation project, timely and
undisrupted disbursement of research resources
may create some savings as well. In most countries,
this legal construct is widely accepted.

Source: World Bank 2006b.

Through Bioconnect, all actors in the organic agriculture value chain, organized by product workgroups, have
decision-making authority in research funding, utilizing
public funds from the Ministry of Agriculture. Early results

suggest that this model can induce more interactive and
inclusive ways of working, given that the interaction of
researchers and users is built into the system and is a prerequisite for obtaining funding.
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Table 1.3 Client Orientation and Participation in Science and Technology Funds That Are Competitive and
Specific to Agriculture in Select Latin American Countries
Country and competitive fund
Brazil
PRODETAB

FNDCT Agribusiness
Chile
Several funds managed by FIA

Colombia
PRONATTA

Ecuador
PROMSA

Mexico
CONAFOR/CONACYT
SAGARPA/CONACYT
Produce Foundations

Client orientation and participation
The fund’s steering committee (mainly government), in consultation with stakeholders,
formulates and prioritizes innovation needs. Private sector involvement in project
development and implementation is an important criterion for funding. The selection of
projects for funding is a centralized process managed by experts. Special attention is given to
ensuring geographic equity.
The private sector has a majority vote on the board. A consultancy firm produced the prioritysetting document. Project selection is centralized and managed by experts.
FIA recently initiated regional consultation of farmers and other stakeholders to formulate
regional priorities. It also started to issue regional calls for proposals in addition to a national
call. A few small information offices have been opened to improve FIA’s regional presence.
Project selection is centralized and managed by experts. Most projects, depending on their
particular objective, involve farmers.
PRONATTA has about 20 local nodes throughout Colombia to assemble local researchers,
extension agents, farmer representatives, government officials, and other interested
stakeholders. The nodes identify and prioritize local research needs and develop project
profiles, which are submitted to one of five regional coordination units. Projects are selected
in two stages, first by a regional panel and ultimately by a national panel (consisting of the
chairs of the regional panels). In both cases, a scoring method is used. Only the highest-scoring
projects are funded. PRONATTA strongly favors farmer participation in the implementation of
projects.
Research priorities are based on past studies and refined at a workshop, where a scoring
approach is used to develop priorities in a three-way matrix of commodities, agroclimatic
regions, and thematic areas. Farmers’ participation in priority setting has been low. Project
selection is centralized and managed by experts, but each project has a reference group
consisting of direct beneficiaries (farmers) and other stakeholders (other researchers,
extension staff, agribusiness, and so on). Ideally the reference group participates in project
design, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
The forestry sector is asked to submit its research needs, which form the basis for the call for
proposals. Project selection is centralized and managed by experts.
Produce Foundations, set up in all 32 states, strongly involve farmers at all levels. Farmers have a
majority vote on the boards of the foundations and provide the board chair. The identification
of innovation needs and selection of projects are decentralized to production chains at the
state level. Farmers are required to cofinance (usually in kind) technology transfer projects.
Project selection is centralized and managed by experts.

Source: World Bank 2006b.
Note: CONACYT = Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (National Council of Science and Technology); CONAFOR = Comisión Nacional
Forestal (National Forest Commission); FIA = Fundación para la Innovación Agraria (Agricultural Innovation Foundation); FNDCT = Fundo
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development); PRODETAB = Projeto de
Apoio ao Desenvolvimento de Tecnologias Agropecuárias para o Brasil (Agricultural Technology Development Project for Brazil);
PROMSA = Programa de Modernización de los Servicios Agropecuarios (Agricultural Services Modernizatiopn Program); PRONATTA = Programa
Nacional de Transferencia de Tecnología Agropecuaria (National Agricultural Technology Transfer Program); and SAGARPA = Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentacion (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food).
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Box 1.14 Bioconnect: A Networked Research Council in the Netherlands

Bioconnect is a new type of research “council” for
organic agriculture, one that is able to induce an inclusive way of working.
Supportive government policy. To support knowledge
development and exchange in organic agriculture, the
government allocates the subsector 10 percent of its
budget for policy support research and statutory
research tasks (€9.6 million in 2008). In 2005, the government delegated responsibility for setting the
research agenda for organic agriculture to stakeholders
by creating Bioconnect. The goal is to determine
whether delegating research governance to networks in
which users allocate research funding can work for
other areas of publicly funded, applied agricultural
research. Farmer-driven research planning exists in the
Netherlands but has not always forged broader linkages
within the innovation system.
Bioconnect. Through product workgroups (dairy,
glass house horticulture, and so on), the users of
research (farmers, agrifood supply and processing
companies, civic advocacy organizations representing
consumers) unite with researchers, consultants, and
policy makers to determine how to use public research
funding. Working within themes established by the
government, workgroups propose topics based on
broad demand among their constituencies. They discuss and prioritize the topics with research coordinators to align research with sector needs. Research is
contracted on the basis of proposals, which are selected
through a review by the users and funding body and
not solely through peer reviews of scientific merit. Bioconnect facilitates the participatory research arising
from the priority setting and links it to legislative and

market developments in an effort to ensure that
research innovations have an impact.
A knowledge manager is the group’s facilitator, streamlining information flows and mediating between actor
groups. A theme coordinator informs researchers about
workgroup results to ensure that proposals correspond to
government funding guidelines. The knowledge managers embody the management of the network; a Knowledge Committee oversees the broad research themes and
seeks to maintain consistency throughout the program.
Early results and challenges. Despite the reluctance of
some researchers, the model does initiate learning about
more interactive ways of working. Similarly, despite their
strong commitment to users’ interests, delegation systems
also allow government to determine the macro priorities
within which users can maneuver. As an intermediary in
all aspects of the research process, from priority setting to
disseminating results, Bioconnect occupies a pivotal but
neutral position—one that is not easy to maintain. The
position of such an intermediary depends on whether it
promotes institutional learning with regard to the new
roles of the actors involved and helps their goals to converge. Bioconnect must constantly balance the interests
and gain the trust of the range of stakeholders for whom
it mediates and on whom it depends for its resources
(social and operating capital). As part of this balancing
act, Bioconnect has to convince research contractors of
the value of setting research priorities through a single,
multiactor platform; balance the strategic interests of the
research contractors; and urge government to achieve
cohesion across ministry directorates with respect to
budgets, macro priorities, and processes for monitoring
the network.

Source: Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009; Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 2

How to Build Innovation Networks
Javier Ekboir, Institutional Learning and Change Initiative (ILAC)

SYNOPSIS

he success of spontaneously emerging innovation
networks has sparked interest in deliberate efforts
to build new networks and strengthen existing
ones. This note describes both spontaneous and deliberately
created innovation networks, discusses the factors related to
success, and offers lessons and guidelines for creating new
networks or supporting existing ones. To support the emergence and consolidation of innovation networks, avoid
imposing formal organizational arrangements. Promote
policies that provide incentives (beyond simple subsidies for
participation) and an enabling environment for innovation
(especially, creating market and social opportunities for
innovation). Consolidate the innovation capabilities of
networks through policies that support action-research and
decentralized experimentation with centralized learning,
the construction of local and distant interactions, and
resources for participatory assessment of innovation capabilities. Finally, build capabilities of members of innovation
networks by strengthening innovation capabilities in private
firms and civil society organizations, building the capacity
of actors willing to be catalytic agents, and promoting
cultural changes in public institutions that foster their participation in innovation networks.

T

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

Innovation networks emerge (and are becoming more
prevalent) because no single actor commands all the
resources required to innovate at the pace demanded by
modern markets (Powell and Grodal 2005). To access the
resources and information they lack, actors establish informal collaborations. Innovation networks emerge when the
problems or opportunities affecting actors in the innovation
system are not clearly defined. This uncertainty prevents
effective contracting and structured partnerships, and it
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forces partners to use flexible approaches to explore
potential solutions. Innovation networks can emerge from
the deliberate actions of actors, as in Brazil with no-till agriculture (IAP 1), or they can emerge inadvertently as actors
perform tasks that require collaboration.
In this module, an innovation network is defined as a
diverse group of agents who voluntarily contribute knowledge and other resources (money, equipment, and land,
for example) to jointly develop or improve a social or
economic process or product. Innovation networks are a
special form of organization with a nonhierarchical structure, a collaboration-based culture, consensus-based coordination (because members are free to leave the network at
any time), usually no legal personality (especially in their
early stages), and often relatively fuzzy objectives (such as
improving the management of natural resources). They
evolve with market opportunities and the technologies they
develop. Different types of actors participate in innovation
networks; in fact, membership changes in response to
emerging problems and opportunities or the development
and diffusion of innovations (IAP 1).
Innovation networks have supported the development of
important innovations, both in agriculture and agroindustries, such as no-till agriculture and Chile’s wine industry.
The networks’ flexibility allows groups of actors to minimize
transaction costs and minimize risk by adding flexibility.
More than any other feature, it is diversity that characterizes innovation networks. Networks’ goals can differ.
Some develop technical solutions to specific problems (like
the no-till networks), create new business models and new
products (like Papa Andina, described in box 1.15), or
reduce poverty. Others empower marginalized groups by
fostering innovations appropriate to their resources and
needs—an example is the International Livestock Research
Institute’s (ILRI’s) innovation platforms to overcome fodder scarcity1—or develop improved crop varieties. Network
membership can encompass farmers, farmer organizations,

Box 1.15 The Creation and Consolidation of Papa Andina

Since 1998, Papa Andina has fostered agronomic, technical, and commercial innovations in Andean potatobased food systems to improve farmers’ access to more
dynamic and lucrative markets. The network, which
reaches about 4,000 poor rural households and includes
about 30 partners in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, pursues
several strategies: increasing demand for native and
commercial potato varieties, adding value to potatoes,
improving contractual arrangements, and facilitating
access to commercial information. Financed by the Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation and other
donors, Papa Andina is hosted by the International
Potato Center (CIP).
Based on a participatory method for stimulating
agricultural innovation (Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems), in 2000 CIP researchers
started to enhance innovation through a participatory
market chain approach and stakeholder platforms.
These efforts bring researchers together with small-

scale farmers, agricultural service providers, and market chain actors (including chefs, supermarkets, and
potato processors). In each participating country, Papa
Andina coordinates its activities with a “strategic partner” that assumes a leadership and coordinating role
in market chain innovation: PROINPA Foundation in
Bolivia, the INCOPA Project in Peru, and the National
Potato Program of INIAP in Ecuador. Although the
approaches to developing the networks are common
(the participatory market chain approach and stakeholder platforms), different organizational arrangements, involving different partners and interaction
patterns, emerged in each project implemented by
Papa Andina.
Papa Andina’s success resulted largely from the exploration of alternatives to reaching its goal (poverty alleviation), the involvement of different actors in developing
and testing innovations, and the continued support of
its funders.

Source: Author, based on Devaux et al. 2009.
Note: CIP = Centro Internacional de la Papa; INCOPA = Innovación, tecnológica y competitividad de la papa en Perú;
INIAP = Instituto Nacional Autónomo de Investigaciones Agropecuarias; PROINPA = Promoción e Investigación de Productos
Andinos.

private and public firms, researchers, extension agents,
government agencies, and donors. Innovation networks
differ in their origins and their approaches to developing
and diffusing innovations. For example, private firms or
farmers catalyzed no-till networks in South America and
relied on farmer associations to diffuse the technology; in
contrast, a private firm and NGO catalyzed Ghana’s no-till
network but relied heavily on a PhD student and traditional
public extension methods (Ekboir 2002).
Innovation networks differ from farmer organizations in
that farmer organizations have a homogeneous membership and more formal, stable relations. Innovation networks
differ from value chains in that the latter are more stable, are
focused on delivering a product or service, and are coordinated by a central actor (such as a supermarket) that organizes the operation (TN 3).
This thematic note describes strategies to foster the
emergence of innovation networks or strengthen existing
networks. It discusses the benefits and policy issues involved,
particularly the need to strike a balance in how the public
and private sector participate. The examples highlight the

many forms and operating modes that innovation networks
can adopt and the potential problems that can render networks ineffective or dependent on external funding.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

Because of their informal structure and frequent changes,
innovation networks need flexible and sustained support,
often from innovation brokers. This flexibility does not fit
easily into the usual requirements of publicly funded projects, especially because it is difficult at first to define clear
objectives and the steps that will deliver the innovation. In
contrast, the private sector has long recognized the special
nature of innovation and created flexible approaches to support it, including venture and angel funds and actions to
develop capabilities that favor innovation. In recent years,
some governments, international donors, and multilateral
funding agencies have started to support innovation projects that include financing for innovation networks—either
to support the emergence of new networks or to strengthen
existing ones.
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Fostering the emergence of innovation networks

Actions to foster the emergence of innovation networks seek
to create trust among potential partners, identify common
goals, establish the bases of collaboration, and develop
innovation capabilities. Few developing countries have
programs to foster the emergence of innovation networks;
on the other hand, many developed countries support such
programs, such as Canada’s Agricultural Biorefinery Innovation Network for Green Energy, Fuels, and Chemicals and
the Dutch InnovationNetwork.
More specifically, the following investments foster the
emergence of innovation networks:
■

■

■

■

Financing catalytic agents—innovation brokers, business
incubators, NGOs, researchers, extension agents, and
groups of farmers—that assemble potential partners.
Their remuneration should be linked to measures of the
consolidation of the network. The milestones should
not be imposed by the financing institution but negotiated between potential partners, funders, and the innovation broker. When the milestones are defined by the
funders alone, innovation brokers tend to respond to
their interests instead of those of potential network partners. The catalytic agents should be trained in the different methodologies that have been developed to foster the
emergence of partnerships (see, for example, Hartwich
et al. 2007; USAID 2004).
Giving small, short-term grants to potential catalytic
agents of networks to facilitate interactions with potential partners, such as organizing meetings or establishing
electronic platforms for communication.
Broadening the mandate of research and extension
institutions to include promoting innovation networks.
Appropriate incentives should be introduced and
resources made available.
Establishing a team to develop capabilities and a monitoring and evaluation system to assess the different methods used to promote innovation networks and catalytic
agents.

capabilities to explore new instruments to develop and foster innovations; and (5) facilitate the implementation of
joint activities. Investments can include:
■

■

■

■

■

■

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Innovation networks have many potential benefits:
■

Supporting existing innovation networks

Given their voluntary nature, innovation networks survive
when they can implement collective action. Support for
existing networks should seek to (1) strengthen their ability
to assess their strengths and weaknesses and gain access to
needed resources; (2) build the capacity of network leaders
to steer nonhierarchical organizations; (3) implement
strategies to gain access to needed resources; (4) develop
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Resources to consolidate innovation networks, including
the implementation of collective action (hire facilitators,
build human resources with formal and informal training, and support travel, meetings, communications and
communications products, and experimentation).
Strengthening innovation capabilities of nonpublic actors
in the AIS, for example, with consulting services, extension activities, technological interchanges, seminars, and
workshops on the dynamics of innovation networks.
Creating venture funds to finance the development of
innovations, similar to those used in the high-tech
industries.
Fostering the transformation of public research and
extension institutions so that they can better integrate
into innovation networks.
Building the understanding of the main actors in the
AIS, especially senior civil servants, of the dynamics of
innovation and the nature of innovation networks.
The no-till networks in South America are examples of
consolidated innovation networks. Initially, they were
supported by agrochemical companies that provided
funds and expertise; once they matured, the networks
were managed by farmers and supported by a large number of companies and farmers (IAP 1).

■

■

They can spur the development of innovations thanks to
increased collaboration and coordination among diverse
actors in the AIS; more effective identification of organizational, commercial, technical, and institutional
opportunities; better exploration of alternative solutions
to reach the network’s goals; lower cost of searching for
technical and commercial information; easier experimentation with alternative solutions; and better development of new ideas and skills.
More rapid development of social and economic innovations can result in stronger economic growth and more
sustainable use of natural resources. Strong networks are
particularly necessary for innovation when public organizations, especially research and extension, are weak.
Human, social, physical, and financial resources are used
more effectively for innovation.
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Innovation programs become more efficient as all actors
in the AIS, especially governments and donors, expand
their innovation capabilities.
Innovations diffuse faster because the participation of
users in the network increases the odds that the results
will be useful to farmers and other actors in the AIS.
Public institutions become more effective when they participate actively in innovation efforts.
Development is more inclusive when innovations meet
the needs of marginalized groups.
Institutional innovations become more inclusive and
effective because marginalized groups gain a stronger
influence on the design and implementation of innovation policies.

foreign participation in developing small-scale equipment
for no-till agriculture in South Asia.

Box 1.16 illustrates some of the benefits that an innovation network can yield, using the example of local and

The sustainability of innovation networks depends on many
internal and external factors. Internal factors include the

■

■

■

■

■

POLICY ISSUES

Key policy issues related to the emergence and continued
success of innovation networks include their consolidation
and sustainability; social considerations (when networks
form spontaneously, based on the resources that each actor
contributes, the poorest and most marginalized groups may
not be included); and the changing roles of public and private actors in the network.
Sustainability

Box 1.16 Benefits of Local and Foreign Collaboration to Develop Equipment
for No-Till Agriculture in South Asia

No-till agriculture is thought to offer environmental
and economic advantages for rice-wheat production
systems in South Asia’s Indo-Gangetic Plains. Farmers in Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Bangladesh have
rapidly adopted the practices since 2000. No-till
approaches used in other parts of the world were
tested and modified to suit local conditions by a
research consortium led by the International Maize
and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and the
Indian Council on Agricultural Research. The technology did not take hold until researchers and agricultural engineers from abroad began working with
local, small-scale manufacturers to design prototype
no-till seeders. Particularly important were several
exchanges of prototypes between small-scale manufacturers from Bolivia and India. The exchanges were
mediated by CIMMYT, which worked in both countries with local artisans and handled the logistics of
importing the prototypes. Several modifications were
made to the original design, and manufacturers now
produce and distribute a wide array of the new seeders. Results of the interaction between local and foreign actors included:

■

■

■

■

■

■
■

■
■

No-till methods were adopted rapidly in irrigated
rice-wheat systems. No-till was used on about
820,000 hectares by 2003–04.
The number of small factories making no-till equipment grew. By 2003, an estimated 15,700 seeders had
been sold in Haryana and Punjab, India.
Profits for small-scale farmers increased, pollution
decreased, and water savings increased. Seasonal
savings in diesel for land preparation were estimated
in the range of 15–60 liters per hectare, representing
a 60–90 percent savings. Water savings in wheat production were estimated at 20–35 percent and profitability increased by 46 percent.
Local manufacturers gained access to information
from different countries in the form of original,
nonadapted equipment.
Equipment was more rapidly adapted to smallholders’ conditions.
Technical and scientific information was generated.
Networks of farmers, equipment manufacturers,
and researchers from international centers and state
universities were consolidated.
The impact of CIMMYT’s actions was magnified.
A market for planting services emerged.

Source: Ekboir 2002; World Bank 2006; Laxmi, Erenstein, and Gupta 2007.
Note: CIMMYT = Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo.
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presence of effective leadership that works by consensus, the
development of collective learning routines and trust, effective governance mechanisms for collective action, and a culture that respects the different partners. Support to sustain
innovation networks should help build trust among potential
partners and encourage a culture of collaboration. External
factors influencing networks’ sustainability include the emergence of commercial and technological opportunities, timely
access to key inputs (particularly to specialized information
and qualified professionals), the general socioeconomic climate, and noninterference from governments.
Because of their voluntary nature and low barriers to
exit, innovation networks have no formal hierarchy and
operate by consensus. Although some actors have more
influence than others, they still have to consider the interests
of other partners if they want them to remain in the network. The more focused a network, the better the chances of
its consolidation. It is important to remember, however, that
motives for joining the network may differ (profit, advancement of science, and so on) and could eventually conflict.
Social considerations

By definition, marginalized populations (poor households,
women, and other groups) have few financial, human, and
social resources to contribute to innovation networks
(Spielman et al. 2008). Their participation in innovation
processes often depends on funds and expertise provided by
other actors (often NGOs or donors). Innovation networks
can cater to the needs of marginalized populations in two
ways: by organizing them to improve their access to markets
and their influence on innovation processes and policies, and
by developing innovations that address their specific needs.
The impacts of innovation networks on poverty are not
easy to identify. For example, no-till practices caused land
ownership to become more concentrated in southern Brazil.
Many smallholders sold their farms and moved to newly
developed areas in central and northern Brazil, where land
prices were one-tenth of those in the south. Working on
much larger areas, the former smallholders became middleclass farmers. Smallholders who remained in the south also
benefited from no-till, but only after other actors formed
innovation networks to develop special no-till packages for
them (Ekboir 2003).
The role of public researchers in innovation
networks

The participation of public sector researchers is not a condition for successful innovation networks, because most
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innovations are developed by networks of productive or
social agents. Yet researchers are necessary when problems
require science-based solutions, such as understanding the
changes in soil dynamics induced by conservation practices
or managing native forests that have life cycles that may last
for over a century. In any event, the incentives and cultures
within most public offices in developing countries, including research and extension institutes, hamper their participation in innovation networks. These restrictive environments have not prevented many researchers from making
important contributions to innovation networks, however,
as illustrated in box 1.17.

Public and private sector roles

Membership in innovation networks usually is varied and
may include partners from the public and private sectors,
civil society, and international organizations. Generally,
networks formed only by private partners seek to develop
products with commercial value. As some of the examples
in this thematic note indicate, however, it is not uncommon for private firms to team with public or international
research institutes to develop commercial innovations,
such as improved plant varieties, or innovations with
social content, such as no-till packages for small-scale
farmers in southern Brazil (Ekboir 2002). The network
partners may have had different interests, but they could
still collaborate toward a common goal. For example, the
private firms may have wanted to develop a new market,
whereas the public partners wanted to achieve social
objectives. Private firms may participate in innovation
networks without a commercial focus when they have a
social responsibility policy. Civil society organizations
have also participated in networks to develop innovations
that address their members’ needs. In a few cases, these
organizations were the catalytic agents for innovation
networks.
As with other aspects of innovation, the public sector
can play several roles in supporting innovation networks.
It can provide funds to support innovation activities,
implement programs to foster the emergence of networks
(particularly by supporting innovation brokers), or provide
specialized assets, such as research capabilities. The public
sector can offer incentives for private firms to participate in
innovation networks, such as tax rebates and matching
funds, and it can promote reform in public research and
educational institutions so that they can participate more
effectively in innovation networks. Some public research
institutions have taken steps to foster the emergence of
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Box 1.17 The Roles of Individuals and Organizational Culture in the Development
of Innovation Networks: A Mexican Example

In the early 1980s, a researcher from Mexico’s national
agricultural research organization crossbred Zebu cattle with European breeds in his ranch. The neighbors,
interested in the new animals, soon organized a group
to discuss technology issues, such as breeding techniques and pasture management. Based on experiences
in Argentina with AACREA, an organization of farmer
groups that conduct on-farm applied research and
share the results with one another, a few researchers
promoted the creation of similar groups of ranchers in
the same region of Mexico. The groups started to
exchange information and work on validating technologies. The research organization’s authorities
strongly objected to these actions, claiming that they
were extension activities and thus beyond the mandate for national agricultural research. Researchers
responded by meeting on Saturdays to avoid being
accused of using their working hours for unauthorized
activities. By the late 1990s, the groups—GGAVATTS—
had developed and diffused several important innovations in their region. In the early 2000s, the federal
authorities acknowledged their performance and man-

dated that their methodology be used in all publicly
supported extension activities. They also decided that
GGAVATTs should have priority in accessing support
programs. The number of GGAVATTs exploded. Most
of the new groups were created by technicians hired to
do so, and they did not respond to farmers’ goals as
the original groups had done. Farmers joined chiefly
to gain easier access to public resources. Only a few of
the new GGAVATTs improved members’ ranching
technologies. Most faded away when government support ended.
This experience contains two important lessons for
supporting innovation networks. First, innovation networks emerge when different actors find a common
interest in exploring ways to improve a product or a
process. The spontaneous convergence of interests is
difficult, however, and facilitating convergence can
greatly accelerate the emergence of networks. Second,
facilitation should not be coupled with the disbursement of other subsidies. Otherwise farmers join to
receive the subsidies and not because they are truly
interested in innovating.

Source: Ekboir et al. 2009.
Note: AACREA = Asociación Argentina de Consorcios Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola (Argentine Association
of Regional Consortiums for Agricultural Experimentation); GGVATTS = Grupos Ganaderos de Validación y Transferencia de
Tecnología (Livestock Producer Groups for Technology Validation and Transfer).

innovation networks, but often their approach follows a
traditional, linear vision of science.

LESSONS LEARNED

Experiences with innovation networks that develop spontaneously and those that are developed deliberately offer
useful lessons about when networks are most effective, who
joins, and what they accomplish. Other lessons relate to
how networks can be catalyzed and otherwise motivated,
how they can be consolidated, and how they can avoid
depending on external funding agencies.

approaches for natural resource management (such as water
catchment in arid regions) or the development of market
niches for poor households (TN 3). The problems and the
potential solutions that innovation processes will explore
are rarely well defined at the beginning. Because of their voluntary nature, innovation networks have the flexibility to
adapt to emerging needs and opportunities, but this responsiveness can depend on the availability of flexible funding
and on enabling all actors in the AIS (especially public
researchers and extension agents) to participate.
A network’s origins greatly influence who joins
and how it innovates

When are innovation networks effective?

Innovation networks are particularly effective for developing and diffusing technical and commercial innovations
that deal with ill-defined or complex issues, like new

Innovation networks can emerge because of the interests of
one person—a farmer, a private firm, or a researcher (as in
box 1.17)—or because it is part of a research program, like
the Ghanaian no-till equipment network (box 1.23 in IAP 1).
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It can originate with field staff and then be integrated with
an organization’s work plan, or it can originate with the top
management. When traditional research organizations
attempt to create innovation networks, they usually emphasize the use of scientific experimentation. Other partners are
sought to contribute complementary scientific capabilities,
provide farmers’ perspectives, or participate in diffusion.
This kind of network includes the scientific network that
developed Golden Rice (a more nutritious type of rice)2 and
demand-driven innovation networks in which farmers
define the problems and researchers work on solutions
(replicating the traditional, linear research pipeline).3 When
farmers, private firms, or NGOs create innovation networks,
they emphasize the social and organizational dimensions.
They often adapt techniques without the collaboration of
scientists. They establish new kinds of organizations to diffuse them (like some of the no-till networks) (Ekboir 2002)
or rely on farmer-to-farmer communication. More recently,
social scientists in research institutes (such as CIP, ILRI, and
Wageningen University) have helped to create innovation
networks involving social and agronomic researchers and
other actors from the AIS. As all innovation networks
mature, the importance and roles of the actors change (see,
for example, IAP 1).
The emergence of innovation networks requires two
types of partners to collaborate: a catalytic agent and a
funder. Committed and innovative catalytic agents are vital
to the emergence of innovation networks, because by
definition only they can induce other partners to invest
time and resources in the network, and they also seek partners to contribute the resources needed by the network
(Ekboir et al. 2009). Catalytic agents can have different
organizational affiliations. For example, they can belong to
an organization willing to start an innovation network in
pursuit of its own interests or can be hired by a project as
an innovation broker. Regardless of organizational affiliation, to start an innovation network, a catalytic agent must
seek partners willing to contribute to the common effort,
identify which capabilities the network needs, and look for
new partners that can contribute those capabilities until at
least one is found. In searching for partners to initiate an
innovation network, it is important to focus both on individuals and institutions. Support from top management is
of little help if the people who must participate in field
activities are not motivated. For example, the first no-till
network in Brazil was catalyzed by a researcher from a private firm. Realizing that no-till required new planters, he
contacted all the manufacturers in the area until one agreed
to participate in the emerging network. He also contacted
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several public researchers and research institutes until he
gathered sufficient expertise in agronomy and soil science.
The motivation of these researchers was critical to the network’s success (IAP 1).
Funders, on the other hand, provide the resources that
allow the catalytic agent to operate. Once the network has
emerged, it is essential for it to establish effective links with
other networks that can provide information, share experiences, and provide access to critical assets the network lacks.
The links are often not provided by the catalytic agent but
by other well-connected partners (“central nodes,” in the
terminology of Social Network Analysis). In addition to
these partners (catalytic agents, central nodes, and funders),
innovation networks are populated by individuals and
organizations. Like any other organization, each innovation
network develops its own culture, learning routines, heuristics, and modes of interaction.

Central nodes facilitate information flows within
and between networks

Innovation networks facilitate the exchange of knowledge,
abilities, and resources among their members, but effective
networks also interact with other networks and sources of
information (Ekboir et al. 2009) through a few central
nodes.4 Innovation brokers are particularly prepared to
become central nodes. By linking clusters of network actors,
the central nodes facilitate flows of information and
resources, as exemplified by CIMMYT’s role in developing
no-till equipment in South Asia, discussed earlier. Securing
funding to build these connections has been difficult,
because the benefits of innovation networks have been
identified so recently.

Supporting innovation networks without
creating dependence

When donors or governments have tried to use innovation
networks to distribute resources, the number of formal
groups in the networks has surged, but most were less innovative and had weaker internal cohesion than groups
formed without the incentive. As a result, most disappeared
when the public program ended, as with the Mexican livestock groups described previously. Subsidies to create
innovation networks have had similar results; partners did
not develop the social capital to keep the network alive once
the subsidies ended (TN 1). Supporting networks that
already exist or supporting innovation brokers that foster
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the creation of social capital among partners are more sustainable alternatives.

■

Incentives and structure for innovation networks

Innovation networks are made up of individuals, even if
they represent an organization. Their contribution to the
collective effort depends on the personal benefits they gain
from participation, the incentives offered by their organizations, and their organizations’ cultures. It is relatively
common for projects in developing countries to start to
build a network by signing memoranda of understanding
between public and private organizations. The public
organizations often have weak accountability and lack the
incentives and culture to effectively induce their members to
collaborate in external networks (Ekboir et al. 2009). Despite
these misaligned incentives, many researchers have participated in innovation networks out of personal interest.
Governance and accountability mechanisms are essential
for innovation networks to survive, because one of their
major existential threats is opportunistic behavior by members. Governance and accountability mechanisms cannot be
imposed, however. All members must see such mechanisms
as reasonable and practical. They must be negotiated clearly
and with care, with all involved.
Innovation networks should not be pushed to adopt a
formal structure. Given the uncertain nature of innovation,
formal contracts and intellectual property rights are seldom
important for the development of innovations that are a little more complex than incremental improvements (Rycroft
and Kash 1999).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

■

Consolidate the innovation capabilities of networks
through policies that
■

■

■

■

■

Provide incentives for innovation by creating market
opportunities, helping to access crucial inputs (credit is a
common need), and facilitating the flow of commercial
and technical information.

Support action-research projects and decentralized
experimentation with centralized learning to identify
new instruments to foster innovation networks and
diffuse best practices.
Support the construction of local and distant interactions. When distant ties are missing, create them by
linking local networks to international sources of information and resources.
Provide resources for participatory assessment of innovation capabilities.
Build capabilities of members of innovation networks by

To support the emergence and consolidation of innovation
networks, recognize their informal nature. Avoid imposing formal organizational arrangements, and promote policies that
■

Create an environment conducive to innovation.
Eliminate excessive bureaucratic requirements for business, develop basic infrastructure, and facilitate the
formation of partnerships by, for example, training
human resources, supporting exchange visits, holding
meetings, and developing communications facilities
and material.
Strengthen analytical capacities in the public sector
so that it can provide better support to innovation
processes.

■

Providing resources to strengthen innovation capabilities
in private firms and civil society organizations. For
example, use consulting services, innovation brokers,
innovation incubators, extension activities, technological
interchanges, and seminars and workshops on the
dynamics of innovation networks.
Building the capacity of actors willing to be catalytic
agents through courses and mentoring. These actors
may be dedicated organizations that foster the
exchange of ideas and shape the public debate on particular topics.
Promoting a change of mentality, management (including incentives), and culture in public institutions, including research institutes, so that they are more willing to
participate in innovation networks.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 3

Facilitating Smallholders’ Access to
Modern Marketing Chains
Javier Ekboir, Institutional Learning and Change Initiative (ILAC)

SYNOPSIS

odern marketing chains can heavily influence
rural employment, poverty, and asset ownership,
especially the concentration of land, physical
assets, credit, and social capital in the hands of farmers with
access to those chains. Only farmers with strong capabilities for innovation can survive in these highly competitive
marketing chains, in which a dominant actor close to consumers (usually a supermarket or broker) organizes many
producers and intermediaries and coordinates their
interactions. The private sector or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will lead the development of modern
marketing chains, but the public sector should play an
important supporting role by improving infrastructure,
facilitating access to input markets and financial services,
modernizing traditional wholesale markets and linking
them with modern marketing chains, improving rural
education, and supporting extension and advisory services.
Project managers, field staff, donors, and policy makers
require sound knowledge of the dynamics of modern
marketing chains, niche markets, and innovation processes,
along with the opportunities and challenges they pose for
small-scale farmers. For a group to identify and maintain
market links, strong leadership with the appropriate experience is the most important factor. External facilitation
can help to access modern marketing chains, but only if
it uses appropriate approaches that target farmers with
strong innovation and managerial capabilities. Building
social capital should be an important component of projects to develop marketing chains, and social capital should
be an important criterion in allocating funds to participating groups. Projects should not impose a model of interaction. Interventions generally should not organize the
poorest farmers to sell directly to modern chains but rather
to develop niche markets, sell to wholesalers, or obtain
training for specialized off-farm employment.

M
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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

Modern marketing chains can foster economic growth and
alleviate poverty directly and indirectly. Direct effects
include higher incomes for farmers who participate in the
marketing chain; the development of innovation capabilities (through interactions with other actors in the chain);
the diffusion of technical, organizational, and institutional
innovations; and the creation of employment in rural areas.
Indirect effects include expansion of local economies,
exposure of local entrepreneurs outside the chain to the
operation of modern markets, the development of links
with new actors in the AIS, and the modernization of traditional wet and wholesale markets. Given these benefits,
donors, multilateral organizations, and governments have
assigned high priority to improving poor farmers’ access to
high-value agriculture and modern marketing chains, yet
only a fraction of smallholders have managed to succeed,
either individually or through organizations (Hellin, Lundy,
and Meijer 2009; Wang et al. 2009).
What differentiates modern marketing chains from farmer
organizations and innovation networks? Modern marketing
chains have many features of buyer-driven value chains: an
actor close to consumers (usually a supermarket or a broker)
dominates, organizing many producers and intermediaries,
deciding who participates in the chain, overseeing all the links
from the farm to the shelf, defining the nature of the interactions and commercial conditions, and setting quality and
safety standards. Farmer organizations, on the other hand, are
member organizations that include only one type of actor;
innovation networks are open organizations formed voluntarily by different types of actors. Other important features
of modern marketing chains are that they focus on marketing specific products (vegetables, fruits, meat, and so on),
access to the chain is highly restricted, verbal contracts based
on trust are common but informal transactions rare, and

technologies are generated mostly in developed countries
and imposed by the leading agent.
High-value products are commercialized through four
types of modern marketing chain. The first type includes
traditional export crops produced on plantations, such as
coffee, tea, and bananas, and marketed mainly by large
companies and traditional agroprocessors. Most innovations in these marketing chains are technical, because the
organizational aspects have already been resolved. In a few
cases, such as the Kenya Tea Development Agency (TN 4,
box 1.22) or the Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation,1
small-scale farmers have created large, successful organizations that compete internationally.
The second type of modern marketing chain, which supplies developed countries with fresh and processed fruits
and vegetables, fish and fish products, meats, nuts, spices,
and flowers, started in the early 1980s following trade
liberalization and improvements in logistics. Traders and
agroprocessors usually work with large-scale farmers under
different associative forms, although occasionally they provide financing and technical advice to smallholders. Both
technical and organizational innovations are important in
this chain, and local actors have to develop strong innovation capabilities to remain competitive in global markets.
The third type of modern marketing chain was triggered
by the expansion of fast-food chains and supermarkets that
supply mostly domestic markets, although increasingly they
reach foreign markets. This type of chain is a product of the
internationalization of wholesaling and logistics, consolidation of rural and urban wholesale markets, emergence of
specialized and dedicated wholesalers who organize procurement, growth in vertical coordination, and the introduction of private grades and standards. The better-off
smallholders tend to sell through this channel (sellers in traditional channels tend to be less well off); they have more
capital (especially irrigation facilities), easier access to
credit, and greater specialization in commercial horticulture
(Reardon et al. 2009). Actors in these chains use sophisticated production packages, but the most important innovations are organizational: coordinating production by large
numbers of farmers of products of consistently high quality
(frequently highly perishable) and delivering them to
numerous distant retail sales points (increasingly abroad).
The same products that are sold in modern marketing
chains are also sold in traditional wet and wholesale markets; the difference is that the latter usually handle products
of mixed quality and operate with spot prices, whereas the
modern chains must adhere to high quality standards, and
deliveries and prices are set in advance. Box 1.18 describes

the operation of these chains in three countries where they
have attained different levels of development.
The fourth type of modern marketing chain comprises
niche markets in their many forms. Examples include the
following:
■

■

■

Smallholders close to a large city, who sell directly to consumers in a process similar to the “locavore” movement
in developed countries.
Development projects that create new markets for traditional products or new products based on traditional
crops (Papa Andina is an example for Andean potatoes;
see module 7, IAP 3, and module 4, TN 4.
The Fair Trade movement, which caters to specific population segments in developed countries.2

Some niches are more demanding than others in terms
of quality and commercial requirements; for example,
wealthy consumers in nearby cities are less demanding than
consumers from developed countries who buy in Fair Trade
shops. Participation in these markets depends on farmers’
capacity to meet their requirements. Although niche markets have had important impacts on local communities,
they cannot expand beyond a certain size without becoming
commoditized. For this reason, they can make only a limited
contribution to alleviating poverty.

INVESTMENT NEEDED

Investments to support modern marketing chains should
support the development of organizational capabilities for
innovation along the chain (especially among farmers),
coordinate actors operating in the chain, and create the
enabling conditions for innovation. It is important to recognize that although modern marketing chains are growing,
traditional wholesale and wet markets will probably retain
an important share of high-value agricultural produce and
remain the main marketing option for most smallholders.
As modern marketing chains become increasingly concentrated, it will be harder for smallholders and farmer organizations to access them directly. For this reason, support to
modern marketing chains should be accompanied by programs to help the farmers who are excluded.
Supporting the expansion of modern marketing
chains through targeted investments

Private actors make most of the investments to develop
modern marketing chains, but targeted public investments
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Box 1.18 Procurement Systems in Modern Marketing Chains in Three Developing Countries

Mexico. Supermarket procurement systems have moved
from traditional wholesale markets to (1) networks
based on centralized distribution centers; (2) emerging
regional networks; (3) sourcing from a combination of
specialized wholesalers (which are increasingly backward
integrated into production zones), wholesaler/growers,
and direct relations with grower/packer/shippers;
and (4) new institutions, such as emerging private
quality standards and implicit preferred supplier (quasicontractual) relations. These trends make it very difficult for most smallholder and even traditional large
wholesalers and medium-scale growers to sell to supermarkets. Supplying directly is increasingly the domain of
(1) the large grower/packer/shipper, (2) the backwardintegrated, large, specialized wholesaler, and (3) to a certain extent the wholesaler and farm company managing
contract farming.
Kenya. Supermarkets have a relatively small but
growing share of urban markets for high-value
products. The leading chains began to modernize
procurement by creating systems of preferred suppliers (farmers and specialized wholesalers) for key
products, centralizing procurement into distribution
centers, and starting to use private quality standards.
Smallholders have found it difficult to enter modern
chains because most lack the physical, financial,
human, and organizational capital to lower production

and transaction costs to a point where they become
competitive. Modern marketing chains increasingly are
supplied by a new type of “middle-class” farmer emerging between large-scale export farmers and small-scale,
traditional market farmers. These middle-class farmers
buy traditional farms and convert pasture and grain
fields to horticultural crops grown with modern production techniques.
China. The expansion of supermarkets has been
driven by factors common to other developing
countries—urbanization, income growth, and liberalization of foreign direct investment in retailing—as well as
a number of China-specific policies, such as government
investment in the sector and policies promoting conversion of wet markets to supermarkets. A feature unique to
China is that poorer households produce the largest
share of horticultural crops; that share is growing,
whereas the share of richer households is falling. At the
same time, there is little evidence that modern wholesalers or supermarkets source produce directly in rural
communities. Instead, they rely on urban wholesale
markets dominated by small-scale traders; for this reason, little or no effort is made to impose or monitor
quality or safety standards directly among producers.
Some researchers have reported the incipient emergence
of features common to more developed procurement
systems, such as dedicated providers.

Sources: Author, based on Reardon et al. 2007; Neven et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2009.

in specific markets and chains can trigger virtuous cycles
of investment (IAP 3). These investments may support the
formation of farmer groups, finance infrastructure and
specialized equipment, build capabilities for farmers and
their organizations to meet the standards required by private companies, and help provide market intelligence. For
example,
Sam’s Club required cooled, packed, and delivered raspberries by a group of small farmers in Michoacán (Mexico).
SEDAGRO/Michoacán [the state department for rural development] discovered exactly what those requirements are in
joint meetings with the chain and the group, and then provided efficient and targeted help to the group to make those
investments. The group then entered the business relationship
and that provided further capital to make investments on their
own. [Reardon et al. 2007, 35]
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Another type of investment is the facilitation of lead
farmer–outgrower schemes. Lead farmers have proven their
ability to produce to the standards required by modern
chains. Supermarkets or specialized wholesalers encourage
lead farmers to organize their neighbors to produce to
the same standards; the only incentive the buyers offer is
a guaranteed market opportunity. For a fee (usually a percentage of the final sales), lead farmers provide various
services that may include production planning, technical
assistance, access to inputs, market intelligence, sorting and
packing, transportation to market, and financial administration. Lead farmer programs require less external support
than support for farmer organizations, but the farmers
themselves have to make higher investments (Reardon et al.
2009; Neven et al. 2009). Investments to support these programs include financing farm equipment and capacity
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building for the farmers willing to work with the lead
farmer, including paying for the time of the lead farmer.
Identifying opportunities for targeted investments requires
fund managers to have the capabilities and incentives appropriate for operating flexible programs.

Fostering coordination among actors in modern
marketing chains

Modern marketing chains usually use sophisticated production and marketing mechanisms to bring perishable
products from rural areas to urban consumers in developed
and developing countries. In addition, the technologies
and market requirements (such as the varieties grown and
packaging methods) change often, forcing farmers to adapt.
Greater coordination along the marketing chain helps
smallholders to adapt by facilitating access to up-to-date
information and financial resources (IAP 6). Successful
coordination, however, requires coordinating organizations
to respond to the needs of actors in the marketing chain and
adapt themselves to changing conditions. Otherwise, coordination results only in formal agreements with little impact
on the ground (see, for example, World Bank 2006). Investments include market intelligence, development of market
and farm infrastructure, facilitation of interactions (usually
by the actor that dominates the chain), and the formation of
farmer groups, assisted by innovation brokers.

Improving traditional markets to benefit
smallholders

Investments to modernize traditional markets and improve
farmers’ bargaining power include developing small-scale
farmers’ human and social capital by fostering the emergence of farmer organizations, providing technical and
organizational support, and offering training in modern
marketing methods. Another useful investment is to facilitate smallholders’ access to modern infrastructure, especially ICTs, as well as to services for business registration
and incorporation, which can facilitate contractual relationships with retailers. It is also important to build the
capabilities of field staff, project managers, donors, and
policy makers to support smallholders; these capabilities
include a clear understanding of the dynamics of modern
marketing chains, niche markets, and innovation processes,
along with the opportunities and challenges they pose for
small-scale farmers. Finally, another investment to benefit
smallholders is to modernize wholesale and wet markets by
improving buildings, storage facilities, communications
facilities, and roads.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

To recapitulate, modern marketing chains can offer the
following potential benefits:
■

Developing niche markets

Niche markets are a particular form of innovation network,
and the investments resemble those described in TN 2.
These investments include financing innovation brokers
and other actors that bring together potential partners and
strengthening the innovation capabilities of nonpublic
actors in the innovation system—for example, through
consulting services, extension activities, technological
interchanges, or seminars and workshops on the dynamics
of innovation networks. Investments also include small,
short-term grants for potential catalytic agents of innovation networks (researchers, extension agents, and groups of
farmers) to facilitate interactions with potential partners
(through meetings or electronic communications platforms), build capacity, and facilitate collective action. Still
other investments could create venture funds to finance the
development of innovations, similar to those used in hightech industries. Finally, it may be necessary to invest in
transforming public research and extension institutions so
that they can better integrate into innovation networks.

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

More rapid organizational and economic innovation,
resulting in stronger economic growth.
Faster creation of wealth for the richer tier of small-scale
farmers through direct participation in modern chains.
Creation of jobs in rural areas, some exclusively for
women (sorting and grading fruits and vegetables, for
example).
For farmers who sell in modern marketing chains and for
smallholders who access niche markets, easier access to
input and output markets and other resources for innovation, such as technical advice, innovation networks,
and participation in action-research projects.
Reduced commercial risk for farmers owing to steady
demand, more formal transactions, and higher probability of being paid on time.
More effective use of human, social, physical, and financial resources for innovation.
Faster creation of wealth and empowerment among
farmers who can access niche markets.
Better interaction and coordination among actors, resulting in a more dynamic innovation system for agriculture.
In the case of niche markets, more inclusive development.
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■

■

Cheaper food that often meets higher quality and safety
standards for consumers.
Faster expansion of exports, improving the country’s balance of payments.

modern chains but should rather organize them to develop
niche markets, sell to wholesalers, or obtain training leading
to off-farm employment as specialized workers.
Sustainability and social considerations

POLICY ISSUES

Key policy issues related to modern marketing chains
involve identifying ways for the chains to spur growth and
reduce poverty, ensuring that modern chains are sustainable
(some may require more public support than others), fostering more equitable access, clarifying appropriate roles for
public and private investors, and identifying appropriate
public investments.
Can modern marketing chains spur growth and
reduce poverty?

As noted, high-value agriculture is expected to continue
growing and transforming developing country agriculture
for the foreseeable future. Instead of trying to impose new
directions on this process, policy makers should identify the
main trends guiding the expansion of different markets and
seek interventions that can steer the process in ways that
spur economic growth and alleviate poverty. For example,
buyers in modern marketing chains clearly prefer to operate
with the better-off smallholders. They buy from the poorest
only when they have no other option. Interventions should
not induce the poorest farmers to organize to sell directly to

As with most private firms, the consolidation of modern
marketing chains depends on the central actors’ capabilities
and on socioeconomic conditions (discussed later). Given
the international nature of supermarkets and traders,
eventually all central actors develop their own capabilities to
organize most modern marketing chains.
Niche markets are a different case, given that they are
innovation networks. In addition to external factors, the
sustainability of niche markets depends on the presence of
effective leadership, on farmers developing strong innovation capabilities (especially collective learning routines and
trust), on long-term support from donors, and on monitoring and evaluation systems that allow experimentation over
several years (box 1.19).
The expansion of modern marketing chains has
increased disparities in asset ownership but has also created
employment in rural areas. Smallholders’ access to modern
chains depends not only on their assets and organization
but on being located in the procurement area for a particular crop. Many programs have helped marginalized
groups (small-scale farmers and/or women) to organize and
access modern marketing chains, but the failure rate has
been very high. In general, the participation of small-scale

Box 1.19 Sourcing Practices Used by Mexican Supermarkets Reveal Experimentation with
Contractual Arrangements and Types of Growers

Mexican supermarkets have pursued a number of
strategies to source frozen vegetables. Exporters have
used backward integration, relying on their own farms,
for “high care” products demanding traceability. Some
supermarkets adopted intense, highly controlled
outgrower schemes in which they provided resources
under contracts with small-scale farmers. Others relied
on small-scale outgrowers for less-demanding products
and market segments requiring less traceability and less
technology, with the company providing only extension services to its outgrowers. Other companies chose
to contract only with large-scale farmers, with a

combination of large- and small-scale farmers, or only
with smallholders through resource-provision contracts. A multinational working with large- and smallscale farmers had seven contract types, ranging from
contracts with large-scale farmers under which no
resources were provided to contracts with the smallestscale farmers under which the company provided
“specialized inputs and equipment, credit, technical
assistance, and insurance.” These examples show that
projects should allow considerable latitude in the types
of contractual arrangements and organizations that
can be financed.

Source: Author, drawing heavily on Reardon et al. 2009 (quoted text, p. 1722).
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farmers has depended more on support and expertise
from NGOs and donors than on private traders or supermarkets, and it has been somewhat easier for smallholders
to participate in niche markets or sell to wholesalers who
supply supermarkets.
Public and private sector roles

As indicated, different types of agents have facilitated smallholders’ access to modern marketing chains. Private agents
(brokers and supermarkets) sometimes provide credit,
inputs, and technical assistance (Reardon et al. 2009), and
research institutes, NGOs, civil society organizations, and
farmer organizations have also managed successful programs.3 The public sector has provided funds, developed
critical market infrastructure (roads, electricity, water, and
communications networks), and facilitated interactions
among actors in modern marketing chains.
Projects led by nonprofit organizations work with smallscale farmers or community-based organizations to identify
niche markets (see, for example, Poitevin and Hassan 2006;
Vermeulen et al. 2008; Devaux et al. 2009). These programs
usually use participatory methods and may involve other
chain actors in the process. Components of such projects
include stakeholder analysis to identify the key people and
organizations that should be invited to participate, visits,
skill development, organizational aid to small and micro
enterprises and community-based organizations, business
plan preparation, assessment of markets and of opportunities to network, and stakeholder workshops.
The private sector will continue to lead the development
of modern marketing chains, but the public sector has an
important supporting role to play by improving infrastructure, facilitating access to input markets and financial services, fostering the modernization of traditional wholesale
markets and helping them to link with modern marketing
chains, improving education in rural areas, and supporting
extension and advisory services.4

LESSONS LEARNED

Because buyers establish different types of commercial relations, even with farmers in the same area, projects should not
try to impose a model of interaction. Commercial chains use
different suppliers according to the nature of the product
and the type of farmers present in the procurement area.
They generally buy from small-scale farmers only when
smallholders dominate a particular market (tomatoes in
Guatemala, guavas in Mexico); large-scale farmers have

several marketing options, increasing the risk of unstable
supply;5 small-scale farmers are more able and willing to
follow highly labor-intensive field management practices
needed by the companies; and small-scale farmers have
reduced transaction costs by organizing (Reardon et al.
2009). If a buyer has only small-scale farmers in its procurement area, it usually assists them with various inputs,
credit, and technical advice.
Social capital should be an important criterion to allocate
funds. Social capital is a significant factor in a group’s ability to sell in modern marketing chains. Social capital is
strong within mature groups with strong internal institutions, intragroup trust, altruistic behavior, membership in
other groups, and ties to external service providers. Older
groups that have built substantial social capital should be
ranked above newer groups in consideration for support.
Additionally, building social capital should be an important component of projects that support the development
of modern marketing chains. Such efforts will require sustained commitment and support from external agents,
which may include NGOs and innovation brokers.
Capable and motivated program leaders are important.
Strong leadership with the appropriate experience is
regarded as the most important factor for a group to
identify and maintain market links, followed by the quality of external facilitation. It is very difficult for one
person to have all the required qualifications. Leaders
should be supported by teams of specialists, not just in
marketing and business management but also in the
management of innovation. A similar approach has been
used in several countries to support innovation in small
firms (see, for example, Shapira 1999). It is important to
offer program leaders incentives to experiment and allow
them to change programs as needed. To this end, funders
and supervising agencies should set up program committees to analyze potential changes or allow program leaders
to use small amounts of money to experiment with new
approaches, and they should review results annually.
Firms use such approaches to develop strong innovation
capabilities in traditional markets (Whirlpool is one
example; see box 1.7 in the module 1 overview and
Skarzynsky and Gibson 2008).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

In addition to improving the infrastructure and socioeconomic policies that are conducive to the consolidation of
private firms, facilitating small-scale farmers’ access to modern marketing chains requires instruments appropriate for
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each of the four marketing channels identified at the beginning of this thematic note.
To foster the participation of better-off smallholders in
modern marketing chains,
■

■

■

■

■

To foster the participation of poor farmers and marginalized groups,

■

Support the modernization of traditional wholesale
markets and traditional retailers, and help them to link
with modern marketing chains (one example is China’s
“200 Markets Upgrading Program”).6 Identify highvalue products that modern marketing chains must
source from smallholders, such as low-volume and niche
products, and support associations of market agents and
small-scale farmers to provide them.
Finance investments (cold storage, packaging, and so on)
that target specific requirements of specific modern marketing chains.
Build the capabilities of field staff, project managers,
donors, and policy makers to support small-scale farmers.
Develop market intelligence programs that provide
detailed, current information on market developments
and trends.

■

■

■

■

■
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Support the development of innovation capabilities in
large farmer organizations, as described in TN 3.
In conjunction with the actor dominating the marketing
chain, define criteria to select farmers for support to
enter into one of the several contractual modes used in
modern marketing chains. Social capital should be one of
the most important selection criteria.
Do not impose specific interaction patterns as a condition for participating in projects.

■

■

Implement “business linkage” programs, such as business round tables and conventions, and support travel to
those programs by farmers and government officials.
Foster the emergence and consolidation of farmer organizations through technical and organizational support, as
described in TN 4. These organizations, in turn, can
work closely with specialized wholesalers.
Develop new financial instruments to take advantage of
the stable relationship between small-scale farmers
(individually or organized) and the main actors in
modern marketing chains. These actors, operating as
intermediaries between banks and farmers, can help
farmers obtain credit at market rates. Several countries,
including Mexico and Croatia, have implemented such
programs.
Develop small-scale farmers’ human and social capital
through sustained programs that include facilitation to
form associations and training in modern marketing.
Help small-scale farmers obtain bank accounts, register a
business, and transact the other business required to
incorporate as formal companies that can enter legal,
contractual arrangements with retailers.
Facilitate access to modern infrastructure, especially ICTs.
To support the development of niche markets,

■

■

■

■

Conduct multistakeholder planning exercises to identify
potential niches and define strategies to develop them.
Apply recommendations in TN 2 for the development of
innovation networks.
Finance innovation brokers to support policy makers
and all other participants in the development of niches.
Aim for sustainable results. If niche markets are not
profitable, they can create dependency on donors.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 4

Building Innovation Capabilities in Farmer Organizations
Javier Ekboir, Institutional Learning and Change Initiative (ILAC)

SYNOPSIS

rganizational capabilities for innovation encompass the abilities of the organization’s members
(such as specialized knowledge, creativity, and
task commitment) and the organization’s key characteristics
(such as culture, governance, communications and learning
routines, and resources). Interventions to build organizational capabilities for innovation involve building the individual and collective capabilities themselves and making the
enabling environment more supportive of innovation.
Instruments for capacity building have included fostering
interactions among actors in the AIS, creating venture
capital funds, consolidating innovation brokers, strengthening the policy framework for innovation, and setting up
training and mentoring programs and multistakeholder
platforms. The environment for innovation improves when
governments and donors facilitate dialogues to develop
consensual innovation policies, create market and social
opportunities for innovation, facilitate access to crucial
inputs, strengthen flows of commercial and technical information, offer public institutions incentives to interact with
farmer organizations, and promote a legal environment that
supports farmer organizations and encourages decentralization to empower local farmer organizations. The most
innovative farmer organizations have a federated structure,
i.e., are composed of small, linked farmer groups, thus combining the best features of large organizations and small
groups. In designing projects to develop farmer organizations that can innovate, practitioners should select
organizations that can learn; avoid overly strict criteria for
participation; avoid requiring organizations to become
formal entities; identify the networks in which the farmer
organization participates, because its partners can indicate
its own innovativeness; use external consultants and innovation brokers to design training programs; and develop a

O

monitoring and evaluation system that promotes exploration and learning.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

The weakening of public research and extension organizations and wider recognition of the complexity of innovation
processes are creating opportunities for farmer organizations to develop and diffuse innovations. By pooling
resources for innovation, connecting with other partners in
innovation processes, and building their individual and
collective capacity, farmers who belong to organizations are
participating more effectively in innovation networks and
value chains. They are gaining better access to new markets
and production methods, including methods to manage
natural resources. Farmer organizations acquire new bargaining power in input and output markets and they can
also coordinate other actors in the AIS. They increasingly
participate in designing and implementing innovation and
research policies and programs and join national innovation councils, sectoral coordinating bodies, and the boards
of research institutes. They lobby public organizations such
as research institutes and industry regulators (World Bank
2004). They manage research funding and share in the
financing, development, and diffusion of technical, commercial, organizational, and institutional innovations.
Whether farmer organizations participate effectively in
these processes is strongly determined by their origin, evolution, the enabling environment, and the capabilities they
develop, as discussed in the module overview. Often farmer
organizations are unskilled in identifying the specific capabilities they lack and in defining strategies to build them up.
Organizations do not develop capabilities for innovation
overnight; they must make a sustained effort, make major
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investments over the long term, have committed leadership,
and work with specialists in organizational change and
innovation processes.
For many years, governments and funders favored the
creation of cooperatives, but their performance has been
rather disappointing. Lately, farmers and rural households
have sought alternative organizational arrangements. These
arrangements have had different goals, operate at different
levels (local, regional, and national), and include community organizations, self-help groups, associations to manage
natural resources (such as water user associations), and
lobbying associations. According to the capabilities they
develop and the type of interactions they establish with
other actors in the AIS, farmer organizations can be categorized into four types:
■

■

■
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Traditional, commodity-based farmer organizations,
such as the Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation,
India’s dairy cooperatives, or the Kenya Tea Development
Agency. Input supply, output processing, and marketing
can be done by the organization or outsourced to private
firms. Less attention goes to facilitating interactions and
cooperation with potential partners in innovation. While
the declared goal is usually the diffusion of technical
innovations, successful commodity-based farmer organizations have innovated to coordinate large numbers of
farmers. These organizations often sponsor their own
research teams.
Nontraditional, market-oriented farmer organizations
seek to improve market access through collaboration
with key actors in the marketing chain (supermarkets or
brokers). Often this kind of farmer organization is created with assistance from NGOs and/or externally
funded projects (Papa Andina is an example). Innovations are viewed as technical, commercial, and social
processes to be addressed through participatory methods. Research capabilities reside in local and foreign universities or international research centers.
Innovation-oriented farmer organizations focus on
developing technical innovations, but they can also
develop commercial or organizational innovations or a
combination of all three (a good example, discussed in
IAP 1, is South America’s no-till farmer associations).
These organizations may be created by farmers, NGOs,
or public programs, and they may use public or private
funds. They usually become the coordinating agent of a
diverse network that includes research institutes, private
firms, and public programs. Some focus mainly on
farmer-developed innovations and seek to improve

■

and/or diffuse them (the ecologically oriented Prolinnova network is one such organization).1 Other farmer
organizations concentrating on innovation include
farmers and researchers as equal partners. These farmer
organizations use participatory methods to manage the
innovation process and may combine top-down and
bottom-up approaches.
Farmer organizations that are service-oriented and networked, such as Mexico’s Produce Foundations, promote
the emergence of local farmer organizations that form
part of larger networks (IAP 2). Through collective
action and participation in local and national forums,
they establish partnerships with other actors in the AIS
for the provision of services, including research, extension, training, credit and savings schemes, lobbying (like
the West Africa Network of Peasant and Agricultural
Producers’ Organizations),2 or developing value chains
(TN 3).

INVESTMENT NEEDED

No recipe exists to create farmer organizations for innovation
(Rondot and Collion 2001). The organizations that carved a
niche for themselves did so by developing: organizational
innovations, such as a clearly articulated purpose, mission,
and vision; organizational cultures that allowed change;
effective learning routines and heuristics (especially the
ability to analyze the organization’s needs and to implement
plans to address them); strong technical capabilities; skills to
participate in innovation networks, interact with the political and economic environment, and mobilize the resources
to accomplish the organization’s goals; effective and transparent governance structures (including new incentives)
and leadership that prevented them from being captured by
donors, governments, or elites; and active participation of
members (Ekboir et al. 2009).
Successful farmer organizations develop their own organizational models. Some emerge spontaneously, such as the
innovation networks that developed no-till agriculture in
Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay; others are created by a
market actor (a supermarket leading a supply chain, for
example), by a coalition of actors (as usually occurs in
action-research projects), by outsiders in the framework of
a project (Papa Andina), or by public programs (after which
they assumed a life of their own, like Mexico’s Produce
Foundations). Independent of their origins, farmer organizations have succeeded when they could adapt their original
“business plan” to unexpected problems and opportunities.
Adaptation is possible only when farmer organizations have
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the organizational and innovation capabilities to create a
shared understanding of the organization’s goals, overcome
institutional inertias and conservative cultures, train all
members (board members, senior management, and field
staff) on the nature of innovation processes, and muster the
internal and external resources for innovation. Organizational and innovation capabilities cannot be built only with
short courses. Nor can they be bought easily. They require a
sustained effort to cultivate.
Relatively few publications describe steps for building
innovation capabilities in nonprofit organizations, but
many successful experiences have been documented in private firms (for example, see Skarzynsky and Gibson 2008;
Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006; and Christensen,
Anthony, and Roth 2004). From this literature, this note
distills the most valuable recommendations for farmer
organizations. Programs to build organizational capabilities for innovation feature a complex menu of interventions over a sustained period and usually include
investments in physical capital, short- and long-term consultancies, courses, and long-term mentoring.3 The interventions can be divided into two categories: building the
capabilities themselves and making the enabling environment more supportive of innovation.

communications routines (whether they are hierarchical or
allow individual exploration of opportunities and horizontal communication); learning routines (the heuristics and
methods used for collectively accepting new ideas and procedures); the propensity to interact and cooperate with
other actors in the AIS; and resources available for the
development of innovations (capital and specialized assets)
(Davila, Epstein, and Shelton 2006; Ekboir et al. 2009).
ICTs, which facilitate networking and information sharing,
are one resource that appears inherently suited to improve
the potential for innovation among farmer organizations
(box 1.20).
A comprehensive program for capacity development
contains a long list of measures, but often the implementation of a few critical actions is sufficient to trigger a virtuous
cycle of autonomous capacity building. In fact, each organization has to develop its own menu of interventions. Possible investments include the following:
■

■

Building social capital

The lack of social cohesion and capital, including transparent governance mechanisms, often explains why farmer
organizations fail or cannot be sustained for long. Capacitybuilding programs for any particular farmer organization
should identify the extent to which the lack of social capital
is an issue and determine the type of capacity building that
can compensate for it. Otherwise, capacity-building investments may not yield the desired results.

Developing organizational capabilities for innovation

Organizational capabilities for innovation encompass the
abilities of the organization’s members and the organization’s
key characteristics. Organizational abilities for innovation
include specialized knowledge, creativity, and commitment
to the organization; developing a long-term vision for the
organization; absorbing information generated by other
agents (also called the absorptive capacity); creating new
knowledge; and using this knowledge to develop innovations that address commercial, social, organizational, or
technological needs or opportunities.4 An organization’s
key characteristics include its culture, governance, and

■
■

■

■

■

An institutional assessment to identify the farmer organization’s culture, learning routines, human capital, and
leadership capabilities.5 The assessment should be the
basis for defining the investments required to develop
organizational capabilities for innovation.
Assess and reinforce the organization’s social capital to
prevent opportunistic behavior, strengthen governance
structures, and establish links with external partners.
Train and mentor an innovative leadership group.
Develop learning mechanisms such as the one used by
Mexico’s Produce Foundations (IAP 2).
Strengthen channels (including IT platforms) to exchange
information on innovative activities.
Implement budgeting procedures that allow experimentation.
Create dedicated teams to explore potential innovations.
These teams should include groups to design and try
innovations; temporary teams of organization members,
partners, and researchers to generate new ideas and
proposals; an innovation board to screen and fund innovation proposals, both internal and with other actors in
the AIS; and trained “innovation champions” to guide
and mentor any member who has an innovative idea. If
the farmer organization is too small to have these specialized structures, it should partner with others in the
AIS that have similar attitudes toward innovation.

Farmer organizations cannot survive, let alone improve
their capacity to innovate, unless they develop sustainable
financing (box 1.21), based on successful experiences,
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Box 1.20 ICTs Improve the Effectiveness of Farmer Organizations

In rural areas of many developing countries, farmer
organizations may be the only organizations on the
ground. Because information and communication
technologies (ICTs) make it easier to speak for and to
farmers, they can dramatically heighten the capacity for
networking, good governance, collective action, and
innovation in producer organizations and agricultural
cooperatives:
■

■

ICTs enhance farmer organizations’ connections and
governance. ICTs can facilitate the sharing of market
and technical information, help organizations
attract and retain members, and inform members of
the organization’s activities on their behalf. In Mali,
Coprokazan (http://www.coprokazan.org), a cooperative for female producers of shea butter, computerized its operations to reach a wider market online,
develop more effective training materials for coop
members, and more generally raise its profile. An
unexpected outcome of using ICTs was that members became more confident in the coop’s governance after coop staff started using computers for
routine administration and to develop visual
overviews of yearly accounts and activities. The
well-known capacity of ICTs to streamline administrative and accounting tasks of all kinds makes them
highly useful for administering farmer organizations. In dairy and coffee cooperatives in India and
Kenya, for example, farmers believe that automated
measurement and record-keeping systems help
ensure fair compensation from the cooperative.
Automated systems have the added advantages of
speeding transactions and reducing spoilage.
ICTs give organizations a stronger collective voice.
High-speed connectivity may still be out of reach in
many parts of the world, but individual farmers can
still use mobile phones and text messages to “have
their say” on agricultural radio. Feedback about
services offered by farmer organizations and local
government, when expressed over the airwaves, has
more influence than comments made in a less
public forum. In Mali’s Sikasso Province, an ambitious project brings farmer organizations into the

■

national agricultural policy debate through telecenters in seven towns and villages, together with local
radio stations. In locations throughout Africa, the
Participatory Radio Campaigns of Farm Radio
International (a nongovernmental organization)
invite farmers’ participation and respond to their
feedback. Text messaging on cheap mobile phones is
proving to be a highly adaptable medium for organizations to mobilize members around specific issues
and concerns, acquire resources (information,
credit, and even insurance) to facilitate production
and marketing, and generally become more integrated and visible within the innovation system.
ICTs can foster innovation. As the examples indicate,
ICTs can spur farmer organizations to innovate in
how and where they operate, with whom, and why.
The use of ICTs can make organizations more effective lobbyists, better at acquiring information or
services from public and private sources, more effective participants in markets and value chains, and
more valuable partners in research and development
initiatives (such as initiatives to provide early warning of plant and animal diseases).

Farmer organizations may be aware of the potential
of ICTs but may not necessarily find it easy to acquire
and learn to use them. Generally it is governments,
donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
that have the funds to develop ICT solutions that
benefit farmer organizations. (The software used in the
Indian dairy cooperatives mentioned earlier was
developed through public-private partnerships, for
example; Farm Radio International is an NGO.)
Another challenge is to sustain the use of ICTs after
external support ends. Significant costs are usually
associated with equipment, maintenance, training, and
continuing system development. New technology
must generate enough additional income for an organization to cover its ongoing costs, or it must generate
enough additional benefits for individual users to be
willing to pay for it. Finally, although ICTs facilitate
communication, it is important to recognize that they
cannot substitute for building social capital.

Source: World Bank 2011.
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Box 1.21 Successful Financing of Farmer Organizations

Voluntary contributions. The Argentine Association of
Regional Consortiums for Agricultural Experimentation (AACREA) is an apex organization of self-help
groups of commercial farmers in Argentina. Each group
has about 10 members who jointly hire a technical advisor and conduct adaptive research and validation. The
group also contributes to the apex organization. The
latter gathers the information developed by each group
and shares it among its 1,880 members. This structure
is an example of decentralized experimentation with
centralized learning.
Levies. The Colombian Congress can tax specific
agricultural products to finance programs to support
them. A specific law must be enacted for each taxed
product, and the proceeds can be used only to support the product’s market chain. The central government collects the tax. The funds are administered by
a contract between the Ministry of Agriculture and a
farmer organization of national reach that represents
producers of the taxed product. Colombia has 15
such taxes.
Sales of goods and services. Starting in 1970, India’s
National Dairy and Development Board imported
food aid in the form of dairy products and marketed

them under its own brand name. The surplus from
these sales was invested in the expansion of the cooperative movement in the dairy industry. Today farmers
organize into village-level cooperatives, which in turn
are organized into district-level cooperatives (comprising 400–1,000 primary village cooperatives). The
district-level cooperatives federate into a state cooperative. At the apex is the National Cooperative Dairy
Federation, which coordinates marketing for all state
cooperatives. The cooperatives currently supply about
70 percent of the processed milk marketed in India
and provide a wide range of services to members.
Government programs. The Mexican government
created a program in 1996 to finance research and
extension projects through Produce Foundations, civil
society organizations in each state that currently also
finance and implement innovation activities. The presence of a foundation in each state makes it possible to
clearly identify local farmers’ needs and foster the
emergence of local innovation networks. The Foundations set the priorities, decide which projects are
funded, and administer the projects; the federal and
state governments audit the use of the funds. See IAP 2
for a detailed discussion.

Source: Author.
Note: AACREA = Asociación Argentina de Consorcios Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola.

voluntary contributions (such as those used in Argentina
by AACREA),6 levies (used in many countries, including
Australia and Colombia), sales of goods and services (Kenya
Tea Development Agency and the Indian dairy cooperatives), and partnerships between the government and civil
society organizations (such as the Mexican Produce Foundations) (box 1.21).

flow” promoters, and strengthening the policy framework
for innovation. Other instruments introduced recently
include mentoring programs, multistakeholder platforms,
knowledge-exchange fairs, and IT platforms to facilitate
communications and coordination.

Adding flexibility to the enabling environment
Using new and more sophisticated instruments
to support innovation

In the past, most projects that sought to build capabilities in
organizations supported professional education, short
courses, or consultancies on specific topics. Current projects
also support interactions among different actors in the AIS
(including public-private partnerships), creation of venture
capital funds, consolidation of innovation brokers and “deal

Farmer organizations’ ability to change depends on whether
the broad policy and institutional environment enables them
to change. For this reason, policies that seek to foster innovation should also consider promoting changes in the enabling
environment. Because so many actors participate and because
the enabling environment is loosely governed, however, it is
very difficult to initiate changes and, once they are introduced, to predict the effect of particular actions (Ekboir
et al. 2009). Given this complexity, governments should use
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adaptive approaches to induce changes in the enabling environment. Various instruments can be used to this end:

■

■
■

■

■

■
■

Devising capacity-building programs to strengthen the
understanding that different actors in the AIS, especially
governments, donors, extension agents, and research
organizations, have of innovation processes.
Building confidence and promoting coordination
among potential partners, including financing for multiactor programs, innovation brokers, and sustainable
extension programs.
Strengthening research capabilities, especially by focusing on the quality of researchers and changing the culture and incentives of research organizations.
Certifying innovation brokers.
Financing programs for innovation, including venture
and angel capital funds and innovation brokers; flexible financing of action-research projects to explore
new instruments; and institutional arrangements to
foster innovation. These programs could be organized
as stakeholder-driven and client-controlled mechanisms, in which farmer organizations have a financial
stake.

Creating a committee to coordinate the AIS and facilitate
multistakeholder dialogues on innovation policies.
Strengthening the participation of farmer organizations
that represent marginalized populations (including
smallholders and women) in policy- and decisionmaking processes and in the provision of services.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Box 1.22 presents an example of the benefits of instilling
innovation capabilities in a farmer organization in Kenya.
More generally, farmer organizations with stronger innovation capabilities can offer the following benefits:
■

■

■

Faster development of social and economic innovations,
resulting in stronger economic growth and more
sustainable use of natural resources; strong farmer organizations are particularly necessary when public organizations (especially research and extension) are weak.
Quicker development and implementation of organizational and commercial innovations.
Better provision of services when governments are not
decentralized or are weak.

Box 1.22 Benefits of Innovation Capabilities in a Farmer Organization: The Kenya
Tea Development Agency

The Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA) was
created soon after independence as a state company to
regulate tea production by smallholders, but it repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to innovate over the
years as it evolved into a major corporation owned by
small-scale farmers. It provides production and marketing services for members, successfully manages tea
nurseries and 59 factories, and represents small-scale
farmers in the Kenya Tea Board. The agency’s innovation capabilities include the following benefits:
■

■

Increasing the income of its associated small-scale
farmers.
Successfully implementing collective action involving hundreds of thousands of small-scale farmers. In
1963, tea was cultivated by 19,000 smallholders on
4,700 hectares, with an annual crop of about 2.8
million kilograms of green leaf. In 2009, about
400,000 smallholders grew tea for KTDA on 86,000

■

■

■
■

■

■

■

hectares and produced in excess of 700 million kilograms of green leaf.
Developing new tea products and opening new markets for them.
Implementing new programs to support its associates
(affordable credit and input supply, for example).
Developing strong managerial capabilities.
Developing strong competitive advantages. The
agency accounts for 28 percent of Kenya’s exporting
earnings and is the world’s second-largest exporter
of black tea.
Adapting its operations and governance in response
to changes in the socioeconomic environment and
market opportunities.
Influencing strategic stakeholders to allow organizational change.
Partnering with private actors and foreign universities to develop and diffuse sustainable production
practices for small-scale farmers.

Source: Author, based on information from KTDA, http://www.ktdateas.com.
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■

■

■

■

■

■

■

Stronger two-way information flows, conveying technical and commercial information to a larger number of
farmers as well as communicating farmers’ needs and
concerns to other actors in the AIS, including researchers
and policy makers. ICTs can be important enablers of
communication, but they should not be seen as an alternative to building social capital.
More effective use of human, social, physical, and financial resources for innovation.
Easier access to input and output markets and to other
resources for innovation (technical advice, innovation
networks, and participation in action-research projects),
both for commercial farmers and marginalized populations (women and landless farmers, for example).
Better interaction and coordination with other actors in
the AIS.
More inclusive and effective institutional innovations
when marginalized groups have a stronger influence on
the design and implementation of innovation policies.
More relevant and more effective public research and
extension programs when farmer organizations effectively participate on boards of research and extension
organizations.
More inclusive development, especially when affirmative
action allows more effective participation of marginalized groups in decision-making bodies.

subsets of farmers, such as women or poorer farmers) can
ensure that weaker groups have greater influence on the
farmer organization and that it meets their particular needs.
These programs succeed, however, only if representatives of
the marginalized groups have the appropriate capabilities.
Often women are illiterate and at a disadvantage in organizations that rely on written information.

Institutional considerations

An enabling environment that allows farmer organizations
to operate effectively and with as little external interference
as possible is a prerequisite for innovative organizations.
This environment can be achieved more easily when governments, donors, and farmer organizations themselves
have a clear understanding of innovation processes. When
governments or donors finance farmer organizations, the
funding agencies usually try to influence them. Governments may resent having to negotiate policies and priorities
with independent farmer organizations. Finally, farmer
organizations operate more effectively when laws, regulations, and interventions by external stakeholders (especially
governments and donors) facilitate transparency and
accountability to farmers.

Sustainability
POLICY ISSUES

Farmer organizations have policy issues similar to those of
innovation networks. They include considerations related to
social hierarchies and inclusiveness, sustainability and
dependence on external funds, and the respective roles of
the public and private sectors.

Social considerations

Local social considerations inevitably come into play in
many farmer organizations. For example, it is difficult to
introduce organizational or institutional innovations (especially more transparent governance) in societies dominated
by elders or clans. Hierarchical societies also stifle technical
and commercial innovation, reducing opportunities for
farmer organizations to benefit members. In such cases,
efforts to strengthen farmer organizations may award
more power to local groups or individuals that are already
powerful. Affirmative action (reserving seats on the organization’s board for marginalized groups, for example, or
well-designed communications programs to reach all

Farmers who organize spontaneously in response to a
need or opportunity often demonstrate self-reliance and
strong and lasting solidarity, but often these farmer
organizations command limited resources. They can
profit greatly from programs to build their capabilities
and link them with other actors in the AIS. On the other
hand, farmer organizations created by external partners
usually have more resources but are less sustainable. They
run the risk of not attending to members’ priorities, and
they may lose their autonomy and effectiveness. Bigger
farmer organizations are better at influencing innovation
processes—but they are more likely to be captured by
governments or elites.

Public and private sector roles

Farmer organizations can substitute for weak private organizations, especially when the commercial private sector is
slow to take over activities abandoned by the public sector,
such as input provision. More frequently, farmer organizations are seen as substitutes for weak public research and
extension organizations, as occurred in Latin America and
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sub-Saharan Africa when farmer organizations began to specialize in natural resource management (IAP 1). Although
farmer organizations can effectively implement research and
extension programs, this activity should not substitute for
research and extension by public programs, because it
increases the odds that nonmembers will be excluded or that
their needs will not be meet. Farmer organizations should
rather participate in joint research and extension efforts that
complement those of public organizations. When farmer
organizations take the lead in fostering innovation, research
institutes may feel threatened, perceiving that farmer organizations are essentially trying to change the ways that
research institutes interact with the AIS.
Appropriate policies and incentives may prevent some of
these problems and at the same time strengthen farmer
organizations. In addition to implementing general policies
(such as research policies or policies facilitating the operation of markets), the public sector can support farmer
organizations by introducing new incentives for researchers
and other civil servants to work more intensively with
farmer organizations; providing resources for organizational facilitators (such as NGOs) and innovation brokers
to create or strengthen farmer organizations (IAP 6); and
supporting the development of farmer organizations’ innovation capabilities. It is vital that farmer organizations do
not end up responding to government interests in lieu of
members’ needs.
Nonpublic actors—including private firms, international
research institutes, and NGOs—can play a number of roles.
They can induce the creation of farmer organizations, create new marketing channels for small-scale farmers, and
work with existing organizations to build their innovation
capabilities.
LESSONS LEARNED

The considerable variety of farmer organizations, experience with older forms of organization, and new organizational strategies are yielding a number of lessons about
farmer organizations and innovation. The sections that follow summarize the conditions that make farmer organizations effective (especially as innovators), including lessons
related to their structure, way of operating, capabilities,
financing, and the environment in which they operate.
When are farmer organizations most effective
at innovating?

Farmer organizations are particularly effective for developing technical and commercial innovations when they focus
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on specific products (the approach of the Colombian
Sugarcane Research Center, CENICAÑA)7 or subsectors
and commercial farmers. Sectoral or national farmer
organizations can also influence the introduction of institutional innovations, either for commercial or small-scale
farmers. Finally, local farmer organizations (especially
community-based organizations) are effective in developing social innovations, including facilitating poor households’ access to markets, and addressing local problems
that require collective action. These observations, however,
are not absolute. In some cases, national associations that
coordinated local groups have developed important economic or technical innovations (see, for example, IAP 1).
Innovative farmer organizations tend to have
federated structures

The most innovative farmer organizations are composed of
small, linked farmer groups. This structure combines the
best features of large organizations and small groups and
benefits the organization’s capacity to innovate. Small
groups have greater internal cohesion, and it is easier to
monitor the members. Farmer organizations with strong
community ties enable grassroots concerns to be voiced
more clearly. They facilitate greater upward participation
and downward accountability. The drawback is that they
command so few resources. By federating into larger
groups, they can achieve greater economies of scale, but
they can also be more easily captured by elites or governments and find it harder to control free riding. Examples of
federated farmer organizations are India’s milk cooperatives (described in box 1.21), the no-till farmer associations
in South America (IAP 1), and Mexico’s Produce Foundations (IAP 2).
Building capabilities for innovation
in farmer organizations

In helping farmer organizations develop their capacities to
innovate, it is important to focus not only on technical or
commercial issues such as accounting or crop management
but on developing good governance, creating structures and
incentives for innovation, developing external links, and
building strong leadership. Capacity-building activities may
include traditional training in purpose-built facilities, onthe-spot training, consulting services, extension, seminars
and workshops on the dynamics of organizational innovation, exchange programs so that managers can see the capabilities of innovative farmer organizations, tutoring, and
mentoring. For example, African managers at the Kenya Tea
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Development Agency developed their capabilities by working over many years under senior managers from multinational companies (Ochieng 2007).
Building capabilities for innovation should be a permanent effort, because organizations tend to lose their innovativeness once they have found routines that help them reach
their goals. The conservative nature of organizations is
particularly strong when top management lacks a good
understanding of the nature of innovation processes (Christensen, Anthony, and Roth 2004). The incentives to change
in commercial firms are provided by markets; the incentives
in nonprofit organizations come from their associates, their
own sense of duty, and the pressure exerted by donors and
governments. This pressure usually is convened through two
channels: funding and policy dialogue. When funding is
conditional on the implementation of capacity-building
programs, funders should be careful not to impose their
objectives on the farmer organizations or alienate management from the farmers. Recognizing this problem, the World
Bank and other donors are providing funds for farmer organizations to build capacity based on demand (training,
advisory services, and startup funds for innovative ideas),
sometimes requiring matching contributions. The decision
on how to allocate the funds is left to the farmer organization’s management, which can contract specialists from a roster of regularly appraised service providers. This approach
allows external experts to be truly independent and at the service of the farmer organization. Such independence is often
harder to ensure when donors select the experts. The World
Bank has funded projects with this design in Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama (IAP 6).

Development of innovations requires
flexible management by farmer organizations,
governments, and donors

Innovations are developed by exploring alternatives. The
failed initiatives may seem to have wasted resources, yet failure is part of the learning process. Farmer organizations
must be allowed to explore, but in that case, donors and
governments must strengthen their own capabilities to
manage innovation, because the inflexibility of public
procedures runs counter to the need for flexibility and
adaptability. Courses and consultancies on the management of agricultural innovation for donors and senior civil
servants are necessary for flexible management practices
to take root. Appropriate controls and audits are also necessary to prevent misuse of resources without hindering
exploration. A committee, formed by donors and senior

civil servants, should be established to review changes to the
original project design at least once a year.
Financing farmer organizations for innovation

As noted, some farmer organizations have developed sustainable sources of funding by selling products or services,
including lobbying, for members. These organizations do
not need special support, but they should be able to access
all of the programs available to private firms, including
those that support innovation.
Demanding that farmer organizations be self-financing
is generally not realistic, especially if they include a large
share of small-scale farmers or if they manage public funds.
Demanding cofinancing from farmer organizations that
include marginalized groups may further alienate those
groups from innovation processes. Even so, farmer organizations should ask members to contribute some funding
(even in kind), because it stimulates commitment. A number of financial arrangements have been used to support the
innovation activities of farmer organizations, including
competitive grants, matching grants (see module 5, TN 2;
IAP 2), credits, funds distributed through government
channels with no mention of competitive or matching
grants, revolving funds for services, beneficiary fees for services (such as advisory services, veterinary services, and
maintenance of group-managed infrastructure), contracting of services, and performance-based contracts. In each
case, the arrangement that is adopted should match the
needs and capabilities of the organization.
Groups to generate technology have
been sustainable only when formed
by commercial farmers

Commercial farmers have usually solved their main organizational and commercial problems and have resources to
invest in becoming more efficient. Most noncommercial
small-scale farmers, on the other hand, have limited
resources and a diversified livelihood strategy, in which agriculture is a dwindling source of income. They can be reluctant to invest time and money in developing new techniques, although they can occasionally benefit from
innovations developed by commercial farmers.
A more supportive environment for
organizational innovation

The level of innovation achieved by farmer organizations
depends on the enabling environment. Governments and
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donors can create a more supportive environment for
innovation in many ways. They can create market and
social opportunities for innovation (by deregulating markets, for example), facilitate access to crucial inputs (such as
affordable credit), and strengthen the flow of commercial
and technical information (by strengthening universities
and innovation brokers, for example). They can offer public institutions better incentives to interact with farmer
organizations. Promotions in many research institutes are
based mostly on the number of indexed papers published,
whereas interactions with farmers are less valued. Actionresearch projects could be implemented to identify new
instruments to build innovation capabilities in farmer
organizations, such as the structure of decentralized
experimentation with centralized learning described in
IAP 2 for the Produce Foundations. Policy dialogues could
be set up to develop consensual innovation policies;
national committees for innovation are critical in implementing such dialogue and defining the policies, as discussed in the module overview and TN 1. Government
could promote a legal environment that supports farmer
organizations and encourages decentralization to empower
local farmer organizations.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

A few principles are useful to consider in designing and
implementing projects that focus on developing farmer
organizations that can innovate.
When selecting project participants, support organizations that can learn. Organizations tend to be conservative, and not every organization can develop innovation
capabilities (Christensen, Anthony, and Roth 2004).
Organizations that can learn are identified in two ways:
They have already shown their innovativeness, or it can be
evaluated through organizational assessments (see, for
example, Ekboir et al. 2009). The assessment is critical to
identify the best approaches to develop innovation
capabilities. For example, if the farmer organization is
particularly conservative, participatory methods may not
be suitable, because management is likely to oppose
change. The assessment should also look at the organization’s innovation strategy, identify its mission and vision,
determine the resources available for innovation and
those that must be secured, and identify the most important current and potential partners. The identification of
important partners can be done using multistakeholder,
participatory procedures such as those described in
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Devaux et al. (2009), Vermeulen et al. (2008), and
Hartwich et al. (2007).
Eligibility criteria should not be too strict. Given the diversity of farmer organizations and the difficulty in knowing
an organization’s true potential for change beforehand, any
membership organization should be eligible for support as
long as it: (1) is recognized as useful by its members; (2) has
an identity—in other words, a history and effective operating rules that, even if they are informal, regulate relations
between members and between members and the outside
world; (3) has governing bodies that function effectively;
and (4) has demonstrated its willingness to develop its
innovation capabilities. An organization can demonstrate
its willingness explicitly (for instance, by training members
or contacting external advisors to develop a plan to
strengthen capabilities) or implicitly (through its formal
and informal routines, the nature of its leadership, its culture, and its incentives).
Do not push farmer organizations to become formal
entities. Experience shows that when a farmer organization
survives a period of informality, it is more likely to succeed
because its members have had time to develop a common
experience and resolve the issues that emerge when implementing collective action.
Identify the networks in which the farmer organization
participates. An organization’s partners can indicate its own
innovativeness. Consider all stakeholders that collaborate
with the organization in innovation networks and identify
the appropriate incentives for them. In particular, public
organizations may face major hurdles to interacting effectively with farmer organizations.
Identify support and training needs. The leaders and staff
of farmer organizations usually need help to identify the
capabilities they lack. Even when the needs have been identified, it is difficult to build the capabilities, especially in
organizations formed by marginalized groups, which need
economic, managerial, and technical support. External
consultants and innovation brokers are necessary to identify these gaps and design training programs for farmer
organizations, given their generally limited organizational
experience and resources. Support for these farmer organizations should be based on the principle of empowerment.
Experience shows that building farmer groups for learning
and reflection often requires continual access to external
facilitation (van der Veen 2000).
Seek nonconventional instruments to strengthen farmer
organizations. The effectiveness of formal courses for building innovation and entrepreneurial capabilities is quite low,
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because these capabilities can be developed only by doing
and by observing other actors who possess the capabilities.
In addition to the instruments mentioned in box 1.8 in the
module overview, exchange visits have been very useful in
spurring innovation in farmer organizations, but only
when visitors had the capabilities to absorb the informa-

tion and only when their organization had reached a certain maturity.
Develop a monitoring and evaluation system that promotes exploration and learning. Examples of indicators
that can be used are given in table 1.2 in the module
overview.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 1

No-Till Networks in Developing Countries
Javier Ekboir, Institutional Learning and Change Initiative (ILAC)

SYNOPSIS

his profile summarizes lessons from the networks
that arose to develop no-till technology. The most
innovative aspects of the networks were their
composition and the ways in which they operated. Partners
and research and extension approaches varied, but in all
successful cases, a flexible innovation network emerged in
which farmers’ participation was important. Innovation
brokers and catalytic agents played critical roles. Effective
networks explored organizational innovations until they
found approaches appropriate to local conditions; they also
explored different approaches to organize the generation
and diffusion of the technical innovation. The composition
of innovation networks changed as the innovation process
matured and new challenges emerged. Parallel innovation
efforts contributed to the effectiveness of innovation,
including efforts by public organizations that gave their
employees scope to explore new ideas.

T

CONTEXT

In the 1970s, intensification of agriculture after the Green
Revolution created severe soil erosion in many temperate
and tropical countries. At the same time, grain prices started
to fall due to rapid production increases. Reacting to these
problems, farmers and researchers in many countries
started to explore more sustainable, profitable technologies.
For centuries, farmers plowed the soil to favor water
infiltration and control weeds. In the 1960s, the chemical
company, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), developed a
herbicide for which there was little demand, but the company decided that it could create a market for the product if
chemical weed control could effectively replace plowing.1 At
the time, ICI was not trying to create a more sustainable or
profitable technological package; it was just seeking to sell a
product in which it had invested substantial resources and
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for which there was little use.2 After the first successful
experiments with no-till,3 ICI realized that a new agricultural paradigm was needed. To develop it, ICI set up a
research team that eventually settled in southern Brazil in
1970. The team leader recognized that for the herbicide to
be of any use, new agronomic techniques, new weed management approaches, and new equipment were required.
Knowing that ICI did not have all the capabilities to develop
the components, the team leader looked for partners. Soon,
the network included a state research institute, the Wheat
Research Center of the Brazilian Agricultural Research
Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária,
EMBRAPA), a factory for planting equipment, progressive
farmers, and the ICI team. Once the package was developed,
farmer organizations diffused it.
A similar process (although with other partners)
occurred in Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay. In all cases,
the technology diffused very rapidly in the 1990s, thanks to
the efforts of very effective no-till farmer associations, the
technology’s benefits, and favorable economic conditions.
During the same period, no-till diffused to a few other
countries as well. No-till programs have now been identified
in more than 60 other countries, but adoption has been negligible (Ekboir 2002) because no-till methods require considerable adaptation to local conditions. No-till was used on
an estimated 100 million hectares worldwide in 2005,
mostly in the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, Australia, Paraguay, and China. Bangladesh, Ghana, India,
Nepal, and Pakistan accounted for a relatively small area
because no-till is used by large numbers of small farmers
(Derpsch 2010).

OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

No-till was developed and diffused by networks that
included several public and private agents such as pioneer

farmers, agrochemical firms, equipment manufacturers,
and sometimes researchers and public extension agents. The
networks had varied origins. Some were started by private
companies, others by public researchers, farmers, or public
programs. Massive diffusion occurred only where networks
that developed strong learning capabilities and effective
interactions emerged. When no-till packages were developed with traditional experimental methods or diffusion
was organized through conventional approaches, adoption
was minimal.
Although the partners and research and extension
approaches varied, a common factor in all successful cases
was the emergence of a flexible innovation network in
which farmers’ participation was important (Ekboir
2002). The uniqueness of no-till processes is exemplified
by the Ghanaian experience. To date, Ghana is the only
country where a no-till package was adapted for smallscale farmers but not for large-scale farmers (box 1.23).
Table 1.4 shows the partners and defining factors of some
successful networks.

THE INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

The main innovation was the emergence and evolution of
new organizations—innovation networks that involved different partners, including public and private researchers,
farmers, equipment manufacturers, extension agents, and
agrochemical companies—that generated, adapted, and diffused no-till techniques. To reach their objectives, the networks innovated in three domains:
■

■

■

Organizational. New modes of interaction among different actors in the AIS emerged, as well as new approaches
to research and extension.
Equipment. New planters, sprayers, and combines
enabled the consolidation of an innovative agricultural
equipment industry.
Agricultural practices. New practices were devised for
planting and fertilization, weed control, management of
soil cover, crop rotations that span several production
cycles, and harvesting.

Box 1.23 Development of No-Till for Ghana’s Small-Scale Farmers

For centuries, Ghanaian farmers used traditional
slash-and-burn agriculture, which is equivalent to notill without mulch. Slash-and-burn was sustainable
when abundant land allowed farmers to leave the
exhausted plots fallow for many years. Demographic
pressure in the second half of the twentieth century
forced farmers to shorten or abandon fallows and
made slash-and-burn unsustainable. In the 1980s,
research to adapt no-till with mulch as a sustainable
alternative to slash-and-burn was initiated by the
Crops Research Institute in Kumasi in conjunction
with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement
Center. Farmers did not adopt the package, because it
was difficult to plant with a stick through the thick
cover of plant residues in the field. In the 1990s, the
importer of glyphosate (a herbicide), the Crops
Research Institute, and Sasakawa–Global 2000 formed
a partnership. Monsanto, trying to emulate its success
in Brazil, later joined the partnership. The partners’
key action was to fund the doctoral dissertation of a
highly motivated soil scientist. As part of his research,

he worked with innovative farmers to develop a weed
and mulch management system that small-scale farmers could use and organized a successful extension
program that motivated and provided resources to
public extension agents. The package was disseminated to farmers in Ghana’s forest, transition, and
Guinea savannah zones and rapidly adopted. In 2005,
no-till was used by an estimated 300,000 small-scale
farmers.
Unlike other countries, in Ghana the no-till package
responded to small-scale farmers’ needs. Adoption was
facilitated by the low-input agricultural practices that
already prevailed and the fact that few farmers had animals (other than some chickens). There was no need to
develop no-till planters, which were major obstacles in
other countries where no-till was introduced, because
crops were planted with a stick or cutlass (machete).
The lack of equipment proved to be a limitation on
widespread adoption among large-scale and mechanized farmers, however, because they needed suitable
machinery to adopt the technology.

Source: Ekboir, Boa, and Dankyi 2002.
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Table 1.4 Factors That Influenced the Performance of Four Successful No-Till Networks
Argentina

Brazil

Paraguay

India

Actors that at some point participated in the network
– Innovative and committed
farmers
– Argentine researchers willing
to interact with farmers
– Innovative equipment
manufacturers
– Farmer organizations
– Universities
– Foreign researchers
– Agrochemical companies
– International research centers

– Innovative and committed farmers
– Brazilian researchers willing to
interact with farmers
– Innovative equipment
manufacturers
– State research institutes
– Farmer organizations
– Foreign researchers
– Agrochemical companies
– International cooperation agencies

– Innovative and committed
farmers
– Farmer organizations
– International research centers
– International cooperation
agencies

– Innovative and committed farmers
– Innovative equipment
manufacturers
– International research centers
– State universities

Modes of interaction
– Active interactions between
– Strong support from agrochemical
researchers, equipment
companies
manufacturers, and farmers in – Active interactions between
the development phase
researchers, equipment
– Initial mild support from
manufacturers, and farmers
agrochemical companies,
– Effective no-till farmer association
which became very strong when organized diffusion programs
the leading firm recognized the – Alliances of several partners
market potential
developed and diffused packages
– Effective no-till farmer
adapted to small-scale farmers’
association organized
needs and resources
diffusion programs
Factors that triggered the development of no-till networks

– Strong links between
– Strong support from an
Paraguayan and Brazilian
international research center and
farmers
state universities
– Support from international
– Exchange of prototypes between
cooperation agencies
Bolivian and Indian artisans
– Support from an international
enabled the development of
research center
efficient planters
– Effective no-till farmer
– Active interactions between
association organized diffusion
international researchers, equipment
programs
manufacturers, and farmers
– Traditional extension services
worked with researchers

– Curiosity-driven research
– Severe soil compaction

– Farmers were aware of the
economic and environmental
benefits of no-till

– Severe soil erosion
– A private firm willing to develop a
market for a new product

– An international research center
had experience with no-till in
rain-fed areas and was willing to
experiment in irrigated crops
– Severe weed infestation that could
be controlled easily with no-till

Socioeconomic and environmental factors that facilitated the generation and diffusion of no-till
– Well-developed commercial
– Well-developed commercial
agriculture
agriculture
– No-till’s economic benefits
– No-till’s economic benefits
– Research institutes that
– Research institutes that allowed
allowed researchers to conduct researchers to conduct curiositycuriosity-driven research
driven research
– Widespread use of custom
operators for planting and
harvesting
– Macroeconomic policies
reduced the profitability of
grain production

– Well-developed commercial
agriculture
– Previous experience with
no-till

– No-till’s economic benefits
– Affordability of planters
– Existence of market for planting
services

Source: Author.

BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

In all countries listed in table 1.5, except China, no-till was
adopted mainly by large- and medium-scale commercial
farmers. Among countries that have adopted no-till but do
not appear in table 1.5, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal,
and Ghana together account for 1.9 million hectares under
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the technology. As noted, this relatively small area is
deceiving in the sense that no-till is used by very large numbers of small-scale farmers. No-till practices are expanding
in South Africa, Venezuela, New Zealand, France, Chile,
Mexico, and Colombia and are in the early stages of adoption in other countries (Derpsch 2010).
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Table 1.5 Use of No-Till in Select Countries, 2007–08
Country

Area under no-till
(hectares), 2007–08

United States

26,593,000

Brazil

25,502,000

Argentina

19,719,000

Canada

13,481,000

Australia

12,000,000

Paraguay

2,400,000

China

1,330,000

Kazakhstan

1,200,000

Bolivia

706,000

Uruguay

672,000

Spain

650,000

Source: Derpsch 2010.

No-till had several important impacts on the AIS:
■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

New linkages developed among actors of the AIS and
with foreign sources of technical information.
New business models developed. For example, contracting planting and harvesting in South America and India
allowed more efficient use of specialized equipment.
New research methods were developed, accelerating the
generation of the no-till package.
New approaches were developed to disseminate the
package.
Some researchers and extension agents changed the way
they interacted with other actors in the AIS.
Farmer organizations developed capabilities for effectively exploring alternative technical and organizational
solutions.
Existing research and extension capabilities were used
more effectively.
Effective farmer organizations with strong innovation
capabilities emerged.

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

Effective networks explore different organizational innovations until they find approaches appropriate to local conditions. “Research” networks adapted the package to local conditions and “extension” networks diffused it; these networks
interacted assiduously, and some actors (especially innovative famers) participated in both of them. The most innovative aspects of the process were the composition of the
networks and the ways in which they operated (box 1.3 in

the module overview). Innovation brokers and catalytic
agents played critical roles in the exploration (TN 2 in this
module and module 3, TN 4). Appropriate resources should
be provided to pay for their services and for the trial of
organizational innovations.
Effective networks explore different approaches to organize
the generation and diffusion of the technical innovation. In
the case of no-till, the research networks used participatory, on-farm research approaches, whereas the extension networks used a larger range of instruments, including
self-help groups, demonstration days and plots, conventions, publications, radio and television programs, sales
forces of agrochemical and equipment companies, and
farmer-to-farmer communication. In the development of
complex innovations like no-till, flexible approaches for
research, financing, and evaluation should be used.
The composition of innovation networks changes as the
process matures and new challenges emerge. No-till networks
started as small teams and incorporated new members as
the innovation process evolved. Despite this commonality,
in each country (or even regions within countries) different
processes led to the emergence of effective innovation networks. For example, in southern Brazil the catalytic agent
was a private firm (ICI), but later, farmer organizations
were the key actors in diffusing no-till among commercial
farmers. In Argentina and northern Brazil, a group of
researchers and farmers developed the package, but a coalition of innovative farmers and agrochemical companies diffused it. In Bolivia and Paraguay, commercial farmers led
the process, but private firms joined the networks after
no-till was widely adopted. Innovation projects should recognize the changing needs of innovation networks and
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facilitate the incorporation of partners that possess assets
the network needs and the withdrawal of partners that no
longer contribute to the common effort. In other words,
when promoting the creation of an innovation network, it
is important to (1) search for willing partners, (2) empower
them to decide on the best strategies to achieve the goals,
and (3) encourage them to identify constantly what
resources and information they lack and who can supply
them. Innovation projects should contemplate resources
for these search activities.
Effective innovation networks use adaptive management to
facilitate collective action. When setting up a project to foster
innovation, it is important to use participatory methods
that help to create trust among potential partners, develop
approaches adapted to local conditions, and use an adaptive
management approach. In other words, prepare a project
plan, implement it, periodically assess its implementation
(at most yearly, but at shorter intervals in the first two years)
to identify emerging problems and opportunities, and
adjust the plans in response to the information collected.
Parallel efforts are necessary for effective innovation.
Different approaches were used to generate the no-till packages and to create the networks that developed and diffused
them. Each approach responded to local human and social
resources and institutional constraints, but distant
groups interacted among themselves. The effectiveness of

74

innovation teams depends on the individuals that participate in them, their interactions, the resources they command, their learning strategies, external constraints, and
unforeseen factors. It is impossible to know in advance how
effective an innovation team will be; therefore, an effective
innovation policy is to have more than one team working on
the same innovation (Huffman and Just 2000). There are no
precise methods to determine how many teams should be
created. The number depends on several factors, including
the quality of the individuals involved, the resources they
command, the nature of the problem (for example, whether
it is a major innovation or a minor adjustment), and the
institutional environment in which they operate. To facilitate learning, however, the teams should interact assiduously among themselves.
Public organizations have to allow innovative employees to
explore new ideas. The public research institutes in South
America initially did not recognize the value of no-till, but
they allowed individual researchers to explore new ideas.
This approach contrasts with current trends in the management of research, which require projects to be clearly
defined before they are implemented. To increase the contribution of public researchers, extension agents, and project managers in innovation processes, it is necessary to offer
incentives that favor exploration, calculated risks, and participation in innovation networks (see TN 2).
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 2

Learning Organizations That Support Innovation:
Mexico’s Produce Foundations
Javier Ekboir, Institutional Learning and Change Initiative (ILAC)

SYNOPSIS

number of internal and external factors influenced
the evolution of Mexico’s Produce Foundations
(Fundaciones Produce), a federated farmer organization that funds and implements research, extension,
and innovation projects. The Produce Foundations
developed strong innovation capabilities that enabled them
to search for new ways to support agricultural innovation.
The main internal factors were the creativity of a few farmers on the boards and of some foundation managers; the
development of effective collective learning routines; the
creation of an organizational culture that valued exploration, creativity, innovation, and a sense of duty; and flexible governance structures. The external factors were the
existence of dynamic markets that created challenges and
opportunities for farmers and the presence of key policy
makers who were willing to allow the foundations to experiment and change. Autonomy and independence proved
important: there is a positive correlation between a foundation’s autonomy from the state government and its
institutional development, efficiency in achieving its mission, and innovativeness. Decentralized experimentation
and centralized learning were important to success, along
with willingness on the part of federal and state governments to let the foundations explore new instruments to
fulfill their mandate.

A

CONTEXT

In the mid-1980s, Mexico began to deregulate domestic
markets and trade and establish a multiparty democracy.
The central government devolved power to the states and
opened channels for civil society participation. These
changes created new opportunities and increased competition for agricultural producers, who reacted by looking for
advanced technologies. When the public research institu-

tions could not provide them, producers and other actors
in the AIS imported or developed them. The federal government also saw technical change as an important instrument to boost competitiveness, but it recognized that the
public research and extension system was not responding
to farmers’ needs. Following the prevalent model of agricultural research, the government argued that the main
problem was that the research system was supply driven
and had to be replaced by one that was demand driven. At
the same time, the federal government restricted its support for research. Public extension organizations were
closed and replaced by a program to develop markets for
technical advice.

OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

Mexico’s Produce Foundations (Fundaciones Produce) are
an example of a federated farmer organization that funds
and implements research, extension, and innovation projects. They are also examples of learning organizations.
Mexico has 32 foundations, one in each state. A national
coordinating body (COFUPRO, Coordinadora Nacional de
las Fundaciones Produce) facilitates organizational learning
and interacts with the federal government. Each Produce
Foundation is governed by a board, which is dominated by
progressive farmers and also includes representatives from
the federal and state governments. Operations are directed
by a professional manager. COFUPRO, in turn, has a board
integrated by the presidents of some of the foundations, a
representative from the federal government, and another
from the national agricultural research organization. Dayto-day operations are delegated to a professional management team.
The Produce Foundations’ main program operates an
annual budget of about US$45 million, 85 percent of which
is contributed by the federal government and 15 percent by
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the states. The foundations also receive additional funds
from public and private sources for special projects.
Individual farmers cannot join the Produce Foundations;
instead, a few farmers are invited to participate on the
boards, and each foundation sets the selection criteria.1
Individual farmers participate in projects financed by the
foundations, both as collaborators and as contributors of
resources. Initially, the Produce Foundations financed
projects that mainly helped commercial farmers; over the
years, they have increasingly sought to meet the needs of
small-scale farmers while continuing to support commercial agriculture.
The objective that motivated the creation of the Produce
Foundations was to mobilize additional funds for the
national agricultural research organization and transform
supply-driven research and extension systems into
demand-driven systems. After several iterations, the current objective of the federal government and the Produce
Foundations is to explore new instruments to foster innovation, transform traditional research organizations and
universities so that they can better integrate into innovation processes, explore new methods to diffuse innovations, and influence the design and implementation of
research, extension, and innovation policies by participating in policy dialogues and educating policy makers on the
nature of innovation.
The changes in the Produce Foundations’ objectives
reflect lessons learned by the government and the foundations. When the federal government created the foundations
in 1995 as part of its efforts to democratize and establish a
new model for agricultural research, it negotiated with each
state governor to establish a foundation that would administer public and private funds for finance research and
extension projects. Each governor handpicked progressive
farmers to join the state foundation’s board. Soon after joining the boards, a few farmers recognized that they lacked an
understanding of managing public funds for research and
extension, and they started to exchange information on how
they operated their foundations. This process enabled innovative foundations to differentiate themselves from the others. The foundations were also influenced by the political
climate in their respective states, the presence of innovative
farmers on their boards, and the backgrounds of the foundation managers (especially with respect to their managerial
experience in large organizations).
In the beginning, when the federal and state governments controlled the Produce Foundations’ boards,
farmers from about six foundations demanded independence. At first the federal and state governments opposed
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their independence, but soon they recognized the benefits
of civil society participation and supported the independent Produce Foundations. Eventually most foundations
followed suit and requested independent status as well.
The innovative farmers also realized that the individual
foundations were too isolated and that a national coordinating office was needed; before long, COFUPRO was
created.
Over the years, COFUPRO and the foundations have
developed a better understanding of innovation processes
and consolidated their structure, operational routines, and
institutional culture. The process entailed a progressive
transfer of authority from individual foundations to
COFUPRO. The main benefits of a strong COFUPRO were
(1) the consolidation of a system of decentralized experimentation with centralized learning, (2) stronger lobbying
capabilities, (3) more transparent use of resources, and
(4) more effective operational rules. The learning process
was particularly effective. The foundations moved from
financing traditional research and extension projects to
supporting innovation activities and stable interactions
among researchers, technical advisers, firms, and farmers.
Each foundation tried new ways to support innovation
and to manage its funds. Once effective operating routines were developed, they were adopted by all of the
foundations.
The foundations implement a number of activities, but
the most relevant for this module are their priority-setting
methods, allocation of funds, and exploration of new methods to foster innovation:
■

■

Priority setting. Over the years, the foundations tried several methods to set priorities. The most important was a
two-year national consultation implemented in 2002,
which was the basis of all agricultural policies for the following five years. The process was considered too costly
and never repeated. In the following years, each foundation developed its own priority-setting method, but they
are converging on a permanent dialogue among the
foundation, researchers, and important stakeholders
from the different agricultural clusters. In other words,
they have moved from a demand-driven, linear process
to a continuous dialogue that results in participatory
research and innovation (there are several modes of participation, however).
Allocation of funds. For many years, the foundations used
a competitive fund to select the projects to be funded. In
2006, they realized that this method did not induce
researchers to abandon their linear vision of science, and
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■

they started to contract research and innovation projects
directly with research institutes and other service
providers. Additionally, the foundations started to prioritize projects presented by groups of actors (usually
farmers and researchers) that had developed stable
relationships.
New methods. In recent years, some foundations have
played a catalytic role in the emergence of innovation
networks that explore new research and diffusion methods. These activities have not been evaluated yet.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

The Produce Foundations’ relevance resulted from their
continued exploration of new mechanisms to foster agricultural innovation and to develop organizational capabilities.
This exploration was made possible by the presence of a few
innovative individuals operating in a socioeconomic and
institutional environment that allowed the foundations to
change. It was further supported by the development of an
organizational culture that allowed new alternatives to be
explored.
BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

The Produce Foundations had several impacts on the
Mexican AIS:
■

■

■

■

■

■

They funded research projects that opened new export
markets, boosted the profitability of agriculture, solved
serious production constraints (for example, with
improved pest control), and improved the sustainable
use of natural resources.
They induced the emergence of networks that explored
new approaches to foster innovation.
They implemented development projects that benefited
small-scale farmers.
They influenced the operations of public research institutes and universities.
They opened opportunities for researchers to interact
directly with farmers, helping them to replace the linear
vision of science with an innovation-based model of
science.
They influenced the design and implementation of agricultural policies, especially for research and innovation
programs.

■

They helped other actors in the AIS, especially farmer
organizations and policy makers, to understand the
nature of agricultural innovation.

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

A number of internal and external factors influenced the evolution of the foundations. The main internal factors were the
creativity of a few farmers on the boards and of some foundation managers; the development of effective collective
learning routines; the creation of an organizational culture
that valued exploration, creativity, innovation, and a sense
of duty; and flexible governance structures. The external
factors were the existence of dynamic markets that created
challenges and opportunities for farmers and the presence
of a few policy makers in key positions who were willing to
allow the foundations to experiment and change.
Autonomy and independence proved important. There is a
positive correlation between a foundation’s autonomy from
the state government and its institutional development, efficiency in achieving its mission, and innovativeness. These
features result from the presence of more innovative individuals, the greater commitment shown by the board members, and more professional management staff.
Decentralized experimentation and centralized learning
were important. The foundations succeeded because they
could explore more effective operating routines and new
instruments to foster innovation. The emergence of
COFUPRO and the foundations’ ability to change resulted
from the creation of variation (32 foundations, instead of
one centralized organization) and an effective process of
self-organization, greatly influenced by a few innovative
individuals. The combination of independent foundations
with strong interactions also became a mechanism to
explore alternative organizational routines and diffuse the
most effective ones (box 1.24).
Finally, it was crucial that the federal and state governments allowed the foundations to explore new instruments
to fulfill their mandate (box 1.25). The effectiveness of the
mechanism was hampered, however, by the informality of
the information flows, the lack of methods to guide the
exploration, weak incentives for unwilling foundations to
adopt best practices, and the loosely structured activities,
which made the performance of individual foundations
dependent on the personalities of the people in command.
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Box 1.24 Organizational Learning in Mexico’s Produce Foundations: Evolution of
Priority-Setting Procedures

At the beginning, the Produce Foundations had no predefined criteria to allocate funds. Farmers on the board
would select projects to finance from among the proposals freely submitted by researchers. The foundations
soon realized that the projects did not respond to farmers’ needs, and they started to search for priority-setting
methods. They learned of a methodology developed by
the national science and technology council, which was
based on the construction of restriction trees and an ex
ante cost-benefit analysis of potential projects. This
methodology was used for a couple of years.
In 1997, COFUPRO authorities met the research
director of the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), who provided guidelines
for a methodology based on accepted practices for
project design. The method involved organizing
forums where the various actors in agricultural chains
could diagnose their most important problems. Over
the next two years, the foundations adapted this
methodology to the Mexican environment. They recognized that ISNAR’s methodology was better than
the council’s approach because it was based on wider
criteria than the expected costs and benefits, and it
enabled different actors to help define priorities. The
foundations implemented the methodology in 2002
and 2003 to prioritize agrifood chains and identify

research demands, first in each state and then at the
national level—an exercise that was not repeated
because it was deemed too expensive.
After a few years, the foundations realized that a
demand-driven system and clearly defined priorities
did not guarantee that researchers would provide solutions that farmers could use, because it still allowed
researchers great latitude in defining the approaches to
solve the problems. The next step was to modify the call
for proposals. The calls were very narrowly defined
(almost down to the title of the project desired), but
after a few years, the foundations realized that this
new method still did not solve their problem because
it was based on a linear vision of science. More
recently, the foundations experimented with different
approaches to define priorities and transform how
researchers defined their methodologies. Researchers
have been induced to interact more closely with farmers and move from their traditional research domains
to participate in innovation networks.
The foundations continuously analyzed the limitations of the prioritization procedures in use and
actively sought alternatives. As they collected information, they absorbed it to develop their own methods,
which in turn induced changes in resource allocations
and the monitoring of projects.

Source: Ekboir et al. 2009.
Note: ISNAR was a CGIAR center that closed in 2004. IFPRI absorbed some of its work.
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Box 1.25 Mexico’s Produce Foundations Explore New Approaches to Foster Innovation

The Produce Foundations initially financed traditional
research and extension projects, but realized after a few
years that the projects had little impact on agriculture.
In 2003, an external evaluation introduced the foundations to the notion of innovation systems. A second
evaluation in 2004 explained how to set up innovation
projects. Since then, several foundations have implemented innovation projects, while continuing to support traditional research and extension activities. The
innovation projects include the following:
■

■

Development of an organization of small-scale
farmers and their families that markets dried and
processed hibiscus flowers and uses the by-products
to feed chickens for egg production.
Development of a farmer-to-farmer system to
exchange technical and commercial information;
the system is based on Social Network Analysis

■

■

■

■

■

techniques to identify the most effective
communicators.
Creation of a company of small-scale farmers to
sell processed sheep meat to domestic and foreign
markets.
Establishment of a consortium of researchers who
interact closely with farmers to validate and disseminate innovations for livestock production.
A joint venture with large-scale farmers to finance a
stable research program (which included paying a
researcher’s doctoral studies) to develop innovations
for pecan production.
With financing from foreign foundations, importing a small sewage treatment plant for two remote,
impoverished villages and using the treated water to
irrigate greenhouses to produce fresh vegetables.
Teaming up with Wal-Mart to develop a supply chain
for fresh vegetables produced by small-scale farmers.

Source: Author.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 3

Chile’s Foundation for Agricultural Innovation
Rodrigo Vega Alarcón, Consultant, formerly with the Foundation for Agricultural Innovation (FIA)

SYNOPSIS

hile’s Foundation for Agricultural Innovation has
facilitated partnerships, especially between public
and private agencies, that promoted technical,
organizational, and commercial innovations. The foundation coordinates actors in the public sector, academic
institutions, private firms, and other entities to understand
and meet the innovation needs of different industries and
agricultural activities. The agency operates as an honest
broker, free of special interests, and implements programs
to generate trust among farmers and other partners. Innovation initiatives are managed responsively, quickly, simply,
and not bureaucratically, and as innovation processes move
forward, the agency retains organizational flexibility and
freedom (for example, to form ad hoc, specialized groups
and instruments for solving particular problems).

C

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

In the 1990s, the Chilean economy was liberalized, the government reduced tariffs, and free trade agreements came
into effect. The agricultural sector was at a crossroads; it
had to modernize and become more competitive. Support
for agricultural research, development, and innovation was
stepped up. The government adopted policies to promote
technology transfer and raise productivity.
The subsequent rapid transformation of Chilean agriculture into an engine of regional development has become a
familiar story. Current exports from the national food and
forest industry (fruit, wine, salmon, wood, white meats, and
other products) are valued at about US$13 billion per year
and are expected to reach US$20 billion in coming years.
The transition from a traditional agrarian economy to an
export-based economy was not entirely smooth. Unemployment and migration increased as traditional agricultural
products such as wheat, corn, milk, and meat were replaced
by imports from countries with more competitive agricul80

tural sectors. The challenge was to improve Chilean producers’ competitiveness through new technologies and to
develop alternative crops for regions and farmers affected by
imports. At the time, agricultural research and development
focused on basic rather than applied science, and little support was given to business innovation.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

In 1994, Chile’s Ministry of Agriculture created the Foundation for Agricultural Innovation (FIA, Fundación para la
Innovación Agraria), a public agency to promote and financially support agricultural research, development, and innovation. Initially FIA focused strongly on technology transfer
to improve competitiveness. It identified products with high
economic or commercial value and significant labor
requirements that could be adapted to Chilean agriculture.
In 2009, FIA became part of Chile’s National System of
Innovation for Competitiveness (SNIC, Sistema Nacional
de Innovación para la Competitivad). FIA’s strategic objective is to promote innovation processes for the agriculture
sector and improve the conditions that favor those
processes, by cofinancing innovation initiatives, generating
strategies, and transferring information and results of
innovative programs and projects carried out with Chile’s
private sector.
The foundation is guided by a seven-member board of
directors chaired by the minister of agriculture. It is headed
by a chief executive appointed by the minister of agriculture. FIA’s annual budget is about US$18 million, mostly
from the Ministry of Agriculture (US$11 million); other
sources of finance include the national Innovation Fund for
Competitiveness (FIC, Fondo de Innovación para la Competitivad), which is supported by mining royalties (US$6
million). The national innovation policy has three pillars:
Science and Human Capital are supported by the National
Commission for Scientific and Technological Research,1 and

Enterprise Innovation is supported by Innova-Chile, the
multisectoral innovation agency of the Corporation to Promote Production (CORFO).2 FIA and other small funds
focus on specific sectors and complement Innova-Chile.
While FIA works mainly with small- and medium-scale
enterprises, Innova-Chile works with medium- and largescale agroindustrial entities and entrepreneurs.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

The efforts of FIA changed the paradigm for agricultural
research and development, which had been confined to
technology institutions and academia and yielded results
that often lacked commercial application. Aside from facilitating partnerships across the public and private sector,
including producers and industry, FIA supports innovation
in the following ways:
■

Strategic development of information and knowledge to
anticipate future trends and technological developments
in global agriculture, through observation, exploration,
and analysis of such emerging issues as climate change,
agriculture’s carbon footprint, water, and bioenergy,
among others.

■

■

■

Development of mechanisms and instruments for disseminating projects and programs with commercial potential
to agrarian enterprises.
Management intervention mechanisms that support collaborative innovation initiatives submitted by clients
(box 1.26).
Evaluation of technical, economic, and social results of
projects cofounded by FIA, prior to their transfer and
implementation.

Currently FIA works with the World Bank on redesigning the system for agrifood and forestry research, development, and innovation through scenario planning. In this
context, FIA plays the role of coordinator and broker,
interacting closely with all parts of the system—agricultural
producers, financial agencies, companies, technological
institutes, or universities.
BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

Since its creation, FIA has promoted the development of
new, high-value agricultural products for the domestic
and international markets. Many of these products
have improved farmers’ incomes and living conditions

Box 1.26 Mechanisms Used by Chile’s Foundation for Agricultural Innovation to Support Innovation

The Foundation for Agricultural Innovation uses several mechanisms to support initiatives and innovation
projects, technology transfer, and human resource
development. Territorial innovation programs are
regional initiatives led by stakeholders and representatives of an agrifood chain in a particular region or
territory. Technology consortiums are joint ventures
between technology agencies (including public
research institutes and universities) and private enterprises to create a new technology-based company or
pursue innovative research on new commercial technologies (for the grape, potato, and dairy industries, for
example). On a smaller scale, technology development
programs promote specific technological development
and innovation led by stakeholders and representatives
of an agrifood chain. Innovation in agri-food marketing
supports market integration and market development
tools for micro, small-scale, and medium-scale agrifood companies. FIA also conducts numerous studies to

assemble and synthesize technical, economic, and/or
commercial information to aid decisions on future
innovation initiatives. Projects are funded on innovations that improve a company’s competitiveness and
that of the sector to which it belongs. Projects must
show measurable market effects. Visits to centers of excellence are sponsored in Chile and abroad to observe and
evaluate technological, organizational, and managerial
innovations in production systems. Individuals are also
sponsored to attend national and international technical
events, such as seminars, symposiums, congresses,
conferences, and technology fairs. FIA also funds specific
events (seminars and conferences) to disseminate and
transfer national and international experiences related
to products, processes, and innovative tools for marketing, organization, and management to different actors
in the AIS. Consultants provide specific skills to enhance
competitiveness of specific products, processes, or
organizations and their management.

Source: Author.
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throughout Chile. An impact evaluation in 2005 determined that each million Chilean pesos (Ch$) spent by the
foundation increased sales in the agricultural sector by
Ch$5.14 million, leveraged Ch$1.89 million in private contributions, and created two permanent jobs in the agricultural sector (FIA 2005). For example, FIA helped to support
development of a successful olive oil–processing and export
industry (box 1.27), increased sheep meat production by
introducing better breeding stocks, extended cranberry cultivation to new areas, introduced new varieties of flowers for
the export and domestic market, and expanded peony production area. FIA has also sponsored investments in ICT
technologies for rural areas. In organic agriculture, FIA
supported the first projects in what has become a growing
business, and it advanced the study and commercialization
of biological control, using a variety of beneficial insects.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PRACTITIONERS

Lessons and recommendations from FIA’s experience may
be useful to other agencies that seek to move from a mission

based on technology transfer to one that involves building
partnerships (locally, nationally, and internationally) that
foster agricultural innovation and access to highly competitive global markets.
A vital role of an innovation agency is to coordinate
actors in the public sector, academic institutions, private
firms, and other entities to understand and meet the innovation needs of different industries and agricultural activities. The key is to be participatory and create avenues for
continuing analysis and discussion in which the experience
and opinions of all actors can be considered.
Organizations such as FIA that specialize in promoting
innovation should act as facilitators, linking the demand for
research and development with the suppliers and strengthening the capacity for research and innovation throughout
the AIS. There should be a distinction, understood by all
actors in the AIS, between the roles of innovation-promoting agencies and centers for developing or diffusing innovations (whether they are public, private, nongovernmental,
or civil society organizations). As facilitators, innovation
agencies should not operate research programs. They must
remain independent of research and technology institutes,

Box 1.27 Purposeful Innovation to Expand Chile’s Olive Oil Industry

In the mid-1990s, Chile produced olives on a small
scale—approximately 3,000 hectares, of which 350
hectares were for oil production. Yields were relatively
low, averaging 3–4 tons per hectare and 16–18 percent
edible oil. Production relied on outdated practices. The
National Olive Development Program, launched in 1995
by the Ministry of Agriculture and coordinated by FIA,
addressed problems (agronomic, processing technologies, zoning) that limited the industry’s development. It
involved all agencies under the ministry, plus producers,
private companies, and other entities, including Fundación Chile. The ultimate goal was to make olive production more competitive and stable and improve access
to domestic and international markets (mainly the
United States, Spain, and Canada). To that end, FIA
supported the following:
■

■

Deepening market research and identifying business
opportunities.
Identifying and multiplying new, more appropriate
genetic stocks.

■
■

■

■
■
■

Expanding area planted to high-yielding cultivars.
Acquiring international technical expertise for agronomic and processing problems and marketing.
Training specialists in olive cultivation and industrialization.
Establishing modern oil-processing plants.
Developing a brand and marketing Chilean olive oil.
Conducting international seminars to promote
Chilean olives and olive products.

By 2009, planted area reached approximately
21,500 hectares (65 percent of production was destined
for oil and the rest for table olives). Investments in
the sector remain strong and have reached US$50 million annually. Exports of extra virgin olive oil from
Chile have increased tremendously in recent years. In
2003, Chile exported 53.7 tons, with a free-on-board
(FOB) value of US$158,200; in 2007, Chile exported
562 tons, with an FOB value of US$3.1 million; and by
2009, it exported 1,933 tons with an FOB value of
US$12.5 million.

Sources: FIA 2009; CHILEOLIVA 2009.
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universities, the private sector, and agricultural organizations. They must be honest brokers, trusted by all, and not
captured by special interests.
Although the private sector is an important force for
innovation in agriculture, a public agency that specializes in
promoting agricultural innovation, with sufficient human
and financial resources, is a vital complement to private
investments. In many cases, agricultural innovations may
not be easy to patent or otherwise commercialize, but they
may be critical to the development of the sector (biological
control programs and information and communications
technology infrastructure are two examples mentioned in
this IAP). It is also likely that the partners involved and the
relative levels of public and private investment will vary
when innovations are in the developmental stage compared
to when they are being commercialized. In other words, as
innovation processes move forward, a certain amount of
organizational flexibility and freedom are needed (for
example, to form ad hoc, specialized groups and instruments for solving particular problems that emerge at a particular stage in the process).

The processes of managing innovation initiatives must
be responsive, quick, simple, and not bureaucratic. Otherwise farmers and businesses have little incentive to participate. Innovation programs and the innovation agency itself
should be evaluated regularly to verify their effectiveness
and impact and make corrections in a timely way, if necessary. The professionals within the agency must receive
training in management techniques for innovation and
technology management, if they are to be of real support to
farmers and entrepreneurs who seek to foster and manage
innovation processes.
Needs for innovation (and partners committed to
developing them) can be quite location-specific, especially
in a highly ecologically diverse country such as Chile. FIA
now develops what it calls “territorial innovations” by
working with the regions to promote innovation at the
local level. The development and adoption of innovations,
especially with smaller-scale and more traditional farmers,
can be slow. The process benefits from complementary
programs that generate trust among farmers and other
partners.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 4

A Rural Institutional Platform Mobilizes Communities to
Become Effective Partners in Agricultural Innovation in
Andhra Pradesh
Gunnar Larson, World Bank
Melissa Williams, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

ommunity organization in the form of small selfhelp groups and the federation of these grassroots
institutions at higher levels have created support
structure that enables the rural poor in Andhra Pradesh to
identify workable strategies to meet their needs—in other
words, to innovate. Each tier in the organization of self-help
groups functions as a financial intermediary and provides
specialized services to members and other stakeholder
groups in a variety of sectors. Through this rural institutional
platform, community members have identified, adapted,
used, and spread environmentally friendly agricultural practices, obtained credit, invested in productive assets, and
improved their food security and health, among other benefits. Lessons from this experience highlight the importance of
developing local institutions with local people (the local commitment and relevance makes them more likely to innovate
successfully) and of organizing at higher levels (where farmers gain a collective voice to empower themselves). These
institutions of the poor plan, manage, monitor, and scale up
new initiatives and build social capital at much lower transaction costs and with much greater purposefulness than is
possible through more traditional forms of organization, in
which the rural poor are more often at the periphery than the
center of service provision and innovation.

C

CONTEXT

Organizing large numbers of poor people around economic
activities and mobilizing their combined assets until they
collectively achieve a scale of magnitude sufficient to attract
the interest of investors and service providers have a number of precedents—most immediately in community-
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driven development programs in Bolivia and Northeast
Brazil beginning in the late 1980s. In the late 1990s, India
applied these principles in a unique way, mobilizing and
federating poor agricultural communities to access credit,
markets, and services on better terms. The southern state of
Andhra Pradesh, where costly and unsustainable agricultural production practices were creating unmanageable levels of debt (box 1.28), quickly established itself as a pioneer
of this approach.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

The Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP), an
autonomous body established by the Government of
Andhra Pradesh, implements the Andhra Pradesh Rural
Poverty Program.1 Under this program, SERP works in
communities to mobilize self-help groups (SHGs), each
with about 10–15 members (such as poor women and/or
farmers), who engage in collective saving, lending, and
other activities that enable them to build an asset base.
As shown in figure 1.1, each tier in the organization of
SHGs functions as a financial intermediary and provides
specialized services to members (and other stakeholder
groups) in a variety of sectors. The SHGs federate into
village organizations (VOs), and each VO manages a capital
fund, from which it provides loans to constituent SHGs.
The VOs organize into subdistrict federations, which
access commercial credit to lend to VOs, and subdistrict
federations organize into very large district federations. This
platform of federated institutions brings economies of scale
and scope that allow community members to build assets,
smooth consumption, access services and safety nets, and
invest in livelihoods to raise themselves out of poverty.

Box 1.28 Rising Input Use and Agricultural Debt in Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh is one of India’s major producers of
rice, cotton, groundnuts, and lentils. Agriculture
accounts for 25 percent of GDP and 60 percent of
employment. Most farmers in the state practice conventional, input-intensive farming that relies on periodic purchases of high-yielding seed, chemical pesticides, and chemical fertilizers. As much as 35 percent of
cultivation costs go to pesticides and fertilizers alone,
which is five percentage points above the national average (NSSO 2003). High production costs generate
tremendous pressure to borrow heavily to pay for
inputs and make ends meet. The average outstanding
loan for farmers with small landholdings was more
than twice the national average in 2005. Among farm
households, 82 percent were in debt—the highest
estimated prevalence of debt among farm households
in India (NSSO 2005). Many farmers used their land as
collateral, eventually becoming nothing more than
tenant farmers or wage laborers on their own land.
Owing to rising debt, land mortgages, and uncertain
profit potential, planted area in Andhra Pradesh plummeted by more than 988,000 acres between 1980 and
2005, along with yields and agricultural growth.

(Cropping intensity during 1980–81 and 1990–91 was
1.16; gross cropped area declined from 12.5 million
hectares in 1980–81 to 12.1 million hectares in 2004–05,
according to the Government of Andhra Pradesh and
Centre for Economic and Social Studies (2008).) The
same period saw a reduction in government-provided
public services that left farmers increasingly dependent
on moneylenders and input traders. Traders became
many farmers’ sole source of credit, inputs, and related
information. One result of this arrangement was that
Andhra Pradesh farmers, ill-informed about the dangers of incorrect input use, applied far more pesticide
than their counterparts in any other state in India:
0.82 kilograms per hectare annually, compared to the
national average of 0.3 kilograms per hectare (Government of Andhra Pradesh, Irrigation and CAD Department 2007). Another result was that many traders and
moneylenders entered into buyback agreements with
farmers at below-market prices in return for their services (Ramanjaneyulu et al. n.d.). Purchasing inputs
imposed such a financial burden on smallholders that
conventional agriculture no longer offered a viable
livelihood.

Source: Authors.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS

Andhra Pradesh has created an ecosystem of support in
which a bottom-up planning process beginning at the
household and community level and aggregating to higher
levels enables the rural poor to identify needs and define
workable solutions (in other words, to innovate). For
instance, farming households develop a microcredit plan
with the help of their VO and are linked to commercial
banks through their subdistrict and district federations.
Community groups also manage enterprises such as procurement centers for agricultural commodities and milk,
which provide grading, quality control, aggregation, and
value addition for products. At the subdistrict level, federations invest in enterprises such as chilling centers for milk
to increase shelf life. Meanwhile, the district federation
manages a number of support functions, including running
an insurance scheme for members through a network of
call centers. Together, these activities help farmers receive
higher prices and foster an environment that favors profitable agriculture. This support along the value chain of

agriculture makes farming sustainable from an economic
perspective. At higher levels, the federation organizes training, engages NGOs and government agencies for additional
support, and monitors progress.
Farmers have also used this institutional platform to
practice community-managed sustainable agriculture
(CMSA), a knowledge-intensive alternative to inputintensive agriculture. Through their groups, farmers learn
about the harmful effects of chemical pesticides and fertilizers on soil, water, and health. They gain access to farmer
field schools, seed banks, equipment centers, finance, and
procurement centers, all organized by their respective VOs.
District and subdistrict federations market the CMSA produce. Through the district federations, farmers can use
funds from the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme, a social safety net ensuring every rural poor household has at least 100 days of paid work each year, to pay for
on-farm improvements for sustainable agriculture. Examples include transplanting tank silt to farms, leveling land,
or building structures to capture rainwater. In this way, a
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Figure 1.1 The Institutional Model for Federated Self-Help Groups

District Federation or Zilla Samakhya
300,000–500,000 members on average
Roles and responsibilities: Conducts market interface, maintains MIS/IT system

District
Federation

Subdistrict Federation or Mandal Samakhya
4,000–6,000 members on average, young professional staff
Roles and responsibilities: Support to VOs, secure linkage with government
departments, audit groups, microfinance functions

Village Organization (VO)
150–200 members on average, activists, bookkeepers, and
paraprofessionals
Roles and responsibilities: Strengthening SHGs, arrange lines of credit to
SHGs, social action and support activists, village development
Self-Help Groups (SHGs)
10–15 members per SHG
Roles and responsibilities: Thrift and credit, participatory monitoring,
poverty reduction plans, household investment plans

Subdistrict
Federation

Village
Organization

SHG

SHG

SHG

Source: SERP and World Bank 2009.
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safety net entitlement is linked to productive, income-generating activities conducted by community organizations.
Largely owing to the effectiveness of the institutional platform (figure 1.2), poor and marginal farmers have developed a more successful livelihood strategy.
To improve food security, households belonging to SHGs
identify the amount of food they can purchase with their
own funds, the amounts obtained through the public safety
net, and their remaining needs. The VO aggregates the
information, ensures that each family gets the safety net to
which it is entitled, and then purchases the rest of the food
from the market in bulk. Households belonging to the SHG
can then take a low-interest, long-term loan from the VO or
SHG to purchase rice on terms they can afford, thereby
smoothing their consumption.

As the discussion has indicated, the benefits of this organizational structure include improved food security as well as the
accumulation of financial acumen, new agricultural knowledge and skills, and productive assets. In particular, the
institutional platform’s success in enabling communities to
pursue alternatives to conventional agriculture has led the
state government to call for the Agriculture Department’s
Agriculture Technology Management Agency (ATMA) to
collaborate with the Rural Development Department’s SERP
to promote sustainable agriculture and move toward
organic agriculture. SERP will train the ATMA staff to use
the CMSA model; ATMA will then work with SHGs to popularize this low-cost, high-return type of agriculture. The
hope is that it will yield benefits similar to those seen with
CMSA (box 1.29).

BENEFITS AND IMPACTS OF ORGANIZING
RURAL COMMUNITIES TO INNOVATE

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

Through SERP and the rural institutional platform it provides, communities have organized to meet multiple needs.

Experience with the rural institutional platform adopted in
Andhra Pradesh indicates how the capacity to organize at
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Figure 1.2 The Same Institutional Platform Provides Services to Develop Multiple Livelihood Strategies
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Source: Authors.

Box 1.29 Benefits of Community Organization to Pursue More Sustainable Agricultural Practices in
Andhra Pradesh

Savings and incomes increased. A survey of 141 farmers found that production costs were 33 percent lower
under CMSA than conventional agriculture (US$180
versus US$280 per acre). The savings translate directly
to increased incomes for farmers. For crops raised
without pesticides and fertilizer, farmers command a
premium of 14–33 percent. Even though CMSA produce is not yet certified organic, consumers (especially in urban retail markets) increasingly recognize
the benefits of pesticide- and fertilizer-free food.
Yields remained stable and diversification increased.
To track changes in paddy yields after farmers switched
to CMSA, 400 farmers’ fields in five districts were
monitored closely. Yields remained the same, ranging
from 1,900 kilograms per acre to 2,200 kilograms

per acre for paddy and rice. Although CMSA brings
higher labor costs, farmers are meeting this challenge
by working together to manage pests and increase soil
fertility. Demonstrations of multicropping and intercropping alternatives are helping more small-scale and
marginal farmers in Andhra Pradesh realize the benefits of diversification. Farmers on nearly 319,000 acres
now plant one or two crops in addition to the main
crop.
Communities obtained debt relief. In a survey of five
districts, of 467 families who had mortgaged their
farmland, 386 had paid off their debt and reclaimed
their land within two years through the savings from
CMSA. The social empowerment associated with
getting their land back from moneylenders and
(Box continued on next page)
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Box 1.29 Benefits of Community Organization to Pursue More Sustainable Agricultural Practices in
Andhra Pradesh (continued)

farming on their own land is very significant for farmers, perhaps as important as the economic relief it
provides.
Families increased their investments in productive
assets and sustainable land and water management.
Communities dug more than 10,000 composting pits
and 1,200 farm ponds. Fertile tank silt has been applied
to more than 13,000 acres of farmland. Lower production costs and higher net incomes have made farmers
less risk averse. Primary surveys by SERP show that
families are leasing additional land for cultivation,
resulting in additional income for households. Farmers
are also bringing fallow and government-assigned land
under cultivation.
Communities saw greater business innovation and
new livelihood opportunities. Villages have begun to
benefit from jobs and enterprises catering to inputs
for CMSA and by providing services such as quality
control and procurement for CMSA produce. At least
2,000 jobs have been created in villages through shops
that supply biopesticides, organic nutrients, seed, and

farm implements. About 5,400 small-scale and marginal farmers are generating additional income by
operating vermi-composting units.
Food security improved. Data collected by SERP from
22,000 CMSA farmers in Khammam District show that
household expenditures on food grains declined by half
owing to higher yields of food grain crops and the
introduction of a second crop. Families purchased
44 percent less food grain from the market.
Human and environmental health benefited. Farmers reported a noticeable drop in pesticide-related
health problems. Women, who traditionally sprayed
the crops—and suffered the effects—are now strong
advocates of the new practices. In three districts, hospitalizations from pesticide poisoning declined by
40 percent, from 242 cases per year to 146 cases. Villages that completely stopped pesticide applications
are benefiting from the elimination of pesticides
from groundwater and soil. Insects and birds, no
longer targeted by broad-spectrum pesticides, are
returning to the fields.

Sources: Authors.

several levels fosters innovation and adaptation in the local
context, with local people, and contributes to success on a
larger scale as well:
■
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Institutions (and their designers) matter. Initiatives
designed by the farmers who will participate in them
carry real advantages over initiatives that outsiders
might design for them. Many of these advantages relate
to the fact that the people who plan and implement
activities are the same people who benefit from them.
Their ownership of the initiative greatly increases the
likelihood that it will be sustainable. The social capital
they cultivate and build upon in working together for
common goals changes the rules of the game for farmers
in relation to the market and the government. In organizing and mobilizing at higher levels of aggregation,
farmers gain a collective voice and empower themselves,
which is something that cannot realistically be done for
them from the outside. Supporting their initiatives by
investing in a process that over time comes to involve
millions of rural people, especially women, has helped

■

to achieve a large-scale transformation in smallholder
farming. These institutions of the poor plan, manage,
monitor, and scale up new initiatives at much lower
transaction costs and with much greater purposefulness
than is otherwise possible. Building social capital is a
necessary investment in transforming human, natural,
and economic capital.
Small-scale and marginal farmers need a creative
approach to the delivery of agricultural extension services. Practicing farmers should be the central stakeholders contributing to an extension system. Where the
system has failed to meet their needs, they should be
enlisted as active extension agents. Their presence in
the village makes them easily accessible and more
familiar with local conditions and challenges. For
example, the use of successful CMSA farmers as community resource persons was critical to building and
scaling up the program. The experience of the resource
persons gives their messages greater credibility among
farmers. NGOs can facilitate extension-related services, but eventually the community resource persons
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assume this role, as they are better equipped to understand farmers’ needs.
Farmers can experiment and develop technologies in their
fields and test innovations through their local field schools.
Once technologies are proven, they can be standardized
for a wider audience through training workshops. In
CMSA, the menu of technology options continues to
grow, and farmers no longer have to rely on the limited
options available through external research and other
sources in the market. Farmers should be encouraged to

look at the cost-effectiveness of options and not focus
only on yields.
CMSA has already been taken to the state of Bihar with
considerable success, and it will be further scaled up
through India’s National Rural Livelihoods Mission. The
achievements in Andhra Pradesh were very much the result
of tailoring solutions specifically to local contexts, and
replicating those achievements elsewhere will require purposeful adaptation to local conditions.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 5

In the Networking Age, Cassava Development Relies on
Public-Private Research Partnerships
Bernardo Ospina Patiño, Latin American and Caribbean Consortium to Support Cassava
Research and Development (CLAYUCA)

SYNOPSIS

LAYUCA transcended the traditional countrybased model of cassava research to develop a
regional research and development network that
attracted nontraditional partners and funding. All members participate in planning, financing, and implementing
prioritized activities for cassava research and development
while sharing costs, risks, and benefits. An emphasis on
competitiveness and a value chain approach helped
CLAYUCA to focus on issues limiting efficiency in production, processing, and utilization, in which the private and
public sector had common research interests. CLAYUCA
demonstrates the importance of allowing different interaction, coordination, and innovation mechanisms to emerge
and of coordinating value chain actors to contribute to
policy debates related to cassava (especially support for
public-private-CSO-NGO collaboration). Another lesson
is that facilitating partnerships between public and private
organizations will become increasingly challenging unless
stable financing is available and public organizations maintain their expertise.

C

CONTEXT

Cassava, the fifth most important crop in the world, can
compete with coarse grains in animal feed, partially substitute for maize and other starchy crops in food products,
serve as a source of industrial starch, and be used to
process ethanol. The crop is especially important in
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. Although
national and international organizations have conducted
cassava research at least since the 1970s, many of these
institutions experienced radical changes in the 1990s as
public funding for agricultural research evaporated
and the need for a less linear, more participatory model of
agricultural innovation became clear. Institutions and
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countries sought to establish strategic alliances to continue agricultural research and development. In 1999, the
Latin American and Caribbean Consortium to Support
Cassava Research and Development (CLAYUCA, Consorcio Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Apoyo a la Investigación y al Desarrollo de la Yuca) was formed as a
regional mechanism to plan and coordinate research for
the cassava subsector.
THE CLAYUCA MODEL

CLAYUCA is a network operating through collaborative
agreements between its members—public and private
entities—in which all members participate in the planning,
financing, and implementation of prioritized activities to
accomplish jointly established objectives while sharing all
costs, risks, and benefits. An executive committee defines
priorities and lines of activity, and coordinates and evaluates research undertaken by the consortium. Each member
country elects one representative (not necessarily from the
public sector) to serve on the committee; the participating
international organizations also elect a representative. The
committee approves the entry of new countries into the network and elects the executive director, who coordinates
CLAYUCA’s activities. Initially a regional network for Latin
America and the Caribbean, CLAYUCA has attracted members from other regions, and member countries now include
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Venezuela, as well as Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, China,
and the United States.
A Technical Committee defines the research agenda,
which is developed in detail by one representative per member country. Research focuses on competitiveness, given the
tremendous challenges in identifying and strengthening
market opportunities for cassava and moving from traditional to more competitive modes of production.

Aside from the collaborative agreements with its members, CLAYUCA operates through a formal agreement
between its executive committee and CIAT. CIAT is a
strategic partner, hosting the consortium, providing core
funding, legal support, administering CLAYUCA funds, and
facilitating the use of the laboratories, fields, equipment, and
offices under a fee payment scheme. CLAYUCA’s activities
are partially financed through an annual membership fee of
US$15,000 per country. In some countries, a private institution pays the fee; in others, a public agency pays (the
Ministry of Agriculture, for example). In Costa Rica and
Colombia, the annual quota is paid by a group of public and
private entities. Additional funding is obtained through special projects and consultancy services. These resources are
invested only in activities defined collectively by the members.

Examples of technology and other knowledge generated
and shared through CLAYUCA include the following:
■

THE INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

Technology platforms for more competitive cassava production and utilization. Technology platforms include
equipment as well as the methodologies, instructions,
processes, training, and other elements to use it correctly.
CLAYUCA has developed a number of platforms: (1) for
producing high-quality, refined cassava flour for human
and industrial use; (2) for producing and using cassava
leaves in animal feeding systems; (3) for producing and
using sweet potato in human food and animal feed;
(4) producing hydrated ethanol for local use with cassava, sweet potato, and sweet sorghum (the technology is
small-scale, low-cost, and easily operated and managed
by small-scale farmers); and (5) for producing cassava
commercially (mechanized planting, partially mechanized harvesting, and soil fertility, pest, and disease management practices).
Planting and breeding materials. CLAYUCA has facilitated access to improved, elite cassava germplasm developed by CIAT and other advanced research centers.
Communications. CLAYUCA communicates relevant, current information on cassava technologies to stakeholders
in the form of websites, electronic bulletins, training
events, annual meetings, study tours, and technical books
and bulletins.
Human resources development. Through training offered
at CIAT and in member countries, CLAYUCA has
strengthened technical capacity in such areas as cassava
processing, crop management, product and market
development, tissue culture, and cassava germplasm
evaluation and selection.

The innovative aspect of CLAYUCA is its role as a regional
facilitator of public-private alliances for cassava research
and development, using a value chain approach and emphasizing competitiveness. Different actors in a member country’s cassava subsector identify where cassava’s overall competitiveness can be improved along the value chain
(production, processing, or utilization). They identify organizational and technical constraints and formulate and
implement technological interventions. The new emphasis on competitiveness, a prerequisite for private sector
involvement in cassava-based industries, has motivated
farmers, especially small-scale farmers, to adopt improved
production technologies such as better varieties and
improved crop and soil management practices. Increased
competitiveness on the supply side is complemented by private investments and contributions to processing capacity
and management. The network’s regional and international
character offers particular advantages for countries where
cassava research has been limited by small national budgets
and little external interaction.

During its first decade, CLAYUCA has benefited various
actors in the cassava subsector of each member country. It
also generated the regional benefits described in the sections
that follow.

BENEFITS AND IMPACT

Benefits to the public sector

CLAYUCA’s structure enables members to have better control of the regional research and development agenda for
cassava and participate more equitably in the distribution of
benefits. The consortium also facilitates better access for
public and private agencies to technologies generated by
international and advanced research centers. Those centers,
in turn, benefit from participating in a regional agenda for
cassava research with relatively little investment.

Public institutions have taken advantage of the presence of
CLAYUCA in their countries, supported by the strong
research background of CIAT, to improve their capacities in
areas such as managing genetic resources, training technical
personnel, and improving knowledge and information
about modern technologies for cassava production, processing, and utilization. At the country level, it is difficult for
one single institution to possess the interdisciplinary

■

■

■
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capacity to scale up new technologies into commercial
activities. Through CLAYUCA, national and regional networking ensures that experience and knowledge are shared.
In some cases, the presence of CLAYUCA has helped to
reconfigure relationships between the public and private
sector and farmer organizations.
At a relatively low cost, CIAT benefited from
CLAYUCA’s role as a regional forum for planning, financing, and implementing cassava-based research and development to reestablish itself as a stronger actor in the
regional innovation system for cassava. Public and private
institutions that require technologies generated by CIAT
now have access facilitated through CLAYUCA. At the
same time, CIAT receives stronger feedback from
CLAYUCA stakeholders on the performance of its technologies and emerging problems and priorities in the
cassava subsector.

China, Europe), allowing members to see technologies in
operation and make informed investment decisions.
The wealth of cassava genetic resources in germplasm
banks at international and advanced research centers will
enable cassava to cope with the effects of climate change,
among other needs. CLAYUCA has helped member countries and farmer groups gain better access to this genetic
diversity for their own in-situ evaluation and selection programs. CLAYUCA has also facilitated farmer groups’ access
to improved varieties with higher yield potential and greater
adaptation to biotic and abiotic stresses. Farmers have benefited from the new markets, additional income, and
employment opportunities represented by the cassavabased agroindustries established in some CLAYUCA countries. Through CLAYUCA, some farmers have gained access
to special services such as production credits under very
favorable terms (box 1.30).

Benefits to the private sector
(producers and processors)

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

CLAYUCA is a technology clearinghouse, constantly searching worldwide for competitive technologies and transferring this information to its stakeholders. Many companies
lack the budget, time, and capacity to seek this information
on their own. A processing technology for cassava starch
would be more expensive if obtained in Europe than in
Brazil or in China. The difference in the initial investment
cost could affect a private entrepreneur’s decision to establish a cassava processing plant in a given country. CLAYUCA
organizes study tours to other countries and regions (Brazil,

The lessons and issues emerging from CLAYUCA’s work
over more than a decade reflect its experiences in inducing
collaboration throughout a large network of diverse
participants.
Public-private partnerships are built
on trust and history

The establishment of partnerships among public and private actors, farmers groups, NGOs, and other entities is

Box 1.30 Raising Cassava’s Profile among Policy Makers in Panama

The Panayuca Project, Panama’s stakeholder in
CLAYUCA, is a strategic alliance between Panayuca, a
private company, and the Association of Small and
Medium Agro-producers of Panama (APEMEP).
Panayuca’s main goal is to raise living standards in
Panama’s poorer rural areas by producing cassava and its
derivatives. APEMEP is an association of more than 300
organizations, including farmer unions, cooperatives,
women’s groups, and indigenous groups, with more
than 60,000 individual members. APEMEP members
produce the cassava; Panayuca develops the industrial

infrastructure and handles logistics and marketing.
Before Panama’s cassava subsector was affiliated with
CLAYUCA, credit lines for cassava at premium rates were
not available to small-scale producers. The government
did not regard cassava as a priority crop. After intense
lobbying led by Panayuca, the government included cassava as one of the crops eligible for credit at very low,
almost subsidized rates. This policy decision benefits a
large group of small-scale farmers, facilitates their partnership with the private sector, and enables farmers and
industry to operate at a competitive commercial level.

Source: Author.
Note: APEMEP = Asociación de Pequeños y Medianos Productores de Panamá.

92

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

facilitated when they already have a shared history and
significant knowledge and trust of one another. CLAYUCA’s
development was strengthened by the effects of previous
partnerships and activities between CIAT, civil society, and
farmer groups in many member countries.

Different interactions and innovation
mechanisms are important

Some countries coordinate their CLAYUCA agenda
through a public agency, but in others the private sector or
a combination of both sectors is more active. Other member countries have strong traditions of cooperatives and
industry associations. Still others have policies that emphasize the social and economic feasibility of a dualistic agricultural sector, in which small- and large-scale producers
coexist and develop. Others have policies that emphasize
the importance of science and technology in agricultural
development. These different traditions, practices, and attitudes have allowed different forms of interaction and coordination to emerge in work funded by CLAYUCA and its
partners:
■

■

■

Partnerships between CIAT, cooperative processing
plants, and the national agricultural research organization in each member country.
Creation of an apex association to link cooperatives in
processing and marketing innovations.
Creation of a research-focused network comprising a
regional consortium, the industry (with its small-scale
farmer base), national and international research organizations, government, and financial organizations, all
linked to domestic, regional, and international markets.

Enabling environment for public-private
partnerships

The success of public-private partnerships depends greatly
on a supportive policy environment. Most Latin American
and Caribbean countries (excluding the Southern Cone
countries, except for Chile) import large quantities of cereals to manufacture animal feed. Most governments sought
to meet growing demand for feed through policy instruments that caused producers of traditional starchy staples
such as cassava to compete with imported cereals at a substantial price disadvantage. CLAYUCA has sought to
counter this problem in a number of ways: through its
efforts to develop more efficient production and processing
methods, new cassava-based products and markets, and a

greater voice for the cassava subsector in the policy debate.
The case of Panayuca (described in box 1.30) is one example of the relationship between policy and the success of a
public-private partnership facilitated through CLAYUCA.
Another example comes from Costa Rica (box 1.31).
After more than a decade of functioning through publicprivate partnerships, CLAYUCA is well aware that such
partnerships have a greater impact when they are sustained
by a group of well-funded technical experts with sufficient
time to dedicate to the needs of the partnership’s stakeholders. For example, CIAT provided strategic core support for
CLAYUCA staff, operations, logistics, and management.
This funding enabled successful institutional learning, the
formation of a long-term network of partners, capacity
building, and organizational innovation. The availability of
such funding cannot be taken for granted, considering the
dynamic environment in which institutions such as CIAT
operate. Leaving the financing of public-private partnerships to stakeholders alone may not be sufficient for those
partnerships to have an impact. CLAYUCA participants in
each country must be creative to find complementary
strategies for supporting the financial requirements of the
partnership.

Improve coordination in value chains

Another lesson emerging from CLAYUCA’s experience is
that more attention should be given to coordination across
value chains. Because public-private partnerships operate in
an environment heavily influenced by policy, stakeholders
benefit from operating in a coordinated manner, both inside
and outside the partnership boundaries. For example, in
Colombia, the Ministry of Agriculture’s official policy is to
support agricultural development and technology generation through “agro-productive value chains.” The cassava
subsector has not organized itself into a centrally coordinated value chain, so cassava projects do not meet government requirements for funding. They are forced to seek
funding indirectly through more organized value chains
(livestock, poultry, animal feed, bioenergy, human food, and
so forth).

Public agencies require sufficient capacity to form
productive partnerships

In each CLAYUCA country, public agencies play a central
role in research and advisory services to improve the competitiveness of the cassava subsector. These agencies are
often seriously affected by frequent changes in their
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Box 1.31 Policy Action to Diversify the Market for Cassava in Costa Rica

Costa Rica’s cassava area is not very large, but intensive
cassava production and processing operations have converted Costa Rica into the world’s leading exporter of
frozen cassava and paraffin-coated cassava, principally
to markets in the United States and Europe. In 2008,
Costa Rica exported 75,000 tons of frozen and paraffincoated cassava, with a market value of US$60 million,
but a significant share of cassava is not harvested
because it does not meet export standards. In 2010, the

Ministry of Agriculture created a country-level Cassava
Committee to promote the use of cassava in animal feed
and thus diversify the market for the cassava crop. This
policy decision means that a large group of institutes
and entities that were working independently will begin
working in a coordinated fashion. CLAYUCA’s Costa
Rica group is a member of the new committee and will
play an important role in transferring CLAYUCA technologies for growing and processing cassava for feed.

Source: Author.

institutional, political, and financial environment, however.
Rarely can they implement long-term strategies to support
cassava farmers and enhance the subsector. The skills and
scientific capacity of technical personnel in some
CLAYUCA countries must be strengthened. In some cases
the private sector is willing to finance such training, but
some of the burden must be shared by public agencies, or
they will not be able to form productive partnerships with
private organizations. Successful partnership will be facilitated if public agencies allocate specific funding for training
through specific projects, competitive grants, donor support, and other means.
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Instability and frequent changes in government
support for research

In many countries, every change in the central government
(such as a new president or minister of agriculture) brings a
wave of new policies that alter support for agricultural
research and development. Public support for cassava
research in Colombia, for example, has run the gamut from
full to negligible support and funding for cassava technology development projects. It is vital for public-private partnerships to seek independent, stable financing sources to
avoid the vagaries of public funding and successfully pursue
partners’ research priorities.
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Rural Productive Alliances: A Model for Overcoming
Market Barriers
Marie-Hélène Collion, World Bank
Michelle Friedman, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

ural productive alliances are formal agreements that
bring commercial buyers together with producer
organizations. The alliances aim to increase
incomes and employment for rural producers through their
participation in modern supply chains, sometimes with a
particular emphasis on lagging regions or indigenous populations. Producers overcome market barriers and gain stability through consistent, higher prices while buyers receive
a consistent, reliable supply of goods meeting their quality
standards. Alliances are initially funded through grants for
technical assistance (in production, management, and marketing) for the producer organization, along with infrastructure and equipment. Grant recipients in some organizations repay a share of the grant to the organization to
create revolving funds that will provide credit to members
when external funding ends. Projects to support rural productive alliances can build upon lessons from earlier projects by, for example, involving financial institutions such as
commercial banks from the beginning; working with buyers
to sustain and scale up activities when project funding ends;
analyzing producer organizations’ ability to use a grant productively; and assessing the risk that a buyer or producer
organization may leave the alliance. Producer organizations
need to build marketing skills and may benefit from a thirdparty agent or broker to enter particular high-value markets. Buyers can improve the alliance through sensitization
to the benefits and transactions costs of working with smallscale producers and through support to optimize the marketability of niche products. Projects require a handover
strategy so that domestic actors can fund, implement, and
scale up activities when project support ends.

R

CONTEXT

Whether they are selling to domestic or export markets,
smallholders worldwide find it increasingly challenging to

enter into and benefit sustainably from modern agricultural
value chains. The “supermarket revolution” has changed the
parameters of market demand: Exporters, agribusinesses,
and supermarkets require large quantities of consistently
high-quality goods that meet sanitary and phytosanitary
standards and arrive on time. Owing to the scale of their
production, high transaction costs, and inability to provide goods of consistent quality, small-scale producers
often are consigned to selling in less demanding but less
rewarding markets, such as open-air markets, or through
intermediaries. Smallholders’ lack of information regarding
markets, especially their poor knowledge of distribution
channels and prices (in relation to product characteristics
and timing of delivery), undermines their ability to negotiate with buyers.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

A rural productive alliance is an economic agreement
between formally organized producers and at least one
buyer. The agreement specifies: product characteristics,
such as size and varieties to be produced; quantity to be
produced/bought; production modalities, such as how a
product will be delivered, by whom, and when, as well as
grading and packing requirements; payment modalities
and price determination criteria; and the buyer’s contribution, such as technical assistance, specific inputs, and
arrangements for input reimbursement (for example, at the
time of sale).
The project cycle

The project cycle begins with a call for proposals, often from
the agriculture ministry to producer organizations and their
commercial partners. The producer organization starts the
process by preparing a basic profile of a potential business
plan, which if selected is developed into a full-fledged
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business plan with the help of a private service provider.
The private service provider also produces feasibility studies, which are reviewed by a multistakeholder committee to
determine the business plan’s feasibility. Plans with satisfactory technical, financial, and market feasibility receive
funding.
Who funds rural productive alliances?

World Bank project funds are transferred to producer organization accounts in installments, based on evidence that
the organization has used the previous installment according to the business plan and that expected outputs have
been achieved. Grants from the project are matched with
contributions from the producer organization and the
buyer (in the form of technical assistance and inputs) and
possibly funding from public and/or private institutions,
such as municipal governments or commercial banks.
What do the grants finance?

The grants finance technical assistance in production, management, and marketing for members of the producer organization. The technical assistance mitigates risks for the
buyer and builds trust between partners, which is essential
to maintaining and sustaining the relationships. The grants
also cofinance infrastructure or equipment such as irrigation equipment for individuals or collective storage and
packing facilities. In certain instances, project grants fund
seed or startup capital for inputs to help smallholders overcome initial financial barriers when dealing with commercial banks.
Creating savings and sustainable funding

In several countries, members of producer organizations
agree to repay to their organization a share of the grant they
receive from the project. (Technical assistance is typically
not reimbursed.) This repayment creates a “revolving fund”
that the producer organization will use to provide credit to
its members when project support is over.
Implementing the rural productive alliances

For each alliance, a business agreement is signed between
the agency in charge of project implementation, the commercial partner, the technical service provider, and the producer organization. An Alliance Management Committee is
formed, which includes representatives from each actor,
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with the objective of monitoring implementation of the
business plan. The committee facilitates communication
between buyer and seller.
Types of alliances

Alliances can be balanced fairly evenly between producers
and buyers. They may also be dominated by either producers or buyers.
In well-balanced alliances, buyers compete to source
from organized producers. Producers can meet the buyer’s
demands and accrue individual benefits from collective
efforts. Producers in this situation improve their bargaining
power with the buyer. Success comes from the productive
use of technical assistance and the buyer’s ability to market
the product based on its particular characteristics, such as
whether it is organic or has been produced for a specific
niche market.
In Quindio, Colombia, plantain producers have a strong
foothold in determining the prices of their products. The
buyer provides technical assistance as needed, and both the
buyer and producer organization are more competitive at
their respective stages in the plantain value chain than
before.
In alliances dominated by a single buyer, the producer
organization has limited room to negotiate, even if both parties benefit from being in the alliance. In instances where the
buyer is the dominant actor, the buyer helps the producers
access the market. The added value of collectively organizing
and creating the alliance will probably go to the buyer, however, unless special efforts are made to help producers
develop negotiating skills to increase their leverage. In other
situations, with a diversity of marketing possibilities for the
producers, there is a risk that producers will circumvent the
buyer and sell directly to alternate markets.
One alliance of this type is Agrìcola Cafetelera Buena
Vista, a coffee alliance in Bolivia. The buyer provides producers with technical assistance to ensure that the coffee is
certified organic. In this instance, the buyer is very involved
with the producer organization and works to ensure good
quality conditions for the producers. Given the high costs of
organic coffee production and lack of marketing capability,
the single buyer corners the market, however, leaving producers with little room to negotiate.

THE INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

In summary, rural productive alliance projects enable producer organizations to overcome the problems faced by
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individual, small-scale producers in accessing markets
(buyers) in a sustainable way. A well-functioning producer
organization is key to the success of the model. Working
through their own organization, producers achieve
economies of scale and can ensure product quality and
traceability as required by the market. The revolving fund
managed by the producer organization enables the organization to develop financial management skills as well as
seed capital to secure future credit for members, thereby
providing a means to maintain competitiveness after the
project has ended.

differentiate their products from mainstream products
while meeting new consumer demands.

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

The lessons from unsustainable alliances have been useful in
developing recommendations to increase the likelihood that
other rural productive alliances will be implemented successfully and become sustainable. The recommendations
focus particularly on actions to ensure that alliances remain
strong and can continue even after external support ends.

BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

Benefits to producers include the following:
■

■

■

■

■

Around 600 rural productive alliances have been established in the four countries that have already begun
implementation (Colombia, Bolivia, Panama, and
Guatemala), benefitting around 32,600 rural families.
Members of producer organizations and the organizations themselves have increased their technical and management skills and improved their market intelligence,
even if the alliance between the commercial buyer and
producer organization is not sustained.
In some countries, producer organizations and their
members have improved their access to private financial
markets.
Women producers benefit. In Colombia, for example,
22 percent of the beneficiaries are women producers.
The overall result is higher agricultural incomes and
increased rural employment, especially for agricultural
workers and women working in postharvest activities.

Lessons

A main risk of any alliance is that either the producer organization or commercial buyer will default from the partnership. Of the 170 alliances implemented through the first
phase of the Colombia project—the oldest of the rural productive alliance projects in Latin American and the
Caribbean—39 have not received World Bank financing for
at least two years. Of these, 26 have maintained commercial
agreements with their buyers or have identified new ones,
representing a success rate of 67 percent.
Other alliances have not endured, for several reasons.
Often more than one factor contributes to the demise of an
alliance.
■

Benefits to buyers include the following:
■
■

■

■

Buyers secure access to products of consistently high
quality. They meet the sanitary and phytosanitary standards that are applicable to international markets and
increasingly important for domestic markets. In addition, by providing improved inputs (seed, in particular)
and training, buyers can obtain raw materials of the
quality they require.
Through the alliance, private companies invest in a community, which is a time-tested way for companies to
secure producer loyalty.
Companies that buy locally, from local small-scale
producers, enhance their image of being socially and
environmentally responsible. This image helps them to

Producers revert to previous practices. Producers have
defaulted because there is a net benefit for them in
returning to their traditional markets, despite having
secured the buyer’s partnership. The default arises when
producers, owing to technical or managerial problems,
cannot sustain the stringent requirements of high-value
markets (see below).
Producer organizations lack social cohesion. Producer
organizations can be dysfunctional in various ways. The
failure of representatives and members to communicate,
poor management, lack of capacity to manage conflicts,
and lack of social cohesion will all negatively affect the
functioning of an alliance. In Colombia, lack of social
cohesion and inability to manage conflicts were perhaps
the main reasons that alliances failed. This situation
often occurred when the producer organization was
encouraged to include more smallholders to make the
proposed alliance more socially or economically justifiable. Because the strength of the producer organization is
a prerequisite for a successful alliance, it is important to
identify such weaknesses early on and provide support to
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■

■

improve organizational and management skills. In
some cases, there is a need for additional support after
subproject implementation.
The producer organization cannot provide services to its
members. Producer organizations are often under social
pressure from the rural community at large to make services accessible to nonmembers. Producer organizations
should provide services, but only to members. This strategy keeps membership attractive and encourages producers to market through the organization so that it can
continue complying with contractual arrangements
made with the buyer. Otherwise the organization is likely
to fail.
The producer organization lacks adequate commercial or
professional skills. Producer organizations also require
management, organizational, and marketing skills to
provide services of good quality, such as the capacity to
manage a revolving fund. In Colombia, alliances that
continued for at least two years after the project ended
often involved two-tier producer organizations: grassroots organizations and their union. The first-tier
grassroots organizations are involved in managing production. At the union level, the organization deals with
procuring inputs, marketing, and financing, with paid
professional staff.

■

■

■

Recommendations

After nearly a decade of implementing rural productive
alliances in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is possible
to identify several recommendations to ensure successful
implementation and sustainability of the alliances:
■

■

98

Projects should emphasize cofinancing from commercial
credit sources in addition to matching grants to fund
business plans. Involving commercial banks means that
the issue of collateral and guarantees must be resolved.
Some projects establish guarantee funds to spread the
risks to commercial banks and encourage them to partner in funding rural alliances. Involving financial institutions at the beginning of the project can also build
their trust in producer organizations and help producer
organizations learn to deal with commercial banks. This
learning on both sides is important to ensure that
smallholders can access credit and partnerships can be
sustained.
More thorough and realistic feasibility studies of business plans must analyze the ability of the producer organization to use the matching grant productively and the

■

risk that a buyer or producer organization may default
from the alliance. Feasibility studies look into the market
and technical aspects of the alliance, but often they fail to
analyze how the organization functions and its capacity
to manage a partnership with a buyer.
To sustain participation in high-value markets, the producer organization needs to build its marketing skills.
For example, the organization could benefit from a
third-party market agent or broker to assist in breaking
into particular markets. Productive alliance projects
should consider establishing such brokers, whose role
would be to scout the market for opportunities and identify the producer groups that can take advantage of them.
These brokers should be private sector agents.
Three key areas of support could help buyers improve
the sustainability and productivity of the alliance:1
(1) sensitization to the benefits of working with smallscale producers; (2) support to optimize marketability of
niche products; and (3) sensitization to the transaction
costs associated with working with small-scale producers. Initially buyers need support to manage their relationship better with small-scale producers. An example is
being aware of smallholders’ cash constraints and the
difficulties they face in managing deferred payments,
especially with supermarkets.
During implementation, projects need to address the
constraints to sustainability that alliances may face after
project support ends. As discussed, a well-functioning
revolving fund is fundamental for ensuring that alliances
can be sustained. It enables producers to access credit
within their own organization and to demonstrate to
financial institutions their ability to manage savings and
credit. It needs to be promoted more forcefully during
project implementation.
Projects need to include a handover strategy so that
domestic actors can fund, implement, and scale up activities when project support ends. At the moment, only the
Colombia project is concerned with these issues. By
focusing on scaling up its activities through the public
sphere, however, the project is likely to face serious obstacles, such as the lack of technical capacity, budgetary
pressures on public officials, and political problems
(changes in government easily lead to changes in people,
priorities, and policies). An alternative would be to work
on the side of the buyers. Producer organizations constitute one source of procurement for an agricultural good
that buyers need for their business, and they may be the
main source if it is produced mostly by smallholders.
Once the project has demonstrated the potential that
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producer organizations represent, buyers should be
interested in continuing to invest in producer organizations, providing technical support, and prefinancing
inputs.
ROOM TO INNOVATE IN RURAL PRODUCTIVE
ALLIANCES BY SUPPORTING VALUE CHAINS

Future rural productive alliance projects should build upon
the lessons of earlier projects, especially lessons about
involving commercial banks from the start and working on
the side of buyers and agribusinesses to sustain and scale up
activities when external funding ends. Scaling up is an issue,
as rural productive alliances are still relatively small-scale
interventions; another issue is the need to improve the competitiveness of supply chains that benefit smallholders. In

the future, a good approach may be to combine the focus on
producer/buyer partnerships with a value chain approach.
The objective would be to create better productive
conditions—for example, by improving the quality of services provided to actors in the chain; improving the capacity of agencies that control compliance with sanitary and
phytosanitary standards; supporting research, development,
and innovation; addressing the administrative and institutional aspects of certification; promoting organic production or access to other high-value niches; and improving
market intelligence. Productive infrastructure, trade facilitation services, and the business environment are additional
areas that a value chain approach could address. This
emphasis could promote opportunities for promising subsectors and can help roll out the alliance model on a
national scale.
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NOTES

Thematic Note 1

Module 1 Overview

1. Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian
Enterprise for Agricultural Research).
2. Sistema Nacional de Investigación y Transferencia de
Tecnología (SNITT, National System of Research and Technology Transfer).
3. Government as well as leaders of the various
innovation-promoting participants in the AIS need a broad,
long-term perspective on agricultural development and
change, along with a sense of what is needed for such
development. They will need not only to identify innovation
and development opportunities but also to understand the
historical, cultural, and social complexities in rural areas
and among consumers. A strategic vision usually describes a
set of ideals and priorities, a picture of the future—but the
strategic vision is also a bridge between the present and the
future, and it should be shared by the actors involved.
4. However, the actual financing and allocation of funds
should belong to another entity, such as ministry or other
special agency.
5. For comparison, see module 6, TN 2 on innovation system governance.

1. For example, a culture of collaboration among stakeholders was a major factor facilitating collaboration and
innovation in Finland and Korea (see module 6, TN 2).
2. Not all interactions result in collaboration. Interactions
can also be antagonistic and result in conflict.
3. Module 4 discusses the role of, functions of, and
investments that research organizations require to perform well in an AIS. TN 2 discusses public-private
research partnerships and IAPs 2 and 3 describe the formation of research consortia supported by competitive
grants. Module 5 provides further detail on innovation
funds, including competitive research grants and matching grants.
4. Despite this weakness, a few researchers with strong
research capabilities are often found in these organizations.
5. The analysis of how public research organizations can
be transformed to better integrate into the AIS exceeds the
scope of this module. This issue is discussed in module 4
and in Davis, Ekboir, and Spielman (2008).
6. Every individual in an organization has at the very least
the power to boycott the organization’s activities.
7. As noted, a “value chain” is the set of linked activities
that a firm organizes to produce and market a product
(Porter 1985). The value chain is a network with a commercial focus, one actor that “organizes” and commands the
chain (Christensen, Anthony, and Roth 2004), and a relatively narrow and stable membership.
8. In terms of coordination, some organizations coordinate other organizations (for example, a commodity board
coordinates producer organizations, traders, and manufacturers); some coordinate individuals (for example, a farmer
organization); and others coordinate both organizations
and individuals (as in a value chain).
9. For an example from Chile, see http://www.cnic.cl/
content/view/469646/Un-camino-de-desarrollo-para-Chile
.html; for one from the United Kingdom, see http://www
.innovateuk.org/; for one from the Netherlands, see
http://www.innovatienetwerk.org/en/organisatie/toon/11/.
10. Rural households can also form community associations to solve local problems, such as problems with water
supply or education, but these organizations are not discussed in this module.
11. See module 6, TN 2 on innovation system governance.
12. Module 4, TN 4 provides further details on innovation
brokers.
13. Despite their institutional weakness, most universities
and research and extension organizations have some very
good professionals.
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Thematic Note 2

1. Fodder innovation project, http://www.fodderinnovation
.org/.
2. Golden Rice Project, http://www.goldenrice.org/.
3. For an example of this type of research and its problems,
see Hall et al. 2001.
4. Networks with this combination of actors are said to
exhibit a “small-world structure.”

Thematic Note 3

1. See http://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/particulares/
en/.
2. According to Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (2011), Fairtrade-certified sales amounted to
approximately €3.4 billion worldwide in 2008. Sales of
Fairtrade-certified products grew 15 percent between 2008
and 2009.
3. A research institute (CIP) organized Papa Andina, the
Andean potato network; the NGO Africare supported
smallholders’ access to markets, as have civil society organizations (such as the Mexican Produce Foundations) and
farmer organizations (IAP 2).
4. Providing public support for extension and advisory
services does not mean that they are provided by traditional public organizations. In the past two decades, many
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institutional arrangements that include public organizations,
private partners, and civil society have been tried (module 3).
5. Since it is not possible to produce high-value products
of uniform quality, wealthier farmers who produce large
volumes sell their produce through more than one channel.
The poorest farmers, on the other hand, have to sell at the
farm gate or in local markets.
6. For a description, see Nandakumar et al. (2010).

est width and depth needed to obtain proper coverage of the
seed. Conventional tillage practices involve multiple tractor
passes to accomplish plowing, harrowing, planking, and
seeding operations; no-till requires only one or two passes
for spraying herbicide and seeding. In addition to reducing
the number of operations, no-till requires less powerful
tractors and reduces equipment depreciation. While no-till
principles are the same everywhere—minimum soil disturbance, keeping soil covered, and using crop rotations—the
actual packages differ greatly by location.

Thematic Note 4

1. See http://www.prolinnova.net/.
2. ROPPA, Réseau des organisations paysannes et des
producteurs agricoles de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (http://www
.roppa.info/?lang=en).
3. The module overview lists the capabilities required
(box 1.7); IAP 3 presents an example of developing them
over the long term.
4. The specialized literature refers to the creation of
knowledge as “invention.” An invention becomes an “innovation” only when it is first used in a product that reaches
the market or produces a change in a social process.
5. See Ekboir et al. (2009) for an example.
6. AACREA is the Asociación Argentina de Consorcios
Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola (Argentine
Association of Regional Consortiums for Agricultural
Experimentation).
7. Centro de Investigación de la Caña de Azúcar de
Colombia (http://www.cenicana.org/index.php).

Innovative Activity Profile 2

1. Boards for many foundations, research institutes, and
firms operate in this way. The Produce Foundations are
legitimate representatives of farmers because other actors in
the AIS recognize them as such, not because farmers elect
their authorities (Ekboir et al. 2009).
Innovative Activity Profile 3

1. CONICYT (Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica) (www.conicyt.cl).
2. Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (http://www
.corfo.cl/acerca_de_corfo/emprendimiento_e_innovacion/
que_es_innovachile).
Innovative Activity Profile 4

1. Financed through community savings and thrift, the
Government of Andhra Pradesh, commercial banks, and the
World Bank.

Innovative Activity Profile 1

1. ICI’s role is described in detail because it provides
important insights into the dynamics of innovation. In particular, it shows that (1) demand-driven approaches often
miss important opportunities—the most important innovations start as curiosity-driven projects that eventually result
in something valuable; (2) innovation processes are essentially uncertain, and it is difficult to set clearly defined objectives; (3) motivated leaders are critical for success; and (4)
building an innovation network is also an uncertain process
that requires a lot of experimentation.
2. Innovators have often found themselves in a similar
situation—that is, they have a product that provides a new
service for which there is limited demand. Subsequent innovations are necessary to create a market for the original
innovation. Examples include the telephone, Internet commerce, computer hard drives, and mobile telephones
(Christensen 2003).
3. No-till is defined as planting crops in previously unprepared soil by opening a narrow slot or trench of the small-

Innovative Activity Profile 6

1. Currently no support is offered to buyers in the rural
productive alliance projects in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
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Agricultural Education and Training to
Support Agricultural Innovation Systems
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Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

gricultural Education and Training (AET) has a
major role as a creator of capacity and supplier of
the human resources that populate key segments
of the AIS and enable that system to function more effectively. Past neglect and low levels of investment have prevented many national AET systems from equipping graduates to meet the needs of modern agriculture and
contribute to the AIS. Aside from the technical knowledge
that is the traditional focus of AET, graduates require the
knowledge and tools to recognize innovative ideas and
technology, catalyze communication between other AIS
actors, and provide feedback to researchers and investors.
Graduates particularly require new, “soft” skills, such as
leadership, communication, negotiation, facilitation, and
organizational capabilities. Employers increasingly
demand these skills, which foster active participation in
the AIS.
Serious constraints to quality education and training
include weaknesses in policies that guide AET, the divided
responsibilities for parts of the AET system, poor governance of AET institutions, continuing isolation of AET systems from key stakeholders, and serious underinvestment in
AET systems. The major priority for reform is to develop a
policy framework and (innovation) policy management
capacity to guide AET. This reform underpins all others; it
has wide implications for AET, interministerial cooperation,

A

financing, and stakeholder involvement. Another investment priority—wide-ranging, systemic reform—requires
internal and external consultations with stakeholders and
an analysis of gaps between stakeholders’ expectations and
current academic programs. Other priorities for investment
include reforming curricula and teaching methods; building
capacity and stakeholder partnerships for technical education and training; and developing effective in-service and
life-long learning capacity among public workers who interact frequently in the AIS. Such reforms can be supported by
investments in capacity building and infrastructure for ICTs
to facilitate learning, research, and global and local networking and communicating. Investments in accreditation
or in a regional resource for advanced degrees may also
improve the likelihood that AET delivers content that meets
stakeholders’ needs.
Regardless of the chosen reform target, any change
initiative will be subject to resistance, and leadership and
commitment will be needed to see reforms through to the
end. Depending on the location, capacity, commitment,
and leadership for change, the time focus may shift to
require longer-than-anticipated support; in other cases,
reforms and changes may proceed faster than expected.
A broad lesson for practitioners in planning reform programs of any length is to pay close attention to building
constituencies of stakeholders at all levels to help ensure
the program’s sustainability.
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WHY INVEST IN AET TO SUPPORT
AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION?

Complementary investments in agricultural education have
been neglected but are essential to ensure a new generation
of agricultural scientists and leaders (World Bank 2004).
The growing focus on innovation systems in agriculture
presents agricultural education and training (AET) with a
challenge and an opportunity. The AIS creates demand for
skills not traditionally developed in agricultural education—
especially the “soft skills” that enable people to communicate
better, listen more carefully and efficiently, nurture leadership, work cooperatively, and generally contribute more
effectively to the AIS. The emphasis on the innovation system as a dynamic, highly interactive marketplace for ideas
challenges AET to strengthen its role as one of the critical
actors in agricultural innovation. All too often, agricultural
education is failing to impart the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that can enable countries to feed growing populations,
participate in international agricultural value chains, and
cope with climate change, especially in the midst of grinding
rural poverty.
The importance of enhanced skills for graduates who
will interact with a wide spectrum of actors in the AIS is
not in question; in fact, such skills assume even greater
importance, given that they will have to compensate for a
considerable educational deficit among the population in
general. The majority of people with whom skilled AIS
actors will interact in most developing countries have not
had access to much more than basic education. The World
Bank (2007b, 9) notes that education levels in rural areas
worldwide tend to be dismally low—an average of four
years for rural adult males and less than three years for
rural adult females in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and
the Middle East and North Africa. Research in the 1980s
established the relationship between primary education
and annual farm output (Lockheed, Jamison, and Lau
1980; Jamison and Lau 1982; Jamison and Moock 1984).
Basic education is a critical element for communication,
understanding, and assessing innovations in the interactive
process that prevails in the AIS.
For a very long time, governments and donors have
invested very little, or only very intermittently, in AET (Willett
1998; Eicher 1999; Rygnestad, Rajalahti, and Pehu 2005; World
Bank 2007b). The results are deteriorating physical infrastructure for education, overcrowded classrooms and residential
accommodations, the exodus of teaching staff, outdated curricula, inadequate teaching and learning materials, and graduates’ limited skills and employment options.
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At this critical juncture, AET remains the main supplier
of human resources for many of the public, private, and
civil-society constituents of the AIS, through its network of
agricultural universities, faculties of agriculture, vocational
and technical colleges, and farmer training centers which,
together, constitute the AET system. The central question in
this module is whether corrective investments in particular
AET models, programs, and activities will enable the AET
system to take its place as a forceful and valued agent of
innovation in agriculture, keeping in mind that major
investments in AET systems occurred decades before the
concept of “innovation systems” could influence their
design and that much work remains to be done.
The general outlines of an AET system that is capable of
operating successfully within an innovation system must recognize that the innovation system in which it operates is
dynamic. The AET system itself will need to be agile, flexible,
attuned to the needs of stakeholders in the innovation system,
and acutely aware of developments in technology, communications, and markets as well as challenges to production stemming from high energy costs, declining water resources, and
climate change. It will also need to channel advice to decision
makers on policies to guide AET at all levels.
These generalizations aside, not all AET systems are
equal. Some need deep, fundamental reform and strengthening, whereas others may require only minor adjustments
to become more effective within the AIS. Before discussing
specific investment needs and strategies over the short,
medium, and long term, this module presents a broad
review of AET—its structure, weaknesses, and strengths.
The module then describes investments in education and
training that will equip actors in the agricultural sector to
negotiate the rapidly changing agricultural landscape with
greater skill, resilience, and innovation. The need for these
investments to foster gender inclusiveness in AET systems is
incontestable (for one example, see box 2.1). Above all, this
module will emphasize that fostering a capacity for innovation on this scale will require equally large measures of
persistence and collaboration—from the agricultural and
education sectors and also from government, civil society,
and rural people.

THE STRUCTURE OF AET SYSTEMS

“Agricultural education and training” covers a range of
organized programs and activities that serve the need for
information, knowledge, and skills among those who work
in various parts of the agricultural sector and the broader
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Box 2.1 Gender-Inclusive AET: The Example of African Women in Agricultural Research
and Development
In agriculture as in other domains, innovation requires
communication of many kinds at many levels. The dissemination of knowledge, information, and innovations poses a special problem among women. Few
women graduate from agricultural education programs—too few to work with women in societies where
women are excluded from rights to land and other natural resources. Women are also marginalized from agricultural events, activities, and programs led by men or
not permitted to communicate with men outside the
family. Essentially, “women have been . . . underrepresented at all levels of AET institutions, from postsecondary to tertiary and higher education, although
detailed gender-disaggregated data are available only
very sporadically or not reported at all” (World Bank
2009, 181). An innovative program that aims at increasing the numbers of females with higher degrees in
Africa may be the beginning of a change in the gender
balance in academic and research institutions.
African Women in Agricultural Research and Development (AWARD, http://awardfellowships.org) is a
project of the Gender and Diversity Program of the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR). This professional development program was launched in 2008 after a successful pilot in
East Africa supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. It

seeks to strengthen the research and leadership skills of
African women in agricultural science, empowering
them to contribute more effectively to poverty alleviation and food security in sub-Saharan Africa. The twoyear career development package builds on four cornerstones: establishing mentoring partnerships;
building science skills; developing leadership capacity,
and tracking, learning, monitoring, and evaluating
fellowship-holders’ progress. The program does not
provide funds for the fellows’ academic studies or offer
research grants, although fellows can apply for research
attachment opportunities.
Sixty outstanding women agricultural scientists
received AWARD fellowships in July 2010, and the project currently supports 180 African women working in
agricultural research and development who have completed bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral degrees in
selected disciplines. The fellows come from Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
AWARD is a US$15 million, five-year project with
plans to expand to a second phase starting in 2013. It is
supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
the United States Agency for International Development, and the CGIAR. AWARD partners with more
than 75 national agricultural research institutions.

Sources: Author.

rural space. At the apex of the system for AET are the tertiary educational institutions such as agricultural universities or faculties and colleges of agriculture within comprehensive universities. Traditionally, higher agricultural
education produced graduates who found employment in
public agricultural research (see module 4) and extension
programs (see module 3) and other technical services
offered by ministries of agriculture. Over the years, as these
public agencies greatly curtailed hiring, holders of agricultural degrees, diplomas, and certificates have been more
likely to seek employment with agribusinesses or with
NGOs operating agricultural programs.
Other institutions in the AET system include the
polytechnics, institutes, or colleges that prepare technicians
at the diploma level (the postsecondary, subdegree level).
This category of education, often termed “agricultural

technical-vocational education and training” (ATVET) or
“vocational education and training” (VET), prepares technicians in a variety of specializations in agricultural subsectors. Some secondary schools offer agriculture as an elective
(Tajima 1985), but in most developing countries these programs have a checkered history, influenced by the qualifications and experience of the teachers assigned to the subject
and the motivation of the students who enroll. Probably the
most successful secondary agricultural education model is
the vocational agriculture program offered in largely rural
districts in the United States. The program offers academic
and practical subjects in school and, through a supervised
youth organization (Future Farmers of America), helps students develop leadership skills and technical prowess by
participating in contests and undertaking a supervised project (box 2.2).
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Box 2.2 Future Farmers of America: A Unique Young Farmer Organization

Future Farmers of America (FFA) was founded in 1928
and brought together students, teachers, and agribusiness to solidify support for secondary agricultural education. Today (circa 2011), the FFA has some 523,000
members (38 percent are female) aged 12–21 in all 50
states. Of these, 27 percent live in rural farm areas,
39 percent in rural nonfarm areas, and the remaining
34 percent in urban and suburban areas. Now known as
the National FFA Organization, FFA—with its motto of
“Learning to Do, Doing to Learn, Living to Serve”—is
dedicated to making a positive difference in the lives of
students by developing their potential for premier leadership, personal growth, and career success through
agricultural education.
The FFA is an integral part of the secondary-level
Vocational Agriculture program, which has three parts:
classroom instruction, the FFA, and Supervised Agricultural Experience (SAE). Students develop their SAE
projects in one of four categories: entrepreneurship
(the student owns and operates an agricultural busi-

ness); placement (the student gets a job on a farm or at
an agricultural business, school, or factory laboratory);
research and experimentation (the student plans and
conducts a scientific experiment, usually related to agriculture); or exploratory (the student attends an agricultural career fair or creates a report or a documentary on
the work of a veterinarian or extension worker).
Through this program, more than 11,000 FFA advisers and teachers deliver an integrated model of agricultural education that provides students with innovative
and leading-edge education, enabling them to grow into
competent leaders. The FFA provides 23 national career
development events through which members are challenged to real-life, hands-on tests of skills to prepare
them for more than 300 agricultural careers. Agriculture
is the largest employer in the United States. More than
24 million people work in some sector-related activity.
Industry values the FFA program and its graduates, contributes to the National FFA Foundation, sponsors programs, and provides individual scholarships.

Source: Adapted from www.ffa.org, accessed December 2010.

Agricultural training, frequently delivered in training
centers or training institutes, is offered to public employees
as in-service training and/or to farmers as farmer training.
Ministries of agriculture are usually responsible for agricultural training programs. Public extension services offer
training (largely to farmers) through formal presentations,
lecture-demonstrations, field days, crop and animal field
trials, farm tours, and various other media. Public agricultural research systems provide educational opportunities
for farmers and extension staff, usually in the form of field
days combined with lectures. Public sector researchers also
act as resource persons in formal, higher-level education
programs, work with extension staff to train farmers, or
provide in-service training for extension staff.
Formal AET

Traditionally, agricultural education has been supplied and
supported largely by the public sector. Although the various
elements in the AET delivery chain are often referred to collectively as a “system” (Bawden 1998, 1999; Rivera 2008), in
many developing countries it is questionable whether these
elements form a robust system in which communication
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and feedback flow between institutions and allow for
adjustments and improvements on a continuous basis. Agricultural education and learning (AEL) is a variation on AET
that reflects a more student-centered approach to formal
programs (Ochola and Ekwamu 2008).
In many countries, responsibility for education and
training for agriculture and rural development has been,
and continues to be, divided between ministries of agriculture and education. Typically, higher agricultural education
has been the responsibility of the education ministry,
whereas training for agriculture and its subsectors has been
the responsibility of the ministry of agriculture. In some
countries, the ministry of cooperatives is responsible for
providing training for a variety of cooperatives that deal
with a range of topics, including agriculture. Given the
increasing interest in farmer organizations (see module 1,
TN 4 and IAP 2) (especially as precursors to large, organized
agricultural cooperatives), cooperative colleges are becoming an important aspect of formal AET.
Whether it is part of a robust, well-integrated system or
not, agricultural education is weakened by the division of
responsibilities among ministries, the isolation of individual
ministries, and their failure to collaborate in designing and
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delivering education and training in a manner that meets
the needs of all AET stakeholders. Under these circumstances, a broad vision for AET is rarely in place. As a result,
policies and strategies for modernizing agricultural education are seldom developed.
As a small but specialized element in the bigger education picture—which includes primary, secondary, and
higher education together with vocational and technical
education and training, teacher training, and a number of
special adult education programs—agricultural education
tends to lack bargaining power when investment decisions
are made. This relative lack of visibility and clout is all the
more critical because the mounting pressure for change in
AET chiefly comes from developments in agriculture that
are outside the control of AET institutions.
Informal AET

Alongside the formal AET system, a dynamic, informal
learning system greatly influences how information, knowledge, and skills are channeled and used in agriculture. At the
heart of this system are farmers, farming families, the services they receive, and the contacts they make on a regular
basis. Informal agricultural education involves awarenessraising and training provided to farmers by public extension
and research services, by traders who purchase farm products and supply farm inputs, and by the media, which convey a variety of information to rural communities.
Farmer-to-farmer communication (see also module 3,
especially IAP 2) is one of the most powerful forces for education within the informal system. Farmers communicate easily
with their peers, observe the techniques and skills used by others, and quickly adopt what they perceive as successful practices. The actors in this AET system are linked with one
another and within the broader AIS. The many roles played by
graduates of AET, regardless of how structured or organized it
may be in a given setting, are detailed in modules 3 and 4.
In-service training and development

Public and private in-service training and development,
which can be categorized as formal AET, serves employers,
employees, extension workers, NGO technical staff, and
vocationally oriented, self-directed learners (Rivera 2008).
Similarly, the innovation system benefits from the communications and technical skills obtained by rural youth, either
in or out of school, through participation in a variety of
young farmers’ organizations. The Future Farmers of America, described in box 2.2, is a very successful but unique

example of this kind of skill development, which makes
important contributions to human resource capacity in
agriculture.
PAST INVESTMENTS IN AET

The 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s saw substantial, dedicated
investments in AET. One of the largest investments,
launched by USAID in the mid-1950s, was a long-term program that established universities similar to the United
States land-grant universities in Latin America, Asia, and
Africa. This ambitious program included technical assistance for administrative and academic activities and curriculum development, provided links to overseas advanced
degree programs, modernized libraries, and paired the new
universities with counterpart land-grant universities. The
USAID program modernized the way that agriculture was
taught and learned in many developing countries; enhanced
the quality of education, research, and extension; provided
current teaching materials; and created an international
network of agricultural education professionals.
The impact of the investment was impressive but not
always sustained. The quality of teaching and learning deteriorated. Changes in leadership, reduced funding, and the
winding down of collaboration with individual overseas
universities all reduced performance. On the other hand, a
number of universities established under the program
thrived and have continued to provide education leadership
long after the investment program closed (the Brazilian system is a case in point; see box 2.3).
During the same period, multilateral organizations
such as the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), and
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) supported AET through freestanding agricultural education projects, training
components in agricultural projects, and seminars, workshops, conferences, and in-country and international
courses. With the exception of free-standing agricultural
education projects, most of the other activities were of
short duration. The impact of the free-standing projects
depended heavily on the recipient ministry’s or country’s
commitment to sustaining the new investment. The choice
of participants for seminars, workshops, and training
courses proved decisive in terms of the usefulness of these
activities and the effectiveness with which the participant
transferred knowledge and/or technology to the parent
organization—a lesson that should not be forgotten in
designing AET projects (see TN 4). By the end of the
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Box 2.3 Brazil’s National Agricultural Research Program Benefits from Long-Term Investments
in Human Resources
In 1963, the Brazilian government took a high-level decision to build a human capital base for a modern agricultural sector. With financing from the United States
Agency for International Development, four American
land-grant universities assisted four Brazilian universities
in strengthening BSc level training for a decade followed
by another four years of support for postgraduate education. In 1971–72 more than 900 Brazilian graduate students were studying agricultural sciences in United States
universities. This experience with building human capital in programs in agriculture is directly linked to political decisions by the Federal Government and the Ministry of Education to pass the University Reform Act of
1968, which linked promotions to higher graduate
degrees and required academic staff to work full time. In
1972, when the government established the Brazilian

Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) to coordinate its national agricultural research program,
EMBRAPA continued to invest in human resources. It
launched a massive human capital improvement program that sent 500 agricultural researchers for PhD programs and spent 20 percent of its budget from 1974 to
1982 on training in Brazil and abroad (World Bank
2007a, 39). Today, one-third of EMBRAPA scientists have
a PhD, half have an MSc, and the balance have a BSc or
equivalent. The most important lesson from this experience is that Brazil did not reduce public expenditure on
its core agricultural institutions some 40 years ago when
foreign investment waned. Instead, by mobilizing highlevel political support, Brazil built a strong human capital base to sustain a globally competitive agricultural
research and extension base.

Source: Author.
Note: EMBRAPA = Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária.

1970s, funding for AET began to decline dramatically
(Willett 1998), overtaken by other development priorities.
Numbers of AET specialists in many international organizations and bilateral donor agencies decreased. Despite
pleas by numerous observers and organizations to governments, donors, and universities to rehabilitate and reform
deteriorating agricultural education programs and facilities, AET continued to drop even lower on the development agenda.
A number of generic weaknesses in the planning and
delivery of AET in developing countries have persisted.1
Briefly, these weaknesses include a lack of university autonomy, weak links to stakeholders, lack of accountability for
quality or employability of graduates, outdated curricula
and teaching approaches, weak training in practical skills,
the variable quality of programs, weak adoption of ICTs,
and low remuneration of faculty and staff.
Diploma-level AET also exhibits weaknesses, including
the absence of supporting policies, weak links to stakeholders, programs that fail to reflect labor-market needs, inadequate and inconsistent funding, and a shortage of skilled
teachers/instructors. Agricultural training at the secondary
level, which is not universally offered, is often chosen as an
“easy pass” by students. It also suffers from a lack of qualified
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teachers and is weakened by poor cooperation between v of
education and agriculture.
A 2005 review of investment in AET in projects supported in Africa by the World Bank found that the same
weak level of investment had persisted since the end of the
1970s (Rygnestad, Rajalahti, and Pehu 2005). One outcome
of the weaknesses and low investment in AET is the reluctance of students to choose agriculture as their preferred
academic pursuit (Pratley 2008; Rivera 2008; Mulder 2010).
In countries where higher education is at a premium, this
reluctance inevitably creates a situation where many of the
students who enroll in agricultural programs have a greater
interest in possessing an academic degree or certificate than
in making a career in agriculture.
KEY POLICY ISSUES

Sound policies are essential to address the recurring weaknesses of AET systems, yet weak and fragmented AET systems cannot present a united front to government or policy
makers and gain support for increasing the effectiveness of
AET. Policy guidance and support are needed above all to:
Clarify the role of AET. Divided ministerial responsibility
for agricultural education, especially for public agricultural
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universities and faculties of agriculture, prevents AET from
realizing its potential. Without a sense of urgency and collaboration between ministries of agriculture and education,
higher agricultural education will not be reoriented and
modernized to reflect the needs of a changing agricultural
and rural environment. Clarifying roles and responsibilities
of agricultural education in the development agenda (with
clear links to the agendas of the respective ministries) would
open the door to reforms that enable these institutions to
fulfill stakeholders’ expectations.
Ensure sustainable, regular funding. The allocation and
disbursement of funds for AET on a sustainable and regular
basis is essential for maintaining the quality and relevance
of education programs. Policies that underpin AET need to
recognize agriculture’s broad contributions to the economy:
as a producer of basic and export commodities, source of
employment, provider of nutritional health, and engine of
poverty reduction. It is essential that these policies are in
place and implemented and updated as changes occur in the
sector.
End political interference in university administration.
Because most agricultural universities, TVET colleges, and
training institutes are public entities, they are subject to
political influence of one kind or another. Demand for education, especially at the tertiary level, can cause politicians to
decree increases in enrollment without providing the physical, human, and financial resources to accompany higher
enrollments. The lack of resources guarantees that educational standards will fall as facilities become overcrowded,
teacher–student ratios become unmanageable, students
struggle to study and learn in unfavorable surroundings,
experienced teachers and researchers leave, and large numbers of underqualified graduates flood the job market.
Appropriate policy instruments, strictly enforced, can help
prevent interference of this kind.
Improve governance in higher agricultural education. A
related policy issue is that agricultural universities and faculties of agriculture lack autonomy. Typically, universities have
little or no control over budgets, hiring or firing of staff, links
with stakeholders, or accountability for the fate of graduates
once they leave. Policies are required to correct these weaknesses and improve the credibility and usefulness of higher
agricultural education. Universities and other third-level
entities need control over their programs, budgets, and staff.
They also need to interact with stakeholders to better understand the changing agricultural sector and amend curricula
to reflect these changes. (See also module 1, TN 1.)
Address the gender imbalance. An appropriate policy that
stipulates active recruitment and quotas for females should

be in place. The policy would also support gender balance in
the faculty and teaching staff of universities, TVET institutions, and training centers. The presence of female teachers,
instructors, or trainers can make a difference when female
students make decisions about pursuing a qualification in
agriculture.
Create a favorable environment for investing in AET and
improve the balance of investments in agricultural research,
extension, and education. Investment is uneven in research,
extension, and education—the three pillars of agricultural
knowledge and information systems. Investors find it easier to
deal with research or extension agencies, with their clear lines
of authority and organized networks, than with multitiered
educational systems, which answer to more than one ministry
and are often isolated from research and extension. Policies
should be in place to ensure that research, extension, and education work together to capitalize on their respective strengths
and present a holistic picture of their interdependence in
bringing knowledge and services to the sector. See module 6
for a broader discussion on an enabling environment.

INVESTING IN CHANGE: PRIORITIES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR AET

Given this background—the declining quality of many AET
systems, the general failure to articulate a strong policy
framework for agricultural education, and the corresponding failure of educational institutions to build a strong and
vocal constituency within the agricultural sector—it is clear
that many AET systems must change. This section discusses
some of the priorities and new directions that could reposition AET systems as catalysts and beneficiaries of innovation. These changes—carefully managed, with sustained
commitment—should enable AET to attain the autonomy,
agility, and human and financial capacity to produce graduates who meet the needs of the agricultural sector and its
diverse stakeholders.
Priorities and new directions are discussed first to provide a broad sense of the kinds of reform that AET systems
might undertake. Because the success of any reform
depends to a great extent on how it is managed, the next
section briefly presents guidelines, based on experience, for
managing change in AET. To support this kind of change in
AET systems, decision makers, AET entities, and donors
can choose among a range of specific investments, which
are discussed next. These investments can be of long,
medium, or short duration, depending on the agreed
objectives, identified needs, support time horizon, and
funding availability.
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Table 2.1 provides a useful checklist of future directions
for AET in relation to current conditions.
Investment priorities

What are the most important investments to make AET a
forceful contributor to the innovation system? Although
every case in every country will differ, and although it is
hoped that new ways will always be found to make AET

more effective, this list gives an indication of the range of
options for reform and the issues that often prove to be the
most important.
Develop a policy framework and (innovation) policy
management capacity. A major investment priority is to
seek policies from government to guide AET, enable it to
develop effective education and training strategies, and
provide it with high visibility in sector and national

Table 2.1 Current and Potential Future Directions of AET Systems
Higher agricultural education now

Future directions

Weak, unenforced, or absent policies

Clear AET policies with responsibilities defined and enforced

Weak governance

Strong governance inclusive of stakeholders

Little autonomy

Autonomy that enables staff decision making, financial control, and standards setting

Uncertain funding

Steady and regular funding guaranteed

Isolation (academically and from stakeholders)

Academic, rural community, and stakeholder connections established and maintained

Programs not accredited

Accreditation the norm

Curriculum now

Future directions

Outdated

Updated and current with stakeholders’ needs

No stakeholder input

Stakeholder consultations; input solicited and incorporated in changes; stakeholders
participate in governance

Teaching

Learning

Theory

Theory and practical application

No student attachments

Regular, organized, and supervised attachments

Inappropriate pedagogy

Effective pedagogy tailored to subject matter and learner needs

Little use of external teaching resources

External resources used in team teaching to expand knowledge and skill pool

Little use of ICT

Use of appropriate ICT the norm

Technical training now

Future directions

Heavily supply driven

Mostly demand driven

Managed by the public sector

Managed through public-private partnerships

Poorly qualified and remunerated instructors

Qualified and fairly remunerated instructors

Qualifications not certified by professional bodies

Certification ensured

Equipment in short supply and outdated

Equipment/practice areas obtained through public-private partnerships

Management of human resources now

Future directions

Weak human resource management leadership

Qualified human resource managers and trainers

Selection of trainees not based on need

All selection based on need and future tasks

Training needs assessments are not undertaken

Needs assessments are standard procedure

Little supervisor/manager involvement

Supervisors/managers consulted and involved

No evaluation of trainee performance on the job

On-the-job performance measured

Trainers not trained to instruct/teach

Qualified trainers standard

Source: Author.

114

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

development planning and implementation. This reform
alone has wide implications for AET, as well as major
implications for interministerial cooperation, financing,
and stakeholder involvement. Specific investments to
develop a policy framework might include the facilitation of
interagency dialogue, technical assistance to help draft
policies, consultations with affected parties at draft policy
stage, and policy launching where all key stakeholders are
represented. This investment priority underpins follow-up
investments that would fund needed organizational and
academic reforms—in other words, all of the other investments
listed here, whether they are pursued together or separately.
This reform effort also requires capacity-building efforts for
policy management and the design of innovation policies.
Most countries experience a chronic lack of capacity to
design and implement public policies, and the capacity to
design and implement policies that foster agricultural
innovation is even more limited (OECD 2005; Rajalahti,
Janssen, and Pehu 2008).2 See also module 6, TN 1 and TN 2
for education policy and governance processes.
Support wide-ranging, systemic reform. Once the policy
framework is in place, AET system reforms are the next major
priority. Such reforms enable universities and other
institutions of higher education to clarify their roles in relation
to the educational system, to their stakeholders, and to the
wider needs of the agricultural sector. Then they can make the
necessary adjustments to governance, administration,
curricula, pedagogical methods, the provision of in-service
and life-long education for graduates and civil society, and
partnerships and links with stakeholders, including the
private sector.
In this “inside-out” approach to reform, the system itself
(and especially the tertiary institutions) undertakes the
reform process from within and reaches out to stakeholders
to measure expectations and satisfaction with existing programs. Gaps between the supply, content, and quality of
education and training and demand in the labor market
point to reform measures that need to be taken. Investments
in system reform, especially at the university level, must
support internal dialogue, interaction between the educational institution and those who make policy and decisions,
stakeholder consultations, analysis of gaps between stakeholders’ expectations and current academic programs, formulation of the reform strategy, a schedule for its implementation, and the related costs. External facilitators (see
also module 3, TN 4) are required to manage the reflection
process, carry out the needs assessment, formulate the
reform strategy, and determine the final reform agenda.

Change what is taught and how it is taught. Very
often it is a priority to invest in reforming curricula and
teaching methods—in many instances, such changes are
long overdue. Coursework will include practical as well as
academic knowledge and skills. Traditional teaching
methods will be replaced by a learning approach that
enables students or trainees to discover and internalize
knowledge and skills and thus equip the AIS with people
who know how to communicate and share their knowledge
with others. Potential employers of graduates from the AET
system consistently report that they seek (and often do not
find) problem-solving skills, the ability to listen, the
capacity to analyze situations, and skill with information
technology (including computer applications), among
other skills (box 2.4).
In-service training: continue investing in human
resources. In-service training is an investment priority for
continuing enrichment of the innovation system.
Continuing training and learning maximizes use of
previously acquired knowledge and skills, adds the lessons
of practical peer experience, and expands human capacity
by introducing new and updated technical and social
information and knowledge. Well-managed, high-quality,
flexible in-service training and learning for public, private,
and civil-society clients expands the network of people in
the innovation system with relevant information and
knowledge. In many cases, they gain specific skills in
communicating more effectively and supporting others in
assessing the suitability and viability of agricultural
innovations.
Tap the power of ICTs. Investments in capacity building
and infrastructure that enable ICTs to facilitate learning
and research, improve the delivery of subject matter, and
support global and local networking and communicating
are critical for effective interaction within an education
system and AIS. The ICT revolution has vastly increased
the flow of information and ideas throughout the rural
space. It has also increased stakeholders’ expectations of
AET graduates, who should be familiar with the range of
ICTs and use them to communicate technical and
managerial information to others in the AIS. The
Information and Communication Technologies for
Agriculture e-Sourcebook (World Bank 2011) shows how
ICTs are used increasingly to provide advisory services,
capture and disseminate market information, and
facilitate research, learning, and communication of all
kinds (box 2.5).
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Box 2.4 The Need for a Broader Skill Set to Foster Innovation

Effective innovation systems need technical specialists
to investigate and elucidate the complex technical
aspects of innovations. Effective innovation systems
also require a cadre of professionals whose mindset
and skill set extend beyond a particular specialization
to encompass (for example) markets, agribusiness,
intellectual property law, rural institutions, rural
finance and credit facilitation, systems analysis, and
conflict management. To foster these capacities, universities must reform their curricula to include innovation systems approaches and shift toward more clientoriented, vocational courses.
The demands placed on agricultural education programs are shifting so rapidly that programs in many
locations cannot produce human resources capable of
the sorts of innovation that the world’s agricultural
economies require. To respond to these requirements,
AET programs will need to balance a highly technical
curriculum with training in a wide range of skills and
competencies. Researchers, extension agents, and other
service providers will need to bolster their professional
training with skills that support interaction with
diverse actors to collaboratively address new challenges
and opportunities and to share information and
knowledge. For example, extension agents need to
know how to build social capital by organizing rural
actors, provide diverse services from technology transfer to marketing, and serve as facilitators or intermediaries among actors (see module 3). Researchers, rather
than sequestering themselves in labs and field stations,

require managerial, entrepreneurial, leadership, negotiation, intellectual property law, facilitation, and partnering skills that educational institutions rarely cover.
To be capable of fostering agricultural innovation,
graduates of the various levels of the AET system
should possess a wide variety of skills, which may
include:
Basic skills and digital literacy: Reading, writing,
numeracy, and the ability to use digital technology and
access and interpret information.
Academic skills to pursue disciplines in advanced
educational institutions, such as languages, mathematics, history, law, and science.
Technical skills: Academic and vocational skills
required by specific occupations and knowledge of certain tools or processes.
Generic skills such as problem solving, critical and
creative thinking, the ability to learn, and the capacity
to manage complexity.
“Soft” skills such as the ability to work and interact
in teams, in heterogeneous groups, and across cultures;
communications skills; motivation, volition, and initiative; and receptiveness to innovation.
Leadership skills: Building and leading teams,
coaching and mentoring, lobbying and negotiating,
and coordinating, with a clear understanding of ethical
behavior;
Managerial and entrepreneurial skills to put innovations into practice and enable organizations to adapt
and respond in competitive environments.

Source: Adapted from Snapp and Pound 2008, OECD 2010.

Despite the evolution from traditional lecturing to interactive, student-centered learning, many AET systems still
operate in the “chalk-and-talk” era. Some systems of higher
agricultural education rely on dated lecturer’s notes as the
only teaching aid, and some vocational and technical programs cannot provide students with an opportunity to
practice on equipment or use laboratories as they learn.
Even when teachers and instructors are willing to use ICTs,
budgets are insufficient to purchase them, or unreliable
supplies of electricity make their use unpredictable. Investments in institutional or curriculum reform for tertiary
agricultural education, agricultural TVET, or in-service
training should include provisions for introducing and/or
updating ICTs and training staff to use them.
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Meet recognized standards for quality. Investing in
accreditation or certification provides universities and
training institutes an incentive to raise their academic quality
to recognized standards. Investments that develop close
working relationships with preeminent educational
institutions are another means of raising academic
standards. For institutes of higher education especially, these
alliances lead to collaborative learning programs involving
information sharing, staff and student exchanges, and joint
research. The local institution, its staff, and its graduates
gradually become much stronger contributors to the AIS.
Provide a regional resource for advanced degrees.
Given the limited resources in many AET systems, many
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Box 2.5 The Potential of ICT for AET and Its Role in an Innovation System

Many AET systems in developing countries do not
employ even low-level ICT in the teaching/learning
process. Reasons for this include poorly trained teaching
staff who have not been exposed to ICT in their training,
lack of funds to purchase ICT, unreliable power access,
and no supervisory pressure to adopt and use ICT. ICT
can improve the quality of teaching and learning and
raise the quality and relevance of AET for greater impact
within the AIS through a number of means:
■

■

■

■

■

Improved competencies among teachers. Teachers
and trainers are trained in basic ICT skills and ICTbased teaching methods.
Improved competencies among graduates. The
effectiveness and employability of AET graduates
improves because they possess ICT skills.
Better educational materials. ICT enables teachers
to access information sources and create, update,
and share learning materials.
Distance education and e-learning. ICT is integral
to creating opportunities for distance and electronic
teaching and learning.
Improved education administration and management. Throughout the AET system, ICT enables
more effective and efficient management of human
and financial resources and monitoring of student
performance.

The International Institute for Communication
and Development (IICD), a nonprofit foundation
that specializes in ICT as a development tool, has
helped to introduce a number of ICT solutions in the
education sector, which indicate the potential for ICT
within AET. For example, teachers in Burkina Faso
learned to build websites, find materials on the web,
and use video, web publishing, and other applications
to improve their lessons. Social media training helped
these teachers start an active online community for
sharing teaching materials with schools across the
country. In a similar project, Bolivian teachers
learned to create videos and CD-ROMs to support
lessons; its success inspired the Bolivian government
to launch a national program to put computer labs in
1,000 schools. At the Copperbelt College of Education
in Zambia, one initiative requires that all graduating
teachers be able to prepare lessons digitally. ICT skills
also benefit vocational training and help make youth
more employable. In Zambia, IICD helped set up a
computer lab in a youth center, where young people
learn basic ICT skills and access the web. As users
learned more about the potential of ICT, the computer lab began to offer additional services, including
secretarial and marketing support. Now ICT is also
used to support training for tailors, carpenters, and
mechanics.

Source: Author and www.IICD.org.

universities cannot provide teaching and research
opportunities at the level of excellence needed to produce
graduates who can assume leadership roles in the AIS.
Investments to create a center of excellence within a region
can provide opportunities for qualified candidates from
smaller or less-well-endowed educational systems to pursue
studies at a higher level. These candidates, on returning to
their academic bases, can contribute to the development of
new knowledge and enhance the local AIS. See also module
4, TN 5 for lessons on organizational change.
Long-, medium-, and short-term opportunities
to revitalize the AET system

The discussion here indicatively classifies investment
opportunities as long, medium, and short term to emphasize the commitment required to achieve various kinds of

objectives. Changes in AET systems, whether sweeping or
piecemeal, do not always conform to the expected process or
timeframe, and practitioners should plan for adjustments.
Depending on the location, capacity, commitment, and leadership for change, the time focus may shift to require longerthan-anticipated support; in other cases, reforms and changes
may proceed faster than expected.
Long-term investments (five or more years;
sometimes much longer). Regardless of whether the
pressure for change is internal or external, long-term
investments to support change in AET systems largely
involve wide reforms. Such investments require
considerable preparation in the form of discussion, creating
a vision for AET (see also module 7, IAP 4 for lessons on
a vision-building process), stakeholder agreements,
catalyzing inputs from facilitators, and field visits to
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successful reform initiatives. Important investment
opportunities include:
Reform of agricultural universities or faculties of agriculture in comprehensive universities. This type of reform
can be classified as internally led change even though the
impetus for change may originate outside the university.
Long-term “twinning” or collaborative links to universities recognized as leaders in AET. These links can reinforce reforms and lead to productive growth opportunities
in research, teaching, and learning through staff and student
exchanges.
Investments in the creation, capacity building, and continuing support for regional institutions that offer specialized degrees, especially at the master’s and doctoral levels.
These entities could become centers of excellence in particular fields of research and education.
The availability of competitive funds that are tied to an
agreement to bring about reforms.
The establishment of new, privately funded and managed agricultural universities—new in approach, vision,
and autonomy, not merely newly built—also fits into the
long-term investment category.
Examples of long-term investments to support reform in
agricultural education are included in one TN and several
IAPs:
TN 1: Reforming Public Agricultural Education at the
Tertiary Level. The process, benefits, risks, and lessons from
comprehensive reform in higher agricultural education are
described, and an example from China is presented in
detail. Efforts in other settings (Australia, Ireland) are discussed in passing.
IAP 1: Reforming India’s State Agricultural Universities. This IAP encapsulates lessons from a major effort to
modernize university administration and management;
update the curriculum; make related changes in pedagogy,
learning materials, and infrastructure; set new standards for
higher agricultural education; and improve human resource
management in state line departments that worked closely
with the agricultural universities.
IAP 4: Innovative Training Program for Midcareer
Agricultural Extension Staff: The Sasakawa Africa Fund
Education Program. This long-term investment focused on
expanding the skills of midcareer professionals through
degree programs featuring fieldwork as well as academic
training. The program developed strong links between
universities, the public sector, and rural communities that
benefited all concerned.
IAP 5: Chiang Mai University Links with Rural Communities to Focus Research on Farming Problems and Foster
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Curriculum Change. Some twenty years ago, the University
of Chiang Mai developed a highly influential learning and
research model that integrated faculty, students, and rural
communities. Feedback from the community experience
continues to influence the university’s research focus, its curriculum, its role in the AIS, and its international standing.
IAP 6: EARTH University, Costa Rica: A New Kind of
Agricultural University. Founded in 1990, the private,
autonomous EARTH University is an example of an institution that was newly developed to address the need to educate and train young people to deal with the region’s numerous agricultural, social, and political problems in rural
areas. Its model blends academic work with practical experience and collaboration in agrarian communities and
agribusiness.
IAP 8: Agribusiness Training for Secondary School
Graduates in Timor-Leste is a relatively short-term investment that requires longer-term support to be sustained.
Medium-term investments (three to five years).
Medium-term investments are tied to reforms and
improvements in education and training organizations, in
the quality of education and pedagogical skills, in shifting
from teaching to learning, boosting the acquisition of
practical skills, and providing life-long education and
training. More specifically, they can include needs
assessments with stakeholders at all levels in the AET
system; reforming the curriculum; improving teaching and
learning methods; building staff capacity; enhancing
communications skills; using, applying, and facilitating
access to ICTs; introducing or strengthening programs for
technicians; creating policies to underpin higher
agricultural education and TVET; modernizing governance
structures at universities, colleges, and training entities;
gaining accreditation for higher agricultural degree
programs, technical diploma programs, and certificate
qualifications; strengthening the management of in-service
training; evaluating the impact of training programs on
work performance; and establishing or strengthening
university capacity to offer outreach education and training
to external stakeholders, including the private sector and
communities. A medium-term investment could also fund
competitive grants to catalyze such changes.
Several TNs and IAPs in this module discuss medium-term
investments:
TN 2: Curriculum Change in Higher Agricultural Education. Practical steps involved in designing programs to
foster curriculum change are discussed, along with useful
supporting investments and policies.
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TN 3: Education and Training for Technician Development. TVET colleges or institutes produce technicians with
the practical skills to manage farm and agribusiness enterprises, provide practical leadership to farm organizations
and agricultural banks, and become entrepreneurs in their
own right. This TN reviews newer approaches to technician
education and training, including public-private and
agribusiness approaches.
IAP 2: Transforming Wageningen Agricultural University. In 1997, the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture initiated a major investment in the knowledge infrastructure for
agriculture that led Wageningen University to change its
focus, structure, programs, and staffing and cooperate with
a wider research, social science, and stakeholder network.
IAP 3: Curriculum Change in Agricultural Universities
Strengthens Links in Egypt’s Innovation System. Curriculum change in five universities has enabled course content
to respond to the needs of potential employers and proven
to be a good entry point for wider institutional change.
IAP 7: Technical Skills for Export Crop Industries in
Uganda and Ethiopia. Through cooperation between a
donor, training institution, and commodity group, workers
in high-value export crop industries in Uganda and
Ethiopia acquired better technical skills. Demand from
employers triggered the training.
IAP 8: Agribusiness Training for Secondary School
Graduates in Timor-Leste. A one-year certificate course on
agribusiness, piloted for three secondary schools of agriculture in Timor-Leste, highlights the value of such programs
as well as the considerable challenges, especially in rural
areas of fragile states.
Short-term investments (one to five years). Even
short-term investments can greatly enhance the capacity of
those involved in AET to be more effective communicators
and agents of innovation. For example, in-service training
programs or programs of farmer training can be improved
by offering short courses to teachers, facilitators, and
demonstrators to enhance quality, make the content more
effective, and improve the delivery of the programs.
Specialized study programs for key sector staff also fit under
this category of investment, provided that they are based on
clearly defined needs and that recipients return to
undertake a work program that is more effective as a result.
In-country, regional, or international sites may be chosen
for specialized learning depending on need and the quality
of programs offered. Support for attachments, work
experience assignments, and student community
interaction also falls into this category of investment. For

rural youth organizations, investments could support
organizer training, youth programs and competitions, study
visits, and the production of educational and media
materials.
While short-term activities do contribute to the strength
and capacity of AET, it should be recognized that interventions designed to strengthen AET systems are, for the most
part, a long-term undertaking: “Only through a long-term
outlook on change can AET systems contribute to the development of more dynamic and competitive agricultural
economies that engage farmers, entrepreneurs, extension
agents, researchers, and many other actors in a wider system
of innovation” (Davis et al. 2007). This observation is
echoed by Eicher (2006), who reported that a number of
successful AET reforms took sixty years or more and
required a continuing commitment on the part of donors or
other partners.
Short-term investments are featured in:
TN 4: Reforming the Management of In-Service Training/Learning. This note describes the rationale and steps
involved in improving the management of in-service training and the capacity of trainers to assess needs, design programs, deliver training in a variety of modes, and evaluate
its impact.
IAP 9: Vocational Training in Egypt Combines Technical
and Innovation Skills for Agriculture. Vocational agricultural education programs in 25 secondary schools in Egypt
were transformed to introduce students not only to practical
training but to higher-level skills such as problem solving,
critical thinking, and decision making. This effort involved
additional changes in pedagogy and school management.
Reforms require reformers

It is worth emphasizing again that the duration of reforms
and the examples provided here are indicative. Short-term
programs have become longer-term programs when stakeholders have championed their goals; many long-term programs have foundered when they are not institutionalized in
a sustainable way. A broad lesson for practitioners in planning
reform programs of any length is to pay close attention to
building constituencies of stakeholders at all levels to help
ensure the program’s sustainability.
MONITORING AND EVALUATING INVESTMENTS
TO REFORM AET

Monitoring and evaluation help to determine whether
investments are contributing to desired outcomes, enable
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institutions to rally support for continued reforms, and
enable institutions to adjust programs and administrative
processes. Although each particular investment in AET will
require a specific set of progress and impact indicators, most
investments to reform agricultural education have common

elements, regardless of whether the reform encompasses
entire systems or institutions or whether it addresses a specific aspect of AET, such as curriculum reform.
Table 2.2 shows corresponding indicators for investments
in each major type of reform described in this module:

Table 2.2 Measuring the Progress of AET Reforms
Comprehensive reform in entities offering higher agricultural education
Intended outcome
– University an active member of the AIS.
– Improved sector productivity through a
more effective role in the AIS.
– University offers life-long learning
opportunities to stakeholders.
– University seen as reliable and
competent source of advice and inservice learning/training.
– Improved, higher-level governance of
AET, underpinned by clear policy and
financial resources.
– Reforms institutionalized.
– Quality of university degree programs
assured through accreditation.
– Stakeholders participate in university
governance, and university has closer
ties with communities and employers of
graduates.
– University actively participates in and
contributes to national, regional, and
international AET networks.

Selected indicator

Needed action/step

– Tripartite body (ministries in charge of
education, agriculture, and finance)
established to coordinate higher-level AET.
– Representative stakeholder membership
of university board.
– Annual university budget prepared and
submitted to tripartite body.
– Annual budget approved and funds
allocated.
– Legal status of reforms finalized and
available to the public.
– Reforms presented to tripartite body
for approval and endorsement.
– University senate approves reforms.
– Staff pedagogical skills updated.
– Use of ICT for learning becomes the
norm.
– Curriculum reform approved by
university senate and tripartite body.
– Community outreach program in place.
– Student attachment mechanism working
well.
– Increase in master’s and doctoral
program enrollment.
– Staff reflect improved gender balance.

– Initiate dialogue between ministries in
charge of education, agriculture, and
finance.
– Prepare budgets on annual basis.
– Present reforms to key stakeholder groups.
– Campaign to institutionalize reforms
undertaken with decision makers.
– Carry out and analyze needs assessment
to identify gaps between current
program and labor-market expectations.
– Describe and undertake curriculum
adjustment.
– Update pedagogy to focus more on
learning than teaching.
– Improve staff remuneration and incentives
to attract and retain good personnel.
– Improve student intake selection and
gender and minority group balance.
– Hold student population to manageable
numbers to assure quality education.
– Increase use of ICT to bring higher AET
into contact with new sources of
knowledge and support.
– Forge links with universities at home and
abroad.

Reform of ATVET and VET
Intended outcome
– Role of agricultural technical education
and training is defined.
– Institution offering life-long education
and training opportunities.
– Instructors’ and teachers’ skills enhanced,
including student-centered pedagogy.
– Policies in place to underpin ATVET.
– Active stakeholder role in governance of
ATVET.
– Functioning network of ATVET/VET
institutions and stakeholder groups in
place.
– Status of ATVET/VET qualifications
improved because of certification and
support from employers.
– Facilities and equipment adequate for
supporting quality ATVET programs in
place.
– Remuneration levels in place attract
qualified instructors.

Selected indicator

Needed action/step

– Role and management of ATVET
officially approved.
– Policies officially approved.
– Public-private cost-sharing formula for
ATVET publicized.
– Public-private partnership agreements in
place for funding ATVET.
– Programs certified to agreed standards.
– Employment rates for graduates
satisfactory.
– Employer satisfaction with quality and
skills of graduates high.
– Courses certified by recognized
authorities.
– Employer and student/trainee
satisfaction with training/learning
impacts.

– Clarify responsibility for management of
ATVET.
– Establish links to the AET system.
– Establish attachment and work
experience programs, and agree on the
rules and evaluation criteria.
– Undertake training needs assessments.
– Train instructors/teachers in studentcentered pedagogy.
– Undertake survey of employers and
graduates.
– Carry out facilities and equipment needs
assessments.
– Review and adapt pay scale for
instructors/teachers.
– Funding arrangements between the
public and private sector and trainees
and their sponsors agreed.
– Courses/programs designed to meet
needs of labor market and stakeholder
employers.

(Table continues on the following page)
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Table 2.2 Measuring the Progress of AET Reforms (continued)
Curriculum change (reform)
Intended outcome
– Curriculum reflects knowledge and skills
that graduates need to meet labormarket expectations.
– Strategy for implementing
reform/change developed and
implemented.
– Functioning mechanism for continuous
monitoring of sector changes in place.
– Staff adopt appropriate pedagogy.
– Mechanism in place for continuously
monitoring the effectiveness of the
curriculum.

Selected indicator

Needed action/step

– Curriculum change team appointed and
terms of reference and work program
defined.
– New curriculum shared with key
stakeholders.
– Reformed curriculum approved by
education entity and responsible
ministry/ministries.
– Feedback from employers positive.
– Teaching staff use improved teaching
materials.
– Widespread use of ICT in teaching and
learning.
– Student satisfaction with curriculum.

– Identify leadership group to spearhead
the reform process.
– Explain curriculum change to key
stakeholders.
– Conduct needs assessment involving key
stakeholders.
– Define clear strategy and reform
process steps and assign responsibilities
for all steps in the process.
– Identify curriculum gaps and prepare
new curriculum to bridge them.
– Plan and implement training program for
teachers and instructors.
– Field-test curriculum and amend as
necessary.
– Design, test, and produce materials to
support curriculum.
– Train teachers/instructors in using new
curriculum.
– Lessons from university-community
interactions conveyed to curriculum
change managers.
– Design monitoring and evaluation plan.
– Survey employers for satisfaction with
graduate performance.

Training management and quality enhancement
Intended outcome
– Training replaced by learning.
– Clear role defined for the management
of agricultural sector human resources.
– Capacity for and regulations governing
HRM developed and in place.
– Training program design and trainee
selection improved and based on needs
assessment and analysis.
– Training/learning records maintained and
up-to-date.
– Merit-based hiring and promotion.

Selected indicator

Needed action/step

– Commitment to improved HRM agreed
and announced.
– HRM strategy in place.
– Responsibility for HRM assigned.
– Qualified persons appointed to manage
HRM.
– Budgetary support for HRM made
available.
– Training/facilitating staff skills updated
regularly.
– Training/learning materials updated and
appropriate.
– Higher staff morale and client
satisfaction reflected in surveys.
– HRM program results reviewed regularly
at ministry level.
– Circulate detailed annual
training/learning reports.

– Managers and supervisors identify
training needs.
– Prepare academic and training
achievement profiles of all staff.
– Create HRM management capacity
within units.
– Conduct HRM orientation for managerlevel staff.
– Impart needs assessment skills to
training/learning staff.
– Hire designers and create HRM database.
– Revisit job descriptions to indicate skill
packages required.
– Upgrade trainer/facilitator pedagogy.
– Acquire appropriate ICT equipment and
tools.
– Develop and allocate budgets.
– Update teaching/learning materials.
– Prepare regular and detailed
documentation on HRM activities.
– Survey impact of training/learning
programs on workplace performance.

Source: Author.
Note: ATVET = agricultural technical–vocational education and training; HRM = human resource management.

MODULE 2: OVERVIEW

121

T H E M AT I C N O T E 1

Reforming Public Agricultural Education
at the Tertiary Level
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

pproaches for reforming higher agricultural education vary but may include comprehensive, systemwide reform, curriculum reform, or programmatic reform to increase the quality and number of
degree-level graduates. Factors determining the scope of
investments to reform higher education include the size and
scope of the AET system. In large systems, decisions about
whether the reform will include all institutions or pilot
institutions are particularly important; reforms of smaller
systems can be more focused. The level and type of investment are also influenced by the time horizon to which government, the university, and donors are committed. Classic
examples of reform in higher education have spanned ten to
sixty years, but shorter investments can yield positive results
and sometimes catalyze more thoroughgoing reform. Stakeholders must agree on the need for reform, the impediments, and the steps to create an environment for successful
reform within the AET system. Investment should not proceed until key stakeholders recognize that reforms are difficult to implement and understand that reforms will lead to
improved university autonomy, funding, policy guidelines,
and governance. Proposed reforms should either fit the
existing rules governing administrative and structural
change in public entities, or changes should be negotiated to
ensure that essential reforms can be accommodated. Prerequisites for successful reform include support for change at
the highest levels and leadership that is prepared to sustain
reform over a considerable period.

A

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

Institutions that provide higher agricultural education are
often aware that their graduates are not meeting the needs
of the agricultural labor market. Perhaps graduates are not
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finding employment, or stakeholders report dissatisfaction
with the quality of graduates. Yet policies are rarely in place
to help universities identify and correct structural and programmatic weaknesses before they become serious. A strategy to correct those weaknesses would help universities
organize themselves to develop and deliver programs that
build the technical capacity and other skills required to foster effective innovation, interaction, and communication
with others in the AIS.
Reforms that bring about meaningful, lasting change in
higher education are hard to implement. They demand
leadership, time, financial resources, and persistence.
Reforms on this scale are not one-dimensional. They must
often encompass policy and strategy formulation, stakeholder cooperation and involvement, governance changes,
increased university autonomy, curriculum updating, pedagogical capacity building, increased practical work by students, and stronger links to rural communities. The weaknesses of agricultural education at the tertiary level in most
developing countries are sufficient in themselves to make a
convincing case for reform, but amid the challenges of persistent rural poverty, globalization of markets, climate
change, and continuing demand to feed a large population
from a stressed natural resource base, the case for reform is
more urgent than ever.
Enabling graduates to operate effectively in the innovation system can lead to increased agricultural productivity,
better livelihoods, and less poverty. These outcomes are
more assured when agricultural education plays an effective
role in the innovation system for agriculture. Although the
particular approach to reform may vary, the priorities for
reform are similar in many cases. The approaches to reform
and elements of investment discussed in the remainder of
this note reflect these priorities:
■

Develop or update policies that describe and guide
higher agricultural education in the broader educational

■

■

■

■

■

system and in the agricultural sector. The policies that
guide AET must be aligned with agreed recommendations for reform.
Pursue an agenda of agreed, specific reforms within
agricultural universities, faculties of agriculture, and
agricultural colleges to revitalize management and
governance, increase autonomy, improve teaching methods, update curricula, ensure financing, strengthen relationships with clients, encourage the use of ICTs to enrich
learning, and focus on stakeholders’ needs as well as
external influences, such as climate change and global
trade in agricultural commodities.
Institutionalize reforms to ensure that reforms are
agreed by decision makers and university administrators, clearly documented, approved by the university
governing body, incorporated in guidelines and policy
instruments, and available to all stakeholder groups.
Attain accreditation of reformed universities and their
programs to give them, their staff, and their degree programs national, regional, and international credibility.
Base curriculum reform on consultation with stakeholders to ensure that the resulting degree and diploma
programs are relevant.
Link curriculum reform closely to pedagogical reform,
especially to adopting a student-centered, practical
approach to learning.

INVESTMENT NEEDED

The heterogeneity of AET systems across the world suggests
that the kind of investments required will be similarly
diverse. Reforms will need to be tailored to the prevailing
situation, including the needs of specific groups of stakeholders (farmers, processors, marketers, and consumers of
agricultural commodities, for example). Innovations in the
management, relevance, and quality of higher agricultural
education will depend on factors such as the quality of leadership at a given university, the incentives to undertake
reform, the university’s capacity to accept that gaps may
exist between current programs and standards and stakeholders’ expectations and needs, and the level of support
from decision makers who finance and guide education and
agricultural development and management. Reforms may
encompass single or multiple universities; they may be long
or short term; and they may be funded by government
and/or external donors.
The impetus for reform in AET can come from different
sources, and organizations can pursue many different paths
to reform. Regardless of the source of pressure for reform

or the path (direct, indirect) taken, all efforts to foster
change require consensus among stakeholders, support for
change at the highest levels, and leadership to sustain
change over time.
It is critical to remember that investments to reform agricultural education, especially at the higher levels, are also
long-term investments in a more robust AIS and in greater
productivity throughout the agricultural sector. With this
ultimate goal in mind, this section introduces alternative
approaches to reforming and modernizing higher agricultural education, lists the main investment elements in each,
and presents examples of good practice.
Comprehensive (“big bang”) reform

The most direct path to reform, often catalyzed by external
pressure, leads the agricultural university or faculty of agriculture to compare stakeholders’ expectations with program
offerings and use the gaps between the two to create an
agenda for change. The change agenda needs buy-in from
university management and, when implemented, needs to be
institutionalized through policy, regulations, and formal
recognition by the ministries in charge of education and/or
agriculture. This “big bang” reform requires leadership and
prior agreement among a number of actors, including university management, faculty, and staff; decision makers at the
resource allocation and policy levels; stakeholders who
employ graduates; and students and their families. The main
elements of investments in this type of reform include:
Facilitating dialogue between the main stakeholders to agree
on the need for and scope of the intended reforms and to
assign responsibility for each reform step and activity.
Undertaking a needs assessment (skills gap assessment)
that reflects differences between the capacity of present
graduates and the expectations of those that hire them.
Analyzing the outcome of the needs assessment and designing a change agenda.
Formulating a strategy for implementing the change agenda
and supplying the facilitation capacity to move the strategy forward.
Convening stakeholder meetings to apprise all involved with
progress and resolve difficulties in implementing the
change agenda.
Finalizing the list of change-promoting activities and clearly
specifying their implications for governance, organizations, personnel, and budgets.
Presenting the detailed change strategy to university management and to policy and decision makers at high levels
in the government.
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Undertaking preparatory activities to develop a refocused
academic program, such as leadership strengthening,
curriculum adjustment, improved pedagogy, administrative capacity enhancement, information technology
upgrading, strengthened links to stakeholder/employers,
and community outreach.

A concrete, stepwise example of a complex, long-term,
national effort to reform higher agricultural education
comes from China (box 2.6). In addition to China, a diverse
group of countries has undertaken reforms in higher
agricultural education. India implemented a large, externally
funded project to reform its State Agricultural Universities

Box 2.6 Reforming Higher Agricultural Education in China, 1990–2000

By the late 1980s, as China gained momentum in moving toward a market economy, the higher education system for agriculture (created in the 1950s in the image of
the Soviet system) recognized that its graduates would
not have the skills to perform well in the changing labor
market. Developed for a planned economy and operating under a centralized administrative system, China’s
institutions of higher agricultural education had little
autonomy. They had no control over staff recruitment
and finances. They struggled to accommodate to the
changes brought about by the market economy.
Catalysts of reform. External and internal factors catalyzed the decision to reform China’s higher agricultural
education system. The three principal external factors
were: (1) better-qualified, better-skilled graduates were
needed to solve emerging technical and managerial problems in the agricultural sector; (2) government pressure
to improve the efficiency of investments in education and
reduce costs; and (3) lessons from reforms in other countries. Internal pressure for reform included: (1) demand
from higher education institutions to gain greater
authority to plan agricultural education, develop curricula, and manage personnel; (2) the need to rationalize the
use of academic staff and bring about efficiencies in
teaching and research; (3) the realization that teaching
staff and institutions had to merge if they were to deliver
graduates with the desired skills; (4) the need to use agricultural education infrastructure more efficiently; and
(5) the need to reduce staff and personnel costs.
Steps in the reform process. Reform began toward the
end of the 1980s with an analysis of internal and external
problems and constraints that emerged from implementing reforms in the national economic system. This
process—initiated mainly internally by the agricultural
education institutions and the Ministry of Agriculture
(MOA)—was informed by the outcomes of a conference
and several meetings. Reforms were implemented in four
main steps. The first was to formulate a reform strategy,
concept, and guidelines to address the problems and

constraints identified and integrate them with national
institutional reform. This step was taken jointly in 1993
by MOA and the Ministry of Education (MOE), with
support from central government. The second step,
undertaken from 1993 to 1995, was to initiate pilot
reforms at some universities. These pilots, which focused
on internal structural reform and merging institutions,
tested the reform concept and contributed to an action
plan for large-scale reform in higher agricultural education. In the third step, the agricultural education institutions, MOA, and MOE synthesized their experiences with
the pilots. Based on the outcome of this learning exercise,
MOA formulated an action plan for launching the
national reform in higher agricultural education in 1996.
The fourth step was to implement the reform throughout
China from 1996 to 2000. That process was guided by
MOA and MOE in cooperation with provincial governments. In some cases, the reform process continues.
Stakeholders and their contribution or involvement. Many institutions collaborated and cooperated
in the reform. The MOA helped formulate the reform
strategy and action plan. The MOE was involved in
designing and implementing the curriculum reform
and merging institutions. Central government participated in the earlier stages, and provincial governments
participated in merging institutions. Employers supported curriculum and employment reform, and
students and their parents pressured the higher agricultural education institutions to improve internal education management and bring about financial reform.
Staff of agricultural education institutions participated
in planning and implementing internal structural
reforms, and education research institutions provided
concepts and guidance with regard to the reform.
Changes emerging from the reform. The major
changes emerging from the reform included:
• decentralizing the administrative structure to the
provincial government level and giving more
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 2.6 Reforming Higher Agricultural Education in China, 1990–2000 (continued)

decision-making responsibility to higher agricultural education institutions;
• changing curricula and pedagogical approaches;
changing student enrollment; aligning employment
patterns more closely with labor-market expectations;
• changing internal administrative structures to
enable better recruitment and motivate staff; and
reforming logistical systems (leading to efficiency
and financial savings).
Note that no gender reforms were needed. The
institutions involved did not have gender discrimination in recruitment or promotion of professional
staff.
Other results of reform. Institutions involved in
higher agricultural education gained more autonomy in
implementing and managing education and research
and in balancing agricultural market needs with national
education guidelines. A performance-linked staff
recruitment and remuneration system was integrated
into the management system for these institutions. Education efficiency improved significantly. Funding also
improved, because student fees were raised and enrollment rose by 10–15 percent. Curricula and teaching
methods are better, more flexible, and more studentfriendly since the reforms took place. The establishment
of a Rural Development section (faculty) has contributed to meeting the challenges of rural development.

New teaching methods introduced by the College of
Rural Development set a good example for further
reforms in teaching methods for other faculty.
Lessons learned. Some aspects of the reforms were
very specific to the national context. For example, once
reform was agreed upon, it proceeded according to plan.
All key actors cooperated in meeting a major economic
challenge that demanded better-educated and trained
graduates from higher agricultural education institutions.
Even amid strong collaboration and support, the
reforms took a decade to achieve their main objectives,
and the process continues to evolve. The lesson is that
if higher agricultural education is to be reformed in a
comprehensive way, the investment in time and continued support will be substantial. In China, even with
strong agreement over the reforms, the reforms did not
always work smoothly, especially when institutions
were merged and the rapid rise in enrollment placed
high pressure on teachers and on space.
Reforms had winners and losers among educational
institutions and staff as the entire system was made
more cost-effective. Notably, reforms in student enrollment and placement systems did not seem to improve
employment among graduates, who found it more difficult to gain employment owing to greater competition for jobs. Government funding is still less than
required, especially for higher agricultural education
institutions in poorer areas.

Source: Liu and Zhang 2004.

(IAP 1); the established, respected Wageningen Agricultural
University in the Netherlands made major adjustments to
management and curricula when faced with declining student numbers and imminent restructuring (IAP 2).
Curriculum reform

An often effective though less direct approach to institutional reform can begin with curriculum change across
degree programs. TN 2 discusses curriculum reform in
detail, but here the point is that while curriculum change is
being implemented, often it exposes other organizational
and academic problems and leads to further and deeper
reforms. Egypt provides an example of this type of investment. Five Egyptian universities undertook radical curriculum and pedagogical change and forged strong links with

stakeholders (IAP 3). Curriculum reform can be undertaken
directly as a project within the university or faculty of
agriculture (see TN 2) or less directly by strengthening
links with rural communities as in the cases of Indonesia
(box 2.8), Thailand (IAP 5), and Africa (IAP 4). In the less
direct approach, when university research and teaching staff
and students become involved with farming families and
communities, their understanding of agricultural and rural
problems improves, giving rise to innovative solutions and
to curricula that are relevant and that reflect the real circumstances of rural communities. Once the value of
reforms in the curriculum or graduate-level courses is recognized and appreciated, a movement for deeper reform
arises from within the organization.
Another approach to curriculum change is to repackage the
traditional agricultural degree as a number of better-focused
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programs that attract student interest and support. Ireland
offers a recent example of such an approach. In response to
declining student numbers, Ireland’s public universities
changed their enrollment procedures during academic year
2000/01 so that new students could apply to nine agricultural degree programs (each with a specific focus) rather
than to one generically defined “agriculture” program. This
change greatly increased the number of students choosing
agriculture, an increase that has been sustained (Phelan
2010; MacConnell 2010).
Curriculum enhancement to better prepare graduates
for the demands of the modern agriculture sector is
another method of supporting curriculum change.
Ethiopia launched a Rural Capacity Building Project (2006)
that focused on new, university-level courses that would
respond to labor-market needs. The courses added would

include civics, ethics, communications skills, and entrepreneurship.
Box 2.7 describes the main investment elements of direct
and indirect curriculum reform. The elements of direct
reform echo the experience in China (described in box 2.6)
and India (IAP 1). The elements of indirect reform echo the
experience in universities such as Chiang Mai University
(IAP 5) and even (on a smaller scale) in postsecondary education (in Timor-Leste, IAP 8) and in-service training (in
Ghana and beyond, IAP 4).
Reforms catalyzed by increasing the number and
quality of graduates with higher degrees

Yet another indirect approach to reform is to invest in new
or upgraded doctoral or master’s degree programs that

Box 2.7 Main Elements of Investment in Direct and Indirect Curriculum Reform
The elements of investment in direct curriculum
reform include:
■

■

■

■

■

■

■

Facilitating dialogue between the main stakeholders
to reach agreement on the need for and scope of the
intended reforms and assign responsibility for each
reform step and activity.
Organizing and facilitating a series of meetings
between university managers, academic staff, and
representatives of key stakeholder groups to identify
gaps between stakeholders’ expectations and the
quality of graduates from the academic entity.
Undertaking a skill gap analysis to better understand
what kind of curriculum change must be considered.
Reviewing and updating the curriculum, using
external expertise if needed.
Packaging revised curricular materials to suit a variety of learning styles—for example, offer material in
several media such as print, CD-ROMs, DVDs,
video, learning management systems (Moodle is
open-source software to create online learning sites)
and formats (textbooks, teachers’ aids, case studies,
and so forth).
Pedagogical upgrading for teaching/facilitating
staff.
Designing a monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
instrument and implementing M&E.

■

Adjusting or revising curricula, based on the results
of M&E and user feedback.

The main investment elements in indirect curriculum
reform through community outreach include:
■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

Facilitating dialogue between university management, faculty, and community leaders to agree on
the need for university-community cooperation
and on the operational approach.
Agreeing on the details of the university-community program, including its goals and the responsibilities of both sides.
Arranging for university staff and students to visit
and reside in communities.
Adjusting curricula to incorporate community
involvement in the academic program.
Facilitating staff and student experiences and observations in communities and translating these activities into processes for developing technical and
social solutions.
Organizing meetings with communities to share
results of university-community interaction.
Accommodating feedback from universitycommunity experiences in an adjusted curriculum.
Funding the logistical arrangements for student and
faculty involvement in community links.

Source: Author.
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strive for excellence. These programs will produce human
resources with a better capacity to generate knowledge and
greater leadership ability (among other skills). Graduates
will staff agricultural universities and faculties of agriculture
and, through their work, catalyze reform. The key investment elements in achieving curriculum and program
reform indirectly, by improving the quality and quantity of
higher agricultural degrees, include:
■

■

■

Identifying academic institutions that could become
centers of excellence or hubs for obtaining higher
degrees.
Facilitating dialogue between the centers of excellence
and universities that could potentially supply them with
degree candidates. Those universities may be unable to
afford the staff or infrastructure to support the volume
or quality of higher degrees needed.
Upgrading facilities at the centers of excellence.

■

■

■

Supporting academic staff capacity with training and
pedagogical skills and tools.
Underwriting some or all of the cost (fees, travel, subsistence) of students accepted from smaller universities to
attend the center of excellence.
Subsidizing research costs in candidates’ home countries
while they fulfill their degree requirements. This item
would include students’ costs in undertaking research and
supervisors’ costs in undertaking visits to the research sites.

Anticipating future knowledge and skill needs for
the sector. Investment in brainstorming about future
knowledge and skill needs for the changing agricultural
sector can lead to better education planning and resource
allocation (box 2.8 presents an example from Indonesia).
In the United States, the Association of Public and LandGrant Universities launched the Kellogg Commission on the
Future of State and Land-Grant Universities in 1999,1 and

Box 2.8 The Pursuit of Relevance Spurs Reform in Bogor Agricultural University, Indonesia
Bogor Agricultural University—Institut Pertanian
Bogor (IPB)—was a pioneer in higher agricultural education in Indonesia. It developed the first four-year
undergraduate degree program in 1974 and Indonesia’s
first graduate school of agriculture in 1975, actively
recruited students from high schools throughout the
country, introduced community extension programs,
and established a regional planning board. More
recently, IPB envisioned additional changes in management, organization, academic programming, community participation, and international outreach to
continue developing and remain relevant.
These changes were reflected in the university’s
decisions to: reengineer the academic and administrative functions in education, research, and community
services; develop human resources; undertake activities to generate revenue; revitalize the financial and
funding systems, infrastructure, and infrastructure
management; and strengthen the management of
information systems and IT facilities. Improved governance was a prerequisite for these changes, including
the creation of a board of trustees and an academic
senate, the use of auditors, the development of university organizations, and portfolio analyses by all university units.

The curriculum was transformed by introducing
more programs that involved additional stakeholders,
most importantly the community. To reinforce the
involvement with stakeholders, IPB emphasized the
formation of a network and good working relationship
among the various stakeholders in the Bogor area.
Aside from IPB, these stakeholders consist of research
institutions, the private sector, NGOs, farmers, and
rural communities. Examples of collaboration that are
already in place include the Integrated Pest Management and Biological Control project in northern West
Java and southern Sumatra, a shrimp restocking project in Sukabumi, an animal husbandry project, and
reforestation and community participation projects.
An entrepreneurial spirit was developed by involving
students, communities, and the private sector in joint
projects (such as a fish-processing project currently
underway), by refocusing research at university centers, encouraging the development and submission of
patents by the university community, encouraging
agribusiness incubator programs, renewing the focus
on community outreach and rural mediation programs, emphasizing programs featuring studentcentered learning, and developing effective international
networks and linkages.

Source: Wirakartakusumah 2007; www.IPB.org.
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the Secondary Vocational Agricultural Education Program
undertook a three-year (1996–99) program, Reinventing
Agricultural Education for the Year 2020, with funding from
the W.K. Kellogg Foundation (National Council for
Agricultural Education 2000). See also module 7, TN 3 and
IAPs 4 and 5 for foresighting and visioning.

the role of higher education in agricultural development,
give educational institutions the autonomy to provide
high-quality education and cooperate with stakeholders,
and guarantee the financial resources to underpin comprehensive reforms.

LESSONS LEARNED
Designing new agricultural education programs

Occasionally opportunities arise to create a new educational
institution, giving designers the freedom to develop a curriculum and adopt pedagogical approaches that best suit the
new institution’s mission and goals. New, privately funded
universities were established in Costa Rica (IAP 6) and
Honduras (in Zamorano, to produce graduates with the
technical and entrepreneurial capacity to work as selfdirected entrepreneurs or as employees in agribusiness, the
public sector, or NGOs).

POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF INVESTMENTS TO
REFORM HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION

Reform that is supported by the academic entity and taken
to a satisfactory conclusion can have a number of important
impacts on the effectiveness of the innovation system. As
mentioned, higher agricultural education can contribute
more effectively to agricultural and rural development by
producing human resources who can solve problems related
to technical agriculture, social issues, and external factors
such as the changing climate and globalizing markets. The
AIS functions better, because graduates are better at listening, analyzing technical and social situations, proposing
solutions, and interacting well with all actors in the AIS.
Investments in higher education foster greater scope in agricultural research systems to identify and internalize community issues and problems and make them part of the
research agenda. Finally, investments in higher education
can endow extensionists with the technical and soft skills to
build a better two-way bridge between researchers and their
rural clients, because extensionists become more proficient
in identifying, analyzing, and communicating issues and
technical responses.

POLICY ISSUES

The policy issues that apply to AET in general (see the module overview) are relevant for reforming public agricultural
education at the tertiary level. Such policies would clarify
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An important general lesson is that the reform of tertiary
agricultural education is a complex undertaking, involving
numerous actors with varied interests in the outcomes and
requiring considerable commitment on the part of reformers, the university or other institutions involved, stakeholders, and decision makers. In many respects, reform needs to
be continuous if higher agricultural education is to respond
to needs that will always be changing. The following sections discuss the conditions needed for reform to succeed,
factors that influence the level of investment in reform, and
more specific lessons from reforms undertaken over the
years.

Conditions for reform

Investment in AET reform is appropriate when the
reform/change, regardless of its source, is supported from
within the system. Even then, high-level decision makers,
university administrators, and other key stakeholders must
clearly understand that reforming higher agricultural education is a long-term process that must be seen to its conclusion. Experience indicates that the length of the process
depends on where the reforms are undertaken, but periods
of 10 to 20 years are not unusual. In fact, if the reform is
truly successful, the change process continues as the higher
education system monitors changing needs for knowledge
and skills and encourages organizational responses on an
ongoing basis. In other words, a short-term project
approach to reforming major educational entities or an
entire system is unlikely to have a lasting impact.
Another important condition for reform (recall the
example from China) is that the ministries in charge of education and agriculture must agree on the responsibilities of
each ministry for the reformed entity and must be willing to
modify those responsibilities if the assured future of the
university is at stake.
Decision makers and the higher education entity must
also understand that change will almost certainly include
greater autonomy for the university. The lack of autonomy
is a key generic weakness of higher agricultural education. It
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curtails institutional agility in responding to developments
in the agricultural sector and stakeholders’ concerns. The
lack of autonomy prevents university administrators from
managing a range of human resource issues, from the hiring
of staff with new skills to the termination of nonperforming
personnel, and the lack of autonomy prohibits financial
decisions from being made at the entity level.
Stakeholders must be involved in formulating as well as
implementing the reform program. In this process, the
needs of women and minority groups must be taken into
account. Equity and gender balance concerns should be
debated in formulating the reform investment program and
set of achievable indicators.

Deciding on the level of investment

The level of investment is influenced by the size and scope
of the AET system. In some countries, a network of universities and colleges offers higher agricultural education
(China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa are examples). In such large systems, decisions about the scope of
reform are particularly important: Will the investment
cover all institutions in the AET system or only selected
institutions to begin with? Other countries typically have
only one or two higher education institutions in their AET
systems, so reform initiative can be more focused.
Another important decision that influences the level and
type of investment is the time horizon to which government, the university, and donors are committed. Although
educational institutions are conservative and slow to
change, slowness can provide a sense of continuity. Paarlberg (1992) has observed that “while the pace of change in
our institutions and rhetoric has been too slow, some lag
does permit accommodation without inducing chaos.”
Reforms take time and require adjustments as the reform
process unfolds.
The classic examples of reform in higher education have
spanned periods from ten to sixty years, but shorter investments can yield positive results and sometimes catalyze
more thoroughgoing reform. Stakeholders’ roles in the
process also have an important influence on the type and
scope of reforms. External stakeholders can often articulate
demands to policy makers more freely than those who work
in the AET system, and their influence can convince decision makers to support organizational and curriculum
change. Another factor shaping the investment is the ability
of the AET system and its supporters to persuade the ministry of education that AET merits an adequate share of

education funding to support the outcomes of reform.
Because AET is a small element in the larger national education picture, a very convincing case must be made.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

Donors, in addition to committing to the reform process,
should be prepared to create a suitable setting in which dialogue between stakeholders can bring about a common
understanding of the need for reform, the impediments to
reform, and the steps that must be taken to create an environment within the university or university system where
reform can succeed. The amount of dialogue and interaction that should occur among stakeholders before reforms
can be initiated must not be underestimated. Sufficient time
must be allocated to enable that phase of interaction.
Once decision makers—ministers of education and/or
agriculture—and managers in the university/faculty of agriculture agree on the approach to reform, the details should
be developed by the university or faculty of agriculture or a
joint working group comprising high-level ministry personnel and a representative reform team from the university.
When systemwide reform is the objective, considerable
investment must be made in ensuring that all key actors in
the reform process participate in the conceptualization and
design of the reform. (See also module 6, TN 2.)
Investment should not proceed until all key stakeholders
recognize that reforms are difficult to implement and can be
affected by political, economic, and social factors. Nor should
investment proceed until it is evident that well-articulated
reforms are supported by decision makers who are convinced
that change is needed and will persist until reforms are
institutionalized.
Investments in major reforms should proceed based on
the understanding that reforms will lead, among other outcomes, to improved university autonomy, funding, policy
guidelines, and governance (with clear lines of responsibility for university oversight and stakeholder involvement).
Reforms should also lead to greater staff support for meeting standards for higher agricultural education and better
faculty and staff remuneration and incentives. See modules
6 and 7 for a broader discussion.
Leadership is vital to remain focused and maintain
momentum. Reform leaders need to be identified and
exposed to examples of effective reform programs in other
entities of higher agricultural education so that they may
provide the leadership and articulate the vision for the
process to succeed.
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Box 2.9 Key Steps in the Reform of Higher Agricultural Education
The key steps in the reform of higher education
include:

■

Decision makers agree on the reform strategy and
its content, which is publicized to university/faculty
administrators, staff, and other key stakeholders.
A timetable for the reform is drawn up. It identifies
tasks and responsibilities in detail for all stakeholder
groups.
Academic programs are analyzed with the help of
facilitators.
Consultations with key stakeholders are conducted.
Gaps are identified between current program content and stakeholders’ needs and expectations.
A change agenda is drawn up to bridge the gaps.

■

■

■

■

■
■

■

■

■

■

■

A timeframe for implementing the change agenda,
the human and other resources requirements, and
cost estimates are produced.
The reform proposal is presented to decision makers for approval and funding.
The change agenda is implemented. In some
instances, the strategy is piloted in a limited number
of locations in the AET system. Later, reforms are
scaled up across the system.
As reforms proceed, the process is adjusted, based
on lessons learned.
Decision makers formulate appropriate policies to
support the reforms.
Reforms are institutionalized within the higher educational institution.

Source: Author; Liu and Zhang 2004.

The capacity of organizational units to implement
tasks in the reform process must be assessed (See also
module 7, TN 2 in particular) before it starts. Investors
need to understand the rules that govern administrative
and structural change in public entities. Proposed reforms
in the AET system should either fit the existing rules, or

130

changes should be negotiated to ensure that essential
reforms can be accommodated. This critical issue is discussed in detail in TN 4. Once stakeholders agree on the
scope of the reform and understand the commitments
needed, a series of logical steps must be taken to develop
and implement a practical reform agenda (box 2.9).
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 2

Curriculum Change in Higher Agricultural Education
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

gricultural curricula require frequent updating to
remain relevant to the agricultural sector, its
many stakeholders, and the AIS. Updated curricula must reflect technological and social change, consumers’ preferences and concerns, external phenomena
(climate change, globalization), and governance issues
related to natural resources. Modern agricultural curricula
feature a learning approach centered on students, use a
range of technology for instruction, and emphasize practical experience gained at university laboratories, farms,
other facilities or external sites. Curriculum change can be
undertaken directly through the academic institution, key
stakeholders, and faculty or indirectly through student and
faculty links to rural communities and other stakeholders.
Key recommendations are to take the time needed to communicate with all key stakeholders, base changes on a thorough analysis of needs as perceived by all stakeholders,
institutionalize changes to the curriculum and in the roles
of stakeholders within and outside the university, and press
for adequate, sustained financial resources. If new skills
(beyond the technical and production agriculture skills traditionally taught in AET systems) are identified in the
needs analysis, the question of how and where they will be
taught must be answered. Establish a mechanism for regularly monitoring and evaluating the impact of curriculum
change; this information is important for decision makers
who make policies supporting higher agricultural education. Ensure that curriculum change is sustained through
organizational mechanisms that involve all key stakeholders on a regular, ongoing basis. Encourage links with universities that have completed or are in the process of implementing curriculum change. Finally, changing the content
of the curriculum may be the easiest part of investing in
curriculum change. Additional investments will be
required in organizational arrangements, staff and faculty

A

capacity, and monitoring and evaluation. This expanded
agenda, its cost implications, and the time needed to
complete the change process, must be considered when
making investments in curriculum change.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

For the agricultural sector, the AIS, and the rural space more
widely, agricultural curricula require frequent updating to
reflect technological and social change as well as consumers’
preferences and concerns, external phenomena such as climate change and globalization, longstanding agricultural
and social issues affecting the rural poor, and governance
issues related to natural resources, including legal rights to
those resources (Villarreal 2002). Aside from technical
knowledge, awareness is growing that students also require
skills in listening, analyzing problems, seeking innovative
responses, and communicating if they are to work effectively in any setting. Although specific reforms will be
driven by clearly defined needs, curricula that fit the human
resource requirements of modern agriculture have been
described (Ruffio and Barloy 1995; Wallace 1997; McCalla
1998).1
Universities typically are alerted to the need to revise,
update, and reform curricula by concerned stakeholders,
international exposure of staff to other university curricula, and the internal realization that students are not well
prepared for the world of work. Curriculum change, once
the need is recognized internally, is perceived as less threatening than major organizational reform and can usually be
completed in a shorter time. The danger of opting for curriculum reform, however, is that the institution may be
avoiding true organizational reform (Hansen 1990). Given
that a relevant curriculum must reflect the labor market’s
needs for graduates, however, sooner or later the university
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may be forced to confront and correct the governance,
administrative, and academic weaknesses that prevent it
from meeting the needs of stakeholders in the agricultural
sector.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

The specific investments that make agricultural curricula
more relevant can be divided into those that catalyze curriculum reform and those that support the individual activities through which a curriculum is revised and integrated
into academic programs. Although external actors—whether
they are government, donor, or other stakeholders—can
catalyze the decision to revise the curriculum, the AET institution itself must assume the role of champion. Internal
leadership that mobilizes faculty, staff, and key stakeholders
in favor of curriculum change is critical to success.
Investments for catalyzing reform include:
■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■
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Support for stakeholder interactions that examine the
relevance of the present curriculum to labor-market
needs.
Resources to ensure that a strategy for undertaking curriculum change is developed.
Investments that support the curriculum change strategy
may include:
Support for staff to design, develop, and produce new
content for the curriculum and the corresponding learning methods and materials (IAP 3 provides an example
from the Arab Republic of Egypt).
Training for teachers, instructors, and facilitators to
ensure that they are comfortable with the new material
and have the confidence to guide students in a learning
rather than a teaching mode.
Support for teaching and facilitating staff to learn to use
ICT effectively in teaching, learning, and more effective
communication in the wider AIS.
Training to ensure that practical sessions are planned and
implemented effectively (see the discussion that follows).
Staff and students who are unaccustomed to practical
skills programs will require orientation. The programs
themselves will require added inputs to ensure that they
meet high standards and are delivered well.
Faculty and staff may need to be introduced to the successful use of external resource persons for enriching
academic programs (see the discussion below).
Support for university-community interaction to foster
curriculum change indirectly (see the section on “Potential Benefits”).

A critical area for support is to ensure that the new
curriculum reflects and improves links to stakeholders in the
agricultural sector. Such links have been weak in AET in developing countries. Curriculum change places new pressures on
administrators and faculty, and investments in capacity building are needed for these groups to cope with new and more
intensive demands from stakeholders and students. Additional
investment will be required to establish a mechanism that
ensures continuous contact with stakeholders and reviews and
analyzes feedback to adjust the curriculum.
One of the most important opportunities that arise during curriculum reform is the opportunity to use stakeholders as external learning resources. The wealth of knowledge,
skills, and goodwill for agricultural education among most
stakeholder groups can be captured and presented to students in the classroom or at practical work sites. A significant means of improving links between the university and
external learning resources in the agricultural sector is to
develop practical skills programs in which students are
attached to stakeholders. To initiate and manage these programs, support is needed to visit field sites where such
schemes have been implemented successfully and, based
on these visits, to design a local attachment program.
Next, the program concept has to be shared with potential
participants—such as farm owners and agribusinesses (see
also module 5 and module 3, TN 2)—to further define and
establish the program. Once agreement to initiate the program is reached, it is vital to clearly state the terms under
which it will be implemented, including statements of the
responsibilities of trainees, hosts, and the university or educational institution. The issue of cost sharing must be part
of the attachment program design and must be agreed in
negotiation with attachment site hosts.
As a final note, it is important to recognize that all curriculum change initiatives will lead to the realization that
some aspects of implementation require investments
beyond amending or updating content and packaging.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Curriculum change can be undertaken directly, with the
academic institution and the involvement of key stakeholders and faculty, or indirectly through student and faculty
links to rural communities, which channel real issues in
rural livelihoods back to the university, where they influence
the research program and curriculum. Either way, curriculum change can have a number of impacts.
Decision makers as well as prospective students and
employers come to see higher education institutions as a
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prime source for human resources for the agricultural sector. In Costa Rica, where the EARTH University curriculum
was designed to meet a range of stakeholders’ needs, the evidence that considerable value is placed on the university is
reflected in its admission applications; requests for places
outnumber slots by 40 to 1 (IAP 6).
Graduates of the institution are well prepared to meet
employers’ needs (the labor market) and the challenges of
the agricultural sector and rural development. Graduates
from EARTH University and Zamorano University (the
Pan-American agricultural school in Honduras) are in high
demand because their mix of skills prepares them for a wide
variety of employment and entrepreneurship.
Graduates are confident and involved in the AIS as
researchers, service providers, observers, listeners, communicators, and contributors of innovative ideas and solutions
to agricultural and rural development problems.
The higher educational institution is aware of researchable issues and problems through its interactions with
stakeholders. Faculty and students from Bogor University in
Indonesia (box 2.8, TN 1) and Chiang Mai in Thailand (IAP

5) work with rural communities to better understand reallife challenges and identify researchable topics.
The morale of faculty and staff is boosted by interaction
with stakeholders and new approaches to teaching and
learning (the Egypt Curriculum Change project described
in IAP 3 reflects such an interaction).
The institution gains a heightened awareness of the
importance of organizational reforms beyond curriculum
change, perhaps including reforms to improve governance,
increase autonomy, and improve remuneration and benefits
for faculty, staff, and administrators.
The higher educational institution attracts additional
resources because it prepares human resources effectively
for the agricultural sector. For example, through the
Sasakawa Africa Fund for Extension Education (SAFE), students in Africa undertake a supervised enterprise project in
communities that brings in support from the private sector
(IAP 4). The Regional Universities Forum for Capacity
Building in Agriculture (RUFORUM) includes a community-based master’s research program that has attracted
considerable donor funding (box 2.10).

Box 2.10 Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture: Fostering Capacity for
Innovation and Adaptation among Students
The Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building
in Agriculture (RUFORUM) is a consortium of 25 agricultural universities and faculties in Eastern, Central,
and Southern Africa. To date, its main activity is to offer
a small grants program for MSc studies in agriculture,
although the program is being expanded to include
doctoral studies. Through its community action
research program, RUFORUM also provides grants for
strengthening the links between rural communities and
member universities. RUFORUM’s mission is to “foster
innovativeness and adaptive capacity of universities
engaged in agricultural and rural development to
develop and sustain high quality in training, innovative
and impact-oriented research, and collaboration.”
RUFORUM was originally sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation and covered 12 universities in Eastern
and Southern Africa. It was established as a consortium
under African ownership and management in 2004 and
is registered as a nongovernmental organization in
Uganda with a secretariat in Kampala. Each member
university pays an annual fee and several international

donors, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have made grants to the organization. Fundraising
will be key to the consortium’s future, as donor grants
will eventually end.
Under its competitive grant program for MSc students, RUFORUM awards around US$60,000 to enable
two students to work under faculty supervision for two
years. Relevance of the studies to African agriculture is
a key criterion in making the awards. Each MSc thesis
must focus on a topic of local importance for agricultural development.
RUFORUM provides MSc students with fieldtested, problem-solving skills that many African universities are still unable to provide. During the first
semester of year two of the study program, students
are based in the field and their work is supervised in
several visits by the faculty supervisor. After five
years of experience, RUFORUM has succeeded in
connecting graduate students directly with farmers,
rural communities, and the reality of African
agriculture.

Source: RUFORUM 2010.
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POLICY ISSUES

LESSONS LEARNED

Demand for curriculum change articulated by the AET system and supported by key stakeholders is an important precondition for gaining support from the ministries in charge
of education and agriculture as well as from planning and
finance decision makers. In turn, those stakeholders play a
crucial role by clarifying the policies and channeling the
resources that will support change.
Curriculum change has implications for the administrators, staff, students, and external stakeholders of higher
educational institutions. These institutions, as bureaucracies, are often slow to agree to change. Change often proceeds slowly, caused by the perception that it is not
approved at higher levels of government, that the old curriculum is good enough, that incentives to change are unattractive, and that, given time, the pressure to change will
decrease. Policies are required to support curriculum
change, to make it clear that change is a priority, that
administrators and staff of educational institutions are
required to implement the changed curriculum as part of
their terms of reference, that stakeholders’ input will continue to be integral to evaluating the impact of the new curriculum on graduates’ performance, and that adequate
funding will be made available to make the changed curriculum work.
Some of the most important policies encourage educational institutions to monitor the quality and relevance of
their programs in relation to the evolving needs of agriculture and rural development. Such policies provide guidance
on governance of the educational institution, especially the
role of stakeholders in providing feedback on graduates’
readiness for the modern agricultural workplace and in
alerting the institution to changing requirements for knowledge and skills.
High-level decision makers outside higher educational
institutions must be aware that they require a continuing
flow of information to update or create policies that give
the institutions the authority to act. Managers of educational institutions must establish systems that continuously and critically evaluate their programs (especially
needs assessments that capture changes in the agricultural
sector). This information, regularly provided to policy
makers, should help to prevent educational policy from
falling out of step with the needs of agricultural education
institutions and their stakeholders throughout the agricultural sector. An essential policy, of course, is one that allocates funds to support change and ensures that such funding is sustained.

Important lessons from previous attempts at curriculum
change concern the impetus for change (who demands
change, and who supports it); the steps that must be followed in the change process; and the possibility that curriculum change will reveal the need for further reform. Curriculum reform is not a one-off activity. To be meaningful,
curriculum changes must continue to be updated as technological innovation develops new approaches to producing, storing, processing, and marketing agricultural products. Curriculum change must be institutionalized in AET
systems and given the approval and recognition that ensures
the sustainable, continuous evolution of the curriculum.
Impetus for change

As noted, the need for change may be articulated by
employers who are dissatisfied with the graduates of agricultural degree programs, signaled by a serious drop in
applicants to the degree program, or emerge from an internal awareness that the degree program is obsolete. Even if
the pressure for change comes from one or more external
groups of stakeholders, support for change must come from
inside the higher educational institution as well.
Steps to bring about curriculum change

The previous section refers to some of the steps in curriculum change, but it is important to list them in their entirety.
Based on experience with curriculum change in a variety of
settings, these steps appear to work well, although processes
will differ from one place or time to another:
■

■

■

■

■

All key stakeholders participate in describing shortcomings in the current graduate knowledge and skill mix
and/or needs not identified by educational institution.
Draw up a clear “roadmap” for implementing curriculum change and make it available to all.
Clearly spell out roles and responsibilities of the educational institution and other stakeholders in the change
process.
Describe incentives for participation in the change
process (for example, capacity building for faculty and
administrators or out-of-pocket expenses for stakeholders who have to travel to participate in meetings).
Select milestones for reviewing progress in curriculum
change. Such milestones could include: presentation of
the analysis of the needs assessment; drafts of new

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

■

■

■

■

content for specific subject matter; proposed pedagogical
changes to support the revised curriculum; infrastructure and teaching/learning tools required; and curriculum field test results and indicative amendments. Share
these milestones with all stakeholders in workshop settings. Note and act upon stakeholders’ comments.
Submit the final draft of the proposed new curriculum
for peer review by regional and international entities in
higher agricultural education. Act upon the relevant
comments.
Present the new curriculum to policy makers and key
stakeholder groups, highlighting the changes and seeking
approval.
Develop or purchase materials to support the implementation of the updated/new curriculum.
Train faculty and staff to use the new curriculum, especially in the area of pedagogy, student-centered learning,
field visits, and attachments to employer sites.

curriculum change and support its sustainability. Key recommendations include:
■

■

■

■

The “iceberg” phenomenon

Achieving curriculum change appears to be a relatively simple
objective, but it can be like the tip of an iceberg: The immediate task (changing the curriculum) is the visible part of the iceberg, although in fact a number of less-visible, interconnected
tasks must be undertaken for curriculum change to be effective. In addition to revising or developing a curriculum, it may
also be necessary to improve capacity for pedagogy, update
teaching materials, involve teachers in managing practical
agricultural activities, and create and maintain active networks
with stakeholder groups that include agribusiness, NGOs, and
communities. This potentially expanded agenda, its cost
implications, and the time needed to complete the change
process, must be considered when making investments in curriculum change projects or programs.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

The technical process of curriculum change needs to be preceded by dialogue with key stakeholders. It should conclude
by putting mechanisms in place to monitor the impact of

■

■

■

■

Take the time needed to communicate with all key stakeholders. While this may seem to delay the commencement
of curriculum change, it is critical that all parties understand why the change exercise is being undertaken, support
the objectives of the changes to which they have agreed,
and appreciate their roles in ensuring a successful outcome.
Changes to curricula must be based on a thorough analysis of knowledge and skill needs as perceived by all stakeholders
Press for institutionalizing changes to the curriculum,
roles of university faculty as well as stakeholders from
outside the university, and adequate and uninterrupted
financial resources.
Underline the need for a mechanism for regular monitoring and periodic evaluation of the impact of curriculum
change. This information is important for decision makers,
who will want to be convinced that there is a positive return
from investments in curriculum change and who will make
the policies that support higher agricultural education.
Ensure that curriculum change is sustained through
organizational mechanisms that involve all key stakeholders on a regular, ongoing basis.
Encourage links between universities (in country,
regionally, or internationally) that have completed or are
in the process of implementing curriculum change.
Modern and modernizing employers in the agricultural
sector seek graduates with skill sets that go beyond technical and production agriculture. This requirement presents a major challenge to curriculum reform. If new
skills are identified in the needs analysis, the question of
how and where they will be taught must be answered.
Be conscious of the fact that changing the content of the
curriculum may be the easiest part of investing in curriculum change. Additional investments will be required in
organizational arrangements, staff and faculty capacity, and
monitoring and evaluation. The need for these investments
may not be obvious, but failure to make them will jeopardize the success of the investment in curriculum change.

MODULE 2: THEMATIC NOTE 2: CURRICULUM CHANGE IN HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION

135

T H E M AT I C N O T E 3

Education and Training for Technician Development
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

he modern agricultural sector demands that technical vocational colleges or institutes produce
highly skilled personnel who can manage a variety
of farms and production units, run processing enterprises,
service market chains, manage and repair farm and processing machinery, monitor food quality and safety issues, and
support AIS actors in assessing the suitability of a particular
innovation for specific persons, communities, farming systems, and value chains. In addition to technical knowledge,
technical personnel need critical behavioral skills such as
teamwork, diligence, creativity, and entrepreneurship.
Reforms in the governance and management of training
colleges and institutes are needed for traditional ATVET and
VET programs to deliver this array of skills in an equitable,
gender-sensitive way. Demand for and content of vocational
education and training must be clarified through dialogue
with key sector actors (ministries of education and agriculture, employers of TVET/VET graduates, and staff and
administrators of entities that train them for the public and
private sectors). If the system produces graduates valued by
stakeholders in the labor market, those stakeholders will
help to sustain the system financially. The VET system must
be underpinned by clear and supportive policy that defines
the role of VET; guarantees public financial contributions to
VET; clarifies roles and contributions of stakeholders who
employ graduates; and spells out governance arrangements
for the system. Based on documented needs and stakeholders’ expectations, invest in the capacity of teachers and
instructors; develop certified programs that meet stakeholders’ needs (begin with a small number of good programs);
and encourage cross-sector dialogue, because agricultural
TVET/VET is often linked to other sectors’ programs and
development plans (the environmental sector is a good
example). IAPs 7, 8, and 9 examine specific investments in
TVET and lessons learned.

T
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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT FOR
INVESTMENT

Technicians interact on a regular basis with other actors in the
AIS and are a unique repository of knowledge and—more
important—skills that enable farmers and others to decide
whether to adopt innovations. Public and private entities in
agriculture have always relied on educated and trained technicians to undertake a range of tasks and activities that support
production agriculture and form links in the value chain that
leads to the local or international consumer. This reliance has
been heightened by growth in agribusiness and the adaptation
of advanced technology for producing, processing, and distributing agricultural goods and services (see also module 5).
Despite the need for skilled technical personnel generated by modern, knowledge-based commercial agriculture,
with its emphasis on value-added and marketing, the
demand for appropriately educated and trained technicians
exceeds supply, and agribusiness entrepreneurs have difficulty hiring suitably qualified people. The shortage of qualified technicians persists amid significant reductions in
public employment opportunities for technicians.
The shortage of skilled technicians is not new (it was
noted during the 1970 FAO, UNESCO, and ILO Conference
on Higher Agricultural Education). This shortage has been
exacerbated in some countries by filling technician-level
jobs with graduates who do not necessarily possess technicians’ practical skills and knowledge, to work directly with
farmers (Muir-Leresche, pers. comm., 2010). A 2009 study
(Blackie, Mutemba, and Ward 2009) showed that African
university graduates typically lacked the hands-on skills and
capabilities that farmers value most.
Government, the private sector, and civil society have a
stake in ensuring that enough qualified, skilled agricultural
technicians are available for the labor market. The preparation of technicians, traditionally sponsored largely by the
public sector, can be expensive. It involves equipment, land,

qualified instructors, and a low student-to-instructor ratio.
While rapidly industrializing countries are investing heavily
in technical education and training to meet high demand for
engineering and IT workers, public investments in formal
agricultural diploma education (usually classified as ATVET)
or certificate training (described as VET) vary and are
unpredictable. The unevenness of investment gives rise to
fluctuating student enrollment, poor staffing, weak program
content, and a variable supply and quality of graduates.
As mentioned, modern agriculture emphasizes greater
productivity, value added activities, and agribusiness.
Agricultural products increasingly are consumed by
growing urban populations or, in the case of high-value
crops, sold in international markets. The focus on intensive farming and sustainability has created management
complexity, altered energy requirements compared to traditional agriculture, and led to unforeseen consequences
for human and animal health. The modern agricultural
sector is also quite knowledge intensive. It demands
highly skilled technical personnel who can manage a variety of farms and production units, run processing enterprises, service market chains, manage and repair farm and

processing machinery, and monitor food quality and
safety issues (see also module 6, TN 5).
In addition, employers in many economies seek workers
who possess behavioral skills such as teamwork, diligence,
creativity, and entrepreneurship, which are essential to
thrive in rapidly evolving, technologically driven, and globalized economies (Blom and Cheong 2010). For this reason,
improvements only in workers’ technical and vocational
skills will not always meet employers’ needs. Systems that
build skills will also have to ensure that these added behavioral attributes are in place (Blom and Cheong 2010). Any
realistic attempt to train technical personnel who can meet
these various needs for 21st century agriculture must revitalize the knowledge and skills provided by traditional
ATVET and VET programs (box 2.11) and reform the governance and management of training colleges and institutes.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

Investment in technical education and training for agriculture has, like investment in all AET, been low. Much recent
World Bank funding for formal TVET is industry-related,

Box 2.11 Producing Technical Human Resources for the Agriculture Sector in Australia

In Australia, technicians for the agricultural sector are
trained through public and private institutions ranging
from comprehensive technical and further education
institutes or colleges, specialist agricultural colleges,
private companies, and not-for-profit organizations
operating as registered training organizations. Australia’s
six states and two territories have legislative responsibility for education. The national government has
become more active in vocational education over the
past twenty years, developing a national system for
vocational training, providing significant funding to
deliver training, and organizing national curricula
around the principles of competency-based training.
Each sector of the economy, including agriculture, is
covered by a comprehensive suite of competencies
known as a “training package.” The content of these
training packages is based on the needs of the economy
and industry, which are communicated through Industry Skills Training Councils.

The council covering vocational training in the agricultural sector, Agrifood Skills Australia, was established
in 2004 as one of 11 Industry Skills Councils to provide
accurate industry intelligence on current and future skill
needs and training requirements for the agrifood industry. Agrifood is a public company with an industry-led
board of directors and industry advisory committees.
Funding is provided under contract by the Department
of Education, Employment, and Workplace Relations. In
New South Wales (NSW), Tocal College is a Registered
Training Organization within the NSW Department of
Primary Industries (DPI). A trademarked brand
name—PROfarm—is used for all short courses for
farmers run by DPI technical specialists through Tocal
College. Attendance at PROfarm courses from the third
quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2010 was 4,309,
and the projected income was 862,377 Australian dollars. Full-time courses at this college have a 90 percent
completion rate.

Source: Agrifood Skills (http://www.agrifoodskills.net.au) and Cameron Archer (Principal, Tocal College, Paterson, NSW,
Australia; see cameron.archer@industry.nsw.gov.au and www.tocal.com), personal communication, 2010.
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and recent projects supported in China and India reflect this
trend.1 In both countries, projects were designed to meet
growing deficits in the availability of skilled workers, particularly in engineering and IT. These investments reflect the
economic importance of engineering, manufacturing, and
IT in both economies.
Innovative aspects of more recent TVET projects outside
agriculture include:2

The presence of skilled agricultural technicians has the
potential to strengthen all links in the agricultural value
chain and lead to still other benefits:
■

Greater industry involvement in defining training standards.
Development of public-private partnerships that enable
costs to be shared.
Creation of attachments and apprenticeships (see
module 4, TN 2; and module 5, TN 1).
A change in focus from training inputs to training outcomes (that is, competency-based training).
Encouraging life-long learning by offering modular curricula that enable learners to enter and exit and continue
to upgrade skills.
Making the shift from teacher-centered to learnercentered pedagogy.
Seeking accreditation for programs.

■

In Africa, these innovative aspects can be seen in Ethiopia,
where TVET is provided to the agricultural sector under the
management of the Ministry of Agriculture and to other sectors through the Ministry of Education and the Regional
Education Bureaus. A 2004 World Bank Post-Secondary
Education Project included a small component for TVET
innovation to expand and deepen system reforms spearheaded by the Ministry of Education. Agriculture was not
included in the project, but the project’s five pillars of TVET
transformation would be a good fit for vocational training in
agriculture: (1) decentralization of service design and delivery; (2) strengthening partnerships among stakeholders,
especially between training providers and employers;
(3) development and implementation of a trades testing and
certification system; (4) cost sharing by beneficiaries; and
(5) an orientation to market-based demand to shape training.
A 2006 World Bank project in Ethiopia, the Rural
Capacity Building Project, included an agricultural TVET
component. The Project Appraisal Document notes that
“capacity-building of middle-level technical workers is an
important factor in the drive to enhance productivity, stimulate economic competitiveness, and raise people out of
poverty.” Implementation of the TVET component is
encountering some difficulties, in part due to the lack of
cooperation between the Ministries of Agriculture and Education and between central and regional governments.

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■
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POTENTIAL BENEFITS

■

■

■

■

■

Greater productivity and efficiency in public and private
entities employing technically educated and trained
graduates of the AET system.
A VET system that is networked with stakeholders in the
public and private sectors and with civil society organizations (CSOs).
Well-crafted and successfully implemented policies to
guide VET for the agricultural sector.
Financing of TVET/VET on a sound footing that
includes public and private contributions and fees levied
on trainees or their sponsors.
Assured quality of TVET/VET through certification of
courses and programs by internal and external accreditation bodies.
TVET/VET pedagogy that reflects a student-centered
approach to learning, coupled with attachments and
work experience opportunities with stakeholder enterprises, farms, and CSOs.
TVET/VET networked with other parts of the AET
system.
Well-qualified and high-performing graduates of
TVET/VET enrich the AIS through their interactions
with a variety of actors in the system.

Investments in the production and upgrading of technical sector specialists ensure that the continued modernization and growth of agriculture and its numerous areas of
focus meet the needs of a public sector that requires technicians to disseminate technology and undertake regulatory
functions; of a private sector that invests in agribusiness,
input supplies, and domestic and international marketing;
of farmers’ associations and cooperatives that represent producers; and of consumer organizations that rely on food
supplies that are fresh and healthful.
Skilled technicians with the potential to be self-employed
entrepreneurs who, in turn, create rural employment and
serve as role models for farmers and others with whom they
interact in the AIS.
POLICY ISSUES

A major policy challenge is to arrive at an agreed formula
for financing TVET/VET. Should the public sector fully
underwrite such education and training, or should
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employers and students share the costs? Given that stakeholders’ involvement in describing the real needs of the
labor market has been minimal and that the standards set
by VET entities have been poor, the private sector has had
little incentive to share the cost. Incentives for cost sharing
emerge only when programs and courses meet labormarket needs, standards of education and training are
high, and education and training entities are flexible and
responsive to change.
Aside from policies that improve TVET financing,
policies must ensure fair and equitable recruitment of
students/trainees from all segments of society and seek a
gender balance that reflects societal structure and labormarket needs.
Policies are also needed to support more effective governance of TVET. Such policies would formalize stakeholders’ contribution to the content and focus of curricula and
programs. They would also clarify the roles of ministries
and regional bureaus in a decentralized education system
and end the administrative paralysis that stems from poorly
defined roles.
Policy guidance is also needed to ensure that apprenticeship and attachment programs are well designed, that
responsibilities of TVET/VET entities and hosts are clearly
defined, and that evaluation of student/trainee performance
is fair and open. Finally, policies must guide TVET/VET
entities to seek accreditation or certification for their education and training programs and courses.
LESSONS LEARNED

Supply-driven VET for agriculture has not been very successful for a number of reasons, including: weak or absent
links to employer stakeholders; the poor quality of graduates resulting from inappropriate curricula and the poor
availability and quality of teachers and instructors; intermittent funding; poor governance of the VET system; and
the related absence of good policies to guide VET. Courses
are rarely certified and competencies rarely tested, with the
result that only a low value is placed on the VET system and
its products.
Another lesson is that divided ministerial responsibility
is a primary source of poor support for and performance of
VET entities (just as it is a fundamental problem for all public agricultural education). For example, the ATVET component of the rural capacity project in Ethiopia proved
difficult to implement because of poor coordination and
cooperation between the Ministries of Education and Agriculture at the national and regional levels.

Policy to remedy this and other weaknesses of agricultural vocational education cannot be formulated in a
vacuum. A precondition for sound policies is the development of a clearly expressed and understood needs statement from the concerned stakeholders. Policymakers must
be convinced that technician education and training, if
performed to a high standard, will produce graduates who
will contribute to the productivity of the agricultural sector. To clarify the demand for and content of vocational
education and training, key sector actors need to be
involved in a series of dialogues. The key actors include
ministries of education and agriculture, employers of
graduates from TVET/VET, and staff and administrators
of education entities that offer programs and courses that
educate and train technical personnel for the public and
private sectors.
Clearly, the sustainability of a quality VET system is based
on its utility to the labor market. If the system produces
graduates that are needed and valued by stakeholders,
resources will be made available by those stakeholders. The
VET system must be underpinned by clear and supportive
policy that defines the role of VET; guarantees public sector
financial contributions to VET; clarifies the roles and contributions of stakeholders who employ graduates of the system;
and spells out the structure of the governance arrangements
for the VET system.
The diverse and fragmented nature of the agricultural
sector robs it of the high-profile, high-energy features of
modern high-technology industries that generate jobs,
export earnings, and strongly pressure decision makers to
support education and training for those industries. Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen quite clearly in the
lopsided investment profile in technical education and
training in recent times.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

By and large, developing countries have neglected TVET for
the agricultural sector, but the time is right for new instruments to support the human resource needs of modern
agriculture. Successful investments in ATVET require innovative governance and technical approaches, but they have
high potential for making positive contributions to sector
productivity. Recommended steps and considerations
include:
■

Initiate dialog with key stakeholders to clarify needs and
expectations and share supply capacity and constraint
information and data.
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■

■
■

■

■

■

■
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Invest in dialogue with major stakeholders to arrive at a
widely understood and supported view of the importance of TVET/VET.
Involve stakeholders in high-level governance of ATVET.
Create a shared and well-documented message for
decision makers to get policy and material support for
VET.
Encourage decision makers to clarify responsibility for
TVET. Is TVET solely a public responsibility, or is
responsibility shared with the private sector?
Undertake a collaborative assessment of labor-market
needs and expectations from the TVET/VET system.
Obtain agreement on funding for TVET, based on documented needs and stakeholders’ expectations. For
example, TVET could be funded through public-private
partnerships that provide private support in cash or
kind (equipment, facilities).
Invest in the capacity of teachers and instructors; it is
important for the viability of TVET.

■

■

■
■

■
■

Begin with a small number of good courses or programs
that meet stakeholders’ most important human-resource
needs.
Form an active network with other TVET and VET systems and, when resources allow, undertake study visits.
Ensure that TVET/VET is linked to AET.
Encourage cross-sector dialogue, because agricultural
TVET/VET is often linked to other sectors’ programs and
development plans.
Seek certification of all TVET programs to ensure quality.
Include environmental considerations in the preparation
of technicians for agriculture, because the sector is recognized as a major contributor to pollution and environmental stress. Programs and courses for technicians
should identify the issues of concern and underline the
need for environmental sensitivity on the part of their
graduates. The environmental focus of the curriculum
would be examined in certification and accreditation
exercises undertaken by internal and external bodies.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 4

Reforming the Management of In-Service Training/Learning
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

n public agencies or projects, the benefits of in-service
training include enhanced capability to contribute to
growth in the agricultural sector and operate in the AIS;
in private enterprises, benefits of in-service training include
more productive workers and higher profits. Opportunities
for improving human resource development (HRD) and
human resource management (HRM) through training
arise when countries develop national, agricultural, or rural
development strategies or their poverty reduction strategies;
when new projects are planned; or in discussions about
adjustments or extensions of current projects. Similar
opportunities arise when the private sector is creating
demand for skilled human resources. The three main investments in HRD and HRM include building capacity in public agencies, developing specific capacities in development
project personnel, and building capacity in private enterprises. Elements in improving in-service training in the
public sector include a clear policy articulating responsibilities for HRD; training personnel to implement the HRD
approach; linking with learning providers; and supporting
specific, short-term programs as well as life-long learning
programs. Investments in project-related training begin
when projects are being developed and include (1) assessing
capacity needs, (2) evaluating capacity-building activities in
every component of project-related training, and (3) supporting training in communications and problem-solving
skills in every component for effective participation in the
AIS. Large private enterprises with a long-term need for
personnel will build capacity in human resources through
joint ventures with the public sector; smaller entities may
be more comfortable purchasing training packages from
the AET system. Major recommendations include: provide
training for faculty and staff managing in-service training;
include training/learning specialists in project design and
implementation; keep capacity-building objectives realistic

I

in projects; consider investing in higher degrees for qualified
HRM candidates; and identify potential partnerships
between public and private entities to add to in-service
training capacity.

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR
INVESTMENT

Investments to improve how capacity building is designed,
implemented, and managed—especially in public agricultural organizations and development projects undertaken in
the public sector—add knowledge and skills that make public organizations and projects more effective and enable the
public sector to participate more effectively and actively in
the AIS. People who interact with the rural population on
behalf of public or private agencies and projects are working exactly where some of the most important possibilities
for knowledge sharing, innovation dialogue, observation,
assessment, and adoption occur. They are a critical vector in
the innovation system. Investing in, adding to, and sharpening their skills should be a priority. Investments can also be
considered in building human and institutional capacity in
private agricultural enterprises, especially where there is
scope for joint activities through public-private partnerships. It is also important to distinguish between building
capacity to implement projects and broader institutional
capacity-building. The former is undertaken to ensure that
each individual has the knowledge and skills to perform
project-related responsibilities effectively, whereas the latter
is concerned with the capability of the organization (ministry, department, unit, private business) to implement its
terms of reference. While individuals collectively contribute
to the capacity of an organization, factors such as policy
frameworks, organizational structures, links, management,
financing, and interface with clients or stakeholders also
influence this capacity.
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INVESTMENT NEEDED

Three main types of investments can be considered to build
capacity in the staff of public agricultural agencies and
development projects and those in the private sector who
provide a variety of agriculture-related services and supplies
to farmers, processors, marketers, and civil society. The first
type builds capacity in public agencies; the second builds
private sector capacity; and the third develops specific
capacities in development project personnel.
Managing and improving in-service training in
ministries of agriculture

In-service training in ministries of agriculture is generally
poorly managed. Managers exert weak oversight of training
programs and impacts. Ordinarily, personnel appointed to
plan and implement training/learning programs are not
selected from a pool of professionally qualified or practicing human resources development specialists. Nor are ministry and other public sector staff systematically identified
for specific training and learning experiences that prepare
them for future responsibilities. Seniority in the civil service is often the criterion that decides who is selected and
promoted in the system; competence is not always a deciding factor. Shrinking budgets in the public sector have left
smaller cadres of professional research, technical, and
extension staff to deal with additional responsibilities that
require enhanced knowledge and skills. Under these circumstances, government agencies must make their capacity-building efforts a priority and ensure that they are as
effective as possible. Key elements in bringing about change
include:
■

■

■

■
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Policies. Following high-level management commitment
to adopting change, a policy directive is issued describing
responsibilities for human resource development
(HRD).
Capacity to implement the policy. Personnel to implement the new HRD approach are selected and enrolled in
appropriate training programs.
Review of training/learning programs. HRD and human
resource management (HRM) rules, needs assessments,
training/learning responses, selection criteria, and monitoring and evaluation of training/learning impacts are
reviewed in detail and adjusted, based on the new
approach to HRM.
Links to learning resources: Establish links with learning
providers such as the research system, universities, TVET
entities, private sector leaders in agriculture and rural

■

■

development, and regional and international training
agencies.
Build AIS-ready skills capacity. Provide selective support for specific, short-term programs for in-service
training using public funding or with public-privatepartnership resources. Specific responses may include:
study visits; short-term overseas training; attachments to
research, community, or private enterprises; or acquiring
urgent adaptation strategies for dealing with the impact
of natural phenomena, such as insect or disease outbreaks or climate change.
Create capacity for life-long learning. Support may be
given for the development of seminars and short learning
activities at universities. These options would be available
to public sector decision makers, senior technical managers, private sector managerial and technical personnel,
and CSOs. This investment category serves to increase
knowledge and skills as well as to exchange experiences
and ideas among influential actors in the AIS.

Investments in building private sector capacity

These investments include support for mutually beneficial
joint ventures in which, for example, the public sector supplies
in-service or life-long-learning opportunities for private
workers and the private sector supplies skilled operatives as
teachers, facilitators, demonstrators. The private sector may
also offer practical training internship spaces for public
employees or students from the AET system (IAPs 3, 8, and 9).
See also module 5 on private sector development.
Investing in project management and
implementation personnel

Almost all development projects for the agricultural sector
seek to strengthen the capacity of the people who implement them.1 A variety of training and learning activities are
often funded for these staff through the project’s larger
capacity-building components. The range of capacitybuilding activities for project personnel and beneficiaries is
wide. Although there are generic lists of activities that can
meet basic needs, each situation and its particular needs will
determine the shape, content, duration, and participants in
the capacity-building intervention.
These activities may be labeled capacity-building components or training components and typically are funded at
about two or three percent of project costs. Such components are project specific. They operate alongside in-service
training programs provided by public agencies for agricultural sector staff. A project’s capacity-building components
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are usually managed by a unit subsidiary to the project
management unit. Not surprisingly, the quality of management varies from project to project.
As noted, investments in project-related training need to
begin when projects are being developed. The team preparing the project should include expertise in capacity building
at every stage. Managers from the beneficiary entity should
be briefed on the importance of the project’s capacitybuilding component and advised to appoint suitably qualified staff to manage the component. Managers from the
beneficiary entity should provide a profile of each appointee
(qualifications, experience, and training history). They
should receive technical assistance to be able to undertake
needs assessments, propose corresponding learning programs or activities, create (with the help of resource persons
in the network) training/learning content, and plan and
implement training/learning activities for carefully selected
project staff. They should learn techniques to measure the
impact of training and learning, to inform managers of the
results, and to maintain clear, up-to-date records of all
capacity-building activities.
Capacity-building specialists should be included in project preparation teams (in the case of World Bank projects,
during the time from identification to appraisal) to ensure
that training for project personnel is relevant, clearly
defined, and can be implemented in time for the project to
operate smoothly and achieve its objectives. Project funds
will need to be allocated specifically to train staff assigned to
project management to ensure that they understand the
project’s overall objectives and can manage its components.
Resources will also be needed to (1) assess capacity needs,
(2) evaluate capacity-building activities in every component
of project-related training, and (3) provide support in each
capacity-building component of the project for training in
communications and problem-solving skills (for effective
participation in the AIS).

FACTORS DETERMINING THE TYPE AND
DURATION OF INVESTMENT IN ENHANCED
IN-SERVICE TRAINING

The most powerful factor guiding in-service training investments (as in higher and technical education investments) is
the realization among stakeholders and within the organization that change is needed. Investors should initiate a dialogue
that highlights the benefits of changing the way that human
resources are managed and details the steps that need to be
taken. The short implementation span of projects and programs enables decision makers and project management to

observe relatively quickly how a capacity-building component
benefits implementation and sustainability. Success at the
project level can convince management of the benefits of
adopting a more comprehensive HRD approach at the ministry or department level. With respect to the duration of the
investment, it is important to note that installing quality management of human resources in a ministry or department is a
process dictated by organizational and civil service rules, the
pace of learning, satisfaction with progress and results on the
part of senior management, and on the commitment of
donors to see the process through to the end. The source of
demand for enhanced in-service training influences the most
appropriate investment response. In the case of short-term
investments in specific courses, study visits, or attachments,
requests may originate from government or from project
implementers through government channels. Responses from
investors may be made bilaterally or through existing project
channels. The duration of such investments can range from
weeks to one year. Support for the development and implementation of seminars or short learning activities at universities would most likely cover an agreed time period measured
in years (or in numbers of events without time constraints).
Underwriting the strengthening of advanced degree programs
at regional or hub universities would fit in a medium- to longterm framework of support. Scholarship support for candidates would take into account the normal cycle for completing
advanced degrees, so an initial commitment might be for ten
years, dictated by successful completion of programs.
In the case of public-private partnerships, much depends
on the type and size of the private enterprise. When the private enterprise is, for example, involved in production, processing, and marketing nationally and internationally, it will
have a long-term need for personnel and will be keen to
invest in building capacity in human resources. It can benefit from technology training from academic and research
institutions and from offering internships to students that it
can assess and possibly hire. Smaller private entities may be
more comfortable purchasing training packages from the
AET system and offering a small number of internship or
attachment places for which the AET system would pay. A
minimum commitment of five years would give both partners time to adjust the program in light of experience and to
evaluate the impact of the partnership.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Benefits of interventions to improve how HRD is managed in
public agencies or projects can include: enhanced capability
of a ministry, department, project management unit, and
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individuals to contribute to growth in the agricultural sector;
heightened capability of individuals and service units to
operate effectively in the AIS; greater clarity of purpose in
capacity-building goals and activities; heightened morale of
better-educated, better-trained, and more confident public
sector staff; greater respect for public service providers among
farming and rural communities; and more successfully
implemented projects. Private enterprises can benefit from
more productive workers and increased margins of profit.

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES IN MINISTRIES
AND DEPARTMENTS

In a practically oriented government ministry such as agriculture, it is often difficult to gain support for in-service
training and learning, especially for reviewing and reforming
the content and management of that training. The application of technology developed through agricultural research
dominates the service activities that support growth in agriculture. Compared to these practical pursuits, capacity
building and HRM can be perceived in the public sector as
less important, “soft “ areas that do not justify funding when
other ministry tasks are so urgent. (In the private sector,
capacity building and HRM are connected clearly to profit
and loss and get much more attention from managers.) Yet
capacity building in public entities is usually a small fraction
of total project costs or ministry operations. Few truly qualified persons are assigned to capacity building. Even at
higher ministry levels, this phenomenon holds true.
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LESSONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

Opportunities for discussing the effectiveness of inservice training and project-related training can arise
when countries are developing their national, agricultural, or rural development strategies or their poverty
reduction strategies; when new projects are planned; or
in discussions about adjustments or extensions of current projects. Similar opportunities arise when the agricultural private sector is creating demand for skilled
human resources.
Several points are critical in taking action to improve
in-service training and learning. Perhaps the most important point is to be certain that decision makers are committed to reforming in-service and project-related training
and that civil service rules and regulations allow organizational change in HRM. Keep decision makers informed of
design and implementation progress and problems. Consider investing in scholarships for qualified HRM candidates to earn higher degrees, and provide training for faculty and staff with responsibility for managing in-service
training. Include training/learning specialists in project
design and implementation. Given project timeframes and
the capabilities of implementation staff, keep capacitybuilding objectives realistic. Be prepared to invest in shortterm support for in-service training and capacity building.
Identify potential partnerships between public and private
entities to add to in-service training capacity, and discuss
these partnerships at decision maker and AET management levels.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 1

Reforming India’s State Agricultural Universities
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

major, systemwide reform of India’s state agricultural universities (SAUs) aimed to modernize
administration and management, update curricula
and pedagogical approaches, upgrade teaching materials and
laboratories, set new norms and standards for higher agricultural education, and improve human resource management in state line departments working closely with the
agricultural universities. The process, initiated with four universities, was viewed as a ten-year effort but confined to a
project of six years (1995–2001). The project improved the
quality and relevance of India’s SAUs by establishing an
Accreditation Board, demand-oriented curriculum reforms,
and complementary investments in staff training and educational infrastructure. The quality and diversity of student
intake and the quality of faculty improved. In hindsight,
however, it is clear that the process could have been introduced more slowly, with fewer objectives and a longer time
frame to institutionalize the reforms. The capacity, readiness,
and commitment of project actors could have been better
assessed. The project might have done better to focus on
higher education alone, reserving human resource management in line agencies for a separate project. Donor coordination should have been emphasized to prevent universities
from attaining funds that made it possible to delay reforms.

A

source of research funding for the universities. A long-term
goal of the reforms was to establish an Agricultural Education Council with statutory power to set norms and standards in agricultural education. For more on ICAR and
India, see also module 1, TN 1; and module 4, IAP 2.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the SAU system was strengthened
and expanded under a large USAID project (Busch 1988). In
the 1990s, concerned about declining standards in the system, ICAR approached the World Bank about the need to
reestablish SAUs as centers of high-quality agricultural education. The resulting project concentrated initially on four
SAUs.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

The five-year project was the first phase in a long-term program to improve agricultural HRD. Estimated project cost
at appraisal was US$74.2 million (World Bank US$37.1;
India US$37.1). The project had four components:
(1) strengthening ICAR; (2) university programs; (3) inservice HRD and HRM; and (4) manpower needs assessment.
Through these components, the project initiated several
broad reforms:
■

■

CONTEXT

By working with a small number of universities, a project
sought to create a compelling demonstration of the potential benefits of systemwide reform in India’s state agricultural universities (SAUs). As state institutions, SAUs receive
funding from their respective states but also from central
government and other sources. At the national level, the
agricultural university system is coordinated by the Indian
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), which is also a

■

It assisted India’s drive to modernize its agricultural sector by promoting changes in the way the center and states
developed and employed human resources.
It supported these changes with policy and institutional
reforms.
It began related processes of (1) improving the quality
and relevance of higher agricultural education and inservice training programs and (2) strengthening the
capacity of participating states to develop and manage
agricultural human resources.

To foster academic improvement, the project strengthened capability within ICAR to establish norms and
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standards in agricultural education and monitor compliance with these standards. While the proposed Agricultural
Education Council was being established, ICAR’s Education
Division was strengthened, and the Norms and Accreditation Committee was restructured.
The project encompassed four subprojects from three
participating states—one each from Haryana and Andhra
Pradesh and two from Tamil Nadu—selected as good candidates for demonstrating the effects of reforms to other
states. The subprojects sought to reform the curriculum
and syllabus, improve faculty quality, revitalize teaching
methods, organize faculty exchanges within India and with
foreign universities, modernize university administration
and management systems, upgrade infrastructure (teaching laboratory equipment, computer systems, communications, farms, libraries, and hostels), and establish placement
centers and programs for student attachments to agroindustries. The project also promoted initiatives to involve
university clientele more in university management
and programs and improve education-related financial
management.
To upgrade human resource management, at the state level
the project supported:
■

■

In-service HRD and HRM programs in 14 line departments that worked closely with SAUs. This support
included training focused on job-oriented needs; systematic training needs assessments; training of trainers; evaluation of training effectiveness; better instructional facilities; and improved management of state agricultural
employees.
Manpower needs assessment, involving the establishment of broad-based Manpower Advisory Councils to
sponsor rigorous studies of labor-market requirements
and trends (that is, to begin developing labor-market
intelligence) within each state. Data from the studies
were expected to provide state authorities and university
officials with technically sound information for crafting
public policy, academic programs, budgets, and adjustments to university intake numbers.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS

In the context of India’s SAU system at the time, the project
delivered some innovative interventions.
It raised academic and administrative standards in the
SAUs through updated curricula, improved pedagogy and
teaching/learning materials, an emphasis on practical exposure for students, and accreditation of academic programs.
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It upgraded the relevance and quality of in-service training, increased client involvement in identifying training
needs, modernized training facilities, and enhanced staff
knowledge and skills.
It emphasized the management of human resources in
line departments to ensure that staff knowledge and skills
were of the highest quality and that human resources were
employed effectively.
It initiated the reform process with four universities and
used the experience to scale up reforms to other universities
in the SAU system.
IMPACT

By and large, the project achieved its development objectives, although the Project Completion Report (June 2002)
identified some design flaws and less-than-satisfactory
outcomes.
The quality and relevance of higher agricultural education was improved by establishing an Accreditation Board,
demand-oriented curriculum reforms, and complementary
investments in staff training and educational infrastructure.
A participatory system of institutional accreditation was
developed, and ICAR was implementing it throughout the
SAU system. Academic norms for all undergraduate and
postgraduate programs were revised and implemented.
Education programs were more relevant. Curricula
were updated for 11 undergraduate and 32 postgraduate
programs. Courses were introduced in new areas such as
biotechnology, computer applications, agribusiness management, and sustainable agriculture. Coursework was
broadened to include skills-oriented, hands-on training
programs developed through wide consultation with
stakeholders.
These changes were reflected in new and improved
teaching materials (laboratory manuals, course modules,
textbooks, and so forth) and methods, along with substantial investments to train research and teaching faculty and
upgrade classrooms, laboratories, libraries, and IT facilities.
These efforts improved the quality and relevance of the
education programs and the teaching/learning environment.
In-service training improved in quality and relevance
through the establishment of needs-based training programs,
greater client involvement (farmers, agroindustry, input
suppliers, and others), modernized training facilities, and
investments in staff training. Improved training programs
and the adoption of more effective practices to disseminate
agricultural technology appear to have improved extension
performance.
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The capacity of participating states to develop and manage agricultural human resources was enhanced by the
creation of skills, institutional capacity, and infrastructure.
These new resources enabled line departments to assess
their HRD needs, formulate and implement human
resource management plans, provide in-service training,
and liaise with other relevant institutions.
Additional positive results

Policy changes improved the quality and diversity of student
intake through a nationwide testing system and the introduction of national talent scholarships and research fellowships. A state-level Common Entrance Test was in place, and
examinations were revitalized through a system of internal
and external assessors. Aside from the training mentioned
previously, a National Eligibility Test helped to improve the
quality of faculty.
To enforce national norms and standards in agricultural
education, ICAR set up a monitoring unit. A system of
rewards and incentives was put in place to speed the adoption of norms and encourage self-improvement in educational standards in SAUs and among students. A manual for
accreditation was issued. By the end of the project, 32 of
35 colleges in the project SAUs had been accredited by the
newly established Accreditation Board. All project SAUs
were accredited, and the process was continuing with other
SAUs throughout the country.
University governance had improved with the establishment of broad-based Advisory Groups and an expansion of
the University Board of Management to include representation from the private sector. Financial powers were delegated to deans and heads of departments, among other
financial reforms. Students’ records and evaluations of
teachers were digitized.
Although Educational Technology Development Cells
and the Student Counseling Centers were set up, by the time
the project ended, their impact on graduate employment
had not been evaluated.
Effects on institutional development

The new accreditation system enabled SAUs to analyze their
strengths and weaknesses, develop strategic plans for academic excellence, and formulate action plans to improve the
quality of agricultural education by involving all stakeholders. Administrative, financial, and governance changes,
especially closer links with clients in the agricultural sector,
are likely to continue and spread to other universities

through positive demonstration effects. Line departments
also experienced changes in their attitude to, and organization of, personnel and training matters.
Sustainability

When the project ended, changes in institutions and procedures, including managerial and administrative changes,
were partly internalized, and the relevant stakeholders
favored continuing the reform program (for example, by
addressing governance reform and individual performance
incentives). Staff from SAUs and line departments reported
a greater sense of achievement and job satisfaction. Overall,
the sustainability of the project was rated as “likely.” The
likelihood of a follow-up project provided incentives to
continue project activities. Yet as the next section will show,
these expectations were not fulfilled.
LESSONS LEARNED

The process could have been introduced more slowly, with
fewer objectives. The capacity, readiness, and commitment
of project actors could have been better assessed. The project might have done better to focus on higher education
alone, reserving human resource management in line agencies for a separate project. Donor coordination should have
been emphasized to prevent universities from attaining
funds that made it possible to delay reforms.
Some lessons are particular to the project:
In hindsight, the project overestimated the capacity and
readiness for reform in the government and implementing
agencies. Many assurances obtained when the project was
negotiated did not materialize within the agreed timeframe.
Implementing agencies’ capacity to identify priorities and
needs and develop workable annual plans for procurement,
financial management, and training were overestimated.
The project was too complex. It should not have
attempted to initiate and manage change in institutions
(universities and line departments) with widely differing
organizational structures, cultures, and objectives.
The project did not give enough attention to monitoring
and evaluation. It used an undifferentiated list of indicators
that were not prioritized, quantifiable, or possible to substantiate. No benchmarks were in place for progress to be
assessed more objectively. The project lacked a framework to
link the project’s various activities clearly with its objectives.
The manpower needs assessment was not satisfactory.
Data were delivered late, were not used, and the substance
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and style of teaching did not change in any substantial way,
even though trainers were using more instructional aids.
Other lessons arising from the project have broader
application:
As emphasized in the module overview, the case for
reform needs to come from within the system—in this
instance, from the coordinating body for higher agricultural
education. The weak impetus for reform underlies the other
lessons presented here.
Reform takes time. Although this project recorded many
successes, the difficult issues were not resolved. A second
phase of the project, which would have institutionalized the
reforms, was never funded.
The number of universities in the project was limited to
four to achieve a convincing demonstration effect. This
decision, in a system as large as India’s, was perhaps good—
but it remains an open question.
Human resource management—intended to make training more meaningful in the state line departments that
worked closely with the SAUs—proved more difficult to manage than expected, because the universities and line departments were administratively separate. (As noted, it may have
been preferable to focus on line agencies in a separate project.)
Unless a project can tap into or build durable constituencies for reform, the “champions for change” will
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turn their attention elsewhere, reforms in governance will
not continue, and the initiatives started by the project will
not be sustained. Creating or strengthening these constituencies requires delegation, decentralization, and
empowerment of different functionaries as well as the
institutionalization of key reforms, such as changes in university statutes that give a genuine voice to the private sector or “teeth” to student evaluations. Projects need to be
designed in ways that will initiate and elicit such governance and institutional reforms, perhaps by phasing in
project investments that are explicitly linked to realizing
agreed elements of reform.
Although the project devoted attention to building up
management and implementation capacity at various levels, in retrospect the ability of the implementing agencies to
manage procurement, financial management, and selection
and placement of staff for overseas training was overestimated. It is critical to make a thorough assessment of
capacity and readiness for reform before designing the
project in detail.
Finally, when supporting university reform in entities
that focus on teaching, research, and extension, it is important for donor organizations to ensure that they do not offer
those entities competing funds that would allow administrators or faculty to ignore the more difficult elements of the
reform agenda and delay or derail the process.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 2

Transforming Wageningen Agricultural University
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

Ministry of Agriculture decision to make a major
investment in the knowledge infrastructure for
agriculture, strengthen research, and make research
more accountable to its clients induced Wageningen Agricultural University to change its focus and work with a wider
research network and with stakeholders. The change process
began in 1997 when the university merged with the Ministry
of Agriculture’s research department to create the Wageningen University and Research Center. The vision for education
at Wageningen University and Research Center is to create a
content-inspired international learning environment based
on (1) an orientation to competencies (knowledge, skills,
and attitude), (2) professional and academic education, and
(3) diverse, dynamic, and flexible learning tracks. To achieve
this vision, the university has undertaken major administrative, staffing, and program changes, in the course of which it
has merged with other education and research entities. A better balance was attained between discipline-oriented and
integrated courses and between a focus on the development
of knowledge and skills and on the competencies needed to
use knowledge in society. Students were expected to understand the synergy between natural and social sciences to
increase the societal relevance of the university’s programs. As
it continues to evolve, the new organization has attracted
more students and funding, become more client oriented,
and expanded its international cooperation network with
academic institutions.

A

CONTEXT

The transformation of Wageningen Agricultural University
into the Wageningen University and Research Center
(www.wageningenuniversity.nl/uk/) reflected the Ministry
of Agriculture’s desire to regain its high profile in the economy and improve agriculture’s image and political clout.

The agricultural sector’s poor image was reflected in low
student enrollment in agricultural education programs.
Budget negotiations in 1994 suggested shifting agricultural
education and research (one-third of the ministry’s budget
and staff) to the Ministry of Education. The response
was to create a strong education and research center—
the Wageningen University and Research Center—to
strengthen the Ministry of Agriculture’s position and give it
a guiding/steering role. For more information on research
networks in the Netherlands, see module 1, TN 1.
REFORM OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

The reform was a total reorganization that involved budget
cutting, staff reductions, rationalization of course offerings,
and a public relations campaign to inform future students
and the public of new and revised academic programs. The
university also reached out to partner with other education
institutions, private sector clients, and the European and
world network of academic agricultural education and
research institutions.
More specifically, 24 academic chairs were eliminated, several education programs closed, and 280 staff positions cut.
A strategic plan developed and introduced in 1999 helped
bring about desired improvements in organizational relevance
and enrollment. A key element in the strategic plan was that
the university abandoned the generalized “agricultural” track
to focus on “life and social sciences,” given that health, food,
nutrition, lifestyles, and livelihoods had gained importance.
Research institutes that were under the Ministry of
Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality merged with the university and now operate in so-called Science Groups on animal, environmental, food, plant, and social sciences. Van
Hall Larenstein, a college of higher agricultural and vocational education, joined Wageningen, and the former tropical school for higher vocational education relocated to
Wageningen from Deventer.
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INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

An innovative aspect of the reform was the leadership from
the Ministry of Agriculture, which saw the importance of
creating a strong, competitive research and education center
that would give the ministry a prominent guiding/steering
role and strengthen its political position. Equally innovative
was the university’s capacity to see change as an opportunity
to increase its competitive power by combining different
levels of research and education that included the university,
research centers, experiment stations, and professional
education, complemented by special centers for knowledge
valorization, business schools, and professional midcareer
training and capacity building.

EXPERIENCE

The Wageningen University and Research Center’s vision
for education is to create a content-inspired international
learning environment based on (1) an orientation to competencies (knowledge, skills, and attitude), (2) professional
and academic education, and (3) diverse, dynamic, and flexible learning tracks. The university’s reformulated mission—“to explore the potential of nature to improve the
quality of life”—has given rise to programs that attract
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more students to pursue a career in agriculture. Student
numbers have risen since the reorganization, and the number of students entering the university from secondary
school doubled. This trend was reinforced by many initiatives to inform the general public and students in secondary
education about the university’s new mission and emphasis
on exploring nature to improve the quality of life.
The university has more than 11,000 students. Approximately 7,000 participate in the bachelor-level program, and
of the university’s 2,500 MSc and 1,600 PhD students, more
than half are from abroad. The relatively large number of
doctoral students signifies the university’s true research
character and international scope (it draws students from
more than 100 countries). A new campus with cutting-edge
teaching and research facilities is under construction. The
university has developed a flexible funding structure that
attracts financing for research fellowships; its scientific
excellence helps to secure operational funding. It participates in international research programs oriented to development and plays a leading role in large, privately funded
programs set up by foundations. The university uses core
funding to support development-oriented research to help
solve important societal problems and at the same time to
build skills and competencies of partners and partner institutions in developing countries.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 3

Curriculum Change in Agricultural Universities Strengthens
Links in the Arab Republic of Egypt’s Innovation System
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

CONTEXT

alling enrollments and mismatch between graduates’
skills and labor-market requirements inspired a
curriculum change project in five agricultural universities in Egypt. The project’s strategy was to strengthen
connections between important institutions in the innovation system (universities, private firms, and commercial
farms) while transforming academic programs. Leaders
from the academy and the private sector participated in a
steering committee that guided the project’s implementation. Based on a skill gap analysis that revealed the human
resource needs of private employers and the corresponding weaknesses in academic programs, faculty updated
core courses and made them more consistent in content
as well as academic standards. The project also trained
faculty, instituted active learning and recognition of good
teaching, and improved the use of teaching aids. An overseas study tour formed the basis for significant institutional changes in the participating universities; for example, the universities organized external advisory
committees to provide feedback on sector development
and labor-market needs to university management. The
universities also established internship programs and
career resource centers. Additional links were forged
between the university and others in the AIS through the
establishment of extension-outreach centers, which
enabled universities to provide direct assistance to communities and, in turn, learn about real community needs.
The main lesson from the design and implementation of
this project is that curriculum reform is complex, involving many aspects of the academic program, the university
administration, and stakeholders. One approach to ensure
institutionalization of the reforms would be for the project to include a mechanism for continuing high-level dialogue with stakeholders.

Egypt’s agricultural universities were losing students. Outdated courses and limited contact with prospective employers
produced a significant number of unemployed graduates
whose skills did not match labor-market requirements. The
quality of education had deteriorated because faculty lacked
the resources to conduct research or pursue professional
development. The Institutional Linkage Project, a component
of the USAID-funded Agricultural Exports and Rural Income
(AERI) Project, was designed to help five agricultural universities in Upper Egypt reassess their course content and create
a model curriculum that other universities could adopt. (See
also IAP 9.)

F

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

The strategy of the AERI Linkage Project was to strengthen
connections between important institutions in the innovation
system (universities, private firms, and commercial farms)
while transforming academic programs. The process began
with a skill gap analysis that revealed the human resource
needs of private employers and the corresponding weaknesses
in academic programs. Based on this analysis, three broad
steps emerged to support the project’s overall goal:
■

■

■

Step 1. Active teaching and learning methods were introduced to faculty to develop the higher cognitive skills
(such as critical thinking, problem solving, and decision
making) that private employers were seeking in graduates.
Step 2. Content of the “core courses” (taken by all agricultural students) was updated.
Step 3. Based on a strategic planning exercise by academic
and private sector leaders, the universities organized
external advisory committees and internship programs as
well as career resource and extension outreach centers.
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INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS

Innovations in project design and implementation included:
■

■

■

■

■

■

Leaders from the academy and the private sector participated in a Steering Committee that guided the project’s
implementation.
A skill gap analysis identified knowledge and skill deficits
in recent graduates.
Academic staff participated in redesigning and improving courses and learning materials.
University deans and private sector leaders gained firsthand views of overseas university systems.
External Advisory Committees were created and provided feedback on sector development and labor-market
needs to university management.
Student internship programs were developed.

Details on the project’s experience with these innovations follow.
Role of the steering committee

A Steering Committee of Egyptian academic and private sector leaders guided planning and implementation of the project’s capacity-building component. Their participation
helped bridge the gap in understanding and cooperation
between the private sector and the participating institutions.
The committee met periodically to review and approve all
major project activities and to select and/or approve nominees for major activities such as overseas study tours.

methods. These two-day events focused on the science,
mechanics, and art of teaching as well as skills to elicit learning. The workshop emphasized active, problem-based
learning strategies. Educators from the United States
conducted three follow-up workshops with 139 faculty
members who had completed the first round of workshops.
Outstanding Egyptian teachers who emerged from the first
workshops organized additional in-service workshops for
faculty who did not speak English. Nine such workshops
were conducted for 234 faculty members from all five
universities.

Leadership study tour generates ideas for change

Nineteen deans and department heads traveled with private
sector leaders interested in strengthening the universities to
visit four United States land-grant universities with important faculties of agriculture. The tour emphasized how each
university worked closely with the private sector to modify
the curriculum, established internship programs, operated
career centers, and incorporated practical skill training into
their respective academic programs. During a two-day
strategic planning workshop following the tour, participants
discussed and developed the elements of a plan to incorporate similar ideas in their universities. The tour enabled participants to see the value of advisory committees involving
the private sector, including their potential to promote partnerships between the private sector and the university system. The conclusion was that the study tour “formed the
basis for significant institutional changes in the participating universities” (Swanson, Barrick, and Samy 2007).

Skill gap analysis

The skill gap analysis involved 254 private employers and
1,000 university graduates who had been out of school
and/or working for at least one year. Private firms and recent
graduates agreed that university students needed to develop
critical thinking, problem solving, and decision-making
skills, as well as effective communication and teamwork
skills. The common method of teaching through lectures did
not actively involve students in learning. It emphasized
knowledge recall at the expense of higher cognitive skills
such as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. The first step in
providing students with the skills they lacked was to transform the teaching/learning methods at the universities.
Active teaching and learning

Altogether, 239 university faculty members participated in
seven in-service workshops on active teaching/learning
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Course development workshops

The skill gap analysis demonstrated the need for the universities to change their curricula, but that would be difficult in
view of the time and effort needed for the Supreme Council
for Higher Education to approve the modifications. As an
alternative strategy, the basic structure of the curriculum
was retained and individual courses were modified to reflect
the current knowledge base in each field of study. The focus
shifted to updating basic course content and teaching methods and developing common academic standards across all
five universities, especially for the common core courses.
Course development workshops, attended by faculty
members and teaching assistants responsible for the core
courses, adapted courses to become more consistent in content as well as academic standards. The Midwest Universities
Consortium for International Activities (MUCIA) selected
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outstanding teachers from partner universities in the United
States to conduct the workshops. They brought their recommended book for the particular course plus an array of
teaching materials (such as the course outline or syllabus,
PowerPoint presentations, videos, and classroom exercises,
quizzes, and examinations).

of graduates from agricultural universities, and it successfully engaged university administrators and faculty in
bringing about those changes. Among the achievements
noted in mid-term project reviews were:
■

Implementing faculty development
programs at United States universities

Faculty development programs consisted of a six-week program split between two United States universities in MUCIA
or a four-week program at one university. The vast majority
of participants (93 percent) intended to modify their teaching
methods in various ways, by promoting greater studentteacher interaction, encouraging more use of the Internet,
making courses more market driven, bringing in more guest
lecturers, stressing practical applications, increasing field visits, and promoting more team-based learning.

■

■

Developing external advisory committees

Workshops led by MUCIA specialists helped to organize
this institutional innovation. Following the first workshop,
three follow-up workshops were organized to discuss
progress. At a separate, one-day workshop held later (April
2006), academic leaders from each university and the private sector members of their respective committees met to
compare experiences and outline plans for building publicprivate partnerships.

Forming internship programs and other
links in the innovation system

The external advisory committees promoted the development of student internship programs in collaboration
with private firms. Additional links were forged between
the university and others in the AIS through the establishment of Extension-Outreach Centers. The centers
enabled universities to provide direct assistance to communities and, in turn, learn about real community needs.
The establishment of Career Resource Centers helped
students plan coursework and prepare themselves for
seeking employment.

PROJECT IMPACT AT MID-TERM

The project created greater awareness of the importance of
supporting major change in the knowledge and skill profiles

Active teaching/learning methods. Sixty-seven percent
of professors had adopted and thirty-three percent had
partially adopted the new methods. The methods seem
to have improved interactions between professors and
students.
Course development workshops. All participants
found the workshops conducted to review courses and
introduce new material relevant to their particular
courses; 53 percent fully adopted the recommended
modifications to their course. The remaining 47 percent adopted some of the materials or recommendations. (Note that the project also supplied computers
and LCD projectors to use with the updated teaching
materials.)
Links to private employers. The study tour was effective
in convincing university administrators that publicprivate cooperation benefits future employers of graduates and the university.

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

The main lesson from the design and implementation of
this project is that curriculum reform is not as straightforward as it might seem.1 It is a complex process involving
many aspects of the academic program, the university
administration, and stakeholders. For example, a revised
or updated curriculum without improved teaching materials and appropriate pedagogical skills is unlikely to have
much impact. The benefits of a revised curriculum will
not be sustained unless the curriculum keeps pace with
stakeholders’ evolving needs. Key stakeholders inside and
outside the university must contribute their perspectives
on the knowledge and skills needed in a developing agricultural sector. To ensure support for curriculum change,
teaching staff, administrators, and stakeholders must be
consulted and engaged as partners in making the desired
changes. Despite impressive reforms in the curriculum,
capacity building for academic staff, and improved links to
agribusiness, the question of whether these five universities can sustain their efforts appears unanswered. One
approach to ensure institutionalization of the reforms
would be for the project to include a mechanism for continuing high-level dialogue.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 4

Innovative Training Program for Midcareer Agricultural
Extension Staff: The Sasakawa Africa Fund Education
Program
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

he Sasakawa Africa Fund Education Program
builds capacity of midcareer practicing extension
workers by enabling them to participate in degree
programs. This opportunity enriches university understanding of field conditions and problems (leading to more
focused curriculum content), benefits participating communities, enhances the status of the university in the agricultural sector and rural space, gives ministry of agriculture
services greater credibility and effectiveness, and confers
greater skills, status, and influence on midcareer extension
workers—all of which is beneficial to the AIS. The process
began in 1993 with cooperation between Ghana’s Ministry
of Food and Agriculture, the Sasakawa Africa Fund for
Extension Education (SAFE), and Winrock International
Institute for Agricultural Development. By January 2008,
2,292 students had benefited from the program. One key to
the program’s success was the Supervised Enterprise Projects (SEP) undertaken by each midlevel extension worker
accepted to the program, which forged the links between
extension, the university, and the community. The main lesson is that initiating a program of this type requires considerable discussion with higher-level decision makers and
university managers so that the potential value of the program is understood. Agreement on program design is essential to ensure that the community attachment portion of the
program (SEP) is implemented effectively. Careful selection
of candidates for the degree program is vital. The financial
lesson is that SEP is expensive to implement, as it requires
supervision and travel for faculty and students.

T

CONTEXT

The persistence of formal teaching methods characterized by
the lecture model is a generic weakness of agricultural
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education, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where students
lack practical experience gained through demonstrations,
field visits, and interactions with rural communities. University graduates who work in agriculture ministries and their
subsidiary agencies often lack the skills and confidence to
understand, respond to, and communicate effectively with
sector stakeholders. To respond to this need and boost field
experience in the leadership ranks of the extension service,
Sasakawa Africa Association (SAA), an NGO funded by the
Nippon Foundation, launched the Sasakawa Africa Fund for
Extension Education (SAFE) (http://www.safe-africa.net), in
1993. A pilot program was implemented in Ghana in collaboration with Winrock International Institute for Agricultural
Development, a nonprofit NGO based in the United States.

PROGRAM GOALS

The SAFE program has four objectives:
1. Create midcareer training opportunities to improve the
technical and human relations skills of outstanding male
and female field-based extension staff with certificates
and diplomas in agriculture and related fields.
2. Help reform agricultural extension curricula in selected
African universities. Coupled with this reform, participating universities are assisted to acquire relevant
instructional materials and to network with other universities in the SAFE program to build strong panAfrican academic partnerships. See also module 3.
3. Develop agricultural leaders for extension organizations in sub-Saharan Africa. This objective does not
necessarily imply helping extension staff to occupy high
positions within the extension organization. Rather, it
means helping them achieve the more important goal of
developing new, positive attitudes towards their work

and responsibilities and to become systems thinkers, catalysts, facilitators, and effective managers of change
within their extension organizations.
4. In the long term, bring about institutional reform
within African universities, not only in the development
of responsive agricultural extension curricula, but also in
the wider institutions themselves.
In summary, SAFE strengthens the in-country capacity
of African universities to be adaptable organizations that
can develop client-focused training programs, acquire relevant core instructional materials in agricultural extension
and related fields, mobilize internal and external resources
to sustain the programs, and forge partnerships with other
local and international institutions and agencies. Specific
problems that SAFE addresses are (Zinnah 2003):
■

■

■

■

■

■

Outdated extension curricula that do not reflect changing needs of providers and users of extension services,
including the private sector.
Inadequate off-campus, farmer- and client-focused practical training activities for students in agricultural colleges and universities.
Lack of appreciation of the experience of midcareer
extension professionals in the agricultural and rural
development process.
Lack of appreciation for midcareer professionals, especially certificate and diploma holders, as a prospective
group of learners.
Lack of appropriate training opportunities for midcareer
extension staff.
Lack of partnerships among agricultural colleges and
universities and employers/clients of their graduates.

education). The second option is a two-year postdiploma
program. Both programs lead to a BSc in Agricultural
Extension.
Innovative elements

The program’s innovative feature—aside from its focus on
the untapped potential of midcareer professionals—was its
off-campus Supervised Enterprise Project (SEP). After an
initial period on campus, students return to their work
environment to undertake a SEP for 4–6 months. These
community-based experiences facilitate experiential learning as well as linkages between the major subsystems of the
agricultural knowledge system: the farmer subsystem, which
includes agribusiness, the extension and education subsystem, and the research subsystem. The SEP embodies the
innovative link that connects the university and the community, thereby enhancing AIS interaction. Through the
student extension workers, the SEP conveys community
problems and successful practices to university researchers
and enriches the curriculum.

Impacts of the Cape Coast program

The main beneficiaries of the SAFE Program are:
■

■

■

■

SAFE’S DEVELOPMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF CAPE COAST, GHANA

To develop the SAFE pilot, in 1992 Ghana’s Ministry of
Food and Agriculture (MOFA) and its NGO partners
requested the University of Cape Coast (UCC) to create a
needs-based BSc degree program in agricultural extension
for midcareer extension staff with diplomas and certificates
(qualifications possessed by some 85 percent of Ghana’s
extension staff). These men and women would undertake
the program on a leave of absence from their jobs and
would return to work when they completed their studies.
The resulting program has two options. The basic option
is a four-year program offered to extension workers who
have passed a certificate course (two years of postsecondary

■

Frontline extension staff of MOFA, because without the
program, they would have little chance to get a BSc, given
the perceptions of diploma and certificate holders
among university admission officers.
Farmers, because the SEPs concentrate on farmers’ problems and have generated income-producing projects.
Academic programs at the university, which are exposed
to real farming community problems and concerns.
UCC, through heightened visibility and links to MOFA,
farmers, extension staff, NGOs, and District Assemblies.
The university received international recognition for the
innovative nature of the program.
MOFA, which gains an infusion of newly motivated staff
with practical skills and experience who serve in key
positions and supervise the work of other extension staff.

By 1999, 51 students (22 percent female) had completed
BSc degrees; of these, 22 percent gained first-class honors.
Seventy-six students, including three from Nigeria and one
from Mozambique, were enrolled (29 percent were female);
51 were certificate and 25 were diploma holders. The participation of the women in particular should increase the
gender balance in the upper levels of the extension service.
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A seven-member Consultative Committee was formed with
representatives from MOFA, UCC, SAA/Winrock, and
farmers/agribusiness to provide recommendations, including recommendations for fund raising. Greater interaction
was fostered between field staff of some bilateral agencies
and NGOs, UCC, and students because of the SEP.
By January 2008, 246 enrollees at UCC had obtained BSc
degrees and 231, a diploma. At the same time, 81 persons
were enrolled in the degree program and 112 in the diploma
program.
WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF SAFE IN AFRICA?

It is becoming evident that partnerships are the only
solution to the multifaceted problem of training Africa’s
agricultural extension staff. In extension education (in
fact, throughout the AIS), the tradition of working alone
in a competitive rather than a collaborative mode is no
longer valid. No single player has the capacity to cover all
education and training needs, and partnerships with
donor agencies will continue to be critical in this poorly
resourced area.
The motives and methods of the SAFE program resonated with African universities outside Ghana. Following
the UCC pilot, other universities in Ghana and elsewhere
joined, including: Kwadaso Agricultural College (Ghana);
the University of Abomey-Calavi (Benin); the Polytechnic
University of Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina Faso), Alemaya
University of Agriculture and Hawassa University
(Ethiopia); the Rural Polytechnic Institute of Training and
Applied Research and Samako Agricultural Institute (Mali);
Bunda College of Agriculture (Malawi); Ahmadu Bello University and Bayero University (Nigeria); Sokoine University
of Agriculture (Tanzania); and Makerere University
(Uganda).1 Donor support for the SAFE program was
lengthy (UCC Ghana, the pioneer university, was supported
from 1992 to 2002), but once universities and diplomagranting institutions accumulated sufficient experience
with running the new curriculum, direct support ended.
A number of lessons were learned as SAFE expanded to
new settings. Perhaps the most important lesson was that the
seemingly impossible task of bridging the technicalprofessional gap in civil service employment could be
solved for midcareer, technically qualified extension staff.
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A relevant program that shows positive results creates further demand among academic entities and potential
enrollees.
Including a practical stage (the SEP) in the program was
central to success, because it fostered the alliances that
spread the benefits to all participants. Communities gained
from the external contacts. Ministries of agriculture gained
better-trained staff with more field experience, which made
their contribution to sector development more effective.
Universities gained greater community visibility and access
to real rural training settings and challenges, and university
research programs and curricula were enriched to reflect
changes in agriculture on the ground.
Aspects of the program can be improved. The four-year
certificate program is too long for some midcareer workers
who would be content with a diploma rather than a degree.
The program also needs more diversity, especially with
respect to female recruits, but the pool of midcareer women
extension workers for the program remains small.
One lesson for implementing this kind of program is that
the need for qualified and committed core staff is paramount. The lack of such staff has been a big constraint,
affecting not only the implementation but the long-term
sustainability of the program. Because the SAFE concept is
new to the university and the extension service, administrative and academic staff members must be oriented to
it. University staff members must acquire the improved
pedagogical methods and skills to better meet midcareer
students’ learning needs. The acquisition of such skills is
facilitated by staff involvement in the SAFE program
through team teaching and joint supervision of SEPs.
Financing is crucial. SAFE, with its strong off-campus
focus, is expensive to run, even if the returns on investment
are large. A clear exit strategy for the funding partners is
vital to enable the university to develop its own means of
continuing the program. In Ghana, MOFA is considering
including the SAFE program in its budget. Incentives also
help universities adopt the program. At UCC, for example,
a multipurpose building (the Sasakawa Center) was completed and is used to generate income for the SAFE program
at the university. It remains vital to build constituencies that
can pressure decision makers on behalf of the university;
some administrators continue to regard SAFE as extra work
rather than a strategic necessity.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 5

Chiang Mai University Links with Rural Communities to
Focus Research on Farming Problems and Foster
Curriculum Change
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

his reform fostered interaction between the University of Chiang Mai and communities to identify problems and find solutions jointly through
Community-Based Research (CBR). In the ten years since
the program began, students and researchers have gained
hands-on experience in communities; through this interaction, they identified researchable topics that enriched the
university’s research program. The curriculum also benefited from the enhanced understanding of rural problems
and challenges. The innovative aspects of the universitycommunity link were that it used an ongoing project (the
CBR project) as a vehicle for introducing students to the
realities of rural life; it created a university Center for
Community-Based Research; and it used CBR projects
created from this center as a learning resource for undergraduate and graduate students. Apart from the core faculty in the Center for Community-Based Research, other
faculty members began to adopt this approach to building
student capacity to deal with real problems in rural communities. The university became a visible and active actor
in the farming community and the AIS. The integration of
learning/teaching, research, community service, and faculty required considerable collaboration among the CBR
projects and communities, the Practical Training Unit, the
Student Affairs Unit, and the Department of Agricultural
Extension. At the same time, the program required support from the national research funding agency as well as
financial support and collaborative organization inside the
university and with communities.

T

communities. The university has established a center to
strengthen research by systematically accessing new research
funding and strengthening faculty research capacity. A faculty research manager encourages faculty, staff, and students
to engage more actively in research. Research performance
is a major criterion for promoting faculty members.
Yet the Department of Agricultural Extension in the Faculty of Agriculture at Chiang Mai University realized in the
1990s that students and faculty were poorly prepared for
work in rural areas. Students and faculty were unfamiliar
with rural living conditions, technical agricultural challenges, and social problems. The university placed heavy
emphasis on classroom learning, literature reviews, and laboratory experimentation but offered little contact with
communities. Many undergraduates had little capacity to
analyze and synthesize information on social situations or
conduct community-based research, and their facilitation,
communication, and writing skills were poor. In 1996, the
Thailand Research Fund (TRF) had resources to support a
Community-Based Research (CBR) program to answer
the question: “How can research findings be used by local
people—the users of research results?”

THE COMMUNITY-BASED RESEARCH PROGRAM

The CBR program employed an empowerment and peoplecentered approach that:
■

■

CONTEXT

A major policy of Thailand’s Chiang Mai University is that
research should be of world-class quality and serve local

Identified problems and research questions in a participatory manner with local residents.
Involved local people as community research in the CBR
program (farmers, women leaders, village leaders, school
teachers, administrative officers, community development workers, community extension workers, doctors,
monks, and youth groups).
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■

Planned projects with care and implemented agreed
actions to solve problems.

Each CBR project would be developed and implemented
in 12–18 months and would receive a grant of
200,000–300,000 baht (B). To facilitate CBR projects, CBR
centers were set up. Through counselors and staff, they
would identify community researchers, identify local problems, develop research questions, develop a CBR proposal
and action plan, sign research contracts, and monitor the
CBR from the beginning to final report phase.
In 1998 the Extension Department saw that CBR projects
could provide an opportunity for students to become involved
in communities. Student learning was integrated with community research through a number of initiatives. Students
enrolled in Extension Communications visited active CBR
projects and, as an exercise, could write an article on their
observations and village issues; produce a script to be broadcast over community radio; or submit an article for community newspapers. Students specializing in Media Production
for Extension visited CBR projects and developed media
products that reflected the needs of community researchers,
such as posters, newsletters, photographs, DVDs, and radio
programs. Graduate students enrolled in Agricultural Communities Studies undertook study visits to CBR communities;
participated in discussion and dialogue; listened carefully
when interacting with CBR researchers, counselors, and staff;
took detailed notes; and produced a review of their visits. The
materials produced, together with their experiences in the
communities, formed the basis of their thesis topics.
Efforts to widen the interaction between the broader university community, the research funding agency, and CBR
communities proved difficult to achieve. For this reason, a
project specific to the university—the Research Management
Fund—was established in 2002 with support from TRF to
foster wider collaboration among the faculty of agriculture,
TRF, and CBR communities for integrating teaching/
learning, research, and community service. The ultimate
objective was to create a learning community of undergraduate students based on CBR projects. To reach this objective,
a Center for Community-Based Research was established in
the Faculty of Agriculture to develop CBR projects as a
means of empowering community researchers. In 2003, 11
CBR projects were developed.
The next challenge was to get the university’s Student
Affairs Unit and Practical Training Unit involved in using CBR
projects as a learning community base for undergraduates. A
start was made during the practical training period in 2003,
when 120 second-year students undertook practical training in
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five CBR communities supported by staff from the Center for
Community-Based Research in the Faculty of Agriculture. The
university’s Practical Training Unit staff learned, for the first
time, how to organize such training in rural communities and
how to communicate with community members and undergraduate students. A practical training manual was prepared
for the 2004 program. As a result, the Faculty of Agriculture
has allotted an annual budget for this training activity. It was
also the first time that communities had hosted 30 university
students for a five-day visit, helped organize the practical
training program, and interacted closely with such a group of
visitors. For the students, the visit was a true learning experience. For the first time, students lived with rural families, communicated, understood the realities of rural life, and appreciated
the value of local wisdom in dealing with livelihood issues.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

The innovative aspects of the university-community link
were that it used an ongoing project (the CBR project) as a
vehicle for introducing students to the realities of rural
community life; it created a university Center for Community-Based Research; and it used CBR projects created from
this center as a learning resource for undergraduate and
graduate students. Apart from the core faculty in the Center
for Community-Based Research, other faculty members
began to adopt this approach to building student capacity to
deal with real problems in rural communities.
IMPACT

In a relatively short period, the program established the CBR
link with communities and dramatically raised awareness
among students and faculty of how isolated the university
had been from life in rural communities. Research has
become more focused, and the curriculum reflects the knowledge and skills needed by graduates who will meet technical
and social needs in rural areas. The university, through its faculty and students, has gained visibility and stature among its
stakeholders and has become an active AIS actor.
By 2007, 650 CBR projects had been funded with grants
from TRF, and 264 had been implemented, facilitated by the
core research team that runs the Center for CommunityBased Research. The center collaborated with the Practical
Training Unit in the faculty to enable second- and thirdyear undergraduate students to undertake “practical training” in communities.
Additionally, these students were encouraged to practice
further “student activity” in the communities through
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various student clubs. Through this learning process,
students, the Faculty of Agriculture, the Center for
Community-Based Research, the TRF, and local communities have gradually developed collaborative interaction. For
example, research problems identified by community members have increased the effectiveness of the students’ clubs.
Local communities have increased their ability to manage
“student practices” as a vehicle for identifying community
problems, to analyze causes of problems, and to develop
solutions through a participatory research process in which
students and faculty become their co-researchers.

LESSONS LEARNED

To summarize, the CBR program—initiated through one
university department in the faculty of agriculture—created
and sustained links between students, teachers, researchers,
and rural communities, all of whom benefit. The university
can focus on real-life problems through research; supervising teachers gain from the field experience; students learn
how to communicate with rural people; and communities
gain solutions to problems based on academic and local
knowledge and see the university as a development partner.
Box 2.12 lists specific lessons from the program.

Box 2.12 Specific Lessons from the Community-Based Research Approach Adopted by Chiang Mai
University’s Faculty of Agriculture

■

■

■

■

■

■

The need for change in academic programs can be
identified from within the educational institution.
Available resources (in this case, the Thailand
Research Fund) can be tapped to begin the change
process.
Involving students and researchers in the change
process is likely to ensure that the change model is
sustainable.
It was not easy to convince all faculty members to
adopt the CBR model, especially because projects
run from 12 to 18 months, whereas mainstream student research projects run only from 6 to 8 months.
Collaboration within the university and with communities is essential.
The participation of academic staff as co-researchers
allows them to increase their knowledge and facilitating skills and to change their world view. For
example, teachers adopted a participatory learning
process, respected local wisdom, and recognized villagers’ tacit knowledge. These practices inspired
changes in their teaching style, which has become
more participatory and facilitates learning more
effectively.

■

■

■

■

■

Through the CBR projects, academic knowledge was
applied to problems that community members
could not solve by themselves.
The involvement of faculty and students with communities brought the university to the field and
strengthened AIS linkages between the university
and a major stakeholder group.
The collaboration of the CBR projects and communities, the Practical Training Unit, the Student Affairs
Unit, and the Department of Agricultural Extension
contributed to the integration of learning/teaching,
research, community service, and faculty.
Information and knowledge generated by CBR projects can be used to develop research projects for
undergraduate and master’s students. At the same
time, community service is built in throughout the
research process and culminates in the development
and use of new knowledge to improve life in the
communities.
As noted, the CBR program was successful but
required financial support and collaborative organization inside the university and with communities,
and the support of the research funding agency.

Source: Author.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 6

EARTH University, Costa Rica: A New Kind
of Agricultural University
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

ARTH University, an autonomous educational
entity, was newly designed and established in Costa
Rica in 1990. Although a significant part of the plan
of study focuses on agriculture and natural resource management, the university’s core purpose is to prepare leaders
capable of promoting sustainable development in the
tropics. EARTH’s unique educational model is based on
technical and scientific knowledge, entrepreneurial mentality, values and ethics, and social and environmental commitment. In addition to inculcating practical skills that
benefit interactions at many levels throughout the AIS,
EARTH’s experiential curriculum balances theory and
practice through work experience, community development, the academic program, entrepreneurial projects, and
internships. The emphasis on entrepreneurial skills equips
graduates with a greater range of career choices, and exposure to rural communities is vital for producing graduates
dedicated to serving the sector and rural people. A major
lesson is that the development of robust rural economies
requires individuals capable of applying knowledge and
skills from across disciplines, often in very practical and
applied ways. Faculty must engage directly with their students in production, processing, and marketing as well as in
research and extension. Reward and promotion criteria
must be designed to encourage innovative teaching and
engagement as well as research. Assured funding combined
with continuous fund raising enable the university to
maintain high academic and infrastructure standards.

E

CONTEXT

EARTH—an acronym for the university’s name in Spanish,
Escuela de Agricultura de la Región Tropical Húmeda—is a
private, international, four-year undergraduate institution
located in the Caribbean lowlands of Costa Rica.1 An initiative
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of a group of largely Costa Rican business, academic, and
government leaders, EARTH was founded in 1990 with significant investments from USAID and the W.K. Kellogg
Foundation, with strong support from the government of
Costa Rica. The support provided by USAID allowed for the
establishment of an endowment that covers between onethird and one-half of the university’s annual expenses.
EARTH University was established in response to urgent
problems in Central and South America, including rural
poverty, high population growth, low productivity, migration to cities, destruction of fragile ecosystems, and political
instability and war throughout the region. EARTH is a private, nonprofit, international university, autonomous and
independent of political pressure. It has an international
faculty, a student body originating from 25 Latin American
and Caribbean countries, a small number of students from
Africa, and is small, with 400 students and 40 faculty. The
university’s 3,300-hectare farm is used for training as well as
commercial, income-generating crop production.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

Although a significant part of the plan of study at EARTH
focuses on agriculture and natural resource management,
the university has defined its core purpose as preparing
leaders capable of promoting sustainable development in
the tropics. The curriculum is highly integrated and
transdisciplinary. While the acquisition of technical and
scientific skills and expertise is obviously important, the
development of values, leadership, commitment, and a
diverse set of skills, abilities, and attitudes are considered
equally important.
The development of EARTH in the 1980s coincided
with a significant change in the agricultural sector and a
marked shift in the structure of employment opportunities in agriculture. Whereas previous generations of
agronomists and other professionals had found relatively

abundant employment in Ministries of Agriculture,
development banks, and other public agencies, by the
1980s structural adjustment programs and other changes
had largely eliminated these possibilities. Consequently,
EARTH’s academic program was focused largely on
preparing professionals for the private sector. Providing
graduates with entrepreneurial skills and abilities became
fundamental to the program. The centerpiece of entrepreneurial training at EARTH is the Entrepreneurial Project
course (see the next section).

■

INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS

To create the type of leader capable of responding to the
social and environmental problems facing rural communities of the humid tropics, EARTH developed a unique educational model based on four pillars: technical and scientific
knowledge, entrepreneurial mentality, values and ethics,
and social and environmental commitment. As part of this
model, EARTH created an experiential curriculum that balances theory and practice. Five keystone programs within
EARTH’s curriculum are based on experiential learning:
■
■

■

■

Work Experience. This course is taken by all first-, second-, and third-year students and continues in the
fourth year as the Professional Experience course. In the
first and second years, students work in crop, animal, and
forestry production modules on the EARTH farm. In the
fourth year, students identify work sites or activities on
campus or in surrounding communities that correspond
with their career goals and develop and implement a
work plan, dedicating a minimum of 10 hours per week
to the “job.”
Community Development. In their second year, in an
extension of the Work Experience course, students work
on an individual basis with small-scale, local producers
on their farms and with organized groups in sustainable
community development. During this experience in the
community, students try to resolve problems facing the
region’s inhabitants. The community transmits realworld experience and provides learning opportunities
for students.
Academic Program at EARTH-La Flor. In their third year,
students spend seven weeks living with a host family near
EARTH’s education and research center in Guanacaste, a
province in the dry tropics of Costa Rica, where they have
the opportunity to become actively involved in the region’s
development process. Students contribute to improvements in the communities and also gain experience by

working with companies in the region in such areas
as: crop management techniques and practices for melons,
sugarcane, rice, and citrus; livestock management practices;
small-scale and industrial aquaculture; and regional efforts
in alternative energy generation from wind, geothermal,
solar, and sugarcane-derived sources. Students also learn
about water management and biodiversity in the dry tropics in relation to each of the above-mentioned activities.
Entrepreneurial Projects. Students develop a business
venture from beginning to end during their first three
years at EARTH. Small groups of 4–6 students, of different
nationalities, decide upon a business activity related to
agriculture and natural resources and conduct a feasibility
study (including financial, social, and environmental criteria). If the study is approved by a panel of professors, other
students, and external experts, the university loans money
to the company, and the team implements the project,
including the marketing and sale of the final product.
After repaying their loan, with interest, the group shares
the profits. The Entrepreneurial Project is accompanied by
a series of classroom modules related to business organization, accounting, marketing, and similar themes.
Internships. In their third trimester of their third year,
students leave campus and take part in an internship
program with a host organization such as a business,
NGO, or farm. This internship program lasts 15 weeks
and is a crucial component of the student’s experiential
education. Using knowledge and skills acquired in their
first three years at EARTH University, students obtain
real-world practical experience upon which they can
reflect during their fourth and final academic year.

These programs give students opportunities to develop
planning and leadership skills, foster responsibility, encourage them to become decision makers and critical and creative
thinkers, improve their ability for analysis, synthesis, and
evaluation, and apply technical and scientific knowledge in
real situations.

IMPACT

In its twenty years of operation, EARTH University has graduated some 2,000 students, the majority of whom have
returned to their home countries to work in agriculture and
rural development. The EARTH educational model is widely
recognized as suitable for developing graduates who have the
academic and practical knowledge, skills, and confidence to
take leadership positions in the sector. Many graduates create their own businesses and become employers.
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LESSONS LEARNED

The key to graduating professionals capable of successfully
promoting change and sustainable rural development is to
begin with young people who have a vocational interest in
agriculture, natural resource management, rural development, and related areas. Such graduates are likely to return
to rural areas and engage in the complex and difficult work
that drives development. Investment in choosing and
recruiting new students is a major contributor to the production of graduates dedicated to serving the sector and
rural people.
Universities have to be engaged with rural communities.
Too often, universities are located in the capital city and lack
the resources (or the will) to get faculty and students into
rural areas to engage directly with farmers and their families. Frequent and direct contact with the realities of rural
life and the challenges of agricultural production are essential in the formation of future change agents.
Higher education in agriculture has become increasingly specialized, with the result that many graduates have
great difficulty integrating knowledge across disciplinary
boundaries. Yet the development of robust rural economies
requires individuals capable of applying knowledge and
skills from across disciplines, often in very practical and
applied ways. Particularly at the undergraduate level, a generalist formation would seem to be more relevant to the
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needs of most developing countries. An emphasis on entrepreneurial skills equips graduates with a greater range of
career choices. Exposure of students and faculty to agricultural communities leads to better communication, greater
understanding of rural living conditions and livelihood
challenges, and the formulation of technical and social
solutions.
A favorable student-to-faculty ratio (10–1 at EARTH)
allows for quality interaction and instruction. Faculty have
to be willing to get their hands dirty and to engage directly
with their students in production, processing, and marketing as well as in research and extension. Reward and promotion criteria must be designed to encourage innovative
teaching and engagement as well as research. At the same
time, teachers and professors must be provided decent compensation for their service. Substandard salaries and working conditions only serve to drive the best out of education,
leaving the mediocre in charge.
Agricultural institutions, faculties, and schools require
investment and must be equipped with the latest technological advances to make a meaningful contribution to building human resources for agriculture. Although assured
funding enables the university to maintain high academic
and infrastructure standards, fund-raising remains a constant task for a private autonomous university, since its
future depends on such income.
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Technical Skills for Export Crop Industries in
Uganda and Ethiopia
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

shortage of skilled technical personnel and high
demand from commercial producers led to the
cooperation between a donor, training institution,
and commodity group to provide technical skills for workers
in high-value export crop industries (floriculture and horticulture) in Uganda and Ethiopia. The innovative element of
the project was the introduction of competence-based training, which ensured that trained technicians were equipped
with work-ready skills; in fact, trainees completing the program had a high level of employment. A lesson learned from
operating the program over three years is that demand from
employers can trigger technical/vocational training and that
close cooperation between a qualified training supplier and
clients can lead to a successful outcome.

A

CONTEXT

Floriculture is a large market in East Africa. Local and foreign investors have developed flower farms that produce
large quantities of roses and chrysanthemums. Dutch flower
growers are also active in this market, which is understandable, since flower auctions in the Netherlands trade onethird of the global market for flowers and plants. The agronomic and economic conditions for raising high-value
export crops are favorable in many parts of East Africa:
Cheap land, labor, and energy combine with good soil,
water, and climatic conditions. Despite this potential, the
associated growers in Uganda and Ethiopia (the Ugandan
Flower Exporters Association and Ethiopian Horticulture
Producers and Exporters Association) lacked well-trained
middle management workers. Various farmers were hiring
managers from abroad, mostly from India or Kenya. Producers and growers felt the need to train local workers and
students and proposed a project to the Netherlands Foundation for International Cooperation to develop education

and training programs at various levels, ranging from short
courses for farm workers to certificate and diploma courses
and bachelor’s and master’s degree programs.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS

The overall objective of the project was to expand the numbers of qualified technical workers for the export flower
industry in Uganda and Ethiopia. The project had two components. The first identified the knowledge and skills
required and designed corresponding training activities.
The second developed a new pedagogical approach.
To develop training programs, two consortia, with
experts largely drawn from the same institutions (the
Department of Education and Competence Studies of
Wageningen University, PTC+, the Agricultural Economics
Institute, and a practical research center in horticulture),
worked with local stakeholders. The consortia are working
with the respective grower associations and academic institutions (in Uganda with the Mountains of the Moon University in Fort Portal and Bukalasa Agricultural College in
Wobulenzi and in Ethiopia with Jimma University College
of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine). The short courses
have been effective at the thematic level. Farm supervisors
and assistant managers of various departments, such as the
greenhouse, “fertigation” (fertilization and irrigation),
postharvest and handling, and pest management, completed the training and were able to apply their new skills
immediately. In Ethiopia, the development and implementation of the curriculum is still underway, but the first reactions are positive. An impact study will be undertaken to
show the real effectiveness of the approach.
A competence development philosophy was employed in
developing the curriculum. A group of staff members went
to the Netherlands for a Training of Teachers (ToT) program. Apart from floriculture and horticulture training,
they also learned principles of competence-based education
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(Mulder 2007; Mulder et al. 2009). They were expected to
disseminate the knowledge obtained in the ToT program to
lecturers in their colleges. The core of the competence-based
education philosophy is that the flower (or other) industry
articulates the need for training. Through a labor-market
analysis and needs assessment, all stakeholders obtain a picture of how the educational program should be structured.
Occupational profiles and competency profiles are developed. The competency profiles contain knowledge, skills,
and attitudes.
A major premise in competence-based education is that
knowledge alone is not sufficient to bring about improved
practice. In many cases, unbalanced concentration on
knowledge develops graduates who may know a lot but cannot apply their knowledge in practice. Applying knowledge
in practice, however, is exactly what is needed in many
developing countries. A matrix comprising eight principles
and four competence-based implementation levels was used
to decide the extent to which the horticulture training
would be competence-based. The matrix structure resembles that of models used by the European Foundation for
Quality Management.
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INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

The innovative element of the project was the introduction
of competence-based training, which ensured that trained
technicians were equipped with work-ready skills.
BENEFITS, RESULTS, AND LESSONS LEARNED

As noted, the farm supervisors and assistant managers of
various floriculture departments were able to apply their
new skills immediately after training. In Uganda, the first
batch of sixteen diploma students graduated, and 14 are
working on flower farms. Because of the training program’s
competence focus, employers appreciate the trained technicians. Placing students in internships was not difficult. Some
farms asked for as many students as were available. Various
farms retained the interns and offered them labor contracts
(Mulder, pers. comm., 2010).
The lessons from this experience to date are that demand
from employers can trigger technical/vocational training
and that close cooperation between qualified training supplier and clients can lead to a successful outcome.
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Agribusiness Training for Secondary School
Graduates in Timor-Leste
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

n Timor-Leste, capacity improvements are needed at all
levels and across the spectrum of participants in the
agricultural sector (public agencies, agribusinesses,
individual farmers, cooperatives, and others). Building
Agribusiness Capacity in East Timor (the BACET project)
offers supplementary training in agribusiness skills through
a one-year, postsecondary certificate program. The project—
implemented by the National Directorate of Agricultural
Education and Training in the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (MAP) and Land O’Lakes (an international
agribusiness)—graduated the first set of students in 2008
(121) and the second set in 2009 (111). For BACET students, the overarching goal is to learn the problem-solving
and other skills required to begin careers as agribusiness
entrepreneurs, agricultural extension workers, and middle
managers to benefit communities in Timor-Leste. The graduate of this program is envisioned to be a learner rather
than a passive absorber of information, capable of contributing to practical solutions in agribusiness. The curriculum’s focus on agribusiness and its emphasis on learning by
doing and practical application of theoretical classroom
materials were innovative in Timor-Leste. Teacher skills that
emphasized learning versus teaching were another novel
aspect of the project and considered fundamental to success. A major lesson from the experience is that the capacity
of staff and facilities needs to be carefully assessed prior to
program design, especially in countries classified as fragile
states. Sites for the project must be chosen carefully to take
into account logistics and the availability of services. Program design needs to incorporate lessons from implementation in redesigned curricula. To sustain the program over
the long term, one strategy would be for MAP to shift the
BACET program from the certificate level to a formal, twoyear diploma course, similar to those offered by other countries in the region. Flexibility is needed to shape the future

I

of the program in light of lessons from the first phase of
implementation and the fragile, postconflict setting.
CONTEXT

Timor-Leste is a postconflict, fragile state that depends
heavily on agriculture, which accounted for 31.5 percent of
GDP in 2007 and employs about 84 percent of the population. Food security is critical for most people in TimorLeste, where agricultural productivity is low in comparison
to neighboring countries. Agricultural development is
essential for improving food security, promoting stability,
and ensuring conservation of environmental and natural
resources.
The human and institutional capacity to bring about
agricultural innovation and development suffered greatly
during the conflict that ravaged the country for a quarter of
a century. Education programs were disrupted; experienced
and educated individuals fled; there was much loss of life;
institutions were destroyed. By one estimate, 53 percent of
rural people have never attended school. Capacity improvements are needed at all levels and across the spectrum of
participants in the agricultural sector—public agencies,
agribusinesses, individual farmers, cooperatives, and many
others. In this context, only long-term investment can build
the foundation for the country to recover.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Building Agribusiness Capacity in East Timor—the BACET
project—was designed to supplement agricultural training
at the secondary level with training in agribusiness skills.
The one-year, postsecondary certificate would be offered to
graduates of the three-year program at three of TimorLeste’s agricultural secondary schools. A five-year project
costing US$6 million, BACET was funded by USAID. It was
implemented by the National Directorate of Agricultural
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Education and Training in the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (MAP)1 and Land O’Lakes, an international
agribusiness. The project, which started in 2006, was to run
for two years, but that timeframe proved insufficient to evaluate and refine the curriculum, and the project was extended
to 2011. The target for each secondary school was to produce
50 graduates from the BACET program each year, beginning
in 2007. The first set of BACET students graduated in 2008
(121) and the second set in 2009 (111). For more information
on agribusiness skills, see also module 3, TN 2; and module 5.
Overarching objectives

The project’s initial objectives (2006–08) were to:
■

■

■

■

Develop and deliver an agribusiness curriculum that
provides practical skills in crop and livestock production,
agricultural mechanics, English language, IT, and business management. Courses would include instruction in
basic bookkeeping, organizational management, marketing, financial analysis, cooperative business, and farming
systems in Timor-Leste.
Develop an ongoing agribusiness at each school and support agricultural enterprises and improved production in
nearby communities. These efforts might include the
development of a functioning poultry business (eggs) at
the Fuiloro School and horticultural crops (a nursery,
orchard, and vegetables) and livestock (goats) at the
Natarbora and Maliana schools. Train students and faculty in the respective technical disciplines at each school
with a view to taking a lead role in operating the business.
Develop local and regional agribusiness case studies and
identify published case studies appropriate for use in
Timor-Leste. Train teachers in the use of case studies as a
teaching tool.
Develop career advancement services for BACET
graduates.

In Phase 2 (2009–11), Land O’ Lakes, using feedback
from the Ministry of Agriculture, USAID, teachers, and students, enhanced the initial program to reinforce practical
and market-oriented skills. Ideally, in this phase, the project
will finalize an agribusiness course that can supply graduates to be problem solvers and meet labor-market needs for
agribusiness entrepreneurs, agricultural extensionists, and
agricultural middle managers. The project will continue to
facilitate enterprise creation at schools and in communities
and expand school outreach to farming communities. This
phase of the project will also develop a placement system to
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help students understand the professional recruitment
process and secure jobs in agribusiness. An agribusiness
education program will be coordinated to enroll young people in the one-year agribusiness course, which will be
handed over to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
(MAP) in June 2011.
Program content: skills and coursework

For BACET students, the overarching goal was to learn the
problem-solving and other entrepreneurial skills required
to begin careers as agribusiness entrepreneurs, agricultural
extension workers, and middle managers to benefit communities in Timor-Leste. During the one-year certificate
program, students build their knowledge of agricultural
systems, with a particular emphasis on markets and practical training. They learn to apply their agricultural knowledge practically and effectively in agribusiness, demonstrate practical agricultural skills and transfer them to rural
communities, analyze issues and problems and find appropriate solutions, and adapt to changes and needs of the
agricultural systems in Timor-Leste. Students also develop
their capacity to be independent and reflective in their
practices and to perform their duties in a moral and positive manner.
The core of the BACET curriculum is agribusiness, with
an emphasis on agribusiness management and planning. In
addition, students learn the principles of cooperative business
models, farming as a business (see module 3, TN 2), and providing business services to agricultural producers. Additional
courses required by agricultural professionals included production agriculture (plant science, crop production, animal
science, and livestock production); agricultural mechanics;
computers and IT; and English. All of these courses are linked
to the core agribusiness focus. Other themes that students
gained exposure to included sustainable agriculture, gender
awareness, healthy lifestyles, and ethics.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS

The curriculum’s focus on agribusiness was an innovation
in Timor-Leste. The emphasis on learning by doing and
practical application of theoretical classroom materials was
also innovative. The graduate of this program is envisioned
to be a learner rather than a passive absorber of information, capable of contributing to problem solving and practical solutions to agribusiness. Teacher skills that emphasized
learning versus teaching are an innovative aspect of the
project and considered a fundamental principle for success.
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IMPLEMENTATION HIGHLIGHTS:
BENEFITS AND IMPACT

With project assistance, infrastructure for water and sanitation, dormitories, and school buildings was improved. Each
school has enough land for practical work and demonstrations, but additional investment is needed in fencing, irrigation, livestock facilities, and storage. The computer centers
and Internet connections at each school are important project contributions. Support from MAP is limited, and Internet connection costs are high. Priority should be given to
sustaining the existing computer and Internet arrangements
and planning the expansion of the facilities.
The variation in capacity at the three schools affected
implementation of the BACET project. Project designers
overestimated faculty capacity: The new program required
skills that are not found in traditional, technology-oriented
programs. The curriculum was adjusted quickly to take faculty capacity into account, but clearly faculty capacity building must continue.
Texts for the various courses were prepared in Bahasa
Indonesia by consultants and with inputs from staff and
BACET coordinators, but they proved too difficult for
teachers to use as testing materials and for students to
understand. In response, the curriculum was streamlined
and revised courses are being used. The curriculum is
designed to be 80 percent practical and 20 percent theoretical, which proved challenging for teachers more familiar
with rote theoretical learning in a classroom setting. During
the remaining project implementation period, a detailed
syllabus for the BACET program will be completed.
Recruiting students is another challenge, perhaps partly
owing to the fluidity of society in a postconflict country. The
BACET program competes with university recruitment.
Efforts are being made to publicize the program, and the midterm evaluation notes that “enrollment is likely to fluctuate
until the BACET program is well established, with adequate
school facilities, a clearly defined curriculum, and recognition
of the enhanced skills and knowledge of the graduates.”
The program established successful internships with
about 18 organizations, even if some placements were less
than satisfactory. Students appreciated the widening of their
horizons, and some employers offered jobs to interns after
graduation. A big gain was the increase in student confidence after completing the internships.
Employment of graduates

Timor-Leste is a country of high unemployment. Finding a
job is difficult for all graduates, including those from the

BACET program. Graduate student placement services were
part of the project’s design. The service is labor intensive
and difficult to institutionalize, but the benefit to the
schools is that they can learn where their graduates go to
work and gain information on where job openings can be
found. As of September 2009, 42 percent of the initial group
of 121 graduates (2008) was employed, and 26 percent were
continuing their education. A slightly higher percentage of
women graduates were employed. Groups of graduates have
established their own farming businesses and many others
have gained employment as community agriculture extension workers or with agriculture livelihood NGOs.

Government commitment

The government was strongly committed to the BACET
program. Memoranda of Understanding were signed with
GIZ2 (for teacher development in Indonesia); with Land
O’Lakes (for sharing responsibility for the program, including curriculum development, agribusiness support, infrastructure, technology, operational support, and phased-in
support for teacher’s salaries and student scholarships from
2009); and with Udayana University in Indonesia (to enroll
agricultural school teachers to pursue bachelor’s degrees).
Financial commitment from government proved difficult
because of the overall national economic situation, but inkind support was provided. As noted, MAP will assume full
responsibility for the agribusiness course in mid-2011.
LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons include implications for the program’s long-term
operation as well as the initial lessons from the attempt to
augment secondary education with subject matter and
teaching methods that were innovative in the context. Flexibility is needed to shape the future of the program in light
of lessons from the first phase of implementation and the
fragile, postconflict setting.
Long-term strategy for a diploma course

To sustain the program over the long term, one strategy
would be for MAP to shift the BACET program from the certificate level to a formal, two-year diploma course, similar to
those offered by other countries in the region. Presently,
graduates of BACET and the agricultural secondary schools
are expected to work as technicians with agricultural skills,
field managers, and extension workers, but in the future the
agricultural sector would benefit from a pool of graduates
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trained to the diploma level. There is logic in focusing on the
practical planning and agribusiness aspects of commercial
agriculture in the first year, followed by a second year of further training and skills development in technical specialties.
A strategy to upgrade to a diploma course could have the
following elements: continue to seek donor support to
increase teachers’ level of education (this support is needed
because of government budget shortages); send teachers to
Udayana University in Indonesia to improve skills and
knowledge; review the curriculum periodically; and enhance
and upgrade facilities (such as laboratories, libraries, and
agricultural equipment) to facilitate learning.
Lessons from the midterm evaluation

At midterm, it is clear that the difficulties of establishing the
new agribusiness curriculum were underestimated. As
noted, the greatest challenge was that the initial curriculum
was too academic and difficult for students, and the faculty
lacked the knowledge and pedagogical skills to teach it.
Owing to the new subject matter, developing new courses
and teaching the new material was a challenge. An additional complication was that 80 percent of the curriculum
involved practical work, which required considerable innovation and flexibility to plan production and marketing
activities, manage machinery workshops, and guide computer work that maximizes practical learning.
A second challenge was the poor infrastructure (from sanitation and housing to the kinds of equipment needed to support training). Logistics were another problem, because of the
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geographic location of the schools and the condition of roads
and communications. The midterm evaluation observed that
it would have been better to start with one school and, based
on that experience, scale up. Finally, few students or staff
members were familiar with Portuguese (the official curriculum language). Although Tetum is the national language,
Bahasa Indonesia is widely used. Teaching materials were not
available in Bahasa and had to be developed.
The midterm evaluation contained a number of other
observations. Students should be involved in two types of
enterprises while in school. One is a school-sponsored
enterprise in which students interact with the public by
marketing school produce and work in production projects
on school farms. The second enterprise, based on the school
farms, should have activities structured as agribusinesses,
with annual budgets and financial records to improve
management and to use in teaching. Budgeting by farm
enterprise can help with planning and management. Some
farm enterprises will be profitable and some will not, but
this is a good teaching/learning situation for students. Graduate enterprises established after students leave the program
should receive continuing support from BACET and from
the agricultural secondary schools. GIZ will help graduates
who wish to start their own enterprises.
Faculty training should also be emphasized. School management should be strengthened so that all responsibilities
for administering BACET will reside with BACET when
external support ends. Finally, semiannual or annual tripartite reviews should take place to plan for sustainability
beyond project completion.
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Vocational Training in the Arab Republic of Egypt Combines
Technical and Innovation Skills for Agriculture
Charles J. Maguire, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

pilot intervention in 25 agricultural technical
(secondary) schools in Upper Egypt introduced
students to higher-level cognitive skills including
problem-solving, critical thinking, and decision making, as
well as practical training, and grew into a four year project
(2008–12) involving 54 such schools. The project was
funded by USAID with US$4.9 million and implemented by
the Midwest Universities Consortium for International
Activities (MUCIA) from 2003 to 2007. The reforms
involved pedagogy, practical training skills, and school
management. Using technical school farms to train students
in the production of export crops proved difficult to implement. On the other hand, the Supervised Internship Program, which enabled students to participate in practical
activities on commercial farms and with fruit and vegetable
producers and exporters, proved very successful.

A

CONTEXT

Egypt has 130 secondary-level agricultural technical schools
(ATS), each with an average enrollment of 2,750 students.
These vocational agricultural high schools have about 154
teachers each, of which 42 percent teach agricultural
courses. The teachers are organized into technical departments that include field-crop production, livestock production and animal health, horticulture, agricultural economics, and agricultural mechanics.
All ATSs follow the same basic curriculum, and teachers
prepare students for standardized tests at the end of each
school year. Most technical agricultural teachers have had no
training in pedagogy or preparing lesson plans. Teaching features lectures and rote learning, so little attention is paid to
higher-level cognitive skills. Because graduates of ATSs are
poorly prepared to use the knowledge and skills obtained in
the courses, their employment level is very low. Teaching

equipment is in short supply, and audio-visuals are rarely
used. Each school has a farm of about 25 acres, but it is not
used for practical demonstration or practice by students.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED
PROJECT COMPONENTS

The pilot project aimed to improve teaching methods used
by over 1,600 agricultural teachers in the 25 selected ATSs. It
would provide lesson plans, teaching aids, and overhead
projectors. It would also introduce active learning, which
would promote instructional activities involving students in
doing things and thinking about what they were doing.
Educators moved from knowledge recall and comprehension toward more advanced cognitive skills, including
analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of information and
knowledge to solve problems. The school farms enabled students to produce export crops and provided them with the
skills to become mid-level technicians on agribusiness
farms. The project approach included seven steps, described
in box 2.13. See also IAP 3.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS

In summary, the innovative elements of the project were its
revitalization of the agricultural technical curriculum, especially through teachers’ improved capacity to use new pedagogy centered on student learning and equip students with
the skills and confidence to become problem solvers.
Another innovation was the repurposing of the ATS farms
for practical work and high-value agriculture.
BENEFITS AND IMPACT

The project’s initial phase was successful in introducing
active learning and raising the quality of the curriculum.
The Ministry of Education supported an expansion and
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Box 2.13 Seven Steps to Improve Teaching Methods and Introduce Active Learning in Egypt’s Agricultural
Technical Schools

Step 1: Training the ATS teacher in active teaching-learning
methods. Forty-five Egyptian university faculty members
from different subject matter areas were trained by two
highly experienced teacher-educators from partner universities in the Midwest Universities Consortium for
International Activities (MUCIA). The teacher-educators
conducted a 28-hour practical workshop on active learning strategies for the faculty members, who would serve
as future trainers. During the workshop, 15 active learning strategies were taught and practiced. The most effective faculty members emerging from the workshop were
selected to conduct similar workshops for teachers from
the agricultural technical schools (ATSs). The MUCIA
specialists handed over full implementation of the
process to the Egyptian trainers over a series of three
workshops, and these trainers were given the task of conducting 20 two-day active learning techniques workshops
for over 1,000 ATS teachers.
Step 2: Developing instructional materials for ATS
teachers. A four-person MUCIA team worked in Egypt
for two weeks to initiate this second step. It became
clear that ATS teachers did not have access to audiovisual equipment, so the team emphasized developing
transparencies that could be produced cheaply and easily and distributed to ATS teachers. Action plans were
developed for the procurement of audiovisual materials suitable for the ATSs. Some 4,000 new transparencies were produced in Arabic and distributed to ATSs.
In addition, 1,100 overhead projectors and screens have
been purchased and installed in each ATS classroom.
Step 3: Developing lesson plans for each ATS course.
Lesson plans were prepared, following the basic content
of each course derived from the textbook used in the
ATSs. A workshop was planned to help teachers use the
lesson plans (Step 6).

Step 4: Headmaster study tour to the Netherlands. A
one-week study tour for headmasters was implemented
in the Netherlands. The objective was to introduce the
headmasters to the Dutch vocational education system
and to investigate innovative ideas that could be used in
Egypt’s ATS system.
Step 5: Refocusing ATS school farms and using them
for practical skill training. MUCIA sent a university
farm manager to develop a work plan that would
change the focus of the ATS school farms toward the
production of high-income, labor-intensive export
crops and give more emphasis to hands-on practical
training for students. The project provided a grant to
each school to purchase inputs, including seed, equipment, facilities, and tools. The goal was to have these
innovations become operational by the beginning of
the 2007/08 school year.
Step 6: Training ATS teachers in the use of lesson
plans and instructional materials. A series of two-day
workshops enabled teachers to effectively use the lesson plans developed in Step 3. The methodology for
running the workshops was the same as used in Step
1 (training teachers in active teaching-learning
methods).
Step 7: Assessing progress and refining the lesson
plans and instructional materials. Project management would meet with ATS teachers and their students to assess the value and impact of the different
innovations in improving the teaching-learning
process at the 25 ATSs. Adjustments would be made
to selected lesson plans and transparencies. The Ministry of Education expressed interest in having lesson
plans and transparency sets for each of the 33 courses
reproduced and made available to teachers in all 104
ATSs.

Source: Author.

continuation of the project to cover 54 ATSs for 2008–12. To
date, results from the expanded project include:

■

Administrators and headmasters of the 54 ATSs have
been introduced to new approaches to managing technical schools, providing a more effective teaching-learning
environment, and identifying skills needed by the private
firms through observation study tours in the Netherlands and Greece and through in-country training.

■

■
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Over 3,700 ATS teachers have been trained to use active
teaching-learning methods, and they have been using
these new methods in their classrooms.
Classrooms and laboratories at each of the 54 ATSs have
been equipped with 386 computers, 910 overhead projectors, and 54 LCD projectors and screens. Overhead
transparencies for 51 technical agricultural courses
(approximately 120 transparencies per course) were
developed and are in use.
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Box 2.14 Views on the Impact of the
Supervised Student Internship
Program in Egypt
“These are absolutely the best employees who have
ever worked on my farm and in my packing station,”
said Mr. Samy Ibrahim, Managing Director and
owner of CELF, one of Egypt’s leading exporters of
horticultural products to Europe. He was referring
to the 122 agricultural technical school interns his
company had hired since 2008. Mr. Hussein
Mohamed, a teacher who participated in the internship training as supervisor, noted that “The greatest
impact of internship on students is that they gain
more than just skills. They learn about their
strengths, interests, problem-solving skills, and abilities to deal with clients. They also gain greater understanding of science-based agriculture and develop a
positive attitude about working in agriculture.”
Source: Adapted from USAID Egypt, n.d.

■

■

More school farms at selected ATSs are being transformed to provide more practical and hands-on training
for students, especially related to export crops.
Supervised Student Internship Programs paid by commercial farms and Ownership Programs helped more
than 8,000 students to improve their technical and managerial skills in horticulture and livestock farms and

■

■

■

agribusiness firms. The internship program, which is
part of the USAID-funded Value Chain Training initiative, has been highly successful in increasing capacity and
confidence in both students and the teachers who supervise their practical experience (box 2.14). Employers
have been impressed at the capability and dedication of
the student trainees and have hired many of them in fulltime or part-time positions.
Career development activities provided communication,
leadership, and personal growth skills to 7,500 students
to prepare them for successful careers in agriculture.
Student competence and confidence improved as a result
of the new pedagogical approach.
Demand for the newly graduated students from the project has increased.

LESSON LEARNED

This relatively low-cost approach to transforming the
teaching-learning process is directly applicable to the other
ATSs in Egypt and to vocational agricultural programs
throughout the developing world.
The initial phase that focused on creating teacher and
administrator capacity to manage the new approach to
learning and on creating links to potential employers of ATS
graduates enabled all parties to evaluate progress and
impact. The result was very favorable and led to an extension of the project for four more years and involving 54
additional schools.

MODULE 2: INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY PROFILE 9: VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

171

NOTES

Innovative Activity Profile 4

Module 2 Overview

1. Adapted from Adjepong (1999) and Akeredolu and
Mutimba (2010).

1. These generic weaknesses have been identified and documented by individual researchers and by gatherings of specialists around the world. See, for example, FAO, UNESCO,
and ILO (1970); Busch (1988); Hansen (1990); GCHERA
(1999); Magrath (1999); Foster (1999); Csaki (1999);
Maguire (2000, 2007); Hazelman (2002); Muir-Leresche
(2003); FAO and UNESCO (2003); Eicher (2006); Ochola
and Ekwamu (2008).
2. Globally, few educational institutions consistently provide learning opportunities in public policy management, a
need that requires further attention from governments,
educational institutions, and donors alike.

Thematic Note 1

1. Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities,
“Kellogg Commission on the Future of State and LandGrant Universities,” http://www.aplu.org/page.aspx?
pid=305, accessed July 2011.

Thematic Note 2

1. See also “Kellogg Commission on the Future of State
and Land-Grant Universities,” APLU, http://www.aplu
.org/page.aspx?pid=305.

Thematic Note 3

1. In China, the World Bank has supported the Guangdong
Technical and TVET Project (2009), Vocational Education
Reform Project (1996), Vocational and Technical Project
(1997), Vocational Education Reform Project (2003), and
Liaoning and Shandong Technical and Vocational Education and Training Project (2010). In India it has supported
the Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement
Project (2003) and the Third Technician Education Project
(2001).
2. Based on Liang (2010) and World Bank (2010).

Thematic Note 4

1. These tasks include implementing the project’s larger
capacity-building components for beneficiaries, who are a
significant constituency within the AIS.
Innovative Activity Profile 3

1. This section draws on Swanson, Barrick, and Samy
(2007).
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Innovative Activity Profile 6

1. This activity profile has been adapted from Sherrard
(2009) and Zaglul (2011).

Innovative Activity Profile 8

1. Ministério da Agricultura e Pescas.
2. Now GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, http://www.giz.de/).

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING
Module 2 Overview

Bawden, R. 1998. “Agricultural Education Review. Part II:
Future Perspectives.” Washington, DC: AKIS Rural
Development Department, World Bank.
———. 1999. “Education Needs of the Rural Sector: Looking to the Future.” AKIS Discussion Paper, based on a
workshop on Education for Agriculture and Rural Development: Identifying Strategies for Meeting Future Needs,
December 1–3, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Busch, L. 1988. “Universities for Development: Report of the
Joint INDO-U.S. Impact Evaluation of the Indian Agricultural Universities.” AID Project Impact Evaluation
Report No. 68. Washington, DC: United States Agency
for International Development (USAID).
Chacharee, N., and S. Chinnawong, 2009. “Farmer Participatory Approach for Sustainable Agricultural Development: A Case Study on GAP in Vegetable Production
Extension in Nakhon Pathon Province, Thailand.” Paper
presented at the 4th International Conference on Agricultural Education and Environment of the Asia-Pacific
Association of Educators in Agriculture and Environment (APEAEN), 3–6 August 2009, Obihiro, Japan.
Csaki, C. 1999. “Change in Higher Agricultural Education.” In Leadership for Higher Education in Agriculture:
Proceedings of a Conference Held in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands, July 22–24, 1999, edited by D.G. Acker.
Ames: Iowa State University, Global Consortium of
Higher Education and Research for Agriculture
(GCHERA). Pp. 67–70.
Davis, K., J. Ekboir, W. Mekasha, C.M.O. Ochieng, D.J. Spielman, and E. Zerfu, 2007. “Strengthening Agricultural
Education and Training in Sub-Saharan Africa from an
Innovation Systems Perspective: Case studies of Ethiopia

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

and Mozambique.” IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 736.
Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI).
Eicher, C.K., 1999. “Institutions and the African Farmer.”
Issues in Agriculture 14. Washington, DC: Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).
———. 2006. “The Evolution of Agricultural Education and
Training: Global Insights of Relevance for Africa.” Staff
Paper No. 2006-26. East Lansing: Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University.
Falvey, L. 1996. Food Environment Education: Agricultural
Education in Natural Resource Management. Melbourne:
Crawford Fund for International Agricultural Research
and Institute for International Development Limited.
FAO and UNESCO (Food and Agriculture Organization and
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization). 2003. “Higher Education and Rural Development: A New Perspective.” Chapter 5 in Education for
Rural Development: Towards New Policy Responses, edited
by D. Atchorena and L. Gasperini. Rome and Paris.
FAO, UNESCO, and ILO (Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and International Labour Organization). 1970. “Report of the World Conference on
Agricultural Education and Training, July 28–August 8,
Copenhagen.” Rome.
Foster, R.M. 1999. “From Local to Global: The Challenge of
Change in Agriculture and the Food System.” Chapter 11
in Leadership in Higher Education for Agriculture: Proceedings of the Inaugural Conference of the Global Consortium of Higher Education and Research for Agriculture,
July 22–24, Amsterdam, edited by D.G. Acker. Ames: Iowa
State University. Pp. 71–76.
GCHERA (Global Consortium of Higher Education and
Research for Agriculture). 1999. Leadership for Higher
Education in Agriculture: Proceedings of a Conference Held
in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, July 22–24, 1999, edited
by D.G. Acker. Ames: Iowa State University.
Hansen, G.E. 1990. “Beyond the Neoclassical University:
Agricultural Higher Education in the Developing
World—An Interpretive Essay.” USAID Program Evaluation Report No. 20. Washington, DC: United States
Agency for International Development (USAID).
Hazelman, M. 2002. “The Need for Change: From Agriculture Education to Education for Rural Development.”
In Searching for New Models of Agriculture Education in
a Disturbed Environment: Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Agriculture and the Environment,
Los Baños, Philippines. Bangkok: Regional Office for
Asia and the Pacific, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Jamison, D.T., and L.J. Lau. 1982. Farmer Education and
Farmer Efficiency. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
Jamison, D.T., and P.R. Moock. 1984. “Farmer Education
and Farmer Efficiency in Nepal: The Role of Schooling,
Extension Service, and Cognitive Skills.” World Development 12:67–86.
Lockheed, M.E., D.T. Jamison, and L.J. Lau. 1980. “Farmer
Education and Farm Efficiency: A Survey.” In Education
and Income, edited by T. King. World Bank Staff Working
Paper No. 402. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Magrath, C.P. 1999. “Reforming U.S. Higher Education.”
Chapter 14 in Leadership in Higher Education for Agriculture: Proceedings of the Inaugural Conference of the Global
Consortium of Higher Education and Research for Agriculture, July 22–24, Amsterdam, edited by D.G. Acker. Ames:
Iowa State University. Pp. 23–30.
Maguire, C.J. 2000. “Agricultural Education in Africa: Managing Change.” Paper presented at Workshop 2000, sponsored by the Sasakawa Africa Association in Accra and at
the University of Cape Coast, Ghana.
———. 2004. “Effective Educational Strategies for Poverty
Alleviation.” In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Agricultural Education and Environment, October 2004, Souwon, Korea. Bangkok: Regional Office for
Asia and the Pacific, Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO).
———. 2007. “Preparing for the Future: Revisiting Agriculture and Environment Education in Asia.” In Proceedings
of the 3rd APEAEN Conference on Agriculture and Environment, held at Munoz City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines.
Bangkok: Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
Moulton, J. 2001. Improving education in the rural areas:
Guidance for rural development specialists. Unpublished
paper for AKIS, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Muir-Leresche, K. 2003. “Transforming African Agricultural
Universities and Faculties: Examples of Good Practice.”
Paper prepared for the International Seminar series,
Sustainability, Education, and the Management of
Change in the Tropics (SEMCIT). N.p.: n.p.
Mulder, M. 2010. Personal communication.
Mulder, M., and N. Ernstman. 2006. “The Public’s Expectations Regarding the Green Sector and Responsive Practices
in Higher Agricultural Education.” In Proceedings of the
8th European Conference on Higher Agricultural Education,
The Public and the Agriculture and Forestry Industries, the
Role of Higher Education in Questioning Assumptions and
Matching Expectations, edited by M. Slavík and P. Žáková.
Prague: Czech University of Agriculture. Pp. 35–53.
Munshi, K. 2004. “Social Learning in a Heterogeneous
Population: Technology Diffusion in the Indian Green

MODULE 2: NOTES, REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

173

Revolution.” Journal of Development Economics
72(1):185–213.
Ochola, W.O., and A. Ekwamu, 2008. “Agricultural Education and Learning: Challenges, Opportunities, and Experiences from Eastern and Southern Africa.” Paper presented to the Conference on Improving Agricultural
Education and Learning through Collaboration and
Partnerships, December 1–5, Maputo.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development). 2005. Synthesis Report. Vol. 1 of Governance of Innovation Systems. Paris.
———. 2010. The OECD Innovation Strategy: Getting a
Head Start on Tomorrow. Paris.
Pratley, J. 2008. “Workforce Planning in Agriculture: Agricultural Education and Capacity Building at the Crossroads.” Farm Policy Journal 5(3): 27–41.
Psacharopoulos, G., and M. Woodhall. 1985. Education for
Development: An Analysis of Investment Choices. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Rajalahti, R., W. Janssen, and E. Pehu. 2008. “Agricultural
Innovation System: From Diagnostics to Operational
Practices.” Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 38. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Rivera, W.M.2008. Transforming Post-secondary Agricultural Education and Training by Design: Solutions for
Sub-Saharan Africa. Unpublished report for the World
Bank (AFTHD), Washington, DC.
Rygnestad, H., R. Rajalahti, and E. Pehu. 2005. Agricultural
Education and Training in Sub-Saharan Africa
FY’98–’04. World Bank, Washington, DC.
Snapp, S., and B. Pound 2008. Agricultural Systems, Agroecology, and Rural Innovation for Development.
Burlington, MA: Elsevier.
Tajima, S. 1985. Types, Development, Processes, Characteristics, and Trends of World Agricultural Education.
International Encyclopedia of Education. Oxford:
Pergamon.
Willett, A. 1998. Investment in Agricultural Education and
Training 1987–1997. AKIS, World Bank, Washington, DC.
World Bank. 2004. Agriculture Investment Sourcebook.
Washington, DC. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTARD/EXTAGISOU/0,,menuP
K:2502803~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:2502781,00.html, accessed July 2011.
———. 2007a. “Cultivating Knowledge and Skills to Grow
African Agriculture: A Synthesis of an Institutional,
Regional, and International Review, 2007.” Agriculture
and Rural Development Department and Africa Region
Human Development Department. Report No. 40997AFR. Washington, DC.

174

———. 2007b. World Development Report 2008: Agriculture
for Development. Washington, DC.
———. 2009. Gender in Agriculture Sourcebook. Washington,
DC. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
TOPICS/EXTARD/EXTGENAGRLIVSOUBOOK/0,,
contentMDK:21348334~pagePK:64168427~piPK:641684
35~theSitePK:3817359,00.html, accessed July 2011.
———. 2011. Information and Communication Technologies
for Agriculture e-Sourcebook. www.ICTinagriculture.org,
http://bit.ly/ICTinAG. Washington, DC.

Thematic Note 1

Liu, Y., and J. Zhang. 2004. “The Reform of Higher Agricultural Education Institutions in China: A Case Study.”
Rome and Paris: Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) and International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP).
MacConnell, S. 2010. “Greater Demand for Agri-food Courses
Drives up CAO Points.” The Irish Times, Aug. 28.
National Council for Agricultural Education. 2000. “The
National Strategic Plan and Action Agenda for Agricultural
Education. Alexandria, VA. http://www.teamaged.org/
council/images/stories/pdf/plan2020.pdf, accessed July
2011.
Paarlberg, D. 1992. “The Land Grant College System in
Transition.” Choices Magazine, third quarter.
Phelan, James, University College Dublin 2010, personal
communication.
Wirakartakusumah, M.A. 2007. “Government-University
Relations and the Role of International Cooperation: An
Experience of Bogor Agricultural University.” Presentation at the 5th GCHERA Conference, March, San José,
Costa Rica.
World Bank. 2007a. “Cultivating Knowledge and Skills to
Grow African Agriculture: A Synthesis of an Institutional, Regional, and International Review, 2007.” Report
No. 40997-AFR. Agriculture and Rural Development
Department and Africa Region Human Development
Department. Washington, DC.
———. 2007b. World Development Report 2008: Agriculture
for Development. Washington, DC.
Thematic Note 2

Hansen, G.E. 1990. “Beyond the Neoclassical University:
Agricultural Higher Education in the Developing
World—An Interpretive Essay.” A.I.D. Program Evaluation Report No. 20. Washington, DC: United States
Agency for International Development (USAID).

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

McCalla, A.F. 1998. “Agricultural Education, Science, and
Modern Technology’s Role in Solving the Problems of
Global Food Resources in the 21st Century.” Paper prepared for the conference “Globalizing Agricultural
Higher Education and Science: Meeting the Needs of the
21st Century,” National Agricultural University of
Ukraine, Kiev, September 28–30.
Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture (RUFORUM). 2010. “Report of the Strategic
Reflection Meeting of the Regional Universities Forum
for Capacity Building in Agriculture (RUFORUM), April
12–16, 2010, Bellagio, Italy.”
Ruffio, P., and J. Barloy. 1995. “Transformations in Higher
Education in Agricultural and Food Sciences in Central
and Eastern Europe.” European Journal of Agricultural
Education and Extension 2(2):11–19.
Swanson, B.E, R.K. Barrick, and M.M. Samy. 2007. “Transforming Higher Agricultural Education in Egypt: Strategy,
Approach, and Results.” In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual
Meeting of the Association for International Agricultural and
Extension Education: “Internationalizing with Cultural
Leadership.” Pp. 332–45. AIAEE, http://www.aiaee.org/
attachments/484_Compiled.pdf, accessed February 2011.
Villareal, R. 2002. “Status of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Management Education in Southeast Asia.”
Paper presented at SEMCIT, Session IV, Maejo University, Chiang Mai, September 29–October 5.
Wallace, I. 1997. “Agricultural Education at the Crossroads:
Present Dilemmas and Possible Options for the Future in
Sub-Saharan Africa.” International Journal of Educational
Development 17(1):27–39.
World Bank. 2007a. “Cultivating Knowledge and Skills to
Grow African Agriculture: A Synthesis of an Institutional, Regional, and International Review, 2007.” Report
No. 40997-AFR. Agriculture and Rural Development
Department and Africa Region Human Development
Department. Washington, DC. P. 58.

Thematic Note 3

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2008. Education and
Skills: Strategies for Accelerated Development in Asia and
the Pacific. Manila.
Blackie, M., M. Mutema, and A. Ward. 2009. A Study of Agricultural Graduates in Eastern and Central Africa: Demand,
Quality, and Job Performance Issues. Report prepared for
the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in
Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA), Entebbe.
Blom, A., and J. Cheong (eds.). 2010. “Governance of Technical Education in India: Key Issues, Principles, and

Case Studies.” Working Paper No. 190. World Bank:
Washington, DC.
Liang, X. 2010. “Global Trends in Technical and Vocational
Education and World Bank Support in China.” Presentation at the Innovation Workshop, Quingdao, June 11–12.
UNEVOC (International Project on Technical and Vocational Education). 1996. “Current Issues and Trends in
Technical and Vocational Education.” Study No. 8. Paris:
Section for Technical and Vocational Education, United
Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO).
World Bank. 1991. “Vocational and Technical Education and
Training: A World Bank Policy Paper.” Washington, DC.
———. 2004. Ethiopia Post Secondary Education Project.
Report No. 28169-ET. Internal document. Washington,
DC.
———. 2006. Ethiopia Rural Capacity Building Project (ID
number PO79725). Internal document. Washington,
DC.
———. 2010. “Governance of Technical Education in India:
Key Issues, Principles, and Case Studies.” A. Blom and
J. Cheong (eds). Working Paper No. 190. World Bank,
Washington, DC.
Thematic Note 4

World Bank. n.d. “Indonesia: Tree Crops Human Resources
Development Project.” http://web.worldbank.org/
external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=7323
0&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P00
3899, accessed July 2011.
Innovative Activity Profile 1

Busch, L. 1988. “Universities for Development: Report of the
Joint INDO-U.S. Impact Evaluation of the Indian Agricultural Universities.” AID Project Impact Evaluation
Report No. 68. Washington, DC: United States Agency
for International Development (USAID).
World Bank. 1995. “India: Agricultural Human Resources
Development Project.” World Bank Report 13517.
Washington, DC.
———. 2002. “Implementation Completion and Results.”
Report 24287. Washington, DC.
Innovative Activity Profile 2

Kropff, M. 2010. “Connecting Knowledge and Society: Scientific Capacity Building for Impact.” Presentation to the
RUFORUM Ministerial Meeting on Education in Agriculture in Africa (CHEA), November 15–19, Kampala.

MODULE 2: NOTES, REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

175

Mulder, M. 2010. Personal communication.
Rabbinge, R., and M.A. Slingerland. 2009. “Change in
Knowledge Infrastructure: The Third-generation University.” In Transitions towards Sustainable Agriculture and
Food Chains in Peri-urban Areas, edited by K.J. Poppe, C.
Temeer, and M. Slingerland. Wageningen: Wageningen
Academic Publishers. Pp. 51–62. http://www.onderzoek
enadvies.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/
transitions.pdf, accessed July 2011.

Innovative Activity Profile 3

Swanson, B.R., K. Barrick, and M.M. Samy. 2007. “Transforming Higher Agricultural Education in Egypt: Strategy, Approach, and Results.” In Internationalizing with
Cultural Leadership, Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the Association for International Agricultural
and Extension Education (AIAEE), 20–24 May, Polson,
Montana, edited by M. Navarro. Pp. 332–42. AIAEE,
http://www.aiaee.org/attachments/484_Compiled.pdf,
accessed February 2011.
Vreyens, J.R., and M.H. Shaker. 2005. “Preparing MarketReady Graduates: Adapting Curriculum to Meet the
Agriculture Employment Market in Egypt.” In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Association for
International Agricultural and Extension Education
(AIAEE), San Antonio, Texas. Pp. 227–235. http://www
.aiaee.org/proceedings/119-2005-san-antonio-texas
.html, accessed July 2011.

prepared for SEMCIT Seminar Session V, Oslo, Norway.
ILN-Africa, http://www.iln-africa.net/uploads/documents/
case_studies/Case_Study_Sasakawa.doc, accessed February
2011.

Innovative Activity Profile 5

Opatpatanakit, A. 2007. “Community-Based Research
(CBR) Approach as a Research Methodology to Enable
Students to Empower Rural Community.” Presented at
the 3rd Asia Pacific Association of Educators in Agriculture and Environment (APEAEN) International Conference on Agriculture, Education and Environment, 4–7
November 2007, Philippine Carabao Center, Munoz,
Nueva Ecija.

Innovative Activity Profile 6

Sherrard, D. 2009. “A Private University’s Model and
Vision for Agricultural Education – EARTH University,
Costa Rica.” Seminar at the World Bank, October 14,
Washington, DC.
Zaglul, J. 2011. Paper in Proceedings of the 4th International
Conference on Agriculture Education and Environment,
August 3–6, 2009, Obihiro University of Agriculture and
Veterinary Medicine, Obihiro, Hokkaido, Japan. Bangkok:
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Regional
Office for Asia and the Pacific.

Innovative Activity Profile 7
Innovative Activity Profile 4

Adjepong, S.K. 1999. “The University and National Development: An Overview of an Innovative Programme at
the University of Cape Coast, Ghana for Mid-career
Agricultural Extension Staff.” Presentation to World
Bank staff at Rural Week, Washington, DC.
Akeredolu, M., and J.K. Mutimba. 2010. Winrock International, Kano presentation at the First Intercontinental
Meeting of the Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services
and the 16th Annual Meeting of the Neuchatel Initiative
Viña del Mar, Chile, 2–5 November 2010.
Sasakawa Africa Association. 2008. “SAFE.” Feeding the
Future: Newsletter of the Sasakawa Africa Association
24:10–11. http://www.saa-tokyo.org/english/newsletter/
pdf/issue24.pdf, accessed July 2011.
Zinnah, M.M. 2003. “Innovations in Higher Agricultural
Education in Africa: The Case of Sasakawa Fund for
Extension Education (SAFE) Programme in Selected
Universities and Colleges in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Paper

176

Mulder, M. 2007. “Competence: The Essence and Use of the
Concept in ICVT.” European Journal of Vocational Training 40:5–21. [Available in FR, DE, ES, and PT.]
———. 2010. Personal communication.
Mulder, M., J. Gulikers, H. Biemans, and R. Wesselink. 2009.
“The New Competence Concept in Higher Education:
Error or Enrichment?” Journal of European Industrial
Training 33 (8/9): 755–70.

Innovative Activity Profile 8

Land O’Lakes Inc. n.d. “Building Agribusiness Capacity in
Timor Leste. http://www.idd.landolakes.com/PROJECTS/
Asia/ECMP087511.aspx, accessed July 2011.
Land O’Lakes Inc. n.d. “Young Women in Timor-Leste Find
Opportunity and Income from Agribusiness Training.”
http://idd.landolakes.com/PROJECTS/Asia/ECMP20113018.aspx, accessed July 2011.

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

Land O’Lakes Inc. 2009. Cooperative Agreement # 486-A00-06-00011-00 Program Update. USAID, http://pdf
.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACO315.pdf, accessed July 2011.
USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and Land O’Lakes Inc. 2009.” Building Agribusiness
Capacity in East Timor (BACET).” http://www.idd
.landolakes.com/stellent/groups/public/documents/web_
content/ecmp0095377.pdf, accessed July 2011.
Innovative Activity Profile 9

Swanson, B. E., R. K. Barrick, and M. M. Samy. 2007. “Transforming Higher Agricultural Education in Egypt: Strategy, Approach, and Results.” In Proceedings of the 23rd
Annual Meeting of the Association for International Agricultural and Extension Education: “Internationalizing

with Cultural Leadership.” Pp. 332–45. AIAEE, http://
www.aiaee.org/attachments/484_Compiled.pdf, accessed
February 2011.
Swanson, B., J. Cano, M. M. Samy, J. W. Hynes, and B. Swan.
2005. “Introducing Active Teaching-Learning Methods
and Materials into Egyptian Agricultural Technical Secondary Schools.” In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual
Meeting of the Association for International Agricultural
and Extension Education (AIAEE), Polson, Montana. Pp.
343–51. AIAEE, http://aiaee.tamu.edu/2007/Accepted/
343.pdf, accessed September 2011.
USAID (United States Agency for International Development) Egypt. n.d. “Success Story: Turning Internships into
Jobs: Major Agricultural Exporters Hiring Upper Egypt
ATS Students,” MUCIA, http://www.mucia-vct.org/
successstories/Internship-%20En.pdf, accessed July 2011.

MODULE 2: NOTES, REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

177

MODULE 3
1

Investment
in and
Extension
and Action
Advisory
Coordination
Collective
for
Services
as Part
of Agricultural
Agricultural
Innovation
Innovation Systems
OV E RV I E W

Kristin Davis, Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS)
Willem Heemskerk, Royal Tropical Institute (KIT)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xtension and advisory services are integral to the
AIS, where now more than ever they play a brokering role, linking key actors such as producer organizations, research services, and higher education. This
module looks at the history and current status of extension
and advisory services and examines important topics such
as pluralism, new roles for extension, new kinds of service
providers, ICTs, and agribusiness.
For strong extension and advisory services, it is important to have coordination and linkage within pluralistic,
multistakeholder AIS. Less traditional actors such as farmer
organizations and agrodealers are important extension and
advisory service providers who are vital to include in the
design of investments and programs. Extension and advisory services must be ever-adapting to the needs of clients,
and they must monitor and evaluate their services.
Perhaps the broadest challenge is the tremendous need
for new capacities within extension. Throughout the
developing world, evolving demands and new roles for
advisory services in the wider innovation system will
require investments in the capacity of individual extension
workers and organizations for value chain approaches, in
market-oriented extension, in group and organizational
development, in agribusiness, and in mechanisms to share
information (networks, platforms, and the like). Recent
global developments require advisory services to focus on

E

climate change, food security, and equipping rural people to
deal with risk in general.
To better serve their constituencies and influence policies, advisory services need a stronger voice at the global and
regional level. There is a need for evidence-based direction
regarding investment priorities and programming options
for agricultural advisory services within innovation systems.
Policy issues related to pluralistic advisory services and
extension include the changing roles of various extension
providers, the comparative advantage for different providers
in carrying out specific extension functions and advisory
services, sustainability, and equity. Paradigm shifts—from
the perception that research knowledge can drive innovation to the notion that change in the whole system is
needed for innovation—must take place not only in the
programs and the thinking of field staff but in the thinking
of extension administrators and policy makers.

DEFINING AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND
ADVISORY SERVICES FROM AN INNOVATION
SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE

Many definitions, philosophies, and approaches to agricultural extension and advisory services exist, and views of
what extension is all about have changed over time. When
agricultural extension services were implemented widely in
developing countries in the 1970s, the needs, expectations,
179

Box 3.1 Extension and Advisory Services,
Defined

In this module, extension and advisory services are
defined as systems that facilitate the access of
farmers, their organizations, and other value chain
and market actors to knowledge, information, and
technologies; facilitate their interaction with partners in research, education, agribusiness, and other
relevant institutions; and assist them to develop
their own technical, organizational, and management skills and practices as well as to improve the
management of their agricultural activities.
Sources: Birner et al. 2009; Christoplos 2010.

perceptions, and tools that defined extension differed from
those we have today. At that time, extension focused very
much on increasing production, improving yields, training
farmers, and transferring technology. Today extension is no
longer viewed as an agency but as a system that is integral
and central to innovation systems and that focuses on facilitating interaction and learning rather than solely on training farmers. CGIAR research on agricultural extension from
an innovation systems perspective shows that it has a vital
role to play in helping to strengthen capacities to innovate
and broker linkages (Spielman et al. 2011). Box 3.1 explains
how the term “extension and advisory services” is used in
this module. Many other extension terms are included in
the glossary for this sourcebook.
OTHER ROLES AND IMPACTS OF EXTENSION
AND ADVISORY SERVICES

Besides being an important part of innovation systems,
extension and advisory services contribute directly to
economic growth, poverty reduction, and environmental
well-being. Extension is an essential tool for dealing with
the serious challenges facing agriculture—such as climate
change, high food prices, and the degradation of natural
resources—while helping to increase productivity and
reduce poverty (Davis 2009). Other roles for advisory services therefore involve such diverse functions as providing
market information, phytosanitary and epidemiological
information, information on access to credit, or the facilitation of access to sources with this information (see also TN 1
and TN 4). Although it is very difficult to show the impact
of extension services, and while evidence on the impact of
some major extension models has been mixed, extension
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has proven to be a cost-effective means of increasing economic returns for farmers and has had significant and positive effects on knowledge, adoption, and productivity (see,
for example, Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder 1991). A
CGIAR meta-analysis of 292 research studies found median
rates of return of 58 percent for investments in advisory services (Alston et al. 2000; Dercon et al. 2008).
Apart from yielding significant financial returns,
advisory services have also yielded positive social returns,
particularly for women, people with low literacy levels, and
farmers with medium landholdings (as shown by CGIAR
research on extension by Davis et al. 2010b). Some extension programs, such as Farmer Field Schools (FFSs), have
shown positive impacts on the environment and health
(Praneetvatakul and Waibel 2006).
Despite calls for privatization, government must play a
continuing role in extension (see Rivera and Alex 2004;
Swanson and Rajalahti 2010). Although a variety of public
and private services are available to farmers, many tasks of
extension and advisory services have a public goods nature,
including tasks related to regulation, quality control in the
produce supply chain, the coordination of service provision, and natural resource management, as well as the
provision of services to marginal groups, which are unlikely
to access or afford private advisory services. The public sector’s role is to fund the provision of advisory services
(directly or through outsourcing) where demand for
services is not being met, to support advisory services in
addressing issues of long-term social and ecological
sustainability (including food security), and to manage
extension and advisory services (including quality control
and knowledge management). The public sector can also
provide incentives for nonpublic actors to play a greater
role in providing services. In pluralistic extension systems,
space can be created by the public sector to shift some public investment toward the management of extension systems and strengthening of private actors’ capacities,
although this shift can come about only when there is
ownership within the public sector for such changes
(Christoplos 2010; Spielman et al. 2011). Embedded
advisory services in input supply services are widespread
and increasing (IAP 1), but coordination by the public sector at the local level is needed to regulate and certify those
services (to prevent them from providing biased information, for example) and to facilitate interaction between
public and private service providers.
EVOLUTION OF EXTENSION AND
ADVISORY SERVICES

The renewed prominence of agriculture on the development agenda has renewed the focus on agricultural extension and advisory services. At the same time, strong
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demands for “more extension” have emerged from unexpected sources: the growing need to provide more climate
information, increasing food security programming, the
changing aid-for-trade agenda, value chain development
programs, and comprehensive reform in global agricultural
research for development. These demands imply a need to
apply existing knowledge as well as a need to explore the relevance of changing extension forms within new development agendas, aid architectures, and institutional structures
(Christoplos 2010, 6,9).
Despite the recognition that traditional approaches to
advisory services are not always appropriate or effective,
no consensus has emerged on what expanded extension
services should actually include. Past mistakes will be
repeated if there is not greater awareness of what has
worked and what has not, what has proven sustainable and
what has not, and who has accessed and benefited from
different forms of extension services. Several publications

discuss these issues at length (see, for example, Leeuwis
and van den Ban 2004; Birner et al. 2009; Christoplos
2010; Hoffmann et al. 2009; and Swanson and Rajalahti
2010). Here we briefly examine the changing nature of
extension investments over time, outline how and why
advisory services have evolved, and present some of the
newer approaches and their goals.
Changing investment levels

Extension investments have been made by donors, various
governments, (international) NGOs, and the private sector. The type and level of investments varied considerably
over the past few decades, especially as extension
approaches rose and fell in popularity (box 3.2).
Many governments have over the years reduced their
investment in extension and advisory services, leaving the
services without operational resources and forced to

Box 3.2 Past and Current Investment Levels in Agricultural Advisory Services

Numerous donors, investors, private companies, and
virtually all governments invest in extension, although
the precise amounts of their investments are difficult to
obtain. Global public investments in extension were
estimated at US$6 billion in 1988, and currently two
initiatives seek to update this estimate. The Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) recently surveyed
investments in nine agricultural sectors worldwide,
including extension. With the International Food
Policy Research Institute, FAO is also conducting a
worldwide extension assessment that will provide a
better idea of investments in physical and human capital, as well as other data, in the near future.
Bilateral and multilateral donors have invested in
national extension systems and in extension approaches
such as Farmer Field Schools and farmer research
groups. World Bank lending to the agricultural sector
more than doubled between 2006 and 2009, to US$5.3
billion in FY09 from US$2.9 billion in the baseline years
2006–08. Agricultural research, extension, and education services did not benefit from this increase nearly as
much as other agricultural subsectors. Most of the additional lending went for productive infrastructure and
policy lending. World Bank support for agricultural
research, extension, and agricultural education has been

around US$120 million per year during 2007 and 2008,
with a significant share going to Africa. Annual lending
to these subsectors has fluctuated widely, with lows of
around US$100–126 million in some years (2003, 2008,
and 2007) and highs of US$499 million in 2006, US$
582 million in 2009, and around US$300 million
in 2010.
World Bank investments in extension services often
consist mainly of small investments accompanying
investments in improved agricultural productivity and
market linkages. Notable exceptions have included large
investments in research and extension system linkages
as well as sweeping reforms of extension systems. For
example, with World Bank and other support, governments have invested heavily in designing and implementing new extension models such as Uganda’s
National Agricultural Advisory Services approach
(described in box 3.7) and Ethiopia’s farmer training
center approach. The private sector has also invested in
extension, including British American Tobacco, Nestlé,
and horticultural and brewing companies. In many
(particularly East African) countries, the export crop
subsectors have organized the delivery of services,
including extension, by sector, financed through export
levies and district marketing fees and taxes.

Sources: Swanson, Farner, and Bahal 1990; Davis 2008; Davis et al. 2010b; World Bank Rural Portfolio Team.
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continue providing blanket recommendations promoted
through ever-repeated demonstration trials. The newly
developing extension constituency, based on strengthening farmer organizations, the private sector, and NGOsupported advisory services, has evoked strong attention to
extension in the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the related Framework
for African Agricultural Productivity. Outside Africa,
increased attention to extension is expressed through the
Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS).
CAADP and the corresponding compact agreements at the
country level advocate sharpening the focus and efficiency
of service provision by basing it on farmers’ actual demands,
avoiding blanket recommendations, working with existing
farmer groups, aiming for matching funds from value chain
actors, and using new tools such as ICTs (box 3.3). The sustainability of service provision has become an important
part of advisory service strategies. CAADP compact agreements also commit national governments to invest more in
extension and not to rely on donor funding. In Uganda, for
example, the percentage of the national budget allocated to
extension (the National Agricultural Advisory Services—
NAADS) gradually increased from 0.3 percent in 2003 to 2.6
percent in 2011, while significantly increasing as a percentage of the agricultural budget.

(Benor and Baxter 1984) was superseded by approaches
pioneered on a small scale by NGOs, FAO, and bilaterally
funded projects. These approaches emphasized participatory learning and action models, with farmer participation and more tailor-made services, including facilitation
of access to financial services and access to markets.
National and international efforts to revitalize extension
brought about a variety of institutional reforms (Rivera
and Alex 2004), informed primarily by market-led and
demand-driven perspectives. For an example from India,
see box 3.4.
Particularly in open and democratizing societies, and
especially through innovations in communications, farmers
are drawing information from an increasing range of
sources. Their knowledge and innovation system has
become quite diverse (Engel and Salomon 1997). Modern
advisory service systems reflect this diversity and complexity in the range of approaches they use, their content, and
their interaction with public and private entities. The term
“pluralistic” is often used to capture the emerging diversity
of institutional forms for providing and financing agricultural extension (TN 1). New actors are offering and funding
advisory services, including NGOs, farmer organizations,
the private sector, and community-based organizations.
This pluralism is almost certain to prevail and deepen with
respect to organizational forms, methods, and institutional
structures.

Changing approaches

Traditional approaches to extension changed as they
encountered criticism for being top-down, unaccountable
to users, biased against women, oriented to production and
technology rather than to markets, and focused on blanket
recommendations that did not take the diversity of farm
households’ circumstances into account. Such criticism
generally stemmed from a combination of factors: a lack
of relevant technology; failure by research and extension
to understand and involve their clients in defining and solving problems; a lack of incentives for extension agents; and
weak links among extension, research, farmers, and market
actors (Davis 2008). In many countries, policies that favor
economic liberalization have enabled farmers to become
more market-oriented and entrepreneurial, creating the
demand for extension services to advise farmers not only on
production issues but on issues related to accessing markets. Training in marketing skills has become much more
important for extension workers (Dixie 2005).
A number of approaches sought to overcome these
problems and meet new demands on advisory services. The
more traditional training and visit (T&V) extension model
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Emerging innovative approaches

Group-based and participatory approaches to providing
advisory services are gaining ground. These methods have
the potential to overcome barriers to participation, foster
inclusiveness, and lead to more demand-driven services.
They all aim to strengthen the voice of farmers and channel their knowledge into agricultural extension, eventually
contributing to farmer empowerment in service delivery
and in value chain development (Nederlof, Wennink, and
Heemsekerk 2008; KIT, Faida Mali, and IIRR 2006).
Farmer groups (contact groups) were introduced in the
T&V extension model, mainly because it was more efficient
to transfer information to groups rather than individuals.
Subsequent experience with farmer extension groups in participatory planning and field schools (FFSs) has expanded
farmer organizations’ involvement in providing extension
services and in farmer-to-farmer (“F2F”) extension, further
facilitated by mobile telephony (subjects discussed in boxes
3.3 and 3.5–3.6). For example, in the district participatory
planning model used in Mozambique, farmer consultative
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Box 3.3 Benefits of ICTs for Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services

Researchers associated with the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research have shown that
telecommunications infrastructure helps to reduce
poverty and provide opportunities to people in developing countries (Torero, Chowdhury, and Bedi 2006).
In the context of rural advisory services that support
innovation, ICTs have three broad functions:
■

■

■

ICTs address the need for localized and customized
information—adapted to rural users in a comprehensible format and appropriate language—to give
small-scale producers as well as providers of advisory services adequate, timely access to technical
and marketing information.
ICTs store information for future reference. In many
cases, information on technologies and good practices
is available only in hardcopy, and data are incomplete,
scarce, or useless. Local and indigenous knowledge is
often transmitted orally, records are often unavailable,
or the information is dispersed. A proper information
system for rural users with standardized formats to
compile, document, and share information renders
that information more useful, secure, and accessible.
ICTs facilitate the creation of networks locally,
regionally, and globally, leading to collaborative and
interdisciplinary approaches to problem-solving
and research diversification through shared knowledge bases, online forums, and collaborative spaces.

Many NGOs, research organizations, and national
ministries have improved access to technologies and
knowledge for their rural advisory services by means
of rural telecenters and online forums.
Throughout the developing world, ICTs are being
integrated into rural advisory services in a variety of
forms, including rural radio, television, Internet, and
mobile services. The advice and information provided via ICTs is becoming more varied, ranging
from information about specific technologies and
practices to information that enables climate change
mitigation and adaptation; disaster management;
early warning of drought, floods, and diseases; price
information; political empowerment; natural
resource management; agricultural information; production efficiency; and market access. ICTs also open
new channels for farmers to document and share
experiences with each other and with experts. The
Information and Communication Technologies for
Agriculture e-Sourcebook (World Bank 2011) features
many examples of these applications.
Although many extension and advisory service
providers are using “e-extension” or “cyber-extension”
to improve their outreach to farmers and farmers’
access to information, most of these initiatives are at
early pilot stages and limited empirical evidence is
available on the effectiveness of ICTs in extension.

Sources: World Bank 2011; Davis and Addom 2010.

councils orient the investment of district economic development funds in local projects developed by farmer associations. The associations receive support to develop business
plans for the selected projects, many of which include
the provision of extension services (see TN 2). The FFS
approach (see box 3.5 and IAP 2) enhances interactive learning between farmers and between farmers and service
providers. More recently, the involvement of farmer groups
has been emphasized in the formation of “modern” cooperatives to develop enterprises and access financial services—
savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) are an example
(Heemskerk and Wennink 2004; Wennink, Nederlof, and
Heemskerk 2007).
ICTs have created more options for providing advisory
services (box 3.3, table 3.1) and are increasingly used to circulate market, price, and weather information as well as to

offer specific kinds of extension advice (see World Bank
2011 and an example for animal health services in Kenya in
box 3.6). At the same time, informal advisory systems, such
as farmer-to-farmer dissemination of knowledge and technology, are increasingly recognized and built upon in pluralistic extension systems (see TN 1, box 3.12).
PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE
EXTENSION AND ADVISORY SERVICES

The specific level of investment in extension and the particular reform strategies to be followed will depend on the
national context, including the current configuration of the
actors in the extension and advisory service system (Birner
et al. 2009). It is not sufficient to find an approach that
worked in one country or district and implement it in
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Box 3.4 Agricultural Technology Management Agency in India

The Agricultural Technology Management Agency
(ATMA) is a market-oriented, decentralized approach
to extension that many regard as a successful model of
extension reform. The ATMA model attempts to
increase farm income and rural employment by integrating extension programs across line departments,
linking research and extension, and using bottom-up
planning. Building blocks of ATMA include empowerment of farmers through farmer interest groups (FIGs),
delivery of services to FIGs by diverse service providers,
use of bottom-up planning relying on FIG representatives (consultation on farmers’ needs and demands),
and autonomy of the extension system. Coordination
of extension service providers is an essential element.
The impact of ATMA is well detailed (Swanson and
Rajalahti 2010, 114).
Among the many lessons learned from ATMA,
one of the most valuable is that extension should be
more decentralized and bottom-up for the following
reasons:
■

Like agroecological conditions, markets for highvalue crops and products are location-specific.
Extension and farmers must identify and consider
which high-value crops have the highest potential
for success in each area. The most effective approach
is to identify innovative farmers within similar areas

■

■

■

who have started producing and marketing specific
products.
Extension must formally establish steering or advisory committees to identify the specific needs and
priorities of representative farmers in each district,
including rural women. For example, under the
ATMA model, 30 percent of the places on each
Farmer Advisory Committee and Governing Board
were allocated for rural women.
Extension can better serve male and female farmers
by allowing private firms to play a role in “disseminating” product innovations and focusing public
extension services more on process innovations, in
which extension personnel serve as facilitators or
innovation brokers (see TN 4).
Innovative farmers play a key role in identifying and
then scaling up process innovations (in farmer-tofarmer extension).

Scaling up of the ATMA model has been attempted
with varying success. Successful scaling up often relied
on sufficient attention to capacity-building to public
extension providers (bottom-up planning, group formation, new extension methodology) as well as the
allocation of sufficient resources for operational costs.
In the absence of these characteristics, the model was
less successful.

Sources: Singh et al. 2006; Anderson 2007.

another. Even though extension reforms must be tailored to
local conditions, it is valuable to begin designing and developing more effective and sustainable extension and advisory
services by considering several approaches to reform. These
include reforms in governance structures, reforms in capacity and management, and reforms in advisory methods
(table 3.1). Investment options and examples of these principles are provided in TN 1–4.
Many countries, especially those under pressure from
democratic decentralization, have embarked on reforms
that bring services closer to farmers. Under these reforms,
participatory planning and resource allocation occur at the
district level, and district agricultural offices coordinate the
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provision of services. Examples include NAADS in Uganda
(box 3.7) and the National Agricultural Extension Program
(PRONEA, Programa Nacional de Extensão Agrária) in
Mozambique (see box 3.12 in TN 1). Ethiopia has embarked
on an ambitious plan to bring advisory services to its most
local administrative level. An intensive review of the extension system was led by CGIAR researchers in 2009 (box 3.8).
Decentralization and the demand for market-oriented
services have heightened the need for district and provincial governments to involve private service providers in
extension, either through close coordination with private
agencies or by contracting them to provide services.
These kinds of outsourcing models exist in Uganda,
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Box 3.5 Farmer Field Schools for
Participatory Group Learning

Box 3.6 Mobile Telephony for Delivering
Animal Health Services

Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) consist of groups of
people with a common interest, who get together
on a regular basis to study the “how and why” of
a particular topic. The FFS is particularly suited
and specifically developed for field studies, where
hands-on management skills and conceptual
understanding (based on nonformal adult education principles) are required.
So what are the essential and original elements
of FFSs? FFSs are a participatory method of
learning, technology development, and dissemination based on adult-learning principles such as
experiential learning. Groups of 20–25 farmers
typically meet weekly in an informal setting on
their farms with a facilitator. The defining characteristics of FFSs include discovery learning,
farmer experimentation, and group action. The
approach is an interactive and practical method
of training that empowers farmers to be their
own technical experts on major aspects of their
farming systems. Farmers are facilitated to conduct their own research, diagnose and test problems, come up with solutions, and disseminate
learning to others.

FARM-Africa, an NGO working in Kenya in
conjunction with the government and other stakeholders, developed a decentralized animal healthcare system in its Kenya Dairy Goat and Capacity
Building Project (KDGCBP). To link key participants in the system, the project approached the
Safaricom Corporation, the corporate social
responsibility arm of the mobile phone company
Safaricom. The KDGCBP system works with a
community animal health worker, who purchases
a veterinary drug kit and mobile phone at a subsidized price. The project also installs community
phones, which have solar panels and batteries
where there is no electricity, at veterinary shops.
The owner of the community phone is responsible
for repairs and can make a profit by charging for its
use; for the private veterinarians, the phone is a
means of diversifying income. Animal health assistants and vets working with the project also receive
mobile phones. The phone system allows animal
healthcare providers to update one another, share
information, and conduct referrals. This system has
reduced transaction costs and increased the efficiency of animal healthcare in the area.

Source: Davis 2008.

Source: Kithuka, Mutemi, and Mohamed 2007.

Table 3.1 Approaches for Developing Effective Extension and Advisory Services
Approach

Definition

What is needed*

Reform of governance structures
Decentralization and Based on the subsidiarity principle, the planning, financing, General decentralization policies that are effectively
deconcentration
and administration of extension services occur at the
implemented; demand-driven services for diverse farming
lowest possible state administrative level.
systems; limited public goods character and nonlocal
externalities of the extension messages; earmarking of
funding in case of fiscal decentralization of extension to local
governments; political will to build and maintain capacity for
extension at the local level.
Strengthening of
Local extension systems that are based on coordination
Capable service providers from private and third sector,** or
pluralism through
between public and private service delivery,
sufficient resources to build this capacity; competition among
outsourcing
complemented by contracting for services based on
service providers; recognition of the governance and
between public
needs.
procurement problems involved in outsourcing and adequate
and private sector
steps to overcome them, including building the extension
agency’s capacity to manage contracts.
Involving farmer
Farmer involvement in extension service provision,
Existing social organizations (social capital); absence of strong
organizations
from participatory planning to procurement to
social hierarchies; availability of sufficient resources to invest
farmer-to-farmer extension and paying for services.
in social mobilization and group formation, especially if
previous conditions are not met.

(Table continues on the following page)
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Table 3.1 Approaches for Developing Effective Extension and Advisory Services (continued)
Approach
Privatization and
public-private
partnerships

Definition

What is needed*

Services (partially) paid by farmers themselves,
directly or indirectly.

Cost-recovery

Part of the operating costs of services paid by farmers
in cash or kind to ensure that they get what they want
and that the system is more financially sustainable.
Reform of capacity and management
New public
Use of private sector principles such as those for human
management
and financial resource management (performance
contracts, costing, and financial transparency).
Business process
The analysis and design of workflows and processes
reengineering
within an organization.
Reform of advisory methods
Farmer Field Schools Farmer-centered learning groups, eventually facilitated
by farmers (farmer-to-farmer extension).
Use of information
ICTs as a means for wider access to information.
and communication
technologies (ICTs)

Commercialized farming systems with adequate market
infrastructure; suitable business climate for the agribusiness
sector; required market-oriented extension services. An
example is the marketing extension approach, based on
farmer training and market information.
Commercialized systems; possibility to embed in contract
farming or link to the sale of inputs; possibilities to raise
levies on commodities (such as export crops).
Fit with general public sector reform approaches and relatively
autonomous extension organizations.
In reviewing hierarchical structures and reporting systems.

Complex technologies that require substantial learning (for
example, technologies that must be adapted to diverse
agroecological conditions) and/or behavioral changes.
Adequate countrywide ICT infrastructure. Capacity of users
(e.g., literacy) required in many cases. Appropriate language
needed.

Source: Birner et al. 2009.
* See “New Directions, Priorities, and Requirements for Investment” (in this module) and TN 1 for ideas on how to implement advisory services of
this kind.
** Consisting of NGOs and organizations based on collective action.

Box 3.7 National Agricultural Advisory Services in Uganda

The Government of Uganda created the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) through the 2001
NAADS Act to provide a decentralized, pluralistic,
contract-based agricultural advisory system that would
improve farmers’ productivity and livelihoods. Local
governments contract for NAADS advisory services
based on needs identified by local farmer groups,
organizations, and farmer forums. District governments provide some additional funding for those
extension activities and help set priorities.
Creating a totally new organizational and management structure for a national extension system takes
considerable time, both for hiring new staff and for
organizing farmers to help set extension priorities,
monitor extension programs, and track expenditures.
Under NAADS, public extension workers were phased
out progressively across regions of the country. Most of
these workers were rehired by the private firms and
NGOs that participate in NAADS and were assigned to
new positions and service areas. This transformation

has had its challenges, such as public extension workers’ dissatisfaction with short-term, performance-based
contracts and the lack of a civil service job guarantee.
Another challenge was the limited availability of
resources to train and improve the skills and knowledge
of the “new” privately employed advisors, who needed
to know how to organize farmer groups and train different types of farmers, including women, to diversify
their crop/livestock farming systems. Along with creating a new management structure and hiring new
employees, the decentralized, private NAADS system
had to arrange for new facilities (offices), equipment,
transportation, and a communications system. Because
the advisory services were to be managed by new
farmer-based organizations, about 80 percent of the
organizational and operational costs were still financed
by donors as of 2008. In addition, the central government covered 8 percent of the recurrent costs, local
governments financed about 10 percent, and 2 percent
were financed by the farmers themselves.
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 3.7 National Agricultural Advisory Services in Uganda (continued)

In 2007/08, NAADS reached 760,000 households in
712 subcounties in 79 of the 80 districts, which is still
less than 20 percent of all farming households that
accessed agricultural extension advice. Apart from
NAADS, Uganda had 1,600 public extension agents
(due to be fully integrated in NAADS in 2010) and

parallel extension programs operated by NGOs and
private service providers.
The investment in Phase I of NAADS (2001–09)
was estimated at about US$110–150 million. For Phase
II (2010–15), an investment of US$300 million is
foreseen.

Sources: Authors; for more information on NAADS, see www.naads.or.ug; Benin et al. 2007; Heemskerk, Nederlof, and Wennink
2008; and Swanson and Rajalahti 2010.

Box 3.8 Ethiopia: Investing in Human Resources

Recently the government of Ethiopia invested
heavily in putting farmer training centers (FTCs)
in every local administrative area (there are 18,000
nationwide) and three extension agents at every
training center. From 2000 to 2008, the number of
extension agents increased from 15,000 to at least
45,000, with a goal of reaching about 66,000.
Reaching that goal would probably give Ethiopia
the world’s highest ratio of extension agents to
farmers (see box figure).
15.7
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Source: Davis et al. 2010b.

Mozambique, Mali, and Tanzania, among other countries
(Heemskerk, Nederlof, and Wennink 2008).
Farmer organizations are becoming much more involved
in delivering extension services. Their involvement is growing because group approaches are becoming more common
(as mentioned earlier) and improve the cost-effectiveness of
providing extension services.

The private sector increasingly finances extension services for specific objectives and/or value chains. Contracting
public extension workers for specific tasks is a common
practice among NGOs as well as specific commodity development programs, such as the program for cashew production in Mozambique. Some export commodity chains
finance extension services through a government-instituted
export levy, as in Mozambique and Tanzania. The private
sector also finances extension services directly, as is the case
with large tobacco companies in Malawi and Mozambique.
Many of these arrangements are in transition to become
systems of cost-sharing with farmers, first by assuring
effective demand for relatively costly services and eventually
by having farmers fully finance extension services, as a complement to services they already provide one another (F2F
extension) (box 3.9).
To increase efficiency and performance, service provision
systems financed by the public sector increasingly apply
principles from the private sector, such as the development
of a business plan for service provision, the costing and
financial transparency of services provided for farmers, and
the use of performance contracts for service providers.
These reforms are generally referred to as “new public management” (Heemskerk et al. 2003).
KEY POLICY ISSUES

In conjunction with efforts to make advisory services more
effective, what key policy issues must be considered? Extension and advisory service systems need to build new
constituencies if they are to influence policies. Constituencies could be based on alliances of public and private
service providers with farmer organizations and key value
chain actors from the private sector. National networks
can relate to international networks such as GFRAS
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Box 3.9 Fee-for-Service Extension: Pros and Cons

Fee-for-service extension is provided by the public
(or another) sector and paid for by farmers. Small
groups of farmers usually contract the services.
This arrangement allows clients to “vote” on the
programs and the scale of the programs they want
by paying for them. Most examples of this model
come from developed countries, such as New
Zealand, where agricultural advisory services are
completely privatized.
In addition to providing feedback to public
extension efforts, fee-for-service extension also can
provide revenue to public extension. It is suitable
for rival and excludable products. Hanson and Just
argue that universal paid extension is not in the
public interest but that there is an optimal mix of
public, private, and paid extension. A problem
with implementing this type of extension service
in developing countries is that farmers who do not
produce for the market may purchase fewer services. One solution to this difficulty is to stratify
farmers, allowing commercial farmers to purchase
services and offering public extension services to
smaller-scale, poorer farmers.

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

Sources: Hanson and Just 2001; Anderson and Feder 2004.

■

(http://www.g-fras.org/en/) and the African Forum for
Agricultural Advisory Services (AFAAS, http://www.afaasafrica.org/) for effectively influencing policy (both forums
are discussed in box 3.10).

■

General policy issues for extension
and advisory services

Two main opportunities for developing policies will improve
the effectiveness of advisory services, based on evidence
of what really works. The first opportunity is provided by the
many lessons and pilot experiences emerging from structural reforms to develop pluralistic, demand-led, and marketoriented extension systems. The second opportunity lies in
the new requirements for advisory services to meet the
demands arising from climate change, food security programming, the new aid-for-trade agenda, and reform in the
agricultural research-for-development agenda (Christoplos
2010). In realizing these opportunities, several important
challenges must be addressed (Christoplos 2010):

188

■

Proceed with extension system reform without relying
on a single grand model, as one model cannot accommodate all situations: Extension is to be location- and
even value chain-specific.1
Move toward pluralism in extension service provision
while retaining public financial commitments and coordination (see TN 1).
Increase downward accountability to farmer organizations (also through decentralization and based on the
subsidiary principle) (see table 3.1 and related text).
Create an effective, efficient market for service
providers, which will control the costs of scaling up
promising experiences by different public and private
actors (see IAPs 3 and 4).
Face the enormous need for human capacity development in management and implementation; extension
workers, to cite just one example, need a wide range of
new skills.
Move away from projects to programs based on longterm vision and commitments (move toward national
extension systems based on public-private partnerships).
Balance investments in extension supply and extension
demand, because both types of investment are needed
for effectiveness (introduce new public management
principles).
Focus on institutions rather than grand methodological
or technological solutions (see IAPs 3 and 4). As noted,
extension approaches must be adapted locally, and there
is no single correct method (emphasize institutional
innovations and organizational change).
Move from standard packages to tailored services provided at the right place, at the right time, and in the right
format. Critical thinking and problem solving are integral to developing tailored services. (Participatory planning as part of decentralization and deconcentration—
including downward accountability—and facilitation
rather than teaching are crucial, as well as an emphasis
on learning and business plan development.)
Address equity issues. It remains a challenge to ensure
that extension adequately reaches different groups of
farmers and entrepreneurs: women, youth, the landless, resource-poor farmers, minority ethnic groups
and castes, and others. (Different extension strategies
are needed for small-scale commercial farmers, emerging commercial farmers, and farmers producing for
food security, subsistence, or part-time. Women
require specific extension programs. Priority setting
needs to be addressed in this context for younger and
older farmers as well as male and female farmers and
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Box 3.10 Global and Regional Coordination to Strengthen Agricultural Advisory Services

Many stakeholders recognize that advisory services
require a more formal, dynamic, and proactive structure to gain a more credible, authoritative voice. Two
forums provide advocacy and leadership for advisory
services at the regional and global levels.
The Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services
(GFRAS) (www.g-fras.org, established in January
2010) is designed to provide a voice within global policy dialogues and promote improved investment in
rural advisory services; support the development and
synthesis of evidence-based approaches and policies for
improving the effectiveness of rural advisory services;
and strengthen actors and forums in rural advisory services through interaction and networking. GFRAS will
link closely to regional networks such as AFAAS.

The African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services (AFAAS) (www.afaas-africa.org, established in
2004), was conceived when the leadership of the
National Agricultural Advisory Services realized that
extension services, unlike research services, had no
mechanism to share experiences. AFAAS envisions
agricultural advisory services that “effectively and efficiently contribute to sustained productivity and profitable growth of African agriculture” in ways that are
oriented toward countries’ individual development
objectives. Through increased professional interaction
and information sharing, AFAAS participants build on
lessons learned in agricultural advisory initiatives and
enhance the use of knowledge and technologies by
actors in agricultural value chains.

Source: Authors.

farmers oriented more to markets or more to food
security).
Other policy issues related to pluralistic advisory services and extension include the changing roles of various
extension providers and the comparative advantage for different providers in carrying out specific extension functions and advisory services. For instance, publicly funded
advisory services should not involve themselves directly in
the provision of physical inputs (including credit). Also,
many bureaucrats still regard extension in a very linear way
that focuses on extension functions such as transferring
technologies to ensure better food security. Paradigm shifts
must take place not only in the programs and the thinking
of field staff but in the thinking of extension administrators
and policy makers. Finally, the sustainability of extension
institutions is another major issue for policy to address
(Swanson and Rajalahti 2010), as is equity. These three topics (the respective roles of public and private extension
providers, sustainability, and equity) are covered in the
sections that follow.
Public and private sector roles

In principle, agricultural advisory services can be provided
and financed by the public sector, the private sector (individual farmers or companies), and what can be referred to

as the “third sector,” consisting of NGOs and organizations
based on collective action. These providers can be organized
on the basis of who provides and who finances the services
(table 3.2). The functions of service provision and financing
often are separated to ensure that services are financed by
clients or the corresponding sector and reflect their
demands. Combinations of implementation and financing
of services are presented in each cell of table 3.2.2
Institutional base for sustainability

Different aspects of sustainability can be considered with
respect to advisory services, but most often the concern
involves the sustainability of financing. Several approaches
have been criticized for their lack of financial sustainability,
including the T&V system promoted in the 1980s and the
more recent FFS approach (Quizon, Feder, and Murgai
2001; Anderson 2006). Current FFS programs, especially in
Africa, address sustainability in various ways, including
revolving FFS funds, self-financing, and FFS loan and
repayment schemes. The use of farmer facilitators reduces
costs dramatically.3 More agribusiness development services and market-oriented advisory services aim for farmers, the subsector, or the commodity chain to pay at least
partially for services.
Sustainability can also be addressed through innovative
modalities for financing advisory services. Cost-sharing
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Table 3.2 Options for Providing and Financing Pluralistic Agricultural Advisory Services
Finance provider
Service
provider

Public sector

Private sector:
Farmers

Private sector:
Companies

Third sector: NGOs

Public sector Public advisory
Fee-based public
Private companies contract
NGOs contract staff
services
advisory services
staff from public advisory
from public advisory
(different degrees
services
services
of decentralization)
Private
Publicly funded
Private companies
Embedded services:
NGOs contract staff
sector:
contracts to private
provide fee-based
Companies provide
from private service
Companies service providers
advisory services
information with input sale
providers
or marketing of products
Third sector: Publicly funded
Advisory service
Private companies contract
NGOs hire own
NGOs
contracts to
staff hired by
NGO staff to provide
advisory staff and
NGO providers
NGO, farmers
advisory services
provide services
pay fees
free of charge

Third sector: Publicly funded
FBOs
contracts to
FBO providers

Advisory service
staff hired by
FBO, farmers
pay fees

Third sector:
Farmer-based
organizations (FBOs)
FBOs contract staff from
public advisory services

FBOs contract staff from
private service
providers

NGOs fund advisory
FBOs hire own advisory
service staff who are
staff and provide
employed by FBO
services free to
members

Sources: Birner et al. 2009, adapted from Anderson and Feder (2004, 44).

arrangements (such as those used in Uganda’s NAADS program) allow resources to be mobilized from various sources.
These resources can be pooled and distributed to end-users
based on demand.
Stakeholder forums consisting of farmer groups create a
critical mass for services required from either public or private bodies and can reduce service costs. Forums empower
farmers to identify and use selected qualified service
providers (Government of Kenya 2005). Other potential
methods for mobilizing and managing funds include levies
on export commodities (Tanzania, Kenya), communitydriven development funds (Guinea, Kenya), and contracting
by the government (Mozambique) (Rivera and Alex 2004).
Financing for advisory services may also come from
resources provided through decentralization programs, the
involvement of farmer associations and NGOs, contractingout of extension services, public-private partnerships, privatization, and embedding advisory services in other types
of contracts (Anderson 2007). More information on these
subjects is available in module 3 of the Agriculture Investment Sourcebook (World Bank 2006b).
Financing alone cannot guarantee the institutional sustainability of advisory services. Capacity within the advisory
service is another major concern. Extension workers must
be able to apply new approaches that focus more on facilitating processes than on teaching models and are more
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oriented toward the development of businesses, markets,
and enterprises. Apart from absorbing these individual
capacities, public providers of advisory services will have to
undertake major organizational changes, such as the use of
performance-based contracts and incentives. Institutional
development is also important (IAP 2). Public advisory
services must develop the institutional capacity to coordinate and manage local extension systems. For example, they
will need the capacity to facilitate interactive learning
between different extension service providers.
Gender and equity considerations

Women make up 60 percent of the rural population worldwide (Hafkin and Taggart 2001), yet they receive only 2–10
percent of extension contacts and 5 percent of services
(Swanson, Farner, and Bahal 1990). In sub-Saharan Africa,
where women play a major role in agriculture and account
for more than half of agricultural output, they continuously
receive a less-than-proportional share of the total investment
in agriculture (Blackden et al. 2006; Quisumbing 2003).
Only 7 percent of extension resources are spent on African
women (Blumberg 1994, cited in Haug 1999). African
women remain especially disadvantaged in interventions
relating to education, extension, capacity strengthening,
empowerment, and market access (Rahmato 1993; Alawy
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1998; Frank 1999; Haug 1999). This problem is especially
pronounced in areas emerging from conflict (World Bank,
UNDP, and UNIFEM 2010).
Despite this evidence of neglect, recent studies conclude
that some programs have reached women farmers by taking
practical steps to address the lack of inclusiveness in providing advisory services (Davis et al. 2010a; Gender and Governance Research Team 2009). A major first step is to develop
transparency in service provision by segregating data on the
participation of men and women, young and old, and different categories of farmers (subsistence, emerging, and
small-scale commercial) in all activities, from planning and
training to monitoring and evaluation. This information
can form the basis for developing joint action plans to
address any problems with inclusiveness for any of these
groups. Second, extension agents and others (including policy makers and local government officials) must be
equipped with the skills to respond to the needs of a diverse
clientele with respect to age, gender, socioeconomic background, ethnic differences, age, livelihood source(s), and so
on. For more information see Christoplos (2010).

This topic is somewhat outside the scope of this sourcebook,
yet it must be considered for investments in extension. The
extent of attention to such issues as nutrition, community
organization, microenterprise development, health, youth
activities, women’s empowerment, and rural development
varies. There may well be a case for extension to facilitate offfarm employment as a means of improving opportunities for
agricultural commercialization.
The thematic notes and innovative activity profiles in
this module offer an array of strategies that may be adapted
to meet these needs for investments, policies, and innovative
approaches:
■

■

NEW INVESTMENT DIRECTIONS, PRIORITIES,
AND REQUIREMENTS

In Africa, CAADP and the compact agreements are guiding
advisory services into efficient and well-focused service
delivery at the center of the AIS. This is a complete paradigm shift from the perception that research knowledge can
drive innovation to the notion that change in the whole system is needed for innovation.
Throughout the developing world, similar evolving
demands and new roles for advisory services in the wider
innovation system will require new investments—among
others, investments in the capacity of individual extension
workers and organizations for value chain approaches, in
market-oriented extension, in group and organizational
development, in agribusiness, and in mechanisms to share
information (networks, platforms, and the like). Recent
global developments require advisory services to focus on
climate change, food security, and equipping rural people to
deal with risk in general. There is a need for evidence-based
direction regarding investment priorities and programming
options for agricultural advisory services within innovation
systems. To influence policies and better serve their
constituencies, including the poor and women, advisory services need a stronger voice at the global and regional level;
box 3.10 describes approaches to achieve this goal. Finally,
investment in nonagricultural issues will be essential.

■

■

TN 1: Pluralistic Extension Systems. Pluralistic extension recognizes the inherent plurality and diversity of
farmers and farming systems and the need to address
challenges in rural development with different services
and approaches. This note describes pluralistic systems,
their strengths and challenges, investment opportunities,
policy issues, and emerging lessons.
TN 2: Farming as a Business and the Need for Local
(Agri-) Business Development Services. Farming as a
small-scale business requires access to markets, financial
services, and inputs, as well as a suitable mix of farmer
entrepreneurial skills and attitudes and bankable business plans. This note discusses approaches to address
farmers’ business development needs, such as reorienting
programs and staff, recruiting new staff, involving communities as agribusiness promoters, and developing
multistakeholder platforms to support agribusiness
development.
TN 3: Extension-Plus: New Roles for Extension and
Advisory Services. Extension can move beyond its traditional technology transfer role to operate as a nodal
agency within the AIS, providing technological and nontechnological services to farmers. This “extension-plus”
approach emphasizes locally developed strategies for
participants to learn through experimentation and adaptation. It is a “best fit” rather than a “best practice”
approach, requiring changes in extension and other
institutions in the AIS.
TN 4: The Role of Innovation Brokers in AISs. Some
extension agents and other actors (such as researchers
and staff of NGOs) have chosen to operate as innovation
brokers. Innovation brokering expands the role of agricultural extension. Extension is no longer a simple, oneto-one intermediary between research and farmers but
an intermediary that creates and facilitates many-tomany relationships (a key concern within AISs).
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■

■

■

■

IAP 1: Agrodealer Development in Developing and
Emerging Markets. Agrodealers have an increasing presence as providers of advisory services. A holistic, marketoriented approach to agrodealer development facilitates
improved efficiency in resource allocation, operations,
and economic performance and helps to develop sustainable input supply systems.
IAP 2: Federating Farmer Field Schools in Networks for
Improved Access to Services. By federating, farmer
groups increase their effectiveness in obtaining the advisory services they identify as important at the local level,
often at a lower cost.
IAP 3: INCAGRO: Developing a Market for Agricultural
Innovation Services in Peru. This case study of INCAGRO
describes how Peru developed a demand-driven market for
agricultural innovation services; two competitive grant
funds were important features of the program.
IAP 4: Combining Extension Services with Agricultural
Credit: The Experience of BASIX India. Recognizing
that agricultural credit alone did not equip India’s rural
poor with the knowledge, skills, and support services to
improve incomes, BASIX developed a triad of integrated
services—financial services; agricultural, livestock, and
enterprise development services; and institutional development services—to improve livelihoods.

Box 3.11 Guide to Extension Evaluation

The Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services
(GFRAS) publishes a guide to conducting more
comprehensive, rigorous, credible, and useful
extension evaluations. The guide describes different types of evaluation, explains how to select the
approach that is most appropriate to the particular
context, and identifies additional sources of theoretical and practical information. It includes guidance on such issues as preparing terms of reference
and links to evaluation manuals in different sectors. The guide is intended to be used primarily by:
■

■

■

■

■
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Those commissioning and managing evaluations.
Professional evaluators and staff responsible for
monitoring systems.
Those involved in knowledge- and resultsbased management within a range of organizations involved with extension.
Staff of public extension agencies, farmer
associations, and other organizations directly
or indirectly engaged in providing extension
services.
Professionals involved in training and educating evaluators.
Researchers looking for ways to synergize their
efforts with evaluation initiatives.

MONITORING AND EVALUATING
INVESTMENTS AND SCALING UP

■

To ensure the proper implementation of extension investments, M&E exercises and tools are crucial. Because
attempts to monitor and evaluate extension and advisory
services have been weak or nonexistent, GFRAS developed a
guide for the evaluation of extension and advisory services
(box 3.11). General studies find high rates of return to
investments in advisory services, but the challenges and difficulties in estimating the benefits are many. Efforts to
strengthen the understanding of how to improve M&E in
extension continue, but it is already clear that some of the
most important components of M&E are participation by
all parties; the clear definition of objectives, indicators, outputs, outcomes, and desired impact; continual assessment
throughout the investment period; and the collection of
baseline data. Important indicators include benchmark and
baseline indicators as well as input, output, outcome, and
impact indicators (Swanson and Rajalahti 2010). For extensive lists of indicators, see Swanson and Rajalahti (2010) and
Rajalahti, Woelcke, and Pehu (2005).

Source: Adapted from the website for the guide at
GFRAS, http://www.g-fras.org/index.php/en/knowledge/
gfras-publications/file/20-guide-to-extension-evaluation,
accessed July 2011.

Indicators are needed for judging the effectiveness of
extension programs, including the share of farmers with
regular access to services and their perceived satisfaction
with the services. Such indicators should not be limited to
farmers but also developed for male and female producers,
other (mostly private) actors in the chain, and (local) governments (Spielman and Birner 2008). To monitor and
evaluate pluralistic advisory services, output indicators
include capacity level in terms of business development
services and local certification services; management of
pluralistic extension systems at the district level; and learning taking place between agencies. Outcome indicators include
the quality of investment plans to improve associations and
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indicators measuring whether the voices of female farmers
are heard in farmer forums.
Given the increasingly pluralistic character of extension systems, many innovations—technological as well as
institutional—will develop. The system needs a mechanism
for monitoring and learning from new, often very local,
practices and experiences, which is a major new task for
extension management. Management will have to be open
to experiences from the private as well as the public sector,
involving all key innovation system stakeholders. Local
good practices can be identified, documented, and then

considered for use on a wider scale through a specific strategy for scaling up.
The process of scaling up agricultural practices is complex and influenced by many factors. Scaling up can largely
concern the more quantitative aspects of increasing the
number of farmers adopting or adapting technology to their
own situations, but it can also concern the policy, institutional, and organizational aspects of implementing a practice on a wider scale. Based on innovation system concepts,
the factors potentially influencing success in scaling up good
practices need to be analyzed ex ante.4
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 1

Pluralistic Extension Systems
Willem Heemskerk, Royal Tropical Institute (KIT)
Kristin Davis, Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS)

SYNOPSIS

luralistic extension recognizes the inherent diversity
of farmers and farming systems and the need to
address challenges in rural development with different services and approaches. It is characterized by the coexistence of multiple public, private, and mixed extension systems and approaches; multiple providers and types of
services; diverse funding streams; and multiple sources of
information—all of which benefit from some degree of
coordination and regulation that facilitates interaction and
learning. Ideally, the outcome of pluralistic extension services is that different client groups in different contexts are
satisfied with their access to services that they have
demanded. Although pluralism in advisory services makes it
possible to capitalize on the competitive advantages of different actors, one of pluralism’s greatest challenges is to
coordinate organizations that have vastly different mindsets
and worldviews. A key message is that the public sector’s
primary role is to ensure that this mix of providers achieves
jointly developed objectives. Public coordination and management of pluralistic extension services should be based on
a program for action developed jointly by multiple stakeholders and service providers. The action program should
reflect stakeholders’ agreement on the roles for the different
service providers and on who is best suited to perform each
function under the program. The variety in services
demanded is then matched with the existing variety of service providers. The emphasis is on coordination, which can
lead to regulation and performance-based contracts for
additional services, all based on complementarity.

P

WHY PLURALISTIC SERVICE SYSTEMS?

Many types of advisory service providers and approaches
exist side by side. This situation is good, as the diversity of
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rural life and needs should be matched by diversity in
services, approaches, and providers. Differences between the
poor and resource-poor farmers; crop, livestock, and fisheries systems; production and conservation objectives; and
local and export value chains—to name only a few—will
affect which organizations can best provide services and by
which methods. These differences are a major reason for
encouraging pluralistic systems.
Farmers, often impelled by market opportunities but
also by environmental, labor, and land productivity challenges, look for information and knowledge to strengthen
their production systems. Trends such as market liberalization and development, as well as democratization and the
communications revolution, drive farmers to obtain agricultural information through a wider range of means and
from a wider range of sources than ever before. Even traditional mass media such as (community) radio,1 television,
and newspapers can reach quite different audiences. For
farmers, public extension services are just one source of
information, often the one focusing purely on production
issues (Spielman et al. 2011). Farmers procure other, more
business-related services in the private sector and access
facilitation services (for group processes, as well as interaction with input and market actors) through NGOs and
farmer organizations. Technology and information are no
longer transferred through a linear system (Wennink and
Heemskerk 2006), leaving national extension and advisory
systems in many parts of the developing world struggling to
meet new demands from farmers and other actors in the
innovation system.
A useful alternative is the coordination and management
of pluralistic extension services based on a program for
action developed jointly by multiple stakeholders and service providers. The action program reflects stakeholders’
agreement on the roles for the different service providers
and on who is best suited to perform each function required

by the program. The variety in services demanded is then
matched with the existing variety of service providers.
The emphasis is on coordination, which can lead to regulation and performance-based contracts for additional
services, all based on complementarity. Some systems are
self-organized (value chains driven by the private sector)
and do not require this public role in coordinating service
provision.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

Aside from the trends mentioned earlier, the provision of
advisory services to smallholders in developing economies
is influenced by the decentralization of governments and
governance as well as by the deconcentration of public
service delivery processes. In such dynamic environments
national agricultural extension services are starting to play
new roles, based largely on principles of demand-driven
planning, management, facilitation, and learning through
interaction.
All of the newly recognized actors in advisory services
can equally bring about new ideas and innovations in agricultural extension, contributing to a system in which the
different roles can lead to synergy. National agricultural
advisory service systems are attempting to capture these
institutional innovations by contracting-in different services at the district, provincial, and sometimes national levels. Advisory services are growing more varied; rather than
being limited to technology services, they are offering more
general information and brokering services (see TN 4).
They also facilitate access to other services, such as financial
and market information services, through different means,
including the mass media and social media.
Advisory service providers increasingly vary as well. Traditionally, the private sector provided the more marketoriented and business development services (TN 2), and the
public sector provided services focused on using technology
to enhance agricultural productivity. In pluralistic extension
systems, the services in demand are supplied by the right
mix of providers. Certain service providers often perform
specific advisory functions (as shown by the “x” in
table 3.3). The matrix in table 3.3 will differ in every situation and context. It can be used to develop the best mix of
services required and can ultimately lead to pluralistic
extension, as described in box 3.12.
Under pluralistic systems, different types of agricultural
and agribusiness advisory services or different providers

work together to provide extension services. Services can be
provided by:
1. Subsectoral bodies representing private, market-oriented
farmers, such as a coffee board or national commodity
association. This practice often occurs in cash crop subsectors such as coffee in Colombia, cotton in Benin,
cashews in Tanzania, or the Kenya Tea Development
Agency (see box 1.22 in TN 4 of module 1).
2. Producer/farmer organizations and cooperatives, not
on the national level but at the meso level—for example,
when a farmer association provides services through volunteer members, as in Mozambique’s National Union of
Smallholders or Mexico’s Produce Foundation (see module 1, IAP 2)—and on the individual level (for example,
a milk producer cooperative or a vegetable producer
association).
3. Local NGOs usually working with farmer groups and
community-based organizations, mostly in subsectors
that do not involve cash commodities but increasingly in
market-oriented services.
4. International NGOs (mostly donor-funded) usually
working with farmers’ groups and community organizations in subsectors for cash and noncash commodities,
which may at times overlap, but also agri-agencies of
developed country farmer organizations.
5. Governments that support activities under 1, 2, 3, and
sometimes 4 in a sort of “joint venture” at the national,
provincial/regional, or local/district level; or public
agencies working with civil servants. In the public sector,
different extension systems (for example, for crops, livestock, and forestry) can exist side by side within the same
or different ministries. Many countries have taken a step
forward in coordinating this multiplicity of public extension programs by adopting a unified (public) extension
system.
6. Input suppliers and agrodealers supplying agrochemicals
and veterinary products and buyers of products (such as
buyers of flowers and fresh vegetables) (see IAP 1).
7. Private business contacts and relationships that provide
informal advisory services, like playing a brokering role
(TN 4). Increasingly, local business development services
are also provided by financial services (microcredit
organizations and banks), actors in the value chain, and
other private actors (TN 2).
8. Village/community extension workers, often connected
to input supply programs (such as cashew spraying services or chicken vaccination). Lead farmers and local
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Table 3.3 Extension Service Functions and Service Provider Categories
(the number of “x’s” indicates the general prevalence of specific services)
Functions
versus providers
Information
Training and advice
Technology testing
Business development
AIS linkage facilitation/
brokerage
Institutional development

Sectoral bodies
Sector-specific
x
Quality
Cash crops
x
x

Producer
organizations

Only general
xx
x
x

Bonding, bridging,
linkage social
capital*

Legal advice
Green services

Local NGOs

Ecosystem services

x
xx
xx
Bonding
Land rights group
registration
xx

International
NGOs

Governments

xx

x

x
xx

xx

xx
Bridging

x

Only w/
research
Bonding

Input
suppliers

Private
business sector

Market

Market info
Quality

Demos
xx

Community
extension workers
xxx
xx

xxx
x
Market links

Research linking

Outgrower
contracts
Certification

Source: Authors.
* Bonding social capital through strengthening the group, bridging social capital through federation and unionizing, and linking social capital through developing the capacity of groups to
interact with other stakeholders (Heemskerk and Wennink 2004).

Box 3.12 Pluralism in Action: Government-Funded Public, Nongovernmental, and Privately Managed
Extension Systems in Mozambique

Mozambique became independent in 1975, but civil
strife prevented the government from establishing public extension services for its farmers until 1987. The
government used (international) public funds to contract several local and international NGOs to organize
and provide extension services to farmers in selected
regions. Over the years, the size of the public and NGO
extension systems has fluctuated from around 600 to
800 extension workers each. The government has also
outsourced some extension services. For example, it
contracted several private, large-scale farmers, companies, and NGOs and hired an additional 200 extension
workers under short-term contracts to focus on specific
assignments. These combined actions have resulted in
an average of 10–14 extension workers in each rural
district, who reach between 10 and 20 percent of farm
households.
The interplay of NGOs, the private sector, farmers, and
their organizations in extension has led over time to a new,
pluralistic extension system in Mozambique. The public
sector concentrates on strengthening and gradually
expanding the size and improving the quality, accountability, and relevance of its public extension services,

because the public sector remains the cornerstone of
Mozambique’s pluralistic extension system. Extension
activities are coordinated at the district level by local
government officials. They coordinate NGOs, farmer
organizations, and private service providers, whereas
provinces (and also districts) may also outsource specific
assignments complementary to the public extension system. Long-term public financing for extension is crucial,
as it will be difficult, if not impossible, for low-income
men and women farmers to pay for extension services
themselves. Poor farmers will pay for specific services,
such as cashew spraying and veterinary services, as these
are embedded extension services, but they are generally
unwilling and unable to pay for advisory services that
deal with “public” knowledge and information.
The current publicly financed extension system
has three main programs laid out until 2015. First, it
will strengthen service provision in the public sector,
the private/NGO sector, and farmer-to-farmer extension. Second, it will empower farmer associations in
planning, pursuing economic activities, and providing
services. Lastly, it will emphasize the coordinated management of service provision at the district level.

Sources: DNEA 2007; Swanson and Rajalahti 2010.

facilitators such as those working with FFSs are also
providing such services.
The brokering and facilitation function can be performed by any of the entities listed above. This function in
particular has become more important with the growing
realization that catalyzing innovation involves more than
transferring knowledge and requires strong interaction
between a variety of actors (Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2010;
TN 4). Such interaction responds to a key concern within
AIS (TN 4).
INVESTMENT NEEDED FOR INNOVATIVE
AND PLURALISTIC EXTENSION SERVICES

The principles discussed in the following list are central to
pluralistic extension systems:
■

Deconcentration. The public sector has an important
but differentiated role at the local, meso (provincial,

■

regional), and national levels, particularly in providing
coordination, technical backstopping, and knowledge
management. The public sector should facilitate learning and scaling up, as well as ensure quality assurance
and oversight. Advisory service systems supported by
public funds are increasingly planned, financed, implemented, and coordinated at the district level. The meso
level coordinates and implements crosscutting services
(mostly on contracts), such as seed services, environmental management services, food security services, and
other services that extend beyond district boundaries.
The public sector at the national level plays a supportive
and backstopping role for all service providers and provides the enabling environment—conducive policies,
strategies, and regulations.
Decentralization. As local governments are empowered
to run their own affairs, it is becoming common (notably
in Anglophone and Lusophone Africa) for district governments and administrations to operate a budget
obtained from the treasury and allocated on the basis of
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■

■

■
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an integrated district development plan. Agricultural
planning priority is shifting from sectorwide agricultural
planning to higher-quality district agricultural development plans.
A system for providing multiple services. Extension
managers and partners recognize that the quality of service provision can be improved through performancebased contracts and that the choice of provider must be
based on the comparative advantages of the public sector, private sector, and civil society. The best mix of services can be identified for every situation, depending on
the demand for and availability of services.
Farmer empowerment. Farmer organizations represent
the voice of their clients, but they are also partners in
extension when it comes to planning, allocating
resources, M&E, and providing services. Empowerment is
twofold, consisting of economic empowerment as well as
involvement in decision making. As farmers’ economic
empowerment in value chains and local economic development grows, farmers gain a more forceful role in setting
priorities, planning, and providing services. In pluralistic
systems, downward accountability and user involvement
make quality control possible only at the local level.
Downward accountability of service providers to farmers
becomes more important for quality control than upward
accountability to financers (see also module 1).
Outsourcing services. Local governments (districts,
communes, and so forth) are contracting-in the services
directly demanded by farmers in district agricultural
development plans, based on the comparative and competitive advantages of the various service providers. This
trend should improve synergy and complementarity in
service provision.
Partnerships. Example of partnerships and linkages
between agricultural advisory services and other actors
in the innovation system and services include partnerships between advisory service providers and agricultural research agencies, agricultural chambers of commerce, microfinance organizations, and agroprocessing
services.
Extension approaches. A major challenge is to continue
shifting extension from a top-down approach offering
blanket, production-oriented recommendations toward a
more interactive learning approach. The interactive
approach provides room to differentiate among categories of clients, messages, and approaches. Extension
officers play more of a facilitating role; based on their
technical expertise, they stimulate learning among farmers
(as in FFSs) and with other actors, particularly market

actors. District extension systems need to be supported by
provincial and national services and knowledge centers in
case demand for knowledge services extends beyond the
district level, as this is part of the new extension.
Depending on the needs identified in a given situation,
investments can be made to support the conditions that
will enable extension to become more pluralistic and meet
those needs. As indicated in table 3.4 and the discussion
that follows, capacity strengthening is a major area for
investment, and investment is needed at all levels.
Capacity development: A major area of investment

In general, capacity can be considered with respect to institutions, organizations, and individuals. In supporting
extension services that enhance innovation dynamics, there
is in general a shift from strengthening organizations to
strengthening extension systems. System or organizational
learning requires five core capabilities: (1) to commit and
engage; (2) to carry out the mandate and deliver results;
(3) to link with, attract, and mobilize resources; (4) to adapt
and self-renew; and (5) to balance coherence and diversity (ECDPM 2008). Capacity development is the external
facilitation of this internal learning process. System or organizational learning processes can be effective and lead to
innovation only if the actors involved have adequate capacity to participate, to actively engage, and to potentially facilitate innovation processes. They also require the mindset
and flexibility to allow others to participate.
In different contexts (under various governance structures, for example), investments in developing capacity will
require adjustments, including a move away from agricultural sector programs and a link to more local economic
development programs. Programs will need to focus not
only on the public sector but also on community extension
workers and private agencies. Two particular opportunities
for investment, described in greater detail in the next
section, are (1) to develop national capacity (independent
agencies, universities, and other mediums) and higher education courses for a new type of advisory service provider in
the public and private sector and (2) to develop capacity at
the district level to coordinate and manage pluralistic extension systems.
Specific areas of capacity strengthening

The capacity of new extensionists is central to the success
of pluralistic extension systems. They must master highly
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Table 3.4 Investment Opportunities to Foster Pluralistic Extension Systems
Mechanisms
and principles
Deconcentration

Decentralization

Multiple service
provision

Farmer
empowerment

Outsourcing
services

Partnerships
Extension
approaches

Examples of investment

Cases and references*

Programs to develop capacity in managing and implementing
extension at the local level, including planning, monitoring,
and evaluation.
Differentiation of the public sector’s roles at the local, meso,
and central level in technical backstopping, coordination,
and quality assurance.
Develop integrated local government planning skills, as
well as local governance skills and mechanisms, including
skills to deal with downward accountability.
Develop the capacity among service providers to coordinate
and use learning mechanisms and skills.
Support the development of local private service provision
through capacity development and local matching
investment funds for service providers.
Develop farmer advisory service providers.
Develop associations and cooperatives to articulate clients’
demands, empower them economically, and improve
service delivery.
Develop the triangle of (1) entrepreneurship, (2) access to
(cooperative) credit, and (3) higher-level farmer lobby
organizations.
Develop capacity in the local government to contract for
services based on principles of complementarity,
synergy, and subsidiarity.
Provide matching fund to contract local services based on
cost-sharing and cost-recovery arrangements.
Develop public-private partnerships to deliver services.
Develop the capacity for coaching and facilitation.
Strengthen facilitation skills and capacities to use learning
approaches such as the Farmer Field Schools.
Strengthen the market orientation of services at the
national and district levels.
Strengthen the targeting and differentiation of services
for different categories of farmers and households,
based on demand.

National Agricultural Extension Program (PRONEA),
Mozambique (DNEA 2005, 2007)

Agricultural Sector Development Program, Tanzania

PRONEA, Mozambique (box 3.12)

Many international NGO programs and the Farmers
Fighting Poverty Program (www.agricord.org); see also
module 1

NAADS, Uganda (box 3.7 in overview) and the Agricultural
Service and Producer Organization Support Project
(PASAOP, Programme d’Appui aux Services Agricoles et
aux Organisations Paysannes), Mali
(www.maliagriculture.org)
PRONEA, Mozambique (see above)
Farmer Field School program and marketing extension
(http://www.farmerfieldschool.info/)
African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services
(AFAAS–FARA 2009, TN 2); many (mostly international)
NGO programs

Source: Adapted from DNEA 2007.
Note: See also table 3.1 in the overview for definitions and needs.
* The seven principles and/or a mix of them are applied in a number of national programs with support from organizations such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Bank.

technical information and skills as well as sophisticated
facilitation and process skills (Blewett et al. 2008). More
specifically, extension workers and their clients require:
■

Specific skills for planning and collaboration. Stronger
capacity is needed at the local level for planning, management, and coordination. As noted, major attention
must be given to enhancing facilitation skills. These
skills are instrumental in the multistakeholder platforms
and processes that foster capacity development across
stakeholders in innovation systems. Skills for communication with male and female farmers as well as differ-

■

ent kinds of stakeholders in the value chain or innovation system are needed.
Extension management skills. As emphasized previously, the presence of multiple actors and approaches in
pluralistic systems means that there is a strong need for
coordination to avoid duplication of effort and wasted
resources. Managing pluralistic extension systems at the
local level requires individuals to develop new knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Management of synergetic services for local economic development, outsourcing,
M&E, and quality assurance must take place in a satisfactory manner. New performance plans and indicators
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■

■

■

must be established. Management for performance and
outcomes must be a focus.
Skills related to understanding and improving accountability. Clients must gain the capacity to participate in,
monitor, and evaluate extension. They must be equipped
to express their perceptions of the performance of advisory services, both in an upward (local, provincial, and
national government) and downward (famer groups,
farmer forums, district councils) direction.
Technical knowledge and skills are required for relevant
actors in the value chain (production, processing, and
marketing), including knowledge about access to all
assets of the livelihood system.
Other skills that improve the quality of service provision. At the local level, the variety of demand for
services and the supply of services will present challenges not only for coordination but also for super vision and quality control. Service providers need to
be registered and certified using established criteria
and conditions in a transparent manner, mostly at the
meso level. To a large extent, the actual quality of service providers’ performance must be controlled by
users themselves.

POLICY ISSUES OF PLURALISTIC
ADVISORY SERVICES

The policy issues pertaining to pluralistic advisory services
are correspondingly diverse. As discussed below, some of
the more pressing issues involve ensuring the sustainability of pluralistic advisory services and preventing them
from exhausting public resources; ensuring that services
are provided in a more equitable way; promoting the institutional development of advisory systems; attending to the
growing demand for advice on a host of environmental
issues; and clarifying the changing roles and contributions
of the public sector, private sector, and civil society within
a pluralistic extension system.

Other investment needs

Sustainability

This sourcebook presents other examples of investments to
support pluralistic extension services. Examples in this
module include enhancing facilitation and coaching skills
(TN 4), capacity development in extension management
and the development of agribusiness services (TN 2), and
green services (TN 2).

Pluralistic extension systems are in principle more effective
than other kinds of extension, but the outsourcing of public services will act as a major drain on public resources if
not properly implemented. Outsourcing whole systems and
creating parallel structures is costly and not very effective, as
shown by the experience with NAADS and pilot activities in
Mozambique (Heemskerk, Nederlof, and Wennink 2008).
Instead it has proven more effective and cost-efficient to
outsource specific functions, such as the development of
bankable business plans. Enhanced coordination between
public and private services at the local level will also make
the system more efficient, while quality control of service
provision will make it more effective. The best mix of public
and private service provision and the level of public financing of such pluralistic systems will be subject to national and
local policies. These policies in turn will be determined by
the broad national vision for rural development, by locally
empowered smallholders, the level of focus of local development plans, and the relative strength of public and private service provision. Other services can be provided in a
better, or at least a more cost-effective, way by community
extension workers. In local development plans, coordination is planned and financial sustainability can be pursued.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF
PLURALISTIC EXTENSION

To recapitulate, the need for pluralistic extension arises
from the perception that specific services are needed for
specific contexts, economic enterprises, livelihood functions, and above all different farmer categories, based on
differences in entrepreneurship, poverty and gender. The
development of pluralistic extension systems should
enhance the competitiveness of local agricultural production within the context of local economic development,
enhance local livelihoods, and ultimately reduce rural
poverty, improve food security, and promote greater gender
equality. Ideally, the outcome of pluralistic extension services is that different client groups in different contexts are
satisfied with their access to services that they have
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demanded. Pluralistic extension systems provide services on
demand as identified in the joint planning process, and
based on the services available for each demand.
Models and lessons of pluralistic advisory services
include Mozambique’s PRONEA (box 3.12), Uganda’s
NAADS (box 3.7 in the module overview), and the programs in Mali (PASAOP) and Tanzania (Agricultural Sector
Development Program) cited in table 3.4.
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Social considerations: Equity, gender

Agricultural production is one of the main economic and
income-generating activities for rural people, yet not all
rural households have the same objectives in economic
development, and they can place wide-ranging demands
on advisory services. Local agricultural development
plans can clarify the priorities for different categories
of farmers (small-scale commercial, emerging and subsistence, food-security-focused, or part-time farmers, for
example) and between male and female farmers. Services
for local economic development need to differentiate
among many categories of clients (households based on
their different objectives, for example, and clients based
on gender, age, and physical abilities). The emphasis on
market-oriented services, cost-sharing arrangements, and
the increasing role of community extension workers will
influence access to services among different categories of
clients. In users’ assessments of service providers’ performance, as well as in the downward accountability of service providers and extension managers, the consideration
of equity issues remains important (Nederlof, Wennink,
and Heemskerk 2008).

pressure on land, questions of access to land, market
demands for sustainably produced products, and climate
change. Public sector coordination of environmental
and/or green services is needed to ensure that services are
provided synergistically by the array of actors involved,
such as:
■

■

■

Farmers themselves, providing ecosystem services with
and without incentives. Examples include maintaining
biodiversity or soil fertility or receiving premium prices
for using sustainable production methods.
The private sector, dealing in CO2 emission rights or
the certification of sustainable and/or organic production.
The public sector, engaging in climate change mitigation, erosion control, watershed management, and
similar public good activities in environmental management.

In local development planning, an integrated approach
to environmental management and the role of different service providers is needed.

Institutional considerations

Public and private sector roles

Pluralistic extension systems are expected to better address
the wide variety of demands and at the same time make
better use of the variety of service providers available.
Although eventually the right mix of services is determined
by the client and through payment for services, in the foreseeable future the public sector will still finance many of the
required services (also based on cost-sharing arrangements
but adjusted for different categories of farmers).
Pluralistic extension systems aim to develop better service
provision for all, based on the complementarity and synergy
of the public and private sectors. This public sector (at the
local, meso, and national levels) will need to play a strong
role in managing and coordinating extension activities in
such a way that demand is adequately addressed, service
providers are accountable, quality is assured, and lessons are
learned among service providers, who are in competition at
the same time. Eventually this coordination and accountability role will gradually shift to farmers and their organizations, once they will finance these services themselves.

Private extension service provision, although publicly
funded, contributes to the development of a new incentive
system in which the quality and content of extension provision is more responsive to farmers’ priorities. The transition to a system with privatized extension modalities and
improved incentives takes time, public investment, and
appropriate long-term plans. Private extension provision
requires well-trained service providers and a certain level of
capacity among farmers and local governments. Farmers’
organizations must increase their capacity to contract,
manage, and evaluate private extension provision. Decentralized political structures need the capacity to manage
such systems.
An evolution toward private extension modalities should
begin with themes that are most likely to elicit farmer
demand and investment and are rarely provided by the public sector, such as the demand for agribusiness development
services, particularly at the local level. Farmers in Ethiopia,
Uganda, Mozambique, and Kenya have all identified the
need for agribusiness development services (see TN 2). The
public sector is likely to retain its responsibility for financing extension on themes such as environmental protection,
although private delivery modalities may prove useful
(Chapman and Tripp 2003).

Environmental implications

Demand for services related to wider environmental
issues is increasing, owing to such factors as increasing
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LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons summarized here draw on several sources that
have recently examined innovations and experiences with
advisory services. The clusters of challenges identified
include the management of pluralistic advisory service systems; the quality of the demand for advisory services, the
quality of the supply, and the quality of the enabling environment (Nederlof et al. 2008).
Management of pluralistic advisory
service systems

The decentralization of advisory service systems to the
provincial or district level provides a major opportunity to
improve the coordination of services at the local level. In
most cases, to deliver a mix of public and private services
effectively, local governments and authorities will need to
improve their capacity to coordinate, manage, and direct
services and service systems. Areas such as the facilitation of
joint planning, the facilitation of learning among stakeholders, the regulation and certification of service providers, and
quality control all need strengthening. It may be necessary
to begin by building capacity in the institutions responsible
for training administrators.
Capacities of the rural poor as service users

Investments are also needed for farmers and farmer organizations to strengthen their capacity to articulate their
demands. To identify and address opportunities, smallholders need information about production, markets, and
financial services. The more vulnerable farmers need specific services related to household food security. Farmer
organizations must be able to: (1) lobby for an enabling policy and institutional environment; (2) give the rural poor a
voice; (3) influence the adoption of socially inclusive
research and advisory service agendas; and (4) become
involved in the implementation of research, advisory, and
business development services.
Provision of relevant, sustainable,
and high-quality services

Extension services need to be relevant, sustainable, and of
good quality. Service providers need to differentiate their
offerings depending on the intended clients and their
demands—for example, some services may focus specifically on vulnerable groups to enhance social inclusion,
whereas others focus on value chain empowerment. Service
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providers also need to design, in close participation with the
rural poor, services that respond effectively to poor people’s
needs. Offering diverse services for different groups of
clients will require different financing strategies. Some services for the very poor will have more of a social nature and
be supported by the public sector, community, or farmer
organizations. Business development services, in contrast,
will evolve gradually from cost sharing to full payment
(direct or indirect) by clients. The deployment and financing of service providers and services at the local government
level must be managed and coordinated to enhance the
coherence and synergy of services, increase the efficient use
of services by the rural poor, and stimulate interaction and
learning between service providers. The public sector also
has an important responsibility to control the quality of service provision (through registration and certification, for
example) and prevent bias (among agrodealers providing
embedded services, for example).
To provide services that are relevant and of high quality
in a financially sustainable way, effective linkages are
needed between (1) productive investment and technological innovation and (2) financial services, risk management, and the reduction of vulnerability. Intermediary
and facilitation services (not just the dissemination of
information) are needed to secure those links (Nederlof,
Wennink, and Heemskerk 2008; Wennink and Heemskerk
2006) (see also TN 4).
Enabling policies and institutional arrangements
for pro-poor services

For pluralistic extension systems to grow and thrive, they
will need to draw on evidence from the experiences of
their wide stakeholder base to influence policy. Policy
changes are likely to be needed to promote innovation,
decentralization, and public-private partnerships and to
empower rural people. Institutional innovations are also
likely to be needed to foster interaction between farmer
organizations and the private sector as well as research and
advisory organizations. Examples include platforms for
interaction, funding mechanisms, regulations, and certification mechanisms. Access to rural services will not
improve without continuous interaction and flows of
information between rural service providers and the rural
poor to prevent information asymmetry. Policies that support the strengthening of social capital and farmer networks will create additional institutional pathways for
improving interaction among stakeholders and enhancing
the performance of the AIS.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

The experience with pilot and larger programs for pluralistic extension systems offers a number of recommendations
for practitioners. Practical, step-by-step recommendations
include:
■

■

Sensitize and get agreement among actors at all levels on
the need to: (1) strengthen interaction and learning
between public and private service providers; (2) involve
public and private service providers on the basis of comparative and competitive advantage; (3) make an inventory of existing service providers (public, private, and
embedded services); and (4) strengthen coordination at
the local level between service providers by enhancing
downward accountability (for example, to farmer organizations).
Make sure that an enabling environment is in place for
a pluralistic extension service system to develop.
Specifically, develop a sectoral or local government
policy that supports public-private interaction in service delivery.

■

■

■

■
■

■

■

■

Open up the public service delivery system by introducing downward accountability mechanisms and performance contracts, and involving farmer organizations in
service procurement (see IAP 3 for examples).
Make provisions for local authorities to manage the
coordination of service provision, contract services
locally, and handle integrated budget management. For
example, local authorities (such as farmer groups) may
to acquire a legal identity.
Empower farmer groups and organizations to articulate
demand (for example, in planning and M&E).
Develop local capacity for small-scale service providers.
Develop capacity to use new extension approaches based
on participatory action learning, such as the FFSs, Farm
Business Schools, and so on.
Develop the capacity of local smallholders’ private service providers.
Develop, use, and manage local performance contract
and outsourcing mechanisms.
Develop local extension management capacity, including
capacity in planning, M&E, and downward accountability and transparency.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 2

Farming as a Business and the Need for Local (Agri-)
Business Development Services
Willem Heemskerk, Royal Tropical Institute (KIT)
Kristin Davis, Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS)

SYNOPSIS

mall-scale farmers, local farmer organizations, and
other local entrepreneurs (such as traders and
processors) benefit from advisory services with a
business orientation. By helping these groups to access markets, financial and input supply services, as well as knowledge oriented to their particular value chains, local (agri)business development services (LBDSs) support innovation
and entrepreneurship. Capacity to provide LBDSs must be
developed at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels. National universities and business schools need
to develop curricula that reflect an entrepreneurial mindset
in public and private service delivery. Farmer organizations
have an important role to play in articulating demands
related to local economic development plans, lobbying for
the right type of business services, and providing services
themselves. The development of private LBDSs for smallholders will require public investments. Many programs
have realized that working with smallholders to strengthen
agribusiness management, business plan development, and
other elements of agricultural enterprises benefits from a
process approach that starts with existing business service
providers. If agribusiness services are fully subsidized, they
may not reflect agribusiness demands and their sustainability will remain uncertain, yet services supported fully by
demand will not be inclusive. Involving other value chain
actors in financing local services for enhanced quality of
production increasingly appears to be the most sustainable
approach. The primary element for success in establishing
local business development organizations is to base the
intervention on local human and financial resources, which
means that practitioners must emphasize linking with product marketing and processing, creating links with savings
and credit activities, developing cooperatives, and building
capacity.

S
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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

A new appreciation of small-scale entrepreneurship has
emerged with the growing awareness that subsistence agriculture cannot eliminate rural food insecurity and that the
commercialization of smallholder agriculture is integral to
economic growth and development in many countries
(Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; UNDP 2004b; DFID and SDC
2008; Jaleta, Gebremedhin, and Hoekstra 2009). Welfare
gains from market-oriented production arise from specialization that builds on and creates comparative advantages, from the potential for large-scale and/or intensive
production, and from the dynamic effects of technological,
organizational, and institutional change that arise through
the flow of ideas from exchange-based interactions (Jaleta,
Gebremedhin, and Hoekstra 2009).
Small-scale farmers and their emerging enterprises
require local services that help them integrate into value
chains (chain empowerment) and relate to other chain
actors (traders, processors) and services (value chain
finance) (Webber and Labaste 2010; KIT, Faida Mali, and
IIRR 2006; KIT and IIRR 2008, 2010). These “local
agribusiness development services” (LBDSs) improve the
performance of a small-scale enterprise oriented to agricultural production, be it individual or cooperative, in
accessing markets, financial services, and enhanced
agribusiness environments.1 LBDSs encompass training
and advisory services, market information services, technology, and business linkage information (UNDP 2004a).
By improving the efficiency and competitiveness of
agribusinesses in specialized and quality production, agroprocessing, input use, and produce marketing, LBDSs help
to close a critical two-way gap between smallholders and
markets: Small-scale, entrepreneurial farmers need better
links to markets and value chains, while market actors

(including small-scale traders, processors, manufacturers,
and exporters) need sustainable sources of produce from
smallholders. Figure 3.1 depicts the roles of LBDSs in relation to local product value chains. Box 3.13 summarizes
the effects of successful LBDSs in Uganda.
Capacity for providing business services is generally
confined to nonprimary production and/or medium-scale
enterprises in the private sector in urban areas. In rural
areas, the public sector and civil society provide most advisory services and concentrate on agricultural production.
In their current form, these advisory services cannot cope
with farmers’ growing demand for services oriented to
markets and value chains. Nor can they cope with growing
demands for sustainable sources of produce from other

Figure 3.1 Roles of Local Agribusiness Development
Services in Relation to Actors in the
Agricultural Product Chain and to Support
Services
Farming
enterprises

Trading
enterprises
Processing
enterprises

Input supply
Local
agribusiness
development
services

Financial
services

Markets

Sources: Adapted from Wilk and Fensterseifer 2003; Roduner 2007; NAADS
2010 (unpublished); and KIT and IIRR 2010.

Box 3.13 Effects of Local Business Development
Services for Farmers in Uganda

In Uganda, local business development services
were identified as offering the key support
required to prepare business appraisals, develop
marketing plans, apply for bank credit, and
obtain advice on financial and legal matters.
Farmers’ demand for these services widened
the involvement of private agricultural service
providers in helping farmers with marketoriented production.
Sources: NAADS 2010 (unpublished); Friis-Hansen and
Aben 2010.

actors in the value chain, including national and international exporters.2 The limited individual, organizational,
and institutional capacity to develop small-scale agribusinesses locally clearly remains a major constraint to marketoriented production.

INVESTMENT NEEDED

Different forms of investment can strengthen agribusiness
development services catering to diverse groups of farmers
and entrepreneurs. These strategies include reforming
public extension systems (building capacity and balancing
public and private service provision), developing the
capacity for private LBDSs, and developing agribusiness
centers for service provision and learning. In practice, a
mix of strategies is usually followed, as in pluralistic extension systems (TN 1).

Reforming public service providers and offering
services through public and private channels

Public extension systems can respond to demands for local
business development through various combinations of
reforms involving capacity building, reorganization, and
complementary public, private, and nongovernmental service provision. Some public systems strengthen competencies in business development by reorienting programs and
staff; others choose to recruit personnel with the required
skills (usually recent graduates of universities and professional training institutes). Mozambique strengthened
capacity to provide more market-oriented, demand-driven
services by outsourcing some services to large-scale farmers, companies, and NGOs (see box 3.12 in TN 1) and
involving more smallholders in Farm Business Schools and
in developing business plans. At the district level,
Mozambique organized farmer-promoters to supply
advisory services and inputs (box 3.14). In Ethiopia and
Uganda, business services were provided by cooperative
unions to primary cooperatives (see http://apf-ethiopia
.ning.com/page/business-development and http://apfuganda.ning.com/page/farmers-organisations). Some business development services are simply unavailable from
the public advisory system and need to be outsourced to
the private sector or civil society, as with NAADS in
Uganda (box 3.15) (Friis-Hansen and Aben 2010; van
Weperen 2011).
Some countries leave the provision of business development services solely to private entities such as produce
boards (for any number of commodities, such as cotton,
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Box 3.14 Farmer Agribusiness Promoters
in Mozambique

Owing to major public and international NGO
investments in agribusiness at the district level in
Mozambique, farmers’ demand to become more
market-oriented has grown rapidly. Because only a
limited number of public extension workers could
meet that demand, District Services for Economic
Activities (SDAE, Serviço Distrital de Actividades
Económicas) involved large numbers of farmerpromoters in different advisory services. Farmer
promoters are involved in small-scale input supply
and related advisory services, such as cashew
spraying, chicken vaccination, groundnut pest
control, and similar activities. Smallholders with
knowledge related to market access increasingly
participate in the development of smallholder
business plans, as pioneered by NGOs in various
Local Economic Development Projects. The
Farmer Field School (FFS) program, in which
farmers serve as facilitators, has been expanded to
all provinces. The Field School approach is also
used widely for enhancing market-oriented farm
management in Farm Business Schools.
Sources: DNEA 2007; Kahan 2007, 90–92.

coffee, and cashews) or value chains with their own brands
(box 3.16). The risk is that services geared to the demands
from particular subsectors or value chains will exclude
many small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs. One possibility is to provide startup capital for private providers of
business development services at the local level, based on
business plans and matching funds, and at the same time
offer incentives for current public and private business service providers to meet the needs of small-scale entrepreneurs rather than focusing exclusively on medium-scale
operations, as done in Mozambique.3
An important aspect of these various innovations in
offering LBDSs is that public advisory systems need mechanisms to capture and share the lessons emerging from
them. They must open up and develop alliances and networks for learning and interaction between different actors
from different value chains and services, especially through
partnerships, multistakeholder platforms, and networks
(www.kit.nl; http://www.delicious.com/tag/apf_ethiopia).
Developing private capacity to deliver
local business services

Service providers’ skills can be strengthened through a series
of related investments at different levels. Often an initial
step is to develop the capacity of existing, often urbanbased private organizations to work in rural areas with

Box 3.15 Developing Small-Scale Agribusinesses in Uganda: Strategies and Outcomes

The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS)
program sought to enhance small-scale entrepreneurship through efforts to develop value chains and widen
access to market-oriented production services. Since
2002, NAADS have made considerable progress. About
50 enterprises have been selected for development and
promotion, more than 45,000 farmer groups were
engaged in market-oriented enterprise development
and promotion, and 200 higher-level farmer organizations were established. Public-private partnerships
were formed to support a substantial number of outgrower schemes involving “nucleus” farmers. The
nucleus farmer strategy encourages small-scale farmers
to increase their market orientation by providing
value-adding and agroprocessing facilities as well as
links to markets.

As a result of these efforts, more small-scale commercial farmers started to emerge, and their production rose to such an extent that more organized marketing and agroprocessing facilities were needed. The
private enterprises and private service providers
emerging to support this growth still require capacity
building and enabling policies to sustain their development. Other challenges remain in scaling up the
successful aspects of NAADS. Access to credit and
inputs can be problematic, and farmers’ empowerment
in value chains is still limited by a lack of capacity,
information asymmetries, poor links among key players along the value chain, and markets characterized by
low activity, low volumes, and other symptoms of poor
competitiveness. Additional public investment is
needed to complement the efforts of the private sector
in developing agribusinesses at the smallholder level.

Sources: Authors; Benin et al. 2007; Friis-Hansen and Aben 2010.
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Box 3.16 KILICAFE, a Local Agribusiness Service Provider in Tanzania

KILICAFE is the name of a brand and farmer organization for specialty Kilimanjaro coffee. The smallholders
who are members of KILICAFE have come to play a
major role in interactions with agricultural service
providers, including providers of research, advisory,
financial, and input services. Aside from linking producers to markets, traders, and millers, KILICAFE provides a range of services to its members. At the Farmer
Business Group level, KILICAFE provides pulping services; at the chapter level, it works to strengthen Farmer
Business Groups; and at the national level, it offers
marketing and financial services. Services include
credit links and financial management of loans for
working capital and for establishing central pulping
units. KILICAFE sources financing from donors and/or
financial institutes to purchase central pulping units
and issues repayments from coffee sales to the Farmer
Business Group on four-year term loans. Input credits
are organized at the chapter level, where each chapter
Annual General Meeting sets limits on how much to
spend on inputs per kilogram. These credits are not
cash loans but guarantees to input suppliers for future
payments. Marketing is done by sending green coffee
samples to the Coffee Board (for buyers at local auctions) and shipping samples directly to overseas coffee
roasters (for direct exports).

KILICAFE provides technical advisory services and
training, such as training farmers in production methods to improve the quality of their product, training in
central pulping unit operations, and training in business management. These services are provided at the
Farmer Business Group level through seminars that are
open to all members. In addition, leadership training
is conducted at the chapter level for all Farmer Business
Group Management Committee members (chairpersons, secretaries, and treasurers). This leadership training empowers smallholder farmers to own fixed assets,
which can be used as collateral for bank loans. KILICAFE also provides communication services such as a
quarterly newsletter, radio broadcasts, and website
(www.kilicafe.com), all containing information on coffee price trends, a farm activities calendar, association
events and activities, and new developments.
Farmer Business Group members also demand
other services from KILICAFE, such as supplying
agricultural inputs well in advance. Some groups want
KILICAFE to clearly specify coffee processing quality
standards and ensure adherence by all Farmer Business Groups. To achieve uniform quality and obtain
premium coffee prices, producers need to use only recommended technologies, although low prices also influence the adherence to quality-enhancing standards.

Source: Wennink, Nederlof, and Heemskerk 2007.

entrepreneurial smallholders (TN 4). Another important
building block is to strengthen the capacity of private business development service providers in rural areas to support
local development of basic farm business plans, market
studies, and feasibility studies (DNEA 2007). Complementary investments involve developing multistakeholder
innovation platforms or networks to assemble all actors in a
particular value chain at the local level (to initiate collective
action for local business development) and at the national
level (primarily for advocacy). Investments in Farm Business Schools, such as those implemented through FAO
in Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia, will
assist farmers in expressing demand for LBDSs (Kahan
2007:90–92; Malindi 2011). Finally, management capacity
will be needed at the district or local government level to
match the demand and supply of LBDSs (TN 1) in addition
to registering, supervising, and evaluating them.
The source of human resources to provide LBDSs
must not be neglected. Universities, professional education

institutes, and vocational training institutes need support to
update their curricula to reflect the growing demand for
capacity in agribusiness, marketing, and entrepreneurial
skills. A vital part of curriculum change is for these institutions to develop the capacity to train, coach, and support
local providers of agribusiness development services (see
http://ruforuminnovationsproject.blogspot.com). One such
initiative is Business Minds Africa: Professionals for Agricultural Entrepreneurship in East-Africa (http://www
.businessmindsafrica.org), a partnership between East
African Universities, RUFORUM (see module 2), International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), the Royal
Tropical Institute, and Van Hall Larenstein University of
Applied Sciences, Wageningen.
Business development service centers

Another potential area for investment is to provide services
through a “one-stop shop” mechanism, in which any
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number of services (technological, business development,
financial, and input supply, for example) are offered in a
central location. These services centers can have additional
objectives of learning and training and are mostly run
through public-private partnerships. Examples include
agribusiness centers (box 3.17), agribusiness incubators,
and local economic development agencies, all of which
could be designed to provide integrated LBDSs for smallscale farmer entrepreneurs. Services could include starting
and registering a business, farm business planning, access to
finance, training, and technical advice. Agribusiness incubator programs support emerging small-scale farm businesses
and build capacity through learning by doing (box 3.18;
see also TN 3 in module 5). Local economic development
agencies, funded by the public sector, foster public-private
partnerships at the local level (examples have been documented in Mozambique; see UNCDF 2009).
Investments are also needed at a higher level for mentoring and coaching these services. As part of public investment programs, national capacity should be developed for
supporting business development services at the district
level, with the aim of establishing and strengthening private
local providers (boxes 3.14 and 3.18). In Mali (box 3.18) and
Mozambique (Eduardo Mondlane University’s Sustainable
Trade Academy in Chibuto), an agribusiness incubator concept was also used to improve university graduates’ capacity
in small-scale enterprise development.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The potential benefits of LBDSs for smallholder farmers
include increased entrepreneurial knowledge, better market
linkages, enhanced access to credit, and better marketing
opportunities. Smallholders have expressed this demand and
given the opportunity will refocus extension on these more
market- and value chain-oriented agricultural advisory services (Webber and Labaste 2010; Friis-Hansen and Aben
2010; KIT, Faida Mali, and IIRR 2006). Services to develop
local farming businesses provide support to producers,
traders, processors, and other actors farther along the value
chain. Each group has different needs and requires different
funding arrangements, which can be local, regional, or
national. Service providers can also support the development
of local economic development plans and strategies. Anticipated impacts among smaller-scale farmers and entrepreneurs include enhanced rural income (both directly and
through employment) through enhanced small-scale entrepreneurial activity, based on the use of local resources and
competitiveness (Webber and Labaste 2010).
POLICY ISSUES

LBDSs, public as well as private, need an enabling environment to make an impact. Wherever options and opportunities exist with respect to financial services, and wherever
markets and market infrastructure exist and function

Box 3.17 Casas Agrárias in Mozambique: Lessons from One-Stop Agribusiness Centers

Around the town of Lichinga in Mozambique’s Niassa
Province, farmer associations established Casas Agrárias
with support from OIKOS (a Portuguese NGO) and
Estamos (a local NGO). Casas Agrárias are agribusiness
centers for marketing crops—for example, they can
offer temporary storage and processing facilities—and
facilitating access to credit, inputs, and agricultural
advice. The centers’ processing activities include milling
maize, processing rice, and extracting vegetable oil from
groundnuts and sunflowers. The Casas Agrárias are special entry points for supporting public-private partnerships, developing capacity in farmers’ cooperatives,
and involving national and provincial farmer organizations. Farmer management committees manage these
centers, which have a limited number of extension staff

(four to five) from public or nongovernmental agencies,
trained in input and output marketing. Important
lessons from the Casas Agrárias are that investment in
these centers must focus on developing capacity
among at least four to five people for each center to
maintain its services, training staff and farmers
in agribusiness management, and offering specialized
training in storage and input supply for farmers
and cooperatives. Another lesson is that Casas
Agrárias need to become sustainable and autonomous.
As soon as possible, they must be handed over to
farmer cooperatives and unions to operate, supported
with adequate financial and administrative management training, and linked with district savings
schemes.

Source: Authors.
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Box 3.18 The Cheetah Network Integrates Agricultural Education and Business Incubation in Mali

Business incubators are programs designed to accelerate
the successful development of entrepreneurial activities
through an array of business support resources and
services, developed and orchestrated by incubator management and offered both in the incubator and through
its network of contacts. Incubators vary in the way
they deliver their services, in their organizational structure, and in the types of clients they serve (see module 5,
TN 3).
Mali’s national agricultural research organization
(Institut d’Economie Rurale, IER), national agricultural university (Institut Polytechnique Rural de
Formation et de Recherche Appliquée, IPR/IFRA),
United States universities, and small-scale subsistence
farmers formed an alliance to develop the Mali
Agribusiness Incubator Network (“Cheetah Network”).
Through its business incubators, the network identifies
and assists entrepreneurs in efforts related to agriculture. The alliance led university staff and graduates
to review and revise course curricula significantly to

develop more skills and change mindsets related to
promoting small-scale agribusiness in Mali and the
United States.
The Cheetah Network supported male and female
graduate students from the agricultural university in
creating a number of entrepreneurial incubators
(essentially, small clusters of small-scale enterprises
focused on a similar goal). One cluster involved a
women’s cooperative in Zantiebougou focused on
producing, processing, and storing shea butter for
export and on developing a high-quality market
for its products in the United States and Canada.
Another cluster involved the production of certified
seed potatoes in Borko and Gao for regional export.
The entrepreneurial incubators have strong elements
of learning for farmers as well as graduate students
and staff. They aim at institutional sustainability
through their links with research and the university
and at financial sustainability through the introduction of fee-for-service systems.

Source: USAID 2009.

properly, LBDSs can be appropriate. National policies and
local government regulations (for example, those governing
input supply and marketing) must foster the development
of entrepreneurship by ensuring a level playing field, and
public agencies must not interfere in input and output markets. Additional policy issues for LBDSs include:
■

Social targeting. Small-scale agribusiness entrepreneurs
often constitute only 1–2 percent of rural households, yet
emerging small-scale entrepreneurs may constitute up to
25 percent. Another large category of households has
limited capacity for risk, focuses on food security, and
relies on multiple income sources (remittances, local
agricultural labor, petty trading, and others). Policies
that support efforts by these groups to organize—in
cooperative enterprises, outgrower schemes, contract
farming, and farmer shareholding in marketing and processing enterprises—make it easier to address their varied entrepreneurial capacities and level the playing field.
Close attention should also be given to the implications
of gender in value chain development and agribusiness
development services.4

■

■

Local governance. Local governance influences the local
development context (including prevailing policies),
which influences investments in developing private
agribusiness services (Friis-Hansen and Aben 2010).
Elements of the local development context that influence
LBDSs include: (1) the emphasis on local public-private partnerships, (2) synergy between local economic
development programs oriented to value chains and
livelihood systems, (3) the involvement of farmer organizations; and (4) local capacity to manage multistakeholder platforms, networks, and interaction between
service providers (TN 1).
Public and private sector roles. Policies influence
whether and how interaction between value chain actors
and private supporting services are brokered by public
agencies, locally and nationally (Webber and Labaste
2010). Locally, the public sector is more prominent in
empowering farmers through local economic development, whereas the private sector often predominates in
value chain development. These roles need to become
synergetic for value chain integration (KIT, Faida Mali,
and IIRR 2006). Three additional considerations affect
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■

public and private sector roles in LBDSs. First, LBDSs
facilitate integration between farmers and others in the
value chain, increasing the likelihood that value chain
partners will provide financial services for farmers (KIT
and IIRR 2010). Second, private LBDSs tend to have
greater capacity for facilitating access to financial services. Third, public support is needed to develop the
capacities of service providers, coordinate local
providers, empower farmers, and provide professional
and vocational training in business development.5
Local entrepreneurs and environmental services. LBDSs
can support smallholders in identifying incentives for
sustainable production, coping with the effects of climate
change, supplying green services (to enhance farmers’
ecosystems or sustain the environment), and addressing
demands from specific value chains (organic food).
Incentives can include sharing in the profits from
forestry concessions, hunting licenses, and carbon emission rights; premium prices for certified organic produce; or agronomic strategies promoted by the public
sector to prevent soil nutrient mining (Odada et al. 2008;
Pyburn, van der Lee, and ter Heegde 2011; box 3.19).

■

Sustaining local service provision. For LBDSs to be sustainable, they must be supported by the value chain
actors or customers involved (see module 5). In the transition to more value chain- and market-oriented production, however, the public sector has a role in providing
services, especially to smallholders who cannot afford
them at first. Farmers indirectly finance services for
traditional export commodities and are beginning to do
so in emerging value chains (IAP 3 gives other examples
of embedded services).6 Some national programs
have partial fee-based systems for delivering LBDSs,
including Uganda (for NAADS; see box 3.7 in the module overview) and Azerbaijan (Lamers et al. 2008).

LESSONS LEARNED

As the examples in this note indicate, much of the experience
in providing LBDSs to small-scale farmers, cooperatives, and
other agricultural entrepreneurs has been gained through
pilot projects funded by donors and NGOs. National programs for advisory services, such as those in Tanzania,
Mozambique, and Uganda, have started to incorporate these

Box 3.19 A Successful Business Model for Mozambique’s Farmers to Provide Environmental Services

With the support of a specialized service provider,
Envirotrade, a prize-winning community project in
Mozambique developed a successful business model for
the sale of carbon offsets to support the conservation of
forests and the planting of new ones. The scheme, one
of three winners of an international climate grant competition, is being rolled out to other environmentally
sensitive sites in Africa.a Sustainable farming practices
introduced as part of the Nhambita Community Carbon Project increased cashew and fruit yields and
improved livelihoods for about 1,300 families. Since its
launch six years ago, the initiative, based in the buffer
zone of the Gorongosa National Park, has traded more
than 120,000 tons of CO2, earning the community over
US$1 million. Participants are paid for carbon stored
by the trees they plant, the forests that they manage,

and the fires that they prevent. For example, Felicio
Lucas Melo, 33, has two plots that can sequester over
55 tons of CO2 per year, earning him US$244 in direct
payments and an additional US$25 that is paid into the
community carbon fund, which is used for improvements to schools, clinics, and wells.
Envirotrade is a Mauritius-based company with
offices in both the United Kingdom and South Africa
and project operations in Mozambique. Its business
model is not a substitute for resolute international
action to address the issues associated with humaninduced climate change, but it offers a means for concerned businesses and individuals to link with forest
farmers in developing countries to change how natural
resources are used and reduce harmful environmental
impacts.

Source: “Cash from Carbon,” Spore (143) October 2009, http://spore.cta.int/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
lang=en&id=1016&catid=7, accessed July 2011.
a. Another green community program, the Kakamega Forest Again Project in Kenya, also won the top US$35,000 prize in the
contest, organized by Hyundai Motor America and Carbonfund.org, in conjunction with the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance.
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experiences in the drive toward more value chain- and
market-oriented agricultural advisory programs and systems
(van Weperen 2011). Demand from farmers and their organizations for high-quality business development services at
the local level is burgeoning. Confirmation of this demand
emerged in an analysis by the AgriProfocus country focus
program with farmer organizations and their supporting
agencies in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda,
Uganda, and Zambia.7 Many countries have sought to meet
the demand for local business services through an increasing
emphasis on local economic development planning at the
district level, with the involvement of key local stakeholders
in the public and private sector (see http://go.worldbank
.org/EA784ZB3F0). It is clear, however, that demand for
LBDSs cannot be met by public service providers unless they
receive adequate public funding.
Based on the large number of pilots to date, a number
of lessons have emerged for practitioners. The lessons are
grouped around key issues: (1) creating awareness;
(2) building agribusiness service capacity; (3) implementation; (4) and developing dedicated agribusiness service
organizations.

Creating awareness and enhancing
demand articulation

At the start of a program for LBDSs, the level of commercialization of smallholder agriculture and the corresponding demand for different types of service providers must
be analyzed. Demand is strongly determined by the economic, regulatory, and service context (Jaleta, Gebremedhin,
and Hoekstra 2009).
An inventory of available local agribusiness service
providers at different levels and by sector (public, private,
NGO, and civil society) can avoid duplication and contribute to synergy based on public-private partnership. This
kind of inventory is often the basis for a local farmer entrepreneur development strategy, as part of a local economic
development strategy.
Farm Business Schools and cooperatives have an important learning role in promoting entrepreneurship among
farmers, but initially they require external facilitation. Farm
Business Schools facilitate learning about production, management, business finance, and marketing. Useful tools have
been developed for this purpose by FAO (Dixie 2005) and
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
(Poitevin and Hossein 2006), including modules on understanding the market; supply and demand; helping farmers
decide what to do; producing for the market; producing

profitably; postharvest handling; and improving market
arrangements (KIT, Faida Mali, and IIRR 2006).
Farmer organizations have an important role to play in
articulating demands related to local economic development plans and in lobbying for the right type of services.
They also have a central role in ensuring that services
remain oriented to their demands and in providing some
services themselves (boxes 3.14–3.16). Higher-level farmer
organizations are needed to influence the agribusiness context and interact with actors farther along the value chain.

Building agribusiness service capacity

An analysis of the capacity development context for business services is key. Often the capacity to strengthen
providers of agribusiness services to smallholders does not
exist. Nor is there capacity at the district level to manage
local public-private partnerships to provide such services.
The capacity gaps are particularly wide among local service
providers and in the capacity available to develop, mentor,
and coach these providers, leading to a need for capacity
development at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels.
National universities and business schools still aim to
produce civil servants rather than self-employed service
providers. Aside from skill development, a special challenge
for these institutions is to develop an entrepreneurial
mindset in public and private service delivery. Interaction
between course programs and the professional sector is
needed for curriculum improvement based on demand (see
module 2 and Spielman et al. 2008).
The development of private providers of local agribusiness services for smallholders also requires public investments, preferably through training and matching grants/
credits for starting small-scale agribusiness services based
on a business plan.
Different types of agribusiness development services are
needed for different types of entrepreneurs and farmers.
These services will often be specific to certain value chains
or even to different levels of a given value chain. Many programs developed to offer small-scale agribusiness services
have realized that working with smallholders to strengthen
agribusiness management, business plan development, and
other elements of agricultural enterprises requires a
process approach. Programs often begin by working with
existing associations and individuals, some of which,
through coaching and facilitation over time (often two
years), develop and graduate into small-scale entrepreneurs
and enterprise cooperatives. A typical process like this in
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Mozambique cost US$300 to move a loosely formed association through seven steps to become a registered, marketoriented cooperative qualified to obtain financial services.
Implementing business development
services at the local level

Business development is about chain development, facilitated by chain mapping and assessment (market orientation and risk assessment; local versus international markets; fostering an enabling business environment); chain
engagement (developing a vision; building trust); chain
development (participatory approach and ownership;
addressing risks and savings; engineering an organizational
development program; promoting entrepreneurial attitudes); chain monitoring and evaluation; and chain learning and innovation (KIT, Faida Mali, and IIRR 2006, Webber and Labaste 2010).
Services to develop small-scale farming businesses have a
central role in facilitating access to input and financial services, but they have no role in directly supplying inputs and
rural finance, which occurs in embedded services (IAP 3
and Roduner 2007). A distinction must be made between
business development services and financial services. The
public sector has a role in providing LBDSs to smallholders
but not in directly providing financial services.
Who pays for LBDSs remains a major dilemma. If
agribusiness services are fully subsidized, the services
provided may not genuinely arise from agribusiness
demands, private services may be crowded out, and the
financial sustainability of the services will remain uncertain. If services are to be fully supported by the demand,
larger enterprises may be able to pay, but others may be
excluded. Involving other value chain actors in financing
local services for enhanced quality of production increasingly appears to be the most sustainable approach (KIT
and IIRR 2010).
To be scaled up, successful models of agribusiness
development require a systems approach that pays attention to access to credit, access to high-quality inputs, the
development of farmers’ capacity, and the formation of
public-private partnerships (box 3.15). A final lesson is
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that the innovation required for farmers to improve the
quality of their produce cannot be sustained by farmer
organizations without proper incentives or premiums
(box 3.16).
Developing dedicated agribusiness
service organizations

The primary element for success in establishing local business development centers is to base the intervention on local
human and financial resources, which means that practitioners must emphasize linking with product marketing and
processing, creating links with savings and credit activities,
developing cooperatives, and building capacity. More
specifically (see the discussion of incubators in module 5):
■

■

■

An agribusiness center requires a critical mass of staff
trained in agribusiness management (at least four or five
people) to maintain its services. Ideally it is governed
with involvement from the private sector, but for smallholder producers it is often also supported by the public
sector. Centers require adequate links with market actors,
input suppliers, and financial services, including local
credit and savings schemes.
Incubators can incorporate an element of capacity building for more business-minded and market-oriented service providers through interactions with universities or
business schools. This interaction builds capacity in the
staff of the business development center, builds capacity
in the students involved in the work, and influences the
content of the related academic programs.
Through training in financial and administrative management, centers must become autonomous as soon as
possible and handed over to farmer organizations (local
and national) and/or the private sector.

All programs directed at developing local agribusiness
services must give considerable attention to fostering a
long-term commitment to building these institutions in a
stable policy environment as well to strategies that will
ensure financial sustainability, based on cost sharing for the
services that are delivered (World Bank 2010).
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 3

Extension-Plus: New Roles for Extension
and Advisory Services
Rasheed Sulaiman V, Centre for Research on Innovation and Science Policy (CRISP)

SYNOPSIS

Extension-plus” is a framework for investment in
strengthening and reforming extension to be a strong
partner and nodal agency within the AIS, providing
technological and nontechnological services to farmers. The
larger goal of investments in extension-plus is to strengthen
the capacity of extension and advisory services to play a
much wider role (a bridging role) and at the same time
enhance the ability of other actors in the AIS to support
producers in an integrated way. All current extension-plus
arrangements have emerged from small pilot efforts that
have expanded their scope and service provision based on
experimentation, learning, and adaptation to local circumstances over time. Investments should focus on encouraging
and enabling staff capacity to initiate small experimental
projects in partnership with other organizations. Promoting
the vision of extension-plus will prove challenging among
public extension organizations unless reforms target the
macro-institutional and policy context in which extension is
practiced. Extension-plus can flourish only in organizational settings that have a culture of experimentation and
learning. For cultural change in this direction to occur, it
must be supported and legitimized unambiguously at the
most senior levels of the extension service and allied organizations. Before designing the program and operational
strategy for investment, it is advisable to undertake an institutional diagnosis to understand the range of organizations
within the AIS, their expertise and activities, and their patterns of interaction. The scope of the specific extension
investment and the priorities will vary in relation to the
national, district, and local situations.

“

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

The limitations of a single model of extension and advisory
services for all kinds of situations are now well recognized.

There is an increasing realization that new extension
approaches need to emerge locally, based on experimentation, learning, and adaptation to prevailing circumstances.
The need for extension to partner with other organizations
and individuals with varied skills and competencies to provide integrated support (technical, organizational, marketing) to producers is also apparent. A number of examples
emerging in the public and the private sectors illustrate how
the conventional technology transfer role of extension is
being expanded to improve its relevance to contemporary
agricultural and rural development (Sulaiman and Hall
2004a, 2004b). Many of these examples appear to demonstrate the value of an expanded mode of extension referred
to as “extension-plus” and provide important guidelines on
design and implementation of new investments.
Extension-plus is a framework for investment in strengthening and reforming extension to be a strong partner in
the AIS. It is especially relevant in the context of reforming
public extension organizations in developing countries,
where extension is struggling to find a relevant role to deal
with contemporary rural and agricultural development
challenges. The key elements of extension-plus are:
■

■

■
■

■

A broad scope of service provision (beyond technology
transfer).
The extensive use of partnerships to fulfill an expanded
mandate.
A learning-based approach.
Negotiations with a wide range of stakeholders for developing workable and effective service arrangements.
An institutional mechanism to represent clients’ interests
at the management level, so the program remains
accountable to its clients.

The larger goal of investments in extension-plus is to
strengthen the capacity of extension and advisory services
to play a much wider role (a bridging role) and at the same
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Table 3.5 Shifting Extension to Extension-Plus
Aspect of extension
Form/content of extension

Monitoring and evaluation
Planning and implementation strategy
Sources of innovation in extension

Role of technical research
Approaches
Capacity development of staff
Capacity development of extension
system
Policy approach
Introducing new working practices
Underpinning paradigm

Shifts from:

Shifts to:

Technology dissemination
Improving farm productivity
Forming farmer groups
Providing services
Market information
Input and output targets
Doing it alone
Centrally generated blueprints
for wider implementation
Technology development
Fixed/uniform
Training
Personnel and infrastructure

Supporting rural livelihoods
Improving farm and nonfarm income
Building independent, farmer-operated organizations
Enabling farmers to access services from other agencies
Market development
Learning
Through partnerships
Locally evolved (through ensuring right kind of support for
local experimentation), with diverse approaches and
multiple partners
Source of technical expertise and supporting adaptive research
Evolving/diverse
Learning by doing, facilitated experimentation
Development of linkages and networks

Prescriptive/blueprints
Staff training
Transfer of technology

Facilitating evolution of locally relevant approaches
Changing organizational culture through action learning
Innovation systems

Source: Sulaiman and Hall 2004a.

time enhance the ability of other actors in the AIS to support producers in an integrated way. Table 3.5 describes key
shifts needed to operationalize extension-plus.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

The most innovative investment element of this approach is
the explicit acknowledgment that investment should be
concerned with creating or enhancing the capacity of the
current innovation system for interaction and coordinated
action, so that the producers receive a wider range of support and services. Extension organizations traditionally
have some capacity for interaction with research. In this
case, however, extension has to widen its networks to
connect producers with different sets of service providers.
This means that extension should partner with a number
of different agencies and develop specific arrangements in
line with local circumstances. Investments should focus
on encouraging and enabling staff capacity to initiate small
experimental projects in partnership with other organizations. By facilitating small projects experimentally and
assisting staff to reflect on their meaning and outcomes,
these investments will build skills related to experimentation and learning. Table 3.6 summarizes the kinds of
investments needed under extension-plus.
All current extension-plus arrangements have emerged
from small pilot efforts that have expanded their scope and
service provision based on experimentation, learning, and
adaptation to local circumstances over a period of time. Box
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3.20 provides three examples—two from India and one
from Bangladesh—of initiatives that served as nodes linking
producers to technology and nontechnology services,
including marketing. Each initiative supported the development of user groups that became the basic units for
implementing programs. For example, in India’s Kerala
State, where smallholder and marginal farmers dominate
agricultural production, almost 93 percent of land holdings
are marginal (less than 1 hectare), and about 5 percent are
small (1–2 hectares). Kerala imports around 80 percent
of its fruit and vegetable requirements, primarily from
neighboring states. In view of this dependency, the larger
objective of the program described in box 3.20 was to
develop a replicable model for horticultural development
to diversify agriculture. The model, piloted in seven districts, was scaled up to cover all districts in the state after
donor funding ended.
In the second example in box 3.20, BRAC (an international NGO) shifted from community development in
Bangladesh toward a more targeted approach based on village organizations in 1977. Currently BRAC’s operations
reach about two-thirds of the population of Bangladesh.
BRAC’s outreach covers all 64 districts and 78 percent of
villages in Bangladesh. Eighty percent of its funds are internally generated.
In the second example from India in box 3.20, a program
to foster horticultural production in South Gujarat
expanded from 44 families in 1982 to more than 23,000
families in 2010. Most activities are now managed by
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Table 3.6 Investments Needed under an Extension-Plus Scenario
Major investment areas

Purpose

Pre-project phase

Institutional and human
capacity strengthening

Technical support

Credit and financial
support
Organizational
development
Market development

– Analyze past and ongoing interventions by different agencies.
– Institutional diagnosis to understand the patterns of interaction among the different agencies and the
institutional and policy environment.
– Understand demand for support.
– Develop a shared vision of objectives and potential approaches and identify potential partners.
– Place staff with diverse expertise (networking, technical knowledge, organizational development, market/
business development, credit and financial operations).
– Develop a new organizational culture that focuses on experimentation, openness to new ideas, reporting
and learning from mistakes, regular staff reflection, incentives for good performance, and guidelines for staff
assessment.
– Encourage appropriate institutional changes to enhance the organization’s ability to act as a nodal agency,
capable of brokering relations with other actors, by broadening its mandate and using partnership and
learning as the key operational strategies.
– Address the current weaknesses in technology use and find opportunities to bring in new technologies for
production, postharvest handling, value addition, and export through contract research, recruitment or
secondment of technical specialists in the program, or bringing experts on short consultancy assignments.
– Identify the current bottlenecks related to the availability of credit at reasonable rates and address them.
This process might include bringing the credit issue to the right policy actors and negotiating with financial
institutions.
– Organize producers to enhance their capacity to deal with different agencies, work collectively, and
evolve new governance arrangements (see module 4, TN 5, on organizational change).
– Improve farmers’ ability to negotiate and receive a fair price for their produce. This process would involve
strengthening the existing value chains, developing more equitable institutions related to procurement and
pricing, and, at times, creating new value chains by linking producers to new markets.

Source: Author.

Box 3.20 Extension-Plus: Examples from the Field

Kerala Horticultural Development Programme, India.
Conceived in 1992, the Kerala Horticultural Development Programme (KHDP) aimed to improve the circumstances of Kerala’s fruit and vegetable farmers by
increasing and stabilizing their incomes, reducing production costs, and improving the marketing system.
The KHDP worked with fruit and vegetable farmers to
promote self-help groups. It trained three farmers from
each group to become master farmers who could deal
with production, credit, and marketing. It promoted
the concept of credit to farmers who leased land, promoted group marketing, and established modern seed
processing and fruit processing plants. To generate and
access locally relevant technical knowledge, KHDP
entered into contract research with the local agricultural university and strengthened the skills of farmers
in participatory technology development. The total
outlay for KHDP was €36.76 million, of which the
European Commission contributed 78 percent and the
state government contributed the remainder. Though

it ended in December 2001, KHDP reinvented itself
as the Vegetable and Fruit Promotion Council, Kerala
(VFPCK, www.vfpck.org), a company in which 50 percent of the shares are held by producer groups. Since
then, VFPCK has expanded its activities, coverage,
and funding sources, obtaining some funds from government programs. All programs related to fruit and
vegetable promotion are undertaken through VFPCK,
whose approach was eventually extended to all districts
in Kerala. The company directly reaches more than
132,000 vegetable and fruit farmers in Kerala.
BRAC’s Economic Development Programme. The
Economic Development Programme of BRAC (an
international NGO that originated as the Bangladesh
Rural Advancement Committee) is the cornerstone for
all of BRAC’s development work in Bangladesh. The
Development Programme covers microfinance, institution building, income-generating activities, and
program support enterprises (such as seed production,
disease diagnostic labs, and produce processing and
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 3.20 Extension-Plus: Examples from the Field (continued)

marketing). While BRAC believes that microfinance is
necessary to break the cycle of poverty, it places equal
importance on microenterprise development services
to maximize the return obtained by the poor. Unlike
standard business development programs, which offer
some mix of generic training and marketing services,
BRAC has developed an integrated, sector-specific
approach to enterprise development for the poor.
BRAC has identified six sectors in which large numbers
of low-income women can be productively engaged at
or near their homes: poultry, livestock, fisheries, sericulture, agriculture, and social forestry. For each of
these sectors, BRAC has developed a set of services that
comprises training in improved technologies, ongoing
supply of technical assistance and inputs, monitoring
and problem solving as needed, and marketing of
finished goods. BRAC evolved this model through
continuous iteration and experimental learning. This
program has so far organized 8.45 million poor and
landless people into 284,825 village organizations,
which are the basic units of the program.
The Wadi Programme of Dharampur Uththan
Vahini, India. Dharampur Uththan Vahini (DHRUVA,
“Vanguard of Awakening in Dharampur”), an associate
organization of the BAIF Development and Research

Foundation, works in 200 tribal villages in Valsad,
Navsari, and Dangs Districts of South Gujarat.
DHRUVA’s Wadi Programme, which facilitated the
establishment of fruit orchards (wadis) on land belonging to poor tribal families, started with 44 wadis in
1982. Village-level peoples’ organizations have been
pivotal in implementing the Wadi Programme’s activities. The organization encouraged the formation of a
cooperative for wadi farmers in the Vansda area to help
them market their produce collectively. Produce from
cashew and mango trees is sold to the cooperatives,
which in turn sell them to the apex cooperative.
DHRUVA helped the cooperative design appropriate
systems to preserve and process horticultural produce
(including cashews, mango pickles, jams, and jellies)
and access local and urban markets under its Vrindavan
brand name. Today, over 23,000 families from 400 villages have adapted the wadi model. Huge tracts of
wasteland have been converted into orchards, which
have contributed to improved livelihoods and the
regeneration of natural resources. The project received
funding from donors (including KfW) as well as
government support for rural employment, tribal
development, and funds from the National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development.

Sources: Bhamoria 2004; VFPCK 2009; BRAC 2010; DHRUVA 2010.

producer cooperatives and village organizations, with only
marginal support from the NGO that initiated the program.
The initiative has been acclaimed worldwide as a sustainable
and replicable model for alleviating poverty.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

A potential benefit of investing in extension-plus is the
development of a sustained capacity for innovation. For
instance, the most important contribution of the investments in KHDP, BRAC, and DHRUVA has been the development of a capacity for continuous innovation even
after the end of external funding. Many externally funded
projects fail to deliver once funding ends because they
fail to develop the capacity to keep innovating. Box 3.21
summarizes the impact of some good practices from
KHDP/VFPCK. Table 3.7 lists some of the indicators that
could be used to evaluate an extension-plus approach.
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POLICY ISSUES

Promoting the vision of extension-plus will prove challenging among public extension organizations unless the
reforms target elements of the macro-institutional and
policy context in which extension is practiced. Extensionplus can flourish only in organizational settings that have
a culture of experimentation and learning. For cultural
change in this direction to occur, it must be supported and
legitimized wholeheartedly and unambiguously at the
most senior levels of the extension service and allied
organizations.
Institutional issues

As indicated, some of the underlying “institutions” (norms,
values, routines, and attitudes) that govern or shape
extension in its current form constrain the adoption of
extension-plus. For instance, many countries continue to
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Box 3.21 Good Practices and Their Impacts for Kerala’s Fruit and Vegetable Farmers

The good practices followed by KHDP and its successor organization, VFPCK, produced a number of
impacts:
■

■

■

The program promoted the concept of organizing
self-help groups of vegetable and fruit farmers and
training certain farmers from each group in specific
skills. VFPCK currently works with about 6,800 selfhelp groups, of which 405 are run by women, and
reaches more than 132,000 farmers.
By working closely with 11 commercial banks, the
program could help farmers obtain credit for
cultivation of leased land. More than US$5.6 million in credit was distributed in 2008–09, and
VFPCK also developed credit-linked insurance
for farmers.
Group marketing was promoted by establishing
markets where farmers could bulk their produce for
sale to traders and improve their bargaining position by obtaining information on market prices
inside and outside Kerala. In 2008–09, more than
200 VFPCK Farmers’ Markets operating across
Kerala sold 87,000 tons of produce valued at

■

■

■

US$20 million. The council supports these committees with infrastructure on a limited scale.
Through its modern seed-processing plant, VFPCK
produced more than 38 tons of seed for 19 vegetable
varieties in 2008–09, thereby contributing 50 percent of Kerala’s internal seed production. Through
participatory technology development trials with
farmers, the council is promoting the cultivation of
vegetables in the cool season.
The council established a modern fruit-processing
factory with farmers as stakeholders. Products from
this factory are traded in domestic and international
markets.
An external evaluation and impact study of KHDP
by the Xavier Labour Research Institute reported a
significant increase in area under fruit and vegetables
in 86 percent of the self-help groups and increased
incomes in 75 percent of the groups. The same study
also reported that the number of farmers receiving
credit increased from 21 percent in the pre-KHDP
period to 41 percent by 1999, with an increase in the
efficiency of loan disbursal and an increase in the size
of the loans.

Sources: XLRI 1999; VFPCK 2009.

Table 3.7 Indicators That May Be Useful for Monitoring and Evaluating an Extension-Plus Approach
Output indicators

Outcome indicators

– Farmer groups or producer associations formed; groups’
sustenance, maintenance of records
– Formation of new markets; marketing and price realization
– Training organized
– New inputs and technologies distributed and/or purchased
and used
– Access to credit; credit use and repayment
– New value-added products developed
– Infrastructure developed; capacity utilization
– Partnerships, new working arrangements, or new areas of
collaboration; quality of interactions
– Reforms promoted; changes in guidelines related to
funding and collaboration

– Increase in income, production, productivity; additional
employment created
– Sustenance of the arrangement; continuance, expansion, and impact
– Enhanced capacity for collaboration and continuance of good practices;
new partnerships formed; other institutional changes generated
– New funding generated
– Ability to respond to new demands
– Governance mechanisms: how different stakeholder views are
expressed and quality of response

Source: Author.

plan, implement, and evaluate extension centrally, which
can stifle any divergence from prescribed procedures and
restrict innovation and learning, particularly by mid- and
lower-level staff. In many instances, extension maintains a

tradition of assessing performance in terms of technology
adoption and upward accountability for resource utilization
rather than by examining whether outputs were achieved
and whether clients are satisfied. The reluctance to change
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is reinforced by an extension policy dialog that continues
to be couched in terms of a narrow conceptualization
of extension as an agency transferring technology and
improved practices from research stations to farmers
(Sulaiman and Hall 2005).

LESSONS LEARNED

Implementing the extension-plus approach can involve a
number of challenges:
■

Public and private sector roles

A first step in operationalizing extension-plus is to reach
broad agreement that extension must be reinvented as a
nodal agency that provides technological and nontechnological services to farmers. In other words, extension will
need to partner with a large number of other public, private, and NGO agencies that provide many of the additional services that will be in demand. In most settings,
partnership among these agencies has been the exception
rather than the rule, given the great level of mistrust among
them. Extension can play its wider role only after undergoing large-scale restructuring and institutional changes,
which extension bureaucracies often have been reluctant
to undertake. Some of these changes include a broadened
mandate, partnership and learning as key operational
strategies, and freedom and support for staff at district and
block levels to experiment with alternative strategies.

Human resource issues

To implement this approach, extension organization would
require new expertise. One way of obtaining this expertise
is to create a core group of specialists with skills such as
market development, organizational development, enterprise development, and agribusiness management. The
extension curricula of universities and the content offered
in extension training centers will also need to be reviewed
to ensure that perspectives such as extension-plus are adequately covered.

■

■

■

These operational issues are not insurmountable. The
program should be fully aware of them and find ways of
engaging the government and the donors to resolve some of
these concerns. Box 3.22 describes how the KHDP/VFPCK
program met these challenges.
Some of the lessons learned from implementing extensionplus in varied settings are:
■

Sustainability issues

To sustain the institutional changes and capacity developed
through this approach, a clear exit strategy must be agreed
upon by the donor and the stakeholders. Building community-based organizations (user groups, cooperatives, village
organizations, self-help groups), shifting the operation and
management of the program to these organizations, and
enhancing the capacity of these organizations to perform
their responsibilities and raise fresh resources are all
important steps toward sustaining the approach, even after
donor support ends.
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The fact that the final program details cannot be visualized in the beginning can make donors and national governments slightly uncomfortable. As the approach can be
implemented only as a series of experiments, resource
allocation in the initial stages can only be tentative.
The approach requires high-quality human resources
at different levels, representing more diverse kinds of
expertise. Human resource costs as a percentage of the
total investment can be quite high.
Partnering with organizations with diverse types of
expertise is critical. Partnering is not an easy task for
organizations that have a long history of isolated or independent functioning. In such cases, implementation
could be slow.
Only when the organization has sufficient flexibility to
deal with administrative and financial issues will this
approach flourish. The program should have opportunities for reflection and learning and sufficient flexibility
to respond to the demands and opportunities emerging
from the field as the program evolves.

■

■

■

The goals of the investment should be broad enough to
provide integrated support to producers, improve competitiveness of the sector, or upgrade the production system to improve livelihoods, and so on. Broad goals are
necessary to challenge extension to broaden its agenda.
The investment should provide for hiring a mix of global
and local expertise to support program implementation.
It would be useful to get human resources on a long-term
basis, starting with the design and inception of the program, to provide continuity and a shared vision of the
objectives and approaches for implementation.
Partnership with other organizations having varied skills
should be the basic philosophy guiding the interventions.
Continuous experimentation, reflection, and learning
should be the basic approach for identifying relevant
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Box 3.22 Experience with Innovative Activity in Kerala Horticulture

The most attractive feature of the program developed
for fruit and vegetable producers by KHDP and its successor organization, VFPCK, was the concept of integrating three main components of agricultural development: production (including support for research
and development), credit, and markets.
To implement this concept, KHDP created a new
organizational structure and management strategy.
It hired the services of international and national
consultants to support key areas of its operation: credit,
implementing an agroprocessing program, technology,
and training. The expatriate experts, who were on a
long-term consulting assignment, brought new knowledge and fresh perspectives to the program as it translated its vision into action.
Another interesting feature of the program was
the flexibility to change the type and nature of interventions as and when problems arose. This flexibility
allowed the program to evolve over the years. In its
early years, KHDP quickly found that it needed to
organize farmers into groups to promote new technology, help access credit, and strengthen negotiating power through collective marketing. It entered
into a contract research arrangement with the state
agricultural university for technical backstopping,
and when it found this arrangement was unsuccessful, it realized the importance of involving farmers
directly in technology development and testing. Since

then, the program has promoted participatory technology development and testing. Initial serious setbacks in group marketing also caused the program to
reflect and learn to overcome the problems. An additional problem was that traders perceived farmers’
markets to be a threat, and considerable persuasion
became necessary to convince them of the benefits
they would receive from cooperating with the farmers’ markets.
In the beginning, KHDP envisaged providing credit
to farmers through cooperative credit societies. After
encountering difficulty in mobilizing funds on its own,
the program decided to arrange for commercial banks
to supply the credit. Although the banks were reluctant
to provide credit to landless farmers, KHDP’s willingness to deposit its own funds with those banks encouraged them to take the risk.
The program paid explicit attention to learning along
the way. It established a monthly review meeting of project managers that provided a forum for sharing knowledge and experience from implementation on the
ground and served as the program’s learning laboratory.
Without this forum, the program probably would never
have learned from its initial experiments, some of which
failed. The donor (the European Commission) supported management’s changes to the initial design,
which to a large extent allowed the program to achieve
its goals.

Source: Author.

■

■

strategies for implementation. The program should have
sufficient flexibility to shift approaches based on this
learning.
Accountability to clients is important. Clients should be
part of the governance structure.
A well-thought-out exit strategy should be in place before
funding ends. Activities in the final year of implementation should focus on how to sustain the investment’s positive outcomes.

Recommendations for practitioners

Extension can and should expand its role, given its significance for the larger AIS. The principles of extension-plus
provide an opportunity for expanding the role of extension

by raising questions on the nature of extension’s tasks,
recognizing the need for new expertise, facilitating a review
of extension’s current interactions, and highlighting the
importance of institutional changes. These tasks are important for developing and sustaining a capacity for innovation, which should be the main focus of investing in this
kind of approach.
Before designing the program and operational strategy
for investment, it would be better to undertake an institutional diagnosis to understand the range of organizations
within the AIS, their expertise and activities, and their patterns of interaction. The scope of the specific extension
investment and the priorities will vary in relation to the
national, district, and local situations. For instance, forming
groups of farmers could be the starting point in one
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Table 3.8 Activities to Ensure Successful Operation of an Extension-Plus Approach
Phase or aspect of operation

Activity

Pre-project phase

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Institutional and human development

Technical support

Credit and financial support

Organizational development

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Market development

–
–
–
–

Conduct individual consultations, workshops, sample surveys
Identify key partners
Develop a shared vision for the program
Recruit experts that can bring specific skills
Negotiate to get the right kind of staff on deputation
Identify and contract consultants (short and long term)
Conduct training, exposure visits, case analysis
Conduct an organizational and management review
Identify best technologies and refine or adapt them to local conditions
Direct recruitment
Make available on time the best and most efficient inputs, either by
producing them directly or brokering arrangements with other suppliers
Recruit qualified technical staff and train them so that they remain up to date
If necessary, fund adaptive research
Understand the financial/credit landscape
Negotiate with financing agencies
Guarantee transactions, set up revolving funds
Organize producers for group lending
Influence policies to help mainstream credit operations
Form producer organizations (self-help groups, commodity interest groups,
federation of self-help groups, producer companies, and similar groups)
Enhance skills through appropriate training programs (for example, skills in
group dynamics or office management, including financial management)
Analyze and strengthen market chain
Negotiate with different actors in the value chain
Create new markets if needed
Develop new products

Source: Author.

location, whereas linking farmers to new or emerging markets could be the priority in another. It would be ideal to
source expertise and other inputs by forging links with
other actors rather than trying to do everything through
one program. If reliable sources of expertise and inputs do
not exist, however, the program will have to start its own
initiatives.
Specific activities that can ensure success at different
stages and for different aspects of an extension-plus
approach are listed in table 3.8.
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Investment should focus on potential ways for strengthening and sustaining the capacity for innovation during the
project period and after its end. Developing a new office
(administration/financing) manual; making arrangements
for monitoring, learning, and impact assessment; creating
opportunities for communication and engagement with
policy; and ensuring adequate funds for addressing evolving challenges are also critical for implementing this
approach.

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

T H E M AT I C N O T E 4

The Role of Innovation Brokers in Agricultural
Innovation Systems
Laurens Klerkx, Wageningen University
Peter Gildemacher, Royal Tropical Institute (KIT)

SYNOPSIS

Innovation brokers” are persons or organizations
that, from a relatively impartial third-party position,
purposefully catalyze innovation through bringing
together actors and facilitating their interaction. Innovation brokering expands the role of agricultural extension
from that of a one-to-one intermediary between research
and farmers to that of an intermediary that creates and
facilitates many-to-many relationships. As an organization
and function, innovation brokering differs from traditional
extension and R&D because it represents the institutionalization of the facilitation role, with a broad systemic, multiactor, innovation systems perspective. Preliminary lessons
from experience are that innovation brokers help build
synergy in agricultural innovation systems, but their
“behind-the-scenes” mode of operating conceals their
impact and may limit financial support for their role. Their
contributions to building capacity for collective innovation
and preventing innovation-system failures offer a rationale
for public investment in their activities, but such investments must be accompanied by improved methods for
measuring the impact of innovation brokering. As “honest
brokers,” innovation brokers need considerable room to
maneuver in building and facilitating networks from a
credible position. Given that countries may have different
cultures of collaboration and different stages of innovation
system development (with corresponding system imperfections), a context-specific design is required for innovation
brokers to attain a credible position.

“

WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR INVESTING
IN INNOVATION BROKERS?

Over the past decades, the stakeholders in agricultural
innovation have become more numerous and their interactions more complex (World Bank 2006). This increased

complexity has made cooperation for innovation less
straightforward. To function, an AIS required shared
visions, well-established links and information flows
among the actors, and incentives that enhance cooperation
(World Bank 2006). Interaction between stakeholders that
are different enough to have new knowledge but related
enough to understand each other seems particularly to lead
to innovation—a relationship described aptly by Granovetter (1985) as “the strength of weak ties.”
Creating and fostering effective coalitions among actors
is often hindered by incomplete information about what
potential partners can offer, by different incentive systems
for public and private actors, differences between indigenous
and formal knowledge, social differences that cause exclusion of certain actors, or ideological differences (Pant and
Hambly-Odame 2006). Innovation scholars (Burt 2004,
Obstfeld 2005) emphasize the importance of having people
who act as brokers in networks, connecting stakeholders that
are not familiar to each other but may provide the “new
combinations” essential to innovation. It is also recognized
that a dedicated actor can fulfill this role of “innovation broker” (Smits and Kuhlmann 2004; Howells 2006).
Innovation brokers act as “systemic intermediaries” in
innovation systems, forging many-to-many relationships.
While the term “broker” has the connotation of a strategically acting go-between who benefits from the separation
between actors and pursues objectives mainly out of selfinterest, the concept of “innovation broker” derives from
the notion of an “honest broker,” who brings people
together mainly for altruistic purposes (Obstfeld 2005).
The role of the honest broker resembles a broadened notion
of the role of a process facilitator (Klerkx and Leeuwis
2009). In other words, innovation brokers are facilitators of
interaction and cooperation in innovation systems, and
their activities extend throughout innovation processes that
last several years.
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In the agricultural sector, innovation is vital for sustainable economic, social, and ecological development. Efforts
to overcome the many barriers to effective communication,
cooperation, and ultimately innovation are thus central to
the public interest and justify public investments.
WHO CAN BROKER AND HOW?

Any advisory service or related individual or organization
can broker, connecting farmers to different service
providers and other actors in the agricultural food chain.
Examples include research organizations such as those of
the CGIAR, national and international NGOs, specialized
consultancy firms, temporary projects, government programs, and farmers’ organizations (see Klerkx, Hall, and
Leeuwis 2009 for examples). Although public organizations
such as extension services and research organizations could
perform innovation brokering as part of their mandates
(see TN 3), many retain a linear, transfer-of-technology

mindset and lack the capacity to fulfill this role (Rivera and
Sulaiman V. 2009; Devaux et al. 2009). Innovation brokers
can also be independent, specialized organizations with a
skill set especially tailored to innovation brokering. A broad
range of specialized innovation brokers has emerged, for
example, in the Netherlands (Klerkx and Leeuwis 2009).
Developing countries such as Kenya (boxes 3.23 and 3.24)
and India (box 3.25) have done the same in recent years
(Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009).
Innovation brokering typically comprises the following
functions, to be applied in a flexible and iterative manner
(Klerkx and Leeuwis 2009; Kristjanson et al. 2009):
■

Analyzing the context and articulating demand. The
participatory assessment of problems and opportunities
through quick system diagnosis identifies promising
entry points (in terms of prospective markets), supportive policy, and constraining factors to be overcome. The
analysis provides information to stipulate a shared vision

Box 3.23 The Need for Innovation Brokering: Supplying Potatoes for Processing in Kenya

In Kenya, DEEPA Industries Ltd. expanded its potato
crisp production capacity from 2 to 12 tons a day, but
its fully automated production line required a steady
supply of high-quality potatoes. The International
Potato Center (CIP) and the Kenya Agricultural
Research Institute (KARI) organized and facilitated a
meeting in 2005 to see if an arrangement could be brokered between the processor and potato producer
groups in Bomet District. During the meeting, agreements were reached on a fixed price for farmers’ produce, transport arrangements, and the regular supply
of produce. The parties also agreed that the local public extension office would support the producer organization’s efforts to supply the processor. No stable source
of funds for continued brokering beyond this one-off
meeting could be identified to continue supporting
development of this emerging beneficial relationship
between actors.
The transporter of the first shipment sold the highquality potatoes destined for the processor elsewhere
for a higher price and replaced them with potatoes of
lower quality. The processor declined to accept further
deliveries from the producers because they did not
meet the quality requirements, with the result that a

constant supply of potatoes did not materialize. The
processor had to scale down his ambition of exporting
to other East African countries.
A structured and sustained innovation brokering
effort could have made a big impact by building a
working coalition between the different stakeholders in
the innovation process. A more harmonized and effective contribution by research, extension, the private
sector, and producers would have been possible
through a clearly mandated broker.
Three years later, in the context of a development
project funded by the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), CIP and KARI renewed efforts to
broker organizational innovation. Meetings are being
organized to build trust and structure communication and economic interactions between the actors.
Currently research, agricultural extension, producer
groups, and DEEPA are innovating within the production chain by using high-quality, clean seed, contract farming, direct purchasing, local collection of
the produce, and testing new genetic material for
quality in crisp processing. These initiatives resemble
types 1, 2, 3 in the typology of innovation brokering
presented in table 3.9.

Sources: D. Borus and P. Gildemacher, CIP, Nairobi.
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Box 3.24 The Innovation Works Unit at the International Livestock Research Institute as an Innovation Broker

The Innovation Works Unit of the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) sought to facilitate
pro-poor innovation related to livestock husbandry
through efforts with a local as well as a systemic focus.
The unit created several learning platforms for public
and private stakeholders in particular projects. The
platforms, which were mediated by local facilitators
hired by the different projects, can be characterized as
hybrids of an innovation consultant and a systemic
intermediary (see the typology in table 3.9). The different projects funded innovation brokering through the
platforms.
The platforms often took the form of safe havens—
environments outside each of the participating organizations that provided a more neutral space conducive
to creativity and co-creation, bypassing dominant
groups committed to maintaining the status quo. A
concrete example involved facilitation of the inclusion

of local pastoral Maasai communities as equal partners
in drawing up a land-use master plan, in which local
and scientific knowledge were combined. The Maasai
gained a voice in the policy debate from which they had
been excluded. A major achievement was that the facilitators tackled the huge power imbalances across their
multipartner project team, such as the often unrecognized power of scientific experts. To build trust and
demonstrate respect for the knowledge of all partners
in the project, the facilitators pursued multiple strategies, such as hiring local community members as members of the core project research team and encouraging
the joint creation of knowledge by a hybrid team of scientists and community members.
Despite these achievements, this kind of mediation
often remains unrecognized and undervalued. It was
difficult to make it a central function of an institute
such as ILRI and get it funded.

Source: Kristjanson et al. 2009; see also www.ilri.org/innovationworks.

■

■

and articulate demands for technology, knowledge, funding, and other resources.
Composing networks. Facilitate linkages among relevant
actors—specifically, by scanning, scoping, filtering, and
matchmaking possible partners that have complementary resources such as knowledge, technology, and funding. This also includes matching demand and supply in
pluralistic advisory and research systems.
Facilitating interaction. Action planning, along with the
identification of and support to those taking leadership
in multistakeholder activities, has the main objective of
building functioning stakeholder coalitions. Considering
the different backgrounds of the actors involved, coalition building requires continuous “translation” between
actors, the building of trust, establishing working procedures, fostering learning, motivating, managing conflict,
and intellectual property management.

Different types of innovation brokers have been
observed, working at different levels of the innovation
system and varying in their level of ambition and thematic scope. Table 3.9 presents a tentative typology based
on the Dutch landscape of specialized innovation brokers
(Klerkx and Leeuwis 2009). Although several of the types

described here can be found elsewhere, the typology is
subject to further research and amendment (Klerkx, Hall,
and Leeuwis 2009).
Innovation brokers have been found at the supranational
(across several countries), national (country), regional
(province, district), and (sub)sectoral or commodity level
(such as dairy or horticulture), but these levels may also mix
(for example, when dealing with cross-cutting value chain
innovations). With respect to their level of ambition, some
innovation brokers focus mostly on incremental innovations at the farm level, in a demand-driven and bottom-up
fashion. They may be reactive, responding to clients’ ideas,
or they can more pro-actively approach prospective clients
and offer a context analysis and demand articulation session
(Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008). Other innovation brokers typically focus on radical innovations that comprise complete
(sub)sectors or value chains, dealing with complex problems that require a systemwide change process. In this case,
innovation brokers are often proactive initiators of
processes and act as change agents. With respect to thematic
scope, some innovation brokers focus on one sector (dairy
alone, for example), whereas others address all kinds of sectors within a region, and still others focus exclusively on a
specific activity (rural tourism, for example). The optimal
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Box 3.25 Agricultural Innovation Broker Initiatives in India

Several types of innovation brokers have emerged in
India. They have taken different organizational forms,
they operate at different levels in the innovation system, and their scope of innovation differs.
International Development Enterprises. In India
and Bangladesh, an international NGO, International
Development Enterprises (IDE), acted as a broker in
the process of developing innovations for low-cost irrigation pumps. (In Bangladesh, aside from coordinating
interaction among actors in the irrigation pump supply
chain, IDE also coordinated interaction with policy
makers.) Because of IDE’s intervention, the focus
broadened from developing a particular technology to
realizing the vision of effective irrigation water provision for the poor. Institutional innovations were the
key to realizing that vision and included changing the
incentives for public and private actors and creating
effective demand for the technology so that a selfsustaining market could emerge. IDE acted as a local
innovation consultant as well as an instrument for systemic innovation.
Using ICT and social media to build awareness of
innovations and other information. To truly benefit
from farmers’ creativity and experimentation, several

initiatives use ICT and social media to identify and
build awareness of little-known innovations. Participants can share experiences and scale up successful
efforts. These initiatives are hybrids of an innovation
consultant, a peer network broker, and a ICT-based
platform that helps to articulate demands and build
networks. Examples include the HoneyBee Network
and Villagro Network, which scout for innovations for
their databases and connect innovators to supporting
agencies such as India’s National Innovation Foundation. The networks also help participants to patent
innovations and find investors to develop products.
Sustainable inventions from the Honey Bee database
comprise 34 categories, including agricultural tools
and techniques, water conservation, health, education
innovation, food and nutrition, traditional medicine,
and industrial and household goods. (Example of specific innovations include a motorcycle-driven plow
for farmers who cannot afford tractors or bullocks
and matchsticks made of natural fibers sourced from
agricultural waste.) Still other efforts use ICT-based
brokering instruments (“infomediaries”) to share
operational (market and production) information
(rather than strategic information) for innovation.

Sources: Authors; Gupta et al. 2003; Hall, Clark, and Naik 2007; Murthy 2010; see also www.ideorg.org, www.honeybee.org,
and www.villagro.org.

innovation system level, ambition level, and thematic scope
of the work can be determined only in the course of the
interaction between innovation brokers and their clients.
This uncertainty implies that sometimes clients will need to
be referred to another type of innovation broker than the
one they originally started to work with. In other instances,
several complementary innovation brokers are involved
within a single innovation process (Klerkx, Aarts, and
Leeuwis 2010, Devaux et al. 2010).
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF
INVOLVING AND INVESTING IN INNOVATION
BROKERS?

The current imperfect interaction between the actors
essential for agricultural innovation—farmers and their
organizations, researchers, extension, agricultural service
providers, local government, agribusiness—is often not a
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result of unwillingness to interact but of a lack of capacities, structures, and incentives to interact effectively.
Through investments in innovation brokering, communication between the multiple actors can improve greatly. By
providing fresh insights and a mirror for self-reflection,
innovation brokers stimulate clients to look beyond their
current situation and constraints. For example, farmers
and other agrifood stakeholders can think about new possibilities to improve their businesses, or producer organizations, researchers, and extension service providers can
think about innovative manners of communicating.
Impartial, honest brokers, because of their less-biased position and the overview of the system that they can provide,
can forge contacts between parties that would normally not
cooperate. They can also mediate more easily in the case of
conflict (see the first point in the section, “What Key Issues
Should Be Considered?,” later in this TN). Hence they can
assist in promoting more perfect information.
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Table 3.9 Typology of Innovation Brokers
Type of broker*

Focus

1. Innovation consultants, aimed at
individual farmers and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) in the
agrifood sector

Connect farmers/agrifood SMEs with relevant collaborators and service providers and also with
sources of funding and policy information. Generally incremental innovation; short time horizons.

2. Innovation consultants aimed at
collectives of farmers and agrifood
SMEs

Similar to type 1. The main difference is that they work with collectives, first connecting farmers or
agrifood SMEs with similar interests and then connecting these actors with relevant collaborators,
service providers, and sources of funding and policy information. Generally incremental
innovation; short time horizons.
3. Peer network brokers
Aim to bring farmers together to exchange knowledge and experience at the interpersonal and
group level—in other words, to facilitate enterprise development through peer-to-peer
learning resembling concepts such as Farmer Field Schools. An explicit objective is to involve
actors from weak networks (surpassing regional and sectoral networks) by inviting entrepreneurs
from other regions or sectors and subject matter specialists.
4. Systemic intermediaries for the
Catalyze radical systemwide innovation (such as an entire production chain, societal systems, or
support of innovation at higher
policy systems) by: (1) managing interfaces between (sub)systems in the innovation system;
system level
(2) building and organizing (innovation) systems; (3) stimulating strategy and vision development;
(4) providing an infrastructure for strategic intelligence; and (5) providing a platform for learning
and experimenting. Involve several societal actors, including farmers, supply and processing
industry, civic advocacy organization, and policy makers, for example. Generally radical/system
innovation and transition trajectories; medium to long time horizons.
5. Internet-based portals, platforms,
Portals and platforms differ with regard to their prospective audiences, which may be selective (such
and databases that disclose relevant
as farmers), all agrichain actors, or project-related audiences. Portals and platforms may have a
knowledge and information
rather passive matchmaking role. Some portals create order in a wealth of information sources
and give an overview but do not serve as a selection aid. Interactive tools exist, however, to allow
the provision of services adapted to users’ needs. Addressing both operational or tactical
problems and strategic innovation issues; short time horizons.
6. Research councils with innovation
Management of multiactor R&D planning networks (involving farmers, supply and processing
agency
industry, civic advocacy organization, policy makers)—e.g., facilitating a demand-driven research
agenda and priority setting. Facilitation of participatory/collaborative R&D (involving end-user
participation), also addressing the creation of an enabling environment for enhancing research
result uptake. Incremental and radical innovations; short to medium time horizons.
7. Education brokers
Aimed at curricular innovation. Provide educational establishments with the latest insights from practice
and research to enhance the fit of their education programs with business and societal needs.
Source: Adapted from Klerkx and Leeuwis 2009.
* Hybrids of different types of innovation brokers are possible within a single organization, as well as involvement of different types of innovation
brokers within a project.

Broadly, innovation brokering can be expected to have
immediate and long-term results. Direct results are
expected through market innovations that arise when producers respond better to the needs of agribusiness and
agribusiness operators develop a better understanding of
production systems, as in the case of potatoes for the snack
food industries in Kenya and Peru (box 3.23 and the
description of Papa Andina in module 1, TN2). Brokering
can facilitate technical innovation by improving how agricultural research service providers target serious bottlenecks
in production or processing or by inducing required institutional change on the part of policy makers and legislators.
Over the longer term, and beyond the immediate results of
a single innovation brokering effort, brokering should
improve how the overall innovation system functions. Once
contacts have been made and working coalitions have

formed between stakeholders, the result should be more
market-oriented research and advisory services, more effective agricultural value chains, and a more conducive policy
environment—in other words, a better-functioning innovation system (Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008; Klerkx, Aarts, and
Leeuwis 2010; see also box 3.24).
WHAT ARE THE MAIN INVESTMENTS
NEEDED FOR INNOVATION BROKERING?

The main investments to mainstream the use of innovation
brokers to support agricultural development are:
■

Improving the recognition and evidence that innovation brokering is useful. Funding the innovation broker
role is problematic. Even when organizations involved
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in agricultural development see this role as central to
their core missions, they lack the opportunity and freedom to execute the innovation broker role within their
mandate (Kristjanson et al. 2009). To widen awareness of
brokers’ potential role in innovation and show that an
investment in their role is justified, more structured documentation of successes and failures (specifically in
developing countries) is required, followed by the publication and promotion of the outcomes.
Improving the understanding of how to implement
innovation brokering effectively as a tool for development. Implementers should take care to not simply
copy innovation brokering models from one context to
the other, as best-fit solutions should be sought
(Berdegué and Escobar 2002). Different approaches are
needed depending on asset positions, favorable or
unfavorable production environments, gender issues,
and power distribution (Kristjanson et al. 2009). To
increase the understanding of effective approaches of
innovation brokering, action-learning cases need to be
initiated and documented in different countries and
agricultural systems.
Improving human capacity to play the role of innovation broker. First and foremost, innovation brokering
requires skills related to process facilitation: leadership,
multistakeholder facilitation, trust building, and communication; it also requires tools for managing group
processes (Anandajayasekeram, Puskur, and Zerfu
2010). A system overview is required to permit stakeholders to understand and “translate” between each
other. This skill set cannot be obtained through formal
education alone but must be developed through a combination of formal education and practical experience.
Investments are required to develop capable facilitators
of innovation within organizations motivated to support agricultural innovation through brokering. A critical mass of experts and organizations in this field is still
lacking, as reflected by the experience with NAADS in
Uganda (Kibwika, Wals, and Nassuna-Musoke 2009)
and the reorganization of agricultural service provision
in Mozambique (Gêmo 2006). Traditional research and
extension organizations must “retool” if they are to
develop their innovation brokering capacity and
abandon a mere transfer-of-technology paradigm
(Devaux et al. 2009). The implication is that they must
develop a service delivery philosophy and a mindset that
recognizes multidisciplinarity (including topics such
as agricultural economics, sociology, and gender
issues), as well as facilitation skills. Capacity-building

interventions should be local and context-specific and
aim to build durable and, ideally, self-sustaining systems
of continuous capacity improvement.
WHAT KEY ISSUES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
IN POLICIES TO ESTABLISH INNOVATION
BROKERS?

A number of criteria determine whether an organization
can play a role in brokering between actors in an AIS
(Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis 2009). The most important are:
■

■

■

A legitimate mandate and credibility in the eyes of system stakeholders. A key factor for the legitimacy of
innovation brokers is that they must have a trusted
position as a relatively neutral “honest broker.” They
should have a reputation that instills a degree of independence from the major stakeholders in the process
and the overall innovation system. This stance is not
easy to maintain, because stakeholders may exert pressure to compose and facilitate networks in a way that
fits their particular objectives. An apparent connection
to an organization may negatively influence credibility
as a neutral, honest broker, which seems to indicate that
innovation brokers might work best as independent,
specialized organizations. Innovation often challenges
prevailing role divisions, power relations, and profit
distribution. To build productive innovation networks,
sometimes parties with vested interests need to be
bypassed.
Both technical and methodological know-how and a
clear role division. Innovation brokers should have sufficient technical knowledge but should not become so
involved with projects that they take over detailed management and take away ownership from the innovation
network partners. They should also give equal attention
to the goals and interests of each of the partners.
Funding sustainability. A durable source of funding is
an important requirement for effective innovation brokering. Often funding is on an ad hoc, project basis, and
especially in times of fiscal austerity innovation brokering services are often discontinued, despite high client
satisfaction (Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008). Because the
impact of innovation brokers is difficult to make visible,
durable public, donor, or private stakeholder funding is
hard to obtain (box 3.24). Ways need to be found to
assess the impact of innovation brokers and better justify
public or donor spending, starting with detailed documentation of specific cases.
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LESSONS LEARNED

Well-documented experiences with innovation brokering
are limited, but there appears to be a growing recognition
of professionals in research, extension, and advocacy who
may have the skill set and honest broker status that we are
looking for in innovation brokers. The development of
innovation brokering services requires continued local
experimentation, adaptation, and learning (Klerkx, Hall,
and Leeuwis 2009). So far several general lessons have been
learned, discussed below.
Context analysis is needed prior to or as
part of the innovation broker establishment

It is essential to adequately map and diagnose the strengths
and weaknesses of the relevant innovation system (see
Gildemacher et al. 2009) to get a clear view on missing linkages and/or deficient interaction. In doing so, it should also
become clear whether some parties already fulfill an innovation brokering role and the extent to which they may
complement or overlap with the envisioned task of the
proposed innovation broker. Such a preparatory phase of
context mapping and consultative talks with stakeholders
prior to innovation broker establishment may take between
one and two years.
Some innovation brokering functions are generic

To bring structure into the process of innovation brokering,
several generic steps in the process can be distinguished:
(1) context analysis; (2) initial network composition;
(3) participatory needs and opportunity assessment, including network recomposition when necessary; (4) action
planning; (5) network facilitation/coordination, problem
solving, and conflict resolution; and (6) exit strategy. As
progress in innovation processes is rather unpredictable, no
fixed time allocations can be given for these phases.
Innovation brokers can use existing tools,
methods, and approaches, but innovation
brokering is learning while trying

Attention for integrated innovation brokering in agricultural development is new. The capacity to play the role of
innovation broker cannot be fully obtained through formal
training. However, many practitioners will recognize the
role of innovation broker as a role they have played or seen
being played. Although innovation brokering is thus not yet
a very well-articulated and recognized role, tools from other

approaches are available, such as the facilitation of multistakeholder interaction and value chain development. Innovation brokers can benefit from using such methods, to
avoid “reinventing the wheel.”
The role of AIS theory should be
appropriately modest

The real proof of concept is in practice. It is important for
practitioners to keep in mind that it is the experience in
practice that steers the development of theory. Considering
that innovation brokering has been recognized only recently
as an important and deliberate function in AIS, practitioners are often pioneers. This situation implies that they
should make decisions based on their own understanding,
experience, and judgment rather than search for answers
from AIS theory. While trial-and-error learning may incur
some inefficiencies in regard to effective spending of funds
(Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008), experimentation appears to be
needed to create locally adapted innovation brokers, as there
is no one-size-fits-all model (Klerkx, Hall, and Leeuwis
2009).
Perfect innovation brokers do not exist

When listing the skills and attitudes required in a good innovation broker, an apparently endless list of required qualities
will emerge. These qualities are impossible to find combined
in a single person. Still, the role of innovation broker will
depend on these imperfect individuals. Each individual will
have to develop a personal style as a broker that fits his or her
strengths and weaknesses.
A structured exchange of experiences
supports capacity building

As this field is new and capacity building is needed, peers
involved in innovation brokering need to invest time and
effort in exchanging experiences. As a reference point, the
Netherlands took about fifteen years to develop a diverse
field of innovation brokers and recognize their role (Klerkx
and Leeuwis 2009). A structure of peer-to-peer exchange
and support will directly improve performance as well as
help to build capacity.
Innovation brokers should negotiate and
defend the freedom to explore options

Once established, an innovation broker should be given
considerable freedom to explore new options and establish
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new linkages. Brokers should not be tied to prescribed
input-output schemes by either their employers or funders.
Monitoring and evaluation are needed for learning

Innovation is by definition an unsure process. It involves
invention, adaptation, and changing directions as a
response to the insights that are gained. It is difficult, even
detrimental, to monitor progress through rigid and SMART
milestones (Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008). Methods of M&E
that focus on learning lessons are more suitable. Alternative
M&E indicators should be identified by the stakeholders
involved as relevant proof of progress, but (more important) these indicators should also serve as points of reference for learning to improve the process of innovation.

Recognize the difficulty of distinguishing
and attributing outcomes

The primary work of innovation brokers is to improve the
quality of interactions, which is a process that includes
many intangible contributions. Innovation brokers will
have to deal with the dilemma that they should sufficiently
emphasize the impact of their role but not take all the credit
(which may annoy stakeholders and diminish their ownership). While attribution is already a perennial challenge for
extension programs, it is possibly even more problematic
for innovation brokers, given their “behind-the-scenes”
mode of operating. Because it is hard to distinguish and
attribute the impacts of innovation brokering, it is also difficult to make the innovation broker role self-sufficient;
willingness-to-pay is typically low among private actors.
Long-term public investments appear to be needed in view
of persistent innovation system failures such as fragmentation and lack of coordination. A focus on short-term funding may engender a vicious circle of short-term funding,
leading to the disappearance of the innovation broker and
renewed funding of a similar innovation broker.

and brokering. The biggest potential for impact is, however,
through the long-term outcome of improved collaboration
between actors, transforming the innovation system in
such a way that it becomes responsive and contributes to a
durably competitive agriculture sector.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS,
POLICY MAKERS, AND PROJECT LEADERS

From the lessons learned so far, several recommendations
can be distilled for brokers themselves, policy makers, project leaders, and those who champion innovation brokering.
Recommendations for prospective innovation
brokers

■

■

Short-term results and long-term outcomes

It is important to keep in mind the two levels of results,
direct and indirect, of innovation brokering. Direct and
concrete activities and results are needed to keep the innovation coalition together long enough to build trust and
build relationships. Without direct and concrete results and
activities, it is impossible to keep actors motivated to invest
in interaction and collaboration. Direct innovation results
are also needed to justify investments in coalition building
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■

The problems and challenges that need to be tackled by
innovation brokers may be different. Although not
exclusive to developing and emerging countries, but
maybe even more severe and pressing in light of rural
poverty and natural resource scarcity and degradation,
problems that need to be addressed include: dealing with
competing claims on natural resources, inclusion of the
poor and giving them a voice in the development
process, and equitably integrating smallholder farmers in
global value chains. For this reason, different approaches
are needed in designing the brokering role. Prior to
setting up an innovation broker (which may be an individual, a unit in an existing organization, or a new organization) in a region or sector, start with an analysis of
innovation system imperfections, and assess the need for
an innovation broker and willingness of stakeholders to
support and/or work with a broker. Gain the confidence
of stakeholders, and work to gain credibility as an honest
broker in the innovation system.
Plan for the nature of the different innovation broker
functions (particularly context analysis, demand articulation, and initial composing of networks as first steps) in
the different steps of the innovation process. Do not apply
them as a blueprint, however. Be flexible at the same time.
Assist in reassessing the context, needs, and opportunities
when needed, and help networks to adjust accordingly.
The facilitation of interaction is a dynamic activity, given
that changing visions and networks require constant
attention to mutual understanding and trust.
The nature and intensity of the innovation broker’s role
will most likely change over time. It should shift gradually from actively taking the initiative to handing over the
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■

■

■

initiative and daily project management to project participants and acting in the more distant role of project
monitor.
A broker will have to deal with multiple accountabilities and conflicts of interest in the innovation process.
Conflict management and intermediation skills are
important. Brokers must prepare to deal with contrasting
demands and the opposition of incumbent actors in the
innovation systems who do not favor change. As an innovation broker, try to be as transparent as possible about
the “what” and “why” of certain actions or interventions,
to avoid giving false impressions. Perception management is essential. In some countries with weak governance, additional challenges need to be dealt with, such
as corruption and favoritism. Due to resource dependencies an innovation broker may nevertheless become a
more or less “hidden messenger” for government or
another party—a perception that may be detrimental to
the broker’s impartiality, credibility, and hence longevity.
Take care in assigning credit for results. As the innovation process evolves and results materialize, the innovation project partners, other actors in the innovation
system, and funding agencies should be made aware of
the broker’s contribution in achieving these results.
Brokers themselves should avoid taking credit from
project participants.
Expect the greatest reward and sign of accomplishment
to be that an innovation broker may no longer be
required when local innovation capacity has been built.
The broker should withdraw rather than force his or her
presence between actors. Brokers should think about an
exit strategy from the beginning.

■

■

■

■

Recommendations for policy makers in government,
research organizations, and other organizations

■

Before establishing an innovation broker, assess innovation system failures and current innovation broker
capacity to avoid duplication of effort. Remember that
in some cases the need for context specificity may justify
the coexistence of several innovation brokers. It is essential to stimulate interaction between different innovation
brokers to demarcate mandates and complementarities.
In the absence of coordination, overlap and even competition between innovation brokers can arise, engendering
confusion among clients about who is facilitating what
and reducing the synergies that innovation brokers
should induce in innovation systems.

■

When establishing innovation brokers, avoid maintaining an overly close organizational and ideological connection with the respective policy domain. Distance will
enable the innovation broker to develop a clean, “honest
broker” image and sufficient operational maneuvering
space. Do not try to use innovation brokers as messengers to bring about government interventions. Sometimes radical innovation goes against current government policy.
Accept that innovation brokers, by counteracting
imperfections in the innovation system, also change the
innovation system’s configurations and interaction patterns. Although such actions may challenge certain policy lines, policy makers who champion the role of honest
brokers should accept this situation and defend it with
their constituencies and peers in the policy domain.
Allow sufficient freedom to forge unexpected linkages
(for example, to connect agriculture with the gaming
industry) and experiment (touching themes that at first
sight do not have anything to do with current ways of
agricultural production), but agree upon certain deliverables. Such deliverables could include the number of new
concepts developed or the number of productive innovation networks forged, supported by narrative case
reports of innovation dynamics. A supervisory board
drawn from the different domains with which the innovation broker works should be installed to monitor the
extent to which these deliverables have been realized. The
board members are ideally well and widely respected but
at the same time visionary and open to change.
As in the case of market failure, innovation system failure justifies public investment, even though innovation
is unpredictable and difficult to plan. Investment in
innovation typically is of a “best bet” nature, and stimulating innovation means that investments are made in
projects with an unknown and sometimes unviable outcome. Despite innovation brokering, failure may occur,
but this does not mean that innovation brokering does
not merit investment.
Stimulate the development of M&E indicators that
capture the rather intangible activities of innovation
brokers, particularly indicators that move beyond case
documentation and satisfy the need for quantitative
justification of investment. Methods and indicators are
especially needed to capture causal relationships between
innovation network performance and the activities of
innovation broker activities as well as the spillover effects
of innovation brokers in innovation systems. Methodologies such as social network analysis may be promising
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■

■

in this regard (see Spielman, Ekboir, and Davis 2009).
Stimulate policy learning and institutional memory in
relation to the roles and effects of innovation brokers to
avoid a vicious circle in which innovation brokers
appear, only to disappear and reappear.
Creating innovation brokering capacity within an
existing organization, such as an extension or research
organization, requires the proper institutional conditions to be shaped. Innovation brokering cannot be
judged on the basis of traditional performance criteria
for research and extension, such as publications or numbers of field visits. Furthermore, management and staff
need to gain an understanding of the role of innovation
brokering so that it is not seen as extrinsic to the organization’s core mission.
Brokering is influenced by the nature of the AIS and
institutional frameworks as well as cultures of collaboration. Many countries are characterized by “immature”
innovation systems that lack a functioning knowledge
infrastructure (research, education, advisory services)
and by inadequate institutional frameworks (in terms of
well-functioning legislation, markets, and interaction
patterns). Policy makers should keep in mind that different cultures of collaboration may affect the potential
effectiveness of innovation brokers (for example, in
building trust, achieving a collective goal) because of the
cultural organization of interaction among actors at different social and economic positions and issues like
clientelism, social exclusion, nepotism, and corruption.

Recommendations for project leaders, project
implementers, and/or innovation champions

■
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Prepare to give up preconceived ideas. Stimulating critical and creative “out-of-the box” thinking is a key role of
innovation brokers.

■

■

■

■

■

Establish a clear division of tasks in innovation process
management, to avoid overlap and a lack of project ownership. Depending on the innovation network’s internal
capacity to manage innovation processes, the intensity
of the broker’s involvement may vary. Generally, daily
project management is a principal task of project leaders/
implementers and/or innovation champions, while
issues like process monitoring and conflict mitigation are
a principal task of innovation brokers. The involvement
of innovation brokers implies that reflection on project
progress, the role of different partners, the viability of the
vision, and objectives becomes an integral part of the
project.
Coordinate actions of the innovation network partners
and the innovation broker when forming the network,
to avoid confusion among the parties approached as to
whom they should regard as their main contact person.
Recognize that the innovation broker cannot always
take a clear stand in advocating the interests of the
innovation project versus external parties, although the
broker is regarded as part of the innovation network.
Advocacy is needed to some extent, but within certain
limits. Innovation brokers that become too institutionalized in the project may benefit from having another
innovation broker give a “second opinion.”
Although innovation brokers are often subsidized, if a
private contribution is requested, realize that this
investment is generally compensated by a lower failure
rate and better access to external resources. In general,
integrate the cost of innovation brokering in the overall
project sum, and do not see it as an unnecessary investment lowering the research budget.
Accept that innovation brokers cannot perform miracles. Some obstacles may be of such magnitude that they
require prolonged action by innovation brokers (for
example, through mediation) but nonetheless cannot be
overcome.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 1

Agrodealer Development in Developing
and Emerging Markets
John Allgood, International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC)

SYNOPSIS

holistic, market-oriented approach to agrodealer
development facilitates improved efficiency in
resource allocation, operations, and economic
performance and helps to develop sustainable input supply
systems. The benefits of agrodealer development accrue at
various levels in the value chain and reach stakeholders at
the micro and macro level. Developing agrodealers’ technical capacity allows them to provide high-quality advisory
services to farmers, accelerates the introduction of technology, and enhances the potential economic returns for
farmers who invest in yield-improving technologies. Developing their business acumen is paramount for improving
dealers’ operations, cost-effectiveness, and potential for
long-term economic success in serving farmers. Developing
business linkages is critical in enabling agrodealers to capitalize on opportunities to improve the cost and operational
efficiency of value chain and credit management and to
expand the scope of their operations. It is vital to tailor each
agrodealer development intervention to the specific conditions and market characteristics of a given country and
region. Agrodealers learn best either through direct, oneon-one assistance or through group participation with
hands-on interaction. Longer-term interventions are more
effective than short ones (program continuity allows for
timely interaction with policy makers and donors). Broadbased stakeholder involvement and attention to cost sharing
(when feasible) are essential to sustaining progress.

A

CONTEXT

Agrodealers play a crucial role in servicing farmers’ needs
related to agricultural inputs.1 Ideally that role includes providing farmers with (1) affordable, convenient access to
appropriate, high-quality technologies to enhance yields and
(2) proper advisory services on the best way to use those

technologies to achieve favorable economic returns. The
functions performed by agrodealers in developing and
emerging markets are substantially influenced by the stage of
agricultural development and the prevailing macro environment (for example, the government’s role in agricultural
input markets, the availability of finance to buy inputs, and
so on).2
In an early phase of development, agriculture is mostly
extensive; the sector is characterized by weak, seriously
underdeveloped agricultural input and output markets. The
public sector typically dominates the supply of agricultural
inputs to farmers. In almost all cases, public systems
that perform the function of agrodealers focus on logistics
management with little (if any) emphasis on stimulating
demand (through farmer advisory services or technology
promotion campaigns, for example). Public systems rely
strongly on the agriculture ministry and public extension
service to create awareness and educate farmers. In the early
phase of market development, private agrodealers’ role usually is limited to bridging the gap between suppliers of agricultural inputs and farmers, often in competition with the
public sector. Private agrodealers perform the essential basic
functions of determining the product mix, physical distribution, pricing, and sales.
In markets where agriculture is more developed, as in
India and Pakistan, agrodealers may assume more complex
roles. In addition to providing convenient and timely access
to appropriate, high-quality products, they may provide
farmers with advisory services, participate in campaigns to
introduce new technologies, and provide sales on credit to
their best farmer customers. In more advanced markets,
agrodealers may serve as an important source of information
that is useful from both a commercial and policy perspective.
As the final link in the agricultural input value chain,3
those entities (public and private) that function as
agrodealers are able both to influence farmers’ demand for
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yield-improving technologies and to improve the transfer
of knowledge related to the proper, safe use of agricultural
inputs. They have a major influence on farmers’ incomes.
Efforts to improve food security and accelerate income
growth in rural areas can be significantly affected by the
presence and effectiveness of agrodealers.

linkage development, and efforts to strengthen the support
systems needed for agrodealers to become successful in a
competitive marketplace. The following focal areas are a priority for IFDC in the design and implementation of activities to accelerate agrodealer development.

Technical knowledge transfer
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

The International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC)
takes a holistic, market-oriented approach to agrodealer
development, whether the challenge is to improve efficiency in public systems or strengthen the capacity of
private agrodealers (box 3.26). Improving the performance
of the members of the value chain, thereby achieving
operational and cost efficiencies that directly benefit
farmers, is a priority. The IFDC approach to agrodealer
development incorporates the marketing concept—an
agrodealer’s long-term success can best be achieved through
better serving its farmer customers—in all activities directed
at capacity building and promotion.
FOCAL AREAS AND INTERVENTIONS

Focal areas in agrodealer development comprise technical
knowledge transfer, business acumen development, business
Box 3.26 Philosophy on Agricultural
Development Drives the Approach
in Agrodealer Development
The philosophy on agricultural development at
IFDC encompasses two premises:
■

■

Improved use of agricultural inputs (such as
fertilizer, high-quality seed, or crop protection
products) is essential, along with good water
management, to sustainable improvement in
agricultural productivity per unit of land.
Efficiency in resource use can be maximized by
employing a market-oriented approach to
development.

The IFDC goal in agrodealer development is to
foster the development of agrodealers so that they
may effectively serve farmers’ immediate and longterm agricultural input needs.
Source: Thompson 2003, 2005.
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Strengthening the technical capacity of agrodealers
allows them to provide high-quality advisory services to
farmers, accelerates the introduction of technology, and
enhances the potential economic returns for farmers who
invest in yield-improving technologies. Efforts to
improve dealers’ knowledge and understanding of agricultural input products focus on analyzing problems in
soil and crop health management and on the field performance of products (for example, in maintaining soil
and plant health); their safe use, storage, and handling to
minimize human and environmental damage; and proper
application to achieve maximum efficiency from use and
optimum economic returns. Two crucial steps in increasing farmers’ demand for agricultural inputs are to create
awareness and transfer knowledge related to yieldenhancing technologies. Particularly in developing countries, the “seeing is believing” concept is highly effective
in educating agrodealers and farmers and stimulating
farm-level demand for inputs. Some of the most effective
approaches for promoting agricultural inputs include the
design and implementation of collaborative technology
demonstration plots as well as technology field days and
crop cuttings. IFDC also provides agrodealers with pointof-purchase technical leaflets, wall hangings, and poster
boards that build farmers’ awareness and knowledge of
agricultural input use (box 3.27).

Development of business acumen

Strengthening the business acumen of agrodealers is paramount for improving dealers’ operations, cost-effectiveness,
and potential for long-term economic success in serving
farmers. Agrodealer development activities of IFDC, CNFA,
and others emphasize improving dealers’ understanding of
the financial, marketing, and management functions that
must be performed well for a business to survive and grow.
Training sessions cover the basics of marketing and business
management; strategic planning to ensure that sufficient
inputs are supplied in a timely manner to farmers; recordkeeping to support profitability analysis, business planning, and credit management; understanding the total cost
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Box 3.27 Technical Knowledge Transfer:
A Public-Private Approach
in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, IFDC conducts a range of technical
knowledge transfer activities, engaging both the
public sector (such as the Department of Agricultural Extension, DAE) and private fertilizer dealers. Providing education to DAE field staff improves
their awareness of appropriate agricultural technologies, the best practices for using them, and
the resulting benefits through a “train-the-trainer”
approach to knowledge transfer. Building the capacity of dealers to provide advisory services to farmers
is a well-accepted practice. Various knowledge
transfer activities are used and target agrodealers as
well as DAE staff, including classroom training sessions that last one to three days, collaborative field
demonstrations/field days, and direct, one-on-one
technical support through site visits.
When a new technology is introduced, rapid
penetration promotion campaigns are effective.
Specific tools to introduce the targeted technology include technical leaflets, signboards, point
of purchase displays, billboards in heavily populated areas, and open sky shows.
Source: IFDC 2011.

incurred in the agrodealer business and the associated
record-keeping needs for marketing and accounting;
price determination and pricing strategies; the design and
implementation of promotional campaigns to improve
sales; procurement planning and negotiation; credit management; and extending agrodealer networks to improve
geographic coverage. IFDC’s experience is that short
group training sessions with a blend of lectures, group
exercises, and case studies are highly effective in building
business acumen.

Business linkage development

Business linkage development is critical in enabling
agrodealers to capitalize on opportunities to improve the
cost and operational efficiency of value chain and credit
management and to expand the scope of their operations.
Strengthening linkages within the agricultural input value
chain generates several advantages. It allows for efficiencies
in logistics planning and inventory management, improves

awareness of new technologies, offers opportunities to realize economy-of-scale benefits through joint procurement,
improves access to credit through banks and supplier credits, and facilitates the expansion of dealer networks. IFDC
fosters business linkage development through workshops,
direct technical assistance, publication of monthly market
news bulletins, study tours, training programs, and the
development of alliance agreements (box 3.28).

Strengthening support systems

Advantages in market development are afforded by forming
groups in a manner that does not impede competition. Market efficiency requires a relatively high degree of market
transparency at all levels; market information is essential to
successful planning and decision-making. Various support
systems facilitate agrodealer development. IFDC often works
to create agrodealer associations and build their capacity to
provide dealer education programs, advance technology
introduction, provide policy advocacy, facilitate business
linkage development, improve access to commercial finance,
and enhance market transparency (box 3.29). The emphasis
is on creating agrodealer associations that provide a formal
structure to support long-term dealer interests.
It is important to tailor each agrodealer development
intervention to the specific conditions and market characteristics of a given country and region. Human capacity
building is emphasized in all activities. Educational programs and the provision of resource materials are crucial.
One or more combinations of the following may be
included: formal (classroom-type) training programs tailored to a particular audience on specific subject matter;4
development/dissemination of an agrodealers’ handbook;
informal, one-on-one site visits with agrodealers to provide
guidance on business management, product display, product storage, and safe input use and handling practices; and
regional and international study tours to observe agrodealers and technology suppliers in more advanced markets.
Cost-sharing (for technology demonstrations and field
days, for instance) is emphasized. As an example of the type
of resource material provided to agrodealers, an agrodealer
handbook was developed in Uganda and Bangladesh to
serve as a ready reference for agrodealers.
The scope of interventions may range from a one-time
event such as a two-day training program to a more extensive, multiyear, comprehensive market development effort
that includes agrodealer development. It is important to be
aware of the peak agricultural input use season and avoid
scheduling programs at those times.
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Box 3.28 Business Linkage Development
and Leveraging Resources

Global Development Alliance. In collaboration
with the United States Agency for International
Development and the Eurasia Group (Pioneer, John
Deere, DuPont, and Monsanto), IFDC helped to
create a Global Development Alliance in Kyrgyzstan. The alliance has been instrumental in introducing technology and building human capacity
through cost-sharing and in linking Kyrgyzstan’s
agrodealers to suppliers of improved technologies.
Linking South Asian and African entrepreneurs. IFDC is organizing study visits and technical
workshops to link suppliers of fertilizer briquette
machines in Bangladesh and agrodealers in Kenya,
Nigeria, and Rwanda. The emphasis is on creating
awareness and establishing business contacts
among agrodealers, entities that directly impact
their businesses (including banks and microfinance
institutions), and agricultural input distributors/
wholesalers with local, national, regional, and
international markets.
Sources: IFDC, unpublished project documents, 2009
and 2010.

BENEFITS AND IMPACT

A holistic, market-oriented approach to agrodealer development facilitates improved efficiency in resource allocation,
operations, and economic performance. The benefits of
agrodealer development accrue at various levels in the value
chain and impact stakeholders at the micro and macro levels. For instance, beginning in 2008, the Government of
Bangladesh endorsed fertilizer deep placement as a technology that would help to improve rice production systems
substantially, thereby contributing to food security and
farmers’ incomes. IFDC, with support from USAID and the
Government of Bangladesh, designed and introduced a program to diffuse the technology and concurrently address
demand and supply issues. The role of agrodealers in
Bangladesh continues to evolve and is having a substantial
impact on food security, farmers’ incomes, and the national
budget (box 3.30).
LESSONS LEARNED

IFDC’s long experience in working with agrodealers in
emerging markets throughout the world can help practitioners plan or support similar activities. Key lessons are
summarized below.
■

Box 3.29 Agrodealer Associations Support
Common Interests

The role and benefits of agrodealer associations are
reflected in improvements in four key areas: access
to finance, advocacy, communication, and education. IFDC implemented the Fertilizer Distribution
Improvement (FDI) II project in Bangladesh during 1987–94 with funding from the United States
Agency for International Development. With FDI
II project support, the Bangladesh Fertilizer Association (BFA) was established in June 1994. A decade
and a half later, the BFA is a 7,000-member-strong
association that provides varied services to its
members, including policy advocacy, knowledge
transfer, and improved market transparency.
It is important to avoid dependency on donor
funds for association operations. Long-term survival
requires the association to create a revenue flow that
comes substantially from membership dues.
Source: USAID 1996.
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■

■

Understand the challenge. The agrodealer market environment and challenges faced by farmers differ from
country to country. A key lesson is that a “one-approachserves-all” philosophy does not work. Each intervention
must be tailored to the prevailing conditions in the target
area. Achieving success in agrodealer development
requires a clear understanding of the overall agricultural
input marketing system, the stage of development, and
the influence of macroenvironmental factors at a given
time.
Engage the public agricultural extension service to the
maximum extent feasible and use its extensive networks
to provide knowledge-building services to farmers. A
key lesson is that the extension service, other public officials, and private agrodealers must provide farmers with
a consistent, clear message on the need for and appropriate and safe use of agricultural inputs.
Keep learning practical and interactive. A key lesson is
that agrodealers learn best either through direct, one-onone assistance or through group participation with
hands-on interaction. Study tours in more advanced
markets often are beneficial to build business linkages
and to further awareness and knowledge of technologies
and the advisory role of agrodealers.
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Box 3.30 Diffusion of Fertilizer Deep Placement Technology in Bangladesh

In close collaboration with the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) and private dealers in
Bangladesh, IFDC is supporting the rapid diffusion of
fertilizer deep placement (FDP) technology. Increasing
farmers’ demand for FDP technology and stimulating
the supply and marketing system to improve farmers’
access to the technology are crucial to sustainable success. At the macro level, the focus is on gaining government and donor endorsement of the technology. At the
micro level, the primary focus is on:
■

Creating farmers’ awareness and demand for FDP
technology: Over four cropping seasons, IFDC completed 3,880 farmer training programs, installed
386 technology demonstration plots, completed
109 FDP technology field days, and conducted
67 train-the-trainer programs for DAE staff. Advertising activities included (among others) the installation
of more than 2,000 signboards and billboards, the
development/dissemination of 135,000 technical
brochures and the development of 72 cinema slides.

■

Stimulating supply system development: Over
18 months, IFDC stimulated private entrepreneurs
to invest (on a cost-sharing basis) in 157 FDP product briquette machines. Eighteen training programs
targeting entrepreneurs were conducted. The results
of concurrently addressing demand and supply
issues related to diffusing FDP are impressive (see
table B3.30).
Table B3.30 Impacts of Addressing Supply and
Demand Issues Concurrently in
Diffusing a New Fertilizer
Technology
Rice area under fertilizer deep
placement (FDP) technology
Number of farm families adopting FDP
Incremental rice production
Farm family income increase
Urea fertilizer savings
GOB subsidy reduction

94,380 ha
408,000
24,000 t
US$8 million
7,000 t
US$1.6 million

New urea briquette machines at
dealer level
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Source: IFDC unpublished project documents, 2009–11.

■

■

Duration and continuity are important. A key lesson is
that while one-time interventions in the priority areas
described earlier are beneficial, they are less effective than
longer-term interventions that provide agrodealers with
continued support for development. Both remedial and
more advanced training are important for achieving a
sustainable impact. Program continuity allows for timely
interaction with policy makers and donors.
Foster broad-based stakeholder involvement. Strengthening dealers’ capacity, building knowledge, fortifying
support systems, and establishing business linkages are
essential, but they are not enough to ensure productive
agriculture and sustained economic development. A key
lesson is that broad-based stakeholder involvement is
essential to sustaining progress. It is important to engage

the ministry in charge of agriculture, the public extension service, commercial bankers, donors, and other relevant development agencies to the maximum extent in
agrodealer development initiatives. Establish links with
other projects to achieve synergies when possible. To
achieve an element of ownership, dealers’ cost-sharing is
emphasized when feasible. The feasibility often depends
upon the stage of market development. In seriously
underdeveloped input markets, where demand from
farmers is weak and risks are high, cost-sharing opportunities are quite limited. Dealers lack the resources to
make a significant contribution to development. In more
advanced markets, dealers’ cost-sharing may range from
providing the inputs for technology demonstrations to
covering a portion of the costs involved in field days.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 2

Federating Farmer Field Schools in
Networks for Improved Access to Services
Arnoud R. Braun,Wageningen University
Godrick Khisa, Farmer Field School Promotion Services
Deborah Duveskog, Consultant
Kristin Davis, Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services (GFRAS)

SYNOPSIS

ield school networks, which mostly developed spontaneously, consist of informal or formal groupings of
FFS groups with a common interest that draw their
membership from all the FFSs within a given geographical or
administrative boundary. Common interests at the network
level are mainly marketing, advocacy, sharing information and
experience, access to finance, and representation. From an
innovation systems perspective, the role of extension and
advisory services here is to assist in developing the needed
capacity and linking producers to markets and service
providers. Network operations are supported through subscription fees from constituent FFSs and other sources of
income, such as interest on revolving funds, commissions on
sales, registration fees, profits from input sales, and grants.
Many networks operate a revolving loan system and therefore
generate more funds to support operations and activities.
Although the networks have shown themselves to be sustainable, their strength varies. Management, leadership, and
organizational skills are needed to federate FFS networks.
Networks are also vulnerable to individual motivation and
capacity, since they are mostly managed by voluntary efforts
among members and committee members. The networks that
have been most successful are those with very committed,
dynamic, and democratic leaders. Facilitating the formation of
FFS networks should be considered in large-scale agricultural
projects as a means to make a larger impact and make greater
use of the social capital they generate. Lessons learned from
the networks are that market information, while needed, is not
obtained easily, and that network capacities for financial
management, standards, and use of ICTs must be developed.

F

CONTEXT

Networks of Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) (see box 3.5 in this
module’s Overview) started emerging in East Africa in 2000
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as an unforeseen effect of the IFAD/FAO East African Integrated Pest and Production Management project conducted with the Government of Kenya. The FFS networks
took off because farmers wished to continue with the
dynamics and positive attributes generated by the first
phase of the project, even without external funding. To
date, at least nine FFS networks in Eastern Africa support
about 2,000 FFSs with close to 50,000 direct beneficiaries.
They have no support from the initial project that established the field schools but have established new partnerships and collaboration with other stakeholders.
Definition of an FFS network

FFS networks consist of informal or formal groupings of
FFS groups with a common interest that draw their membership from all the FFSs within a given geographical or
administrative boundary. Each FFS elects one representative
to the higher network level. These networks offer a number
of services to FFS member groups and individual farmers.
The networks are characterized as FFSs clustered in an association or not-for-profit company. They usually have an
elected core executive board and at least three working committees, such as finance and planning, loans, and market
information service. They have a constitution, by-laws, are
registered, and have a bank account. The operations are
supported financially by member FFS through subscription
fees, commission on bulk sales, shares, or profit from the
sale of farm inputs.
Evolution from individual groups into networks

As the number of FFS groups in the program grew and
broadened their level of operation, new challenges and
issues emerged that could not be solved by individual
groups. There were also increased opportunities for the FFS

to take advantage of economies of scale, necessitating
more interaction and coordination. Based on these developments and exchange visits and interactions between
farmers, facilitators, trainers, and project staff in Western
Kenya in early 2000, FFS networks emerged. The networks
were formed mainly by FFS graduates. Aside from taking
advantage of the opportunities just mentioned, the graduates wanted to continue the dynamics generated by the FFS
process—to build local institutions to ensure the continuation of farmer-led FFS and gain a stronger voice in expressing their demand.
The inherent attributes of the FFS approach of cultivating cohesion and a willingness to learn together while solving problems that affect them as a community help to build
their social capital. Common interests at the network level
are mainly marketing, advocacy, sharing information and
experience, access to finance, and representation. There is
therefore no conflict of interest when different FFSs come
together to form the network. As a precursor to transformation, the level of empowerment and organization developed
in an FFS is critical and can have a significant impact on the
marginal returns of a subsistence-based farming system.
This strong cohesion within and among FFS groups is one
of the main factors contributing to the emergence of higherlevel federations1 like the FFS networks.
BENEFITS TO FARMERS, IMPACT,
AND EXPERIENCE

FFS network members state a range of benefits experienced by the networks. Important benefits appear to be
increased voice and power and access to services and markets. Some of these benefits are especially important for
women (box 3.31).
Despite the market barriers experienced by smallholders, the networks have been able to arrange collective marketing with its many advantages. The networks have
assisted in identifying markets and collecting marketing
information. A network-based monitoring and record
system helps group members track the availability and
quantity of their produce, making it possible to plan bulk
sales and negotiate with buyers in advance of harvests. By
selling in larger quantities, FFSs reduce transaction costs,
gain bargaining power, and thus command better prices
for their products. They have also been able to break or
weaken manipulative relationships with market intermediaries and thereby gain access to more lucrative markets for their produce. Obtaining funds from government
programs also appears to be easier for federated FFSs
(box 3.32).

Box 3.31 Gender Issues in FFSs

FFSs have been shown to change gender relationships, mainly because they introduce a formal
group structure but also because they operate
under agreed group norms and rules. All issues
brought to the group are accepted for discussion,
so fewer subjects are off-limits. As a result, the
position of women participating in FFSs has
generally strengthened. In some East African communities, women dominate FFSs. Men are less
interested in working in groups, although in some
cases, they join at later stages of the FFS process.
Source: Authors.

To assist members in access to affordable inputs of reliable quality, such as seed and fertilizer, the networks have
arranged bulk purchases of inputs for resale among members in smaller quantities, thus improving access and reducing costs. Many networks also operate small input kiosks at
their offices.
By joining together, FFSs also gained access to technical
and advisory services not normally available to individual
FFSs or farmers. Government and other extension agents
have been very responsive to requests for assistance by the
networks, because they can reach more people.
Networking acts as a safety net and sustains the FFS
process long after a given project ends. By jointly applying
for/guaranteeing loans for individual members or groups
and helping each other in the development of proposals, the
federations have found it easier to obtain formal credit. Further, a savings fund is in place in most networks from which
individual FFSs can borrow money through informal credit
arrangements.
Finally, farmers appreciate the sharing of information
and experience that networks facilitate. Through connections with other networks, member farmers exchange
technical knowledge and new farming ideas in addition to
benefitting from the social network in terms of mentoring,
encouragement, and a feeling of togetherness. Farmers
attribute their involvement in network activities to the
social bonding and trust building taking place within the
FFS. After networking and strengthening their capacity for
collective action, member of FFSs have in many instances
gained access to governance and policy processes, and they
have also been invited by the government and other service
organizations to represent farmers in official functions.
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Box 3.32 A Kenyan Federation of Field Schools Benefits from Government Programs

As a result of becoming federated, the Kakamega FFS
Network has obtained funds from government programs such as Njaa Marufuku (“ban hunger in Kenya”)
and the Kenya Agricultural Productivity Project
(KAAP), a World Bank-funded program. For example,
the network obtained US$10,000 from the Livelihoods
Diversification and Enterprise Development Fund for
building marketing capacity of network leadership,
developing and introducing a farming-as-a-business
curriculum, establishing a marketing office that uses a
blend of appropriate technology, developing links to
established agricultural commodity exchanges, intro-

ducing financial diversification and the role of credit in
agriculture, and teaching an agricultural planning
process called “plant-to-meet-market.” The network
also received 2.8 million Kenya shillings (K Sh)
(US$40,000) from KAPP for coordinating marketing
activities and agricultural commodity marketing. The
funds were used mainly to purchase computer hardware and software, provide training in agribusiness and
value chain management, and support service
providers. Finally, through the network three FFS
Groups obtained K Sh 120,000 (US$1,715) each for
vegetable production and marketing.

Source: Authors.

SUSTAINABILITY

FFS networks ensure their sustainability in a range of ways.
Financially the operations of the networks are supported
by the constituent FFSs through regular contributions in
the form of subscription fees. Other sources of income
include interest charged on revolving funds, commissions
on bulk network sales, registration fees, fines or penalties,
donations and grants, shares from FFS members, and profits from sales of inputs. Many networks operate a revolving
loan system and therefore generate more funds to cover
operations and fund activities. Some have managed to
secure donor support.
Politically and institutionally the networks can be considered independent of government and development support.
The networks are fully locally grown, owned, and managed.
Donor support, where involved, has provided infrastructure
and education. In no case have donors supported the networks’ recurrent operations. Running of FFSs by FFS networks is one way to reduce the costs of running FFSs; FFS
networks have lower operating costs owing to lower transport costs, lower overheads, and cheaper facilitators (most
are farmer facilitators).
To date the networks have shown themselves to be sustainable; all are still active. Their strength varies, however.
Management, leadership, and organizational skills are
needed to federate FFS networks. Networks are also vulnerable to individual motivation and capacity, since they are
mostly managed by voluntary efforts among members and
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committee members. The networks that have been most
successful are those with very committed, dynamic, and
democratic leaders.
Environmental sustainability is supported by using environmentally sound farming methods. FFS learning revolves
around principles of integrated production and pest management, in which farmers balance the ecological and economic implications of particular practices for their farms
and businesses.

SCALING UP

In most locations where a considerable number of FFSs
have been implemented, FFS networks have spontaneously
emerged. Currently FFS networks operate at different levels
in many districts of East African countries (Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania) and elsewhere in Africa (mainly Sierra
Leone). Most networks have emerged in relatively highpotential (high-rainfall) areas, although some operate in
semiarid and arid areas. As noted, the replication of FFSs is
stimulated by FFS graduates’ wish to continue the dynamics
generated by the FFS process and the recognized need to
build local institutions. Through various modes of information sharing, networking is also promoted when farmers
hear success stories from other places. In East Africa, the virtual network “Linking Local Learners,” which connects
farmer groups and networks online, contributed to the
growth and development of FFS networks.
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The emergence and expansion of FFS networks has
also been attributed to the “foci model”2 adopted for the
establishment of FFSs in East Africa. In this model, successive FFSs are established in the immediate neighborhood of
existing ones to form a cluster. This strategy has enhanced
the frequency of interaction, experience sharing, and the
horizontal flow of information among groups. The model
also reduces the cost of implementing collective activities
because the FFSs can procure inputs and market their
produce in bulk. Facilitating the formation of FFS networks
should be considered in large-scale agricultural projects as
a means to make a larger impact and make greater use of
the social capital they generate.
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

Farmer Field Schools are considered “stepping stones” to
networks, federations, and associations and are an effective
platform for farmer organization and empowerment.
These networks serve an important role for farmers both in
terms of social and technical support. The probability that
networks will form can be increased if projects give attention to the longer-term prospects, if farmer facilitators and
FFS alumni receive follow-up support, and farmer-driven
network development is encouraged.

In the case of the East African FFS networks, market
information clearly was crucial for enhancing farmers’
access to markets. Market information is not always easy
for rural, often illiterate farmers to obtain. Extension advisors often are uncomfortable or incapable of changing their
role from providing technical messages to acting as more of
an information broker. The need to rethink the role of
extension and (re-)train extension agents accordingly, discussed throughout this module, is clear.
Based on needs realized and expressed by networks, there
is a demand for more attention to capacity building in
financial management, marketing, standards and quality,
and the use of ICT tools. Much of the current extension
practice is targeted at improving technical skills, not management skills.
The principle of federating upon graduation must be
incorporated into the curricula of all FFSs. As FFS networks grow and take on more complex initiatives, networks will need investments to acquire and learn to use
ICTs to bridge the information gap, enhance the diversification of business opportunities, and improve operational efficiency. Computer and Internet access and skills
are high priorities. Revolving funds need to be developed
into more sustainable and long-term investments by supporting networks in identifying viable income-generating
activities.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 3

INCAGRO: Developing a Market for
Agricultural Innovation Services in Peru
John Preissing, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

SYNOPSIS

BASIC PROJECT DATA

he INCAGRO project seeks to establish a national
agricultural science and technology system that is
decentralized, pluralistic, demand-driven, and led
by the private sector. The project achieves this objective by
strengthening the market for agricultural innovation services, increasing strategic competencies in agricultural
research for development, and promoting the institutionalization of policies, information, and the quality of innovation services. The most notable innovation of INCAGRO
was the emergence of a demand-driven market for agricultural innovation services that was more extensive and
inclusive than before. This achievement came about as a
result of empowering clients to formulate, cofinance, regulate, implement, monitor, and evaluate extension services
through the mechanisms and tools offered through two
competitive funds. One fund increased the demand and
supply of extension services through competitive bidding,
and the other expanded the number and quality of extension providers. Another innovation of INCAGRO is that it
provided effective national yet decentralized support
through regional offices and a central headquarters. The
potential long-term impact or sustainability of the model
has not been established (more care is needed to document
ex post impacts), but it is clear that with appropriate
backstopping farmers can become authentic drivers of
agricultural extension systems. The competitive grant
funds owed their success to transparent policies and rigorous selection and monitoring. A small staff functioning as
agricultural innovation brokers throughout Peru promoted
efficiency and effectiveness within the agricultural innovation market. Organizational development is needed to
work with underserved groups (and also larger groups of
farmers to decrease administrative costs). The emphasis
must shift to developing a more sustainable system based
on private cost recovery, funding partners, and government
support.

The Innovation and Competitiveness Program for Peruvian Agriculture (INCAGRO, Innovación y Competitividad
para el Agro Peruano) contributed to the development of a
market for agricultural innovation services by paying close
attention to how demand for such services is generated and
how those services are supplied. INCAGRO has led to technical innovations that bolstered production and productivity and institutional innovations that fostered potentially
sustainable models for delivering innovation services.
INCAGRO’s primary partner has been the Ministry of
Agriculture and the national agriculture research and innovation institute (Instituto Nacional de Innovación Agraria)
(financing details are shown in box 3.33).

T
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Box 3.33 Sources of Support for the Innovation
and Competitiveness Program for
Peruvian Agriculture (INCAGRO)

The first phase of the INCAGRO research and
extension program (November 1999–January 2005)
was financed through a World Bank Adaptable Program Loan (US$9.6 million), the Government of
Peru (US$1.44 million), and local counterparts
(US$2.78 million), for a total of US$13.82 million.
The second phase (October 2005–December 2010)
was financed through a second Adaptable Program
Loan (US$25 million) in addition to US$6 million
from the Government of Peru and US$12 million
from local counterparts, for a total of US$43 million. As of this writing, financing for a third phase
remains under review by the Government of Peru
and the World Bank.
Source: Author, based on INCAGRO project documents
and World Bank 2005.

CONTEXT

Peru’s public extension services grew considerably from
the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, but in the years that followed, a range of factors led to their decline. The number
and range of services supplied by Peru’s public extension
system became financially unsustainable owing to government financial limitations, privatization trends, and
the inhibiting presence of the Shining Path guerilla group
(Ortiz 2006). The system was considered too top-down,
too supply-driven in its focus on technology transfer, and
too centralized. Although large-scale commercial producers could still obtain extension services, small and medium
producers came to rely on sporadic support from NGOs.
A common concern with the extension services supplied
by NGOs was that those organizations were not well integrated with the AIS and its knowledge and information
subsystem.
Because the provision of agricultural innovation services
to Peru’s small and medium-sized farmers was particularly
weak, in 1999 the government signed a letter of intent with
the World Bank to promote agricultural innovation through
the Bank’s Adaptable Loan Program in three phases: the
establishment of the innovation system; scaling up the system; and a final consolidation phase (presently under discussion). A key feature of the resulting INCAGRO project is
the use of competitive funding schemes to promote a market for agricultural innovation services.

DEVELOPING A MARKET FOR AGRICULTURAL
INNOVATION SERVICES

INCAGRO’s main objective is to establish a national agricultural science and technology system that is modern,
decentralized, pluralistic, demand-driven, and led by the
private sector. The project’s three components are designed
to achieve this objective by: (1) strengthening the market for
agricultural innovation services; (2) increasing strategic
competencies in agricultural research for development; and
(3) promoting the institutionalization of policies, information, and the quality of innovation services.

Agricultural technology fund: Competitive grants to
improve the demand and supply side of the market
for agricultural innovation services

The Agricultural Technology Fund (Fondo de Tecnología
Agraria, FTA) has financed projects developed by farmer
organizations for support in agricultural extension. Project proposals are based on business plans and use standardized logframes. Independent, three-member panels of

agribusiness leaders rate the proposals and determine
which projects will be funded. The panels may also recommend changes in the content or size of the proposed projects.
The INCAGRO team receives guidance from the evaluation
panels for adjusting proposals with the farmer organizations.
The exercise of developing a business plan, submitting proposals for competitive review, negotiating with INCAGRO
“innovation brokers,” and the follow-up monitoring and
evaluation data demonstrates, particularly to farmers, that a
positive return can be made on the investment in agricultural innovation services.
Proposals range from using innovation services to
improve agricultural production and productivity to using
them to improve agricultural products and agroindustry.
To date, extension service projects covering 40 annual crops,
26 perennial crops, 10 kinds of farm animals, 11 kinds of
fish, and 18 agroprocessing efforts have been funded. Crops
include basic food crops as well as export crops, some raised
organically.
An important aspect of the FTA model is that farmers
own the project. They contract extension providers to complete a specified number of activities. Farmer groups are
required to make a financial contribution in cash, plus
any in-kind contributions. The cash contribution ranges
between 15 and 30 percent of the total costs for extension
projects. Farmers must form legal entities to sign contracts
and receive government support. To meet these requirements, participants must be willing to collaborate, handle
considerable legal paperwork, and have the capacity to manage and implement their projects.
The FTA fund makes it possible for farmer groups to
gain organizational and project development skills by contracting an “ally” (aliado), a private individual or a public or
private agency, to assist in formulating the project proposal,
developing the corresponding business plan, identifying
the right extension supplier, and managing project implementation on behalf of the farmer group (box 3.34 provides an example from the project). An ally is a new but
critical innovation in the development of a functioning
market for extension services. (For more on this concept,
see the discussion of innovation brokers in TN 4.)
Competitive funds have expanded the market for extension service providers through various means. Producer
organizations have hired their own extensionists, contracted
individual private extension providers, signed agreements
with NGOs, and partnered with cooperatives for the provision of extension services. The FTA guidelines for project
proposals support a more holistic approach to agricultural
innovation by including collaborating entities in the project
proposal, such as private input and marketing firms in the
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Box 3.34 An Ally Broadens Farmers’ Skills to
Articulate and Meet Their Demand
for Innovation Services
Through the Agricultural Technology Fund, three
cacao cooperatives in Huánuco Region partnered
with an ally to acquire technical assistance and
training in a project to increase the productivity
of cacao, obtain certification for organic cacao
production, and increase the marketing of their
organic cacao. CAFÉ PERÚ (Central de Organizaciones Productoras de Café y Cacao del Perú)
served as the ally and implementing agency for the
project. The cooperatives received market analysis
and specific training in cooperative management
and product promotion. Starting from zero in
the project’s first year, more than 1,200 producers
had obtained organic certification by the end of
year three. Over the same period, cacao productivity rose from 340 to 600 kilograms per hectare, and
the cooperative markets some 1,500 tons of
organic cacao. Although cacao prices have risen
overall, the productivity increases and the switch
to organic production enabled producers’ returns
to rise from US$ 546 to US$ 1,543 per hectare.
The total project cost was US$ 158,716 over the
three years. INCAGRO staff, along with CAFÉ
PERÚ, played an important role in brokering the
arrangement between national and local partners.
Source: Author, INCAGRO (http://www.incagro.gob.pe).

value chain as well as public agencies. Together, these collaborators form a strategic alliance that is formalized in an
Agreement of Participation. The agreement establishes the
roles and responsibilities of each member of the alliance,
their respective contributions to the project, and the final
disposition of any items obtained as a result of the project.
The idea is that a strong strategic alliance will raise the probability of success.
In addition to developing extension-based projects,
farmer organizations can develop adaptive research projects
to verify the technical and economic suitability of research
findings in the local setting. The research is participatory,
requiring the producer-clients to become involved in identifying problems or opportunities in their fields and
contribute actively during all stages of the research. Producers can use the strategic alliance framework to include other
actors in the value chain as part of the adaptive research
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business plan and use the ally to assist them in implementing the adaptive research project. The research entity can be
a public or private institution or an individual with specific
competencies required for the project. In this case, the
farmer organization must meet 5 percent of project costs.

Strategic Services Development Fund:
Improving the supply side of the market
for agricultural innovation services

The Strategic Services Development Fund (FDSE, Fondo
para el Desarrollo de Servicios Estratégicos) uses competitive matching grants to promote basic and applied strategic
research, focusing on genetic resources, biotechnologies,
plant and animal protection, natural resource management,
postharvest technologies, and conservation agriculture. It is
a demand-driven system (box 3.35 provides examples).
These strategic research areas were defined through national
as well as decentralized workshops, with actors in the value
chain for all of Peru’s major agricultural products, and on
the basis of in-depth studies.
Projects must involve strategic alliances of at least two
major stakeholders in the research. A specific entity must
make the proposal and lead the research; collaborating
research organizations are encouraged and increase the
competitiveness of a proposal. Funding is capped at
US$125,000 per project. Grant recipients must match this
funding by 50 percent or more through actual or in-kind
resources. National, independent, three-member panels
comprised of researchers evaluate proposals for funding.
A second purpose of the FDSE—to improve the supply
of agricultural extension services—has proven useful for
developing service providers. Competitive grants are
awarded to train extension providers to establish extension services; use specific extension methods; learn
particular crop and livestock practices, laboratory procedures, and postharvest storage practices; write and analyze business plans; and conduct market analysis. One
example of how these funds are used is the training given
by the Lambayeque Institute for Agricultural Development to extension providers in how to price and market
their services. Another example is the value chains and
improvements in value chain training on small livestock
in Arequipa by the Institute for Development of the Informal Sector–Arequipa (IDESI, Instituto de Desarrollo del
Sector Informal). Extension training providers have
included cooperatives with their own staff, universities,
national and regional research institutes, and national
and regional NGOs. While this training has been useful
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Box 3.35 Using Competitive Grants to Fund Multiple, Synergistic Innovation Services for a
New Oilseed Crop in Peru

Competitive grants awarded by the Agricultural Technology Funda and Strategic Services Development
Fundb for nine interrelated projects provided extension services for producers, adaptive research, and
strategic research for the development of Sacha Inchi, a
native Amazon oilseed plant with high levels of omega
fatty acids. The projects involved actors all along the
value chain, including the Ministry of Agriculture and
Institute of Peruvian Amazon Research, rootstock
providers, regional producers’ associations, extension
providers, and processing and marketing associations.
Extension services were offered to community-based or
regional producer organizations on improving and

standardizing production, making production of
organic Sacha Inchi more competitive, and improving
producers’ agribusiness skills. These projects reached
450 producers directly. Adaptive research projects
included testing and validating two technology packages, one for organic production methods and the
other for production and processing methods; these
projects had 220 direct and 670 indirect beneficiaries.
The four in-depth strategic research projects focused
on integrated pest management methods, the identification and improvement of genetic lines of Sacha
Inchi, the generation of elite lines, and asexual propagation methods.

Source: Author, INCAGRO (http://www.incagro.gob.pe).
a. Fondo de Tecnología Agraria; b. FDSE = Fondo para el Desarrollo de Servicios Estratégicos.

for improving the quality of the extension services market, it represented just 10 percent of the projects. According to the World Bank (2009), this low percentage reflects
the small number of providers, the weakness of current
and potential training institutions, and a lack of communication between the potential providers and suppliers.
Monitoring, evaluation, and policy development to
support a high-quality market for agricultural
innovation services

A key activity under the third component of INCAGRO has
been to develop an effective project monitoring and reporting system that is agile and robust. For each project, baseline
information is collected as part of the business plan proposal required for submitting the requests for funds. During
the life of each project, data are collected during the “critical
path” steps. At the end of each project, a final financial and
technical report is prepared by the project executor. INCAGRO has developed strong, web-based tools (spreadsheets
and templates) to aid in this analysis. Data for all of the
projects are compiled for analyses by region, crop, type of
intervention, gender, and other critical features.1
Periodic evaluations helped to improve how INCAGRO
is implemented. For example, based on initial findings
from the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group, the
competitive fund strategy was redesigned to ensure that
disadvantaged groups would have greater access to the

competitive funding cycles and have greater success in winning rounds. Stratifying the funds and providing direct
assistance to targeted low-income groups were key features
of INCAGRO’s second phase.
RESULTS AND INNOVATIONS

The most notable innovation of INCAGRO was the emergence of a demand-driven market for agricultural innovation services that was more extensive and inclusive than
before. This achievement came about as a result of empowering clients to formulate, cofinance, regulate, implement,
monitor, and evaluate extension services through the
mechanisms and tools offered by the two competitive funds
(J. Ramirez-Gaston, personal communication, April 19,
2010). The demand and supply of extension services was
increased through the FTA competitive bidding process,
while the number and quality of extension providers
increased through the FSDE.
Another innovation of INCAGRO is that it provides
effective national yet decentralized support through seven
regional offices and a central headquarters. Approximately
60 consultants led or supported the overall project, with an
average of four per regional office (this number has fluctuated over the life of the project, based on competitive funding and activity levels). All INCAGRO staff members are
consultants rather than permanent government employees.
To improve their integration into the ministry, most INCA-
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GRO offices are located at stations of the national agricultural research service, unless they are quite distant from a
city center.
The impact of the individual projects funded by the
grants has been significant, but challenges remain in ensuring a sustainable market for agricultural innovation services. There is no evidence yet that effective, sustained
demand for technical assistance services exists or that the
capacity to pay for these services (through increased
incomes) will suffice to maintain them. In fact, one institutional challenge to the continued market for agricultural
extension is the plethora of providers from NGOs and other
government projects (some also funded by the World Bank)
which provide technical assistance gratis or without competitive funding. Indicators of sustainability are discussed in
the benefits section below.
BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE TO DATE

Two recent evaluations assessed the impact of INCAGRO
(World Bank 2009; Ministry of Agriculture 2009). These
and the INCAGRO database provide information on the
project’s near-term benefits and outcomes, but they are not
conclusive on the potential long-term impact or sustainability of the model. Over eight years of INCAGRO’s implementation, thousands of farmers demanded and received
extension support (table 3.10). Over half of the funds used
in the competitive grant projects came from financing provided by farmers and service providers, though much was in
the form of in-kind contributions.
The two evaluation studies, using nonrandomized samples due to data limitations, reached positive findings on
the project’s impact. The Ministry of Agriculture study
estimated that 56 percent of producers were likely to adopt
the technology innovations, productivity increased by 86
Table 3.10 Measures of INCAGRO Project Output
Projects supported
through grants
Funding cycles: 36
FTA extension projects:
34% to indigenous groups*
12% to women’s groups*
1,211 proposals
330 approved
FDSE extension training:
349 proposals
51 approved

Outreach and funding
72,000 farmers reached
580,000 indirectly affected
16% indigenous population*
5.5% women farmers reached
directly*
US$43.7 million expended
53% from cofinancing
67% used strategic alliances

Sources: INCAGRO (http://www.incagro.gob.pe); Benites and
Wiener 2008.
* Some of these beneficiaries may be indigenous women.
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percent, 77 percent of participants were willing to partially
pay for extension services, the number of extension and
research providers grew by 23 percent, and the diversity
and quality of services increased by 25 percent. The same
study calculated an internal rate of return between 23 and
34 percent, higher than typical returns for agricultural
development projects. The benefit-cost ratio was estimated at two to one, and net present value at US$15 million (2009). Using a different sample, the World Bank
study concluded that the economic rate of return for the
FTA projects was 39 percent. The Bank’s study also reports
that Barrantes et al. (2004) calculated an average economic rate of return of 76 percent for a selected number
of extension projects.
Based on these analyses, INCAGRO appears to have been
a sound investment and successful project. Equity remains a
concern, however: The greatest beneficiaries were mediumto large-scale producers rather than the most disadvantaged
producers, including women. Strategies were adopted in the
second phase to target more vulnerable groups with separate funding, more support, and training. The results of this
effort are not clear, but it has led to a perception that costs
per client have become higher. Finally, while it is possible to
conclude with confidence that the competitive grant projects represented strong investments, INCAGRO itself must
be judged against its broader goal of generating a sustainable model for an agricultural innovation market for extension services.

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

Peru now has many new competitive funding schemes supporting agriculture, including at least two other schemes
managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and others by science and technology and innovation units. In interviews,
these funders credit INCAGRO for much of the success
of competitive funding schemes, including their role in
developing competitive funding strategies; in building
the capacity of producer organizations to follow rigorous
funding protocols and implement projects; preparing a
cadre of professionals that now manage other funds; developing a pool of competent service providers; and creating
competitive funding mechanisms and tools that were
directly adopted by the new funding agencies. These are
actually some of the strongest signs of INCAGRO’s sustainability, if not as a program then as a concept. The long-term
sustainability of individual extension service providers is
not guaranteed through competitive funding schemes, but
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such schemes may represent a sustainable model for extension provision. Quite possibly, future markets for agricultural innovation services will include multiple competitive
funding schemes that seek efficiency and responsiveness on
the part of extension providers and effective demand from
farmers. This model or market may grow, shrink, or change
focus based on who funds it and on what producers
demand of it.
In summary, major lessons and issues have emerged
from INCAGRO. Farmers can become authentic drivers of
agricultural extension systems, but initially they require
professional backstopping (by “allies”). Transparent policies and rigorous selection and monitoring procedures are
keys to the success of competitive grant funds. INCAGRO’s
operating procedures, information systems, and communication strategies were essential. A small number of staff

functioning as agricultural innovation brokers throughout
Peru served to promote efficiency and effectiveness within
the agricultural innovation market. Further, by basing staff
throughout the country, INCAGRO supported national
decentralization goals. Smaller projects dominated the
market for extension services, incurring higher administrative costs. Organizational development is needed to work
with underserved and also larger groups of farmers to
decrease administrative costs (IAP 2). While it is important
to focus on establishing funding cycles and tools, eventually
the emphasis must shift to developing a more sustainable
system based on private cost recovery, funding partners,
and ongoing government support. Finally, more deliberate
care is needed to document ex post impacts, including the
careful and limited use of control groups to reach clearer
conclusions on INCAGRO’s impact.
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Combining Extension Services with Agricultural Credit:
The Experience of BASIX India
Vijay Mahajan, BASIX Group
K. Vasumathi, BASIX Group

SYNOPSIS

ince 1996, BASIX has piloted and scaled up livelihood promotion initiatives in which an integrated
triad of services—financial services, agricultural,
livestock and enterprise development services, and institutional development services—is delivered on a fee-forservice basis. BASIX has reached as many as 3.5 million
poor households across 19 states in India. The emphasis
has been less on increasing agricultural production than on
reducing production costs through a variety of agricultural
and business development services. A thorough analysis
and understanding of particular subsectors (paddy,
groundnut, dairy, and soy, among others) helped identify
opportunities for increasing incomes and develop appropriate products and services. Facilitating linkages with
high-end markets also resulted in a net increase in producers’ incomes. Because products and services were tailored to
customers’ diverse needs, they were willing to pay for
them. The mix of services enabled customers (primarily
the rural poor) to increase their incomes from their crops,
livestock, and other enterprises. While it is widely understood that financial services alone are insufficient for
promoting livelihoods, BASIX provides an innovative
strategy for offering such integrated services in a financially sustainable manner.

S

cattle feed) as well as irrigation pumps and crossbred cattle, but BASIX realized that financial services alone could
not raise farmers’ incomes. Farmers also needed awareness
of better agricultural practices and preventive animal
healthcare to reduce risk and costs. In other words, they
needed a range of agricultural and livestock development
services to gain the knowledge to improve crop and livestock production, mitigate risk, and develop stronger links
to markets.
OBJECTIVE AND DESCRIPTION

BASIX (www.basixindia.com) began in 1996 “to promote a
large number of sustainable livelihoods, including for the
rural poor and women, through the provision of financial
services and technical assistance in an integrated manner.”
BASIX, recognized as a pioneer in livelihood promotion,
now operates in over 40,000 villages across 19 states in India
with more than 3.5 million poor households.
For the first five years, BASIX delivered what it called
“microcredit plus” services to clients. The “plus” components were Technical Assistance and Support Services
(TASS), provided through various programs:
■

CONTEXT

More than 80 percent of India’s roughly 90 million farm
households operate on a small or marginal scale, farming
less than two hectares. Most of them also usually have one
or two buffaloes or cows, reared for milk and dung. Given
that most small-scale and marginal farmers fall below the
poverty line, any improvement in their income will help to
reduce overall poverty in India. Credit can help farmers
obtain yield-enhancing inputs (improved seed, fertilizer,
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■

■

Dryland Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Program (DAPEP). DAPEP introduced new crops or varieties; arranged for inputs such as seed, fertilizer, and
pesticides (including biopesticides); provided extension support for new agronomic practices to cut costs
and increase yields; and arranged for collective transport, processing, and purchase of produce by local
agencies and companies.
Inter Borrower Exchange Program (IBEX). IBEX focused
on the exchange of expertise among borrowers on better
management practices and local innovations.
External Resource Person Advisory Program (ERAP).
ERAP invited experts to serve as resource persons to

deliver advisory services on required topics and practices.
Self Help Group Quality Improvement Program
(SHGQIP). A microfinance agent model for promoting
self-help groups was tested under this program.
Rural Infrastructure Revival (RIR). Local community
resources were activated to rehabilitate lift irrigation, the
electricity supply, milk chilling plants, and other infrastructure.

(See TN 2, which discusses the need for financial services, and
IAP 2, which explains how to build strong federations of
farmer groups to obtain better services.) In 2002, BASIX
developed a “livelihood triad” strategy to provide comprehensive livelihood promotion services to poor rural households.
Box 3.36 describes how services evolved for one particular
subset of clients.

These programs delivered services on a full grant basis
or 50:50 or 75:25 cost sharing by customers and BASIX,
depending on need and customers’ willingness to pay.
Under the triad strategy described in the next section, these
services evolved into the services listed in table 3.11.

As mentioned, the livelihood triad strategy includes the
provision of financial inclusion services; agricultural, livestock and enterprise development services; and institutional development services detailed in table 3.11. Under
Agricultural, Livestock, and Enterprise Development
(AGLED) services, BASIX currently provides services to
farmers growing several crops (cotton, groundnuts, soybeans, pulses, paddy rice, chilies, vegetables, mushrooms)
(box 3.37) and lac (a form of organic resin) and producing
milk and livestock (poultry, sheep, and goats).
Nonfarm business development services are also provided
for selected activities such as tailoring, woodworking, bamboo work, retail stores, and niche handicrafts and handlooms. An example of the need for institutional development
services beyond financial assistance is given in box 3.38.

■

■

RATIONALE FOR BASIX’S TRIAD STRATEGY

In 2001, BASIX asked the Indian Market Research Bureau, an
independent external agency, to assess the impact of BASIX
among recipients of its services. Only 52 percent of customers
who had received at least three rounds of microcredit had significantly improved their incomes, compared with a control
group who received no credit. Income levels did not change
among 25 percent of customers; 23 percent reported a decline.
BASIX carried out a detailed study of those who had experienced no increase or a decline in income and concluded that
this outcome arose from unmanaged risk, low productivity,
and limited access to markets, combined with poor terms for
buying inputs and selling output. The analysis clearly identified several needs: to improve farmers’ productivity, offer services to mitigate risk, improve producers’ links to markets,
and organize producers to gain a stronger bargaining position.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

ACHIEVEMENTS

Today BASIX works in more than 40,000 villages through a
network of over 250 branches, each with five field executives under a team leader. Each field executive supervises five
livelihood service advisers (LSAs). Each LSA covers about
10 villages, originating credit, selling insurance, collecting

Table 3.11 Services Included in the BASIX Livelihood Triad
Financial inclusion services
Savings (directly in districts where
BASIX has a banking license and
through other banks elsewhere)
Credit: agricultural, allied, and nonfarm,
short and long term
Insurance for lives and livelihoods,
including index-based weather
insurance for crops
Money transfer, for migrant workers
Experimental products such as
micropensions and warehouse receipts

Agricultural, livestock, and
enterprise development services

Institutional development services

Improved productivity through higher
yields from improved seed or practices

On an individual level, develop awareness,
skills, and entrepreneurship

Improved productivity through cost reductions

Form producer groups, federations, cooperatives

Risk mitigation (other than insurance), such as
livestock vaccinations

Functional training in accounting and management
information systems, using information
technology
Build collaboration to deliver a wide range
of services
Sector and policy work: analysis and advocacy
for changes and reforms

Local value addition, such as processing cotton
into lint (fiber) before selling
Alternative market linkages: input supply and
output sales

Source: Vijay Mahajan, BASIX.
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Box 3.36 BASIX Services for Groundnut Farmers in Andhra Pradesh: From Financial Services
to Livelihood Triad Services

In 2001–03, BASIX was working in Anantapur District,
which had 700,000 groundnut farmers, with support
from ICICI Bank. Based on recommendations from
research institutes,a the program introduced droughttolerant cultivars and agronomic practices to reduce the
effects of drought, but three years of severe drought
dashed efforts to raise groundnut yields. BASIX had
greater success with improving groundnut marketing.
BASIX formed a farmer cooperative and facilitated it
to lease a local factory to shell groundnuts—an activity
formerly done by intermediaries. This value-adding step
enabled farmers to sell their produce at a higher price.
Women’s self-help groups bought groundnuts produced
under irrigation in the rabi (winter) crop cycle and
processed them for sale. Large hand-processed nuts
were sold as seed for the upcoming kharif (summer
monsoon) crop cycle, and smaller ones were sold for
bird feed.

These interventions offered little for rainfall-dependent farmers affected by drought, however. Dairy production was promoted as an alternative livelihood strategy
in 2003. BASIX identified villages to form milk collection routes, educated farmers in dairy farming, helped
villagers grow fodder where some irrigation sources
were available, and negotiated linkages with nearby
bulk chilling centers established by the Andhra Pradesh
Dairy Development Cooperative Federation. The market
linkages facilitated with the federation led to the revival
of chilling centers in Kalyandurg and Kannekal. Chilling center capacity increased from 2,000 liters to 10,000
liters. Outreach to women, for whom dairy became a
primary livelihood activity, increased. Migration from
the area declined. Many such efforts have led to the
BASIX “livelihood triad” of services (financial inclusion
services; agricultural, livestock, and enterprise development services; and institutional development services).

Source: S. Amarnath and K. Vasumathi, BASIX.
(a) The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics and the Central Research Institute for Dryland
Agriculture.

Box 3.37 AGLED Services for Mushroom Cultivation

BASIX seeks to enhance clients’ awareness of good
practices related to their investments. One example is
the fee-based Mushroom Development Services Package, which BASIX offers to customers who have sufficient space to raise mushrooms as an additional source
of livelihood. The package includes:

■

A review of the primary requirements for mushroom cultivation. A suitable location and the use of
specific materials are key factors for good mushroom production.
Mushroom bed installation (including straw-cutting techniques, soaking straw in water, preparing
the bed using spawn and feeding material), aftercare
for optimum production, identification of poisonous mushrooms, and precautions to be taken.

■

■

■

■

■

An assessment of mushroom beds for progress
of mycelium growth. Training is provided to conduct regular inspections of beds to ensure regular
growth of mycelium, avoid losses, and enhance
production.
Training in measures to mitigate the effects (and
risks) of high temperatures and low humidity.
Training in producing two value-added products. It
can sometimes be difficult to sell raw mushrooms.
Value-added products such as mushroom pickles
and soup always fetch higher prices and increase
profits for producers.
Input market linkages for spawn and polythene.
BASIX helps customers identify sources of good
spawn and facilitates the procurement of polythene
and spawn.

Source: Tapaskumar Pati, BASIX.
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Box 3.38 Contract Farming for Potato:
The Need for Strong Farmer
Organizations
BASIX became involved with financing the potato
value chain in Jharkhand in 2005. PepsiCo was
already buying potatoes from some farmers in
Jharkhand but on a very limited scale. It
approached BASIX to facilitate contract potato
farming on a larger scale. BASIX had strengthened
its capacity as a facilitator and subsequently helped
negotiate contracts between PepsiCo and smallscale potato farmers to supply agreed quantities
of potatoes at a specified quality and price to
PepsiCo’s chip-making factory in Kolkata.
Although in the first years the contract resulted in
increased yields and higher incomes for farmers, in
later years farmers’ yields were affected by problems with seed quality, heavy disease infestations,
and unfavorable weather. Sometimes their potatoes were rejected at the factory because of poor
quality, and other times they resorted to the open
market, where they obtained better prices. Clearly
the partners needed more than finance to continue
their association productively. BASIX invested in
strengthening the relationships with partner
organizations and the farming community to
ensure that contracts operated fairly.
Source: Mishra 2008.

payments, and selling AGLED services. Repayment schedules
depend on the crop, cropping season, and household cash
flows and range from 6 to 11 months and 1–3 installments.
BASIX has more than 4,000 LSAs.
BASIX field executives identify and select villages or
clusters of villages to receive services. A cluster is a group of
villages within a radius of 6–8 kilometers, which offers a
reasonable base for delivering services effectively and efficiently to customers. The branches start enrolling customers
for services in villages where at least 30 borrowers engage in
either crop or livestock activities.
BASIX has a cadre of over 1,000 livelihood services
providers (LSPs). While LSAs function as salespeople, LSPs
resemble extension agents. An LSP works with BASIX on a
regular basis and is typically a high-school graduate trained
as a para-extension worker or para-veterinarian. He or she
covers 200–400 customers for one crop or activity. More
than 10 percent of the LSAs and over 15 percent of the LSPs

are women. BASIX distributes product brochures in
regional languages telling customers what services they can
receive and explaining the service conditions. Customers
pay 450 rupees (Rs) (US$10), including a service tax, for a
year of AGLED services.
In 2010, AGLED services had over half a million customers.
About half of them used agricultural and livestock services,
and the remainder used services related to nonfarm activities.
Among the agricultural services, BASIX provided a soil-testing
service for more than 30,000 farmers, integrated pest management or integrated nutrient management services to nearly
160,000 crop customers, and field surveillance to more than
85,000 farmers. It connected most customers to input markets
(seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and bio-inputs such as vermicompost and organic pesticide) and output markets. BASIX
provided index-based weather insurance to more than 10,000
farmers for different crops in different agroclimatic zones in
2009, in collaboration with private insurance companies.
BASIX also conducted health checkups of nearly 450,000
animals, vaccinated nearly 165,000, and dewormed 200,000
animals. It trained more than 170,000 customers in feed,
fodder, and other improved practices for dairying. More
than 60,000 farmers were linked to milk marketing chains
supported by cooperatives or private companies. More than
120,000 animals were insured in collaboration with private
companies.

LESSONS LEARNED

It has taken BASIX about seven years to reach the scale
described, and it has learned many lessons along the way.
Lessons that may prove useful for similar initiatives are
summarized here.
■

It is vital to respond proactively to farmers’ needs.
In its first two years, BASIX emphasized market
research to identify which services farmers needed. The
organization also conducted action-research through
many pilot interventions. This research, which featured
numerous field visits and group interactions with
farmers, showed that small-scale farmers preferred
cost-saving and risk-reducing interventions over yieldenhancing interventions requiring greater cash outlays.
BASIX also learned that it was not possible to handle
such interventions for a large number of crops, so it
focused on a few crops grown by a large number of
farmers, such as groundnuts in southern Andhra
Pradesh, cotton in northern Andhra Pradesh, and soybeans in western Madhya Pradesh.
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In designing services, focus on reducing costs. Productivity can be increased by raising yields as well as by
reducing the costs of producing the same amount of output. Local agricultural universities and research stations
had developed many practices for increasing yields, so
BASIX decided to focus on reducing costs. One example
of this approach was to apply pesticide on cotton stems
to reduce pest multiplication and reduce pesticide applications later in the season. Another example was the
introduction of soil testing to enable more precise, economical fertilizer use. For dairy animals, simple practices
like vaccination and periodic deworming were more
cost-effective than procuring high-yielding crossbred
animals.
Customized services enhance willingness to pay. BASIX
staff learned how to customize AGLED services to different agroclimatic zones, which enhanced farmers’ willingness to pay for services. Customer satisfaction surveys
conducted by independent audit teams found that the
satisfaction level was nearly 80 percent; the main cause of
dissatisfaction was inadequate visits from LSPs. To
improve service, field executives introduced tighter monitoring of service delivery through passbooks, acknowledgement receipts, and service cards, but this practice
was expensive. BASIX is piloting a strategy to monitor

■

service delivery through mobile phones so farmers can
report LSPs for poor service or missed visits.
Sustainability and extension of services to larger farmers.
The income from AGLED services in 2010 was nearly
Rs 148 million (US$3 million). BASIX made a modest profit
(nearly Rs 22 million or US$450,000) by providing these
services to over half a million customers. With more LSPs
reaching the breakeven number of customers, profitability
is likely to improve. BASIX also plans to move some basic
facilities like soil-testing labs and artificial insemination centers under its own control to improve its service to farmers.

Although BASIX agricultural credit operations are aimed
at small-scale and marginal farmers, the organization plans
to extend AGLED services to larger farmers to whom it does
not extend credit in the same villages. In improving their
yields, these farmers will generate additional production as
well as employment opportunities for the landless poor,
outcomes aligned with the BASIX mission. So far BASIX has
worked mainly in poorer dryland districts. It is considering
providing AGLED services in irrigated districts and for
large-scale farmers where it has no credit operations
through its new BASIX Krishi company. With these changes,
BASIX is confident of reaching two to three million farmers
with AGLED services by 2015.
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NOTES
Module 3 Overview

1. It is useful to have a conceptual and analytical framework for implementing and analyzing extension reforms
with a focus on pluralistic extension. Such a framework
has been developed by a multidisciplinary group of
researchers, and it distinguishes four sets of factors that
need to be considered: the policy environment, the capacity of potential service providers, the type of farming systems and the market access of farm households, and the
nature of the local communities, including their ability to
cooperate. The analytical framework then “disentangles”
the major characteristics of agricultural advisory services
for which policy decisions must be made (“choice variables”): governance structures, capacity, management,
organization, and advisory methods. Implementation of
the resulting extension programs and reforms should focus
on “best fit” rather than “best practice.” For more information see Birner et al. (2009).
2. Many of the points in the table and this section are
based on Birner et al. (2009).
3. These strategies and lessons are relevant for other advisory service programs; for more information, see Braun and
Duveskog (2009) and Davis et al. (2010a).
4. See the discussion of the scaling-up tool developed by
ZALF (the Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape
Research), described in Herberg and Schoening (2010).
Thematic Note 1

1. Farm Radio International (www.farmradio.org), an
NGO that reaches millions of rural people, is one example.
Thematic Note 2

1. Others refer to these services as “value chain oriented
services” (KIT, Faida Mali, and IIRR 2006; Webber and
Labaste 2010), “Market-Oriented Agricultural Advisory
Services” (Chipeta, Christoplos, and Katz 2008), and
“marketing extension” (FAO, http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/
agricultural-marketing-linkages/marketing-extension/
en).
2. These actors have (re-)discovered the need to address
small-scale farmers’ demands; see, for example, the
roundtable for a sustainable cocoa economy (www.roundtablecocoa.org) and the sustainable spices initiative
(http://www.kit.nl/spiceconference).
3. “Republic of Mozambique: Country Programme Evaluation, IFAD http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/

eksyst/doc/country/pf/mozambique/index.htm, accessed
July 2011.
4. KIT and IIRR (2012). Women’s skills and techniques can
be assets for entrepreneurship, and services should be tailored to their circumstances as individual entrepreneurs and
within groups. Capacity-building strategies and programs
with a gender focus are helpful (Kahan 2007: 90-92).
5. A priority of AFAAS (www.afaas-africa.org).
6. Examples include sesame, peppers, and organic and Fair
Trade produce (Jaleta, Gebremedhin, and Hoekstra 2009;
Kristjanson et al. 2009).
7. AgriProfocus (http://www.agri-profocus.nl) fosters concerted efforts by public and private agencies to support
smallholders’ farming entrepreneurship.

Innovative Activity Profile 1

1. This IAP focuses primarily on agrodealers who continuously engage in supplying inputs. In reality, businesses
that supply agro-inputs operate on a seasonal basis in many
emerging markets. They often sell inputs as complementary products to their core general merchandise business.
Subdealers, or “stockists,” play a key role in improving
farmers’ access to inputs. This IAP focuses on agrodealers and only alludes to the development of subdealers/
stockists.
2. Macroenvironmental factors (in particular the government's role in a country) substantially influence agrodealer
participation in agricultural input markets.
3. The terms “value chain” and “agricultural input supply
and marketing chain” are considered synonymous in this
IAP. For consistency, this IAP uses the more contemporary
“value chain” terminology.
4. Activities are varied and may include lectures, group
discussions, role-playing, case studies, problem solving,
hands-on analysis (such as the use of soil test kits), individual and group presentations, special studies to design
promotional programs, observation/hands-on applicationn of agricultural inputs, product displays, and videos,
among others.

Innovative Activity Profile 2

1. Federations in this paper are defined as farmer organizations that have emerged from bottom-up empowerment
processes (such as the training of farmers’ groups), leading
to a higher level of organization at a given administrative or
geographical level.
2. Growing from a nucleus outwards.
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Innovative Activity Profile 3

1. Information on INCAGRO’s subproject management
and M&E tool (SIGES, Sistema de Gestión de Sub Proyectos)
is available at http://www.incagro.gob.pe/WebIncagro/
detalleArticulosBanner.do?c_codigoArticulo=000166.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

nvesting in agricultural research within an AIS framework complements the traditional internal focus on
capacity and research priorities with an external
emphasis on better articulation of client demand and
effective institutional partnerships. Agricultural research
as a producer of new knowledge requires effective institutional arrangements to apply that knowledge. The types of
organizations and nature of these partnerships in the generation of innovation will depend on the market orientation of the agricultural sector and private investment in
agro-industry. In urban and transforming economies,
these institutional partnerships will tend to focus on
research linkages to agricultural input or processing
industries, often within the frame of public-private partnerships, including technology transfer arrangements, and
often facilitated by public financing arrangements. Such
research linkages to the private sector and other actors
will tend to be organized around clusters, and financing
will often be in the form of competitive grants with cofinancing from the private sector.
In agrarian economies, on the other hand, external
connectivity of research is primarily through bridging
organizations, particularly extension services, farmer associations, trade associations, and NGOs, and farmer demand is
articulated through nonmarket mechanisms with farmer

I

representation. The latter tend to involve novel organizational
arrangements, such as farmer councils and innovation platforms, new methodologies, organizational change within
research institutes, and financing arrangements that support
the increased transactions costs inherent in improved external
connectivity. Farmer participation in the codesign of innovations is characteristic of these organizational arrangements,
and it may be facilitated by innovation brokers. Financing is
almost solely based on public sources and will tend to be
organized around research foundations or agricultural
research councils. There is an inherent tendency for research
within an AIS to focus on market-driven applications, often
within a value chain framework, and particular strategies are
required to ensure that research continues to contribute to the
reduction of rural poverty.

RATIONALE FOR INVESTMENT

As the globe enters a period of increasing constraints on
land, water, and nutrient supplies, a tight balance between
food supply and demand, and the certainty of climate
change, new knowledge from agricultural research systems
will be essential to maintain growth in agricultural productivity and in world food supplies. Locating agricultural
research within an AIS is a means of heightening the performance of research systems through improved articulation
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with demand, more effective, better-differentiated institutional partnerships, and better market integration.
An innovation systems framework adds a set of new
dimensions to the investment in agricultural science and
technology. An AIS framework focuses attention on: (1) an
expanded range of technologies (particularly postharvest
and mechanical) provided by a differentiated set of suppliers; (2) demand responsiveness, particularly better connectivity and interaction of agricultural research with actors
beyond farmers; and (3) adaptation to and facilitation of
organizational innovations in credit, markets, insurance,
farmer groups, and extension services.
The reframing of technological innovation coincides with
the emphasis on market-led approaches for smallholder
development, which have emerged in the wake of structural
adjustment and market liberalization in the 1990s. Orienting
research to markets, often through work in specific value
chains, has become a principal vehicle for delivering new
technologies and for combining them with the organizational and institutional innovations that so often accompany
technical change in the agricultural sector.
In this sense, an AIS approach represents a relatively evolutionary form of institutional change in agricultural
research, with a particular focus on enhancing the research
system’s external responsiveness. Yet improved responsiveness in the short term must be balanced with the investment
strategies needed over the long term for a research system to
be productive. In the process of balancing these short- and
long-term imperatives, research organizations will arrive at
a better alignment between internal research capacities and
external partnerships and consortiums, increasingly with
the private sector.

PAST EXPERIENCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH

Investment strategies for agricultural research over the past
three decades have gone through a series of approaches,
often requiring major organizational restructuring. Research
restructuring has been much more pervasive in small
countries than in large, which has given systems such as
EMBRAPA in Brazil continuity in addition to significant levels of investment. The sections that follow describe these various approaches to investing in agricultural research.
Building national agricultural research institutes

Broadly defined, the 1980s and early 1990s were the period
of the national agricultural research institute (NARI), when
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research units distributed throughout ministries of agriculture and other ministries were brought under a single, independent administrative structure. The assumptions ruling
this restructuring were that economies of scale and scope
could be achieved in agricultural research, budgetary
resources allocated much more efficiently, and personnel
policies freed from public civil service bureaucracy. Large
countries such as Brazil and India developed a complex federal and state system of national research institutes, state
agricultural universities, and state research institutes. Donor
investment in agriculture was at an historical high, at least
in percentage terms. The CGIAR network of international
agricultural research centers expanded, and donors led by
the World Bank and USAID funded programs that focused
on training, infrastructure development, and program formulation within the newly formed NARIs.

From national research institutes
to research systems

The dominance of the NARI gave way quite quickly in the
late 1990s to reform based on the development of more
pluralistic, decentralized systems, in which research funding and execution were separated, often through a competitive grants modality. The intent was to move away
from reliance on a single research institution and toward
the development of a broader-based national agricultural
research system (NARS). At the same time, support for
agriculture in aid budgets was declining, and domestic fiscal budgets came under pressure from structural adjustment. The rapidly growing Asian economies could support
agricultural research from expanding tax revenues, and in
Latin America market liberalization allowed greater participation of the private sector. In Africa, however, the reform
of NARIs took place amid severely restricted budgets, often
within a small-country context. The World Bank remained
virtually the only donor investing in national agricultural
research. Selective investment caused a few relatively strong
NARSs to develop, leaving a majority of systems with limited capacities.

Decentralization and participatory research

This period also saw the rise of participatory research and
the recognition that NARIs had to become more responsive to demand. Improved responsiveness was the principal
justification for reforms that decentralized management
within NARIs and created autonomous research councils.
The councils, which often had farmer representation,
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now controlled the funding decisions (World Bank 2006),
but their effectiveness varied greatly. Many had a narrow
representation of stakeholders, consisting primarily of ministerial representatives or researchers, and their research
prioritization process was not necessarily consistent and
rigorous. The councils often had little influence on the policy process and how research was conducted. Many did not
separate funding allocation and implementation effectively
(see module 1). Decentralization was already a feature of
large federal systems, but it involved significant tradeoffs in
small systems. Scale economies in areas such as plant
breeding were sacrificed, and operational budgets were
directed to more adaptive research.
Shifting funding

Shifting funding to competitive grants had different
impacts depending on the capacity of the research system.
In larger systems with strong capacity, competitive mechanisms were used to improve research quality. Larger
research systems used competitive grants to provide funding based on scientific peer review. They particularly aimed
to: focus scientists’ efforts on high-priority research or new
fields of expertise; improve the relevance and quality of
agricultural research, extension, and training; promote
research partnerships and leverage research resources; and
help to develop a more efficient and pluralistic research system (World Bank 2010). In smaller research systems, where
financial constraints already limited core capacity, competitive grants were often used as a mechanism for farmers to
articulate their demands for research more clearly, and
farmers would participate in the grant review process. Such
mechanisms reinforced the shift to adaptive research.
The use of competitive grants tended to undermine longterm strategic planning, however. A new crop variety can
take ten years or more to develop; so does a locally adapted
conservation agriculture system or a system to manage animal disease. The longer-term nature of agricultural research
has produced significant debate on the extent to which
research systems can respond to demand by allocating
resources (often based on contestable funding mechanisms)
to applied research as opposed to allocating resources (core
funding) through longer-term strategic planning in relation
to priority needs in the agricultural sector.1 According to
World Bank (2009, xii–xiii), a review of four World Bank
projects in Latin America that employed competitive grant
schemes for agricultural research,
A principal lesson concerns the importance of strengthening
the capacity of research organizations, not just financing

research. Competitive funds can be an important vehicle for
research financing and have a strategic role to play in piloting new ways of working, or focusing research on new topics; but they are most likely to make a sound and lasting
contribution when they complement a relatively strong
public sector framework for research (in this respect,
prospects were brighter to begin with in Brazil and Colombia than they were in Nicaragua and Peru). Public funding
is essential for agricultural innovation systems and private
funding complements rather than substitutes for higher levels of public funding.

In Latin America, small-country systems became much
more reliant on research outputs from CGIAR centers and
spillins from private sector sources globally. Some countries
even terminated public agricultural research altogether.
Efforts to building core research capacities in sub-Saharan
Africa, Central America, and the smaller South American
countries got lost during this period of restructuring. In
Africa, core research capacities remain largely underdeveloped after three decades of experimentation. While African
governments committed themselves to increasing investment in agriculture to 10 percent of the overall national
budget, by 2009 only a few countries had met the target.2
Limited operational funding

Operational funds are vital to research that results in interaction with rural communities outside the research station
(on-farm adaptive research, multilocational testing networks, participatory plant breeding, disease surveillance
programs, and soil fertility trials, for example). Because soil
and biotic constraints are more severe in farmers’ fields, carrying out research in farmers’ conditions increases the relevance of the results.
The lack of operational funds is the first most binding
constraint on the productivity of agricultural research, and
the shortage of funds was particularly binding in Africa,
where it limited the demand articulation that decentralization was supposed to provide. Ensuring access to operational
funds is essential for research performance, but where budgets are highly constrained, such funding is the first to be cut
to assure salaries, station running costs, and maintenance of
core resources such as germplasm banks. Productive scientists
are usually those who obtain external funds at the expense of
the integrity of the overall research program.
The small-country problem

There remained a pervasive sense, especially among bilateral
and multilateral investors, that agricultural research in the
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public sector was not meeting the performance standards
that were expected. This perception tended to apply to
research systems in smaller countries with little private sector capacity in agricultural research and with systemic market constraints.
Agricultural research in this context faces what is best
termed a “small-country problem,” in which limited market
size, constraints on achieving economies of scope and scale,
constrained fiscal budgets, and ineffective farmer demand
for new technologies significantly limit the productivity
of research. Research capacity is needed even to borrow
technology, and in some conditions, technology can rarely
even be borrowed. In sub-Saharan Africa, the potential for
international spillins is very often limited because of the
crops that are grown (they are not widely grown elsewhere)
and the particular constraints on farmers’ productivity
(Pardey et al. 2007). Improving institutional performance
under such circumstances is difficult, but the justification
for investing in research in agrarian economies remains very
strong, because agriculture remains the engine of growth
for the overall economy.

Support to subregional research

One approach to the small-country problem, particularly
in Africa, was to organize agricultural research at the subregional level to achieve scale economies and organize
spillins efficiently. Since the late 1990s, many donors have
shifted funding into subregional research organizations
and the regional apex body (the Forum for Agricultural
Research in Africa) and away from NARSs (see TN 3 on
regional research). Initially subregional research organizations became a mechanism for coordinating regional
research undertaken by CGIAR centers, but since the mid2000s they have been a mechanism to “retail” research
grants to national programs. The lost connection with
international research centers left no framework to
develop scale economies in these regional approaches,
although two large projects funded by the World Bank (the
East Africa Agricultural Productivity Project and West
Africa Agricultural Productivity Project) were partially
designed with that goal in mind. In Africa, the centralization represented by subregional organizations further
diminishes farmers’ ability to articulate demand (Sumberg
2005) in a context where the prospect of spillins is quite
small, agroecologies extremely diverse, and the commodity structure of the food system very heterogeneous
(Pardey et al. 2007).
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Key lessons from reforms

Possibly the most important lessons drawn from attempts
at restructuring agricultural research are:
■

■

■

■

■

One size does not fit all. Context and path dependence
matter in the design of an agricultural research system.
The productivity of agricultural research differed significantly between large and small countries and between
countries with well-functioning market economies and
those without.
Some period of consolidation was necessary for
researchers to adapt to reorganization.
Leadership was a crucial factor in NARIs that performed
well.
The lack of sustainable funding and weak capacity continued to limit the performance of agricultural research
institutes in small countries.

The shift in investment in agricultural research from a
focus on NARIs to a focus on NARSs and subregional
research organizations took place as markets were liberalized, civil society expanded, and collective action increased
in rural economies. To a significant degree, these developments were preconditions for investing in agricultural
research within an AIS framework. One framework for
needs assessment for agricultural research systems argues
to (1) get the resources right, (2) get the priorities right,
(3) get the linkages right, and (4) get the incentives right
(Howard Elliott, personal communication). In an AIS, the
investment framework shifts to focus on linkages and
incentives and on identifying where further organizational
change is oriented to external responsiveness. Whether this
reorientation at this early period in the development of
AISs can produce self-correcting change in both resource
and capacity constraints is still largely untested, at least for
research systems in small countries. The rest of this
overview will focus on the evolving practice of undertaking agricultural research within an AIS framework.
RESEARCH WITHIN AN AIS

Knowledge and information are the engines of an AIS, and
a market economy provides the incentives to search for
improved products and processes that lead to overall gains
in productivity within the agricultural economy. In many (if
not most) agricultural economies in the developing world,
however, resources, capacity, and market constraints retard
the development and functionality of innovation systems
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for agriculture. The World Development Report 2008 (World
Bank 2007) differentiates between agrarian, transforming,
and urbanized economies:
■

■

■

Agrarian economies are almost always relatively small,
mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, depend primarily on staple food crop production, and rely on agriculture for
their economic growth. Their agricultural markets are
not well integrated, transport and logistics are costly, and
private investment in rural areas is still limited.
Transforming economies, including China and India, are
mostly in Asia, where economic growth is now led by the
industrial sector and the economy is rapidly urbanizing.
Growing urban demand, especially for higher-value
products such as livestock and horticultural crops, is
resulting in structural shifts in the agricultural economy.
Even so, large areas of the rural economy still have high
poverty rates and are not integrated into the growth
process.
Urbanized economies have most of their population in
urban areas, are primarily located in Latin America, and
the agricultural sectors are well integrated into global
markets. Poverty is principally an urban problem.

Compared to the agrarian economies, transforming and
urbanized economies invariably have better developed
transport infrastructure and agricultural markets, a larger
and more vibrant private sector, deeper R&D capacity, more
effective agricultural institutions, and greater investment in
ICT. These in turn are some of the preconditions for more
functional innovation systems, particularly systems driven
by expanding opportunities in more dynamic agricultural
markets.
The sections that follow describe the contrasting roles
of research and AISs in well-functioning market contexts
and underdeveloped market contexts. A discussion of AIS
approaches used to promote technological innovation is
followed by an overview of key policy issues related to
agricultural research in an AIS context, evolving areas of
investment, and approaches for monitoring, evaluating,
and scaling up agricultural research within an AIS.

Well-functioning markets and AISs

The functionality of an AIS rests on increasing connectivity
within a widening organizational “matrix” in the agricultural sector. A growing private sector, increasing commoditization, and expanding market opportunities lead to an

increasing array of organizations to promote their interests,
most often in relation to government policy but also in relation to establishing norms of operation within their respective subsectors.
The proliferation of formal seed, chemical, and fertilizer
associations, agroprocessing associations (for example, the
Thai Tapioca Trade Association), animal feed milling associations, and commodity organizations (in module 1, the
overview as well as TNs 3 and 4 provide examples) (from
wheat and oilseed milling to horticultural exports) reflects
the higher and more concentrated end of the value chain. In
higher-value commodity chains, farmer organizations usually form around a particular commodity and often build
off of cooperatives (dairy industries and the Colombian
coffee federation are two examples). Such an organizational
matrix balances competition with cooperation and organized collective action to further the interests of the subsector.
Information flows are good: The subsector’s needs are easily
articulated, and appropriate institutional linkages and
arrangements formulated, usually on a task basis.
At this stage of market development in the agricultural
sector, an AIS is self-organizing. Public sector research has
to be very responsive and flexible indeed, primarily to needs
articulated through input-supply or agroprocessing firms,
or it will quickly become an anachronism.

Innovation systems and the shift
to a market context

As farmers integrate into the market economy, they rely
more on inputs as a source of increased productivity and
sell an increasing percentage of their production. Often they
first diversify into higher-value crops and then specialize in
particular production activities. Such intensification is facilitated by a widening array of innovations provided through
markets for inputs and agricultural services. These innovations increasingly respond to changing urban demand, both
for specific commodities and for specific quality characteristics in commodities.
Public agricultural research has continually wrestled with
the issue of how to be more responsive to demand and, in a
modernizing agricultural economy, how to balance farmers’
needs with improved consumer acceptance. For example, in
plant breeding and seed systems, seed companies are the
translation point in the seed value chain between farmers’
production constraints (how to produce a seed that farmers will buy) and consumers’ quality requirements (if consumers and marketing agents want the product, then their
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preference feeds back to farmers in the form of a price premium for the commodity/variety). Plant breeding innovation by seed companies bridges the interests of producers
and consumers, but only within a functioning, competitive
seed market.
Private research capacity develops principally where
agricultural markets function well, as in Latin America and
Asia, especially in the large countries with their large markets. As agricultural economies modernize and the private
sector becomes more active in funding its own agricultural
research, innovation turns more to the application of frontier science, and public research tends to support private
companies by developing new products (hybrid rice, for
example) or supporting private sector research.
In agriculture, molecular biology and genomics represent this kind of frontier science, which is often supported
through competitive grant schemes and in which universities often have a comparative advantage. For example,
India’s National Agricultural Innovation Project (NAIP)
has a competitive grant scheme that funds innovation clusters around more basic research with potential applications
of interest to the private sector. In Thailand, similar efforts
are led by the Ministry of Science and Technology through
its National Innovation Agency and BIOTEC program;
they also focus on funding clusters of research and related
applications. In addition, BIOTEC has set up two independent research programs, the Rice Gene Discovery
Unit (applications of genomics and molecular biology in
rice breeding) and the Cassava and Starch Technology
Research Unit (molecular approaches to understanding
starch synthesis and quality, with a particular focus on the
Thai starch industry).
In these cases, public sector research is increasingly
divorced from farmers as the primary clientele, relying
instead on input markets as the mechanism for articulating
farmer demand. Occasionally the interests of farmers and
input companies do not coincide, however, as exemplified
by the tensions surrounding pesticide use and the scaling up
of integrated pest management programs in Asia.
Under these market-driven conditions, investments in
public agricultural research tend to focus more on institutional innovations that reinforce the ties between research
and the private sector. IPRs are emphasized, for example,
often as much to ensure open access to publicly generated
innovations as to protect innovations developed in the private sector. IPRs are often the basis for contractual arrangements in public-private partnerships. This connectivity can
be reinforced by competitive grants that insist on publicprivate partnerships, brokers that can mediate between
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public research and subsector needs, science parks adjacent
to research institutes that focus on areas of joint R&D, and
venture capital funds that invest in developing products and
markets based on research innovations.
Other areas of applied agricultural research are less well
served by the private sector, however, and constitute more
classical public goods, such as pulse and grain legume
breeding, crop disease surveillance, development of forages
for ruminants, and especially crop management and natural
resource management research. Agricultural research institutes within dynamic agricultural sectors have to strike a
balance between the more basic research that complements
the private sector’s interests and the more applied research
that farmers need. This balance will become even more
important with the increasing focus on using water and
nutrients efficiently and reducing environmental externalities in production systems.
Even transforming agricultural economies have a role for
public sector research in lagging rural areas with high
poverty rates, usually associated with underdeveloped markets. External connectivity in these cases usually focuses
on bridging organizations, particularly NGOs and extension services. In these cases, the AIS essentially reduces to
the traditional partnerships between farmers, research,
and bridging organizations, but those organizations provide a range of services beyond advisory services, including savings and credit schemes, farmer mobilization, and
improved market access.
India’s NAIP is an example of a funding program that
stratifies its platforms or clusters based on relative market
development and associated rural poverty. In more commercialized areas, NAIP’s platforms involve public-private
partnerships, and in lagging areas they involve traditional
research and bridging organizations.
For smaller research institutes, this kind of stratification
creates a dilemma. Should they focus on the more commercial areas and associated partnerships or focus on the lagging areas? The potential for innovation will be higher in
the commercial areas, but the public interest may reside
with the lagging areas. The tendency within an AIS will be
toward the former, whereas the public role will in most
instances lie in the latter.
Research within underdeveloped market contexts

The more agrarian economies, particularly those in subSaharan Africa, can be characterized as primarily dependent
on smallholder, rainfed agriculture. Farmers face conditions
of incomplete and unintegrated input and output markets,
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asymmetric information, and high transaction costs.
Markets for insurance and credit are virtually nonexistent.
Combining technical and institutional innovations.
For agricultural research to be effective under these
conditions, technological innovations must usually be
combined with organizational and institutional innovations, primarily to compensate for the lack of markets as
an organizational impetus for innovations. Moreover,
innovations tend to follow more orchestrated trajectories
(Rajalahti, Janssen, and Pehu 2007)—in other words, the
innovation process tends to be facilitated by external actors,
and technical innovations are often integrated with
organizational innovations.
For example, the deployment of improved sorghum
varieties, microdosing of fertilizer, and pit technology
for water harvesting in Sahelian countries becomes much
more profitable for farmers to adopt if farmers form associations around warehouse receipt systems. In this way,
technical innovations are combined with organizational
innovations that compensate for incomplete input and
credit markets and foster efficient bulking for output
markets. Orchestrated trajectories are further facilitated
by policy changes that legalize banks’ acceptance of
warehouse receipts, often initially with a loan guarantee
program.
Bridging organizations. Where markets are incomplete
and unintegrated, bridging organizations—particularly
extension services, farmer associations, trade associations,
and NGOs—link the research and knowledge domain with
the production and emerging market domain. These
organizations deliver and adapt research products as well
as develop supporting organizational innovations that
provide greater access and efficiency in processing and
marketing.
Bridging organizations are an imperfect mechanism for
articulating consumer and farmer demand unless that
demand is organized around a specific value chain. Value
chains have become a dominant framework for orchestrated
innovation platforms. Within an AIS, the emphasis on value
chains will drive the organization of agricultural research
back to a more centralized commodity approach. It will
tend to drive the organization of farmer associations along
similar lines. Where markets are already well developed, like
markets for horticultural exports, organization along commodity lines is already evident. The Fresh Produce
Exporters Association of Kenya (see module 1, box 1.5 in the
overview) is but one example among many.

Increasing private sector linkages. In general, public
agricultural research, especially within a NARI, is organized
around core capacities involving some combination of plant
breeding, disease and pest management, integrated crop
management, soil and water management, livestock and
fisheries, and potentially forest and rangeland management.
Virtually all of these areas focus on improving land
productivity and have farmers as their principal clients,
either directly or through bridging organizations such as
NGOs, farmer associations, and extension services.
The large change in organizing research within an AIS
is the development of linkages between research and an
emerging private sector. Research and bridging organizations are not well organized to effect such linkages (Larsen,
Kim, and Theus 2009). In small agrarian economies, the
private sector is not very prominent in rural areas. Largescale processing tends to locate in major urban markets.
Many nonfarm activities to generate income in rural areas
are based in the household, such as brewing beer or processing root crops.3 Haggblade (2009:A1-2) noted that
“rural manufacturing remains limited across most of
Africa . . . but, overall, local rural services, commercial and
other business activity account for 80 percent of rural
nonfarm earnings.”
Innovations that have broad impact on the rural nonfarm economy thus tend to focus on organizational innovations that improve marketing efficiency or on small-scale
processing where initial market conditions exist to specialize outside the household. The development of technology
for small-scale processing relies primarily on mechanical
innovations that usually come either from private industry,
international borrowing, or occasionally (for specialized
processing) from university engineering departments or
industrial research institutes (Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007). The availability of specialized processing equipment depends, however, on the presence of local private
capacity for manufacturing and distribution.
What then provides the basis for effective linkages
between agricultural research and the private sector in
agrarian economies? Strategies include vertical integration,
brokering, and public-private partnerships.
In larger-scale processing, such as maize milling or feed
production, a company’s interest lies in procuring stable supplies of raw material of a certain quality at a competitive
price. Where cost structures and margins permit, a company
can vertically integrate across the value chain, as in export horticulture. Alternatively it can rely on imports, like the wheat
milling industry of coastal West Africa. Under these conditions, there is no incentive for public-private partnerships.
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If a company relies on domestic production supplied by
market trading, however, it will be interested in combining
higher farm productivity and lower costs with more efficient assembly, bulking, and marketing. An agroprocessing
firm has little incentive to invest in increased farm-level productivity unless there is a quasi-monopoly on purchases of
feedstock, such as for oil palm or sugarcane processing.
Innovation platforms for staple food crops tend to focus on
linking innovations in assembly and bulking by small-scale
marketing agents with technologies for farmers to improve
crop productivity. In value chains with significant returns to
improved quality (for example, specialized coffee or dairy),
coordination is usually needed from the farm to the final
processing point. The mechanism for coordinating all of the
actors in the value chain is usually provided by a specialized
NGO with public funds (in other words, by a brokerage
agency). The scope for public-private partnerships in agrarian economies is quite circumscribed, and enhanced farm
productivity will generally continue to be the objective of
partnerships or platforms.
Another principal sphere of interaction between research
institutes and the private sector surrounds agricultural
inputs. In this sphere, the potential interactions are more
directly complementary. Public research provides varieties
for seed companies, can target fertilizer blends and integrate
them with organic sources, and can develop integrated pest
management packages for safe horticultural production.
In crop breeding, the nature of public-private partnerships changes as competition and product development
evolve in the seed market. Evolving private sector capacity in
input markets, tied to responsive public research programs,
can provide a direct channel for disseminating the products
of public research. The public sector can focus its research
on areas where input companies do not invest, which tend
to be areas with high rates of poverty and ineffective farmer
demand.
Technical innovation through AIS approaches

An evolving AIS has an increasing capacity to innovate, and
agricultural research plays a key role in technical innovation. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) observed that “contrary to
much common wisdom, the initiating step in most innovations is not research, but rather design” (quoted in Sumberg
2005). In this sense, applied agricultural research is probably
a misnomer, as its central focus is on technology design,
whether it is the design of an improved variety, an IPM system, a system to manage animal disease, or an agroforestry
system. In such instances, the design process focuses to the
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extent possible on ensuring that farmers will be able to use
the final product, principally to improve farm productivity.
Ensuring that technical design is congruent with farmer utilization is a central tenet of farmer participatory research
(including participatory plant breeding) and its antecedent,
farming systems research, as the design process often entails
iterations with farmers in testing and design modification—
or rather codesign (see TN 4).
Innovation platforms. In practice, approaches to technical innovation within an AIS often take the form of
project-based innovation platforms (TN 1; see also
module 1, TN 2). Projects usually operate for a limited time;
unsurprisingly they tend to focus on quick solutions to
technical problems identified within the platform. This time
frame orients research institutions to adapt existing
knowledge and technology. Nevertheless, research institutes
must balance this increasing demand for capacity to
conduct shorter-term adaptive research with the longerterm research capacity required to expand the set of
technical options. Farming systems research units were
often successful locally but had difficulty achieving any
significant scale in the adoption of adaptive research
results. A value chain framework, which usually focuses on
applied research, expands the specification of the problem
and usually integrates technical innovation with institutional innovations in farmer organization and marketing to
ensure that results are used throughout the value chain. Yet
in many cases it is difficult to scale up results that are
specific to particular value chains and contexts, as seen with
warehouse receipt systems in underdeveloped grain markets
such as those in Sahelian countries.
A research institute can also foster the development of
innovation platforms by establishing a specialized unit or
through funding arrangements such as those in Latin
American research foundations or competitive grant programs. Through these units or funding arrangements,
research institutes respond to some form of “articulated”
demand, which may come only from a limited proportion
of the farming population. Alternatively, the research institute may take a more proactive role and initiate an innovation platform itself, especially if it believes it has a technical
innovation with a good chance of success and that an innovation platform is an effective means of ensuring its use.
This approach can be described as “linear,” but it is only
another form of applying existing knowledge.
Scale of innovation platforms. The scale of innovation
platforms has not been much explored (Hall, Dijkman, and
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Sulaiman V. 2010). In Africa, innovation platforms often
operate at the district level, where the constraints lie in the
heterogeneity of production systems and the location in
relation to markets. In value chain platforms, scale is determined by the problem, market size, coordination requirements, and structure of the value chain. In Rwanda, for
example, the conversion of the coffee subsector to highvalue, specialty blends was done at a national, subsectoral
level. In comparison, the development of organic horticultural value chains is often organized at the district level
or lower. Scale is often a key design criterion in the development of a value chain platform. It determines whether
the platform operates at the national, regional, or district
level, whether it involves individual versus institutional
partnerships, and whether policy change is a key element in
the platform’s activities.
Platforms that are not structured around value chains
and that have poverty or food security objectives tend to
approximate rural development programs and rely on public sector or civil society participants. Introducing an innovation perspective into what are essentially facilitation and
service delivery platforms requires methodologies that are
more participatory, focus more on the problem, and allow
greater scope for experimentation. These requirements
often limit the scale of operations and introduce higher
implementation costs, however. Smaller-scale innovation
platforms may be required, which will feed into and support
broader rural development programs.
Innovation platforms with poverty objectives. There
is a tendency in an AIS to focus primarily on value chain
approaches, as for example with the Kenya Agricultural
Productivity Program (KAPP). After Kenya liberalized its
markets in the 1990s and the private sector became
increasingly active, Kenya generated successful market-led
approaches to develop smallholder tea, horticulture, and
dairy production as well as a fertilizer market. Despite these
achievements, rural poverty remains very high in marginal
agricultural areas and densely populated areas around Lake
Victoria. Most smallholders are still net buyers of maize, the
principal staple—only 18 percent of maize producers are
net sellers and only 2 percent of producers account for 50
percent of sales (Jayne, Mather, and Mghenyi 2006). The
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, like many smallcountry agricultural research institutes, faces the dual
challenge of innovating through market-led approaches
while attempting to expand market participation or
minimally improve household food security for the
majority of smallholders.

As discussed, in India, NAIP (IAP 2) has managed the
trade-off between market-driven innovation and innovation for lagging areas by creating two funding streams to
support different types of innovation clusters. In lagging
areas, funding supports the transaction costs involved in
establishing innovation platforms and organizing partnerships. These platforms are bound by the duration of the
grant, however, and either the problem focus has a shortterm horizon, the results can be seen as a pilot for which
larger-scale funding would be sought, or the funding is
structured so that follow-up grants would be awarded to
promising longer-term problem areas. However, a NARI
such as the one in Kenya must internalize these trade-offs
within the frame of its own research programming, the
number of partnerships it can manage, the duration of the
partnerships, and in the end the public good objectives
that drive these decisions. In other words, it must prioritize whether to invest in more scientific capacity or collaborative capacity.
Taking note of long-term needs. Planning for longerterm needs in regard to technical innovation tends to take
place in well-developed market economies and tends to
focus on capacity needs in relation to basic and strategic
research. At this stage in the development of the agricultural
economy, there is a strong sense that new science will be a
principal engine of continued agricultural growth and
competitiveness in world markets. Scenario planning is
often used to gauge alternative futures in relation to the
evolving structure of the agricultural economy and to chart
longer-term investment needs in agricultural R&D.
In developing countries, the private sector does not
invest in scenario planning, although multinationals such as
Monsanto do use such approaches, and a clearer division of
labor emerges between public and private R&D. In developing basic research consortiums, NAIP used foresight scenario planning (see module 7, TN 3) to define longer-term
needs. Tapping the potential of genomics and molecular
biology as well as the potential of bioenergy often becomes
a key focus in supporting continuing structural change
in the overall economy.
KEY POLICY ISSUES

The key policy issues surrounding agricultural research in
an innovation system range from the very broad (the need
for an environment conducive to organizational interaction)
to the very specific (the need for particular policy instruments that reduce the transaction costs of organizational
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collaboration). Policies that promote decentralization and
democratization can also have a positive effect on rural
innovation.

Incentives for organizational interaction

Within AISs, framework policies provide the broad incentives for increased organizational interaction in support of
agricultural innovation: market policies, administrative
policies, and financing mechanisms. Policies in general
should enhance collaboration, collective action, and what
might be termed “functional sufficiency” in innovation—
the participation of a diversity of actors that bring a sufficient set of skills to the innovation process. As noted, market liberalization policies have been a critical driver of
investments in the agricultural sector, market participation,
and growth linkages in the rural economy.
With the trend toward market liberalization, government’s role has shifted to improving marketing efficiency
and defining standards for market participation, particularly the development of grades and standards in commodity markets and quality and safety standards in input
markets. Seed certification, varietal testing and release,
biosafety regulation, plant breeders’ rights, and IPRs (see
module 6) all set the rules under which product innovation takes place. They define the rules of competition (for
example, between seed companies) and provide incentives
for collaboration (for example, between integrated pest
management firms and horticultural producers). The regulatory environment in turn provides incentives for the
private sector to increase its investment in research, which
often initially provokes competition with public research
and then evolves into more collaborative modalities. The
tension then becomes whether public research, especially
if jointly funded by the public and private sector, is done
under exclusive rights to particular companies or whether
the research supports the whole agricultural sector. In
general, public research turns its attention to more
upstream research that has longer time horizons and
addresses issues of less importance to the private sector,
such as natural resource management, poverty reduction,
gender, and equity.

Financing for transaction costs inherent in AISs

Financing mechanisms are possibly the most effective policy instruments for increasing organizational connectivity
(box 4.1). Aside from providing incentives, financing
mechanisms are also critical for supporting the increased
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transaction costs inherent in developing organizational
linkages and platforms. Where benefits to collaboration are
clear, particularly for the private sector, such transaction
costs are a necessary component of investments in the innovation process. For public sector research, however, financing these costs requires explicit budgeting categories and
clarity on how these expenditures will support institutional
outcomes. To overcome the inherent risk and uncertainty
and cover transaction costs for participation, special agricultural innovation funds (module 5, TN 2) have been
developed (World Bank 2010).

Decentralization and equity issues

The trend toward democratization is often reflected in
greater administrative and financial decentralization, in
which the delivery of public services is managed at the district level and the public agencies involved become more
accountable to local constituents, including women and
men farmers. Decentralization has had a major impact on
the organization of advisory services, animal and plant
health services, and the development of infrastructure,
especially for water and rural roads. Democratization is also
accompanied by an expansion in civil society organizations,
including the rebuilding of farmer organizations. In many
respects, these processes are fundamental to creating capacity for rural innovation. In areas where local government is
particularly responsive, they can facilitate innovations such
as the Land Care movement in the Philippines.

EVOLVING AREAS OF INVESTMENT
IN RESEARCH WITHIN AN AIS

How will research investments continue to evolve in an AIS
context? Investments are expected to continue supporting
the wider connections that lead to innovation. They will
encompass new forms of collaboration and institutional
structures as well as new technologies and systems that
increase the flow of information among actors in an innovation system.
In some instances, greater collaboration and communication between actors in an innovation system will change
where agricultural research occurs, who conducts and funds
it, and its priorities. In Africa, however, public research
agencies will be even more challenged to respond to the
proliferation of small-scale innovation processes. Research
investments will also be critical for counterbalancing the
heavy market orientation of AISs and promoting greater
inclusiveness and equity in innovation processes.
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Box 4.1 Financing Agricultural Research and Innovation

Agricultural research in developing countries is characterized by significant underinvestment, especially in
Africa. It remains very much a public activity that produces public goods. Government remains the largest
contributor to public agricultural research, accounting
for an average of 81 percent of funding. Internally generated funds, including contracts with private and
public enterprises, account for only 7 percent. Because
continuity of financing is so critical to the productivity of agricultural research, new approaches to funding
have been piloted over the past two decades. As the
precursors of funding strategies for AISs, they offer
insight into the potential challenges involved.
The new approaches shared two fundamental characteristics. They separated funding decisions from the
execution of research and they expanded the sources
and sustainability of financing.
To ensure accountability and a research agenda
that met users’ needs, representatives of the private
sector, farmers, and the public sector decided which
research to fund, primarily through competitive
grants. This separation required new organizational
arrangements to manage the increased transaction
costs, most often in the form of a research foundation,
a national agricultural research council, or a government agency that managed competitive grants (see
module 6, TN 2). Experience with research foundations
yielded lessons on ensuring clients had a voice in funding decisions and on developing sufficient capacity to
manage the funding within a strategic framework.
Research foundations and competitive grant funds
have focused on funding projects that foster critical
partnerships in the AIS, usually between public scientific institutes and the private sector. For example, Chile

organized clusters in which firms’ market, processing,
and management expertise were matched with expertise
from public research institutes (IAP 3). Three government agencies, each with a slightly different mandate,
managed the funding. In India a similar program was
managed by a program office organized within a World
Bank loan (IAP 2). The primary funding mechanism was
competitive grants, awarded to specific types of partnerships, often with explicit contractual terms.
To diversify and sustain funding, the beneficiaries of
the research are increasingly required to contribute. In
Kenya, for example, levies have funded research on
export crops (tea and coffee). In Uruguay, producer
associations invested directly in national commodity
research programs. More generally, tax incentives have
encouraged companies to invest in R&D by hiring their
own researchers or contracting with public agencies. In
all of these arrangements, the research supported is
defined much more specifically to reflect users’
demands, ensure that appropriate products are developed, and promote accountability.
Such funding sources are still a small component of
overall funding for agricultural research, however.
Large parts of the agricultural sector still rely almost
entirely on public funds to meet their needs, especially
for plant breeding research in staple food crops and
natural resource management research.
The key lesson is that a strong market and commercial orientation, if not bias, appears to exist in financing arrangements that move away from financing
research and toward financing innovation within an
AIS. A primary challenge is to ensure that research and
innovation to generate public goods will be adequately
supported.

Sources: Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (http://www.asti.cgiar.org); Byrnes and Corning 1993.

Increasing connectivity between research
and other innovation actors

In an AIS, research is chiefly oriented toward integration
with the rest of the innovation actors, be they private, public, or civil society entities. In practice, most efforts have
focused on interactions between the public and private sectors. Partnerships between public and private agencies
involve a range of contractual arrangements, from informal
to formal, under which research institutes provide products

or services to the private sector. For a public research
agency, the degree of exclusivity in the use of its particular
product or service, which is often under IP protection, often
defines the contractual arrangement (see TN 2 in this module and module 5, TN 1).
Science parks create a useful nexus between commercial
enterprises and research institutes by taking promising
research products to market and providing backstopping in
product modification. They function best where private
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investment capital and industrial engineering expertise
coexist (see the overview in module 5).
The development of new markets for agricultural products often calls upon public expertise in agronomic and
breeding research and relies on services ranging from brokering contracts and partnerships and assembling investment capital to developing capacity in the private sector.
The costs of research for these niche markets often cannot
be justified for public research institutes with their broad
public good mandates. This issue is explored further in
module 3, TN 4.
Value chain platforms, the most informal approach to
linking publicly funded research and the private sector,
seem to function best when coordination is needed to produce a specialized product like high-quality coffee. They
require external funding and facilitation, and their effectiveness in generating innovation for a range of commodities
and market conditions remains to be tested (see module 1,
TN 2 and module 5, TN 4).

Box 4.2 ICTs Make Agricultural Research
More Inclusive

ICTs are making agricultural research more inclusive and at the same time more focused on development goals, because they change how, where,
and to whom information flows. Information can
flow in many directions; it can be highly dispersed
and accessible; it can also be highly targeted and
location specific. ICTs are significant in the
research process but may be even more significant
as a catalyst throughout the wider innovation system, in: collecting, storing, and analyzing data,
with or without human interaction; geospatial
applications; decision support and knowledgebased systems and robotics; embedded ICTs in
farm equipment and processes (agrionics); connecting communities and enabling learning; collaboration with stakeholders across the research
process; and the management of competitive innovation funds.

Enhancing access to information
and communication

Enhanced information flows will improve the integration of
an AIS. The facilitating role of ICTs is vital for researchers
and other stakeholders in an AIS involved in gathering and
manipulating data or interacting with global information
resources (see box 4.2) (see World Bank 2011).4 Information flows among actors in an AIS in developing countries
have always been particularly costly, often asymmetric, and
generally incomplete. New ICTs could significantly improve
access to information and the availability of communication
and collaboration tools, although access to information is
only one component of the innovation process in agricultural
systems. The design of technology in agricultural research
oriented to increased farm productivity depends on a twoway flow of information between farmers and researchers.
Farm-level innovation requires contextualized information
(a particularly difficult problem, especially where farmers’
level of education is limited), access to research products, and
a significant learning-by-doing process. Researchers in turn
need to understand the heterogeneity of farming systems and
the constraints on farm productivity to inform their technology design and testing systems and ensure that they respond
to farmers’ needs. Some emerging areas of investment are discussed in the sections that follow.
Mobile phones as an information exchange device.
Mobile phones are becoming pervasive in some rural areas.
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Sources: Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators
(http://www.asti.cgiar.org); Byrnes and Corning 1993.

They are more than a mechanism for two-way flows of
information. Kenyan farmers use them to obtain market
prices, verify the certification of seed and fertilizer sellers,
and obtain recommendations on which fertilizer and seed
to choose. Equipped with GPS and cameras, mobile phones
are becoming a very efficient means for researchers and
farmers to collect farm-level information. For example, a
network of sentinel farmers in the Great Lakes region of
Africa monitors two cassava disease pandemics, the
hybridized form of cassava mosaic virus and two species of
cassava brown streak virus. A data template has been
developed with the service provider, and farmers provide
photographs of suspected new outbreaks. This effort could
evolve into an interactive disease surveillance and control
system. The potential of mobile phones for such interactive
information flows between researchers and farmers will
continue to evolve.
Market intelligence units. Within an AIS, research
institutes will increasingly have to balance farmers’ demands
with those of the private sector, which will affect farmers
indirectly through research that produces innovation
elsewhere in the value chain. Within commercial agricultural economies, information flows are increasingly
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specific to the needs of each subsector. Market intelligence
becomes an important public good in improving the
efficiency of the market and directing investment in the
subsector, including research investment. In countries such
as Brazil, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
collects basic census and production data,4 while agricultural economic research institutes collect information
on prices, domestic trade volumes, agroprocessing output,
and international markets and undertake analytical work
in support of market development.
Learning alliances. Learning alliances provide a platform
for networking often disparate R&D institutions around a
common focal area involving program or project
development and implementation. They focus especially on
the learning associated with scaling up innovations, which
usually involves the interaction of research, capacity building,
project implementation, and evaluation. These platforms
move beyond the scope of a traditional monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) system and focus on broader learning
objectives across institutions. Learning alliances are
particularly intensive in the use of facilitation and
information synthesis and require external funding to
operate. See IAP 4.

Organizational change of research
within an evolving AIS

Organizational change within a research system reflects
increasing differentiation and specialization in the production of new knowledge, products, and services. This differentiation among R&D organizations is driven by improvements in their ability to respond to changing demands
within the agricultural sector as organizational linkages
within the sector improve (TNs 1 and 5; box 4.3). Closer
interaction between publicly funded agricultural research
and an expanding private sector and civil society has organizational implications for research because interaction
shifts the locus of agricultural research, research priorities,
and research financing.
This shift is most apparent in the rapidly growing
economies of Asia, which are experiencing increasingly
dynamic organizational change. Private investment in agricultural research is expanding rapidly, especially in plant
breeding. Hybrid maize led the movement of seed companies into breeding, but they have since expanded into horticulture, hybrid rice, and plantation crops. In Asia and Latin
America, public plant breeding has responded to these
developments by either moving toward more prebreeding

and genomics research in support of the private sector or
toward breeding for areas not covered by the private sector
(box 4.4).
In sub-Saharan Africa the market and agricultural
research context remains quite different, requiring NARIs
to balance traditional research focusing on productivity
with an emergent private sector that has almost no capacity to undertake research. Finding this balance, improving
connectivity to the private sector to improve farmers’ access
to markets, and developing more effective linkages to
bridging organizations that provide services to farmers are
all on the agenda of how the NARI improves its connectivity within the AIS.
In many cases, approaches will vary depending on location and commodity, as research organizations have a role
even in postconflict situations. In all cases, enhanced partnerships with a diversity of NGOs, farmer organizations,
and civil society organizations are critical to effective performance.
With their persistent funding constraints, African
NARIs face an increasing dilemma in organizing themselves to respond to an expanding range of innovation
processes, which are often grouped around relatively micro
market and development niches. As Hall, Dijkman, and
Sulaiman V. (2010: 4) have argued, “Innovation diversity is
central to research design, emphasizing that there is no
optimal approach or way of organizing research into use
for innovation and impact; rather it is context-specific and
path-dependent.” How African NARIs address the diversity
question in their external linkages while organizing their
limited internal resources around the biotic, natural
resource, and impending climate change challenges facing
African agriculture will be a persistent driver of organizational change within NARIs. Such change is best built on
experimentation, piloting, and continuing enhancement of
skills in developing external institutional arrangements,
while evolving increased flexibility in designing research
products and services.

Pro-poor innovation

The market orientation of AIS raises a number of challenges
with respect to pro-poor innovation; in many ways these
challenges echo the debate over the equity impacts of the
Green Revolution. First, the rural poor are primarily found
in contexts characterized by poorly developed markets,
either because of inadequate transport infrastructure, distance to markets, or low population density. The poor often
reside in marginal areas bypassed by private investment
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Box 4.3 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research and the AIS

The institutional role of the 15 centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR) in agricultural innovation has been a source of
debate and has changed significantly over time. The issue
is most often framed in terms of where the centers operate within the research-to-development spectrum.
■

■

■

For the first two to three decades, the centers’ role
was defined in terms of a division of labor with the
NARIs (the centers would mostly develop technologies and NARIs would refine and disseminate
them). Significant investment in training and capacity building within NARI research programs were
made to develop a technology pipeline.
Farming systems and participatory research in the
1980s and 1990s expanded the institutional matrix
within which the centers operated (and the number of centers themselves expanded). The focus
shifted from pushing the supply of technology to
understanding farmers’ demand for research and
conducting more work on natural resource management. Core funding shifted to competition for
project funding. The shift heightened the emphasis
on achieving development outcomes—but within
a less strategic, more project-driven modality.
The 2000s saw Centers consolidate their downstream research and focus methodological develop-

ment under frameworks such as integrated natural
resource management, agricultural research for
development (AR4D), and knowledge to action programs—all forerunners or embodiments of AIS.
Demand articulation was embedded in each of these
approaches, and organizational and institutional
innovation were seen as critical complements to
technical innovation. The institutional matrix
within which the centers worked expanded again.
In its current incarnation, the CGIAR intends for its
15 centers to function more as a system than as
autonomous centers. They will operate through multicenter CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs). Financing
will return to longer-term core funding allocated by
funders through a Fund Council that is legally separate from the centers; centers will be governed by a
Consortium Board. CRPs will be managed within a
results-oriented framework and evaluated with respect
to their contributions to four system-level outcomes.
The new arrangements incorporate elements of an
AIS approach, with a focus on measurable results
(which are reflected in the contractual arrangements
between each CRP and the Fund Council). This
results orientation will have to differentiate between
innovation-induced rural change and structured
implementation of development projects.

Source: Author.

Box 4.4 Examples of Public-Private Engagement in Prebreeding and Genomics

Thailand has invested in higher-end genomics research
and molecular breeding, not in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives but rather in the Ministry of
Science and Technology. This high-end science is
organized in clusters with private companies.
In Indonesia and the Philippines, the private sector
accounts for one-fifth of agricultural R&D, partly
because of the plantation structure of significant parts
of the agricultural economy. In turn, the Indonesian
Research Institute for Estate Crops generates a significant portion of its budget from contract research and
commercial seed sales.

The same trends are apparent in Latin America,
although not to the degree of Indonesia and
Philippines. Colombia, Uruguay, and Argentina fund
research on coffee, rice, sugar, and oil palm from levies
on commodity sales. Chile has a number of specific
competitive funds, all of which require collaboration
with industry. These trends suggest that agricultural
research is moving away from direct involvement
with farmers and that private companies are increasingly the intermediaries between researchers and
farmers.

Source: Beintema and Stads 2008.
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until rural wages start to increase dramatically in other
areas. The potential for developing sustainable links to markets under such circumstances is often limited.
Second, where market development is possible, the rural
poor often lack the resources to access markets. Ensuring
the participation of women is even more challenging.
Women’s roles in the value chain and the services that support those roles may need to be differentiated. Organizational innovations may also be needed to ensure that
women participate in and benefit from the formation of
farmer groups.
Finally, agricultural research linked to development
agencies often has a significant role in improving food
security for more subsistence-oriented households, including food-based nutritional approaches (especially for
households affected by AIDS), limiting the “hungry season,” and improving the resilience of the farming system.
An AIS framework requires a very different institutional
mix and methodologies to support innovation in such
contexts, potentially extending into learning alliances. For
AIS approaches, the incentives for researchers tend to
come from more commercial producers, especially when
researchers are working with value chains. A pro-poor
innovation process requires more orchestrated investment
approaches and in the end much more experience and
evaluation of how the innovation process can be sure to
include the poor.
MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND SCALING UP

Monitoring the performance of agricultural research within
an agricultural innovation framework presents a number of
conceptual and implementation issues. Optimally an M&E
system will function at a project level, at a research institute
and research system level, and at the level of the overall AIS,
and indicators developed at lower levels will aggregate to
higher levels. Virtually all of the experience with M&E in
innovation systems is at the project level, however.
Spielman and Kelemework (2009) have developed an AIS
performance index and tested it in Ethiopia and Vietnam.
They divided the AIS into organizational domains, one of
which was the knowledge and education domain, which
includes agricultural research. Performance in this domain
was measured in terms of knowledge production, reflected
primarily in scientific publications.
When innovation outcomes are defined at the level of
the overall AIS, the performance measure for agricultural
research shifts from farmers’ adoption of technology to the
role of agricultural research as a producer of knowledge.

Impact at the farm level is attributed to the AIS rather than
the agricultural research institutes. In the overall AIS, the
monitoring of agricultural research organizations shifts
toward process-oriented assessment (Daane 2010), the
characterization of systemic linkages between agricultural
research and other domains within an AIS, and their functionality. Ragasa et al. (2010) used this approach in developing an M&E system for agricultural research in Nigeria.
At the project level in an AIS, M&E in many ways is more
comprehensive and tends to be organized around value
chains, innovation platforms, public-private partnership
arrangements, or competitive grants. In such contexts, agricultural research will be only one of many organizational
partners in the M&E framework. The focus will be on
understanding and adapting processes, often within an
action-research modality (an iterative process of diagnosis,
planning, action, evaluation, and reflection). The M&E system will serve several functions, particularly (1) monitoring
project progress; (2) learning and change; (3) collecting data
for testing hypotheses, often in relation to scaling up project
results; and (4) project management (Njuki et al. 2010).
Data will be collected on a combination of quantitative and
qualitative indicators, the latter often collected through a
participatory M&E process with project participants.
Defining the scope of innovation outcomes is often not
straightforward. The outcomes reflect the application of
new knowledge, products, or services within a context of
organizational or institutional innovations. Investors will
want to know the impact of these innovation outcomes and
whether the organizational innovations are more cost effective than current institutional arrangements.
In a few cases, as in the sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Program of the CGIAR, experimental and quasi-experimental
methods have been employed to test the comparable efficiency gains from using innovation system methods over traditional research and extension approaches (FARA 2009).
Such tests are very expensive, however, and in the end not as
rich as adaptive approaches employing M&E data in progressively improving the efficiency of AIS methods and
processes.
Table 4.1 provides selected indicators for topics covered
in this module.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS MODULE

Agricultural research within an AIS framework is still in quite
early stages of development, and the experiences and applications described here have been drawn from a number of contexts and often within a piloting modality. This material has
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Table 4.1 Schematic of a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Assessing the Performance
of Agricultural Research within an AIS
Domain
Innovation outcomes/research impact

Demand articulation

Organizational interfaces/partnerships

Organizational change
Research productivity

Knowledge flows

Indicator
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Technology adoption
Increased farm productivity and incomes
Increased efficiency within the value chain
Increased total factor productivity
Increased agricultural GDP
Forums for farmer voice
Joint priority setting
Participatory or codesign research
Number of public-private partnerships (PPPs)
Number of innovation platforms, clusters, or consortiums
Number of PPPs
Value chain platforms
Scientist participation in networks
Involvement of stakeholders in planning, priority setting, and evaluation
Presence of mechanisms or units for managing partnerships and for brokering innovation processes
Number of competitive grants received
Number of peer reviewed articles published
Number of varieties released
Number of on-farm trials
Number of hits on website
Articles or programs in mass media
Citation index
Extension bulletins produced and distributed

Source: Author.
Note: All indicators should be disaggregated by gender when possible.

been organized by typology in this overview and by theme in
the notes that follow (except for TN 1).
The typology emphasizes that the market, organizational, and economic context needs to be understood in
deciding on investment approaches for AIS. The themes
covered in the notes enter into more detail on alternative
areas of investment in important domains of AIS. They
include a discussion of demand articulation and external
organizational interfaces (TN 1); public-private partnerships (TN 2), regional research (TN 3), codesign in agricul-
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tural research (TN4), and management structures and organizational change (TN 5).
The TNs are followed by profiles of innovative approaches
to agricultural research within an AIS framework. IAP 1 discusses the redesign of an international agricultural research
center to align with an AIS approach. Two profiles focus on the
implementation of agricultural innovation funds, especially in
facilitating public-private partnerships, in India and Chile
(IAPs 2 and 3). Another describes experiences with learning
alliances (IAP 4)
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 1

Designing Agricultural Research Linkages
within an AIS Framework
David J. Spielman, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
Catherine Ragasa, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
Riikka Rajalahti, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

onsensus is growing that new ways of conducting
agricultural research are needed. To date, the operational implications of these changes and strategies for making them efficient, effective, and sustainable
have been discussed very little. Lessons on strengthening
the connectivity between agricultural research and other
innovation system actors are viewed through the lens of
three types of economies—agriculture-based, transforming, and urbanized—and two strategies: (1) investing in
“demand articulation” mechanisms to better identify the
needs of different user groups and (2) designing “organizational interfaces” that help transform research into real
goods and services. There is a case for both market and
nonmarket approaches to improving demand articulation
and organizational interfaces. They include investment in
formal mechanisms that provide stakeholder input to
research organizations, more participatory mechanisms
that bring researchers and farmers together to solve problems, innovation platforms that address larger, more
complex challenges with diverse actors, commercialization
programs that move research into the marketplace, and
financing mechanisms that encourage collaborative
research. Careful adaptation to the specific innovation
contexts, strategies, and mechanisms is prerequisite for
success.

C

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Agricultural research needs to be examined within the
broader analytical framework of an innovation system,
which means recognizing that innovation in agricultural
development may occur in collaboration with, separately
from, or even in spite of agricultural research organizations. The challenge is to make public research organizations more responsive, dynamic, and competitive within

this new landscape in agricultural development. To reach
this goal, public research organizations will have to increase
their relevance, their capacity to respond to a changing
landscape, and their ability to produce goods and services
that can be put to use in a socially or economically productive manner.
These statements are not a call for paying less attention
to the quality of scientific inquiry and expertise in disciplinary fields. They are rather a call for greater interaction
between researchers and other knowledge producers and
users to maximize the quality of science and its impacts
on society and the economy. Increased interaction means
that public research organizations will continue to play a
role in developing country agriculture but that their role
must change. The key to this change will be flexible institutional arrangements that encourage dynamic, rapid
responses to changing circumstances from public research
organizations.
This TN examines specific investments in key design
elements and approaches in three innovation contexts
(box 4.5) similar to those discussed in the module overview.
It focuses on key investments in articulating demand (identifying the needs of different user groups for the knowledge
and information produced by research organizations) and
designing organizational interfaces (modalities that help
transform this knowledge and information into socially and
economically relevant goods and services).
Research systems have undergone any number of
reforms, ranging from rebuilding after a crisis to redesigning more complex and advanced systems. Little evidence
points to which reforms actually work well in different types
of research organizations and how these reforms might ultimately affect agricultural productivity and poverty. Without
sufficient evidence, it is often difficult to provide conclusive
insights into the returns on investing in large-scale reforms
of research systems. The next best option is to examine
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Box 4.5 The Three Innovation Contexts

(1) Agriculture-based countries. In these countries,
farmers have limited access to agricultural markets,
which in many cases do not function well. Most
countries in sub-Saharan Africa are in this category. In agriculture-based countries, research
organizations must develop an interface with
their clients—primarily small-scale farmers,
extension systems, and government decision
makers—and with the rest of the national,
regional, and global research system. The private
sector engages mostly in licensing technologies to
public breeding programs, multiplying improved
seed developed by public breeding programs, distributing inputs such as chemical fertilizer, or providing other small-scale and localized agricultural
products and services.
(2) Transforming countries. Transforming countries
host innovation systems in which agricultural markets are expanding and developing. A subset of
farmers gain from good connections to markets.
Transforming countries can be characterized by an
increased reliance on market-based approaches to

guide the contribution of agricultural research to
the wider innovation system. Many developing
countries in South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, the
Middle East, and North Africa are in this category.
(3) Mature innovation countries. These countries
have innovation systems in which agricultural
markets function relatively efficiently and farmers
are effective market players. Most countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean and many in Europe
and Central Asia are in this category. In transforming and mature countries, research organizations
should take greater notice of market demand and
rely on market-based approaches to guide their
contribution to the wider innovation system.
Research organizations are required to interface
with a wider set of clients—smallholders and commercial producers, diverse private sector actors
(input suppliers, processors, wholesalers, retailers,
industry associations, exporters), other service
providers, and consumers—to create venues for
them to express their needs and align national priorities to research agendas.

Source: Authors, based on World Bank (2007).

different reform processes to understand the impact pathways through which they are expected to work.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

This note describes nonmarket and market-based approaches
to investment, starting with approaches that fit particularly
well with agriculture-based contexts and moving to more
commercial, market-oriented approaches. The note does
not provide an exhaustive list of investment mechanisms
but features the mechanisms that are most relevant for
developing countries:
1. Strengthening information sharing and demand articulation in research systems through formal coordination
organizations, enhanced communication, and ICTs.
2. Promoting greater participation of farmers and other
clients in technology development processes.
3. Technology transfer and commercialization approaches.
4. Financing mechanisms for multistakeholder approaches.
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Table 4.2 summarizes the approaches, their purposes,
and the key knowledge assets used and exchanged as part of
each approach. The approaches or mechanisms can be
selected and combined to fit the particular need for innovation in a given context.

Strengthening information sharing and
demand articulation in research systems
through formal coordination organizations,
enhanced communication, and ICTs

In many countries, formal organizations facilitate regular
exchanges of information and identify research priorities. These organizations include committees, agencies,
and other formal bodies that obtain farmers’ input on
research results (for example, their opinions of the performance of new cultivars), on longer-term priorities for
research and/or competitive research funds, and on the
wider policy issues associated with agricultural production
and markets.
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The public sector often leads and manages the process
of setting up these formal organizations. Often they
include representatives of farmers, extension services, the
research system, and ideally other actors in the public sector, private sector, and civil society. Both centralized and
decentralized approaches are applied. Organizations at the
provincial/zonal level, such as the Research Extension–
Farmer–Input–Linkage System in Nigeria or the Research
and Extension Linkage Committees in Ghana (box 4.6),

particularly fit agriculture-based contexts and tend to
focus on consultation and receiving farmers’ input on
research results.
Organizations that operate at the national level use a
more sophisticated set of tools for priority setting aside
from stakeholder consultations, including tools for scenario
and technology foresight, information databases, and M&E
of research programs. Examples include the Senegal Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project

Table 4.2 Approaches to Strengthening the Articulation of Demand and Interfaces with the Agricultural Research
System in Agriculture-Based, Transforming, and Mature Innovation Contexts
Approach

Purpose

Formal
coordination
organizations

Information exchange,
priority setting,
coordination,
fund allocation

Communication
and ICT

Share information;
demand articulation

Participatory
research

Engage farmers in
research priority
setting, selection,
testing, and
experimentation

Codesign
approaches

Engage diverse stakeholders in the entire
R&D cycle

Innovation
platforms

Consortiums
Technology
transfer

Key assets

Agriculture-based: Research Extension–Farmer–Input–Linkage System
(REFILS) in Nigeria (Koyenikan 2008); Research and Extension
Linkage Committees (REALCs) in Ghana (World Bank and IFPRI
2010); Senegal Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations
Project
Transforming and urban: Fund governance and national
research/innovation councils or forums
See Information and Communication Technologies for Agriculture
Sourcebook (World Bank 2011, forthcoming).

Scientific information;
extension services;
capacity/methodology
in participatory
approach

Participatory plant breeding (Sperling et al. 2001; Morris and Bellon
2004)
Central America Learning Alliance (Faminow, Carter, and Lundy
2009); CIALs in Colombia, Honduras, Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Nicaragua (CIAT 2006; Quiros et al. 2004)

Scientific and local
information;
capacity in codesign
approach
Promote co-innovation; Public and private
exchange information;
technologies; capacity to
identify opportunities
reach commercial and
and set priorities;
underserved markets;
promote policy
private financing; farmerchange
private sector-policy
maker linkages

Acquire technology

Examples (sources)

Scientific information;
extension and advisory
services

Liu (1997); Almekinders, Beukema, and Tromp (2009); Hocdé et al.
(2009); Bernet et al. (2006, 2008)

Agriculture: Civil society partnerships: Papa Andina (Thiele et al.
forthcoming; Devaux et al. 2009, 2010; Horton et al. 2010; Smith
and Chataway 2007)
Transforming: Agricultural innovation networks in Argentina (Ekboir
and Parellada 2002; Trigo et al. 2009), Bolivia (Monge et al. 2008),
Mexico (Ekboir et al. 2009), Andean South America (Devaux et al.
2009, 2010; Horton et al. 2010), and the Netherlands (Klerkx,
Aarts, and Leeuwis 2010); Research consortiums: CLAYUCA on
cassava (Patiño and Best 2002; see IAP 5 in module 1)
Urban: Netherlands (Janssen and Braunschweig 2003; Klerkx and
Leeuwis 2009a)
International and regional research networks: CGIAR, FARA, ASARECA,
APAARI
Australia; NAIP India (IAP 2)
Scientific information and
Agriculture: Material transfer agreements between international and
tools; capacity for
national research centers for wheat improvement (Dubin and
dealing with international
Brennan 2010; Louwaars et al. 2005) and biotechnology (Byerlee
agreements
and Fischer 2002)
Urban: Agricultural biotechnology (Byerlee and Fischer 2002);
drought-tolerant maize research (AATF 2011)

(Table continues on the following page)
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Table 4.2 Approaches to Strengthening the Articulation of Demand and Interfaces with the Agricultural Research
System in Agriculture-Based, Transforming, and Mature Innovation Contexts (continued)
Approach

Purpose

Commercialization
programs

Commercialize
public research

Public-private
research
partnerships
Science parks and
business
incubators

Develop new products

University-industry
research
collaborations
Alternative
funding
mechanisms

Promote co-innovation;
commercialize public
research
Farmer-funded research;
finance research

Develop new products

Key assets

Examples (sources)

Public technologies; capacity Transforming: ICSRISAT Hybrid Parents Research Consortia for
to commercialize new
sorghum and pearl millet (Gowda et al. 2004; Pray and Nagarajan
products
2009); Sustainable Commercialization of Seeds in Africa (SCOSA)
(Jones 2006)
Urban: Cooperative R&D agreements (Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie
2000); Plant genetic IP management (Louwaars et al. 2005)
Scientific information, tools, East Coast fever vaccine development (Smith 2005; Spielman 2009);
and materials; managerial
agricultural research (Spielman, Hartwich, and von Grebmer
capacity
2010); see also IAP 2 in module 6
Scientific information and
CIAT and ICRISAT (Spielman, Hartwich, and von Grebmer 2010);
tools; managerial capacity;
see also TN 3 and IAP 1 in module 5
private and public capital
Public technologies; capacity Agricultural biotechnology (Ervin et al. 2003)
to commercialize new
products
Financing from financial
Competitive grants and innovation funds (World Bank 2006, 2010;
markets and donors;
Gill and Carney 1999); Research prize schemes (Masters 2003);
specialized scientific
farmer levies (Klerkx and Leeuwis 2009b); market segmentation
services
schemes (Kolady and Lesser 2008; Lybbert 2002)

Source: Authors.
Note: APAARI = Asia Pacific Association of Agricultural Research Institutions; ASARECA = Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa; CIALS = Local agricultural research committees; CGIAR = Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research;
CLAYUCA = Latin American and Caribbean Consortium to Support Cassava Research and Development; FARA = Forum for Agricultural Research in
Africa.

Box 4.6 Research-Extension-Linkage Committees in Ghana: Experience and Lessons

In Ghana, Research-Extension-Linkage Committees
(RELCs) include producers, researchers, and extension
agents from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture
(MoFA). The committees facilitate dialogue and elicit
better guidance from producers about local research
and extension efforts. Five RELCs were piloted, one in
each of the country’s major agroecological zones,
under the World Bank–funded Agricultural Services
Project. Eventually the committees were expanded to
cover each of Ghana’s 10 regions. Each regional RELC
has 15 members, including two representatives of
farmer organizations, one representative from a nongovernmental organization, one representative of
agribusiness, and representatives from research and
extension.a Under the Agricultural Services Project,
the second call for proposals from the competitive

research grant scheme was based on the RELCs’ identification of farmers’ problems. Thirteen research projects from seven regions were approved for funding.
Despite this effort at planning from the farm level
up, the RELCs proved ineffective in strengthening links
between research and others in the AIS. Funding for
implementing RELC initiatives has been limited, partly
because responsibility for allocating operating funds is
divided between the national research institute (the
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) and
MoFA. Perhaps owing to these financial constraints, the
RELCs have not engaged greater numbers of farmers
and end users and have had little influence on the
research agenda. Sustainable financing for farmers’ and
end users’ participation in the RELCs is likely to have
made them more effective.

Source: World Bank 2007; Riikka Rajalahti, personal communication.
a. According to the project’s 2002 procedure manual.
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(box 4.7), research councils (module 1, TN 1), and competitive funds (module 5, TN 2).
Improved awareness of research programs, results, and
applications—among research partners (national, international) and other stakeholders, including clients—are
important for articulating demand in increasingly decentralized AISs and developing a platform for information
sharing and collaboration. The key investment elements
include development of a communications strategy and
program; capacity building for staff on communications
and ICTs; hardware and software for collecting and storing
data, and a telecommunications and Internet platform. For
details and examples, see World Bank (2011).

Promoting participation of farmers and
other actors in technology development

Participatory research approaches, codesign, and innovation platforms offer pathways for farmers and other clients
to develop agricultural technology with researchers. The
next sections discuss these approaches and specific corresponding investments. The concluding discussion focuses
on the potential for research consortiums to strengthen
links between research and other actors in the AIS.
Participatory research approaches. Participatory
approaches identify farmers’ demands and bring farmers’
knowledge as well as researchers’ knowledge to bear on

Box 4.7 Lessons from Senegal’s Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project

The Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations
Project (PASAOP) strengthens end-users’ demand for
services and public research institutions’ ability to meet
their demands. In its first phase (1999–2006), PASAOP
established a network of producer organizations in
142 of 320 rural council areas, along with decentralized, demand-driven agricultural services. In its second
phase (2006–11), the project further strengthens the
institutional framework, extends the coverage of agricultural advisory services nationwide, supports the
emergence of private service providers, strengthens
research capacity and focus, and further empowers
producer organizations, while increasing their social
accountability and representation. Both project phases
have built on the following approaches:
■

■

■

Restore the focus of ministries active in agriculture on
their core public functions: policy formulation, monitoring, and evaluation. Create specific directorates
for policy analysis, forecasts, and statistics. Decentralize services with the creation of regional directorates.
Replace the traditional technology transfer model
with demand-driven support. Decentralized advisory
services are managed jointly (including planning and
evaluation) by a semipublic National Agency for
Agricultural and Rural Advisory Services (ANCAR),
producer organizations, and private agribusiness.
Establish transparent, competitive financing for
research on agriculture and agroprocessing through

■

■

the National Fund for Agricultural Research
(FNRAA).
Engage producer organizations in decision making
as genuine advocates of proposals. Producers also
chair the management committee of FNRAA to
ensure that research programs are relevant to their
needs.
Link producers through a network of rural consultative forums (CLCOPs) in 152 rural council areas
so producers contribute fully to defining, implementing, and evaluating research and extension
programs. Producer organizations have also established and manage their own Demand Driven Rural
Services Fund, which allocates resources to microprojects prepared by producer organizations.

Benefits
To date, PASAOP has helped improve the quality and
selling price of groundnuts, level and quality of community seed stocks, beneficiaries’ incomes (12 percent
higher), and nonfarm household income. Producer satisfaction with services is 80 percent against a target of
100 percent. Food security increased among 62 percent
of producers against a target of 60 percent. In producer
organizations, 45 percent of members adopted at least
one technology in their production systems against a target of 50 percent. The agricultural research system generated 22 technologies. Cofinancing of FNRAA by other
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 4.7 Lessons from Senegal’s Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project (continued)

stakeholders (government, other donors, commodity
organizations, and the private sector) is expected to
reach 30 percent.

■

Lessons
■
■

Invest in producer organizations. Local institutions can responsibly and efficiently implement
their activities and limit the need for a project to
establish an implementation unit. Producer federations with adequate project support improved
their efficiency and internal governance (quality
of records, meetings, actions taken, satisfaction
of members). Demand-driven funds that supported physical investments and equipment were
more effective than those focused only on soft
investments.

■

Two channels for research proposals (from
researchers and from users) provided flexibility.
They made it possible to respond to producers’
immediate concerns as well as opportunities identified by scientists.
Complement core funding with competitive funding. Together, these two mechanisms guarantee that
institutional development continues. Funding for
operating costs goes directly to research teams working on projects relevant to users, to whom they are
accountable. Core funding for developing human
resources is essential to elicit relevant proposals of
good quality.
Specific pro-poor strategies must be designed into
the project. The project’s second phase seems to
have had a greater impact in richer households than
poorer households.

Sources: Diaw, Samba, and Arcand 2009 on impact assessment of Phase 2 of PASAOP; World Bank Project Appraisal Documents
for Phases 1 and 2 of PSAOP; World Bank Implementation and Completion Report for PSAOP.
Note: PSAOP = Programme d’Appui aux Services Agricoles et aux Organisations Paysannes; ANCAR = Agence Nationale de
Conseil Agricole et Rural; FNRAA = Fonds National pour la Recherche Agricole et Agro-Alimentaire; CLCOP = Cadre Local de
Consultation des Organisations de Producteurs.

agricultural problems. Farmers (and others) participate in
monitoring and evaluating the results. Some participatory
research is done in farmers’ fields. This approach is
particularly suited to agriculture-based countries in which
resources are at a premium and farmers are often isolated
from others in the AIS. The approach allows research
organizations to complement their programs in cultivar
improvement and crop management with work on more
integrated and natural resource management issues, such as
common resource management of pastures, shared water
resources, fisheries, and communal forests, and incorporate
gender and community-based development perspectives
through farmer organizations, forest user groups, and local
savings and credit associations.
Codesign approaches. Codesign approaches (discussed in
detail in TN 4) seek better articulation between the supply
of research (from researchers) and demand for research
(from users). Researchers engage systematically with a
heterogeneous set of actors, which may include farmers,
input suppliers, traders, processors, researchers, NGOs, and
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government officials in the iterative, adaptive, and flexible
process of developing innovations. The core principles of
codesign include joint planning, implementation, and
decision making related to all activities that foster
innovation; close coordination among stakeholders at all
strategic and operational levels; and combining scientific,
other technical, and local knowledge and other resources.
Codesign is often used when problems are complex
and/or the scale involved is challenging. Examples include
the shared management of a dwindling natural resource
held in common (a forest or water source, for example); the
period of adjustment to new policies or market operations;
the development of shared understanding of problems and
their solutions, when there is potential to do so; and problems for which previously designed solutions or scientific
and technical knowledge are not available. Given the issues
of scale involved in such a large group of actors and their
numerous concerns, codesign relies on at least some of
the concerned stakeholders to have the experience and
skills to facilitate, coordinate, and negotiate multistakeholder efforts (module 1). The Papa Andina program
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implemented in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru successfully
combined and applied codesign and innovation platform
approaches (TN 4, box 4).
■

Innovation platforms. Innovation platforms (or networks and forums) assemble stakeholders to share information, identify opportunities, discuss problems, and agree
on joint activities related to a shared interest, often with a
specific commodity/cluster focus. They usually provide a
means for many participants to exchange opinions but tend
to imply less commitment to addressing the needs
identified, compared to codesign approaches, consortiums,
or competitive grant schemes. Innovation platforms focus
on all kinds of innovation, not necessarily research alone,
and they may be led by actors other than researchers. Even
so, they present an important venue and opportunity for
many research organizations to engage with other AIS
actors, improve their understanding of how they can best
fit into the AIS, and develop partnerships. In transforming
countries, innovation platforms are likely to be more
mature than in agriculture-based countries, where public
support and funding are prerequisites for success. The key
assets or contributions by each actor in the interface may
be explicit (for example, they may consist of scientific or
market information, tools, and materials, both proprietary
and nonproprietary) or more implicit (such as the
capacity to manage complex projects, move technologies
through regulatory processes, or market and distribute
new products).
Examples of innovation platforms include the Central
America Learning Alliance, a multistakeholder network that
promotes rural enterprise development (IAP 4), and the
innovation network that promoted zero-tillage cultivation
practices in Argentina (module 1, IAP 1). Papa Andina
(TN 4) and the client-oriented research management
approach (box 4.22 in TN 5) apply both nonmarket and
market-based strategies.
Investment needs in participatory and codesign
approaches and innovation platforms. Specific investments improve the likelihood that these approaches and
platforms will function more successfully.
■

Invest in researchers’ capacity to work in innovation
systems. Researchers must have the capacity to diagnose
innovation systems and the ability to participate in and
sometimes facilitate group processes involving people
with diverse stakes in a commodity or value chain. Aside
from their technical and scientific expertise, they will

■

■

■

■

need the skills involved for organizing actors, coordinating activities, and consulting, negotiating, monitoring,
and evaluating.
Invest in other partners’ skills. Farmers, universities,
NGOs, the private sector, and others will need skills in
designing partnerships, building trust, and effective
communication. Farmer organizations often need help
in learning how to articulate their demands, establish
links to local government, and engage in social learning
and experimentation to innovate rather than simply
demonstrate or accept technological “fixes.”
Invest in bringing people together. Operational funds
are needed to run committees and cover the costs of faceto-face, facilitated group meetings (coordination, facilitation) and the collective action that are inherent to
collaboration at all stages of the codesign process.
Invest in innovation brokers. A good facilitator or a
project team is required to take an initiative forward.
Innovation brokers can limit the failures that occur
when different interests and conflicting agendas frustrate initiatives designed to foster partnership. They
can also reduce competition between the public and
private sectors, creating a more coordinated approach
to problem solving. Innovation brokers do not often
emerge of their own accord. Their facilitation role
needs to be funded, supported, and linked to activities
in research, extension, and the broader innovation
system.
Invest in incentives for participation. These incentives
often take the form of funding that makes partnerships
work: operational costs and costs of joint R&D.
Invest in value chain analysis and development. Investments in value chain development are a key entry
point for research organizations in transforming countries
to contribute solutions that enhance the benefits (and
lower the costs) to actors along the value chain. Tools
such as value chain analyses—including participatory
approaches to such analyses—can identify constraints
and market opportunities at different stages of the value
chain as well as entry points for support.

Research and innovation consortiums. Consortiums
are more formal mechanisms than networks or innovation
platforms. They bring together diverse partners around a
specific and common problem requiring research
investment, jointly define R&D strategies, and finance and
implement the subsequent research-innovation project.
They often—but do not necessarily—focus on applied
R&D. Consortiums often require multidisciplinary teams
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consisting of private, public, civil society, and producer
actors. Most consortiums have a lead organization, and
each partner has a specific role and commits resources.
Contributions from a range of actors, including private
enterprises, cover various aspects of R&D (demand
identification, R&D investment, technology transfer and
adoption). Consortiums are often funded through competitive grants (which match funds to resources mobilized
by partners) for a limited period.
Australia (box 4.8) and the Netherlands (box 1.14 in
module 1, TN 1) are examples of mature urban innovation
contexts where a consortium approach helped R&D meet
specific challenges. Consortium approaches have shown
promise in transforming countries; see the discussions of
approaches in India (IAP 2) and Chile (IAP 3).

Technology transfer and commercialization
approaches to integrating private actors

Technology transfer is the foundation of many research programs in agriculture-based countries and prevalent in transforming and urbanized countries. Transforming and more
mature innovation contexts increasingly rely on formal
transfers of technology from public research organizations,
universities, and the private sector. Such technology may
require IP protection and/or other legal agreements that
transfer property rights to commercial or international
partners. Many of the technology transfer and commercialization approaches in these countries build on approaches
introduced earlier, but they require a higher level of capacity with respect to advanced science and technology,
complex regulatory systems, IP protection, sophisticated

Box 4.8 Design of the Australian National Agricultural Innovation System

Australia’s AIS is one of the most dynamic and successful in the world. Direct engagement of producers
through their financing and oversight of commodityfocused (mainly applied) research was the primary
mechanism for gaining insight into the needs and
demands of key user-groups. Sharpened priority setting, increasingly involving ex ante economic analysis
of competing proposals along with ex post impact
assessments, has been the hallmark of the approach.
Agricultural research intensity has been maintained at
nearly 0.04 of agricultural GDP, among the highest levels in the world, and total factor productivity for agriculture has been close to 2 percent per year since the
major reforms in the agricultural research system
began in the mid-1980s.
A key feature of the reforms is the creation of
Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs), which are joint
agreements between research providers to undertake
R&D in particular areas. CRCs must comprise at least
one Australian end-user (either from the private,
public, or community sector) and one Australian
institution of higher education (or research institute
affiliated with a university). These institutions work
for a limited period (generally seven years) to resolve
technological problems in a multidisciplinary fashion.
The involvement of universities and their disciplinary
expertise is especially important for linking industry

demand to academic centers of excellence in joint
problem-solving.
Traditionally Australia has invested relatively heavily in agricultural research through a blend of public
and private (producer levy) funds, which were largely
used by federal and state government agencies with
some producer oversight through farmer membership
on various advisory committees and an institutional
watchdog (the Productivity Commission for institutional learning and ensuring accountability). Producer
funding was matched equally by federal government
support of up to 1 percent of respective commodity
GDP.
A key lesson is that a charismatic change leader with
a relevant vision is critical. In this case, it was a minister of primary industries, who was insightful and
effective (originally a farmer, then a research agricultural economist and a politician). The strong (albeit
less than perfect) accountability mechanisms built
into the new processes, such as the CRCs, surely
helped greatly. A major lesson for other countries
is that, given the inherent complexity of the AIS, it is
critical for public policy analysts to keep pursuing
their understanding of the realities and opportunities in agricultural research as it evolves and to keep
a sharp eye on the effectiveness of institutional
arrangements.

Source: Jock Anderson, personal communication.
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markets and market infrastructure, and international trade
considerations.
The capacity to manage formal technology transfer
mechanisms is critical to engage effectively in publicprivate partnerships and, increasingly, to transfer technologies that can be disseminated through market channels.
Technology transfer offices are special units affiliated with a
research organization or university with a mandate to identify and protect as well as facilitate the use and commercialization of research results. These offices can expand the
recognition of the research organization’s work (thereby
strengthening public perceptions of its value), move technologies to end-users (seed companies, farmers) on an
exclusive or nonexclusive basis, and generate revenues to
fund continuous research.
Technology transfer offices can provide special expertise
on IP protection and/or legal agreements and contribute to
formal transfers of technology from public organizations
or universities or from the private sector to commercial or
international partners (see box 6.20 in TN 3 of module 6
and TN 5 in module 5. Several examples of this interface
have been used successfully to disseminate hybrid parent
lines of pearl millet and sorghum in India, with substantial
improvement in the availability of improved seed and
yields for small-scale farmers in semiarid and arid tropics
(Gowda et al. 2004; Pray and Nagarajan 2009). Aside from

technology transfer offices, other pathways to technology
transfer may be applied (summarized in box 4.9).
Some technology transfer offices also host incubators to
help technology-oriented firms (often established by
researchers) commercialize new technology. Incubators
provide hands-on management assistance, access to
financing, business and technical support services, shared
office space, and access to equipment. For details, see module 5, TN 3.
Science park approaches. Science parks (also called technology or research parks) are a mechanism for fostering
public-private partnerships in more mature innovation
contexts.1 Science parks are organizations managed by
specialized professionals, whose main aim is to increase local
wealth by promoting a culture of innovation and improving
the competitiveness of local businesses and knowledge-based
institutions. A science park stimulates and manages the flow
of knowledge and technology among universities, R&D
institutions, companies, and markets; facilitates the creation
and growth of innovation-based companies through
incubation and spin-off processes; and provides other valueadded services together with high-quality space and facilities.
Science parks function best where there is investment
capital from the private sector, industrial engineering
expertise, and a sufficient knowledge and technology base.

Box 4.9 Technology Transfer Pathways

Technology transfer agreements. The classic example
of technology transfer agreements is the formal
exchange of breeding materials for crop improvement,
typically from international research centers or universities in industrialized countries to national research
organizations in developing countries. Scientists and
research managers in developing countries require
additional skills to understand the increasingly complex material transfer and intellectual property agreements that govern technology transfer; they must also
expand their linkages to international and regional science networks. Great success has been achieved with
technology transfer programs (for example, for wheat
and rice improvement in Asia, NERICA rice in Africa,
and orange-fleshed sweet potato in several postconflict
countries in Africa).

Commercialization programs. These programs create windows for private companies or entrepreneurs to
access public research outputs and move them into
commercial use. Often this approach is used to move
improved breeding material from public research
organizations to private seed companies. For example,
the Hybrid Parents Research Consortiums of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics have provided more than 35 Indian companies
with improved sorghum, pearl millet, and pigeonpea
lines for commercial use. The program for Sustainable
Commercialization of Seeds in Africa, the Eastern and
Southern Africa Seed Alliance, and the West Africa Seed
Alliance are also designed to improve the private sector’s access to breeding materials and strengthen its
seed marketing capacity.

Source: Authors.
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As discussed in the module overview, they are a useful nexus
between the private sector and research institutes (particularly universities), taking promising research products to
market and providing backstopping for product modification. Their diverse services include facilitating the creation
of public-private partnerships for research, providing infrastructure, and providing other services, including business
development. The scope of this note does not allow the
numerous science parks to be discussed in detail (including
China’s agricultural demonstration and technology parks;
CIAT’s Agronatura, and France’s Agropolis); see module 5,
IAP 1 on the incubator affiliated with the Agri-Science Park
of the International Crops Research Institute for the SemiArid Tropics (ICRISAT).

stakeholders (see module 6, IAP 1 for a matching grant
scheme to develop agribusiness in Zambia). Matching
grants require a financial commitment from the beneficiaries (farmers, entrepreneurs) and therefore may be more
effective than competitive research grants at enhancing the
dissemination and use of knowledge and technology. They
are also better suited for funding overall innovation and
activities requiring private sector engagement.
Both competitive research grants and matching grants
involve short- to medium-term funding arrangements.
They should complement, never substitute for, stable
funding for long-term research, private sector development, human resource development, and infrastructure
maintenance and development.

Financing mechanisms for multistakeholder
approaches

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Transforming and mature countries often demonstrate a
higher level of complexity and capacity when it comes to
funding research organizations and activities, especially
where functioning markets exist alongside an organized agricultural sector. Aside from public core funding for research, a
great number of funding mechanisms or other arrangements
(such as levies on sales, public-private partnerships, cofinancing with farmer organizations and trade associations,2 R&D
tax deductions, joint ventures, or research partnerships, see
IAP 3 on Chile) incentivize and reduce the transaction and
risk management costs associated with collaborative research
(for a summary on financing agricultural innovation, see
module 5, TN 6). This TN briefly describes the two main
mechanisms—competitive research grants and matching
grants—which are described in detail in module 5, TN 2.
Competitive research grants are a common mechanism for
funding basic, strategic, and applied research through competition based on scientific peer review. The aim is to focus scientists’ efforts on high-priority research or new fields of
expertise, improve the relevance and quality of agricultural
research, promote research partnerships, and leverage research
resources (from the public or private sector). See IAP 2 for an
example of a competitive research grant scheme to promoting
multistakeholder consortiums in India (World Bank 2010).
Funds for competitive grant schemes usually come from the
public sector and are managed by a public or semiautonomous organization. Competitive grants have been used to
fund consortiums working on specific research themes.
Matching grants are used for financing near-market technology generation, technology transfer and adoption, or
business-related innovation, often by including multiple
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The immediate benefits of these investments are straightforward. Research organizations gain greater relevance and
responsiveness, ultimately leading to greater impact on agricultural development, food security, and poverty reduction.
In many agriculture-based countries, these impacts are
measured in terms of increased yields (output per unit of
land) and production (total output).
Where markets operate with some degree of efficiency,
potential benefits may include higher returns to crop cultivation (Kaaria et al. 2009; Thiele et al. forthcoming;
Devaux et al. 2009, 2010; Cavatassi et al. 2009). Potential
benefits also extend to improvements in gender aspects of
agricultural development, such as changes in the household assets owned by men and women.
Beyond the immediate benefits to productivity, output,
and welfare, these approaches carve out a niche for research
organizations within a rapidly changing agricultural landscape. They provide research organizations with new clients
and markets as well as access to new resources and assets. In
urbanized systems particularly, an improved interface
between research and other AIS actors may accelerate the
rate of innovation by bringing the best science to bear on
real problems and ensuring that sufficient resources are
allocated to solving problems. The research system will
become more responsive to the demands of society because
users such as farmers and consumers have many different
pathways to express their needs.

POLICY ISSUES

Most issues related to the policies and governance structures that enable research institutions to participate more
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fully and successfully in the AIS are detailed in
module 6. A few key issues should be mentioned here,
however.
■

■

■

■

■

Sustainability requires managerial and structural
reforms. Research organizations often organize their personnel and assets by discipline, but this form of organization makes it costly to bring personnel and assets
together to resolve problems in agricultural value chains.
Management and structural reforms are vital to overcome this barrier; see the discussion in TN 5.
Institutional change and reform require stable, longterm support. Efforts to encourage research organizations to interface with other user-groups and respond to
their demands require considerable time, effort, and
resources. Policy makers must commit the time, space,
and funding to implement reforms and build the related
capacity.
The participation of civil society, including women,
may require specific policy initiatives. Farmer associations and community-based organizations cannot
operate in their members’ interests in an environment
hostile to grassroots and women’s participation. Policies to foster equitable participation and social mobilization can (for example) provide operational funds to
build marginalized groups’ capacity to participate,
cover the costs of their participation, and require that
financing mechanisms have specific criteria to promote
inclusiveness.
Are public funds used where they are most needed? A
value chain approach with a focus on multiple stakeholders can lead public research organizations to serve
those who need their services least. Research organizations typically struggle with such trade-offs. For example, should they develop technologies for high-potential
agricultural areas where the gains are likely to be high,
or should they concentrate on technologies suited to
both high- and low-potential areas? Decisions on how
to address these tradeoffs require strong leadership
from policy makers to ensure that public funds are used
as intended.
Foster a conducive investment environment. The key
policy issue for a mature innovation system is to create a
climate that supports private sector participation and
development. Policies are needed for public research to
contribute to private participation (through sound regulatory frameworks, for example) and also to ensure that
women and the poor are included in the activities and
benefits of innovation.

LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons related to designing agricultural
research linkages within an AIS are grouped into general lessons, lessons on the approaches that are best in particular
innovation contexts (agriculture-based, transforming, and
mature urban countries), and lessons related to particular
mechanisms linking research to other AIS actors.
General lessons:
■

■

■

■

■

While large structural reforms are a good investment,
smaller, more evolutionary, and incremental approaches
to systemic change sometimes work best. Invest in
stepwise efforts to engage diverse user-groups, define
problems collectively, build joint action plans, develop
internal capacity, and learn through iterative processes.
Such interventions sometimes involve only short-lived
projects, marginalized administrative units, short-term
bridge financing, or small team initiatives, but they foster responsiveness, dynamism, and competitiveness.
Often they are more grounded in a specific innovation
challenge.
Experiences from industrialized countries can prove
instructive. For example, Australia’s approach to formalizing joint public and industry funding for its rural research
program, and its regular and broadly consultative review
of progress, could be effective in other contexts.
Invest in a mix of integrated approaches. The appropriate
mix depends on the specific circumstances of a country’s
agricultural research system, but it could involve a combination of formal research/innovation governance arrangements, participatory or codesign research approaches, and
more commercially oriented approaches and financing
mechanisms.
Approach capacity strengthening more comprehensively and iteratively than in the past. Bench scientists
require management training to interact effectively with
other AIS stakeholders and ultimately improve the quality and impact of their research. Develop courses and
learning materials based on experimentation and rigorous assessments of approaches that work or do not work
in different contexts. To create a critical mass of
researchers with skills suited to the AIS, integrate participatory processes and innovation network techniques
into agricultural education systems.
Organizations also need new capacities and incentives to
reform. The ability of researchers and research organizations to leverage constructive interactions at some lower
experimental level depends on the signals—authorization,
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encouragement, or financing—from higher levels. In
designing and implementing strategies to facilitate interactions and linkages, incentives and motivating factors
among staff and leaders of research organizations (and
other organizations with which they interact) must be
assessed with care. Organizations need to enhance support
for risk-taking managers and collaborative teams experimenting with learning approaches—but coupled with
periodic external evaluations. Change of the kind
described here requires strong, long-term leadership and
political commitment in addition to incentives.

Lessons related to specific mechanisms:
■

Lessons specific to particular innovation contexts:
■

■

■
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In agriculture-based countries, improve researchers’
responsiveness to farmers’ needs and increase access to
global science and technology through a diversified,
cross-cutting approach to participatory research and
technology transfer. Strengthen individuals’ capacity to
use participatory approaches by building skills in facilitation, negotiation, conflict prevention and resolution,
building relationships and trust, and developing the rules
of the game. Broaden research organizations’ access to
technology by expanding their links to international science networks and their understanding of complex
material transfer and IP agreements.
In transforming countries, use combined market/nonmarket approaches (making use of the skills just
described) to engage the private sector more actively
and encourage opportunity-driven entrepreneurship.
Public sector orchestration and financing are key to
addressing transaction costs (of collective action and
negotiation, for example), reducing risk, and providing
incentives. Innovation networks and platforms are vital
tools to identify opportunities, set priorities, and influence the research agenda.
In urban countries, policy makers and practitioners can
invest in sophisticated competitive funding mechanisms. The channels through which user groups articulate their needs should be advanced enough to ensure
that science, technology, and innovation respond to market opportunities and that public research organizations
work alongside the private sector and other stakeholders.

■

■

■

■

Pay careful attention to the design of multistakeholder
approaches and platforms, because they do not work in
all contexts. These platforms need good facilitation to
bring stakeholders (with their potentially divisive power
relationships, capacity differences, and levels of interest)
together. To sustain these programs, enhance negotiation
and conflict management, improve the representation of
poor and marginalized farmers, fully fund communication and knowledge management, and clearly define
roles and functions of advisory committees, secretariats,
and members. Engagement of high-level policy makers is
often crucial.
It takes time to form and sustain networks or platforms.
These interfaces require clear priorities, roles, and milestones. Substantive capacity strengthening of all partners
in partnership design, trust-building, and effective communication is required for these approaches to work,
along with incentives for participation.
Consortium approaches have the advantage of a
problem-oriented focus. This focus permits the definition of partners’ objectives, goals, and responsibilities,
which in turn permits better management and evaluation of the collaborative effort. The disadvantage is that
the reason for collaboration ends the moment that the
problem ceases to need attention.
Innovation brokers play an important role in facilitating change in an innovation system. More formal
approaches to innovation brokering include the use of
research coordination councils, committees, and other
bodies (see module 1, TN 2).
Analyze the pros and cons of new funding mechanisms
carefully before introducing them. Matching grants
may better suit innovation contexts where private sector engagement is crucial and where dissemination
requires significant attention. Competitive research
grants can develop high-quality research portfolios,
but they tend to have high operational costs and have
been ineffective in engaging the private sector and
disseminating knowledge and technology. Small
research systems may not allow sufficient scope for real
competition.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 2

Building and Strengthening Public-Private
Partnerships in Agricultural Research
Frank Hartwich, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

SYNOPSIS

ften the challenges of developing country agriculture can be met only by pooling the limited
public and private resources available and
unleashing innovative potential out of critical interaction.
Investments that support the building and conduct of
research partnerships can lead to more substantial and
viable research that fosters social and development needs
while not getting overshadowed by private interests. Before
providing financial support to public-private partnerships,
public and development agencies must determine whether
the partners’ interests and objectives are sufficiently mutual
and whether the partnership will generate synergies from
joint use of knowledge and resources. If these conditions are
met, brokering a partnership arrangement is a powerful
means to foster agricultural research.

O

RATIONALE FOR INVESTING IN PUBLICPRIVATE RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS

The innovation system approach extends the conventional
argument for public investments in agricultural research1 by
saying that a single organization, be it private or public, may
not be able to assemble the necessary resources, capacities,
and knowledge to generate and diffuse innovations. (See also
module 5, TN 1.) The increasingly blurred roles of the public
and private sectors in agricultural research can be seen in the
rise of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The two sectors
are redefining their traditional division of labor as their overlapping interests and the benefits of combining resources lead
both of them to engage in both types of research (Hall et al.
2001; Hartwich and Negro 2010; Muraguri 2010). Some of
the implications of this mixed panorama in agricultural
research are summarized in box 4.10.
In PPPs, at least one public and one private organization share resources, knowledge, and risks to achieve a

match of interests and jointly deliver products and services.2 In agricultural research, PPPs can be seen as arrangements that bring together partners with different skills and
knowledge to contribute jointly to the generation, adaptation, and/or diffusion of an innovation. Usually the
partnership agreement is in the form of a contract that
establishes each partner’s commitments and the distribution of benefits.
PPPs in agricultural research can be set up not only to
generate knowledge via research but to foster the diffusion
and application of knowledge among private actors
(agribusinesses, farmers) as well as public actors (universities, research institutes, and extension agencies). In this
respect, PPPs can be distinguished by their contributions to
the research-development continuum (table 4.3). Some
partnerships also engage in a mix of types of research and
development; research-based activities precede the stage of
product development.
PPPs can be distinguished further according to the partners engaged. Common partners are research institutes,
universities, extension agencies in the public sector, and
producer associations, businesses, and individual producers
in the private sector. Many partnerships involve a public
research organization that has the main responsibility for
conducting the research, but in others a private entity conducts the research and public agencies diffuse and/or fund
the research. Other types of organizations engaged in partnerships include farmer and community groups, private
associations, investment and sector development promotion bodies, and funding agencies. Often more than two
parties are engaged; depending on the leading partner one
can distinguish PPPs led by private enterprises, research
institutes and universities, government (ministries), and so
on. For an example of PPPs among public research organizations, the private sector, and farmer organizations, see
module 5, IAP 2.

289

Box 4.10 Public-Private Partnerships and the Changing Roles of Public and Private Agents in
Agricultural Research

■

■

■

PPPs are more than an organizational solution
between market and hierarchy; they are arrangements that maximize benefits by using the creativity
and synergy of collective action to respond simultaneously to public and private needs.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) generate social
benefits in the way that they leverage resources from
the private sector and combine them with public
resources. In this way, additional resources and
capacities become available to address pressing
research issues.
PPPs can be instrumental in increasing the overall
volume of agricultural research, although developing countries may not replace public funds substituted by private funds (and match levels of private
investment in more developed countries).

■

■

To develop and improve their image in line with
public goals and respond to corporate responsibility
criteria, private companies will partner with the
public sector. Corporate social responsibility alone
is not a good motivation for PPPs that want to promote sustainable businesses, however.
It is simplistic to reduce the private sector’s interest
in agricultural research to the development of private goods that can be protected by IPRs. In fact,
private partners in only a small fraction of 124 PPPs
in agricultural and agro-industrial research in Latin
America were interested in protecting property
rights; the few examples occurred only in seed companies. Apparently private companies benefit more
from the synergistic use of resources than from
protecting the IP of research results.

Source: Hartwich and Tola 2007.

Table 4.3 Types of Research Subject to PublicPrivate Partnerships
Type of research
Creative research partnerships that
generate and explore new scientific
finding
Applied research partnerships that use
an existing research methodology to
generate new solutions
Development-oriented research
partnerships that focus on the
development of products
Diffusion-oriented partnerships that
promote the dissemination of
developed knowledge and
technology

Example
Biotechnological exploration
of compounds in
pharmaceutical plants
Development of a plant
variety that resists a
new pathogen
Development of a new
potato chip
A seed multiplication
program supporting
dissemination of a
particular plant variety

Source: Author.

INVESTMENT OPTIONS FOR SUPPORTING
PUBLIC-PRIVATE RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS

PPPs become interesting subjects for investment in two
ways. First, they constitute product development mechanisms that foster collaboration for innovation that otherwise would not occur. For example, a private company and
a public research institute may not collaborate in the
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development and diffusion of a new pest-management
technology simply because they are not informed about
their common interest and complementary capacities. In
fact, potential partners from the public and private sector
often fail to collaborate because each lacks knowledge
about the other sector and the potential benefits of a partnership. A funding agency could improve information
flows by financing meetings and a platform where these
players can start interacting and identify common interests
to develop a common work agenda.
Second, PPPs constitute funding mechanisms in their
own right that enable a funding agency to engage with
actors in agricultural innovation, particularly the private
sector. (See also IAP 2 and module 5, TN 2 and IAP 2.) For
example, a development agency or donor can use a PPP to
support the efforts of an international agribusiness specializing in dairy products to work with small-scale dairy
producers who initially lack the capacity to participate in
the dairy value chain. The funding agency would ensure
that activities under the partnership would also generate
social benefits, particularly for the small-scale producers.
Quite a number of PPPs have been set up over the past
ten or more years in developing country agriculture
(Hartwich and Tola 2007; Spielman and Hartwich 2009). In
many cases the public and private organizations involved
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found that partnering in research is to their benefit. Examples include partnerships where research reduces the costs
of processing primary products, partnerships that
improved product quality to access higher-value markets,
or partnerships to exchange planting material and outsource seed multiplication to the private sector (boxes
4.11, 4.12, and 4.13.)
The failure of PPPs to fulfill their potential provides the
context for a range of public investment opportunities to
build and improve PPPs for agricultural research. But in
which PPPs should development agents invest? In general, a
precondition for investment in PPPs in agricultural research
is that they should count on financial support from government and development agencies; they should address problems of public concern that require collective action; and
they should pool capacities for innovation. Specific investment opportunities include:
■

Investments in bringing partners together—specifically,
in identifying partners, their common interests, available
resources and competencies, and potential synergies.
One option is to invest in the organization of platforms
that allow public and private organizations interested in
developing and adopting agricultural innovations to
meet, exchange information, and develop joint projects.
Often a neutral broker is needed to facilitate the platform; see module 1 and module 3, TN 4 for examples.

■

■

■

■

Investments in fostering better planning. Investments
can support the design of partnerships that facilitate efficient work and fair distribution of benefits within the
partnership framework.
Investments to partly fund the operation of the partnership, complementing the public contribution. An example of such investments is a fund that provides grants to
research projects conducted in partnership between various organizations. (See also IAP 2 on NAIP in this module and TNs 1 and 2 on PPPs and innovation funds in
module 5.) The fund’s contribution to the partnership
usually depends, among other considerations, on the
partnership’s ability to respond to certain public interests.
Investments to set clear legal rules and framework conditions for partnering. Many public institutions still lack
clear rules to determine when and how they can work
with the private sector; in the end, individual initiatives
determine whether partnerships are set up. Many
research institutes leave it to their legal departments to
screen and approve collaborative research projects.
Investments in coaching partners to ensure that public
and private benefits reach the partners and society.
Often it is not enough to help organizations to set up a
promising partnership. During the partnership, conflicts may arise, partners fail to comply with promises,
and certain framework conditions can change. Support
during the partnership (for example, through a partner-

Box 4.11 Public-Private Partnership for Participatory Research in Potato Production in Ecuador

An international potato chip producer operating in
Ecuador could not procure enough potatoes of suitable
quality to use all of its local processing capacity. The
company tried to provide incentives to farmers through
contract farming and higher prices, with unsatisfactory
results. The company finally determined that on its
own it could not persuade small-scale farmers to
deliver more and higher-quality potatoes. It partnered
with the National Agricultural Research Institute
(INIAP, Instituto Nacional Autónomo de Investigaciones Agropecuarias) to focus on identifying, developing, and distributing potato varieties with the required
processing qualities. The partnership had an extension
component in which INIAP helped farmers adopt the
new varieties, grow them with appropriate management practices, and increase productivity and output.

After some months of negotiation, the partnership
was set up and a formal agreement signed. INIAP provided research and extension capacities while the private company provided funding. A national research
fund contributed additional public funds. The partnership ended after some years because the company had
achieved its objectives.
Factors that enabled the partnership to succeed
included a good match of interests (INIAP sought to
support small-scale farmers, from whom the company
wanted to buy quality potatoes). The partners’ competencies were also well matched: INIAP was expert in
developing and disseminating improved potato varieties, and the company had expertise in evaluating the
cost-reduction and product-improvement potential of
the potato varieties.

Source: Author.
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Box 4.12 Public-Private Partnership for Processing Cashew Nuts in Northern Brazil

In the late 1990s, Brazil’s cashew nut sector was in
ruins. Competition and price variation on the world
market, along with poor product quality and mismanagement, caused the processing industry to go bankrupt, taking a large number of small-scale producers
with it. Producers’ crop remained without buyers, and
they had few alternatives to cashew production.
Brazil’s national agricultural research institute,
EMBRAPA, partnered with a cashew-exporting company and a number of organizations of small-scale
growers to develop and diffuse microprocessing units
for cashews that would be owned and managed by the
grower organizations. Researchers adapted large-scale
processing technology to develop much smaller processing units they called “minifactories” (minifabricas).
The export company provided knowledge of market
demand, product quality, and processing requirements,
as well as some quite limited funding for training
farmers. EMPRAPA covered the main costs of the
partnership, which involved laboratory research and
on-site testing of growers’ processing units.

EMBRAPA constantly exchanged information with
growers and the exporter about the appropriateness
and readiness of the technology. Growers slowly
became familiar with the technology and started to
adapt it to their own needs. Eventually farmers gained
substantial capacity in cashew processing and the
commodity was once again, through the exporting
partners and soon through competing exporters, sold
internationally. Farmer incomes benefited significantly as farmers regained a market for their primary
product and profited from the value added by their
primary processing units. The exporting company
also increased its profits, which benefitted employees
and shareholders. The partnership succeeded because
EMBRAPA’s advance project identification and planning were good, the market for cashews remained
strong, and EMBRAPA and the exporting company
had complementary knowledge and skills (processing
technology in EMPRAPA and market information in
the exporting company).

Source: Author.
Note: EMBRAPA = Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária.

Box 4.13 Public-Private Partnership for Research on New Wheat Varieties in Argentina

A private European company specializing in wheat,
sorghum, and maize seed wanted to benefit from
Argentina’s rapidly expanding market for cereal seed
but knew little of Argentina’s wheat breeding program
over the years. For example, it did not know which specific resistance and tolerance traits had been introduced
(and failed) and which varieties, lines, and breeding
strategies had been used to raise wheat yields. The
national agricultural research institute (INTA, Instituto
Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria), partly funded
through a levy on the agricultural sector, had downsized its wheat breeding program and was looking for
a partner with whom it could exchange information
and genetic material. It was also interested multiplying

certain varieties that it had developed but not tested,
released, or multiplied. The two organizations entered
a partnership that envisioned the exchange of certain
genetic materials to develop and multiply seed of new
varieties. The IP for the resulting varieties would
remain with the public sector, but the seed company
would benefit from seed sales and pay royalties to the
public institute. The partnership was phased out after a
number of years and the company (among others) now
caters to a well-established market for wheat seed. Factors that contributed to the partnership’s success
included their complementary skills (INTA’s excellence
in wheat breeding and the company’s advantages in
seed multiplication and marketing).

Source: Author.
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ship support unit) may be useful. The unit could also
help partners set up an efficient system for monitoring
and evaluating the partnership. For example, CIAT’s
partnership development and facilitation unit has
played this role.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN
PUBLIC-PRIVATE RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS

For a number of important reasons, public and private
organizations participate in research partnerships and
governments encourage them to do so. First, supporting
PPPs in agricultural research provides an opportunity to
improve the performance of agricultural research operations. Research partnerships can also broaden the scope of
research activities, increase efficiency and synergy, access
complementary resources, and promote organizational
learning among the partners (Hagedoorn, Link, and
Vonortas 2000). The potential benefits from funding measures that initiate PPPs and help them operate successfully
can include:
■

■

■

■

■

■

Better use of existing research capacity by allowing public and private partners to form and draw from a greater
critical mass of scientific capacity.
The research process becomes more creative when allowing public and private partners to join complementary
competencies.
Agricultural research productivity and results improve
when public and private partners develop synergies
through the combined use of resources.
Cost-efficiency in agricultural research improves when
public and private partners share costs and benefit from
more efficient private sector management practices.
Research results can arrive more quickly owing to the
private partner’s drive for more immediate results.
Investments in agricultural research for social benefits
increase by identifying compatible private and public
interests and combining private and public sources of
funding.

Boxes 4.11 and 4.12 illustrate how the efficient collaboration of public and private agents in the Ecuadorian potato
industry and the Brazilian cashew nut industry yielded
some of these benefits.
It is important to note that these are potential benefits.
They will be achieved only if a number of conditions are
met. In certain situations partnerships may even “block
competition” and “create monopolies” (Hagedoorn, Link,

and Vonortas 2000:568). In others, particularly in small
developing countries, partnerships may be instrumental in
bringing together the scarce but necessary research
resources.
Aside from potential benefits, potential risks exist. Risks
related to uncertainty and failure are inherent in any
research endeavor, but every partnership also carries a risk
that the partners may not contribute to the partnership as
initially negotiated. Partnership agreements may not be met
for any number of reasons, including changes in the market
and business environment for which the partnership’s products are geared. The legal and government framework may
prove too inflexible for the partnership to progress, or the
framework can change to prevent the public partner from
fulfilling its commitment. Finally, the relationship between
the partners can run into difficulties because of misunderstandings, a clash of cultures, and distrust. For this very reason, partnerships often benefit from investments in building
trust, brokering, and partnership development—both initially and indeed throughout the partnership.
(POLICY) ISSUES OF OUTSOURCING,
SUSTAINABLE FUNDING,
AND PUBLIC GOODS

Governments often use PPPs to outsource service provision
to private companies (improving service provision through
“bringing in private sector efficiency”). In agricultural
research in developing countries, where research capacity is
insufficient both in the public and private sectors, outsourcing is hardly relevant. Instead PPPs aim to maintain public
research facilities and strengthen them with contributions
from and collaboration with the private sector to attain a
critical mass in research.
Partnerships must not persist over time. They are
agreements that help partners reach an end but they are
not an end in themselves. Sustainability over the duration
of the PPP depends on the partnership’s capacity to cover
the related costs of human resources, infrastructure, and
equipment as well as operations, which in itself is positively related to the negotiations and the setting of binding contractual relationships at the start. More than other
contractual relationships, however, partnerships are
prone to financial risks. If one partner loses interest,
changes the strategic focus, or becomes insolvent, the
partnership will lose part of the anticipated contributions
despite any prior commitments.
Core funding is a prerequisite for PPPs established in the
public interest. Competitive grants that require public and
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private collaboration (or vice versa) are one instrument to
develop PPPs. Evidence from competitive grant schemes
for agricultural research in Latin America indicates that
without a solid core budget, public organizations cannot
enter such partnerships from a sufficiently strong position
to negotiate an agreement that reflects their interests
(Echeverría 1998a).

LESSONS LEARNED

Despite the numbers of successful PPPs, the concept is still
under development. In many situations PPPs fail to meet
their potential to improve agriculture and rural livelihoods
in developing countries, for two reasons. First, the number
of PPPs is still very low and cannot match the opportunities
to conduct research and develop innovations by means of
PPPs. Second, many efforts to build partnerships among
public research organizations and the private sector fail to
bring sufficient benefits to both partners; usually one partner profits at the expense of the other (Hartwich and Tola
2007). Nor do most PPPs use their complementary
resources effectively to produce substantial social benefits.
Planning can be weak. Prior to initiating their partnership,
partners do not engage in the necessary negotiations to
clarify their common interests, each partner’s commitments, and the redistribution of benefits. Usually these
partnerships collapse as soon as resources become scarce
and/or accrued benefits are not shared equally.
Experience on the best strategies for supporting collaborative agricultural research and PPPs is mixed (Hall 2006).
Specialists in plant breeding and biotechnology research
stress the value of strengthening public institutions’ awareness of and capacity to manage IPRs (Lewis 2000; Byerlee
and Fischer 2002). Other analysts emphasize the importance of negotiating not only IP issues but other aspects of
benefit sharing and resource commitment (Rausser, Simon,
and Ameden 2000; Vieira and Hartwich 2002; Hall et al.
2003). The following sections discuss some of the most
important lessons from various studies and experiences.

Partnering may not always be the best option

Public research organizations and development funding
agencies that seek to support partnerships need to separate
the wheat from the chaff. Promoting and financing partnerships simply for their own sake is not useful. Partnerships may not produce good results, and in many situations
another solution is more appropriate. For example, a public research agency may consider contracting the services of
a private laboratory. A private company may prefer to set
up its own research unit rather than collaborate with public researchers.
Motivation matters

Governments and funding agencies that want to support
partnerships need to assess prospective partners’ motivations for entering a partnership. According to Spielman
and Hartwich (2009), one can distinguish between:
■

■

Representational partnerships, in which one partner
joins the partnership for prestige without contributing
knowledge and/or resources.
Outsourcing partnerships, in which one partner seeks to
outsource research and diffusion activities to another.

Box 4.14 Indicators for Evaluating
Public-Private Partnerships
in Agricultural Research

■

■

■

■

■

Public-private partnerships as funding opportunities

PPPs are a mechanism through which funding agencies can
build collaborative research as well as an arrangement into
which they can inject public funds. In a partnership to
develop wheat varieties such as the one in Argentina
described in box 4.13, public research funds (for example, a
competitive grant) would support the partnership financially while ensuring that social benefits are met.
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■
■
■

Costs of interaction among the partners,
including time for negotiation as well as cost of
communication and monitoring compliance.
Contribution of each partner to the partnership
in terms of human resources and expenditure.
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
of the partnership as perceived by partners, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders.
Mapping of communication and information
flows among individuals in the partnership.
Anecdotal information on the history and functioning of the partnership as perceived by partners, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders.
Joint authorship of publications by partners.
Attribution of patents and user rights.
Intensity of use of research results by each of
the partners.

Source: Author.

■

■

■

Competency-led partnerships, in which one partner is
trying to tap into the competencies of another.
Finance partnerships, in which one partner aims to
secure complementary funding.
Co-innovation partnerships, in which one or both partners try to reach a critical mass in research and synergy
in developing innovations.

This last type of partnership, with its focus on adding
value through collaboration, is the partnership in which
public development agencies will mostly want to invest.

Importance of brokers

Evidence from Latin America indicates that PPP-promoting
agents, acting as brokers in the public interest, play a crucial
role in building partnerships, particularly to motivate potential partners, build trust among them, and provide credibility
to partnership initiatives (Hartwich et al. 2007). Gradually, as
common interests are identified and partnerships are formalized, the roles and contributions of partners need to be
negotiated to ensure that partnership arrangements are in
alignment with partners’ interests, their capacities, and the
prevailing technological and market opportunities.

Lack of planning

Through inappropriate planning and management, PPPs
often fail to use their complementary resources effectively
and benefit both the public and the private sector. It helps to
develop a clear contract specifying the resources each partner
will commit over the project period as well as the use of the
research results, including IPRs and payment of royalties
(boxes 4.12, 4.13). It can also be useful to strengthen partners’
capacities in negotiating partnerships as well as in planning
and implementing activities under partnership agreements.
As noted, for many PPPs, protection of IP is not always a
priority. IPRs often are of minor or no concern to the private partners, who are interested instead in public sector
support to obtain primary materials for newly developed
and/or quality products and eventually market them to consumers. Research on new varieties may be the exception
here. In the partnership described in box 4.13, any varieties
developed remained public goods, and the seed company
had to pay royalties on sales of those varieties. The main aim
of the seed company was to market very good varieties
(which it could not develop on its own) to complement its
existing product portfolio. (See module 6, TN 3 on IPR and
module 5, TN 5 on technology transfer offices.)

Learning and evaluation

M&E is a particular challenge in partnerships. Many criteria can be used to evaluate the outcomes and impacts of
agricultural research, but evaluating collaborative processes
is different and onerous for several reasons. First, partnerships can involve multiple and heterogeneous partners and
stakeholders with different goals. Second, it is difficult to
monitor the joint use of knowledge and other resources by
partners. Third, partnerships change over time and in
response to internal and external conditions. Finally, there
is the inherent difficulty in attributing benefits to the collaboration itself and not to partners’ individual activities
(de Bruijn and van der Voort n.d.). A unified framework
for the evaluation of research partnerships does not exist,
and little progress on this issue has been reported in the
literature (Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonortas 2000; Serafin,
Bustamante, and Schramm 2008). Box 4.14 lists some
indicators that, despite these difficulties, may help in monitoring and evaluating the success of collaborative research
processes.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR
PUBLIC-PRIVATE RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS

Public funding agencies that want to invest in PPPs should
consider five minimum conditions that must be met beforehand (Hartwich et al. 2008):
■

■

■

■

■

The existence of a common interest which, during initial
negotiations, needs to be agreed upon by the partners.
For example, setting up a partnership for developing a
new pesticide could unleash substantial synergies among
the partners, but the pesticide itself could be so harmful
to people and the environment that public involvement
could not be justified.
Each partner must show a clear commitment that goes
beyond shared interest. Commitments must come in the
form of time and resources allocated to the partnership.
The individual benefits of each of the partners must outweigh their individual costs; otherwise partners have no
incentive to engage in the partnership.
Benefits must be distributed proportionally. One partner
cannot reap a large share of the benefits while the other
receives only a marginal payoff.
Overall benefits must outweigh overall costs. Without
this synergy, there is no justification to engage in any
partnership. The costs of collaborating would outweigh
the benefits, and for one of the partners it would be better to pursue the goal alone. This last condition puts
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PPPs in the context of innovation systems, suggesting
that mechanisms of collective action, joint learning, and
complementary use of resources are all operational in the
development and diffusion of innovation.
In conclusion, investing in PPPs makes sense where
there is agreement on objectives, strong commitments,
some added value through partnering, and a fair distribution of benefits. PPPs that are badly designed, fragile,
and/or result in a public subsidy to private organizations
do not represent value for public investment. Partnerships
should also have a limited time period. Funding agencies
should particularly exclude from funding any partnerships
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that evolve spontaneously in the search of funding opportunities or prestige.
A public funding agency may find few of these partnerships in place, however, and could consider helping to build
adequate partnerships. If after a period of support and brokerage a PPP shows signs of complying with the criteria just
mentioned, it can be considered for further funding.
Finally, any PPP that is up and running can benefit from
continuous support to its management that helps sustain it
until the end. Given the complex relations prevalent in partnerships, tension is to be expected, and a funding agency
should consider the support for partnership management as
a promising opportunity.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 3

Regional Research in an Agricultural Innovation
System Framework: Bringing Order to Complexity
Howard Elliott, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

pontaneous self-organization will not be sufficient
for a strong regional AIS to emerge. The emergence
of a regional AIS will require compatible organizations and institutions that can bond, a timely and adequate
concentration of resources, and a sustained infusion of
resources. Proposed initiatives should be assessed against
six basic criteria for their contributions to national and
regional innovation systems. First, participants in a
regional arrangement must developed and share a vision of
mutual benefit and make a formal commitment prior to
concrete investments. Second, the regional arrangement
should lead to greater efficiency in research for development, especially through economies of scope and scale.
Participants must understand that the gain from research is
not where the expenditure is made but where the benefits
are used. Third, the research design and approval process
must ensure research quality and relevance. Investment in
strong M&E is necessary to gain political support. Fourth,
regional arrangements must improve national capacity,
especially in the smaller countries. Fifth, a regional AIS
should foster collective action on shared challenges that
cannot be addressed by a single nation, especially transboundary problems of a regional public good nature. At
some point, an innovation system may emerge as participants become aware of their connectedness and begin to
coordinate through information flows, markets, and new
organizations. A sequence of many small investments leading towards collaboration, collective action, and stepwise
integration is needed. Finally, sustainable regional organizations will require a higher-order political and financial
mechanism committed to a regional strategy. Self-sustaining
regional centers can emerge when a host-country institution
accepts a regional role and has a business model that sustains
it through a national core commitment, research grants, service fees, and projects.

Regional agricultural research has a long history rooted in
colonial initiatives and commercial crops (in West Africa
or South Asia, for example). In most instances these initiatives came to an end with independence. Regional and
subregional organizations emerged again in the 1980s,
when several regions sought to address challenges they
would or could not address alone. They also wanted to
strengthen their influence over the networks of international centers operating in their regions. The new arrangements were expected to lead to greater regional ownership
of research and economies of scale and scope. Not all
regions were organized in the same way. All evolved in
path-dependent ways.

S

■

■

■

■

Asia and the Pacific had APAARI,1 which included both
giants like India and China and the microsystems of the
Pacific without any subregional associations.
The Near East and North Africa was covered by a similar organization, AARINENA,2 without differentiation.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the rationale for subregional
programs focused on economies of scale and scope, the
development of regional public goods, and the need to
create regional capacity to compensate for weak NARSs.
In addition, the subregional organizations emerged
politically to bring coordination and ownership to networks run by the CGIAR research centers. The pioneer
subregional organization for Africa was SACCAR,3 created in 1984 to serve the frontline countries surrounding
then-apartheid South Africa. It was followed by CORAF
in 1987 (as a Francophone group), ASARECA in 1994,4
and CORAF/WECARD in 1997 (to include Anglophone
countries).5
In Latin America, PROCISUR6 served as the forerunner
and model for other subregional organizations: PROCIANDINO in the Andes, PROCITROPICOS in the
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Amazon,7 and in Central America and the Caribbean.
Successful regional commodity programs also developed.
Every subregional organization evolves within its unique
combination of constraints and driving forces. Latin America offers several rich experiences from which sub-Saharan
Africa can benefit. Latin American countries have used their
middle-income status to invest in agriculture as a dynamic
sector. Strong rural organization and fiscal systems that
leave resource-based revenues in the regions are often
important elements in this strategy (box 4.15).
Many regional and subregional initiatives have strengthened particular components of an innovation system at the
national level, but they have been faced variously with
national free-riding, avoidance of responsibility or inability
to carry out commitments to collective action, and sensitivities with respect to “equitable sharing of the benefits.”

Despite these issues, the need for collective regional activity
is greater than ever, because more problems and opportunities are transnational.
On the demand side, investment is needed in the
capacity to exploit market-driven agricultural opportunities and to negotiate rules and standards for better competition. On the supply side, investment in knowledge for
addressing emerging challenges, such as transboundary
diseases, climate change, water scarcity, and increased
price volatility in global markets. All of these challenges
have significant implications for the knowledge system
and do not recognize country borders. Moreover, opportunities provided by advances in biotechnology require
concentrated investments in infrastructure, advanced
computing, and scarce human capacity that call for central
hubs and platforms that offer economies of scale (as in the
example in box 4.16).

Box 4.15 Subregional Organizations in Latin America: Strong National Capacity, Commitment to Research,
and Alignment with an Emerging Regional Economic Community as Drivers of Success

Created 1980, PROCISUR has been an autonomous
regional organization since 1981, located with IICA in
the headquarters of Mercosur (the Southern Common
Market). In its evolution, PROCISUR came to focus on
themes affecting all countries of the region, including
biotechnology policy and intraregional trade. PROCISUR’s success in generating political and financial
support for itself and its members reflects the influence
of two strong research systems, Argentina and Brazil, as
well as a functional regional economic community,
Mercosur. PROCISUR has been adept at championing
projects that bring together national universities and
national research institutes with regional and international partners, thus closing a gap at the national level
that may exist. (LOTASSA, a research project on forage
legumes, is one example.) As the regional community,
MERCOSUR has several redistributive measures to
support the smaller members of the community. The
integration of markets and realignment of production
have created incentives for investment and relocating

economic activity in the region. Despite this success, in
recent years, the smaller members of Mercosur have
increasingly resisted deeper economic and regulatory
integration. Finding a common policy has become
more difficult.
South America has also seen the emergence of
commodity consortia funded by the region to address
special needs for research or integration with the rest of
the innovation system. The Latin American Fund for
Irrigated Rice (FLAR) collaborates with CIAT but takes
responsibility for irrigated rice in temperate countries.
CONDESAN was created with the help of CIP to
involve more than 30 actors in the potato innovation
system. After 25 years of public research on cassava,
CLAYUCA’s role has evolved into organizing public
and private organizations to promote uses for cassava
in addition to food. The concept of a regional innovation system seems to be taking shape. Convergence of
policies, market integration, and some equalization
measures are important factors.

Source: Author.
Note: CLAYUCA = Latin American and Caribbean Consortium to Support Cassava Research and Development; CONDESAN =
Consorcio de Desarrollo Andino/Consortium for Andean Development; FLAR = Fondo Latinoamericano para Arroz de Riego;
IICA = Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura; LOTASSSA = Lotus Adaptation and Sustainability in
South America; Mercosur = Mercado Común del Sur, Mercado Comun do Sul; PROCISUR = Programa Cooperativo para el
Desarrollo Tecnológico Agroalimentario y Agroindustrial del Cono Sur.
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Box 4.16 Creating Sustainable Scientific Hubs: An Example of the Biosciences in Eastern and Central Africa

The entry into biosciences research usually begins by
developing capacity in a central location to serve a
number of clients, such as university scientists, commodity breeding programs, and often nonagricultural
research as well. Major indivisibilities in laboratory
and computing facilities for genomic research, for
example, mean that there are significant economies of
scale in creating a hub. Over time, and with the falling
cost of more applied operations, decentralized capacity is developed. One new platform for biosciences, the
BecA-Hub (Biosciences Eastern and Central Africa),
benefited from major support from the Canadian
International Development Agency to upgrade facilities at the International Livestock Research Institute
(ILRI) in conjunction with the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
Located at ILRI’s Nairobi campus, BecA is one of
three regional initiatives championed by NEPAD. The
hub’s sustainability depends on whether it builds on its
role as an international facility, serves its clients in East
and Central Africa, and generates strong international
collaborative research program on animal disease. The
location of a regional hub at an international research
center brings many logistical and administrative facilities in addition to economies of scale and scope.
From the earliest days of biotechnology in developed countries, the location of a biotechnology facility

has been controversial. Should it be based in a separate
center, faculty of science, or faculty of agriculture?
The business models for sustainable research in
biotechnology differ in universities and national
agricultural research institutes, and given scale considerations, stable funding arrangements will be a
determining factor. BecA estimates that it will have to
generate at least 50 percent of its funds from hosted
research projects to sustain its capacity. Growth will
come through an expansion of target countries,
broadening the scope of activities, a good synergy of
African and international partners, and incubation/
innovation projects.
BecA currently supports staff from 6 international
centers, has helped 60 MSc and PhD students advance
their research, and has hosted 41 projects (17 in crops
and 24 in livestock). A NEPAD “BecANet” provides
resources for national agricultural research systems
and university scientists to use these resources to support their own priorities. In West Africa, the Alliance
for a Green Revolution in Africa supports the West
Africa Center for Crop Improvement, a regional postgraduate training program at the University of Ghana,
Legon. The center, which benefits from a faculty institute for biosciences and backstopping from Cornell
University, has attracted scientists from francophone
countries as well.

Source: BecA website, http://hub.africabiosciences.org/.

This TN discusses two central questions. First, how can
investments in regional programs and institutions better
strengthen national AISs? Second, how can they support the
emergence of a regional AIS? This TN argues that if more
complex systems are to emerge, they will require (1) compatible organizations and institutions that can bond, (2) a timely
and adequate concentration of resources, and (3) a sustained
infusion of resources over a sufficient period (Elliott 2010).
The agenda, science, and methods are changing rapidly at all
levels, and it is difficult to design organizations to deal with a
moving target. Spontaneous self-organization will not be
sufficient for a strong regional AIS to emerge.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

While there is no model for a regional research system that
is well integrated within an AIS, a few main investment

elements are needed to ensure the necessary concentration,
connectivity, and continuity for a self-sustaining regional
innovation system to emerge:
■

■

Support consensus on a regional vision and agreement.
The most important element is that participants in a
regional arrangement share a vision of mutual benefit
and make a formal commitment. Support for this dialogue and agreement on vision, research priorities, and
cost and benefit sharing are needed prior to concrete
investments. A mutual accountability framework must
be developed and provide incentives for all partners to
deliver on their commitments.8
Select a committed host organization. A regional
research system must be led by a committed and capable
host institution, preferably the most effective research
organization in the region. The host institution needs a
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■

■

■

■

■

business model that sustains the effort through a
national core commitment, research grants, service fees,
and projects. In other words, the host organization
should have a sustainable research program that ensures
its continued ability to serve a regional demand.
Support national partners. A successful regional
research system requires sufficient national capacity for
research, dissemination, and coordination (national and
regional) to avoid competition and duplication and to
reach synergies. Support is needed to address the human
resource gaps, perhaps by investing in MSc programs at
the national and regional levels to give government,
NGOs, and aid organizations the staff they require to
participate in the initiative.
Design a governance structure. The regional initiative
requires a board with representatives from participating countries, including financial decision makers,
political allies that ensure continuity, and other relevant
stakeholders. The board is expected to recruit strong
leadership, ensure a strategy is in place, oversee its
implementation, and support the regional mission. Governance structures have to be capable of changing strategies and adapting governance itself to new conditions.
Base a strong secretariat in the host organization. A secretariat performs the day-to-day administrative functions
of a regional network, platform, or hub as mandated. The
secretariat must have staff and skills to support efforts to
meet clients’ needs, generate and communicate new
information to members, and raise funds.
Maintain regional funding authority. A regional
research arrangement requires a regional funding
authority to maintain its scale of operations and commitment to a regional role. National commitment and
support from the host government are required. Reliance
on donor funding is not a sustainable solution.9
Develop procedures for selecting, monitoring, and evaluating regional research projects. Clear and transparent
procedures, taking notice of stakeholders’ concerns, are
needed to ensure both quality and relevance of research.
Such procedures would permit the balanced articulation
of demand, base the selection and approval of projects
on strong and independent scientific evaluations, specify
the financial and reporting requirements, and outline
requirements for objective ex ante evaluations, program
monitoring, and ex post evaluations. See module 5, TN 2
on innovation funds for details on sound procedures.

Box 4.17 presents an example of the challenges presented
in developing a regional research system.
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POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Regional research efforts may create different types of benefits. Often such efforts are designed to gain efficiency in the
production of research for development in a given priority
area, primarily through economies of scale and scope.
Participants can share costs for infrastructure, software,
laboratory equipment, and highly specialized scientists, as
in BecA (box 4.16). Regional efforts also put institutional
arrangements into place that facilitate the use of research
results. Their financial sustainability requires special attention, however.

POLICY ISSUES

The policy issues that are particularly relevant to whether
and how regional research might contribute to the emergence of a regional innovation system are discussed in the
following points. Perhaps the central issue is the tension
between national and regional priorities and the considerable challenges of collective action at a regional level.
■

■

Achieving balanced growth of innovation system components through regional collaboration. Coordination
among NARIs, universities, and technology dissemination is often weak or even resisted at the national level.
The source of this problem may be unbalanced growth
among the components, their sequential development,
different scales of operation, and different bases for
organization (agroecological, political administrative, or
centralized for economies of scope and scale). Regional
facilities may allow a national knowledge system to
operate at a higher scale by avoiding the need for large
fixed investments in one or more sectors through
regional borrowing.
Partnerships in producing regional public goods.
National research systems, subregional organizations,
and international agricultural research centers all contribute in complementary ways to the production of
public goods. Pingali (2010) warns that an unintended
consequence of the CGIAR research centers’ shift toward
product adaptation and dissemination relative to innovation and product development is a potential break in
the R&D pipeline that supplies public good research and
technologies to raise agricultural productivity in developing countries. Improved partnership is the elusive
solution to issues of competition and crowding out, but
it requires behavioral and institutional change (Horton,
Prain, and Thiele 2009).
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Box 4.17 RUFORUM’s Choice: Regional Center of Excellence, Continentwide Forum, or Both?

The Regional Universities Forum in Africa (RUFORUM),
initiated in 2004, grew out of the Rockefeller Foundation
project (FORUM) to help 5 countries and 10 universities
specialize around particular themes, create university
centers of excellence, and train graduate students
from participating countries. Its challenge was “to build
a national and regional research for development
(R4D) innovation system based on partnerships and dialogue between all actors, impact-oriented and wellcoordinated, where universities are an integral part.”
RUFORUM is recognized as an international nongovernmental organization and is supported by the European
Community and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
Experience to date. RUFORUM planned to roll out
seven regional thematic programs, each assigned to a
lead university, and train more than 800 MSc and
150 PhD students by 2013. Students from participating countries would receive local tuition and living
allowances. The attractiveness of the concept (and the
absence of another body with a similar mandate)
caused membership to grow from the original 12 to 25
universities in Eastern and Southern Africa alone. In
2010 a strategic reflection meeting identified the
challenging trade-off between a sharp focus and an
expansion in scope and scale, including a proposal for
RUFORUM to expand to West Africa. A ministerial
Conference on Higher Education in Agriculture called
for universities to (1) create a pan-African university,
(2) contribute fully to NEPAD-CAADP processes,a
(3) link to the private sector as a potential source of
funding and internships, (4) engage in policy formulation and implementation, and (5) coordinate with
ministries in the national innovation system. Another
resolution that emphasized the AIS was to include
investment in agricultural higher education within the
NEPAD-CAADP 10 percent budget allocation (provided it did not dilute the commitment to agriculture).
Lessons. RUFORUM faces at least three large
challenges arising from its initial success. First, how can

it meet the needs of its 25 university member-owners?
Second, should it consolidate activities at a meaningful
subregional scale, with tangible results for participating
countries, or should it follow donor pressure to expand
and assume additional functions? Third, how can it
manage the sustainable addition of functions as it
moves from network to advocacy platform to possibly
more intensive service functions?
RUFORUM’s Business Plan 2011–2016 describes
how balanced growth would allow it to take on an
expanded function as a continental forum. Documentation of lessons from the “RUFORUM model” in
eastern and southern Africa would create legitimacy
and credibility beyond its current region. Continental
action would require both changes in governance and
full cost recovery by new initiatives to avoid competition with delivering RUFORUM’s flagship MSc programs, which serve national and regional AIS needs
directly. As seen with the effort to create a hub for the
biosciences in East and Central Africa (box 4.16), sustainable financing for a platform or hub depends on
many things: a subsidy from the host country, continuous donor commitment, or integration of national
and regional activities through products and services.
Regional efforts often founder when the national host
cannot or will not continue its regional role, so selecting the host for a center of excellence is a critical
decision. Many major universities were created with
support from Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and
bilateral aid programs. A handful emerged to play
sustained regional roles, whereas others’ regional
presence diminished in the wake of purely national
decisions and crises or a host institution’s inability to
sustain regional commitments beyond donor funding.b The Conference on Higher Education in Agriculture pushed for a continental forum rather than a
consolidation of action at the subregional level or a
definition of subregional communities that are natural partners.

Source: RUFORUM 2005, 2010, 2011.
a. Under NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development), African heads of state committed to allocating a 10 percent
share of their national budgets to agriculture. CAADP (the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme) is a
NEPAD program with wide support from international, regional, and national actors that is designed to increase Africa’s agricultural productivity.
b. The breakup of the East African Community broke up the University of East Africa. The creation of dozens of new state universities in Nigeria siphoned experienced staff from the University of Ibadan, who gained promotion to top management, professorships, and department heads just when Ibadan’s renaissance was attracting students from neighboring Francophone and
Anglophone countries.

MODULE 4: THEMATIC NOTE 3: REGIONAL RESEARCH IN AN AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEM FRAMEWORK

301

■

■
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Sustainable funding. A corollary of the previous point
is that R&D mandates have to come from funding bodies that can commit to sustained funding of regional
activities. Regional centers of excellence will be sustainable only if it is national policy to play a regional role
and maintain that role through resources from the
government or institute. It helps if the governance
mechanism for agricultural research includes people
with access to decision makers if not the decision makers themselves. Regional initiatives must be seen to generate tangible benefits with clear value added to
national efforts.
Shared regional goals and a policy-making framework. Regional policies presume there must be some
regional policy maker with the power to fund regional
challenges and organize regional collective action. The
current overlapping of regional economic communities
and lack of coherence with R&D structures needs to be
resolved. Regional agricultural R&D priorities must be
embedded in the strategic agendas of regional economic communities.
Subsidiarity and equity considerations. Regional collective action to deal with inequality, gender, and social
unrest across national borders is extremely difficult to
organize. Border populations are sometimes marginalized within their own country or even in opposition to
the central government,10 so transboundary problems
sometimes may not attract central policy makers’ concern. Gender mainstreaming is a widely accepted concept
at the regional level but can be implemented only at the
national level. Finally, regional collective action takes
place in an environment of overlapping mandates and
resource competition; the result is that sometimes a
national priority is underfunded because it is perceived
as something that others will fund.
Policies for international markets. Whether regional
research contributes to the emergence of a regional
innovation system is linked to the development of the
wider environment: regional economic communities,
removal of trade barriers, and mechanisms to compensate the losers for their participation in the wider
system. Seed policy harmonization, common standards,
and certification requirements have fostered seed industries within regions. Regional seed associations emerge
as seed markets grow; some national companies become
international; and many small companies flourish by
finding a niche in areas where multinationals have little
interest. Policies and institutions that widen regional
markets can facilitate these developments. Investment in

creating these institutions rather than designating coordinators is justified.
LESSONS LEARNED AND GUIDANCE
FOR FUTURE INVESTMENTS

The long experience with regional research efforts offers a
considerable number of lessons and other guidance. The
issues with the greatest relevance for regional research
and innovation systems are discussed in the sections that
follow.

High-level policy support

High-level policy frameworks such as the NEPAD-CAADP
commitments are important if they succeed in raising real
financial contributions by national governments. Such
high-level organizations have not previously been successful
in implementing scientific programs, but if they raise
national commitments or create frameworks for regional
economic communities to finance regional collective action,
they play their role.

Appropriate level of coordination

Ensuring that regional research programs integrate with the
national AIS is a matter of how well the national system is
integrated with its own subregional organization or benefits
from alternative mechanisms. Contracts, networks, strategic
alliances, partnerships, and mergers are all ways of achieving coordination. Researchers can coordinate around tasks,
problems, target communities, commodities, and scientific
challenges. Their linkages with the farmers, the private sector, and advisory services will differ among activities and
countries. For this reason, innovation usually emerges
through self-organization. Subregional organizations can
design mechanisms to coordinate the activities of international centers through regional programs but wisely do not
fight activities that escape their control.11 Attempts to
impose “coordination” run the risk of imposing costs that
exceed efficiency and relevance gains.
Particular outcomes will be context-specific
and often path-dependent

The examples presented here describe a diversity of
approaches designed to deal with issues of centralization
and decentralization, governance and ownership of a program, political and financial sustainability, responsiveness

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

to demand, and quality of science. It is possible to analyze
proposed investments in light of experience with these
approaches.

Analyze the AIS prior to investment
in individual components

First, recognize that an AIS of some type already exists in a
country. It may not be consciously defined, and it may have
missing pieces, but it can be described in terms of a system’s
five elements: its objectives, its components, its resources,
its means of coordination, and its environment (context).
Second, analyze both external and internal drivers of
change. The external drivers include the global and regional
economic environment, opportunities for innovation that
trade may open for small countries, the global advance of
science and technology, and external finance. Other critical
factors may be partly or fully endogenous, such as the
national capacity to profit from new technology, regional
arrangements for accessing and using technology, and ease
of access to different markets. Third, since institutions
evolve, formulate scenarios around their most likely life
cycles. Understanding path dependency allows one to build
on it or to overcome it. Finally, to overcome undesirable
path dependency, institutional innovation requires leadership, financial commitment, and sustained effort by
national decision makers, investors, and donors.

Assess and design interventions against
a checklist of six basic criteria

Proposed initiatives can be assessed against six basic criteria for their contributions to national and regional innovation systems. The six criteria are summarized in table 4.4
along with an interpretation of their meaning. Readers
should look for examples of their application in the boxes
that accompany this TN or apply them to cases with which
they are familiar. The six criteria are not exclusive but serve
as a checklist of common elements in the success or failure
of regional action. They are elaborated in the sections that
follow with potential actions to facilitate innovation.
Fit with regional vision, context, and priorities. A
national innovation system either works within its regional
environment and constraints or attempts to overcome
them. The most important element is that participants in
a regional arrangement share a vision of mutual benefit.
Threats of loss may be more compelling promoters of collective action than opportunities for expanded production

or potential gains from cost reduction. Regional efforts
designed to share the cost of “lumpy” infrastructure, costly
software or laboratory equipment, and highly specialized
scientists are logical arguments but may not be seen as
compelling reasons for collective action by policy makers.
Agreement on regional priorities that create an “effective
demand” for research output by pooling the demand of
small users assumes that markets and mechanisms exist for
research outputs to be used and final agricultural products
to be sold. This outcome requires all components of the
system to move in a convergent way, however. Economic
integration among countries, at least in the targeted sectors,
helps achieve wider markets and greater demand for
research. Important investments for innovation could focus
on (1) strengthening the ability of the regional economic
community to create wider markets, (2) creating regional
seed associations, (3) harmonizing policy, and (4) building
regional buffer stocks.
Efficiency in the production of research for
development. The regional arrangement should lead to
greater efficiency in the production of research for development in a given priority area. Some gains may be made
by eliminating duplication of low-technology research, but
much larger gains in research productivity will come
through economies of scale and economies of scope,12 and
often the hard decision of where to locate a regional center of
excellence will have to be made. A regional arrangement may
also bring better access to global knowledge and state-of-theart technology, along with an understanding of how to use
it and better share its benefits across recommendation
domains cut by national borders.
Given the heterogeneity of small systems, allocating
problems at the regional level through breeding networks
will allow better use of limited capacity. In some cases, less
complexity may be called for. Commodity programs on
water-efficient maize and orange-fleshed sweet potato have
regional specificity that is organized along a narrow value
chain.
Mechanisms for benefit sharing must be put in place.
Participants in the arrangement must understand that the
gain from research is not where the expenditure is made but
where the benefits are used.
Quality and relevance of science. The processes by
which research is designed and approved need to ensure
both the quality and relevance of that research. A proper
balance is needed between the articulation of demand (by
technology users) and the response from scientists as
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Table 4.4 Six Criteria for Assessing Prospective Regional Research Initiatives for Their Contributions to
Regional and National Innovation
Criteria and indicators
(1) Fit with regional vision, context, and priorities
Shared vision at national and regional levels

Interpretation or specific examples
– Do countries have the same perception of potential gains and losses from an initiative?
– Is it a shared challenge with the same sense of priority or urgency?

Potential for technical spillovers and spillins

– How much of the recommendation domain is found in each member country?
– How much of the targeted area is found in each country?

Economic impact and incentives for
regional action

– Are spillovers beyond the research area highly likely to occur without frictions?
– Do mechanisms exist to share benefits of regional investments?

Evidence that policies, standards, and regulations
encourage spillovers and spillin benefits

– Is there clear analysis of spatial distribution of benefits along the value chain?
– Do regulations favor cross-border investment in markets, transportation, and freedom
of trade?

Components of innovation system are evolving in
compatible way and in line with new challenges

– Are institutional strategies addressing new issues such as climate change, adaptation
needs, water scarcity?
– Do educational institutions produce future researchers or competent technical staff?

(2) Efficiency in the production of research for development
Research located in the most effective site in
– Is the network hub located where research capacity and infrastructure,
the region
ICT, and administrative depth are present?
– Does it cluster with other AIS components to serve as a center of excellence?
– Is it located in the appropriate agroecological zone if relevant?
Economies of scale can be gained in research
from lumpy capital, specialized software,
scarce human resources
Economies of scope can be realized from locating
the program in multi-interest center or cluster
Research taps into global knowledge cost-effectively

(3) Quality and relevance of science
Project approval based on strong and independent
scientific evaluation
Mechanism for project approval of projects includes
key stakeholder concerns
The balance between long-term strategic and
short-term problem-solving research is appropriate

– Can a centralized capacity draw on a wide testing network for rapid feedback on
adapted or adaptable cultivars/results?
– Does the hub have a sustainable program of research that ensures its continued ability
to serve a regional demand?
– Is there a mixture of disciplines and a balance of strategic and applied research to
serve multiple commodities, themes, or functional groups?
– Do research contracts and partnership arrangements ensure cost-effective access to
global science and technology?
– What incentives linked to location, special skills, or environment attract foreign
partners?
– Can strong ICT compensate for size?
– Are program and project review subject to formal evaluation according to agreed
criteria and processes?
– Do governance and management respect scientific evaluation?
– How are the private sector’s and farmers’ concerns included in analysis, consultation,
and decision-making processes?
– Do processes help build participation and demand by key stakeholders?
– Is scientific quality and feasibility ensured by peer review?
– Is relevance ensured by governance mechanisms or financial support by client?

Access to advanced breeding, biotechnology, or
analytic techniques helps problem-solving research

– How do regional platforms remain open to partners across public, private, and NGO
sectors?
– What internships, training awards, and fee structures make advanced facilities accessible
to downstream demand?
Mechanisms for objective ex ante evaluation, program – Does a functional M&E system provide objective evidence of performance against
monitoring, and ex post evaluation
development objectives at the national level?
– What peer review from regional experts exists for regional program?
– What mechanism exists for subregional partners to ensure performance?
(4) Contribution to national capacity and functioning of national AIS
Regional initiative provides support for
– Does regional program build national capacity in sustainable way?
long-term staff development at national level
– How does regional program reinforce gender mainstreaming?
– Do standards for regional awards raise the standard for national research?
– How does program reduce net regional brain drain?

(Table continues on the following page)
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Table 4.4 Six Criteria for Assessing Prospective Regional Research Initiatives for Their Contributions to
Regional and National Innovation (continued)
Criteria and indicators

Interpretation or specific examples

Gap-filling by regional initiative is temporary, linked to
training, and does not compete for funds

– Does regional staff contribute to training and refrain from crowding out national staff?
– Where regional program provides training or equipment, does the national authority
assume responsibility for maintenance and replacement?

Regional program enhances ability of national
research-for-development institutions to generate
political and financial sustainability

– Does regional research meet a national as well as regional need?
– Do regional projects enhance the reputation and credibility of national scientists?
– Do regional projects connect with the national agricultural innovation system or do
they work only on regional and global public goods?

(5) Facilitation of collective action
Increased ability and incentives for collaboration

Planning and priority setting processes identify
“regional public goods”

Compensatory or redistributive mechanisms to
ensure sense of “fairness” of arrangements

(6) Political and financial sustainability
Design of program and equity in benefit sharing builds
financial commitment by governments of the region

– Does initiative identify and address problems that partners could not address on their
own?
– Does collaboration reduce research costs through complementary skills, resources, or
access to partners?
– Does addressing transboundary issues enhance regional food security?
– Do processes help identify regional problems that can be addressed by collective
research for development?
– Will initiative bring in issues that were previously believed to be beyond research, such
as postdisaster or postconflict recovery?
– Do countries that are not part of the hub have funds to access transborder services
from neighbors?
– Do their scientists participate equally in regional missions (travel, per diem, consultancy
fees) written into initiatives?
– Is host country of regional program willing to maintain commitment to regional
collaboration in the absence of donor funding?
– Is it able to sustain a regional role on basis of core funding and generation of research
contracts?
– What sanctions are there for governments who evade their commitments?

Governance structure of initiative brings in financial
decision makers or political allies that ensure
continuity

– Are relevant ministries represented in governance of the initiative if necessary to
ensure political and financial support?
– How are key stakeholders maintained as allies of the initiative?
– How are nongovernmental regional stakeholders included in the governance?

Regional hierarchy supportive of initiative?

– To what degree can a regional innovation system emerge without a hierarchical
structure at the regional level?
– What arrangements by regional economic communities are needed to ensure a
favorable environment for uptake of research results?

Source: Author.
Note: The criteria in this table were identified inductively by the author from experience with strengthening agricultural research systems and used
deductively in applying an AIS perspective to regional research arrangements that are currently being initiated.

suppliers of knowledge and technology. Not all countries in
a regional organization will have the same priorities, and
how priorities are funded is important enough to be a
separate criterion. Investment in strong M&E is necessary to
gain political support. The success stories of CGIAR
research centers usually focus on two things: either genetic
breakthroughs leading to increased productivity or
successful control of plant diseases and pests (especially
cassava pests). Better methodologies are needed to evaluate
returns to natural resource management to ensure proper
attention to this aspect of research at the national level.

Contribution to national capacity. National capacity is
often the scarcest factor. A regional program with large and
small members may help to build capacity in the smaller
units, if only to enable them to play their role in a regional
effort. It is important to identify whether regional efforts
compete among themselves or compete with the national
programs for scarce scientific capacity and whether there is
sustainable national support for this area of research. The
politics of higher education make it intensely national.
Investment in MSc programs at the national and regional
level is needed to give government, NGOs, and aid
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organizations the staff they require (as discussed in box 4.17
on RUFORUM).
Facilitation of collective action. Collective action—in
the very specific sense that parties assemble to address shared
challenges that they would not or could not address alone—
should increase. It may often address transboundary
problems of a regional public good nature, such as regional
economic policies, transborder watersheds, diseases and
pests, and postconflict/postdisaster rehabilitation. At some
stage, an innovation system may begin to emerge from the
interaction of components and reach a point where
components become aware of their connectedness and begin
to coordinate through information flows, markets, and new
organizations. The system may become “emergent” and
create new complexity. Various governments and donor
programs may consciously attempt to strengthen linkages or
create human and institutional capacities to overcome
binding constraints that exist at a given time, but the system
may become conscious and self-correcting. A sequence of
many small investments leading towards collaboration,
collective action, and stepwise integration is needed. In a
changing environment it is unlikely that a fully designed
system can be imposed from above.

Political and financial sustainability. Sustainability
of regional arrangements depends on the incentives for
participation by all parties. A regional role allows a host
country to move to a higher level of complexity in its science. The collapse of regional organizations is precipitated
most often by national decisions by a member country that
free rides, shirks responsibility, becomes unable to carry out
commitments to the collective action, or determines it is not
sharing equitably in the benefits.
These problems need to be addressed by governance and
financing mechanisms, methods of ensuring access to and
sharing of benefits, and some formal policing of commitments. Sustainable regional organizations will require a
higher-order political and financial mechanism committed
to a regional strategy. Self-sustaining regional centers can
emerge when a host-country institution accepts a regional
role and has a business model that sustains it through a
national core commitment, research grants, service fees, and
projects. A mutual accountability framework that provides
incentives for all partners to deliver on their commitments
is necessary.
Box 4.18 describes the continuing challenges of subregional organizations in sub-Saharan Africa to secure
funding.

Box 4.18 Subregional Organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges with Secure Funding
and Collective Action

In Africa, the three subregional organizations—
ASARECA, CORAF/WECARD, and SADC-FANR—are
quite different.a They shared a common goal of increasing African ownership and control of research funded
by donors and the centers of the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Their
separate evolution reflects the composition of their initial memberships, the role of donors under the Special
Program for African Agricultural Research (SPAAR),
and path dependency imposed by historical structures
and objectives. Different SPAAR donors had different
motivations for creating subregional organizations,
and the original memberships reflected their interest
and funding.
ASARECA. ASARECA was an association of 10
directors of national agricultural research institutes; its
geographic spread was defined by countries included in
the regional offices of the United States Agency for

International Development or the World Bank. Freedom from regional political direction facilitated
research collaboration, even among countries whose
unstable borders provoked political conflict, but the
absence of political coverage limited financial sustainability and commitment to action. In 2007 ASARECA
created a mixed board (representatives of donors,
national research institutes, and stakeholders), disbanded its networks, and consolidated their work into
seven programs with donor funding through a trust
fund held in the World Bank. The national agricultural
research institutes have not divided up management of
the new programs, which remain centralized in
Entebbe for administrative rather than scientific reasons. Unlike Latin America, in sub-Saharan Africa no
single regional economic community is present to create the environment for wider market integration and
policy harmonization.
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 4.18 Subregional Organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges with Secure Funding
and Collective Action (continued)

CORAF/WECARD. In West and Central Africa, the
SPAAR strategy of base centers and regional programs
was a familiar model, especially in the Francophone
countries. The need to bridge Anglophone/Francophone structures involved integration on a North/South
(interior/coastal country) basis within ECOWAS.
Southern Africa. The Southern African Center for
Cooperation in Agricultural Research and Training
(SACCAR), an autonomous center composed of
frontline states, brought the CGIAR’s regional programs under a mixed board of national research institute directors, university representatives, and a donor
committee. Donors coordinated their efforts under
Cooperation for Development in Africa, subsumed
under SPAAR when the World Bank became the dominant donor to research. With the end of apartheid
and opening of South Africa, the frontline states
remained wary of SPAAR’s message of strong “base
centers” and “regional programs,” which implied centralization around a scientifically dominant South
Africa. When SACCAR disbanded in 2001, its functions were brought under a directorate of the SADC
Secretariat. It has taken almost ten years for a new subregional research organization, similar to ASARECA
and CORAF, to replace SACCAR. The Center for
Coordination of Agricultural Research and Develop-

ment in Southern Africa (CCARDESA) was established in 2010.
Lessons from Sub-Saharan African subregional
organizations. No subregional organization has
achieved significant financial support from its member
governments. Political fragmentation, overlapping
regional economic communities, and membership in
multiple regional units has prevented the subregional
organizations from taking on significant collective
challenges such as climate change, postconflict rehabilitation, and development of regional markets. It would
be a true example of “collective action” if the governments in each region had assumed responsibility
for funding. Through their scientific networks, however, the subregional organizations have successfully
addressed some transboundary emergencies and challenges. For example, ASARECA helped Burundi
overcome a banana wilt attack with replacement cultivars. The cultivars were developed and maintained in
Uganda and multiplied with help from Kenya and
Uganda under reallocated funding from regional
donors. Like PROCISUR, their next step (and an
essential element in regional innovation) is to
strengthen technologies, institutional linkages, and
policies of the regional economic communities that
integrate markets.

Source: Author.
a. ASARECA = Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa. CORAF/WECARD = Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain pour la Recherche et le Développement Agricoles (West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development). SADC-FANR = Southern Africa Development Community–Food, Agriculture, and Natural
Resources.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 4

Codesigning Innovations: How Can Research
Engage with Multiple Stakeholders?
Bernard Triomphe, Agricultural Research for Development, France (CIRAD)

SYNOPSIS

odesign aims at achieving better articulation
between research supply and user-driven demand
for problem-solving. It implies that researchers
engage systematically with multiple stakeholders in the
iterative, adaptive, flexible, and nonlinear process of developing innovations. Core codesign principles include:
(1) joint planning, implementation, and decision making
related to activities aiming to foster innovation and
(2) close coordination among stakeholders at the strategic
and operational levels, combining scientific, technical, and
local knowledge and other resources. Codesign may be
implemented at any scale, depending on the nature of the
problem, the innovation being developed, and the types of
stakeholder involved. Investing in codesign approaches
implies covering the costs of coordination, facilitation, and
collective action inherent to working collaboratively at all
stages of the codesign process. Investment is also needed to
build capacity required by different stakeholders, including researchers.

C

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Research is not necessary for innovation to take place, but
often research is an important part of an innovation
process. Innovations usually result from a process of networking and interactive learning among a heterogeneous
set of actors, which may include farmers, input suppliers,
traders, processors, researchers, NGOs, and government
officials. Many research organizations and researchers in
developing countries have some experience in research collaboration with other public sector professionals and with
farmers (often within the framework of competitive
research grants), yet they generally lack the more wideranging exposure, related skills, and attitudes to engage
effectively in collaborative research with more diverse
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public and private stakeholders. Individual researchers and
research systems need to change and expand the scope of
their research, methodologies, and core skills.
Since the 1990s, “new” research approaches have emerged
and been consolidated to ensure that researchers interact and
collaborate effectively with users in identifying and producing the knowledge and innovations to respond to a rapidly
changing local, national, or international environment, be it
biophysical or socioeconomic. These codesign approaches
include well-tested and documented “branded” approaches
(table 4.5; boxes 4.20 and 4.21). Each “brand” has its specificities but also borrows more or less explicitly from related
approaches, so the boundaries between approaches are
blurred.
“Codesign” is a generic term referring to any approach by
which researchers contribute explicitly to developing innovations together with other stakeholders (or users) at all or
most stages of the innovation process by making use of four
underlying principles (adapted from Liu 1997):
1. The processes of producing knowledge and solving users’
problems have equal strategic importance and run concurrently during codesign.
2. All stakeholders involved have the right and a fair opportunity to take part in all stages of the codesign process.
Research does not have an inherently stronger input than
other stakeholders have. Researchers do not necessarily
lead or even initiate the process.
3. Goals, objectives, ethical values, and the way that they
are effectively translated into approaches, governance,
operating structures, and activities are subject to
explicit initial and periodic negotiations and formal
agreements.
4. Periodic reflection on the progress achieved and the consistency of the approach in relation to the stated goals is
integral and essential to an effective codesign process.

Table 4.5 Key Approaches or Brands Fitting under the Codesign Umbrella
Approach

Key references

Participatory technology or Veldhuizen, Waters-Bayer, and
innovation development
de Zeeuw (1997); Sanginga et al.
(PTD/PID)
(2008)
Participatory action-learning Liu (1997); Almekinders,
and action-research (PAR) Beukema, and Tromp (2009);
Hocdé et al. (2009); Faure et al.
(2010)
Participatory market
Bernet et al. (2006, 2008)
chain approach
Companion modeling
(ComMod)a

Bousquet, Trébuil, and Cerf (2005);
Béguin and Cerf (2009)

Key features and focus

Examples

Systematized steps and methods to develop
production or natural resource management
innovations, with a strong focus on local people,
knowledge, and resources
Negotiating common goals and setups, combining
production of knowledge and problem-solving

PROLINNOVA program
(www.prolinnova.net)

Add value by creating interactions and coordination
among stakeholders along an existing or
new value chain
Combining and representing different types of
knowledge and exploring scenarios for collective
action in natural resource management

Papa Andina Box 4.21

ASOSID (box 4.20)b

New irrigation
arrangements in
northern Thailand

Source: Author.
a. See http://cormas.cirad.fr/ComMod/en/index.htm.
b. Asociación para la Agricultura Sostenible en base a Siembra Directa (Association for Sustainable Agriculture Based on Direct Seeding).

In codesign, the concurrent and explicit application of
these four principles contrasts strongly with more conventional R&D and other so-called participatory or collaborative approaches, even though the latter may appear to share
some characteristics of codesign.
While this module treats general issues related to the role
of research in AIS, this TN focuses on how research may
engage in AIS in practice, drawing from recent experience
with codesign approaches to improve agricultural productivity, develop market chains, and manage natural resources
in developing countries.

■

■

At least some of the concerned stakeholders have prior
experience with the skills necessary for the negotiation,
facilitation, and coordination of multistakeholder efforts.
Codesign requires a positive, open attitude, motivation,
and sufficient degrees of freedom among individuals and
institutions toward multistakeholder collaboration. This
condition implies, among other things, that stakeholders
can recognize the legitimacy of all other stakeholders in
being part of the process, an incentive structure compatible with codesign exists, and participants have the
ability to operate outside the established rules and paradigms within each institution.

INVESTMENT NEEDED

Ideally, codesign approaches should be applied only when
the context, the problems to be solved, and the stakeholders
are well suited to such approaches (table 4.6). Usually the
circumstances are right when one or several of the following
conditions are met:
■

■

■

Concerned stakeholders face changes in their socioeconomic or biophysical environment, or problems that
typically cannot be solved by one of them alone, because
of the complexity and/or scale involved. Examples
include managing a dwindling common natural resource
or adjusting to new policies or to changes in how markets
function.
A shared understanding of the problems and their solutions can be reached.
Current scientific and technical knowledge and predesigned solutions to address the issues at hand are inadequate or inaccessible.

Conducting an effective codesign innovation process typically involves organizing three main interlinked and overlapping phases: (1) exploratory phase, (2) implementation
phase, and (3) a dissemination and exit phase. Investing
heavily in capacity-building of all stakeholders involved,
with regard to specific thematic issues as well as the principles and approach of codesign, will be necessary (Triomphe
and Hocdé 2010). Box 4.19 summarizes the associated costs
and investments.
Exploratory phase

Three goals may be pursued: (1) diagnosing the situation
faced by stakeholders; (2) identifying and characterizing concerned stakeholders, their demands, and needs; and (3) negotiating the overall goals of the codesign process and the
related institutional and operational mechanisms and
arrangements, all of which influence the effective implementation of codesign activities during the next phase.
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Table 4.6 Examples of Problems, Corresponding Potential Innovations, and Key Potential Components of a
Codesign Approach Adapted to Address Those Problems
Types of problems or issues

Examples of components of an adapted
codesign approach

Types of innovations

– Reducing costs or increasing profitability
of cropping or farming systems, making
farming more environmentally friendly
– Unequal access to irrigation among different
types of farmers in a given watershed
– Conflicts for common resource use
(such as pastureland)
– Reducing deforestation
– Managing erosion and natural resources
(such as biodiversity)

– New cropping or farming systems
– New arrangements and institutions

– Responding to farmers’ and consumers’
needs related to crop and food quality
– Limited access of poor farmers to
high-value markets

– New germplasm

– New irrigation or grazing techniques
– New rules or institutions at
community watershed level
– New farming systems
– New land uses and new policies
and/or regulations for land use

– Infrastructure development
– New food processing techniques
– Farmer organization for marketing

–
–
–
–
–
–

Joint experimentation
Creation of multistakeholder alliances and platforms
Multiscale networking
Joint experimentation
Role-playing games
Participatory and simulation modeling

– Territorial multistakeholder committees
– Participatory land use and policy planning
– Creation of multistakeholder alliances,
platforms, and similar mechanisms
– Participatory plant breeding
– Geographical indications
– Approaches for pro-poor market chain innovation
(such as development of geographical indications)
– Supply chain coordination
– Public-private partnerships

Source: Author.

Box 4.19 Costs and Investments Associated with Codesign

Codesign approaches require that proper funding (or
cofunding) be made available for a number of specific
expenses, especially:
1. Holding all necessary initial negotiations among
concerned stakeholders: travel and meetings.
2. Enlisting researchers from several disciplines
(biophysical and social sciences), as required.
3. Ensuring sufficient staff involvement from key
stakeholders, and funding the time of those who are
not in a position to support themselves.
4. Expenses related to the proper functioning of multistakeholder coordination instruments and mechanisms, such as multistakeholder platforms, steering
committees, and facilitation costs, without forgetting the funding needed for corresponding communications strategies.
5. Resources to hire a full-time or at least part-time
facilitator or innovation broker (these resources
might be especially critical).
6. A multifaceted capacity-building program directed
at strengthening the capacities and skills of each and
every stakeholder on a variety of topics over the
duration of the codesign process.

7. The establishment and implementation of a formal,
rigorous, and participatory monitoring and evaluation system, which is necessary to provide feedback
to guide the direction and content of the codesign
process.
8. Sufficient funding should be made available to document the codesign process and its major outcomes
in diverse media, from classical scientific and technical publications to videos, Internet-based products, and policy briefs. There should be as many formats and products as types of stakeholders involved
or concerned by the problem.
Other costs typically associated with a codesign
approach may not differ much from the costs of other
approaches: the cost of running a multisite, on-farm
experimentation scheme, costs of a large-scale dissemination strategy, costs of specific research activities,
and so forth. It may be possible to share some of the
costs among the partners, and as encouraging results
are generated, it may be possible to leverage further
investment.

Source: Triomphe and Hocdé 2010.

310

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

The perspective and perceptions of each stakeholder
about problems and opportunities need to be brought
shared, understood, and recognized by others as legitimate
so that suitable solutions may be identified collectively.
Diverse diagnostic methods can be used to achieve an accurate collective representation of the situation; they usually
involve developing some sort of a conceptual model (or
simplified representation) of the problem, as proposed in
the ARDI method (actors, resources, dynamics, interaction)
described in Etienne (2005).
In characterizing stakeholders, the key is to understand
the actual motivation and goals of each stakeholder, its history and trajectory, its strengths and weaknesses, its actual
political clout, and its past and current interactions with
other stakeholders. Specific methods and tools have been
developed to elicit this understanding, such as stakeholder
mapping or the analysis of sociotechnical networks.
Intense negotiations in bilateral and multilateral arenas
are needed to identify the mutually acceptable overall goals
and objectives of the codesign process. Negotiations also
revolve around identifying and agreeing on the roles and
functions of each stakeholder and on the resources that each
must commit or find. Negotiations need to come up with
effective mechanisms for managing the codesign process
during implementation at the strategic/governance and
operational levels, such as steering and implementation
committees. At the strategic level, goals and objectives need
to be reassessed dynamically and adjustments made periodically to refocus the collective energies and to solve any tensions or conflicts, which frequently arise during multiple
stakeholder endeavors. At the operational level, a key concern is effective implementation and dealing successfully
with technical, logistical, and financial issues. Who is
selected to represent the various stakeholders in these committees will greatly influence their eventual effectiveness.

Implementation phase

All activities are conducted in effective multistakeholder
fashion, and the implementation is expected to reflect the
overall goals, governance, and operational mechanisms
established as an output of the exploratory phase. Joint
experimentation and participatory M&E are two important
activities occurring in this phase.
In joint experimentation, the nature of the experimentation depends on the types of innovations sought:
■

When new cropping or farming systems are being
designed, agronomic trials codesigned by farmers,

■

■

researchers, and extension agents are often conducted.
These same trials support field visits and hands-on training during which stakeholders may be invited to share
their experiences and assess the results.
When the goal is pro-poor market chain innovation, the
implementation phase will usually involve developing
and testing new products, or finding safe paths for smallscale farmers to enter high-value markets. This work
involves not only technical research and innovation (to
develop both pre- and postharvest technology) but also
economic and organizational innovation (for example,
to test the viability of new products or organize stakeholders more effectively along the value chain).
Successful technical and commercial innovation often
requires changes in organizations and institutional arrangements. Institutional innovation may require experimentation with new coordination or collective-action mechanisms, such as a new farmer organization in charge of
collecting products for subsequent joint marketing.

In a codesign approach, participatory M&E focuses on
outputs, the process itself, and on providing the elements
needed to assess the continued relevance of the goals and
the methods used to solve the problems identified during
the exploratory phase. Participatory M&E thus provides
strategic inputs for guiding and dynamically adjusting the
overall codesign process.

Dissemination and exit phase

An important task is to conclude the codesign process in a
way that will lead to sustained and scaled-up application of
the innovations developed or enable the process to be used
for other issues, in other settings. A priority is to document
and take stock collectively of what was achieved, both the
expected and unexpected outcomes. The outcomes can take
many forms; examples include innovations of different types,
new knowledge, individual and collective learning, strengthened capacities, and new institutional norms and behaviors.
In this phase, some activities also aim at sharing some of the
results as well as scaling them up or out. Successful codesign
processes often pave the way for launching activities or programs pursuing one or more of the following goals:
■

■

Consolidating and expanding the use of pilot innovations to achieve more significant and sustainable impacts
(scaling up).
Tackling new problems in the same area, with the same
stakeholder group.
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■

Expanding the codesign/innovation process to new
areas and new stakeholder groups, or institutionalizing
the corresponding approaches within existing or new
institutions.

At times, a codesign approach may also need to be
terminated before a satisfactory outcome has been achieved,
because conditions for continuing are no longer favorable.

Some stakeholders might not wish to collaborate further;
they may view the costs and time as too high or too uncertain. What is important under such circumstances is to minimize the potential long-term damage that an unmanaged
failure (usually in the form of a conflict or crisis) might
cause to future collaboration.
For examples of codesign processes in Mexico and the
Andean Region, see boxes 4.20 and 4.21.

Box 4.20 Applying Codesign for Conservation Agriculture in Central Mexico

How it started: identifying a common problem and a
potential solution. In early 2000, a small group of international researchers met with representatives from the
private sector and the government of Guanajuato State
in Central Mexico. They discussed the opportunities
and challenges of a joint effort to develop and diffuse
conservation agriculture in the Bajío (lowland) region,
where a crisis in environmental sustainability was
underway. Thousands of mechanized smallholders produced high-yielding cereals (wheat, barley, maize, and
sorghum) in the Bajío using large amounts of fertilizer
and irrigation water. Production costs had soared, making the profitability of grain production uncertain.
Competition for scarce irrigation water was increasingly
fierce. Conservation agriculture, internationally heralded for its potential to reduce costs and save water, was
seen as a relevant solution. Conservation agriculture
had been successfully tested for years in the region, but
residual technical problems and poor coordination
among stakeholders prevented its significant adoption.
Launching the codesign process. Researchers did
not add to the pile of experiments showing the potential or drawbacks of conservation agriculture. Nor did
they develop a participatory scheme to fine-tune and
test even more locally adapted conservation agriculture with a handful of farmers. Instead, research broke
away from well-established paradigms. A flurry of
negotiations followed with key local or national stakeholders in the Bajío, including farmer-managed local
and regional water associations, the state extension
agency, high-level policy makers from the state government, the private sector (input providers, no-till
equipment manufacturers), national research, and
funding agencies. A major objective was to establish a
means of coordinating and implementing a multifac-

eted conservation agriculture program in the Bajío. It
soon became apparent that such a program would be
complex, involving numerous diagnostic activities, trials and demonstrations, the introduction of new
equipment, training of technicians and farmers, and
monitoring and evaluation, among other activities. In
2002, all stakeholders agreed that the rather informal
coordination started in 2000 had to make way for a
more formal one in the shape of a nonprofit association, ASOSID AC.a The key stakeholders were the
founding members of ASOSID, which became the recognized agency for implementing the program.
The role of research and the results obtained.
Throughout the process, research played key roles.
Unusually, it was a major innovation champion in the
initial stages, assuming the role of innovation broker by
enrolling key stakeholders and tirelessly negotiating
(bilaterally, multilaterally) the common objectives and
approach. At the same time, it produced technical, economic, and social knowledge about the situation, developed new cropping systems in close collaboration with
farmer innovators, and helped shape the enabling environment to establish ASOSID. It strengthened stakeholders’ capacity—an investment that continues. Aside from
the creation of ASOSID (a major institutional innovation), key results included the increasingly wide adoption
of conservation agriculture and related water-saving
techniques. The capacity and reach of farmers’ local and
regional water-user associations expanded. The associations decided to venture beyond their original mandate to
manage irrigation water and gradually got involved in
advisory services and alternative crop marketing.
Although it has gone through several stages, ASOSID is at
work ten years later, long after international research
ceased to be a major force in its agenda and activities.

Source: Author, based on Triomphe, Hocdé, and Chia 2006 and www.asosid.com.
a. Asociación para la Agricultura Sostenible en base a Siembra Directa (Association for Sustainable Agriculture Based on Direct
Seeding).
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Box 4.21 Features of Papa Andina’s Partnership Programs

Papa Andina is a regional partnership funded by the
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and
other donors. It involves the International Potato Center (CIP) and national agricultural research organizations in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Since its inception
in 1998, Papa Andina has shifted its focus from implementing a regional research agenda to developing a
regional learning agenda and strengthening national
capacities for innovation.
Organizational interface. Papa Andina’s participatory market chain approach (PMCA) features facilitated, face-to-face meetings that involve diverse market
chain actors, researchers, and other agricultural service
providers in exploring options for market chain innovation. The facilitating R&D organization then conducts
or arranges for R&D on specific innovations. A project
team based at CIP (with external funding) has continued to facilitate interactions between researchers, market actors, and decision makers at various policy levels
(in theory this task should eventually pass to the market
actors). This group sees itself as an innovation broker
and plays a lead role in a Learning Alliance that has been
established to promote exchanges among different
groups working on market chain innovation and development in Peru. Full-time facilitators and innovation
brokers reduce some of the transaction costs and coordination issues related to partnerships and networks.
Financial sustainability beyond donor funding remains
controversial and problematic for Papa Andina, both in
CIP and in national research organizations.
Outcomes. PMCA and stakeholder platforms have
achieved higher prices for native products, increased
farmers’ revenues, developed more stable markets for
producers of native potatoes (partly through successful
branding and marketing), and increased farmer’s selfesteem. In Bolivia, new potato products sold to supermarkets enable farmers to receive 30–40 percent higher
prices than they received in traditional markets. The
innovation network in Ecuador (Plataforma) enabled
farmers to raise yields by 33 percent, improve inputoutput ratios by 20 percent, and increase gross margins
per hectare fourfold.a
New products and markets. Other key outcomes
include the creation of a new brand of high-quality

fresh potatoes for the wholesale market, a new native
potato chip product and brand, and the first brand of
high-quality native potatoes to be marketed in
Peruvian supermarkets. Technological innovations
improved pest and disease management and the selection of harvested produce. A national platform,
CAPAC-Peru,b was established to promote the marketing of quality potato products and innovation, in
which local actors are gradually taking more responsibility as their capacity and trust increases. CAPAC
helped organize small-scale farmers to supply potatoes
meeting the more demanding market requirements.
When a multinational entered the market, Papa Andina began to work on corporate social responsibility to
balance corporate interests with the interests of community suppliers and the environment. Other indirect
results include the popularization of native potatoes
in Peru’s urban cuisine and the establishment of
Peru’s annual National Potato Day, which caused the
United Nations to declare 2008 the International Year
of the Potato.
Key lessons
■

■

■

Approaches such as PMCA require substantial time
and resources for capacity development if they are
to strengthen linkages between researchers, economic actors, and policy makers.
Traditional evaluation approaches based on objectives and logical frameworks do not work for
innovation processes and innovation brokers’ performance. The processes and tasks involved are too
complex and results often take some time to be
apparent.
A pro-poor focus is vital to market chain approaches
and innovation networks, which run the risk of benefiting those who are better able to take advantage of
new market opportunities and innovations. In Peru,
native potato varieties have evolved from “poor peoples’ food” to a source of national pride, and the
main beneficiaries have been the smallholders from
the high Andes who preserved and grew them over
thousands of years.

Source: Devaux et al. 2009, 2010; Horton et al. 2010; author.
a. Impact statistics from Cavatassi et al. 2009. (b) CAPC = Cadenas Productivas Agrícolas de Calidad en el Perú (Quality Agricultural Productivity Chains in Peru).
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POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Benefits of codesign are diverse and depend greatly on the
specific goals of each codesign experience. Generally speaking, benefits include a mix of:
■

■

■

■

■

More suitable and diverse innovations that are more
appropriate, easier to adopt, and developed more rapidly
than innovations generated through conventional
approaches.
Involved stakeholders, whose individual and collective
capacities for action, research, and problem-solving are
strengthened. If attention has been duly paid to the
weakest stakeholders, their technical, social, and at times
political endeavors may be empowered.
Institutions develop better routines and capacities to
implement their respective missions and goals, owing to
their involvement in codesign.
New institutional arrangements allowing better coordination and synergies among stakeholders.
A virtuous, sustainable circle through which, at the end
of the codesign process, the various stakeholders are
more willing and able to keep innovating as needs or
opportunities arise. In short, a greater capacity for stakeholders to take their destiny into their own hands.

For research, experience and skills in applying codesign
approaches can result in several additional benefits, such as
a greater ability to work in an interdisciplinary fashion and
to think systemically. The approach helps to renew and open
the research agenda and to reduce the typical divide
between research and societal needs.
POLICY ISSUES

Strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in
codesign is an essential part of the process and improves
their ability to interact with each other and with their institutional and socioeconomic environment. Such interactions
allow the visions and concerns of a specific stakeholder
group to become visible and legitimate to other stakeholders, and hence may eventually influence the scope and
nature of the innovations being developed, the distribution
of benefits among stakeholders, and other outcomes.
Practitioners must be prepared to deal with the strong
ethical and political dimensions of codesign processes.
Large power asymmetries can prevail among stakeholders.
Codesign processes frequently deal with or uncover conflictive situations. The process can have different consequences
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for different stakeholders’ livelihoods or their respective
places and influence in the institutional and political landscape. In some cases, codesign empowers the weakest stakeholders, but empowerment is not automatic; it may be
necessary to overcome tensions arising from the resistance
and inertia of traditionally powerful stakeholders.
Codesign may affect the strategic positioning of research
and its role in the innovation landscape. Research may
decide it is legitimate to go beyond its traditional role as a
producer of neutral knowledge and invest explicitly in such
areas as innovation brokering or documenting stakeholders’ positions and rationales in conflicts over resource
management.
Public research organizations may also need to become
better acquainted with innovation development initiatives
and modes of collaboration led by private stakeholders, who
often exhibit more responsiveness than public stakeholders
to emerging opportunities and who possess the skills and
tools to deal with consumers and markets. On the other
hand, research may play a vital role in innovation programs
by ensuring that public goods are identified, produced, and
protected and that political agendas and concerns relating to
sustainability, poverty reduction, and equity are duly
reflected in the collaboration.

LESSONS LEARNED

Experiences with codesign show that efforts to innovate are
most successful when they tackle innovation in its broad
sense and diverse dimensions, including technological,
organizational, and institutional dimensions. In ASOSID
and Papa Andina, innovations ranged from production
techniques (new pest management techniques) to new institutions. A narrow focus on predefined solutions is not likely
to yield effective innovation.
By necessity, codesign is a highly iterative, dynamic
approach. The unfolding of an actual innovation process is
by nature highly iterative and dynamic. It typically involves
overlapping and interlinked phases and activities, including
participatory identification of demands and problems,
stakeholder mapping and enrollment, the development of
rules and modalities for collective action, joint experimentation on different innovative solutions, capacity building,
participatory monitoring and evaluation, joint learning
among stakeholders, and the sharing and dissemination of
results and outcomes among stakeholders.
Codesign is really a set of guiding principles. It is not a
blueprint or a ready-built, standard approach, method, or
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toolbox that can be implemented “as is.” Codesign is only
one of many possible and complementary approaches that
researchers may need and decide to use, after having
thought carefully about its justifications, advantages, intrinsic complexities, and the limits of what it can or cannot contribute.
Innovations may be codesigned on a small to large scale,
depending on the issue at hand and the stakeholders involved.
While most experience with the approach has been gained
at a local or limited scales (in problems affecting a few communities at a time, for example), proponents of codesign
now tend to work at multiple scales and/or involve institutions, supply chains, and networks operating at a regional,
national, or even international scale.
Codesign requires strong bottom-up, participatory
processes shaped by interactions among key individuals
(“champions”) acting autonomously rather than along existing hierarchical and institutional channels and routines.
Different stakeholders need to be involved. As noted, each
stakeholder has a unique legitimacy, role, knowledge base,
and contribution to the codesign process, depending on its
own stake in the outcome, demands, desires, needs, and previous experience, capacities, and skills in relation to the specific issues and objectives being addressed. For their part,
end-users of innovations need to be given a fair opportunity
to play a central role throughout the innovation process.
Mapping and analyzing stakeholders is an effective way to
increase the chances that a codesign approach will be realistic as well as successful.
Demonstrable, early progress with tangible (visible)
innovations is important for keeping stakeholders motivated and actively engaged throughout the codesign
process. It also increases their sense of ownership.
There are no theoretical limitations to the types and
number of stakeholders that can or should be involved. In
practical terms, however, the ability to effectively coordinate
multiple stakeholders and maintain “reasonable” transaction costs can reach a limit. An important lesson for process
management is to keep stakeholders’ involvement as flexible
and dynamic as possible, with stakeholders entering or exiting the process, or becoming more or less active, depending
on the phase of the codesign process.

Stakeholder coordination needs to be formalized, however, via specific instruments (such as steering committees
and multistakeholder platforms) to allow joint strategic
decision making and effective joint implementation of
activities.
Approaches for codesigning innovations still represent a
novel field of investment, requiring investments in developing
new roles and new methods. To increase the chances that
researchers and their organizations will be successful in such
endeavors, they need to critically assess the roles they usually play in an innovation process and take appropriate steps
to develop new roles and skills that may be needed, such as
skills in facilitation, negotiation, building and nurturing
partnerships, understanding power relationships and how
to deal with them, and reflection. They also need new conceptual frameworks and tools for assessing problems;
understanding the diversity of stakeholders’ objectives,
perceptions, and criteria; exploring new scenarios and innovations effectively and ex ante; and assessing impact in its
tangible and intangible dimensions.
Allow flexibility with project proposals. Donors need to
adapt their guidelines for acceptable proposals to co-design
approaches. Donors usually require clear proposals and
funding plans that outline several years of activities, with
detailed explanations of what, where, when, and how activities will occur and at what cost. In contrast, when funding
“true” codesign approaches, donors should allow the maximum level of flexibility by those submitting proposals. This
flexibility includes giving proper consideration to conducting a true exploratory phase (whose outcome, by definition,
cannot be known beforehand), allowing a significant margin of freedom for plans and budgets to be developed and
adjusted as and when needed, and allocating sufficient
funding for the typically significant transaction costs and
other specific costs related to operating a codesign
approach. Since conditions for an effective codesign process
are not always suitable, one outcome of the exploratory
phase may be a decision not to engage in codesign after all.
Far from being a negative or undesirable outcome, a decision of this kind should be viewed as an excellent way of
preventing limited resources from being wasted on a potentially ill-fated process.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 5

Organizational Change for Learning and Innovation
Douglas Horton, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

arlier sections of this module identified strategies
for agricultural research organizations to work more
effectively with partners in an AIS. This note discusses the changes that research organizations may need in
their management practices, structures, and incentives if
they are to use these strategies effectively. It emphasizes the
need for agricultural research organizations to become
“learning organizations” that are responsive to changes in
their environment and innovative in their policies, management practices, and structures. Becoming a learning organization frequently requires: shifting from closed innovation
strategies to more open ones; shifting from simple, hierarchical organizational designs to more complex ones that feature multidisciplinary teamwork and multi-organizational
collaboration; shifting from traditional planning and implementation systems to adaptive management; expanding
evaluation functions to encompass both accountability and
learning; and incorporating societal concerns and priorities
into performance incentives.

E

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

This thematic note outlines changes in organizational structures, management systems, and incentives that agricultural
research organizations can make to improve their performance in AISs. It develops a number of themes introduced
previously and offers practical suggestions for improving
research-action linkages and partnering in the day-to-day
work of agricultural research organizations. The changes
discussed may apply to organizations operating at the local
or zonal research level, national agricultural research institutes, regional or subregional bodies, and international agricultural research centers. Whatever the case, the aim is to
make agricultural research organizations more open and
responsive to changes in the external operating environ-
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ment and more effective in linking research to the practical
needs of clients and society more broadly.
INVESTMENTS NEEDED

This section highlights the importance of change management and capacity development. It identifies the main areas
in which agricultural research organizations may need to
change and where investments may be useful. Priorities for
investment to support organizational change are summarized in table 4.7.
Capacity development and change
management strategies

The shift from a linear model of technology generation and
transfer to an innovation system model, which involves a
range of stakeholders from the start, requires new competencies related to communication, participatory planning,
facilitation of teamwork, and learning-oriented evaluation.
Conventional capacity development has concentrated on
developing the knowledge and skills of individuals, but
research organizations that perform effectively in innovation systems also require changes in policies, management
systems, and incentives.
There are two basic approaches to organizational change:
top-down (deliberate) change and bottom-up (emergent)
change. In recent years, agricultural research organizations
with weak leadership have implemented numerous but disconnected strategies, often driven by external donors. This
type of bottom-up change fragments decision-making and
jeopardizes the coherence of an organization’s programs.
Transforming an agricultural research organization into a
learning organization requires that bottom-up initiatives be
complemented with strong leadership from the top, to ensure
that organizational learning takes place and that useful organizational innovations are mainstreamed.1 Leadership within

Table 4.7 Priorities for Investment to Support Organizational Change
Organizational element

Priority for investment and change

Capacity development and
change management
Strategy formulation

Develop new competencies related to communication, facilitation, and mediation needed to work with diverse
stakeholders in identifying and developing new opportunities for technical and institutional innovation
Shift from production of research outputs to fostering innovation processes that contribute to broad
socioeconomic goals
Include representatives of diverse stakeholders, including smallholders, market agents, and consumers, in
governance bodies
Formulate policies for working with partners, including the objectives and types of partnership and principles
for decision making, communication, and sharing of costs and benefits
Develop practical procedures for systematic planning and priority setting, which combine stakeholder inputs
with analysis of costs and benefits
Develop learning-oriented M&E systems that clarify “impact pathways,” monitor progress in relation to these
markets, and use results to improve the design and implementation of ongoing and future work
Reward teamwork and partnerships that produce practical results. Develop competitive grant schemes for
innovation projects
Increase flexibility in arrangements to allow adaptive management and responsiveness to emerging needs and
opportunities
Develop mechanisms or units to manage inter-organizational partnerships with multiple lines of accountability
Develop specialized innovation brokerage units outside of the national agricultural research organization

Accountability and governance
Partnership policies
Planning and priority setting
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
Incentives for change
Administration and finance
Organizational arrangements
Beyond the agricultural research
organization
Source: Author.

the organization is needed to formulate appropriate goals and
strategies, improve policies and management systems, and
adjust organizational structures where appropriate.
Organizational change is a highly political process,
because there are winners and losers. For that reason, change
initiatives need to have a powerful guiding coalition and
local support. Effective capacity development and change
management require experts, local and international, who
possess not only technical expertise but skills in coaching,
process facilitation, and management development.
For agricultural research organizations to shift their focus
from doing research to using research to foster innovation, they
are likely to need changes in the following areas: strategy
formulation; accountability to end-users and beneficiaries;
partnership policies; planning and evaluation systems;
incentives; administration and finance; and organizational
arrangements. Box 4.22 describes how a Tanzanian capacitydevelopment program addresses some of these needs.
Strategy formulation

Reformulation of the basic goals, values, mission statements, and strategy documents of agricultural research
organizations can be a crucial area for investment, because
this information influences the motivation and guides the
behavior of all the organization’s members and programs.
The mission and strategy of agricultural research organizations traditionally focused on producing research for major

crops and livestock. In an AIS, the mission and strategy
should focus on fostering innovation processes that address
broader social goals, including poverty reduction; improved
food security; improved health and nutrition; and sustainable management of natural resources.
Reformulating the strategy of an organization is not the
job of a management consultant or senior manager. It needs
to be done in a participatory fashion, involving representatives of a cross-section of management and staff, to build a
strong coalition for change within the organization.
Accountability and governance

Accountability refers to the processes and practices that an
organization uses to keep its stakeholders informed, take into
account and balance their interests, and ensure adequate
responses to their concerns (Blagescu and Young 2005) (box
4.23). In agricultural research institutes, accountability procedures usually focus on meeting the needs of funding bodies
(the public treasury and donors) and pay little attention to
the needs and interests of partners and intended users of
research products and services (development programs,
farmers, market agents, consumers). In particular, small-scale
farmers have little voice and influence in decision making.
Investors can encourage agricultural research organizations to include representatives of different stakeholders,
including smallholders, in their governance bodies (see
module 1, TN 1) and to incorporate principles of good
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Box 4.22 Strengthening Capacity in Tanzania through a Client-Oriented Approach to
Managing Research and Development

Tanzania’s Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
wanted to internalize a strong orientation to clients in
all of its services. The ministry’s Client Service Charter,
adopted in 2002, required the ministry to establish service contracts with clients. The national agricultural
research system adopted a Client-Oriented Research and
Development Management Approach (CORDEMA)
in 2003. Under the multidonor Agricultural Sector
Development Programme (2006–13), public and private providers of agricultural research use the
CORDEMA approach to provide more relevant and
effective services. Funding for services comes from
performance-based contracts and Zonal Agricultural
Research and Development Funds (ZARDEFs) (competitive grants).
Organizational change involves training public
researchers and their partners, who also develop a collaborative, market-focused agenda for R&D. Funding
is available to plan and competitively fund collaborative R&D. Change management focuses on developing
capacities in (1) human resource management,
(2) financial management, (3) partnership and linkage
management, (4) planning, monitoring, and evaluation, and (5) output orientation, dissemination, and
information management.
The capacity development program includes all
24 research managers (national and zonal), 30 zonal
CORDEMA facilitators, and more than 280 researchers
and partner agencies competing for grants. It began
with the development of a National Facilitation Team
and subnational training teams. The curriculum was
developed collaboratively by the Ministry of Agriculture, a university, a farmer networking organization,
and the Royal Tropical Institute of the Netherlands.
Results and benefits. Although it is too early to verify whether agricultural innovation has increased and
influenced the impact of research on development, the
CORDEMA program has improved awareness that
research should be managed as a performanceoriented, demand-driven service. Among other results,
the program increased interaction between research,
the private sector, and farmers. These “innovation triangles” benefited from research funds available
through the grant program and activities related to

District Agricultural Development Plans. Researchers
participated in Farmer Field Schools and farmer
groups, including farmer research groups. The capacity
to develop effective research proposals for national and
international research funds improved.
Lessons. Lessons from this capacity-strengthening
program include:
■

■

■

■

■

■

■

A comprehensive framework is needed for change
management. It should include regular reflection
based on close monitoring of the framework, institutional support, flexibility, and links between all
management areas.
Build awareness of the need for a client and service
orientation at all levels, among staff of the research
organization at the national level, ministerial decision makers, and national policy makers. Broad,
effective awareness cannot be achieved by zonal and
district champions alone.
Provide resources for training and sustained learning with follow-up funding. To maintain the
momentum for change created during training, fund
at least part of the subsequent organizational change
activities as well as win collaborative research proposals. Otherwise the momentum is lost.
Durable change in research organizations concerns
not only researchers but all staff. It includes service
units and financial administrators as well as support
staff and field assistants.
Trained and competent facilitators are needed
nationally and locally. To avoid conflicts of interest,
facilitation should not be combined with resource
management or implementation.
Monitoring organizational and institutional
change is essential to maintain momentum and
inform decision-makers.
Research organizations need autonomy for full
institutionalization of CORDEMA. In Tanzania,
implementation was slowed by a hierarchy of policy
makers, many of whom were not directly involved
with or committed to the change process.

Sources: Personal communication from Willem Heemskerk (KIT), Ninatubu Lema (Department of Research and Training), and
Zainab Semgalawe (World Bank); www.agriculture.co.tz; www.kit.nl; DRT 2008; Hawkins et al. 2009; Heemskerk et al. 2003; Lema,
Schouten, and Schrader 2003; Schrader et al. 2003.
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Box 4.23 Principles of Accountability

The One World Trust has formulated four principles that agricultural research organizations can
apply to improve their accountability, not only to
funding bodies but to key stakeholders and partners in innovation processes:
■

■

■

■

Participation. The organization should involve
stakeholders in its decision-making processes
and activities.
Transparency. The organization should make
information about its aims and activities available to its stakeholders.
Evaluation. The organization should reflect on
and learn from past experiences and provide
evidence for reporting on progress and impact.
Feedback management. The organization
should invite and respond to feedback, comments, and critiques of its activities.

Source: One World Trust, www.oneworldtrust.org.

innovative partnership policies can go beyond local benefits
and include valuable contributions to general knowledge. As
indicated in TN 2, procedures for selecting partners and
managing relationships are quite different for upstream
research partnerships than they are for downstream partnerships to promote innovation. These differences need to
be built into partnership policies and management systems.
Planning and evaluation systems

Planning and evaluation in agricultural research organizations are often ad hoc and externally driven. An important
area for investment is the development of simple but effective institutional systems and procedures for planning,
priority setting, monitoring, evaluation, and impact assessment. The goal should not be to introduce the most sophisticated methods available but to develop local institutional
capacity and commitment to continue with systematic planning and evaluation after the initial investment project has
been completed.

The objectives the organization seeks by engaging in
partnerships.
The main types of partnerships employed by the organization.
Principles for working in partnership, including decision
making, communication, and sharing of costs and benefits (including intellectual property).

Planning and priority setting. Planning and priority
setting assume even greater importance in the changing
context for public agricultural research. As competitive
grants come to replace core funding and block grants for
agricultural research, as the goals of agricultural research
organizations proliferate and become more complex, and as
agricultural research organizations work with more partners,
they need more systematic planning and priority-setting
procedures that combine stakeholder inputs with analysis of
the research costs and benefits. Module 7 in this sourcebook
provides guidance on planning and assessment approaches
and bodies (such as research-innovation councils, research
networks, and subsector networks, platforms, or associations) that can perform planning and priority setting. The
sourcebook on planning agricultural research (Gijsbers et al.
2001) and the collection on prioritizing agricultural research
(Raitzer and Norton 2009) provide useful approaches and
methods for planning and priority setting. The value of wellfacilitated priority-setting exercises goes beyond their
empirical results. By engaging partners and external
stakeholders in a process of shared reflection over the
validity of assumptions underpinning impact pathways,
priority-setting exercises also promote collective learning
and strengthen relationships among stakeholders. (Raitzer
and Norton 2009, 2).

Since there is little experience in this area to date, the
payoff to investment projects that support development of

Monitoring and evaluation. As noted, agricultural
research organizations typically employ monitoring and

accountability into the rules and procedures of their boards
of trustees and other governing bodies.
Partnership policies

Although agricultural research organizations already work
with partners, whose numbers will only grow as AIS
approaches become mainstreamed, few agricultural research
organizations have formal partnership policies, leading to
frequent confusion, inefficiency, and conflict. A priority for
organizational reform and for investment in this area is to
support the formulation of appropriate policies for working
with partners in research and innovation processes. Partnership policies need to define:
■

■

■
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evaluation to satisfy accountability requirements and report
to external funding bodies. M&E programs are seldom
designed to draw lessons from experience to improve the
design and implementation of programs. Similarly, ex post
impact assessment is done mainly to document results of
past investments and justify future funding, rather than to
learn from experience with a view to improving future
programming (Kelly et al. 2008; see also module 7).
Improving M&E systems is an important area for investment. Innovative evaluation approaches are needed to:
■

■

■

Articulate “theories of change” and “impact pathways”
for projects and programs, with clearly defined progress
markers.
Monitor and evaluate progress and results in relation to
these markers.
Use the results to improve the design and implementation of ongoing and future research and research-related
activities.

Module 7 provides guidance on M&E, and useful
approaches are also presented by Raitzer and Norton (2009)
and Walker et al. (2008). Issues and ideas for developing

institutional evaluation systems for agricultural research
organizations are discussed in the inception report for
establishing a CGIAR independent evaluation arrangement
(Markie and Compton 2011).
Incentives for change

Another priority for investment projects is to ensure that
researchers have adequate incentives to communicate and
work effectively with others—other researchers in other disciplines, development professionals, agricultural service
providers, and farmers and other market chain actors—to
promote agricultural innovation. There are two main ways
to provide such incentives. The first is through human
resource management policies and practices that reward
teamwork producing practical results. The second is through
competitive grant schemes for innovation projects. Without
such incentives, individuals are more likely to continue producing research publications, regardless of their relevance,
than to work with partners to ensure that research results are
relevant and useful. Module 5 describes various approaches
for implementing competitive grants schemes; box 4.24
below provides an example from Peru.

Box 4.24 Promoting Agricultural Innovation through a Competitive Funding Scheme in Peru

During the 1990s, Peru took important steps to liberalize the economy, but smallholders did not share in the
benefits. Public expenditures on research represented
only 0.2 percent of agricultural GDP. In 1999, the Government of Peru and the World Bank initiated a program to increase the competitiveness of the agricultural
sector through the adoption of environmentally sound
technologies generated and disseminated by a decentralized technology innovation system led by the private sector. The new program relied on a competitive
funding scheme to promote innovation. A Fund for
Technical Assistance supported extension services for
producer groups and field-level adaptive research. A
Strategic Services Development Fund supported
research as well training for extension providers. Further support aimed at developing institutional capacity
in the public sector to formulate and implement
agricultural innovation policy in conjunction with the
private sector. INCAGRO, the program coordination
unit, resided in the Ministry of Agriculture and was

administratively independent of the national agricultural research institute (INIA, Instituto Nacional de
Innovación Agraria). INCAGRO’s innovative features
included:
■

■

■

■

■

■

An approach and tools for rigorous and transparent funding (clear rules, an independent vetting
committee, and an efficient and transparent monitoring system).
Empowerment of producer groups to plan and carry
out agricultural innovation projects and demand
extension services.
Use of business plans to estimate expected economic
benefits.
Cofinancing of innovation projects through producer groups and/or alliances.
Establishment of regional offices with staff to facilitate and coach the producer groups and alliances.
Innovation project budgets that include funds for
hiring technical experts as innovation brokers.
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 4.24 Promoting Agricultural Innovation Through a Competitive Funding Scheme in Peru (continued)

■

A database management system that covers all
aspects of the project cycle.

Results. The program reached most regions of the
country and appears to have increased the volume and
quality of available extension services. The research
fund also appears to have contributed to setting
national priorities for research funding, developing a
research agenda, strengthening researchers’ capacities
for innovation, strengthening producer organizations,
and achieving research impacts. An ex post cost-benefit
study found that a sample of 171 agricultural extension
subprojects financed through INCAGRO had an average internal rate of return of 54 percent.
Not unexpectedly, establishing the competitive
funding mechanism outside of INIA created resistance,
and a 2008 law placed INCAGRO under INIA. Even so,
INCAGRO had helped create institutional capacity in
the regions, including producer organizations and
public-private alliances which could compete for new
cross-sectoral innovation funds established by the government. The largest fund was based on the INCAGRO
model and designed by former INCAGRO staff.
A recent law requires INIA to promote the establishment of a national, pluralistic, demand-driven agricultural innovation system. Though many practical

aspects of these institutional innovations remain to be
worked out and the future of INIA is uncertain, the
competitive funding model to promote agricultural
innovations has proven effective.
Lessons. The main lessons from this experience
include:
■

■

■

■

Institutional success did not depend on designing an
institutional model for agricultural innovation for
the country but on sound implementation of the
competitive funds themselves (in other words, the
power of the model was that it created institutional
capacities on the demand side).
Despite the significant risks involved in promoting
innovative approaches from outside the predominant institutional structures, specific circumstances
can justify such an approach.
Transparent policies and selection and monitoring
procedures are keys to successful competitive funds.
INCAGRO’s operating procedures, information systems, and communication strategies were important
in implementing the program effectively.
Placing INCAGRO staff throughout the country
supported national decentralization goals. Other
competitive funding programs in Peru noted the
strength of this decentralized approach.

Sources: Klaus Urban, FAO (personal communication); Días Avíla, Salles-Filho, and Alonso 2010; INCAGRO 2010; Fresco 2010;
Vargas Winstanly 2010; López Heredia 2010; http://www.incagro.gob.pe/WebIncagro/inicio.do.
Note: More nuanced findings on the Peruvian case are presented in World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2009).
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/InterLandingPagesByUNID/DB83D0B3CC8500D085257 8330014721A.

Administration and finance

As innovation processes are inherently dynamic and unpredictable, working to promote pro-poor innovation requires
considerable flexibility in administrative and financial
arrangements. Yet flexibility can be difficult to achieve in
traditional public administrative systems, which demand
considerable forward planning of activities and expenditures. Working to promote innovation processes also
requires extensive work “off campus” that is difficult to
monitor.
Agricultural research organizations that support or
engage in pro-poor innovation may need to adjust their
administrative and financial procedures to gain more flexibility and responsiveness to unanticipated needs and opportunities. Decentralizing decision making to units with

regional, thematic, or value chain mandates can help bring
administration and finance “closer to the field.” Another
option is to establish semiautonomous bodies (such as foundations) that may use administrative and accounting procedures that are simpler and more flexible than those which are
common in the national agricultural research organization
within the public sector. PROINPA in Bolivia is a successful
example of a foundation dedicated to agricultural research
and development (Gandarillas et al. 2007).2

Organizational arrangements

By themselves, changes in organizational structure are unlikely
to produce the behavioral changes for agricultural research
organizations to promote innovation more effectively,
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although some new organizational arrangements can be useful. They include specialized units responsible for spanning
institutional boundaries and for innovation brokering.
Boundary management. Working across institutional
boundaries is essential for the effective operation of
innovation systems. The development of units responsible
for managing interorganizational relations and partnerships
is a new and promising area for investment in agricultural
research for development. Agricultural research organizations have tended to partner exclusively with other
research entities, but they require a more diverse set of
partners to promote innovation. The idea is not to partner
for the sake of partnering, but to partner when and where
it is essential to achieve impact. One way to achieve this
outcome is for specialized bodies to manage communication
and relations between agricultural research organizations
and other key stakeholders in innovation processes.
It is essential that boundary management units have lines
of responsibility and accountability to groups on both sides
of the organizational boundary and not report only to the
agricultural research organization (Cash et al. 2003:8086).
Because the benefits of boundary management units may
accrue to several organizations, there are limited incentives
for any one organization to take the initiative and bear the
full costs. For this reason, boundary management constitutes an important area for investment by national governments or external donors that wish to promote pro-poor
innovation.
Innovation brokerage. The establishment of sustainable
innovation brokerage units (see module 3, TN4) is another
potentially high-payoff area for public investment.
Innovation brokerage is less concerned with linking
researchers in a research organization to external stakeholders
than with fostering innovation processes and bringing in
needed research products or services from wherever they
reside. Brokering innovation processes is related to boundary
management but focuses on articulating demands for
research products and services, forming stakeholder networks
for innovation, and managing innovation processes (Klerkx,
Hall, and Leeuwis 2009, 413). In performing these functions,
innovation brokers enable other organizations to work
together and innovate. These functions may be performed by
independent bodies or by units within or attached to
agricultural research organizations. Innovation brokerage
units have played useful roles in stimulating and facilitating
innovation processes, but the participants (particularly smallscale farmers and market agents) have been reluctant to cover
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the full cost of their operations—hence the key role for public
investment.

Looking beyond the agricultural
research organization

As the previous paragraphs indicate, the changes required
for agricultural research organizations to contribute more
productively to innovation systems are not all within agricultural research organizations themselves. To establish legitimacy and trust, it might be necessary to assign innovation
brokerage functions to organizations that are independent
from the main participants in agricultural innovation
processes. Peru’s competitive grant scheme (see also module
5, TN2) to promote pro-poor innovation was established in
the Ministry of Agriculture and operated independently
from the national research institute (box 4.24).

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Effective capacity development and change management in
the areas highlighted previously are essential for implementing the approaches recommended in other thematic
notes of this module (linkages, public-private partnerships,
regional programs, and codesign of new technologies). The
benefits that can be expected from these measures are
described in the other thematic notes and innovative activity profiles. Box 4.22 describes the likely direct benefits
from capacity strengthening (CORDEMA, Tanzania), box
4.24 describes benefits from changes in incentive and funding schemes (INCAGRO, Peru), and box 4.25 describes
benefits arising from sweeping organizational change
(NAIP, India).3
Given the complex nature of organizational change
and the emergent nature of the results, it is notoriously
difficult to evaluate and measure the benefits of organizational change processes. The types of benefits that may be
expected to result from well-managed organizational
change processes carried out under favorable conditions can
be summarized as follows:
■

■

■

Greater awareness on the part of researchers of the
importance of working in coalitions with other stakeholders in innovation processes.
Improved relations between agricultural researchers,
policy makers, and economic actors (producers, market
agents, consumers).
Changes in the research portfolio to emphasize research
with higher short-term potential impact.
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Box 4.25 Organizational and Institutional Changes through a National Innovation Project in India

The National Agricultural Innovation Project (NAIP) is
a major reform initiative implemented over six years
(2006–12) by the Indian Council of Agricultural
Research (ICAR), with funding from the Government
of India and the World Bank. NAIP seeks to accelerate
the collaborative development and application of agricultural innovations involving public research organizations, farmers, the private sector, and other stakeholders. ICAR is responsible for catalyzing institutional
change through initiatives in the areas of policy, strategy, governance, financial management, and accountability mechanisms and through a massive human
resource development initiative. NAIP has established
51 market-oriented collaborative research alliances of
public, private, and nongovernmental organizations as
well as farmer groups and international organizations.
Applied research focuses on technological innovation
in disadvantaged rural areas. Basic/strategic research
focuses on such areas as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and postharvest technology. Nearly 60 percent of
the research funding provided under NAIP is channeled through competitive grants to research partnerships involving public, private, and nongovernmental
organizations.
ICAR faced several challenges in implementing
NAIP because of the scale of the project, its broad
vision of joint technology development by public and
private organizations, and the formation of coalitions
with a wide range of partners. It addressed these challenges through extensive awareness campaigns prior to
initiating the grant program; a helpdesk to support
potential project partners; a sophisticated monitoring
and evaluation system; and partnership guidelines that
provide for management of intellectual property and
sharing of capital expenditures.
Results. The project’s main results and benefits
relate to organizational and institutional change. NAIP

gave public sector scientists direct experience of the
challenges involved in partnering with a wide range of
nonconventional partners critical for innovation. Lessons from this experience have not been systematically
documented to date, but interactions with scientists
involved in NAIP suggest the following organizational
and institutional outcomes:
■

■

■

■

■

■

Greater appreciation of the range of skills needed
for innovation and the complementary roles of
diverse partners.
The importance of broad consultations with a range
of actors before conceiving project ideas and developing concept notes.
Better understanding of how to develop large-scale
projects with multiple partners, which can achieve
significant impact.
More frequent project reviews with partners at regular intervals.
Improved facilitation of partnerships and brokering
of innovation processes.
Increased confidence of scientists to work with
private and nongovernmental organizations.

Lessons. Externally funded programs such as NAIP
provide useful opportunities for researchers to learn
how to work with the wide range of actors needed for
innovation, but such partnerships are challenging for
organizations with a long history of working in isolation. Aspects of research project management (review,
financing, procurement, and so forth) in public
organizations must change to provide the support and
flexibility for partnerships to flourish. Systematic
assessment of and reflection on the experience gained
through NAIP will yield valuable insights to further
reform the national research system and enable good
practices fostered by NAIP to take root and multiply.

Sources: Rasheed Sulaiman V, Centre for Research on Innovation and Science Policy (CRISP), Hyderabad (personal communication); Mruthyunjaya 2010; NAIP 2010.

■
■

■
■

Greater influence on policy processes.
Better mobilization of resources to support research and
innovation processes.
Improved uptake and use of research results.
Expanded socioeconomic and environmental benefits.

POLICY ISSUES

Organizational change directed at enabling public research
institutions to participate more fully in the innovation system must give particular attention to three policy issues.
They include gender and equity issues, the national
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commitment to change, and the possibility that broader
reforms may be needed to support innovation.

rizes useful lessons on what works and why (World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group 2008).

Dealing with gender and equity issues
in organizational change

LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Investment projects are convenient mechanisms for supporting agricultural research organizations in addressing
important and complex issues, such as gender, equity, and
empowering poor people. In fact, having access to external
resources and legitimacy can often be crucial for agricultural research organizations to begin working on these
issues. Gender and empowerment issues are especially
important for pro-poor agricultural innovation, because
women feature so prominently in the target population.
Additionally, empowering farmers and strengthening their
organizations may be essential for the success of multistakeholder processes. The Gender in Agriculture Sourcebook
(World Bank, FAO, and IFAD 2009) presents principles and
approaches for introducing gender work into agricultural
research organizations.
Key role of national leadership
and commitment to change

In any organizational change effort, it is important to keep
in mind that while external agents can motivate and support
change, local commitment and leadership are essential for
the initiative to succeed. A key role for external change
agents is to assess and cultivate local commitment and leadership among policy makers for the organizational changes
that will enable the agricultural research organization to
promote agricultural innovation more effectively. The local
commitment of resources to the change process is a key
indicator of commitment. Where local leadership and
financial commitments for change are not forthcoming, the
appropriate decision might be to not proceed with the investment project.
Need for broader public sector reform

As public agricultural research organizations are part of
larger public administrative systems, successful efforts to
introduce changes needed to perform more effectively in the
AIS may require changes in the broader system of public
administration. For this reason, modernizing agricultural
research organizations is best viewed as part of a broader
initiative of public sector reform. A recent evaluation of
World Bank experiences with public sector reform summa-
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A number of lessons and recommendations provide guidance for initiating organizational change that makes it possible for public research organizations to participate more
fully in the AIS, especially as proponents of pro-poor innovation. They are discussed in the sections that follow.
Investment projects may be useful vehicles
for initiating and mainstreaming changes

Organizational change efforts are fraught with difficulties
and often lose momentum or veer off course. Participants
within the organizations concerned may lack or lose legitimacy and can benefit from external support and guidance. For these reasons, it is useful to organize organizational change efforts as “institutional projects” with
defined leadership, goals, capacity development strategies,
budgets, timelines, evaluation procedures, and lines of
accountability. In this sense, investment projects play a
useful role in organizational change. One thing to keep in
mind, however, is that while external agents can play useful roles in supporting and legitimizing change processes,
leadership for organizational change must come from
within the organization. Experience shows that it is easier
to introduce changes through externally funded projects
than to mainstream changes in agricultural research
organizations. On the other hand, a large-scale project
such as NAIP (box 4.25), which has allowed ICAR to
develop, fund, and operate a large number of consortia,
can help change efforts to reach a critical mass and
become embedded in organizational routines. From the
very start of a project that aims to promote organizational
change, it is important to develop strategies for mainstreaming innovations.
Adaptive management Is needed
for organizational change projects

Change processes are highly dynamic and inherently unpredictable. For this reason, it is inappropriate to attempt to
plan organizational change projects in great detail and then
implement them rigidly as planned. Adaptive management
is needed for change projects, and project managers in
external funding bodies may need to be creative to maintain the required accountability without imposing undue

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

limitations on the local teams who need to spearhead organizational change.

Developing internal capacity for organizational
innovation is crucial for agricultural research
organizations

To keep up with rapid alterations in the social, economic,
environmental, and technological landscape, agricultural
research organizations need the capacity to adjust their policies, management practices, and structures as conditions
change. The continuing success of an agricultural research
organization will depend on its capacity for organizational
innovation. Agricultural research organizations often fail to
develop this capacity because of the lack of continuity in
policies and leadership in agricultural research.
Bringing about cultural change takes time
and multipronged approaches

Organizational changes (institutional change) may take
considerable time to take root; withdrawing support too
quickly can jeopardize the sustainability of results. Change
agents and donors need to keep this in mind. In many cases,
the changes that are needed to allow agricultural research
organizations to contribute more effectively to pro-poor
innovation amount to a significant shift in culture, and
organizational cultures are notoriously resistant to change.
Past organizational change has focused on formal structural issues—position titles, reporting relationships, and the

titles and boundaries of various organizational units—yet
day-to-day activities are more often influenced by formal
and informal rules and norms enshrined in an organization’s “standard operating procedures.” Deep changes in
organizations also produce losers as well as winners, and the
potential losers often fight long and hard to retain their status and privileges. The high rate of turnover of managers
and researchers in many agricultural research organizations
presents another important challenge. Innovation system
approaches are seldom taught in agricultural universities
and must be introduced to new staff members when they
join the organization. If staff turnover is high, these “new
approaches” may need to be introduced again and again.
Strengthening capacity needs to be skillfully
meshed with managing organizational change

Public organizations are often perceived as resisting change.
Many seek capacity—the ability to get things done—but not
change—a different way of doing old and new things. In
working with agricultural research organizations, it is
important to understand which aspects of the status quo are
amenable to change and which ones are not, so that an
appropriate capacity development initiative can be designed
and appropriate alliances can be forged with progressive elements in agricultural research organizations, NGOs, the
policy community, and the private sector. The case of
EMBRAPA in Brazil illustrates how an agricultural research
organization can successfully embrace both capacity development and organizational change.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 1

Redesigning a Livestock Research Institute to Support
Livestock Development within an AIS Approach
Ranjitha Puskur, International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)
Peter Ballantyne, International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)
Patti Kristjanson, World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)

SYNOPSIS

PROJECT OBJECTIVE AND DESCRIPTION

he International Livestock Research Institute
(ILRI) has undertaken significant institutional
change as it attempts to shift its research from a
linear, science-driven approach to an innovation systems
approach through the adoption of a research-fordevelopment strategy, fostering of new partnerships and
knowledge brokering roles, reorganizing and refocusing its
research focus, and by adjusting its skills and human
resource needs. To illustrate these changes and their
rationale, this profile draws on lessons from a wide range
of projects and research into linking knowledge with
action.

The objective—redesigning ILRI to support livestock development within an AIS approach—was attempted by developing an approach that uses innovation systems and value
chain perspectives to design and implement an expanding
portfolio of research-for-development (R4D) projects with
an emphasis on developing innovation capacity among system actors with external funding (box 4.26). Adopting this
approach has required considerable innovation in how livestock research is done and in the issues it addresses. That
innovation was supported by developing a new research
strategy and approach, impact orientation, changes made to
human resource and discipline mix, partnership management, and strategic communication (described in more
detail under “innovative elements”).

T

CONTEXT

The imperative to invest in agricultural research that provides more benefits to more poor people is driven by the
increasing numbers of poor throughout the world, the
global food crisis, and evidence of mounting climate
change, among many other forces. Livestock are a key
asset for poor households, especially women, and they
often contribute to better health and livelihoods. Yet
the capacity of livestock-related research to produce
measurable reductions in poverty has been questioned,
indicating that perhaps other, less linear approaches merit
evaluation.
Livestock systems and mixed crop-livestock systems are
inherently complex and diverse. National agricultural
research and extension systems in developing countries are
relatively weaker at working on livestock than on crops.
Public services for animal breeding, health, and market
information are grossly underinvested and often underdeveloped, and private participation remains quite limited.
These conditions make it especially challenging to develop
livestock innovation systems.
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INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS

Over the past decade, ILRI’s organizational structure and
research approaches have evolved to pursue the new agenda.
Some of the key and innovative elements are:
■

■

A research-for-development strategy and approach.
ILRI’s research strategy features a holistic systems perspective extending from production and markets to
institutions and policy. Its R4D projects balance technical and process issues through orchestrated innovation
networks, in which coalitions of actors along particular
value chains (such as those for dairy or small ruminant
production) identify knowledge required by target
groups and test options to address them. The networks
emphasize joint action and learning.
A knowledge brokering role. ILRI engages as a knowledge partner that integrates or bundles complementary
knowledge and technologies to promote pro-poor
livestock development. It uses knowledge to influence

Box 4.26 Building Capacity in Livestock Innovation Systems: Early Results from the
International Livestock Research Institute and Partners

A starting point for building capacity in livestock innovation systems is to make it easier for the actors to
innovate—through organizing, partnering, and linking
in a number of ways. This form of capacity building is
a major element of recent projects by the International
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and its partners.
Networking actors. The Fodder Innovation Project
(funded by the UK Department for International
Development) works with partners within and outside
government in India and Nigeria to form innovation
networks that enable actors in local livestock systems to
organize for innovation. Working with a diverse set of
actors in the system made it possible to address broad
system constraints rather than narrow technical issues.
Partner organizations have started to institutionalize
this approach (see box 4.27 for details).
Designing interventions around a service hub. The
East Africa Dairy Development Project, initiated in late
2007, has built upon ILRI’s experiences in Kenya and
elsewhere to design interventions around a “service
hub” that develops a network of actors to introduce,
test, and offer a range of services, technical options, and
information.
Forming public-private partnerships to reach
clients. Several projects engendered new partnerships
between public and private agencies:
■

The Livestock, Livelihoods, and Markets project
(LiLi), started in 2007 with the International Crop
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, promotes better delivery of livestock services and market
participation of smallholder goat and cattle keepers
in Southern Africa. Through an innovation platform
facilitated by the Namibia National Farmers Union
in the LiLi Project, AGRA (a commercial agricultural
cooperative) sponsors a veterinary outlet as part of
its Social Responsibility Outreach Program.

■

■

Partners from public, private, and nonprofit
organizations developed and tested index-based
livestock insurance in Kenya’s Marsabit District in
a project initiated in 2009. The insurance proved
commercially viable and will be scaled up for use
in Ethiopia. The first pilot involved Equity
Bank of Kenya, UAP Insurance, and Swiss-Re as
commercial partners. More than 2,000 contracts
have been issued, covering livestock worth over
US$1 million and attracting premiums exceeding
US$77,000.
A vaccine against East Coast fever has existed for
more than three decades. Highly effective and in
great demand, the vaccine has been produced in
ILRI’s laboratories, but more widespread distribution would require an effective cold chain. To scale
up production and make the vaccine more widely
available, the Global Alliance in Livestock Veterinary Medicines is partnering with ILRI and private
companies to establish viable commercial production and delivery systems (module 6, IAP 2).

New partnerships broaden the participation of the
poor. Several new projects respond to zoonotic diseases
such as avian influenza by building the capacity of veterinarians and public health officials in early detection,
diagnosis, and response. The projects mitigate disease
risk by improving coordination at the national level. An
“ecohealth” project initiated in 2009 in Southeast Asia
develops community-led options to prevent and control emerging zoonoses. A group of regional health and
disease surveillance networks and institutions catalyzed
this effort. Under the Safe Food, Fair Food Project, initiated in 2008, ILRI and its partners promote risk-based
approaches to improve food safety and the participation of the poor in informal markets for livestock products in West Africa.

Source: Authors; www.fodderinnovation.org; http://www.ilri.org/ibli/; www.GALVmed.org; http://www.ilri.org/EcoZd;
http://www.ilri.org/SafeFoodFairFood; http://www.slideshare.net/ILRI/using-hubs-to-increase-smallholder-farmers-accessto-services-experiences-from-the-east-africa-dairy-development-project; http://mahider.ilri.org/bitstream/10568/1787/1/
InnovationPlatformMozambique.pdf.

actions globally and in target regions, facilitates and convenes livestock R&D actors around pro-poor livestock
issues, and identifies gaps in knowledge and technologies
to fill.

■

Reorganizing and refocusing research. There is no
perfect way to organize human resources, but ILRI recognized that impact depended on replacing disciplinebased and geographically specific research projects with
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■

■

■

a new culture of working across disciplines and thematic
areas. ILRI has built up multi- and transdisciplinary
research capacities and added capacity for poverty and
gender research and impact assessment. Its Science Advisory Panel helps to assure research quality, renew intellectual capital, and provide an informal, outside evaluation of ILRI’s work. Links between strategy, planning,
and research implementation have been strengthened.
Aligning human resources and skills. ILRI began to
change its culture by building a new mix of capacities
(scientific, managerial, and business and partnership
management) and testing staff evaluations that reflected
the multifaceted roles involved in its new way of working. Financial and other systems were reformed in parallel. ILRI emphasizes larger projects to improve the efficiency of human resources, finance, and administrative
support.
Forging strategic R&D partnerships. As indicated in box
4.26, ILRI engages proactively with key enabling partners
(policy makers, regulators) and implementing partners
(farmers, market agents’ organizations, private companies, NGOs, and government) and provides incentives to
research managers to do so. Its R&D partnerships benefit from complementary competencies and capacities
and its work is aligned with broader government, NGO,
and private initiatives. A partnership strategy and guidelines (ILRI 2008) support these efforts.
Strategic communications and knowledge management
play a key role in engaging and supporting partnerships,
influencing the global and regional livestock agenda, and
making ILRI’s research outputs accessible. Its communications strategy differentiates the information needs of
its stakeholders and networks of influence.

BENEFITS, LESSONS, AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

Lessons and issues for wider application from the new
approaches, as well as from the “Linking Knowledge with
Action” study (Kristjanson et al. 2009), are summarized in
the sections that follow. Box 4.27 presents detailed lessons
from the Fodder Innovation Project, which was instrumental in the design of subsequent projects and reflects an AIS
approach.
Designing livestock innovation systems and processes

Localized innovation systems (often established around
sharply defined value chains) are most effective and have the
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greatest potential to create impact. Extracting meaningful,
practical principles and lessons from these context-specific,
path-dependent innovation processes makes it complicated
to scale up successful approaches or replicate them. Practitioners must give rigorous attention to learning what works
where and how, and then make judicious use of the elements. Building on the social capital of actors, their history
of collaboration, successes, and current initiatives can overcome some of these challenges.
One question is whether innovation system approaches
need to be expressed through projects. Is it possible to
build coordinating mechanisms into innovation systems
without bureaucratizing and immobilizing them in a topdown program? Where should ownership be located? In
the national agricultural research system? Are the most
appropriate contexts for an innovation system approach
in commodity research, in regional programs, or in programs based on agroecological areas? These questions
are part of a long list of queries that practitioners will
need to consider in deciding on the best means of achieving their goals.
Orchestrating coalitions and building
innovation capacity

Spaces and environments have to be created to facilitate
interaction and communication among actors in the innovation system. They need a place to articulate demands and
promising solutions and create the “pull” that elicits innovation. The scale (national, regional, district, or village) of
such platforms depends on the problem being addressed,
coordination requirements, and structure of the value
chain. Experience shows that effective projects require a
year simply to lay the groundwork. This important issue
needs to be highlighted and negotiated with donors. For
example, the Fodder Innovation Project created loose networks of actors around the issue of fodder scarcity at the
district level, but as the networks emerged, it became clear
that the focus needed to be at the broader level of the livestock value chain.
Are partnerships among individuals or organizations?
Often projects identify like-minded individuals in organizations, with personal contacts and relations playing a big
role. This means of operating is inherently unstable in the
longer term. It is critical to test and learn how networking
can become a routine in the organizations involved and not
be limited to select individuals.
Boundary spanning and brokerage functions are critical.
Brokers by definition have to be good communicators who

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

Box 4.27 Lessons and Operational Issues from the Fodder Innovation Project

The Fodder Innovation Project provided practical
guidance for implementing other projects with an
innovation systems orientation:
■

■

■

■

Fodder was too narrow a theme for building a network. It is more appropriate to build networks and
innovation capacities around crop-livestock value
chains that mobilize wider coalitions of partners
and more interest. Appropriate technology introduced through partnerships that ILRI had made
prior to the project proved to be a useful catalyst to
involve new stakeholders and raise and address
broader system constraints.
Building true partnerships, facilitating stakeholder platforms, and building innovation capacities take time. These processes and projects need
longer time frames to mature and gain currency in
policy debates and organizational change.
Innovation processes need one or more organizations or individuals to assume the critical roles of
broker, connector, and catalyst. An organization’s
ability to do this depends on its particular situation.
The history of the partners and stakeholders, their
social capital, and the legitimacy and credibility they
bring are all critical factors.
Monitoring and evaluating the processes and
resulting changes are essential but far from trivial

■

■

tasks. Traditional logframes and monitoring and
evaluation systems are inadequate for measuring
many of the indeterminate outcomes of innovation
systems (see module 7, IAP 6 and Lilja et al. 2010).
Financial management and planning must be
flexible and adept at accommodating emerging
opportunities and challenges.
Engage policy actors from the beginning to identify
windows for influence and for ownership of
research results. Policy stakeholders have observed
that the evidence of impact is very valuable but the
evidence base is too small.

In its examination of the Fodder Innovation Project
(among others), the “Linking Knowledge with Action”
study concluded that projects are more likely to link
knowledge with action when they (1) recognize that
scientific research is just one “piece of the puzzle,’’
(2) apply systems-oriented strategies, and (3) engage
the partners who are best positioned to transform
knowledge jointly created by all project members into
actions (strategies, policies, interventions, technologies) leading to better and more sustainable livelihoods.
The knowledge flows both ways between practitioners/
implementers/policy makers and researchers—making
the emphasis on linking with action rather than linking
to action an important one.

Sources: Authors; Kristjanson et al. 2009; de Haan et al. 2006.

are skilled at supporting collaboration and interactive
processes that involve different types of stakeholders. A
critical function of brokers is to manage and deal with large
asymmetries of power among actors. Brokering roles can
be played by local government, extension services, CSOs,
national research systems, or even the private sector,
depending on the constellation of skills, capacities, social
capital, legitimacy, and credibility they possess. Engaging
nontraditional partners like the private sector is still a
challenge for NGOs and government as well as public
research institutes. ILRI has found that assuming these
brokerage roles is not always the best solution, given that
these intensive, long-term, and local processes demand
continuous engagement that is rarely supported by short
project periods.

It seems much more logical that ILRI should focus
instead on building the capacities of key partners to play
these roles. This approach poses its own challenges: The
skills required cannot be mastered easily in formal training
alone. They require substantial coaching and mentoring on
the job. Two vital questions for project designers to answer
are who is best placed to play this role, and who is responsible for setting arrangements in motion.
Researchers will need to hone their skills to assume the
roles that the innovation system requires, and researchers
from complementary disciplines rarely found in traditional
research organizations will need to be engaged: anthropologists, political economists, communications specialists, and
project managers, among others. New institutional arrangements will make it possible to work more effectively with
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partners to capitalize on the competencies and human
resources they bring.
Monitoring, evaluation, and impact assessment:
new approaches urgently needed

In research-for-development projects, finding the right balance between the production of international public goods
and the achievement of local development impact is a recurring challenge for international organizations like ILRI.
When such projects attempt to build innovation capacity,
they often must choose between a capacity-building
approach aiming for sustainability, with much wider and
deeper potential impacts, or an approach that seeks the
rapid “adoption” of research products to raise productivity
and incomes (often only for a short time). Projects are
needed that blend the implementation of a good development strategy with rigorous scientific research.
Research projects are much more likely to link knowledge with action when they are designed as much for learning as for knowing. These projects are openly experimental,
embracing failures so as to learn from them throughout the
project’s life. This kind of learning does not occur unless
risk-taking managers are funded and rewarded; these managers also must be evaluated regularly by external experts
(Kristjanson et al. 2009).
It is important to develop M&E frameworks to track
both processes and outcomes and serve the twin objectives
of learning and accountability. In the typical three- to fouryear research-for-development project, it is difficult to
demonstrate change, because it often depends on complex
processes and interactions among diverse organizations and
individuals coming together for the first time. In the Fodder
Innovation Project, technical, institutional, and organizational changes appeared to reinforce each other and generate improvements in livestock systems that could improve
livelihoods. In reality, it was difficult to draw clear causal
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links in these complex adaptive systems and attribute specific changes to specific interventions. Impact assessment
frameworks and methodologies are still imperfect tools for
demonstrating impacts and proof of concept. More appropriate tools must be developed and tested.
Pro-poor partners help make innovation pro-poor

The Fodder Innovation Project showed that working
through and with partner organizations that had an explicit
pro-poor mandate and agenda helped target interventions
better and ensure pro-poor outcomes through negotiation
in the networks. Although service delivery generally
improved in Fodder Project areas owing to the networks’
actions, better service delivery did not guarantee that the
poor would benefit. The possibility that they would benefit
increased only when champions in the network negotiated
the conditions to ensure that outcome. It is vital to gain
greater clarity on which alternative mechanisms will ensure
pro-poor outcomes if partner organizations are not specifically committed to those outcomes.
Policy engagement

Innovation is more likely to occur if it is fostered by specific
policies and institutional arrangements. The evidence and
learning from research projects can inform policies so that
they result in better outcomes and impacts. Although many
organizations tend to assume that they understand policy
makers’ needs for information and knowledge, in practice
research organizations often seem to lack an adequate
understanding of policy processes and the best mechanisms
to incorporate evidence and knowledge into policy decisions. Engaging policy actors from the outset is one strategy
for enabling policy makers to influence and own research
results. Engagement in policy processes demands special
expertise and targeted, strategic communication.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 2

An Innovative Approach to Agricultural Technology
Development and Transfer in India
Mohinder S. Mudahar, Consultant

SYNOPSIS OF PROJECT DATA

Project:
Cost:
Date:

National Agricultural Innovation Project
US$250 million (IDA amount: US$200 million)
September 18, 2006 to December 31, 2012 (now
extended to June 30, 2014)
Contact: Paul S. Sidhu, World Bank

DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

lmost 85 percent of India’s poor live in rural areas
and depend on agriculture for their livelihood.
Despite the large potential of India’s agricultural
sector, overall growth in agricultural production and productivity is low. Agricultural practices for managing natural
resources (land, water, and biodiversity) remain unsustainable, and the transition to a market-oriented, globally
competitive agricultural sector has been slow. The Government of India views agricultural R&D as a critical means of
improving agricultural productivity and increasing agricultural growth. Strengthening institutional capacity in the
NARS, improving coordination among institutions within
and outside the agricultural research system, and promoting
partnerships between national agricultural research institutions, the growing private sector, and NGOs are essential to
speed the transition to a more competitive agricultural sector.
The National Agricultural Innovation Project (NAIP), fourth
in a series of projects funded by the World Bank to improve
agricultural research and technology in India, addresses these
challenges by changing the way in which scientists, farmers,
and agricultural entrepreneurs interact in the national AIS.

A

PROJECT OBJECTIVES, DESCRIPTION,
AND EVOLUTION

NAIP incorporates lessons from the three earlier projects
(representing almost 25 years of experience), including the

need to develop public-private partnerships, integrate technology development and transfer mechanisms, and finance
research through competitive research grants. The project’s
development objective is “to contribute to sustainable transformation of agriculture and accelerate the collaborative
development and application of agricultural innovations
between public research organizations, farmers, the private
sector, and other stakeholders.”1
The project seeks to achieve this objective by strengthening the role of the Indian Council for Agricultural Research
(ICAR) in catalyzing and managing change in the NARS
and by financing agricultural research through innovative
consortiums of public organizations, universities, private
enterprises, NGOs, and other stakeholders. Activities pursued under the project include:
■

■

■

■

■

Strengthening ICAR’s technology foresight and policy
analysis to envision and plan for future needs.
Strengthening ICAR’s communications and information
capacity through better dialogue and interaction with
the public at large, farming community, private sector,
and within the ICAR system itself.
Reinforcing the research system’s capacity through
national and international training.
Improving technology transfer and commercialization
through business planning and development units and
IPR management.
Adopting organizational and management reforms such
as M&E, procurement, and financial management
throughout the ICAR system.

The project also promotes the development of three
kinds of multistakeholder, multidisciplinary consortiums of
public and private organizations, universities, NGOs, and
others focusing on three high-priority research themes.
Market-oriented, collaborative research alliances focus on
sustainably improving the productivity, profitability, and
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sustainability of selected agricultural value chains. Livelihood research alliances focus on strategies to sustain secure
rural livelihoods in about 110 disadvantaged districts,
mostly in rainfed, hilly and mountainous, dryland, tribal,
and coastal areas. Basic and strategic research alliances focus
on well-defined areas of frontier science with potential
applications for problems in Indian agriculture.
Promising consortiums and research alliances are
selected through a competitive process, and NAIP funds
their proposed research. Members of each consortium are
jointly responsible for the governance, design, and implementation of their research programs; maintaining satisfactory fiduciary and safeguard arrangements; applying the
resulting innovations; and disseminating new knowledge
through conferences, innovation marketplaces, networks,
and communications strategies.
INNOVATIVE PROJECT ELEMENTS

India has one of the world’s largest public agricultural
research systems.2 In this context, NAIP produced three
critical innovations: scenario planning, new kinds of partnerships, and the Helpdesk.
■

■
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Scenario planning. ICAR and World Bank teams conducted a scenario planning exercise that identified and
analyzed critical policy and institutional challenges facing the agricultural sector and identified corresponding
reforms that would strengthen the research system’s ability to meet those challenges. Scenario planning enabled
ICAR management to assess the consequences of alternative reform scenarios, including their likely benefits
and impact, and identify specific reforms to be supported through NAIP. This process has not only
increased government ownership of the reforms but also
its commitment to implement them.
Expanding capacity and resources via partnerships.
The underlying principle of NAIP is the formation and
management of consortiums that bring research institutions together with those who use research results. The
collaborative arrangements developed by these stakeholders optimize the use of research resources in an
enhanced process of innovation, value addition, commercialization, and technology transfer that solves
specific agricultural development problems. Research
proposals prepared by the consortiums clearly define the
roles of the consortium leader and the other partners,
including the budget for each institute. The broad array
of participants and clarity about their specific roles and

■

contributions lead to significant synergies and value
addition in the design and implementation of their
research projects. ICAR and NAIP management have
invested considerable time in building partnerships and
providing support through meetings, workshops, and
the Helpdesk.
Helpdesk. The Helpdesk was established to support the
new and more challenging partnerships that the consortiums represent. The project outsourced Helpdesk
functions to one national institute and informed the
prospective consortiums that it was there to help them
in a number of ways: by providing guidance for
preparing concept notes and full research proposals,
assisting in matching consortium partners, and helping to overcome initial problems in managing the
consortiums. The Helpdesk does not charge for its
services. The experts managing the Helpdesk understand all of the process and details involved in forming
consortiums; developing, selecting, and approving
concept notes and full proposals; and the priority
research themes. Users found the Helpdesk effective in
facilitating the proposal selection process and forming
consortiums. The Helpdesk used a number of tools in
its work: the Helpdesk portal, e-learning and multimedia modules, databases of potential partner institutions and organizations, case studies of agricultural
projects using direct e-mail responses to potential consortium members.

BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

NAIP was approved in April 2006 and the approval of consortiums was completed only in December 2009. The sections that follow describe some of the early results. Readers
interested in tracking the project’s progress are directed to
the NAIP website (http://www.naip.icar.org.in).
Overwhelming national interest
in the consortium approach

The number of consortiums was three times the number
anticipated, far exceeding expectations. The overwhelming
response enabled consortium leaders to assemble the
consortium partners with relative ease. From a total of 188
consortiums, 142 were selected through a two-stage competitive review, and the remaining 46 were sponsored. The
average consortium budget is about US$1.4 million, of
which approximately 62 percent of the committed amount
went to the 188 consortium leaders and 38 percent to the

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

646 consortiums’ partners. Table 4.8 summarizes the types
of participating institutions, their relative commitments,
and their budgets.
EXPANDING THE INSTITUTIONAL BASE
FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH

NAIP introduced greater pluralism into agricultural
research, given that 38 percent of consortium institutes
(leaders and partners combined) come from outside the
ICAR–state agricultural university system. Through NAIP,
ICAR has promoted public-private partnerships on a large
scale for the first time. The project has provided the
opportunity for ICAR and the state universities to collaborate with the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), the
Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs), general universities, and institutes in the Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research. The main motivations for these institutions to participate in NAIP are the opportunity to
work with agricultural scientists and access their skills
and facilities, the opportunity to work in ICT and
biotechnology applications in agriculture, and the availability of research grant funds.

Focus on high-priority agricultural research themes

Through the competitive selection process, a number of
potentially high-quality and high-impact subprojects were
selected to address the research themes described earlier.
The focus on value chains is intended to solve practical
problems in commercial agriculture and agribusiness
(box 4.29 describes achievements in research for two value
chains). At the other end of the spectrum, work in 110 disadvantaged districts with NGOs has given researchers
opportunities to address poverty and growth problems.
Improved quality and relevance of research

The synergy created through partnerships has improved the
quality and usefulness of research results. Agricultural scientists now have access to unique skills (in ICT and biotechnology, for example) and research facilities provided by the
scientists who had generally never worked with scientists
from the national agricultural research system. Through
their work with the private sector and NGOs, more public
sector researchers have been exposed to the perspectives of
these partners and their sense of urgency for solving clients’
practical development problems. Box 4.30 summarizes the
project’s preliminary results and likely impact.

Positive experience from partnerships

As of this writing, field visits, workshops, and supervision
missions indicate that the consortiums have been working
smoothly. There is consensus in ICAR and among consortium partners that the consortium approach has promoted
pluralism, synergy, teamwork, value addition, learning, and
better research; they believe that as a result the development
impacts will be much larger. On average, each consortium
has four partners. Box 4.28 summarizes the main issues
raised by partners.

Institutional development

By sponsoring formal training and, even more important,
developing new kinds of partnerships, the project has
strengthened the institutions that serve agriculture,
agribusiness, and livelihood security and is preparing them
to deal with the development challenges of 21st century
agriculture. A vital element of institutional development is
the continuous interaction between public, private, and
NGO sectors and the willingness of ICAR institutes to work

Table 4.8 Consortium Leaders and Partner Institutions in the National Agricultural Innovation Project, India
Type of institution
ICAR institutes
State and central agricultural universities
International institutes
Central institutes
State institutes
Private agencies
Other universities
NGOs
Other institutions

Institutions as
consortium leaders (%)

Institutions as
consortium partners (%)

Share of participating institutions
in the NAIP budget (%)

46.5
30.9
2.7
8.0
–
3.2
3.2
2.7
2.7

37.2
22.9
1.4
7.1
2.0
10.4
2.3
13.3
3.4

50.8
26.3
1.9
6.6
0.6
3.9
2.4
6.3
1.2

Source: NAIP Project Implementation Unit.
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Box 4.28 Issues and Experience of Partners in Consortiums Funded by the
National Agricultural Innovation Project

The 188 consortiums consist of 188 consortium leaders (one leader for each consortium) and 646 partners, coming from about 370 public, private, and
nongovernmental organizations. (Together, the consortium leaders and their partners comprise 834
project-implementing units.) Many consortium partners are working together for the first time in addition
to participating in a World Bank-funded project for
the first time. In this situation, implementation challenges are expected. They are being addressed as part
of the learning process for the consortium approach.
The coordination of the consortiums generally
appears to be working well, but some partners have
experienced problems arising from poor coordination.
The performance of 188 consortiums was rated in 2010
using a scorecard system, and 15 (8 percent) were rated

Not Satisfactory. Milestones were developed to upgrade
their performance. Instances of problems with staff
commitment, staff skills, and the flow of funds to partners have occurred. Most consortium partners had
problems with World Bank fiduciary requirements
(procurement and financial management), environmental and social safeguard requirements, and monitoring and evaluation. They find the requirements too
rigid, especially the reporting requirements. Often
funds have been delayed. Most of these issues have been
or are being addressed. Finally, capacity has been
strengthened through training, workshops, the
Helpdesk, and manuals. Although some problems continue, the project implementation team is committed
to addressing them and learning how to make the consortium approach more sustainable for all involved.

Source: Based on surveys conducted by NAIP Project Implementation Unit.

Box 4.29 Achievements by the Bioethanol and Banana Pseudostem Consortiums Funded
under the National Agricultural Innovation Project, India

A value chain model for producing bioethanol from
sweet sorghum in rainfed areas through collective
action and partnerships. This consortium is led by the
International Crops Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT) and six partners (five research institutes,
one private company). Although it is only partway
through its research program, the consortium has
increased awareness of sweet sorghum’s multiple uses
in the project area (food, feed, fodder, and fuel) and
organized farmer groups to produce the sweet sorghum
crop. Farmers increased sweet sorghum yields by growing improved varieties and using better management
practices, and new farm equipment provided under the
project reduced the drudgery of farm operations.
Farmers now use sorghum grain for food and feed,
stalks for syrup production, and bagasse for fuel and
fodder. A crushing unit (owned by the private partner)
using ICRISAT’s bioethanol conversion technology was
established to produce syrup and the organizational

structure of the unit is designed to manage the supply
chain. One ton of stalks produces 269 liters of juice and
50 kilograms of syrup. Syrup production costs were
reduced by increasing juice recovery, syrup recovery,
and labor efficiency. The syrup is sold to the bioethanol,
food, and pharmaceutical industries. Although farmers
who cultivate sweet sorghum and raise livestock have
benefitted from this arrangement, the profitability of
bioethanol production ultimately depends on crude oil
prices.
A value chain of banana pseudostem for fiber and
other value-added products. This consortium is led by
a university and four other partners participate (one
research institute and three private business partners).
Banana pseudostem is generally regarded as a waste
product and source of pollution after bananas are harvested. In seeking to develop a value chain for banana
pseudostem, the university and research institute have
focused on the backward linkages (to banana farmers)
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 4.29 Achievements by the Bioethanol and Banana Pseudostem Consortiums Funded
under the National Agricultural Innovation Project, India (continued)

and the private sector has focused on the forward linkages (developing useful, marketable products from
banana pseudostem). Consortium members have
already been able to produce fiber, yarn, paper, candy,
woven fabric, artificial leather, cellulose powder, vermicompost, and liquid fertilizer from banana pseudostem; the machinery needed to produce these valueadded products has already been designed, fabricated,
and commissioned under this project (although not yet
commercially available in India). Having demonstrated
that these products are technically feasible, the consortium is currently analyzing the financial and economic

prospects for various products (and conducting experiments on producing yarn from banana and synthetic
fiber). Farm income has improved because farmers
have been able to sell pseudostem through the project,
and the conversion of banana pseudostem into various
products has generated employment.
These examples demonstrate achievements that
would not have been possible without the complementary resources provided by each consortium partner.
These examples also demonstrate substantial economic
and social impact through value addition for all the
stakeholders and the country.

Source: Based on information provided by NAIP Project Implementation Unit and the consortiums.

Box 4.30 Preliminary Results of the National Agricultural Innovation Project, India

Catalyzing and managing change in the national
agricultural research system. Knowledge can be a powerful change agent, and NAIP has given considerable
attention strengthening research capacity through the
provision of knowledge. Students, teachers, and scientists now have access to a much deeper knowledge
base. Over 2,000 scientific and professional journals
can be accessed in 124 libraries; 155 of 368 e-courses
have already been developed; 6,000 PhD theses have
been digitally uploaded; electronic information on
agriculture is available through an “agro-web”; and
10 business planning and development units have been
established. Significant formal training should have a
long-term effect on the human resources available to
the national research system (and wider AIS): already
1,611 experts have been trained (1,441 nationally, 170
internationally).
Research to strengthen value chains. The project
supports research for value chains representing a wide
spectrum of potentially high-value agricultural products: banana pseudostem, briquettes from industrial
residues, industrial agroforestry, oceanic tuna, potato
and potato products, natural dyes, bioethanol, coconut,
seed of spices and flowers, millet foods, sorghum

foods, and maize and maize products—among others.
Preliminary results for most of these value chains
appear promising with respect to the new technologies
used and the potential economic gains. For example, it
may be possible to develop a new industry involving a
large number of small-scale entrepreneurs in producing and distributing briquettes.
Research on more sustainable and secure rural
livelihoods. Subprojects encompass a wide range of
topics, including: scaling up crop production technologies; increasing water storage capacity through
improved natural resource management (extremely
important in drought-prone parts of India); backyard
poultry production; generating employment through
various natural resource management interventions;
expanding irrigated area; improving grain storage
capacity through storage bins; vermi-composting units;
rice-fish-poultry farming; drought mitigation measures; and water harvesting. A few consortiums report
early results in improving yields of maize (by 30 percent), rice (37 percent), soybeans (22 percent), wheat
(32 percent), sorghum (24 percent), and cotton (126
percent). Improved resource-use efficiency and
increased productivity are likely to raise incomes
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 4.30 Preliminary Results of the National Agricultural Innovation Project, India (continued)

among marginal and small-scale farmers. To mainstream the best practices they develop, some consortiums are establishing sustainability funds.
Basic and strategic research (frontier science).
Results from these subprojects are expected to advance
scientific knowledge and yield economic benefits for
farm families, the agricultural sector, and the economy
as a whole. Subprojects focus on natural resource
management innovations as well as innovations that

improve agricultural productivity, quality, and value
added in staple crops, horticultural products, livestock,
and fish. Promising results include the identification of
30 genes specific to cotton fiber development; 10
herbal extracts to control ticks in cattle; a chip-based
biosensor and a micro-well chip platform to detect
ultra trace concentrations of pesticides and adulterants in milk; and a prototype rubber dam for smallscale watersheds.

Source: Information provided by NAIP Project Implementation Unit and consortiums.

outside their system. ICAR has started to mainstream the
consortium approach and competitive selection process
throughout its institutes. If these actions continue on a large
scale, the process, interventions, and impacts initiated
through NAIP are likely to be sustained and substantial. The
consortium approach has encouraged partner institutes to
consider new strategies for solving real agricultural problems. The technical solutions emerging from the consortiums appear to have benefited from increased interaction
and creativity, given their quality, economic potential, effectiveness, and level of appropriateness to clients’ needs.
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

The formation of consortiums, partnerships, and the
competitive selection process has been a major but timeconsuming achievement. Innovation is needed to shorten
this process without sacrificing quality and pluralism. All
heads of research organizations must be encouraged to
reach out to scientists whose work complements the project’s research themes and overall benefits—a strategy that
should be pursued for all agricultural research, irrespective of the funding source. Based on experience to date,
the consortium approach is likely to emerge as a best
practice for agricultural research, if indeed it ensures high
returns to investments in agricultural research and promotes collaboration throughout the wider AIS.
Project teams must develop a strong sense of the number
of proposals that are likely to be submitted and plan accordingly. Subproject selection and review in NAIP were delayed
by 18 months by the high number of proposals submitted
for consideration. The proposals were not only numerous
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but complex to develop, review, revise, and approve. The
involvement of new partners from diverse backgrounds and
inclusion of research issues that the public research system
is formally pursuing for the first time (value chains and sustainable livelihood security) also extended project selection
and approval. If future projects fund a larger-than-expected
number of subprojects, they must make appropriate
arrangements to handle the increased workload for management, procurement, financial management, monitoring,
evaluation, and safeguard management. Otherwise implementation will be delayed.
From the start, all consortiums must be aware that they
are required to follow agreed procurement procedures and
receive appropriate procurement training. The procurement of goods (especially scientific equipment and supplies), services, and works must keep pace with the implementation of the project and research subprojects.
Procurement under NAIP was very slow, especially in the
beginning. Most consortium partners had never worked
with Bank-funded projects. It took some time to convince
and train them to use World Bank procurement procedures.
The Helpdesk seems to be a best practice to adopt in collaborative programs for agricultural research. In NAIP, the
Helpdesk portal has been extremely useful in forming consortiums and preparing proposals, and it should be available
to address implementation problems as they arise, especially
considering the large array of consortiums and organizations involved in the project. It could also be useful for disseminating success stories.
At the beginning, establish an effective M&E system for
internally tracking the project’s progress and performance
as well as its likely impact. A good M&E system provides
regular feedback to project management about potential
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problems as well as progress, results, and impact. Supplement the internal M&E system with an independent
external M&E system for the benefit of the project management team.
Establish an effective outreach and communications system from the start. This system should promote emerging
best practices, share success stories, disseminate knowledge

and experience about consortiums that perform well, and
share the emerging outcomes of the project with policy
makers, the scientific community, and general public. The
communications system will use a range of media and formats (not simply print, or scientific journals, but electronic
and visual media in appropriate languages) if it is serious
about reaching stakeholders and the public.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 3

The Agricultural Technology Consortium Model in Chile
Rodrigo Vega Alarcón, Consultant, formerly with the Foundation
for Agricultural Innovation (FIA)

SYNOPSIS

his IAP presents and discusses the main objectives,
results, and lessons from Chile’s experience with
agricultural technology consortiums. These formal
alliances promote joint work between industry and science
within a market framework. Chile is regarded as a pioneer
in using this model to focus public policy on innovation.
Consortiums are a good option when industry is strongly
committed to the process and the partners possess the technological capabilities to develop the kinds of products they
seek. When these conditions are not met, a strictly corporate
model such as the one used in Chile may not work. Special
programs may be needed, for example, if consortiums are
intended to include small-scale producers.

T

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Chile’s economy has grown at a remarkable pace since the
mid-1980s. The country has pursued consistent economic
reforms, including market liberalization and important free
trade agreements, and it has developed an export model
relying on its abundant natural resources and commodities.
These reforms have benefited from political and social stability, underpinned by sound democratization.
An important warning signal emerged in the second half
of the 1990s, however, when economic growth began to flag.
The decade that followed saw near-zero growth in total factor productivity.1 In response, the government adopted a
new innovation policy to make Chile’s economy more
competitive. The National Council on Innovation for Competitiveness (Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad) was formed to advise the president on strategies
and policies to foster innovation and increase competitiveness in the medium and long term. The resulting national
innovation strategy has three pillars: science, human capital
development, and business innovation (CNIC 2007a,

338

2007b). In conjunction with this strategy, a new institutional framework was developed to give priority to economic sectors exhibiting the highest growth potential,
create appropriate instruments to realize that potential, and
allocate more public and private resources to research,
development, and innovation.2
New policies and instruments have been designed and
implemented to further innovation. They include the strategic use of mining royalties; tax deductions for research,
development, and innovation; the organization of clusters
(high-priority areas for innovation); and the establishment
of technology consortiums. This note discusses the main
objectives, results, and lessons from Chile’s experience with
agricultural technology consortiums, which promote joint
research and innovation by industry and science within a
market framework.
Chile is considered a pioneer in using consortiums to
align public research with national innovation policies, and
the government issued its first tender for a Technology Business Consortium in 2004. The Chilean consortiums were
initially modeled on Australia’s Cooperative Research Centres, established in 1990 (see box 4.4 in the overview of this
module). The Cooperative Research Centres linked academia, public research institutes, business, and producers
through a forum for dialogue, which proved to be the key to
developing trust and a meaningful relationship between the
parties. This process allowed researchers to understand the
problems and needs of private industry and producers and
seek specific solutions. It also allowed industry and producers to understand the importance of research and innovation to their business strategies.
OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION
OF CONSORTIUMS

As noted, Chile’s technology consortiums are expected to
strengthen links between research communities and local

and global business communities, thereby improving competitiveness and opening new business opportunities
(Álvarez et al. 2010). Their specific objectives are to:
■

■

■
■

Increase national competitiveness by encouraging companies to invest in research, development, and innovation.
Implement programs for research and development that
target long-term profits.
Encourage links between science and industry.
Develop and strengthen scientific skills and techniques.

A consortium is defined as a technology company in
which one or more companies agree to carry out joint projects with universities, institutes, and/or technology centers
to develop new technologies that can improve and add value
to production processes and products (Álvarez et al. 2010).
The theoretical justification for this type of instrument is to
discover solutions for market failures limiting innovation
by an enterprise and encourage partnership strategies to
incorporate knowledge externalities, coordinate the use of
complementarities, and share the risk of investment in technology innovation.

Public agencies3 fund and manage the consortium program. The maximum contribution of the public sector to a
single consortium is US$6 million, and each consortium
can operate for up to five years. The maximum yearly public contribution to a consortium’s total budget is 25 percent
for research activities, with an additional contribution of
10 percent for human capital development and 15 percent
for research infrastructure. This funding is matched by
cofinancing of 50 percent from nonpublic consortium
members. Box 4.31 describes the conditions that consortiums must meet to receive public financing.
Like a corporation, a consortium is run by a board composed of representatives from academia and industry in a
number according to their capital ratio. Their responsibility
is to define the consortium’s strategic aims, determine
which research projects to pursue, and allocate funding to
each. A general manager reporting to the board is responsible for consortium administration and management. The
manager’s main responsibility is to coordinate all activities
of the consortium. Several consortiums have also established technical committees (appointed by the board) composed of researchers and business professionals who are not
involved directly with the research; their role is to monitor

Box 4.31 Characteristics and Conditions for Business-Technology Consortiums to Receive Public Financing

The following conditions are expected to be met:

The consortiums and the projects under them must:
■

■

■

■

■

Produce results that contribute to economic growth
in Chile.
Create permanent capacity for research, development, and innovation in Chile.
Use mechanisms to generate, transfer, and adopt
knowledge that will achieve the anticipated impacts.
Identify suitable participants for collaborative work,
based on their capacity (including managerial
skills), the proposed mode of collaboration between
universities, research institutes, and private companies, and the level of commitment to achieve the
desired results.
Provide sufficient cofinancing. The commitment of
the partners is expressed in the proportion of cofinancing they are prepared to commit and the
returns they envision as a result.

■

■

■

■

The objective justifies the need for different enterprises and research institutions to undertake a sustained R&D effort through the consortium.
The consortium’s work will significantly strengthen
existing industries and stimulate the emergence of
new ones.
The projected work requires public funding to be
performed.
The resources requested are consistent with the
projects and their anticipated results.

Consortiums are generally formed by enterprises that
seek to use cutting-edge research to satisfy the needs of
their particular productive sector. An integral part of the
business model for these enterprises (and usually a prerequisite for their participation in a consortium) is the
development of patentable results that can be licensed and
generate spinoffs (in the form of new businesses).

Source: Author, based on information from CONICYT.
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research and ensure that it is being conducted as planned,
evaluate new research proposed by the consortium, make
related recommendations to the board.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

Technology consortiums have several novel aspects. The
institutional setup of the consortiums was a major innovation because it gave a market orientation (from the
companies) to research on technical solutions (to the
science-based institutions). This intermediate approach
does not imply that research and business should change
in any fundamental way; it is simply a means to
strengthen the relationship between private enterprise
and science. Companies and research centers forge links
by pursuing applied research for profit. Members act
together “upstream” when they develop technology but
act in competition “downstream” in the marketplace.
Companies determine the priorities and corresponding
research projects, which are executed by research institutions (either as consortium members or externally
contracted agencies). When a group of companies or an
industry identifies common priorities, problems, or
opportunities and sets priorities, resources are allocated
more efficiently to address them. Greater trust and understanding among the actors will increase their propensity
to share information and achieve synergies for industry
and advances for research.
BENEFITS AND IMPACT

The previous discussion has given an idea of the kinds of
benefits, tangible and intangible, that can emanate from
technology consortiums. As the Chilean experience with
this model is so recent, however, the empirical evidence of
impact is limited. Most of the consortiums studied have
focused on improving the competitiveness of productive
sectors rather than on improving capacity to pursue innovative activities. The consortiums’ main contributions are
improved access to technological and other kinds of knowledge (such as marketing, international market regulations
and requirements, and staff with specific kinds of expertise) and joint technology development by researchers with
companies. On-going assessments have identified the following trends:

■

■

■

■

■

Given the consortiums’ short duration and the applied
research they generally conduct, applications for IP protection are still very low. For the same reason, the companies in
the consortiums have not yet achieved major technological
breakthroughs.
LESSONS LEARNED AND GUIDANCE
FOR THE FUTURE

Studies in Chile and in Latin America more broadly suggest
that various factors influence consortium partners’ willingness to exchange knowledge, collaborate in R&D, and thus
produce innovations (Álvarez et al. 2010):
■

■

■
■
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The large public investment in these consortiums leveraged significant private resources for research, development, and innovation. These private investments have

risen considerably since the consortiums were established.
Consortiums have demonstrated the capacity to identify
and implement projects relevant to business or industry
and to achieve economies of scale in applied research.
Industries’ and companies’ demands for specific applied
research spurred the formation of appropriate institutions and stronger research teams to develop technology.
Participants gained access to knowledge that otherwise
would have been very difficult for them to acquire.
In some initiatives, the participation of experienced and
emerging businesses allowed the companies to learn
from one another. In the wine industry, for example,
most developing vineyards work with more established
companies.
The trust engendered in the course of the research is
likely to have important long-term implications for the
actors involved, increasing the potential for further collaboration.

■

The greater the number of partners, the less profitable
the results.
The more that consortium partners compete directly in
the final market for goods or services, the more they produce results of limited impact. Not all firms that compete
in final markets produce results of limited value when
they partner in consortiums, however. Firms that negotiate clear agreements for managing IP before they join a
consortium produce better results, because their fears of
losing trade secrets or failing to recover R&D costs are
alleviated.
The greater the geographical distance between partners,
the less profitable the results.
The greater the partners’ experience, the better the
results.
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■

■

■

■

The greater the number of employees in R&D or other
technical areas in the consortium, the better the results.
The more frequent the interaction between partners, the
better the results.
The more satisfied the partners are with the contractual
provisions to protect IP and resolve conflicts, the better
the results.
The greater the trust and goodwill between partners, the
better the results.

Empirical evaluations of consortiums have yielded other
lessons. One lesson is that the long startup times of consortiums (about one year) in relation to their duration acts as a
disincentive to participation. Startup delays usually involve
uncertainty over who will participate, what kind of formal
relationship they will adopt, what resources each will provide (social capital, physical capital, counterpart funding),
and the IP arrangements.
Part of the application process should be a formal presentation by the parties of the consortium’s objectives, the
issues it will address, and its projected business model,
governance model, IP arrangements, legal status, national
and international partners, and other important features.
The consortium can operate for a startup period of up to
one year with financial support to assess whether to continue or terminate the relationship. This “pre-consortium”
period can be useful to define both the business and
governance models that the consortium will adopt. It is
essential that the business and governance models be consistent with one another. The final structure chosen for
any single consortium will not necessarily work for
another because in each case the business model is likely
to vary.
The preconsortium stage is also the time to define IP
arrangements. It is better to define these arrangements
before any revenue is generated to avoid conflicts later when
revenue begins to flow. The alternatives are for the IP to be
owned by the joint venture or consortium or for each partner to own a share of the IP. In that case, the consortium acts
as a technology broker, charging a fee for administering any
royalties or commissions.
Another lesson is that governance and management
make a difference. An active, committed board and technical committees as well as fluid dialogue between participants and high-level management are essential. One concern expressed by companies and research centers alike is
that the difference in their objectives is the greatest obstacle
to their success in consortiums (box 4.32 provides an example from the wine industry). To address this problem, the

consortium must have a very good full-time manager and
constant support from government agencies with a voice—
but no vote.
A corporate model may not be suitable for all types of
consortiums. Consortiums are a good option when industry
is strongly committed to the process and the partners possess the technological capabilities to develop the kinds of
products they seek. When these conditions are not met, a
strictly corporate model may not work.
For example, if consortiums are intended to include
small-scale producers, a number of other considerations
become important, such as the potential social and economic importance of smallholders’ participation in the
subsector; government’s commitment to support their
participation in a consortium; guidance for smallholders
to form and function in organizations; and advisory services that enable smallholders to manage new technology
and practices successfully. Potato production in Chile is
dominated by smallholders with few assets and thus limited capacity to participate in consortiums. A special program could establish better links between these farmers
and research institutions (box 4.33), fostering the trust
and experience that could make them more effective partners in a consortium, or a less formal association could be
devised.
Two strategic elements should be taken into account
when implementing a consortium (Lavados 2009):
■

■

Business model. From the outset, the business model
needs to be clear. Is the consortium geared to develop a
single product or multiple products? (To date, most
Chilean consortiums have attempted to develop a portfolio of products.) Are local or global markets targeted?
How will the partners acquire their medium-term revenues (royalties, licensing, product sales, or some other
mechanism)?
Portfolio of programs and projects. Research projects
usually deliver results in the medium and long term. To
attract private sector partners, consortiums will need to
develop a portfolio of projects that is balanced between
short- and long-term marketable products.

Another lesson is that Chilean scientific and technological capacity is not always sufficient to address companies’ or
industries’ increasingly complex needs for R&D. A proactive
plan must be implemented to generate local knowledge
and/or import knowledge and expertise from abroad
(immigration of specialists, alliances with international
R&D centers).
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Box 4.32 A Vine-and-Wine Consortium: Vinnova Merges with Tecnovid in Chile

The quality and prestige of Chilean wine have risen to
the extent that Chile now ranks among the top five
nations in global wine sales. Two consortiums, Tecnovid and Vinnova, have joined forces to maintain and
enhance this position and achieve the economies of
scale required for successful R&D. The R&D requirements are set by the companies and executed by university research teams. The consortium ultimately seeks
to become a viable enterprise that manages continuous
innovation in the wine industry, from processing to
marketing.
Through their merger, the consortiums will improve
the productivity of the wine industry, develop programs for disseminating and adopting knowledge that
will enable the wine industry to use research results
quickly and efficiently, and develop the human capital
needed to innovate at high scientific and technological
levels. The research programs focus on improving the
quality, productivity, and differentiation of wines and
on developing sustainable production practices. For
example, researchers are studying which wines are most
competitive among consumers, nationally and internationally; strategies to ensure that planting material is
free of disease and pests; the origins of certain physio-

logical disorders in Merlot grapes; the fermentative
capacity of various strains of yeast, and winemaking
processes that yield higher levels of antioxidants in the
final product.
The anticipated benefits and results of the collaboration include: positive and synergistic interaction
between academia and the wine industry (all teams
consist of business professionals and university
researchers); a competent professional team attuned to
corporate and business requirements channels the
industry’s needs for research and innovation; and
research that not only solves scientific problems but
produces results that can be incorporated into an enterprise’s management and marketing.
Lessons include the importance of sound leadership,
of working with mature enterprises, and of focusing on
innovations that are important to the national economy and the industry. To meet global challenges, the
wine industry increasingly needs collaboration
upstream in R&D, needs to acquire additional technology and knowledge, and needs to increase its competitiveness in the wine market. If the best expertise to
reach those goals does not exist in Chile, industry must
seek it abroad.

Sources: Vinnova and author.

Box 4.33 A Business-Technology Consortium for Potato

Potatoes, an important part of the Chilean diet, are
grown by 15,000 producers on 50,000 hectares, mostly
on small farms. The potato subsector contributes only
a fraction of agricultural GDP. A business-technology
consortium has been formed to improve the competitiveness of Chile’s potato industry through stronger
participation in the international market for potato
seed, potato for consumption, processed products, and
potato varieties. The Consortium has taken the form of
a new company, Consorcio Papa Chile SA, through
which a large part of the potato industry (mainly
small-scale producers) entered into a formal association with technology institutes. The company has 17
shareholders, of which 15 are producer organizations

(representing 1,500 small- and medium-scale farmers
who operate 4,500 hectares in various locations) and 2
are research entities: the Instituto de Investigaciones
Agropecuarias (Institute of Agricultural Research) and
Los Lagos University.
The Consortium has five lines of action: developing
technology, strengthening human capital, adding
value, management, and transferring and diffusing
technology. It pursues research to develop production
technologies adapted to particular agroecological conditions and market requirements and is developing
new potato varieties with better postharvest characteristics and traits that match consumers’ preferences. It
has implemented a market intelligence system as well.
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 4.33 A Business-Technology Consortium for Potato (continued)

The main benefit of the Consortium, aside from assembling commercial and public partners to produce
innovations requested by the industry, is that it is likely
to increase private investments in science and technology for the subsector.
One lesson from the potato Consortium that may
prove useful elsewhere is that it is quite difficult to
launch a consortium in an industry with multiple,
diverse, geographically dispersed, and heterogeneous

actors, for which the products generated are essentially
public goods. A second important lesson is that a corporate structure does not seem to be the best match
for a subsector with these characteristics. Finally,
given the characteristics of the subsector and heterogeneity of the partners, a special program is needed to
foster trust between partners (producers, companies,
and technology institutions) if they are to work
toward a common goal.

Source: Potato Consortium and author.

Finally, the role of public agencies in designing, implementing, and evaluating the work of consortiums must be
reconsidered. The specific capacities required in personnel
charged with tracking and monitoring consortiums as a

whole must be reviewed. The technical, administrative, and
financial procedures used in consortiums should also be
analyzed with a view to learning which practices enable consortiums to produce the best research outcomes.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 4

Linking Research and Development Actors
through Learning Alliances
Mark Lundy, International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT)
María Verónica Gottret, Tropical Agriculture Research and Education Center (CATIE)
Rupert Best, Catholic Relief Services (CRS)

SYNOPSIS

earning alliances view research and development
outputs as inputs to processes of rural innovation
that are place- and time-specific. Methods and tools
will change as users adapt them to their needs and realities.
Understanding why adaptations occur, the extent that these
lead to positive or negative changes in livelihoods, and documenting and sharing lessons learned are key objectives.
The learning alliance approach differs substantially from the
common practice of attempting to train development practitioners in new methods through short, one-off training
courses. Learning alliances rely on an iterative learning
process jointly undertaken among multiple stakeholders
with a common interest or goal through a series of learning
cycles, typically over 12–24 months. The Central American
learning alliance improved connectivity between organizations working on similar topics, provided better access to
information and knowledge on rural enterprise development, and access to improved methods and tools. Attitudes
have shifted from competition to collaboration as partners.

L

CONTEXT

Millions of dollars are spent each year on R&D initiatives to
improve rural livelihoods in the developing world. Despite
this expenditure, rural poverty remains an intractable problem in many places. Among the multiple causes of this situation is the limited collective learning that occurs between
researchers, development workers, cooperation agencies,
policy makers, and private enterprise. As a result, useful
research does not benefit the poor, lessons learned do not
influence research, cooperation and policy agendas are less
relevant than they could be—and development falters.
Starting in 2003, a group of actors in Central America came
together to explore how to improve the links between
344

research and development actors through learning alliances
(defined in box 4.34).
OBJECTIVE AND DESCRIPTION

The chosen thematic focus of the Central America learning
alliance, consisting of international and local NGOs, an
international agricultural research center, a national university, and the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC), was rural enterprise development.1 Learning
alliances were proposed as a process-driven vehicle through
which the effectiveness of investments in rural livelihoods
could be augmented.
During the first phase of the learning alliance (starting
in 2003), process facilitation and knowledge management
were managed by CIAT. In 2008, these functions were
devolved to the Tropical Agriculture Research and Education Center (CATIE, Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza) in Central America based on a
regional agreement and cost-sharing strategy. In its second
phase, the Central American Learning Alliance continues to
promote sustainable rural economic development, considering the following objectives:
■

■

Facilitate joint learning processes between development
agencies, technical and financial cooperation, universities and research centers, and state and private actors,
based on the development, validation, and dissemination
of strategies, concepts, methodologies, and tools for
developing effective rural economic development.
Enhance knowledge management to influence the design
of public and private policies that provide incentives for
the development of sustainable rural commodity chains,
based on the implementation of research activities relevant to sustainable rural economic development.

Box 4.34 Advantages and Impacts of Learning Alliances

Learning alliances rely on an iterative learning process
jointly undertaken among multiple stakeholders with a
common interest or goal. Typically, stakeholders might
include research organizations, development and
cooperation agencies, universities, policy makers, and
private businesses. Learning alliances facilitate the
development of cumulative, shared knowledge between
these stakeholders about what works, what doesn’t, and
why in temporal and spatial contexts. Shared and accessible knowledge in this sense contributes to improved
development outcomes as lessons are quickly identified
and learned. Improved links among research and development actors improve both research focus and development practice. As funds diminish, increased efficiency becomes paramount in achieving positive
livelihood change. Finally, jointly developed proposals
are also more attractive for funding agencies as they
have a higher potential for scaling out and up and
therefore to achieve broader impact.
A well-functioning learning alliance achieves the
following outputs:

■

■

■

■

■

Cumulative and shared knowledge about
approaches, methods, and policies that work in different places, cultural contexts, and times (as well as
those that do not), and the reasons for success or
failure.
Learning opportunities across organizational and
geographical boundaries through the establishment
and support of communities of practice around specific topics.
Synergy among multiple actors by providing a vehicle for collaboration, helping to highlight and develop
diverse solutions to problems that may appear
intractable to the individual actors.
Contribute to healthy innovation systems by building bridges between islands of experience, helping to
assess how these results were achieved, and what
others can learn from these experiences.
Capacity development for implementing, scaling
out, and improving innovative approaches and
methods.

Table B4.34 Types of Learning Alliances
Type

Need

Focus

1

Building capacity and skills base

Training and learning to use concrete, practical approaches and proven methods

2

Developing new methods, tools,
and approaches

Action-research that generates methodological guides based on good practice, which
is then validated through capacity-development learning cycles

3

Generating information that can
lead to policy influence

Conventional socioeconomic research to understand principles and lessons across
experiences

Sources: Authors and Best, Ferris, and Mundy 2009.

Common principals applied by the
market-oriented alliance

Collaborative processes require agreement on certain basic
principles to govern collective work. Table 4.9 lists and
describes these principles.
Agenda setting

The selection of themes and topics in the learning alliance is
based on dialogue among partners to identify knowledge or
skill gaps that limit the success of their interventions. Once
a topic has been selected, the interested partners define the
central learning questions, which may range from basic

development issues to research hypotheses. Partners select a
small number of these options for development as full
learning cycles. Attempts are made to target areas where
partners have both an interest and ongoing projects, to align
the learning process with concrete results that are useful for
improving existing projects or contribute to the development of new proposals.

Learning cycles: A shared process
of documentation and reflection

The learning alliance approach differs substantially from
the common practice of attempting to train development
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Table 4.9 Key Principles for an Effective Multipartner Learning Alliance
Principal
Clear objectives

Shared responsibilities,
costs, and benefits

Outputs as inputs,
documentation, and
experience sharing

Differentiated but linked
learning mechanisms
Long-term, trust-based
relationships

Description
Multiple stakeholders have different objectives and interests. A learning alliance is based on the identification and
negotiation of common interests, needs, and capacities of participating organizations and individuals. What does each
organization bring to the alliance? What complementarities or gaps exist? What does each organization hope to
achieve through the collaboration? How can the alliance add value to partner activities?
Organizations and individuals participate in learning alliances when: (1) they perceive benefits from this association,
(2) transaction costs are lower than expected benefits, (3) benefits from collective action are perceived to be
greater than those obtained individually, and (4) results do not conflict with other key interests. Learning alliances
seek to benefit all parties. Therefore, transaction costs and responsibilities, as well as benefits and credit for
achievements, are shared among partners in a transparent fashion.
Rural communities are diverse and no universally applicable recipe for sustainable development exists. Learning
alliances view research and development outputs as inputs to processes of rural innovation that are place- and timespecific. Methods and tools will change as users adapt them to their needs and realities. Understanding why
adaptations occur, the extent that these lead to positive or negative changes in livelihoods, and documenting and
sharing lessons learned are key objectives.
Learning alliances have a diverse range of participants. Identifying each group’s questions and willingness to participate
in the learning process is critical to success. Flexible but connected learning methods are needed.
Rural development processes stretch over many years or decades. To influence positive change and understand why
that change has occurred requires long-term, stable relationships capable of evolving to meet new challenges. Trust is
the glue that cements these relationships, but develops gradually as partners interact with each other and perceive
concrete benefits from collaboration.

Source: Lundy and Gottret 2007.

practitioners in new methods through short, one-off
training courses. It involves establishing a series of “learning spaces,” typically over 12–24 months (Best, Ferris, and
Mundy 2009).
The development of feedback loops and space for reflection as a way to improve practice is the final method used by
the learning alliance. It is implemented through face-to-face
meetings as well as web-based tools.
■

■

■
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Capacity-strengthening workshops are used to train
local partners for implementing new approaches and
methods developed by learning alliance partners based
on best practice and action-research. Follow-up is provided by learning alliance partners. Results are documented and feedback given to improve these new
approaches and methods. This process is critical for
action-research and strategic research results to be scaled
out and up.
Backstopping is carried out by an alliance member with
more experience with a specific tool or approach who
pays periodic visits to other partners who are adapting
the tool to their needs.
Write shops are used to help distil lessons learned into
documents. They are especially useful with partners who
have difficulties finding time to write up results from
their work. The learning alliance adapted methods and
tools developed by IFAD (Berdegué et al. 2002) and
Douthwaite et al. (2007) for this purpose.

■

■

National learning fairs are based on the Most Significant
Change method developed by Davies and Dart (2005).
Web-based tools are used principally for documentation
and dissemination among partner agencies.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENT: LEARNING
ALLIANCE PROCESS AND TOOLS

The learning alliance approach is made up of four interrelated strategies:
1. Capacity development activities seek to strengthen or
improve partners’ capacities in the selection, use, adaptation, and improvement of specific approaches, methods,
and tools. This process is directly linked to specific learning cycles. Capacity building is not limited to training
workshops but focused on practical, field-level use, follow-up, adaptation, and improvement, with continuing
support as partners implement the prototype. As a result,
partners strengthen their ability to use specific tools and
approaches, adapt them to their needs, and discern when
specific methods might or might not be useful.
2. Targeted action research responds to specific knowledge
gaps identified with partner agencies. In this strategy, key
research questions are identified and fieldwork designed
and implemented in collaboration between research
and development agencies. Outcomes and findings are
shared with other partner agencies, selected decision
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makers, and the public in general in workshops and in
electronic formats.
3. Connectivity and knowledge management strive to
increase the relationships that form the basis of the
learning alliance. The “densification” of networks and
personal connections is critical to the success of the
alliance. To achieve this, the alliance makes use of faceto-face meetings, training, and exchange visits, as well as
virtual tools such as a website and a list server.
4. Evidence-based decision-making in partner organizations, public entities, cooperation agencies, and private
firms. This strategy has been markedly less successful
than the previous three in engaging nonpartners. Despite
this difficulty, the learning alliance partners feel that this
is a critical capacity that should be developed to leverage
higher-level change based on field results. Work in this
direction is being piloted with the public sector in Honduras and Nicaragua (Swisscontact, Catholic Relief
Services, and CATIE) and Colombia (CIAT); with cooperation agencies in Guatemala and the Dominican
Republic (CIAT, Oxfam Great Britain, Sustainable Food
Lab); and with the private sector in Guatemala (Oxfam
Great Britain and the Sustainable Food Lab).
BENEFITS AND IMPACT

By 2007, the Central American Learning Alliance had contributed to significant changes in partner knowledge, attitudes, and practices. Evidence showed improved connectivity between organizations working on similar topics, better
access to information and knowledge on rural enterprise
development, and access to improved methods and tools.
Attitudes shifted from competition to collaboration as
organizations witnessed that working together enhances
their capacity to serve rural communities’ needs and receive
cooperation funds rather than undermining it. Rural enterprise development practices and knowledge management
have improved, as shown by increased effectiveness in existing projects and more strategic new projects. These shifts in
turn contribute to a more efficient innovation system in
favor of rural enterprise development, as evidenced by the
shared use and generation of information, joint capacity
building programs, and large-scale, collaborative projects.
The first phase of Central American learning alliance
worked with a total of 25 direct partner agencies and
through their networks influenced 116 additional organizations. In total the learning alliance contributed to change
in organizations working with 33,000 rural families
(approximately 175,000 people) in Honduras, Nicaragua,

Guatemala, and El Salvador. With a four-year budget of
US$499,000, the alliance leveraged an additional
US$990,000 in in-kind and additional funding, exceeding
budgeted counterpart funding by a factor of ten. The
alliance website (www.alianzasdeaprendizaje.org) is a key
site for practitioners focused on rural enterprise development in Latin America.
Strengthened networks and knowledge management
contribute to improved processes of collaboration between
partners. Partner agencies report the use of methods and
tools from the alliance in 46 occasions in ongoing projects.
Community-level assessment in 2007 led to the identification of 30 cases of most significant change that highlight the
positive impact of these tools on income generation, natural
resource management, and the role of women.
This initiative started a new phase in July 2009 when five
of the organizations that participated in the Learning
Alliance during its first phase—Catholic Relief Services, the
Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), the Swiss
Foundation for Technical Cooperation (Swisscontact),
Oxfam Great Britain, and CATIE signed a Cooperation
Agreement for five years to support a Coordination Unit
that is being facilitated by CATIE.
This new phase started with the first jointly developed
project cofunded by IDRC, “Leveraging Information and
Knowledge for Inclusive and Sustainable Agricultural Value
Chains Development” (K4ValueChains) with the participation of CATIE, CIAT, Catholic Relief Services, SNV, and
Swisscontact. This action-research project aims to leverage
the development of sustainable and inclusive value chains
through the strategic access and use of information and
communication technologies to improve the participation
of the poor in overall chain governance and decision making, contributing to value chain competitiveness, sustainability, poverty reduction, and food security.
With the collaboration of the World Bank’s Agricultural
Risk Management Team (ARMT) and the Regional Unit for
Technical Assistance (RUTA), the learning alliance has also
started a pilot learning cycle on price risk management with
seven coffee cooperatives in Nicaragua. With a five-year
(2009–13) core budget of US$25,000, the regional learning
alliance has already leveraged an additional funding of
US$940,310 for strategic learning, and US$206,400 for
capacity development in Nicaragua, where the Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and
Lutheran World Relief (LWR) are also participating.
Participation in learning alliances has transformed the
work of development partners and has broadened the work
of research centers. The changes that the learning alliance
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Box 4.35 How Learning Alliances Change the Work of Development Agencies: The Example of
Catholic Relief Services

The learning alliance approach has been successfully
adopted within Catholic Relief Services’ (CRS) Agriculture and Environment Program. It highlighted the
interdependence of development actors and how,
through partnership and collaboration with appropriate research and development actors, real gains can be
made in achieving common goals. The reasons that led
to CRS’s adoption of the learning alliance approach
included:
■

■

■

■
■

A desire to demonstrate the benefits of market-led
approaches in relief and development.
Frustration with the effectiveness of traditional
training programs.
A disappointing record of adoption of innovations
in methodologies, technologies, and partnerships
based on traditional training methods.
A lack of feedback in more typical learning processes.
Insufficient impact assessment and follow-up.

Prior to adopting the alliance approach, almost all
the farmer training undertaken by CRS and its partners dealt with a single skill set (for example, how to
increase production of a particular commodity, or
basic business and marketing skills). CRS and the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) came
to understand that self-sustaining growth and development of farmers requires multiple sets of skills. The
learning alliance partners also realized that these skill

sets required the integration of several sectors (e.g.,
microfinance, agriculture, water, and enterprise development).
A research-development partnership was established between CRS, CIAT, and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture–FOODNET in which they
pooled agroenterprise skills and expertise with the
methodologies and tools that they had been developing
to help smallholder farmers link to markets. Together
they mapped out an iterative process of learning,
putting into practice what had been learned, and then
analyzing and reflecting on the results. From small
beginnings in East Africa and Central America in
2002–04, CRS is now involved in agroenterprise development learning alliances in 5 regions, with participation of around 30 countries.
In countries where the learning alliance has been
most active, CRS agriculture programming has undergone a radical change. Where formerly CRS’s attention
was narrowly focused on a low-input/low-output, subsistence farming-oriented approach to food security,
now CRS programs integrate the goal of enabling
small-scale producers to enter competitive markets by
identifying market opportunities, strengthening rural
enterprise, and converting poorly coordinated supply
chains into value chains. Many learning alliance participants sum up this change by saying that they are helping farmers transition from “struggling to sell what
they have produced, to producing what sells.”

Sources: Author and Best, Ferris, and Mundy 2009.

experience brought to the work of CIAT and Catholic Relief
Services are detailed in box 4.35.
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

Several important lessons can be extracted from the learning
alliance for innovation systems work. A key lesson is the need
to increase connectivity and information flows between individuals in a transparent fashion, facilitated by an honest
broker. This process is critical to build trust among participants. The experience highlights the importance of individuals as opposed to organizations as well as the need to avoid
organizational standard bearers who feel threatened by open
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systems where “the competition” also participates. Second,
clear and shared objectives, applicable results, personal
commitment, and flexibility are key elements. An effective
innovation system adds value to individual participants in
diverse ways by leveraging a collective motivation to work
smarter, learn, and share with others. Finally, the facilitation
of an innovation system is an art in itself. The learning
alliance taught the partners to value diversity of opinion
and tension as a crucible of creative ideas.
In the hopes of contributing to more effective innovation
systems in the future, there are also several critical issues
and/or errors that can be taken from the learning alliances.
These include: (1) the difficulty of selling a process in a project- and outcome-driven context; (2) a lack of causality in
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many of the results, which makes evaluation and reporting
difficult in more formal channels; (3) an initial excessive
emphasis on web-based tools when what seems to work best is
face-to-face exchanges to build trust and innovation; (4) the
difficulty in securing on-going funding for a sometimes
“fuzzy,” demand-driven process; (5) the need to proactively
involve more members of the overall food system (such as
public policy makers and the private sector) from the outset;
and (6) the need for eventual buy-in from key decision makers in the organizational “home” of the innovation system.
Specific interventions highlighted by partner agencies to
support innovation systems projects or programs focus on
connectivity and information. Key interventions in connectivity include face-to-face exchanges and trust building.

Once a minimum level of trust exists, the use of ICT-based
communication tools is useful. Sequencing is important
here. Trust is the basic building block without which technical fixes are of limited use. A second key type of intervention
focuses on increased information access and flow. Participants in the learning alliance value new ideas about how to
resolve constraints, short case studies illustrating the application of these ideas in diverse contexts, access to people
with experience using these tools, and feedback mechanisms
to share their experiences with others. Investments in simple process documentation (for example, contracting local
reporters), knowledge-sharing fairs, and web-based platforms as well as support for write shops to make sense of
outcomes are useful here.
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NOTES

Thematic Note 3

Module 4 Overview

1. Asian and Pacific Association of Agricultural Research
Institutes.
2. Association of Agricultural Research Institutes in the
Near East and North Africa.
3. The Southern African Center for Cooperation in Agricultural Research and Training.
4. Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in
Eastern and Central Africa.
5. CORAF/WECARD = Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain
pour la Recherche et le Développement Agricoles (West and
Central African Council for Agricultural Research and
Development); ASARECA = Association for Strengthening
Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa.
6. Programa Cooperativo para el Desarrollo Tecnológico
Agroalimentario y Agroindustrial del Cono Sur (Cooperative Program for Technological Development in Agrifood
and Agroindustry in the Southern Cone).
7. Cooperative Agricultural Research and Technology
Transfer Program for the Andean Subregion (Programa
Cooperativo de Innovación Tecnológica Agropecuaria
para la Región Andina) and the Cooperative Program
on Research and Technology Transfer for the South
American Tropics (Programa Cooperativo de Investigación y Transferencia de Tecnología para los Trópicos
Suramericanos).
8. The ASARECA priorities assume potential benefits
across frontiers are counted equally. They may not be realized if trade is banned during periods of drought and market access is restricted by informal barriers.
9. Regional economic communities need to assume
responsibility for funding regional public goods, whereas
donor funding may be channeled through funding authority for specific activities/projects.
10. Efforts by CGIAR research centers in Eastern and
Southern Africa to develop a postdisaster and postconflict
program classified 17 of 25 countries as belonging to these
categories, but countries were very resistant to becoming
involved in their neighbors’ internal problems or found border areas too difficult to target.
11. Many well-focused, tightly organized initiatives by
CGIAR research centers and the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation do not come through subregional organizations.
12. Economies of scale occur when the cost per unit of
research output fall with the number of units of output produced, usually through better use of major fixed investment
or specialized skills. Economies of scope occur when the
cost of a desired output falls with an increase in the number
of different research outputs being produced. These gains
occur when there is cross-commodity or cross-disciplinary
learning as an external economy.

1. New Zealand reformed its agricultural research system
in the early 1990s, creating separate research institutes
under a research funding foundation based on short-term
contestable grants. By 2005 government policy was
reformed: “The aim appears to be a move away from shortterm contestable funding and a move toward long-term
commitment of resources to individual providers to plan
their own priorities” (Johnson 2006:8).
2. By 2009, only Chad, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Namibia, and Niger had met the target, but for many
if not most of these countries (Malawi, for example), the
new funds were directed more to short-term interventions,
especially fertilizer subsidy programs, rather than to longerterm investments in agricultural research.
3. In Sub-Saharan Africa nonfarm rural income is about
34 percent of total income, compared to 51 percent in Asia
and 47 percent in Latin America (Reardon, Berdegué, and
Barrett 2007).
4. IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.
Thematic Note 1

1. For other definitions and functions, see the International Association of Science Parks, http://www.iasp.ws/
publico/intro.jsp.
2. Examples include cofinancing through trade organizations and farmer associations to pay for research and steer
priorities toward the needs of farmer-members. Examples
include research interfaces with such organizations as La
Fundación Nacional del Arroz (FUNDARROZ, National
Rice Foundation) in Venezuela. For such arrangements
to work, the associations must develop the capacity to
articulate their needs. The provision of research and
extension services will need to be pluralistic (that is,
involving many potential providers with the skills to provide those services).
Thematic Note 2

1. The conventional rationale for investing in agricultural
research suggests that governments and development agents
should finance agricultural research when the private sector
“underinvests.” This condition is usually given when technology is a public good—in other words, when others cannot be excluded from its use and the private sector cannot
recover the costs of developing it (Anderson 1998; Pray and
Umali-Deininger 1998; Day-Rubenstein and Fuglie 1999).
2. Horton, Prain, and Thiele (2010) discuss PPPs in the
broader context of partnerships.
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Thematic Note 5

1. The World Bank Institute’s Capacity Development
Results Framework (Otoo, Agapitova, and Behrens 2009)
presents a useful step-by-step guide and associated methods
and tools for planning, implementing, and evaluating interventions to develop capacity.
2. It should be noted, however, that PROINPA’s autonomy
from the national government has sometimes led to
strained relations with public-sector bodies responsible for
agricultural research and development.
3. For a more extensive discussion of NAIP with a somewhat different emphasis, see IAP 2.
Innovative Activity Profile 2

1. For a detailed description of NAIP, see World Bank
(2006) and http://www.naip.icar.org.in.
2. India’s national agricultural research system consists of
ICAR as well as a large network of state and central agricultural universities. ICAR is an autonomous organization
under the Ministry of Agriculture. At present, there are over
90 ICAR institutes and 50 state (45) and central (5) agricultural universities.
Innovative Activity Profile 3

1. Recent studies have shown that TFP [total factor productivity] growth depends heavily on at least two factors
that are very important to this Council: the quality of
human resources and spending on research and development (Bitran Colodro and González Urrutia 2010).
2. The government plans to raise the contribution to
research, development, and innovation from 0.7 percent of
GDP to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2025. At the same time, it will
reallocate a large share of the public investment in research
to the private sector. Two-thirds of public expenditures on
research currently go to the public sector and one-third goes
to the private sector; in the future, the allocations will be just
the reverse.
3. InnovaChile-CORFO is the most important multisectoral public innovation agency (CORFO is the Corporación
de Fomento de la Producción) along with CONICYT
(Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica) and FIA (the Foundation for Agricultural Innovation /
Fundación para la Innovación Agraria).
Innovative Activity Profile 4

1. “Rural enterprise development” is a catch-all phrase that
includes methods and tools to facilitate market linkages
for small producer associations. In the first phase of the

learning alliance, topics covered included the identification
of market opportunities with producer groups, participatory
supply chain analysis and upgrading strategies, and inclusive
innovation in products and processes. For a current list of
themes, see http://www.alianzasdeaprendizaje.org.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

overnments in developing countries increasingly
intervene actively in supporting private sector
development through diverse means. Public investments in business development can direct private investments towards areas of significant public interest and areas
where the private sector alone would generally underinvest.
They can facilitate or stimulate private investment through a
conducive policy, legal, and institutional environment. Public investments for business development can also complement private investments (for example, by funding services
or basic research). Such public-private partnerships need to
become a strategic element of the agricultural development
agenda. Formal technology transfer mechanisms (IPRs,
licensing) offered through specialized technology transfer
offices are critical to engage effectively in PPPs and disseminate technology through market channels.
The appropriate funding mechanisms to support innovation by collaborating public institutions, private entrepreneurs, and other actors depend on the public good to be
produced and the role of the public sector. Useful alternatives include specialized innovation funds and matching
grants to provide incentives for collaboration and risk taking. The use of venture capital funding has been limited in
developing countries, but small and medium agricultural
enterprises require risk capital to capture opportunities presented by agricultural innovation.

G

Support for business incubation helps to scale up small
and often newly formed enterprises that bring innovative
technologies and services to market. Developing countries
require broader, less intensive, and more diverse incubator services to develop entrepreneurial, innovative cultures and business environments. Agricultural clusters
foster innovation through proximity; they encompass
interdependent firms in a value chain, service providers,
and associated institutions. Cluster-based approaches
have increased agricultural productivity, innovation, and
business formation.
The key policy issues for agricultural business development and PPPs involve their potential for altering development priorities, the potential welfare effects of agricultural
innovation and growth driven by private interests, welfare
concerns related to gender and social equity, and prospects
for building a “shared responsibility system” capable of
balancing the sometimes divergent interests of the public
sector, private sector, and civil society. Finally, in an environment characterized by increasing private involvement in
agricultural innovation, very clear criteria will be needed to
determine when public intervention is justified and at what
level. Every publicly supported partnership or business
development program must have a clear time frame and exit
strategy. If the temporary nature of public involvement is
not clear at the outset, private investors’ decisions and business plans will be biased. The sustainability of social and
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environmental services, on the other hand, is often assured
only through long-term public support.
RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC INVESTMENT

The power of the private sector to innovate and foster economic growth is a critical driver of long-term, sustainable
development in agriculture. Development programs apply
two major instruments to engage with the private sector for
this purpose: agricultural business development, which aims
to stimulate general economic growth, and public-private
partnerships (PPPs), which aim to address development
issues in conjunction with the private sector.
Agricultural development aims to achieve three objectives: national food security, income for rural people, and the
sustainability of natural resources. These interdependent,
sometimes conflicting objectives must be finely balanced;
for example, food security must not be attained regardless
of the cost to the environment. The private sector’s primary
goals are to generate income and economic growth, and its
involvement in agricultural development carries the risk
that development will be inequitable. The challenge is to
find the common interests that will enable the private sector
to use its many advantages to encourage balanced agricultural development and innovation.
Public sector support for and cooperation with the private sector are generally considered justified, valuable, or
even necessary to: (1) compensate for market failures that
prevent or hinder necessary private investments, (2) stimulate growth and help businesses become established; (3) generate and/or direct innovation in areas considered important
for society; or (4) reduce some of the risk inherent in commercializing new technologies.
Support for agricultural business development

For agricultural business development, the most important
objectives are to generate qualitative and innovation-led
economic growth and income opportunities. “Qualitative
growth” is associated with a range of additional public
goods that especially reduce extreme poverty, provide food
security, narrow structural inequalities, protect the environment, or sustain the growth process itself (Thomas et al.
2000). “Innovation-led” growth is based on innovative technologies, processes, products, markets, or organizational
arrangements rather than on large additional uses of natural resources.
Public investments for business development are important because they can accelerate and improve the quality of
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growth in several ways. They can direct private investments
towards areas of significant public interest and areas where
the private sector alone would generally underinvest. They
can facilitate or stimulate private investment through a conducive policy, legal, and institutional environment. Public
investments for business development can also complement
private investments (for example, by funding services or
basic research).
The agricultural sector is characterized by specific market failures that are less prominent in other sectors, including the problem of scale, the time lags, and the multitude of
partners. To overcome these and other initial obstacles to
private investment and enable new products or technologies
to be introduced, the public sector can provide incentives
such as tax incentives, grants, and guarantees. Many governments support investments in new agricultural products or
production systems until they can be commercialized or
support the commitment of actors throughout an industry
(in production, processing, and marketing) until a secure
and mature business foundation develops. Most of the
recently subsidized biofuel production programs were justified on these grounds.
A typical problem in developing agribusinesses is that
the number and diversity of market players in a given value
chain is often high. A chain’s production base often consists
of large numbers of small-scale, unorganized, geographically scattered producers. In circumstances such as these,
which the market alone cannot improve, it makes little sense
to introduce new production processes and products.
Public funds are needed to facilitate the vertical and horizontal linkages that will make the value chain efficient—for
example, to organize farmers into cooperatives and associations and create platforms for institutional cooperation. For
example, China’s government supports farmer-company or
farmer-company-researcher arrangements, in which farmers
organize to partner with investors in processing/marketing
industries, contract research institutions to develop certain
products, or move into processing and marketing their
products themselves (see IAP 2).
Support for public-private partnerships

Public support for PPPs in agriculture moves beyond business development and facilitation and makes direct use of
individual private sector actors to generate public goods. Many
governments and development agencies recognize that it
can be more effective and sustainable for the public sector to
work with the private sector to generate public goods in
ways that enable each sector to build on its comparative
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advantages. Such direct cooperation can benefit both partners and is particularly useful in the following areas:
■

■

■

Social services. Governments and development agencies
use cooperation with private partners to invest directly
in the delivery of social services. Public support ranges
from providing favorable conditions for private investments in targeted poor or remote areas to contractual
agreements between public institutions and private
investors to deliver specific social goods and services.
Such partnerships can offer a number of benefits, not
only to small, local companies but to large multinational
firms, which have come under increasing scrutiny to
ensure that they operate in socially responsible ways. For
example, under a PPP supported by GIZ and the multinational food company Tchibo GmbH, factories in
Bangladesh, China, and Thailand are trained to implement production and labor standards with worker participation and sustainably improve employees’ working
conditions (GIZ 2009). In this way, PPPs pave the way
for the development and adoption of international
social standards.
Environmental services. The protection and sustainable
use of natural resources in agricultural production are
important public goods. To preclude private entities from
externalizing environmental costs or the costs of using
natural resources, governments traditionally apply two
sets of instruments: (1) regulations and controls and
(2) incentives and disincentives in the form of financial
instruments, such as subsidies for water-saving technologies or planting trees on eroded hillsides. The second set of instruments has recently become much more
diverse and has created a new line of business in agriculture. Payments for environmental services involve
not only payments for avoiding environmental costs (for
example, payments for not cropping in watershed areas
of reservoirs) but payments for actively generating environmental benefits. Farmers in the European Alps are
subsidized to continue livestock production to maintain
the characteristic alpine landscape, for example. Many
countries use carbon sequestration funds to support
farmers’ efforts to plant trees, protect grasslands, use
biogas, or pursue similar activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Innovation and technology adoption. Agriculture in
particular suffers from significant underinvestment in
R&D (see module 4, TN 2) because of the high degree of
externalities (such as benefits not being captured by the
investor). PPPs lower the risk for individual private

partners; at the same time, they foster the adaptation and
dissemination of new research results or existing knowledge and technologies. This kind of collaboration helps
to overcome problems of underinvestment and accelerates technological progress.
Notably in agricultural PPPs farmers play an important
role as partners and providers of public services. This
involves the mobilization and organization of farmers in
formal or informal associations, cooperatives, or groups as a
first step; then these organizations can partner with public
services organizations or participate in wider partnerships
with public and private organizations. Most commonly this
partnering involves training and extension services but can
also include adaptive research and technology testing or
social and environmental services.
Table 5.1 summarizes some of the instruments used in
business development, including PPPs.
PAST EXPERIENCE

Agricultural development agencies traditionally have been
ambivalent about business development. Attitudes range from
seeing business as an obstacle to agricultural development—
at worst, the “evil middleman” that must be controlled—to
regarding business as a necessary link between farmers
and markets and finally to regarding business development
as a driving force for agricultural innovation, growth, and
development.
Business development is a relative latecomer to the agricultural development agenda, but starting in the mid-1990s
the business sector came to be widely recognized as an
important driver of agricultural development. Agricultural
development programs and projects started to address the
development of the private sector, particularly small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) and value chains, and to seek
ways of improving the business environment and facilitating business operations. Table 5.2 presents a more schematic
view of the relationship between business development and
partnership objectives and instruments.
Business development and
partnership instruments

Recognition of the business sector’s role in agricultural
innovation and growth was accompanied by business development services (BDS) similar to those employed in nonagricultural sectors for many years. While most of these
instruments are applied for general business development
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Table 5.1 Business Development Instruments Used in Nonagricultural Sectors (and Later Adapted to Agriculture)
Type of instrument

Target firms

Key features

Tax incentives
(for R&D)

– All firms (generally more attractive for
larger firms)

Business advisory
services

– Small and medium enterprises (SMEs)

Business development
services

– SMEs

Business incubation

– Startups and SMEs with high growth
potential (dynamic enterprises)

Science and
technology parksa

– Emerging and established technology
businesses, but may target specific industries

Industry clustersb

– Related and supporting businesses and other
organizations linked by a shared value chain
(vertical) or shared final market (horizontal)
– Concentrated in technology industries
– Mature, strong, experienced companies
(sharing of responsibilities)
– Private partners can be diverse, from small
to multinational

Public-private
partnerships (PPPs)

– Motivate companies to invest in R&D and innovation
– R&D tax credit to reduce a firm’s tax liabilities, based on the
amount spent to develop new products or improve existing
products
– Large enterprises paying more tax will benefit more than small
firms
– Broad business support, including training and advisory services
– Acts as primary service provider
– Basically supply driven
– Broad business support, including training and advisory services
provided to individual businesses (more on a demand-driven
basis than advisory services)
– Often coordinates other service providers
– Focus on building capacity within the business development
service industry
– Integrated mix of intensive strategic and operational support
provided to entrepreneurs and businesses selected for their
growth potential
– Focus on helping firms manage risk and build competitiveness
through early, high-risk growth stages
– Support typically ends when clients “graduate” by reaching
particular milestones
– May be linked with educational or research institutions
– Focus on helping relatively mature businesses accelerate growth
– May use incubation as way to source future clients
– May be linked to national, cluster-driven development strategies
– May be linked with educational or research institutions
– May use incubation to source future clients
– May be linked to national competitiveness strategies
– Addresses delivery of public goods more directly
– Addresses diverse set of public goods (social, environmental
goods and technologies)
– Can have sustainability problems (e.g., if social or environmental
goods are targeted)

Source: infoDev Monitoring, Evaluation, and Impact Assessment Study, n.d.
a. For more information about technology parks, see infoDev, http://www.infodev.org/itparks. b. A practical application of Michael Porter’s industry cluster theory, explored in The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990).

or private sector partnerships, they can also be tailored to
particularly stimulate and direct private sector development
for R&D and innovation.
Tax incentives for R&D and innovation. R&D tax incentives have been used to encourage more spending on R&D.
Such tax incentives are usually provided in the form of tax
deductions based on the amounts spent in financing agricultural research and innovation. They can be a suitable
instrument to overcome market failure resulting in underinvestment in R&D as they motivate companies to invest in
innovation. Although such incentives may not always be
limited to large corporations but include small and medium
enterprises, clearly large enterprises that pay more tax
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than small firms will benefit proportionately (World Bank
2006). Even though the use of tax incentives is widespread
(over two-thirds of OECD members have tax incentives, as
well as many developing countries), evidence of their cost
effectiveness is not clear. Box 5.1 describes the experience in
Chile, which has yet to undergo a closer impact evaluation.
In general, tax incentives tend to benefit larger companies
with large-enough revenue streams. Small and start-up
companies may have difficulties benefiting from tax deductions because their revenue base is limited.
Other forms of tax incentives used in some countries
include personal income tax deductions for individuals
investing in startup businesses (effective only if the investor
is paying any substantial income tax) and tax relief on
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Table 5.2

Objectives, Instruments, and Financial Support Mechanisms for Business Development and Partnerships
Business development and partnership instruments

Financial support
mechanisms

Incubators

Science parks

Clusters

TTOs

Business growth

Business growth

Often initial public
funding, but
service fee
collection
important for
sustainability

Generation of
innovations
of public interest

Commercialization of new technologies

Most incubators
subsidized, fee
collection and cost
recovery difficult

Efficiency gains (e.g., through
synergies, reduced
transaction costs, among
other means)
Complementary public funding
(e.g., infrastructure, public
sector institutions)
Tax breaks and other financial
incentives (e.g., subsidies,
public sector credit
guarantees) are common
Risk capital
Commercial financing

PPPs
Specific public goods
(e.g., social, environmental, innovations
with high public good
content)

Qualitative, innovation-led economic growth and income opportunities

Business startups
Intermedia te

Objective

Overall

BDS

Initial public
funding
replaced by
service fees

Transfer and application
of technologies

Matching grants
Competitive grants

Matching grants
Source: Author.
Note: BDS = business development services; TTO = technology transfer office; PPP = public-private partnership.

Box 5.1 Research and Development Tax Incentive Law in Chile

Chile was one of the first Latin American countries to
introduce competitive funding programs for agricultural research. These programs have helped to increase
the volume and quality of Chilean agricultural and
nonagricultural research significantly. Another step was
to introduce tax incentives.

■

■

The main objectives of the incentives are to:
■
■

■

Increase private investment in R&D.
Strengthen the link between research centers and
companies.

Thirty-five percent of the payments private companies make to the research center against an R&D
contract are considered a credit against corporate
taxes.
The remaining 65 percent of the payment is automatically considered expense for tax purposes.
The main requirements to qualify are:

■

The R&D tax incentive works as follows:

■

Companies hire registered R&D centers through a
previously approved R&D contract.

■

Research centers need to be registered. The criteria
to be included in the registry include years of operation, research capabilities, and good accounting
practices to ensure appropriate enforcement.
Contracts need to be approved by CORFO, the
Chilean development and innovation agency.
The company and research center cannot be related.

Source: Adapted from Noe 2007.
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donations to research foundations or endowments. Infant
firms can benefit from incentives such as tax grace periods
while they grow, which may be an important strategy in
countries that tax firms even before they start production.
Reducing taxes on importing equipment and supplies
needed in R&D can help innovative projects. Innovation
can be further encouraged by establishing special economic
zones offering tax and regulatory relief, especially to stimulate cooperation with foreign partners.
Business development services. Business development
services (BDS) comprise a wide range of nonfinancial services provided by public and private suppliers (BDS
providers) to entrepreneurs who use them to operate more
efficiently and expand their businesses. BDS thus may
include training, consultancy, and advisory services, marketing assistance, information, technology development and
transfer, and business linkage promotion. The high cost and
low impact of many BDS approaches has caused government and international donors to shift from providing
highly subsidized BDS toward a demand-led, market-based
approach based on undistorted private service markets. The
most frequently mentioned weaknesses of the former
approach include (Altenburg and Stamm 2004):
■

■

■

■

366

Lack of financial sustainability. Because most services
are highly subsidized, service providers come to depend
on continuous public support. Most countries are cutting back on public expenditures, including business
support measures.
Insufficient outreach. Even in times marked by high government revenues, deficit spending, or substantial inflows
of foreign aid, business services usually only reach a relatively small percentage of the target group.
Lack of business orientation. Public service providers
can share some of the less admirable tendencies of publicly administered programs. Budget allocations are not
linked to program performance, employees do not act in
a business-like fashion, and beneficiaries are not treated
as clients. Incentives—both for support institutions and
the people working within them—often are not designed
for them to actively seek links with the business sector
and strive for client satisfaction.
Poor quality. Service providers and clients work under
different incentive systems, operational routines, and
even mindsets, with the result that service supply often is
not tailored to clients’ needs. In addition, products delivered at low cost or for free may induce a debilitating
dependency and cynicism over quality and value.

■

Crowding out private competitors. Delivering services at
highly subsidized rates distorts markets and hampers the
emergence of commercially viable service providers.

In contrast, the new BDS market paradigm highlights
the need to deliver services at cost-covering rates and for
providers to operate in a demand-driven, business-like
manner. Service providers should either be private companies or public entities organized like firms with respect to
their incentive systems, personnel, culture, and attitudes.
Services should be regarded as commercial products, and
the companies that receive services should be regarded as
customers rather than beneficiaries. Providers should
always charge fees high enough to secure the provider’s
financial sustainability (box 5.2).
Business incubators. Incubation first emerged in developed countries in the 1980s, operating alongside many
other generic business development services and evolving to
provide narrow and deep services for a small, select group of
companies. Developing countries picked up the concept,
and today more incubators are based in developing than
developed countries. Observers and the “global business
incubation community” estimate that of about 5,000 business incubators worldwide, at least 1,000 are based in Asia
(approximately half in China), 1,000 in North America, 900
in Europe, and close to 400 in Latin America (with a sizeable
and robust industry in Brazil).
As the name implies, incubators nurture young firms,
helping them to survive and grow during the startup period
when they are most vulnerable. Incubators provide handson management assistance, access to financing, and business
and technical support services; they frequently also provide
shared office space and access to equipment. Although
they work with a broad spectrum of business development
models, the vast majority of business incubators fall into
two general categories: technology (focusing on commercializing new technology and transferring technology) or
mixed use (serving a wide range of clients). Hybrid models,
combining outreach, virtual, and broader services with
more traditional incubation for new and existing businesses, have emerged in many developing countries, particularly those with smaller economies, limited generic business
support services, weak cultures of entrepreneurship, difficult business environments, and limited resources to support innovation. In these circumstances, the demand for
intensive, narrowly focused, and deep incubation services
is minuscule. Instead, broader, less intensive, and more
diverse services are needed to extend impact and develop
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Box 5.2 Main Aspects of Developing and Implementing Demand-Driven, Sustainable
Business Development Services

Market assessment and reasoned justification of any
public intervention. Well-intended government interventions may be harmful for the long-term development of markets for business services and business
development services, because they may distort
prices, create bad habits, and crowd out private competitors. For this reason, intervention, rather than
nonintervention, in markets for business development services has to be justified on the basis of a clear
analysis of the situation.
Separating funding from service delivery. Major
problems arise with subsidized service provision
when the service provider and the organization
managing and administering the funds are identical.
Without relatively complex external supervision
arrangements, it is nearly impossible to commit this
“system” to an efficient and cost-sensitive execution of
its tasks. Inefficiencies often result from an explicit or
implicit obligation to spend funds in a given period,
disregarding careful targeting and the best possible
cost-benefit ratio. Separation of funding and delivery
functions will reduce the risk of crowding out private
suppliers, especially when private companies can apply
for public funding to provide services. This kind of
competition increases the transparency of service markets and provides additional information on whether
there still is a case for public intervention.
Improved accountability. Many service providers
offer a more or less ample set of services, often without
having established an accountability system to measure
the cost and the income generated by each service
offered. It is highly important to improve accountability and enable service providers to monitor market
success and cost-related aspects of each and every service offered. Service providers with a public function or
mission may then decide to cross-subsidize different
services to maintain important services that cannot be
provided on a cost-covering basis.
Monitoring and evaluating performance. Public
service provision must be continuously, transparently,

and independently monitored and evaluated. The two
subsystems of service provision (funding and delivery)
need to be evaluated according to different performance criteria. Within the organization that manages
the funds, the cost-benefit ratio of the previously
established objective(s) should guide the evaluation.
At the level of service delivery, the evaluation should
focus on the proven impact and efficiency of links
between the provider and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Establishing a direct link between performance
and resource allocation. Monitoring and evaluation
are not objectives in their own right but should be
used for continuously improving the system. The
most effective way to ensure the system’s responsiveness is to link the allocation of funds directly to the
performance of those who supply services. The success of effective service providers is largely based on
incentive systems that provide financial rewards for
good performers.
Compulsory cofinancing. To ensure that SMEs feel
some ownership of the services they receive, every
transaction should be partly financed by the customer.
The proportion of cofinancing will depend on the
character of the service and the final objective of service provision. Additional factors to consider include
the business environment and changes in the institutional setting. Services with predictable and appropriable outcomes should be largely financed by the
customer, while in some strategic areas it will be necessary to step up the share of funds transferred. When
SMEs operate under conditions of economic growth or
at least stability, a higher proportion of private financing should be expected. On the other hand, when
macroeconomic conditions are volatile and competition is becoming life-threatening for many companies,
governments or other funding organizations may opt
for a higher share of subsidies, stressing short-term
impact and outreach and temporarily sidelining
aspects of financial sustainability.

Source: Altenburg and Stamm 2004.

entrepreneurial and innovative cultures and business environments. For more information on how an incubation
approach may contribute to business development and
innovation in agriculture, see TN 3.

Technology parks and clusters. Technology parks (also
known as science parks or research parks) are usually linked
with educational or research institutions and provide infrastructure and support services for businesses, particularly
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real estate and office space. Technology parks can foster business-driven development and innovation because they focus
on creating links and collaboration among diverse businesses, many of them large, established businesses for
technology transfer and economic development. Business
incubation shares some of the features of technology parks
and industry clusters, in that each involves a “place,”
processes, and companies with potential for growth. The
main difference is that business incubation focuses on
startup companies that eventually graduate from the incubator service, whereas companies in clusters or parks usually
intend to maintain their association. Technology parks often
have their own business incubators dedicated to “growing”
tenants for the park, and some clusters have a business incubation component as well.1
Technology transfer offices. Technology transfer
translates agricultural research innovations into applications. The vast majority of agricultural innovations in
developing countries arise from publicly sponsored research
centers that typically are inexperienced and unprepared to
engage in formal mechanisms of technology transfer. Technology transfer offices (TTOs), which are usually affiliated
with research organizations or universities, have the mandate to identify and protect research results2 with a view to
facilitating their use and commercialization. Some TTOs
also host incubation services for businesses to commercialize technology. TN 5 offers a detailed discussion of TTOs.
Industry clusters. Since 2000, industry clusters have
become an increasingly popular model for organizing
strategies and policies to promote regional development.
Clusters are agglomerations of strongly interdependent
firms (including specialized suppliers) linked to each other
in a value-adding production chain, service providers, and
associated institutions in a particular field. Some clusters
encompass strategic alliances with universities, research
institutes, knowledge-intensive business services, bridging institutions (brokers, consultants), and customers.
Cluster-based approaches for business development and
innovation have increased agricultural productivity,
innovation, and business formation (Gibbs and Bernat
1998; Andersson et al. 2004; World Bank 2009b). TN 4
summarizes key lessons from cluster-based business development and innovation.
Partnerships. At first, private partners in agricultural
development initiatives focused on developing and
strengthening businesses, but growing appreciation of the
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private sector’s role in agricultural development has led to
innovative partnerships in which the public and private sectors are true business partners, producing public goods. The
partners bring their complementary skills to a program or
project, with varying levels of involvement and responsibility (TN 1). Partnerships range from global strategic
alliances to specific forms of cooperation in individual
development projects. In true PPPs, the financial and managerial strength and experience of the private partners is
important (box 5.3), but many development programs have
difficulty working with financially strong and experienced
companies and are concerned that the partnership will
weaken their focus on poverty. The objective of PPPs is not
to support weak businesses through public contracts, however, but to engage with the private sector as a reliable partner that can deliver a public good efficiently. A comparison
with the procurement of public works is useful, because it
follows requirements for bidders based on size, past experience, financial strength, and reliability.
Funding mechanisms

A range of innovative funding mechanisms can be used to
support innovators and their links to public institutions,
private entrepreneurs, and other actors.3 Rather than funding innovation through block grants, many countries use
specialized innovation funds to provide incentives for collaboration and risk taking. For example, competitive
research grants target research-related activities to mobilize
public and private research capacity. Matching grants are
widely and increasingly used to stimulate engagement
between the private sector and farmers in activities related
to technology generation, technology dissemination, and
innovation processes.
Matching grants show greater promise than competitive
research grants in fostering business-driven innovation
development, as they tend to be better at promoting pluralism in applied technology development, transfer, and
adoption by enhancing ownership among actors. They are
also well suited to overall development of agribusiness
because they can be adapted to support productive partnerships, provide technical assistance and other services,
promote productive activities by farmer groups, support
value-added activities, and build small-scale infrastructure
(World Bank 2010). TN 2 reviews experiences with grant
schemes and the various opportunities they present; IAP 4
provides examples.
Venture capital funding is explicitly designed for investment in a high-risk business or security of some type. It has
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Box 5.3 Critical Choices for Public-Private Partnerships

Before entering into any partnership project or program, the rationale for the investment must be fully
understood, along with the problem(s) to be fixed or
outcomes to be achieved. These considerations have
critical implications for the choice of:
■

■

Institutions and partners. If delivery of a public
good is the main objective of the partnership, it
must involve organizations that are capable of generating the good (or that can undergo institutional
development to acquire this capability). This issue is
explored in the discussion of institutions and partners later in this module.
Financing instrument. The appropriate financing
instrument depends on the type of public good to be
produced and the role of the public sector. When
governments act as brokers in these sorts of partnerships, common instruments include government
guarantees, risk or venture capital for developing and

■

introducing new technologies, or competitive and
matching grants to “buy” public goods from the private sector. For environmental and social services,
temporary or permanent subsidies are more common instruments. For creating an enabling business
environment, legislative instruments are complemented by direct investments in services, infrastructure, and facilities.
Exit strategy. Every support program must have a
clear time frame and exit strategy. The public sector
intervenes to support private investment until
industries mature or technologies are proven and
adopted. If the temporary nature of public involvement is not clear at the outset, private investors’
decisions and business plans will be biased. The sustainability of social and environmental services, on
the other hand, is often assured only though longterm public support.

Source: Author.

been used widely outside agriculture to support businessdriven development, but its application in agriculture has
been limited. Small and medium agricultural enterprises
require risk capital to fully capture the opportunities presented by agricultural innovation, however. TN 6 summarizes experiences with and applicability of risk capital
investment models for agriculture in developing and
middle-income countries.

KEY POLICY ISSUES

The key policy issues for agricultural business development and PPPs involve their potential for altering
development priorities, the potential welfare effects of agricultural innovation and growth driven by private interests,
welfare concerns related to gender and social equity,
and prospects for building a “shared responsibility system”
capable of balancing the sometimes divergent interests of
the public sector, private sector, and civil society. Finally, in
an environment characterized by increasing private
involvement in agricultural innovation, very clear criteria
will be needed to determine when public intervention is
justified and at what level.

Food supply versus rural incomes

Building on business development and business-driven
innovation, agricultural development is likely to see priorities shifting toward growth and income generation and
possibly away from regional and global food security.
Business development is driven by the interest of producers, processors, or traders of agricultural products in
generating profits (for example, by increasing factor productivity, adding value, or developing new products and
markets) and capturing a meaningful proportion of these
gains as additional income rather than passing them on to
consumers.
Increasing factor productivity in primary agricultural
production is the main approach to increase food production, but increased factor productivity does not always
translate into higher profits for producers over the long run.
Historical trends show that after early adopters of a technology achieve their initial high gains, most of the ensuing
productivity gains are passed on quickly from producers to
consumers in the form of absolutely or relatively lower
prices for foods. This scenario offers little to interest key
business actors, with the possible exception of the input
supply industry (box 5.4).
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Box 5.4 Different Trajectories of Agricultural Growth and Producer-Consumer Welfare Distribution

From an economic welfare perspective, additional agricultural economic growth and ultimately additional
welfare in a society are generated by higher levels of productivity, which in turn depend strongly on innovation.
Technologies that increase the volume of production
(such as a higher-yielding crop variety) would shift the
supply function to the “right” and increase welfare, but
this shift would largely come at the expense of producers
because of a price-decreasing effect. Technologies that
reduce the cost of production (such as insect-resistant Bt
cotton, which reduces the use of costly pesticides) would
shift the supply function “downward” again, with a significant welfare gain that would in this case be shared
more equally between consumers and producers.
An alternative option for growth is possible by
actively addressing the demand function or creating

new demands for agricultural food and nonfood products. For example, agricultural raw materials like maize,
sugarcane, or cassava could be used in new ways for
energy production; consumers’ changing preferences
could be served through market differentiation, brandnaming of products, and so on; an agricultural raw
material could serve as the basis for chemical or pharmaceutical products; or agricultural products could be
designed as functional foods. While the vast majority of
agricultural production is still destined to meet the
world’s basic requirements for food, market differentiation and new products and uses will increasingly play
a role in raising the overall value of agricultural production, especially in middle- and higher-income
countries, with production coming from developed
and developing countries.

Source: Author.

Distributional effects of business-driven
agricultural growth

The distributional aspects of agricultural innovations are
related to the food security issue just mentioned. As
explained in box 5.4, the nature and type of innovations and
technologies influence both absolute growth and welfare
gains as well as the distribution of welfare gains between producers and consumers. Agricultural innovations and growth
driven by business interests not only open new growth
opportunities but are likely to move agricultural development in a different direction. Although innovation generated
by the private sector can be important in securing continued
gains in agricultural productivity, particularly from the agricultural input side (in the form of new seed or chemicals, for
which royalties can be sufficiently protected), the private sector will probably give much more attention to adding value
in agricultural production and production systems. This
emphasis will favor agricultural industry (companies supplying inputs and processing or marketing products) and
possibly farmers as the primary producers, but it could put
poor consumers of staple foods at a disadvantage.
Gender and social equity

Compared to the public sector, private interests are not
equally sensitive to gender or other social equity consid-
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erations, with the risk that a growing role of the private sector could further erode social equity in agricultural development. For example, women make up most of the rural
workforce (70 percent), but in comparison to men, women
still have far fewer resources (land, capital, and access to
knowledge) to carry out their tasks (World Economic
Forum 2011). The growing influence of civil society and
shared responsibility for social and gender issues by the
public and private sector are positive, continuing developments, but on their own they will not ensure that gender
and equity considerations are reflected in agricultural
development. Governments need to incentivize the private
sector and promote and safeguard gender and social equity
in all business development activities, PPP contracts, services, and access to resources and knowledge. Specifically
targeted PPPs can make an important contribution to gender and social equity goals (for an example, see IAP 2 on
the China Technology Transfer Project).

A shared responsibility system with
new roles for stakeholders

A well-functioning society provides a range of checks
and balances to keep the agricultural development agenda in
line with the desired priorities. Many companies have started
to integrate social and environmental responsibilities in their
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long-term business concepts because they understand
that this strategy is important for long-term commercial
success. A balance between private commercial interests
and the interests of society is not attained automatically,
however. It is the product of smooth interaction among
governments, civil society, and the private sector, under a
shared responsibility system (for example, see Henckes et
al. 2004).
While PPPs and business development activities can be
interesting for most countries, these activities are unlikely
to deliver the desired results in the absence of a minimum
level of governance and sufficient control mechanisms in
civil society (box 5.5). A capacity analysis is a prudent step
to take before investing in PPPs and business development in a given setting. The analysis should assess risks
and risk mitigation measures and determine whether
supportive capacity building is needed. To work well, a
shared responsibility system requires a high level of transparency, sensitization, and sufficiently effective mechanisms for society to influence policies as well as private
sector decisions—conditions that are anything but perfect
in most countries.
Market distortion

Market failure is the main justification for public sector
interventions, but efforts to address market failures often

distort markets unduly. Two key questions need to be
answered: First, is public investment justified? Second, what
is the right amount or level of support? The generation of a
public good is a necessary condition for intervention, but it
is not sufficient justification. Public funds need to generate
additional positive economic net returns that would not
have been generated without public investment. In other
words, the public sector should not pursue investments that
the private sector is likely to undertake on its own. For practical purposes, this determination can be difficult to make,
however. Nor is it easy to determine the right level of public
sector support (box 5.6). TN 1 describes methods for determining additionality.
NEW DIRECTIONS, PRIORITIES, AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR INVESTMENT

Given that business development and PPPs are becoming
important drivers for innovation and growth in agriculture,
policy makers and development agencies need to consider a
range of issues related to supporting partnerships and business. Among these considerations, developing a vision of the
priorities and strategic choices related to agricultural development is perhaps the most fundamental. Agriculture provides more than food. It produces essential commodities
that increasingly include energy, environmental services,
and a wide range of social goods. Given that three-quarters

Box 5.5 Consumers Want to Be Engaged

Civil society itself has developed a wide range of instruments to express its interests and preferences and influence governments, development agencies, and private
companies. “Mature and sensitive” societies significantly influence the direction of technology development and business opportunities. For significant numbers of consumers in these societies, the value of a food
product lies not only in its taste, nutritional value, and
chemical and physical properties but in the resources
used to produce it, the impact on the environment, the
contribution to global warming, and the social conditions and safety of farm or factory workers.
According to the 2010 Cone Shared Responsibility
Study, 84 percent of Americans believe that their ideas
can help companies create products and services that

are a win for consumers, business, and society, yet only
53 percent feel that companies effectively encourage
them to speak up on corporate social and environmental practices and products. A majority of consumers
want to be engaged on four key pillars of responsible
business, including how a company conducts its
business (85 percent), its products and packaging
(83 percent), its support of social and environmental
issues (81 percent) and its marketing and advertising
(74 percent). Consumers are prepared to dedicate time
and money to help influence corporate social/environmental practices through surveys and research (70 percent), buying or boycotting a company’s products
(44 percent), or through email, phone, or employee communications (32 percent), among other activities.

Sources: Author; Cone 2010.
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Box 5.6 Additionality Criteria to Use in Deciding Whether to Provide Public Funding

Public investment decisions need to be based on an economic and a financial analysis. The economic analysis
determines whether an investment is likely to generate
additional benefits at minimum rate of return for public capital investments. The financial analysis shows
whether public funds are required at all. It helps to
ascertain, for example, if an investment is unattractive
to private investors, and it determines the level or
amount of public funds needed (the share of public
grants or level of subsidy, for example).

Additionality is a key consideration in programs to
support private sector development. Certainly companies will enjoy public support and will give any
assurance to donors that they would not have
invested without such support. This assertion needs to
be proven. Especially in matching grant programs, the
risk is high that public funds will simply replace
private funds. This substitution is not only inefficient
but disturbs and biases competitiveness among producers or businesses.

Source: Author.

of the world’s poorest people live in rural areas, agricultural
development goals are often torn between delivering lowcost food using increasingly scarce and more expensive
resources and providing income for poor farmers. Effective
partnering and business development must be guided by a
vision for agricultural development that sorts through these
issues, sets priorities, and makes strategic and often difficult
choices.
The roles of the public and private sector must also be
defined clearly. Business-driven agricultural development,
combined with PPPs, will require a definition or redefinition
of the roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors. Many governments already find it challenging to define
and implement clear policies of what the public sector
should do in relation to the private sector. Ministries of
agriculture and their subordinate institutions often still
engage directly in enterprises related to agricultural production, such as input supply or food processing facilities. They
will need to reassess these enterprises with a view to facilitating participation by the private sector and partnering
with private entities.
A fundamental role of government is to create conditions
enabling the private sector to generate economic growth
through innovation and the development of new businesses. The lifeline of an enabling business environment is a
strong legal and institutional framework capable of protecting investors and intellectual property. Module 6 gives
examples of strategies to develop an enabling environment
for agricultural innovation.
The public sector also intervenes actively in supporting
private sector development through business development
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and advisory services, business incubators, technology
parks, and cluster development. Formal technology transfer
mechanisms, such as intellectual property protection and
legal agreements that transfer property rights to commercial
or international partners, are becoming critical to engage
effectively in PPPs and disseminate technology through
market channels. TTOs are an interesting option, especially
if they are affiliated with research organizations or universities or host incubation services—in other words, if they
focus on nurturing businesses that aim at commercializing
technology.
Working in isolation, public institutions and private
companies are less and less likely to address global, regional,
or even local agricultural development challenges. New
partnerships need to be encouraged, from global strategic
partnerships and alliances to innovative PPPs and individual stakeholder partnerships. Such partnerships need to
shift from being ad hoc initiatives to becoming a strategic
element of the agricultural development agenda.
With the growing diversity of partners and institutional
arrangements, the demand for more innovative funding mechanisms is growing as well. The significant experience with
some of these mechanisms, such as competitive research
grants and matching grants, can be built upon; at the same
time, new applications for other funding mechanisms, such as
risk capital funding, are beginning to emerge.
MONITORING AND EVALUATING INVESTMENTS

Tracking and attributing the results of a business innovation or partnership program is highly challenging. The
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particular challenges relate to the timeframe, complexity of
the processes, great array of stakeholders, and external
influences. Key aspects of M&E include clarifying the
program’s objectives, identifying appropriate indicators,
establishing appropriate M&E arrangements, following
common monitoring practices, and evaluating impacts.
For complex business innovation or partnership programs, a multistage grouping of indicators may be useful.

For example, the PAID framework includes process indicators (P), used to track the first stage of a program; action
indicators (A), used to track activities and inputs provided
by the program; investment indicators (I), used to track
investments and co-investments by the private entities
receiving support; and delivered results (D), used to measure
final outcomes.4 Table 5.3 provides examples of indicators
for designing monitoring systems.

Table 5.3 Possible Monitoring and Evaluation Indicators
Program type
Type
Process
indicators

Action
indicators

Investment
indicators

Delivered
results

Indicator

Grant

PPPs

Incubator

Cluster

Analytical activities (competitiveness, availability of infrastructure, capacity
of institutions)
Memoranda of understanding
Agreed schedules and levels of participation (including aspects of gender or
other social equity)
Other milestones in process for designing and establishing a business support
scheme (for example, private sector mapping)
Technical assistance provided
Completion of strategies
Completion of action plans with responsibility split among representatives
Delivery: Number of subprojects terminated within a year after the planned date
Success rate: Number of subprojects that have achieved the planned milestones
Punctuality: Ratio of realized and planned time for subproject execution
Length of subproject cycle (number of months)
Number of incubatees supported
Outsourcing for efficiency: Share of contracted research within subproject activities
(percentage of total)
Additionality of resources attracted by mechanism (from clients, government,
private sector, and partners)
Business formation: Number of new business registered
Value of newly registered capital
Accessed financing during the incubation process
Business retention: Percentage of graduates staying in the community
in which they were incubated
Business success: Percentage of incubator graduates staying in business
National and foreign investment attracted
Factor productivity (crop yields, labor productivity)
Trends in natural resource degradation (soil erosion rates)
Social rate of return to research (percentage)
Absolute and relative poverty rates (percentage)
Scientific quality and spillover benefit (publications, citations, peer evaluations)
Increase in the value of sales, farmer value-added, the quality of produce of farmers
engaged in partnerships
Increase in the income/profitability or competitiveness of target actors
(agribusiness, farmers, and others)
Increase in innovation (technical, organizational, and other) among the target actors
Public return on investment (e.g., tax revenue versus public spending)
Sector or subsector growth rates
Employment

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

Sources: World Bank 2010; World Bank 2009b; author.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 1

Foundations for Public-Private Partnerships
Josef Ernstberger, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

overnments and bilateral and multilateral development agencies are engaging the private sector to
deliver a range of services traditionally delivered
by the public sector. Such PPPs involve new arrangements
under which governments obtain services through contracts
with direct payments or various forms of subsidization.
PPPs are also increasingly valued as a means of unleashing
the private sector’s capacity to generate innovation in the
rural sector. This note discusses the opportunities and constraints of PPPs, including their institutional settings, the
capacities and skills on both sides, partnership arrangements (especially the need for contracts that clearly define
outcomes and ensure accountability), and the need for
independent supervision and monitoring of PPPs.

G

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) bring the complementary skills of the public and private sectors to a program or
project in which each partner has a different level of involvement and responsibility, with the objective of providing public goods or services. These partnerships leverage the
strength and reflect the interests of the individual partners.
These partnerships are not intended primarily for business
development, for which business development programs are
a better alternative, but for bringing about a public good
outcome in partnership with the private sector. The public
sector is interested in cooperating with the private sector to
use technologies, capital, and know-how and (ideally) to
benefit from the comparatively greater flexibility, innovative
capacity, and efficiency of private companies. For the private
partners, the incentive is generally that the collaboration
opens an interesting new line of business.
PPPs in agriculture mainly target opportunities for environmental, social, or equitable growth. They range in scope
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from cooperating on an individual project, to generating
ideas and innovations in a specific field or for a specific purpose, to major strategic alliances that address major concerns in the development of the agricultural sector.
PPPs implemented through individual development projects
are characterized by a relatively clear and specific expected
outcome or service for which the private partner provides
know-how and technical solutions. In infrastructure projects
this kind of arrangement is generally known as a “designbuild,” “design-bid-build,” or “design-build-operate” contractual arrangement. For example, an IT company may be
invited to develop and implement a tailored search engine
for a local Internet-based agricultural extension system.
When PPPs are used to generate ideas and innovations, the
public sector defines more or less specific fields and objectives in which it seeks progress (environmental health, social
welfare, agricultural growth, and so forth) and issues a call
for proposals to public and private entities, who submit
their ideas for collaborative work to generate the desired
innovations. The proposals are submitted for review, and if
they are selected for funding, the public and private partners
implement the programs.
Strategic alliances usually involve long-term cooperation
(ten or more years), multinational companies, or groups of
companies. Examples include the development and introduction of minimum social and environmental standards
for agricultural or forestry products, fair trade arrangements, and similar ambitious programs.
In agriculture, PPPs are more promising in some areas
than others. They can be quite effective for introducing
environmental and/or social production and processing
standards, which then become national and sometimes even
international standards (box 5.7). Examples of collaborative
projects that subsequently resulted in national legislation
include projects on standards for organic and fair trade food
production, control of child labor, and the protection of forest biodiversity.

Box 5.7 A Public-Private Partnership to
Implement Labor Standards in Asia

Many international companies produce goods in
developing countries where international labor
standards are not followed and in any case are
challenging to monitor. A public-private partnership run by GIZ and Tchibo GmbH engages workers in factories in Bangladesh, China, and Thailand
in implementing the International Labour Organization’s core labor standards and improving working conditions. Since the project started, 13 local
training providers have acquired the specialized
knowledge and tools to advise suppliers on setting
up company structures for dialogue and implementing social standards. Forty firms are taking
part in the pilot, and the number is rising. All have
designed and implemented action plans, including
plans for electing staff representatives, avoiding
forced labor, and reducing overtime.
Source: GIZ 2009.
Note: GIZ = Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit.

PPPs have also helped governments or development
organizations direct innovation toward specific areas of
public interest. Governments or development organizations
either acquire innovations directly from the private sector
or, through competitive research grant schemes or idea
competitions, challenge the private sector to pursue innovative ideas and technologies of public interest. Efforts could
be as specific as identifying a solution to a particular plant
disease or as general as improving energy use in agricultural
production systems. (See table 5.1 in the module overview;
see also module 4, IAPs 2 and 3, for examples from India
and Chile.)
A number of countries have started to use private organizations or NGOs to provide specialized services (such as
agricultural advisory services) that public agencies once
provided. Development organizations have turned to commercial or noncommercial NGOs to deliver extension or
training to farmers or train cooperatives and agricultural
processors. For more detail, see module 3.
With technologies and production processes becoming
more complex and technically demanding, governments
increasingly use private sector capacity for regulatory controls and enforcement. Partnerships have been formed with
leading enterprises or specialized private companies and

laboratories to regulate biosafety hazards, control animal
diseases, detect genetically modified ingredients in food,
and enforce restrictions on seed imports or exports, among
other activities.

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS
AND INVESTMENT NEEDED

Countries require a governance framework that brings
together the capacities for designing and executing PPPs. In
most countries, line ministries or lower-level government
institutions execute PPPs, which may require public officials
to master new skills. They must know how the private sector operates and design collaborative programs accordingly.
They must assess the risks and incentives that make collaboration attractive and do not waste taxpayers’ money. They
need skills to negotiate and manage contracts, and to avoid
disturbing markets, they need to be able to assess the longterm implications of their partnership programs for industry structure and competiveness. A new way to provide these
capacities is to establish PPP units within cross-sectoral
ministries such as finance or planning (Dutz et al. 2006).
These units can operate in several ways. For example, they
can provide information and guidance to other government
departments for designing and preparing PPPs, provide
advisory support and funding to line departments or agencies, or directly approve PPPs.
The execution of PPPs entails numerous steps, beginning
with the selection of private sector partners. For most PPPs,
specially convened committees—whose membership comes
from government and the private sector but should not be
dominated by the government representatives—select the
private partners. Depending on the nature of the partnership envisaged, the committee may also include farmers
or representatives of farmer organizations, agricultural
education, extension, or NGOs. Competitive application
and selection procedures are common. The objectives of the
partnership program, the conditions for application, and
the funding arrangements are publicly advertised. One or
more rounds of proposals follow. In evaluating proposals,
the selection committee often calls upon additional expertise in the form of a technical expert group or individual
experts. These experts might prepare a short list of candidates, but the final decision remains with the committee.
After selecting the private and public partners, it is a good
practice to formalize the partnership through a contract or
signed memorandum of understanding.
Generally PPPs are managed by project implementation
units established for this purpose and supported by a
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secretariat with appropriate technical and administrative
capabilities. Every PPP also requires a framework for M&E
to ensure that the program is on track and make adjustments as needed. It is vital for the partners to agree beforehand on the M&E framework and the practical arrangements for implementing it. The framework must be flexible
enough to handle an unpredictable timeframe and outcomes, given that many of the key variables will have a significant amount of uncertainty. An independent but mutually accepted monitoring agency or organization should
implement the framework.
Particularly in the agricultural sector, PPPs require supplementary funding to build capacity in most or all private
partners. Capacity building can extend from the application process to proposal development and program implementation.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

As mentioned, the major benefits of PPPs derive from
using the complementary strengths of the public and private partners to:
■

■

■

■

Attain efficiency gains. Many public goods can be delivered by private partners more cost-effectively, especially
if contracts are output oriented and give the private partners the flexibility to identify the most cost-effective
technical solutions.
Mobilize resources and investments. PPPs have significant potential to mobilize additional resources and funding. Sometimes only limited or even no public funds are
needed to trigger significant private investment (box 5.8;
IAP 3).
Develop innovative solutions. PPPs can encourage the
private sector to come forward with creative ideas.
Reduce risk. Transferring part of the project risk to private
partners can be one of the key benefits of PPPs and result
in better control over public spending, the service delivery
time frame, and quality of service. Output- or deliverybased payments can be effective for reducing risks.

POLICY ISSUES

PPPs often require the public and private sector to redefine
their respective roles and responsibilities. This issue requires
particular attention from policy makers. Many governments
already find it difficult to separate the functions of the two
sectors; they may subsidize private enterprises without clear
justification or operate what appear to be commercial agri-
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cultural ventures such as plantations or seed companies. For
these reasons, PPPs can aggravate rather than resolve uncertainty over what each sector should properly do.
Many PPPs also suffer from a lack of suitable public institutions and legislative arrangements. Donor programs often
bridge this gap by setting up their own program- or projectspecific implementation units and operational manuals.
While project-specific arrangements may be necessary, as
long as an overall institutional and legislative framework is
lacking, it will be challenging to implement PPPs as a regular feature of government procedures and programs.
As discussed, poorly designed PPPs can easily distort
markets, and many PPPs probably do so. Major market distortion occurs when public funds are invested in activities
that the private sector would pursue in any case (crowding
out private investment) or when private companies participating in PPPs achieve an unfair and unjustified market or
production advantage over their competitors.
To attract public investment, private companies tend to
emphasize their social or environmental responsibility, but
their ultimate (and legitimate) interest is to generate revenue. PPPs will remain sustainable and private partners
will meet their obligations in the long run only if this
interest is appropriately factored into partnership arrangements acceptable to all participants. The simplest PPPs use
public funds to pay private enterprises to deliver public
goods. More complex arrangements pay for the delivery of
public goods by incorporating the price of the public
goods (such as social or environmental services) into output prices.
Although PPPs can reduce the gap between technology
development and adoption and make public research institutions more effective, responsive, and demand driven, they
do have risks. Private interests can supersede public interests
in public research agendas. Governments can lose the public
research capacity that is critical for developing technologies
that may not be commercially attractive but are in the public interest.
LESSONS LEARNED

The experience with PPPs can be distilled into guiding principles to help practitioners develop and invest in partnerships while avoiding problems such as market distortion and
poor sustainability. Over the years, important lessons have
been learned about which private enterprises and farmer
organizations make successful partners for the public sector and which strategies work best for selecting them. Issues
related to contracts, the partnership’s time frame, the
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Box 5.8 A Public-Private Partnership to Conserve Genetic Resources in China

The Chinese government maintains important genetic
stocks for animal breeding at a number of stations
throughout the country. In Anhui Province, the government contracted a medium-scale company engaged in
pig breeding and processing to protect an endangered
pig variety called Wei Pig, which was close to extinction.
The company undertook to commercialize the variety
as a niche product while continuing with its mainstream
pig production business. The market strategy for Wei
pig involved a special “near nature” production process,
in which poor, small-scale farmers in mountainous
areas raised pigs under contract for the company, which
operates a breeding center that also functions as a park

for visitors. The higher prices of meat from these pigs
compared to conventionally produced pigs reflect the
higher costs of the more environmentally and socially
oriented process used to produce them. The government provided a share of the initial financing for the
company and its contract farmers. This partnership
made it possible to close a government facility and
sustainably protect genetic resources without public
funding, once the cofinancing ended. The partnership
succeeded owing to a combination of private technical
know-how and experience, an innovative business and
marketing concept, and significant private financial
resources, complemented by public startup funds.

Source: Author.

capacity gaps that may need to be filled, and arrangements for
M&E are also important to consider before the partnership
begins. Details of these guidelines, lessons, and issues follow.
Guiding principles for partnership

Guiding principles for PPPs involve the clarity of their political objectives, potential mutual benefits, additionality,
competition and transparency, and sharing of risks and
responsibilities:
■

■

Consistency with political objectives. The public partner
must clearly define the larger political objective that
motivates the partnership. For example, government
may want to stimulate agricultural growth as an instrument to address rural poverty and reduce increasing
income disparities in a society (equitable growth). It may
want to protect specific natural resources and future
livelihood systems (such as forest products for traditional medicine), support specific vulnerable groups (by
improving labor conditions, promoting pro-poor
growth, or improving gender equity). It may want to bolster national food security.
Mutual benefits. As discussed, all partners must benefit
sufficiently from the partnership to honor their commitments for as long as required. The public sector benefits
if the PPP proves to be effective and efficient at generating the desired public goods. Benefits to the private
sector can be indirect (for example, its participation will

■

■

■

improve its reputation by demonstrating social or environmental responsibility), but in most cases the desired
benefits are legitimate financial profits. It is important to
understand the benefits required by all partners to prevent the partnership from being abused. For example, the
real incentive for private partners may be to gain closer
ties to government to pursue a hidden agenda such as
influencing political decisions or obtaining an unfair
advantage over competitors.
Additionality. Public funds should support PPPs only
when the private sector would not undertake a similar
activity to achieve the same outcome, either on its own or
as required by law.
Competition and transparency. Like other forms of
public investment, PPPs must give all competent private
partners an equal opportunity to compete for the
business opportunities supported. Setting priorities for
funding, selecting partners and programs, allocating
resources to partnerships, implementing and monitoring
partnership programs, and all other decisions must be
transparent.
Sharing risks and responsibilities. In PPPs the commitment of partners is generally demonstrated by an appropriate sharing of risk and responsibilities. A major difference between PPPs and traditional public contracts such
as infrastructure contracts is that the participating private companies contribute financial and/or human
resources (for example, through cofinancing, matching
funds, and other arrangements).
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Selecting the right partners with the right capacity

The financial and managerial strength and experience of
private partners are important for the success of partnerships. As mentioned in the module overview, PPPs have to
be clearly distinguished from programs to support SMEs:
SME development focuses on the enterprises themselves
by helping them to become fully established or providing
venture capital, but PPPs focus on achieving public good
outcomes. Partnerships with financially strong, experienced companies are more likely to succeed in delivering
those public good outcomes efficiently and reliably. As discussed in the module overview, properly constructed PPPs
do not support weak business with lucrative public contracts; nor do they weaken the public sector’s or donor
agency’s focus on poverty. These problems can be avoided
if the public sector performs due diligence and thoroughly
assesses prospective partners beforehand on the basis of
minimum criteria related to their financial strength, management capacity, and demonstrated ability to deliver the
kinds of public goods required.
Farmers can be effective partners in PPPs and improve
their impact in rural communities, yet very few farmers
have the capacity to perform in PPPs without some form of
assistance. Most PPPs involving farmers have a strong component for organizing farmers and providing the skills they
need to perform their role in the partnership. Partnerships
with farmer organizations work best when the organizations have a clear and narrow interest or focus. For
example, water user associations have become strong public
partners in many countries and have successfully assumed
traditional public service functions. Farmer-managed grazing associations or other natural resource management
organizations have successfully regulated access to and use
of common resources.
Farmer organizations are increasingly important commercial partners, given that the most efficient agricultural
value chains emanate from a strong, organized producer
community. Forming these organizations will help to balance the power among the partners and is practically the
only feasible way for government and companies to interact
with producers, because organization substantially reduces
the cost of interacting with large numbers of smallholders.
Preparing the way for successful partnerships

The administrative steps in selecting partners and implementing programs were discussed earlier. The next points
describe practical steps to lay the groundwork for successful
partnerships.
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■

■

■

■

For PPPs, the public good outcome is the primary objective,
and it must be clearly defined (an innovation, an environmental or social service, the performance of a traditional
public service by a private partner, and so on). Confused
objectives are a common defect of many programs,
which fail to clarify whether their primary objective is to
support or develop businesses or to deliver specific public goods.
Clearly define the criteria that a private partner must meet
to participate, especially the type of partner (private
company, farmer group, and so on), legal status (perhaps
farmer organizations must incorporate to participate),
size, previous experience, and technical, financial, and
managerial capacity.
Clearly specify the contribution expected from each partner. Contributions can take many forms: financial
resources, human resources, risk-sharing arrangements,
sharing of innovations, or access to confidential or internal information (financial data, income, cash flow, technical processes). It is rarely in the interest of companies
to share information related to innovative technologies,
business concepts, or financial status, but if this information is necessary to achieve the partnership’s objectives,
this requirement must be very clear before potential
partners apply for funds. This point reinforces the earlier
point that absolute clarity at the outset can prevent conflicts from derailing a partnership.
Provide transparent information on modes of public
financing and decision making. Information about the
size of and conditions for public financing is generally
straightforward. The problem lies more with the lack of
clarity over government procedures and the time they
require. Private companies are especially frustrated by
complex and lengthy public procurement procedures
and bureaucratic clearances, but if they are aware of procedural requirements beforehand they may cope better.

Contracts

Like any business relationship, each PPP should be based on
a signed contract between the partners, usually representatives of the government partner, company, and farmer organization, as relevant). At a minimum, the contracts must:
■

Define each expected outcome, the corresponding indicators (measurable and conducive to monitoring), and
time-bound targets. This level of specificity may seem
challenging for PPPs intended to develop innovations,
because of the organic nature and unpredictability of the
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■

■

■

process. The intended outcome is already clear, however,
for specific partnerships based on a proposal to provide
an innovative business idea, technology, or public good
or service, and the partners need to be assessed against
their progress in achieving that outcome.
Specify the resources committed by the partners, along
with a detailed financing and implementation plan.
Include a monitoring framework with agreements on the
monitoring arrangements and contract supervision by
an accepted third-party monitoring institution or individual (see the concluding part of this section).
Define the exit strategies and follow-up arrangements (as
discussed next).

Exit strategies and sustainability

PPPs generating social or environmental goods may end
once a good has been delivered, or they may need to continue for as long as the public good is required (ideally
without public support). For example, if the social or environmental value of a particular good becomes a critical
part of the marketing concept (as with many organic and
fair trade products), the level of commercial interest may be
sufficient for the government to withdraw public support.
If the partnership pilots environmental technologies or
social standards that are eventually embodied in mandatory
regulations, they will be sustained if compliance with regulations is assured.
PPPs generating innovations require an exit strategy
based on transferring and adopting the innovation. Many
PPPs are designed to include elements of technology transfer. For example, World Bank-supported grant programs in
Albania and Armenia required PPPs to earmark a certain
percentage of funds for publicizing and/or transferring their
innovations to farmers or small businesses. Because it is not
in the interest of private companies to share innovative ideas
or new technologies with potential competitors without
compensation, future ownership of any innovation developed by the partners and any obligations to share information must be spelled out in the PPP design and clarified in
the contract. Many arrangements have been developed to
protect financial and other incentives to share technology
and information.
PPPs that shift public service provision to private partners can be sustained by institutionalizing partnership
arrangements. For example, private partners can be organized and authorized to collect user fees, which must be high
enough to assure financial sustainability and/or maintain
the business interest of the private partner. Many water-user

organizations have used this kind of arrangement once initial public support for their activities ends. Private food
quality testing laboratories receive a fee for performing
public-service functions.
Capacity building

A precondition for involving farmers in PPPs is to form
organizations and equip the members with the skills to be
effective partners, as discussed earlier. Aside from needing
to acquire management skills and an understanding of
managerial procedures, farmer organizations may also
require training related to agricultural production and processing, quality standards, participating in adaptive
research, testing technology, and providing social and environmental services. The best practice for PPPs is separate
supporting activities in capacity building very clearly from
the actual funding of PPPs. One option, for example, would
be to include capacity building as a separate component of
the project.

Monitoring and evaluation

If a PPP encompasses more than a single project, the M&E
system should provide information corresponding to several levels of activity. First, at the level of individual projects
(often called “subprojects” when they are part of a large program that funds numerous small projects), the M&E system
should provide information on adherence to contractual
arrangements and outcomes from each subproject. Second,
at the program level, the M&E system should provide information on the program’s processes, outcomes, and attractiveness. Third, at the policy level, the M&E system should
generate feedback on the program’s broad effects on economic growth (the causal link between the program and the
resulting innovation and factor productivity) and wider
social benefits.
Project or subproject level. As mentioned, project-level
M&E combines contract supervision as well as outcome monitoring and evaluation, and it should be done by an independent, third-party M&E institution that is acceptable to
all partners. The basis for M&E of individual projects (subprojects) is established when partners enter the proposal
development and approval process. No proposal should be
approved for funding unless it possesses a set of clearly
defined objectives linked to measurable and monitorable
outcome indicators and time-bound targets. The indicators
should distinguish between the public good objectives (such
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as the provision of an environmental or social good or an
innovation for scaling up) and the financial or commercial
objectives (such as target figures for production, sales, or
income and benefit sharing). These detailed indicators and
targets are included in the contract between the individual
partners. The contract also specifies detailed input and output parameters, such as the financial and other resources
that the partners have each committed to provide.
Program or project level. Program/project-level M&E
should aggregate the achievements of individual subprojects
and devote most of its attention to examining the effectiveness and efficiency of the PPP program. Many programs
report outstanding achievements of individual subprojects
but offer very little information, for example, on whether
the program proved attractive for investors, partners, and
beneficiaries; on any design flaws that emerged; or on
whether investments were taken up slowly or quickly. Few
programs use “with-program” and “without-program”

scenarios to assess their effectiveness, because designing
control groups or control scenarios is difficult. Program
M&E should also provide information on the overall use of
funds, factors driving the use of funds, and mechanisms for
delivering funds. All of this information will improve how
similar projects are designed and implemented.
Policy level. Some of the most difficult issues in monitoring and evaluating PPP programs relate to whether and to
what extent a PPP program has influenced overall economic
growth, whether it experienced or caused interference with
other parts of the economy, what its wider social or environmental implications (positive and negative) may have
been, the sustainability of its impacts, and finally the policy
measures that should be taken as a consequence of these
findings. The list of failed government interventions in the
private sector is long, and the effects have sometimes been
significant. On the other hand, sound analyses of the effects
of PPPs will be invaluable for formulating policy (box 5.9).

Box 5.9 The Importance of Policy-Level Monitoring, Evaluation, and Analysis

The economic effects of public-private partnerships
(PPPs) can be very large. For example, many governments responded to skyrocketing energy prices by
launching programs to generate and support innovations in renewable energy. Some of these programs
related to biofuels have had far-reaching consequences
for agriculture and food production that remain controversial and are not yet completely understood.
Another example of the economic effects of PPPs comes
from China, where the government promoted PPPs
(among many other strategies) to develop a modern
dairy industry. The result was an enormous overstimulation of milk production. The subsequent collapse of
the dairy market and bankruptcy of many producers
was accelerated by scandals over contaminated milk but
was probably inevitable, given the inappropriate level of
market interference.
Most PPPs will not have such vast economic effects,
because they are small and locally confined, but the
positive or negative macroeconomic and policy implications even of small programs should be analyzed
and understood. Policy-level M&E and analysis are

also important for determining whether PPPs are the
right instruments for achieving certain objectives (for
example, taxes or regulations could be used instead of
PPPs to induce compliance with social or environmental goals).
Policy-level evaluations of PPPs can also determine
whether more extensive policy measures might be warranted. For example, the China Agricultural Technology
Transfer Project supports a number of PPPs with private
companies to develop and test new technologies for
manure treatment. Cattle manure treatment plants of
different sizes, using different fermentation processes,
are being tested in Heilongjiang Province; special technology to treat duck manure was developed in Anhui
Province. Aside from introducing and testing technical
solutions, partners in these projects are analyzing their
commercial and financial parameters to learn, for example, how the competitiveness of the livestock industry
would be influenced if manure treatment were to
become mandatory. In other words, aside from stimulating technical innovation, these PPPs are preparing the
ground for decisions about future policy measures.

Source: Author.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 2

Innovation Funds
Josef Ernstberger, Consultant
Riikka Rajalahti, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

his note summarizes experiences with the two
main mechanisms used to fund agricultural innovation, competitive research grants (CRGs), and
matching grants (MGs). It offers lessons and guidelines for
designing and implementing innovation funds, drawing on
information and analysis published in World Bank (2010).
That report primarily analyzed experience with World Bank
investments, but the lessons are relevant in other contexts.
The decision to use a grant scheme to fund innovation and
the choice of scheme require a rigorous decision on the
objective, which must be embedded in a strategic vision of
the innovation system. CRGs are often used in the larger
context of agricultural research system reform programs.
MGs tend to work best when combined with complementary investments (infrastructure, financial services).
Significant costs can be associated with setting up and
administering a grant program, and the cost-effectiveness of
procedures to keep overhead low must be balanced against
the need to ensure accountability and transparency of operations. Funding priorities must be set with stakeholders,
who should participate in the governance of the grant or
program and provide continuous feedback on implementation. Transaction costs associated with participation in a
grant scheme may be significant and reduce the pool of private applicants. Grant recipients are often not adept at fulfilling M&E requirements and will benefit from specific
training and hands-on support.

T

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Institutional core funding from public resources has been the
most common means of funding research and innovation,
as many core research activities require long-term support.
Core funding also facilitates the development of integrated
research programs to address major problems, commodity
needs, or geographical areas. Many core research activities,
such as plant breeding, have only one research provider, so

competitive funding is irrelevant (World Bank 1999a). Institutional core funding does not easily lend itself to innovation processes that engage diverse stakeholders, however,
even though much innovation can result from tapping the
vast pool of creative ideas they possess. In many instances,
those ideas never translate into innovation because the
incentives and human and financial resources that enable
collaboration and innovation are lacking.
To compensate for this failure, many countries are using
innovation funds in the agricultural sector to strengthen
innovation-promoting links among public institutions,
private entrepreneurs, and other actors, such as groups of
rural producers. These funds—often in the form of grants—
create platforms for innovative activity by providing incentives to improve research collaboration and quality. They
complement traditional core funding allocated annually to
specific public research institutions to pursue their core
research agenda.
Competitive research grants (CRGs) fund research based
on national competition and scientific peer review. Transparent procedures are used to select the proposals that will
receive funding, based on rigorous criteria. Grants can
accomplish objectives that may be difficult to achieve
through core funding, such as innovation in specific areas of
research (perhaps through adaptive on-farm research projects that require organizations and farmers to work
together) or innovation in a target region. If they are well
designed, grants can bring greater contestability to the innovation process; the funding may not necessarily flow to the
traditional recipients. Grants can promote research partnerships, leverage research resources, and help develop a more
efficient, demand-driven, and pluralistic research system by
involving clients in setting priorities and financing, executing, and evaluating research (World Bank 2009, 2010). For
an example of using competitive grants to promote multistakeholder collaboration in India, see module 4, IAP 2.
Matching grants (MGs) can be used to finance research but
increasingly promote near-market technology generation,
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technology transfer and adoption, private economic activity, and overall innovation, often by including multiple
stakeholders. By focusing greater attention on demand and
use from the very beginning, basically by attracting users of
technologies and knowledge in partnerships (and requiring
a matching commitment), MGs may be more effective than
CRGs at enhancing the use of technology and knowledge by
farmers and other entrepreneurs. Funds from the granting
organization (usually a public agency) are matched with
funds from the beneficiary. Table 5.4 compares the three
financing modes.
The use of MGs in particular warrants caution. They
should be used for public good investments, such as generating technical or institutional innovations with positive
economic, social, or environmental externalities or reversing market failures. They can thus be used for addressing
knowledge gaps and reducing the risk for investment when
the market fails to produce a necessary or desirable good,
but at the same time other public sector instruments may be
more effective and less costly.
The following list indicates when grants may or may not
be a good choice (van der Meer and Noordam 2004; Donovan 2006):
■

The lack of public goods such as infrastructure, legislation, or information. In this case, the appropriate solution is to invest in these public goods. It will not help to

■

■

■

■

■

give grants to reduce the high costs of production caused
by their absence.
The lack of economies of scale. No single enterprise is
large enough to make the lumpy investments needed to
overcome this problem. In this case, grants do not automatically help, although it may help for governments to
support collective action for making lumpy investments.
High risk, arising (for example) from the long gestation
periods for certain investments, political instability, lack
of transparency in government policy, or natural disasters. Private insurance schemes can handle some risks,
and governments should first deal with any deficiencies
in their own policies and performance before considering grants.
High costs of protecting property rights. In general, governments should establish and protect property rights
and provide subsidies (grants) only where the costs of
enforcing those rights are too high.
Lack of commercialization of the economy. In such an
economy, the development of financial services is especially slow. Grants should not be used in these cases for
subsidizing credit, but they may be justified for training,
developing management information systems, or helping
to expand rural outreach of credit providers and install
new technologies.
Lack of technology, information, or trained staff. Grants
may be useful to solve these problems.

Table 5.4 Comparison of Competitive Research Grants (CRGs), Matching Grants (MGs), and Core (Block) Funding
Issue
Primary
objectives
and activities

Key stakeholder

Capacity
requirements
for success

Cost sharing
Overhead and
transaction
costs
Incentives for
partnership
Sustainability

CRGs

MGs

Basic, strategic, and adaptive research
(and extension)

– Demand-driven, near-market technology
development, dissemination, and adoption
and overall innovation processes
– Private sector activity, including agribusiness
and productive partnership creation
Primarily research system actors, increasingly
Farmers, private sector, NGOs, research
also private sector
institutes, extension services, other service
providers based on objective
– Requires a critical mass of staff and a steady
– More flexible with capacity requirements
operational budget to allow true competition
of participants or the administrative burden
and result in improved research quality
– Business understanding, ability to partner,
– Capacity to compete and administer
and monitoring and evaluation requirements
(including technical review) crucial for success
great
Limited, due to ownership issues
High for demand-driven activities
Significant, due to management and monitoring
and evaluation
Fair, depending on criteria

Varies; can be significant depending upon the
degree of decentralization of the program
and the overall purpose and actors involved
High

Limited unless complement long-term funding

Limited unless complement long-term funding

Source: Authors, adapted from World Bank 2010.
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Core (block) funding
Long-term strategic
research and
institution building
and strengthening
Public research
organizations
Little additional capacity
required

Limited to in-kind
resources
Low or nonexistent

Limited
High

INVESTMENT OR ACTION NEEDED

A number of investments and actions are needed for innovation funds to perform successfully. They are briefly
explained in the sections that follow. See World Bank (2010)
for detailed explanations and examples.
Establish a fund for financing projects

A grant scheme requires a fund that provides financing for
the selected subprojects. The fund is usually situated within
a ministry of agriculture and managed and disbursed to the
winning participants by the fund secretariat (which is independent of the ministry). The actual size of the fund
depends on the anticipated portfolio of subprojects (that is,
the size of subprojects, the size of the grant subsidy, and the
anticipated number of subprojects). Successful grant
schemes supporting subprojects may range from several
hundred dollars for small farmer groups and initiatives to
more than US$1 million.
Establish rules regulating the terms of
the competition and implementation

Transparency of management, institutional arrangements,
eligibility of applicants, projects and expenditures, selection
criteria and processes (calling for proposals, approval, contracting, disbursement, financial management, audits, procurement, safeguard management requirements, and M&E
procedures) are the most critical elements for a successful
grant scheme. Significant preparatory work is required to
identify and define appropriate operational procedures.
Conduct a communications campaign

Successful grant schemes require a rigorous awareness raising and communications campaign, managed by the grant
administrator (secretariat), targeting the potential applicants. A communications campaign (either a nationwide
information campaign or a more targeted marketing
approach) guarantees that potential grant applicants learn
about the innovation fund and related capacity-building
opportunities. Communications campaigns may use diverse
means, such as mass media, a specific Internet site, and/or
more targeted communications (such as stakeholder meetings and face-to-face contact).
Build capacity of participants and service providers

Most grant schemes need to build capacity in grantimplementing units (related to the role of implementing

units, communication, administrative procedures, and
requirements of the grants), potential applicants (understanding the procedures, proposal development, partnering,
financial management, and M&E), and potential service
providers (proposal development skills, technical skills, and
M&E capacity).
Establish a governance and management system

Grant schemes require effective governance and strong
management. A good practice is to maintain separate units
for policy setting, technical evaluation, management, and
impact evaluation. The main governing responsibility
resides with a governing board (sometimes also called an
“advisory board” or “coordinating committee”). Table 5.5
describes the typical governance and management structure for a grant scheme. Grant schemes require a secretariat to handle day-to-day administrative functions such
as communication, processing, coordination, and M&E.
The capacity and placement of the secretariat is of significant importance for the success of a grant program. The
options range from placing the secretariat within a public
institution managing the fund or outsourcing it to private
or civil society.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The major benefits of grant schemes arise from their
capacity to tap into a vast pool of creative ideas. For
designers and implementers of grant schemes, the emerging innovations (technological and organizational) are one
of the most exciting and often surprising features. By
mobilizing new partners, grant programs facilitate significant opportunities for synergies in technology and institutional innovation development. Some schemes stipulate
particular partnership arrangements, such as companyresearch or company-farmer partnerships (as in China and
Vietnam). In Turkey, a matching grant program helped to
promote scientific and technical collaboration and technology development (box 5.10).
CRGs in particular, with their clear, outcome-oriented
design, can significantly increase the chances that research
will succeed and that research resources will be used effectively.
When grants focus on specific themes or activities, the
approach of inviting proposals provides a good opportunity
to receive the best ideas and select only proposals with a
high likelihood of achieving the desired outcome.
MGs in particular have a strong business orientation
(expectation of revenue) from the outset and result in more
business-driven innovations. Because users determine what
MODULE 5: THEMATIC NOTE 2: INNOVATION FUNDS
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Table 5.5 A Generalized Governance and Management Structure for Grant Schemes
Unit

Composition

Responsibilities

Governing
board

Often consists of representatives of key stakeholders
associated with the grant scheme, such as government,
farmers, agribusiness, and finance. A nonvoting
representative of the secretariat usually participates.

Secretariat

Composition depends on the type and size of grant scheme.
The secretariat should have administrative capacity, including
capacity to manage contracts and procurement; technical
expertise (for example, in agribusiness); and M&E experience.
The capacity and stability of the secretariat are often crucial
for the success of the grant scheme.
This committee may be a subcommittee of the governing
board or may be combined with the technical review
panel described below.
Often composed of 3 members selected from a pool of
approved experts, including technical and financial experts.
The size and complexity of the proposals will determine the
number of experts required. Proposals for small subprojects
may require one reviewer, whereas larger or technically new
or more complex proposals may require 2–3 reviewers.
Often managed by the grant secretariat. Appeal decisions are
made by steering committee or governing council associated
with the project or host institution.

Technical
advisory
committee
Technical
review
panel

Appeals body

Responsible for overall program policy. Oversees operations,
establishes program priorities, awards grants, and
represents program with funding agencies. Ensures close
connection between the selection criteria used to evaluate
proposals and the system-level objectives to which the
competitive research grant scheme should contribute.
Responsible for managing programs and carrying out daily
operations. Provides support for governing and technical
bodies and facilitates communications about program
operations.

Provides technical input for planning programs and setting
priorities, advises on peer reviewer selection, and
monitors technical quality of research subprojects.
Responsible for evaluating, scoring, and ranking proposals.
Makes funding recommendations.

Responsible for handling any petitions that may arise from
the decisions by the reviewers or the approval committee.

Source: Adapted from World Bank 2010.

Box 5.10 Getting the Most from Matching Grant Schemes: The Turkey Technology Development Project

Perhaps the most notable legacy of the Turkey Technology Development Project (a US$100-million project
approved in 1991) was the construction of the Technology Development Foundation of Turkey (TTGV).
The Foundation provided funds for Challenge Programs, which stimulate applied research and technology development by industry through a mix of matching grants, income notes, and conditional loans. TTGV
stimulates private investment in the development of
industrial technology by providing seed capital (matching funds) for market-driven research and development (R&D) subprojects in a host of critical industrial
sectors, including agro-industry.

In 1992, TTGV began to cofinance R&D subprojects
in the private sector with the assistance of the World
Bank. Proposals were solicited twice yearly. Of 273 proposals submitted by April 1998, 103 (37.7 percent) had
been approved for funding. The funded projects
elicited US$99 million in funding—US$44 million
from TTGV and the remainder from private matching
funds. The majority of the approved subprojects (84)
were for technology development; 67 of these subprojects had concluded by the time the project’s Implementation Completion Report was submitted in 1998.
A large majority of subprojects funded through those
grants succeeded technically as well as commercially.

Source: World Bank 1999b, 2006.
Note: TTGV = Türkiye Teknoloji Geliştirme Vakfi.

kind of innovation they require, the resulting innovations
often have fewer problems with adoption or transfer. The
innovations must pass the test of commercial usefulness,
which increases the attractiveness and efficiency of the
funds used in such grants.
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POLICY ISSUES

The policy issues related to innovation funds resemble those
for many of the other investments discussed in this sourcebook (sustainability, equity), but special concerns are
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related to the potential fragmentation of the research
agenda and distortion of markets.
CRGs can be an effective component in a portfolio of
funding mechanisms, but they must complement rather
than substitute for long-term public funding for strategic
research through block grants. When institutional block
grants fall below 40–50 percent of the funding portfolio,
the viability of long-term research may be compromised
(EMBRAPA, IDB, and World Bank 2000). Competitive
grant schemes—either for research or other activities—
may introduce instability into the funding structure of
institutions that compete for grants. Sustainability is also
threatened by the fact that most grant schemes funded by
donor organizations provide financing for only a limited
number of years, and donor-initiated schemes are rarely
mainstreamed into government programs. Inequitable
access poses a challenge for grant schemes, particularly
competitive ones. Grant schemes may be inaccessible for
administrative reasons, lack of capacity to participate, or

limitations inherent in the funding, which could favor particular themes or areas and unwittingly discriminate against
certain groups of applicants (World Bank 2010). In Colombia, MGs were used to incentivize collaboration between
smallholder groups and the private sector (box 5.11). For
other examples of MG schemes, see IAP 2 on China in this
module, IAP 6 in module 1, and IAP 1 in module 6.
The risk of “projectization” and the accompanying failure to build capacity are acute in grant schemes, especially
in CRGs, which do not require the counterpart funding
implicit in MGs and PPPs. Competitive grants may be used
as stopgaps to gain resources that cannot be obtained
through the national research system or financial services.
This inappropriate use of competitive grants yields a set of
ad hoc research projects that contribute to no overriding
research strategy (World Bank 2010).
Finally, many grants by definition interfere in markets as
they try to resolve market failures. As observed, poorly
designed grants can easily distort markets by directing

Box 5.11 Colombia Productive Partnerships Project: Incentivizing Market Inclusion through Matching Grants

The Colombia Productive Partnerships Project creates
favorable conditions for large buyers and small sellers
to establish mutually beneficial and sustainable relationships. It offers matching grants to complement
producers’ own resources and/or funding from other
sources (local governments, municipalities, commercial partners). Producer organizations use the grants to
obtain technical assistance and build their capacity (for
example, to meet quality standards, bargain, or
enhance their entrepreneurial and negotiating skills).
Through the grants, producer organizations gain the
ability and incentives to invest in collective goods such
as storage facilities and packing facilities. The grants
also enable individual small-scale producers to invest in
productivity-enhancing infrastructure and gain startup
capital to meet buyers’ requirements. The types of partners have varied: over half have been food processors,
one-third wholesalers, and the remainder supermarkets
and retailers (for domestic and international markets).
By the end of the project’s first phase, of 136 partnerships financed initially, 118 were sustainably operating in a wide range of markets. The average income
of small-scale producers had increased by 77 percent
and their employment by 70 percent. Success varied,
but the relationship between the buyer and producer

was terminated only in 13 percent of partnerships.
A particular set of incentives, infrastructure, and market conditions is needed to create and sustain wellfunctioning, productive partnerships. The key lessons
for success were:
■

■

■

■

A stronger producer organization yielded a more
successful partnership. Social cohesion and business
skills were difficult to achieve and are emphasized
more strongly in the second phase of the project.
A rigorous, transparent, and competitive selection
process ensured the credibility and integrity of the
grant scheme.
Technical service providers as facilitators were fundamental to building trust with the commercial
buyers.
Management and support of partnerships should
be outsourced to local service providers at the end of
the project.

This project was the first World Bank project of its
type in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since its inception, similar projects have been initiated in Brazil, Bolivia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, and Peru.

Source: Collion, forthcoming.
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money to activities that would have attracted private funding anyway and by conferring undue advantages on some
companies at the expense of others (see TN 1).
LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons learned from implementing innovation funds
are briefly and partially discussed here. For a more comprehensive discussion, see World Bank (2010).
The decision to use a grant scheme to fund innovation and
the choice of the scheme require a rigorous decision on the
objective, which must be embedded in a strategic vision of
the innovation system. Weak objectives lead to incoherent priorities and funding rules and an inefficient use of resources.
Caution is advised with CRGs, given the tendency to distort
long-term research agendas and markets (box 5.12). No shortterm grant scheme can substitute for long-term funding for
research, private sector development, human resource development, or infrastructure maintenance and development.

CRGs are often used in the larger context of agricultural
research system reform programs. MGs on the other hand
tend to work best when combined with complementary
investments such as infrastructure, financial services, collective action, and market development. They also tend to
benefit from complementary policies that are similarly introduced to provide enabling conditions that make overall
investment more effective, and more attractive to prospective investors.
Significant costs can be associated with setting up and
administering a grant program. Many programs set overhead
costs at 10 percent of the budget, but one analysis found
overhead costs of competitive grant schemes to be 25 percent or more in some cases (World Bank 1999a). The costeffectiveness of procedures to keep overhead low must be
balanced against the need to ensure accountability and
transparency of operations.
Funding priorities must be set with stakeholders, who
should participate in the governance of the grant or program

Box 5.12 Lessons from Competitive Grant Programs in Latin America

Do not just finance research; strengthen the capacity
of research organizations. Competitive funds can be an
important vehicle for financing research, piloting new
ways of working, or focusing research on new topics,
but they are most likely to make a sound and lasting
contribution when they complement a relatively strong
public sector framework for research. Public funding is
essential for agricultural innovation systems. Private
funding complements rather than substitutes for
higher levels of public funding.
To compete for funding, research institutions
require a minimum core budget and critical mass of
staff. All institutions need some core funding to maintain and improve their physical and human resources.
The sustainability of the public research apparatus and
competitive funding alike will depend on continuous
public funding. Grants usually fund operating costs
over two to three years. A grant model is unlikely to
flourish in a climate of fiscal austerity because there is
only limited scope for private funds to substitute for
public money.
The competitive fund model is more likely to
strengthen the strongest agencies providing research
and extension than it is to reduce disparities between

the strong and the weak. Competition between alternative service providers breaks down when the range of
providers is limited and many potential providers lack
the skills to prepare viable proposals.
The competitive model itself has not spurred large
growth in the role of the private (for-profit) sector as a
provider of agricultural research and extension, but it
has contributed to the broader process of private sector development. Commercial firms have played a
smaller role as providers relative to public and private
nonprofit agencies. To the extent that commercial firms
have played a role, they have largely done so outside the
framework of competitive grant schemes. On the other
hand, under the competitive schemes, through the
medium of subproject copayments, producers have
provided private funds as a complement to public sector grants; they have received training in the preparation of business plans; and they have become more
market-oriented owing to partnerships with producer
associations that have been facilitated by competitive
funding agreements. In this sense, the competitive fund
model has contributed to the broader goal of private
sector development without entailing a major role for
commercial firms as service providers.

Source: World Bank 2009.
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and provide continuous feedback on implementation. Qualifying stakeholders to fulfill these vital roles entails an investment in capacity building, as discussed earlier.
Board composition and transparency of activities require
careful attention. Boards can easily be taken hostage by one
interest group that skews decisions in favor of its constituency at the expense of others (World Bank 2010). The
capacity and institutional location of the secretariat is also
crucial (box 5.13).
If the absorptive capacity is low, grant schemes will have
fewer participants, lower-quality proposals, and a tendency
to favor well-established research or private business entities. In CRGs this situation will limit the chances for innovative ideas, and in MGs established businesses may abuse
grants to strengthen their business positions and dominate
a market.
Calls for proposals can target an entire nation, specific
regions, and/or stakeholders. A two-stage selection process,
starting with concept notes and followed by full proposal
development, is recommended to winnow out ineligible
applications at an early stage. Given that most MGs target
farmer groups or enterprises, often all proposals that meet
the minimum eligibility criteria will be funded. A good practice is to carry out a field appraisal before accepting a concept
note for further development. The field appraisal is helpful
for verifying the information and identifying needs for technical assistance (for example, for developing the full proposal). In large and/or new and technically complex projects

that use MGs, a second field appraisal may facilitate progress
with the grant scheme. In some cases eligible proposals are
selected by ranking.
Consider limiting the grant contribution in the overall
business portfolio of an enterprise and in the budget of a
public research institution. Businesses receiving MGs
should not use them as the main source of financing for a
startup business. Grants can easily be abused in this way,
replacing commercial financing (risk or venture capital
funding) or core public funding.
Transaction costs associated with participation in a grant
scheme may be significant and reduce the pool of private applicants. To retain applicants’ interest in a grant scheme, the
secretariat needs appropriate administrative and communication skills. Procedures for application and implementation need to be as streamlined and clear as possible. Simplified procurement methods (shopping or commercial
practices) are often more suitable for business grantees,
since it is in their interest to use funds efficiently. Tracking
and documenting the outcomes of innovation funding are
too often neglected in grant schemes, yet a sound M&E system enables grant schemes to identify and address problems
as they arise. Specialized M&E personnel can be employed
in the grant secretariat; the responsibilities can be outsourced to independent experts; or a combination of both
options may be used. Grant recipients often are not adept at
fulfilling M&E requirements and will benefit from specific
training and hands-on support.

Box 5.13 Recommended Options for Grant Program Secretariats

■

■

An existing public institution, such as a ministry or
local government agency, can generate additional
political buy-in, institutional sustainability, and
leverage. The same public institution may also be
the key stakeholder within the grant and innovation
system and provide a higher chance of sustainability
or institutional mainstreaming. Disadvantages arise
from the tendency of such institutions to be bureaucratic, interfere politically, and lack commercial acumen and understanding.
An existing private entity that brings an aptitude
for business and less bureaucracy but could be
affected by conflicts of interest or unwillingness to
meet donor requirements (procurement and fiduci-

■
■

■

ary practices or social/environmental safeguards,
for example).
Creating an autonomous public/private unit.
Using the services of a NGO when independence
and flexibility are most important and local capacity
is very low. NGOs bring knowledge about donor
requirements but may entail higher costs, problems
with long-term institutional sustainability, and a
lack of business acumen.
If outsourcing to a competent body is not feasible, it
is usually best to provide sufficient capacity building
to the staff of the hosting organization, and/or supplement it with technically and administratively
appropriate staff.

Source: Authors.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 3

Accelerating the Development of Agribusiness
Enterprises by Using Business Incubators
Seth Ayers, World Bank Institute

SYNOPSIS

his note explores business incubation as a mechanism for effectively and sustainably accelerating
the growth of startup enterprises that bring innovative technologies and services to market. Typically
startup enterprises face a number of challenges in growing,
including the lack of technical assistance, appropriate
financing, networks of partners and customers, and infrastructure. Business incubators have effectively supported
the growth of enterprises across many sectors, including
agriculture. Although the number of agribusiness incubators is limited, interest is growing in expanding them and
learning from experience in other sectors. This note summarizes experiences with two agribusiness incubators and
offers key lessons learned from others around the world,
including business plan development (for example, a tenyear financing and sustainability plan) based on a detailed
market assessment and structuring an effective management team.

T

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Especially in emerging economies, SMEs play a major role
in economic development. Formal SMEs contribute up to
45 percent of employment and up to 33 percent of GDP in
developing economies; these numbers are significantly
higher when the estimated contributions of SMEs in the
informal sector are included (IFC 2010). Enterprises are
particularly important for generating innovations in
response to market demand.
For these reasons, creating links with business development is one of the most important challenges facing
agricultural innovation in developing countries. The agricultural sector has consistently struggled to bring new technologies, services, and business models to market at a scale
that can have substantial impact. Efforts have been limited
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by many factors, including the difficulty of coordinating
the diverse partners required to develop and deploy new
technologies successfully; market failures that discourage
private investment; lack of access to financing; limited
engagement of end-users in product development; and
poor alignment of complementary roles for the public and
private sectors (Boettiger and Alvarez 2010). It is critical to
find effective ways to help SMEs to sustainably scale up their
operations.
Business incubators occupy the space between mechanisms
such as business development services (BDS), technology
parks, and other platforms for business development. The
core of business incubation is a focus on emerging enterprises. Services can range from mentoring to seed financing
to influencing policies (box 5.14).
Since 2000, as awareness of their usefulness has grown,
the number of business incubators has expanded substantially in developing countries.1 Countries such as Brazil and
India have established large domestic networks of incubators, facilitated by a national association. Table 5.6 provides
Box 5.14 Services That Incubators Can Provide

■

■

■

■
■
■
■

Capacity-building, training, and mentoring
services.
Technology testing, demonstration, and certification facilities.
Technology transfer and IP policy advisory services.
International networking and collaboration.
Policy advocacy and market intelligence.
Links to investors and other financing sources.
Infrastructure (IT and office facilities, for example).

Source: infoDev (www.infodev.org).

Table 5.6 Business Incubator Typology and Overview
Context and features

Strengths (broad)

Mixed portfolio business incubation
– Targets high-growth firms in a range of
sectors
– May select sectors that align with the
overall regional or national
competitiveness strategy
– May exist in environments with little
entrepreneurial activity

– Can align with regional and national strategies,
germinate new areas of competitive capacity,
and provide a locus for innovation in this
regard
– In environments with little entrepreneurial
activity, may include extensive “pre-incubation”
and education to source entrepreneurs and
businesses

Technology business incubation
– Targets high-growth technology firms
– Can be an economic resource by attracting
– Requires foundation of strong technology
and developing research, skills, and businesses
and human capital infrastructure
– Can develop technology as a new source of
– Where this infrastructure and human
competitive capacity
capital are weak, may require extensive
pre-incubation activities
– May exist in economies in transition
Business incubation with university relationships
– Frequently the university or academic
– Opportunity to bridge the gap between
institution has a role as founder and is
research and commercialization or
a source of resources such as research,
technology transfer
expertise, space, and/or funds
– Access to intellectual property and the
– Typically targets technology firm,
potential to develop competitive businesses
but may work with other sectors
from it
– Often provides financial stability for incubators
Agribusiness incubation
– Targets firms in the agricultural sector
– Can often have significant economic and
– Aim is to commercialize innovative
social impact by improving the livelihoods of
practices or transform sector firms from
communities
slow growth to growth
– Can have an agritechnology focus and focus
on commercialization

Challenges (broad)
– Where new competitive sectors are under
development, time to achieve impact and
scale may be long
– Where there is little entrepreneurship,
attracting clients with high growth
potential can be a challenge; it may not be
possible to operate at the scale necessary
to support the incubator’s business model
– May be challenging to scale businesses
beyond seed stage because of lack of
financing and difficulties entering
international markets

– Can create “cultural” tensions if academics
seen as good researchers but poor
managers or if the university is seen as
too bureaucratic or risk-averse

– Requires both business and community
development skills
– May be challenging to enter markets
beyond local communities

Source: infoDev, “Incubation Models,” http://www.idisc.net/en/Page.MEIA.Incubator.Models.html.

an overview of the types of business incubators that can be
deployed in different markets.

■

INVESTMENT NEEDED

The incubator must be designed based on market demand,
which is reflected in a detailed ten-year business model that
outlines how the incubator will be sustainable. In establishing a business incubator, the main issues and areas of
investment include selecting the appropriate model, establishing a successful management and governance apparatus, and accumulating the appropriate physical assets.2
The broad choice in selecting which type of incubator to
develop is between a mixed-portfolio incubator and a sectorspecific incubator, such as an incubator for technology or
the agricultural sector (subsector) (table 5.6). For the agricultural sector, both models can be relevant and can support
businesses that provide services, products, or new technologies contributing to agricultural innovation.

■

In a mixed-portfolio model, the incubator will incubate a
business in any sector, pursuing any business activity
from technology to agriculture, as long as it believes that
the business is scalable. (Scalability is key to ensuring that
the incubatee will be able to pay for rent, services, and
possibly royalties.) A mixed-portfolio incubator is often a
more appropriate choice in developing countries, because
the pool of scalable SMEs in a specific sector is limited,
and a sector-specific model is not viable without a substantial and ongoing subsidy. For examples, see Fundación
Chile, which is a unique, one-stop business incubator, and
Technoserve of Mozambique, which leverages BDS to
transform entire sectors (infoDev 2011).
A sector-specific incubator is appropriate if there is a
sufficient pool of clients (incubatees) and demand for
agribusiness development. It will be important to leverage other actors in the sector, including well-established
enterprises that can be potential clients for the enterprises being incubated. For examples, see box 5.20 on
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■

Rutgers University later in this note and infoDev (2011)
on Fundacion Jalisco in Mexico.
A technology-oriented incubator is particularly appropriate when technology transfer and commercialization are desired. In that case, the incubator supports
actors (often affiliated with research centers or universities) in commercializing a technology. For an example,
see box 5.19 on ICRISAT later in this note and infoDev
(2011) on CENTEV/UFV (the Federal University of
Vicosa in Brazil).

The choice of business model determines how the incubator will sustain its operations—in other words, what
types of services the incubator will offer to attract the targeted clients and generate revenue.3 Broadly speaking, three
revenue models have been developed for different business
incubation environments (box 5.15). Most business incubation environments will combine elements of each model.
For agriculture, revenue from tenants and other clients,
complemented by public support, may be the most appropriate model, as used in the Agri-Business Incubator.
As with any business, a key factor for the success of
business incubator is strong leadership and management,
which can develop a sustainable business plan, adjust the
plan as needed, and ensure that business meets the desired

objectives (infoDev 2009). A committed and skilled manager can guide entrepreneurs through the development
process and act as their on-site management counselor.
This person should have business experience, the ability to
analyze the issues facing client entrepreneurs as they
develop their businesses, the ability to develop networks
that will serve clients, and the ability to work with stakeholders to retain their support for the program. Box 5.16
describes typical staff and tenant levels.
In a business incubator, the board of directors provides
strategic guidance to management and helps build complementary relationships in the community where the incubator operates. The board is composed of representatives
from the management of the incubator (often the incubator
manager) and from external partners, including those
that provided the financial and material resources to establish the incubator (Medeiros et al. 1992). Board members
should be selected from every area in which the incubator
has needs.
Finally, the physical assets associated with an incubator
range from the availability of IT equipment to real estate
with sufficient space for the incubator office, offices for
incubatees, and other services/equipment. The level of
physical assets is determined by the business model, client
pool, and incubator type. The two most common choices

Box 5.15 Key Features of Revenue Models for Business Incubators

Revenue from tenants and other clients. Rent (40–60+
percent) is the most common source of revenue in this
model, but fees for the business support provided
(business incubation fees) and for the use of facilities
and other services can be just as important. Hot-desking fees (renting a desk and computer connected to the
Internet by the hour) can be important for broader
incubation models. This model is financially self-sufficient, given that the incubator relies on “free” buildings,
has minimum economies of scale, and often has anchor
tenants.
Revenue from sharing in clients’ success. This
model is based on small equity positions or royalty
agreements on gross sales and brokerage fees on raising
finance. For example, ParqueSoft in Colombiaa requires
clients to pay 20 percent of their sales as commission.

This model can help ensure the incubator’s sustainability while aligning both the incubator and client business to growth of the business and its revenue. The
model requires stakeholders to have a long-term vision,
because it can take ten years to develop revenue streams
that will sustain operations into the future. The model
also requires managerial sophistication, a welldeveloped business environment (to form and protect
an investment), and functioning capital markets (if it
relies on brokerage fees from finance raised).
Ongoing government or donor funding. A longterm commitment from government, a donor, and/or
other organization finances the incubator. This model
is potentially risky, because it has no additional revenue
streams. If funding is discontinued, the incubator is
likely to close.

Source: infoDev’s Online Incubator Toolkit (www.infodev.org/idisc).
(a) Described in box 5.21.
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Box 5.16 Typical Numbers of Incubator Staff
and Tenants

The typical incubator will have 20 or more client
companies (tenants), some of whom may be virtual
clients who are not physically located in the incubator but receive technical assistance and other services. A building of about 2,000 square meters
should easily handle 20 tenants. At a minimum,
staffing should include a manager with business
experience who has been trained in incubator
operation, possibly an administrative assistant, secretary/receptionist, and at least one business counselor who provides technical services directly to
tenants. A minimal maintenance staff is probably
also required, but numbers will vary by location.
Source: infoDev’s Incubator Toolkit (www.idisc.net).

are to establish a stand-alone business incubator in an existing building or use a complementary organization already
in operation to house and operate the incubator. The
ICRISAT incubator, for example, is housed within the
ICRISAT facility, which offers both physical space and access
to new technologies and equipment.
POLICY ISSUES

The policy issues4 that arise most often with business incubators include their sustainability, the public sector’s role
in creating an environment in which business incubators
can operate successfully, and adapting incubator models to
address social concerns.
Sustainability is a key factor in designing the business
model for an incubator. The design must consider the
potential client pool (what is the existing market for
prospective tenants?) and mix of services that will create a
sufficient income base and cover operating costs.
The more business-friendly the market environment is,
the more likely a business incubator is to succeed. The World
Bank’s annual Doing Business report ranks countries based
on the extent to which their market environments facilitate
common business operations and transactions. The report
and corresponding website (www.doingbusiness.org) provide recommendations for creating a supportive market
environment for business, including business incubators.
Specific policy instruments that governments can use to
support incubators include tax incentives and early-stage

soft funding such as grants (for an example from India, see
box 5.17). Since most incubators operate as nonprofit
organizations, the public sector can play an important role
in providing physical space for the incubator as well as
financing to cover operating costs.
Business incubators can target specific sectors such as agriculture or certain segments of society, such as women entrepreneurs. Incubators that have a specific focus may require
additional public support, given that they aim to serve a small
subsegment of the market and not the market as a whole,
which means that they are more challenging to sustain. In
Tianjin, China, an incubator for women’s businesses has had
considerable impact on the growth and sustainability of
enterprises that women own and manage (box 5.18).

BENEFITS

The benefits of business incubation range from direct
financial benefits in terms of tax revenues to significant
improvements in SME sustainability, through which new
technologies, services, and business models can be delivered and scaled up. In addition, business incubators raise
awareness of entrepreneurship. They create a cluster of
entrepreneurial activity around a particular sector, such as
agriculture, as the incubator becomes a primary point of
contact for actors working in the sector.
The National Business Incubator Association (NBIA),
based in the United States, estimates that over 7,000 incubators operate around the world, with more than 1,100 in the
United States alone (of which 94 percent operate as nonprofit organizations). In the United States, the impact of
business incubation has been well documented (University
of Michigan et al. 1997; Knopp 2007). For example, every
US$1 of public investment in an incubator has yielded
US$30 in local tax revenue; 84 percent of incubator graduates stay in the community where they were incubated; and
87 percent of incubator graduates remain in business. The
economic impact and investment return from business
incubators, as demonstrated by the experience in the
United States, indicates the opportunities for agriculture,
particularly in developing countries, to use business incubation for developing and mainstreaming new agricultural
technologies.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PRACTITIONERS

The experience gained from using business incubators in a
number of settings, within and outside agriculture, offers
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Box 5.17 The Government of India’s Incentives
to Support Business Incubators

■

■

■

Incubators and small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) that are clients of incubators are
exempt from service tax and corporate tax.
Foreign equity ownership of incubated SMEs
can be as high as 100 percent.
Seed funds for SMEs (US$230,000 per fund)
are managed by selected incubators.

Source: Department of Science & Technology, Government of India (http://dst.gov.in).

countries without a substantial subsidy. To sustain their
operations, most incubators in developing countries must
operate as mixed-portfolio incubators by providing services to scalable SMEs in all sectors.
An example of a successful sector-specific incubator is
the agribusiness incubator located within ICRISAT in
Hyderabad, India (box 5.19). The incubator benefits not
only from a large market but also from the substantial pool
of R&D available to be commercialized (see IAP 1 for
details). The incubator played a key role in building a business around a new seed technology and providing shared
equipment for processing sweet sorghum into ethanol.
Develop a comprehensive business plan
that captures lessons and evolves to
suit changing needs

Box 5.18 The Tianjin Women’s Business
Incubator

The Tianjin Women’s Business Incubator (TWBI) is
China’s first women’s incubator, started with a grant
of US$300,000 contributed by infoDev, a building
contributed from the Tianjin Municipal Government, and a cash investment from the Tianjin
Women’s Federation along with three other local
government authorities. As of 2009, TWBI worked
with 48 on-site tenants and 10 off-site tenants. At
that point, the incubator had graduated 16 companies, creating new jobs for more than 3,000 people; assisted 2,000 women entrepreneurs to obtain
microfinance; and provided business training to
more than 20,000 entrepreneurs. Operating near
full capacity, TWBI has almost reached financial
self-sufficiency through charges for office rent,
business services, and external training courses.
Source: Author.

many useful guidelines on incubator design, management,
and finance. They are summarized in the sections that follow; practitioners interested in developing their own incubators will also want to make use of the resources listed in
the references for more comprehensive advice.

As noted in the case study of the Rutgers Food Innovation
Center (box 5.20), preparing a comprehensive business
plan, including a seven-year financing strategy, was essential
to success. The Center’s iterative approach to design and
implementation allowed it to test the business plan before
investing substantially in building the center. Incubator
development must allow for iteration; ideally, the investment should permit modifications over time.
Incubator management and board must be strong

Strong management will attract clients and help the incubator become viable. For example, a key aspect of the business
model used by iPark, an incubator in Jordon, was to recruit
successful (serial) entrepreneurs to bring a mix of entrepreneurial experience to the incubator. iPark maintains a strong
management relationship with tenants, pursues a flexible
approach to solving problems, and recognizes that the incubator will not succeed if its clients do not succeed.
As an incubator evolves, it may need to change the composition of its board.5 Management must determine which
skill set will be most useful in enabling board members to
support the incubator’s operations. For instance, in many
developing countries access to finance for SMEs and incubatees is a significant issue. Therefore, many incubators
select Board members who represent local banks as way to
sensitize these banks to the challenges that incubatees face
in accessing capital.

Choose the right incubator model for the context

As discussed, in a few markets, particularly in middleincome and larger economies, sector-specific incubators
are viable, but they will not be viable in many developing
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Ensure access to finance for clients

Figure 5.1 shows that enterprises require different amounts
and types of financing (for example, more patient capital
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Box 5.19 The Agri-Business Incubator@ICRISAT

The Agri-Business Incubator@ICRISAT (ABI), launched
in 2003, estimates that its various programs have benefited more than 40,000 farmers. ABI is an initiative of
the International Crops Research Institute for the SemiArid Tropics (ICRISAT) in partnership with the Department of Science and Technology (DST), Government of
India. It promotes technologies developed exclusively by
ICRISAT, jointly developed with collaborators, or agricultural technologies developed by R&D centers of
excellence, universities, and other institutions. ABI
develops agricultural enterprises by providing various
services and facilities:
■

■

■

Entrepreneurship development. ABI offers entrepreneurs support from concept to commercializa-

tion, with a focus on seed ventures, biofuels, and
farm systems solutions.
Technology commercialization. ABI is a platform
for commercializing technologies developed by
public institutions through the creation of agribusinesses. ABI also facilitates the commercialization of
technologies and services that have been developed
by entrepreneurs and benefit the agricultural sector. Products and technologies incubated by ABI
include sweet sorghum for ethanol production,
insect-resistant transgenic cotton, and pesticide-free
crops produced through organic farming.
Services and facilities. ABI offers technology consulting, business development, and training services,
as well as office space, laboratories, and agricultural
land to test new technologies and services.

Source: Agri-Business Incubator@ICRISAT.

Box 5.20 The Rutgers Food Innovation Center

The Rutgers Food Innovation Center, based in New
Jersey, provides business and technology expertise to
small and midsize food and agribusiness companies in
the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast regions of the United
States and, through its outreach capacity, to food and
agribusinesses throughout the world. The Center created over 1,000 new jobs by incubating new businesses
and over US$200 million in revenue growth for clients,
in addition to millions of dollars in local tax revenue. It
has assisted more than 1,200 companies and entrepreneurs since it began operations in 2000, including:
■

■

■

Farmers and agricultural cooperatives desiring to
create new businesses based on value-added agricultural products and/or developing new markets for
their existing commodities.
Startup food companies coping with challenges
such as financing, technology, regulations, market
development, and infrastructure requirements.
Existing small and midsize food companies seeking
to access new technologies, upgrade quality assurance

■

capabilities, enter new markets, train their workforce,
and expand and improve their operations.
Retail and food service establishments seeking to
improve their operations and purchase locally
grown New Jersey products.

An extensive feasibility study in 1999 helped identify the prospective client base. The center developed
a detailed business plan based on significant primary
and secondary market research, a national benchmarking study on best practices in food business
incubation, a comprehensive strategic plan, and a
seven-year financial pro forma. Based on this plan,
the Food Innovation Center began operations in
2000. A very important consideration was that the center did not begin its program with a dedicated facility
but held back until its program was fully developed.
The center operated out of a rented office for eight
years before moving into a full-scale facility. During
this period it tested its model, fully developed its programs and services, gradually hired staff, and established a network of resources to meet the needs of a
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 5.20 The Rutgers Food Innovation Center (continued)

broad clientele. It ensured that sufficient demand
existed for its services before investing in a building
(funded entirely through grants).
The Center’s facility consists of a Client Services
Area, where clients receive marketing, development,

and analytical support from concept to commercialization. A Shared-Use Processing Area uses an
array of food-processing technologies to produce a
broad range of value-added agricultural and food
products.

Source: Rutgers’ Food Incubator, http://www.foodinnovation.rutgers.edu/incubatorlinks.html.

assistance, only office space is required. If the incubator
also provides office space and shared equipment (office
equipment and agricultural processing equipment, for
example), it needs an appropriate space to house them. If
the incubator plans to offer access to the latest agricultural
information and/or to enable virtual mentoring and collaboration between enterprises, it will need the appropriate
IT equipment. For an example, see box 5.21.

Figure 5.1 Financing Gap for Small Enterprises
Problem areas: banks do not
lend easily and the money
required is too small for the
venture capitalists to consider
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Source: infoDev 2008.

early on)6 at different stages of development. If these
amounts and types of financing are not available in the market, enterprises will struggle to scale, and the incubator’s
impact will suffer. It is important that an assessment of the
financing available in the market is made before establishing
an incubator to determine if financing gaps exist and can be
addressed effectively.

Lessons on real estate investment

The incubator’s client base will determine the array of services and physical assets required, including real estate. The
client base must consist of a relatively large number and mix
of small enterprises, because not all small enterprises are
growth-oriented. The type and number of enterprises will
determine the space, equipment, and other resources
required, as well as where the incubator needs to be located.
If the incubator provides only business planning and strategy
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Lessons related to financing incubators differ depending on
their source of funding. A model based on revenue from
incubatees or from equity may become self-sufficient with
time, and the only continuing support it may need will be
the use of buildings, free of charge or at cost. In more challenging markets, as noted, a proportion of ongoing government funding is likely to be required, especially if the social
and economic return on investment is greater than for other
BDS interventions. The financial strain on the public sector
may make it very difficult for it to afford long-term funding,
however. If a model based on long-term support from an
external donor is considered, it will be important to conduct
a rigorous cost-benefit analysis to compare incubation to
BDS and other business development support mechanisms
before committing.
Business incubators that rely upon rent and client fees as
their main revenue sources cannot, as a general rule, be
financially self-sustainable in commercially leased accommodation or where they pay the capital costs of a building,
unless they have other, substantial forms of support. Generally this support consists of ongoing financial subsidies
by a third party, which can be an unreliable and unpredictable source of funding. It is very hard for business incubators to achieve adequate margins in commercially rented
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Box 5.21 Real Estate and Management Arrangements Associated with Parquesoft Centers, Colombia

Colombia’s network of ParqueSoft Centers comprises
14 incubators situated throughout the country and
managed from a headquarters in Cali. The founder is a
highly charismatic individual who used his expertise
in information and communications technology to
establish ParqueSoft and promote social development
through business creation. More than 270 businesses
participate in ParqueSoft. These interlocking business
entities provide internal as well as external consulting,
marketing, and training support. Member companies
pay a 20 percent commission on each sale to ParqueSoft,
which also receives grants, in-kind donations, rents, and
service fees. This revenue allows ParqueSoft to pay for
advertising, maintain its building in Cali, and cover
other overhead expenses. Local universities provide
office space in each location except Cali. ParqueSoft is

largely self-sustaining, though it must seek grants and
contributions in addition to revenues. Its growth to
14 centers proves it is scalable, and it has required very
limited public sector support other than real estate.
The ParqueSoft brand is known internationally and
is associated with high-quality services. An association
with ParqueSoft allows the startup companies to obtain
larger contracts that are effectively subcontracted to the
member companies. The use of cubicles in ParqueSoft
buildings permits more intense networking and interaction by the companies. Although this setup builds the
ParqueSoft brand and makes each company seem competitive with larger, more established companies, it
should be pointed out that it also diminishes the efforts
of individual companies to establish their own identities and brand equity.

Source: infoDev 2009.

accommodation. They run the risk of either failing financially or having to cut costs until they are really nothing
more than real estate operations. More commonly, business
incubators attempt to rent buildings at a purely symbolic
rate (for example, US$1 per year) or to obtain funds to purchase or construct their own facilities, both of which are
more reliable strategies for securing on-going support.
Taking a small proportion of equity or a royalty on gross
sales for a period can be a very good way for an incubator to
receive payment for its value-adding services once the company being assisted has succeeded (not up front, when the
company is short of cash). This success-sharing strategy
aligns the business incubator’s mission with that of its
clients. Increasing numbers of technology incubators take a
small equity position or negotiate royalty agreements as a
condition for membership in an incubator. Realistically, taking equity applies only to high-growth and generally intellectual property-driven companies, in situations where clear
exit mechanisms (such as initial public offerings or trade
sales) exist. This option makes little sense for most service

companies or for locations where exit mechanisms are
unclear. In that case, royalties may be a better approach.
Business models that rely on sharing clients’ success have
proven somewhat problematic. Returns from the equity position, royalties, and brokerage on finance cannot be relied
upon for financial sustainability in the short term. It can take
ten years to realize returns, and a portfolio of at least 20 companies is required to spread the risk. A high level of management expertise is also required.
Aside from a sound financing model, incubators need to
“walk the talk” and demonstrate high levels of financial management capability to incubated enterprises. Financial management consists of planning, overseeing, and controlling
the incubator funds, whether they are brought in through
services or provided by partners and investors. Mechanisms
need to be developed that allow the incubator manager to
know accurately the amounts available, the needs, and the
investment capacity. Additionally, financial management
should focus on bringing in new sources of funds for the
incubator.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 4

Agricultural Clusters
Florian Theus, World Bank Institute
Douglas Zeng, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

cluster-based approach helps to identify policy
and institutional impediments to competitiveness
and innovation. Through dialogues at the cluster
level, new partnerships can be forged between cluster leaders and various public organizations (such as those working
on industrial development, infrastructure development,
research, innovation, and training) to formulate and expedite policy reforms. Given that developing countries have
very limited financial resources, selectivity and efficacy are
important guiding principles of competitiveness strategies.
Focusing on a cluster approach mirrors these principles,
helps in scaling up to the industry level, and fosters regional
innovation systems. A government may choose to pursue
cluster initiatives along with simultaneous policy reforms,
because the two approaches may create positive externalities
and help government develop a compelling case for policy
reform. Based on a broad range of successful cases, the most
important factors in the success of a cluster program or
initiative appear to be demanding markets, positive joint
action, and institutions capable of moderating and focusing
power imbalances—complemented by the push factors of
education and prior technological knowledge. Perhaps most
important from a policy perspective is the ability to adopt
flexible and coevolving policies designed to foster cluster
emergence, which reflect the development of institutions,
technologies, and firms in a dynamic and self-organizing
process. It is critical to find a balance between carrying
capacities, the institutional setup, and the individual incentive design.

A

CLUSTERS AND THE RATIONALE
FOR INVESTING IN THEM

The cluster approach focuses on networks of production
and value chains rather than on nationwide initiatives to
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foster innovation. Clusters are agglomerations or networks
of production populated by strongly interdependent firms
(including specialized suppliers) within a value-adding production chain as well as service providers and associated
institutions in a particular field. In some cases, clusters also
encompass strategic alliances with universities, research
institutes, knowledge-intensive business services, bridging
institutions (brokers, consultants), and customers. These
entities are linked by externalities and complementarities
and are usually located near each other. Agricultural clusters
often form geographic and sectoral agglomerations of
enterprises (Schmitz 1992). The most dynamic clusters
spring up spontaneously, without direct intervention by
external actors.
Why and when to use a cluster approach

Cluster-based policy aims at removing the imperfections of
innovation systems by enabling them to function more efficiently and avoid coordination failures. A cluster-based
approach is a realistic way to identify the policy and institutional impediments to competitiveness and innovation.
When a critical mass of firms moves simultaneously to
function as an initial cluster, they become an effective vehicle for catalyzing reform. Through dialogues at the cluster
level, new partnerships can be forged between cluster leaders and various public organizations (such as those working
on industrial development, infrastructure development,
research, innovation, and training) to formulate, effectively
sequence, and expedite policy reforms.1 A government may
choose to pursue cluster initiatives along with simultaneous
policy reforms, because the two approaches may create positive externalities and help government develop a compelling case for policy reform.
The cluster perspective provides a number of advantages
over the traditional sectoral approach in both analyzing and
promoting competitiveness, innovation, and innovation

networks. Given that developing countries have very limited
financial resources, selectivity and efficacy are important
guiding principles of competitiveness strategies. Focusing
on a cluster approach mirrors these principles, helps in scaling up to the industry level, and fosters regional innovation
systems. A value chain may be too narrow a domain when
the surrounding innovation ecosystem is underdeveloped.
On the other hand, the national innovation system may be
too broad a domain, and its top-down approach (unlike the
bottom-up approach possible with a cluster strategy, discussed in “Lessons Learned”) would increase the risk of
making mistakes on a large scale.
Clusters versus value chains

While a value chain approach2 can be used in the absence of
a cluster approach, value chains must be supported for a cluster approach to work. Cluster development and value chain
enhancement must go hand in hand if a cluster aims to promote innovation-based competitiveness in developing
countries, where (1) value chains are often very unstructured throughout their segments (transportation, distribution, enabling environment), thus requiring intervention by
numerous stakeholders who cannot resolve these problems
alone; (2) trust among stakeholders is weak, and a special
effort is needed to build social capital; and (3) obstacles
need to be addressed by multiple stakeholders and value
chain segments (USAID 2008).
Spontaneous versus orchestrated clusters

The most dynamic clusters spring up spontaneously, without direct intervention by external actors (McCormick and
Mittulah 2005). On the other hand, agricultural clusters in
developing countries may be fostered by local and/or
national government as well as donor support.
In supporting the transformation of clusters into innovation systems, evidence points to the importance of complementary policies, programs, and financial mechanisms
that can foster new linkages and create opportunities for
sustained growth. Where these links and opportunities are
not established, stagnation and decline in the face of crisis
and challenges often followed (Zeng 2010). Regulatory
frameworks and extension agencies also play important
roles in agricultural cluster development.
It is obvious that cluster development is a long-term,
multifaceted approach that is unsuited to short-term investment projects. External support is often provided during
later phases of cluster development, when clusters have
demonstrated their potential.

ENABLING INVESTMENTS TO SUPPORT
AGRICULTURAL CLUSTERS

The cluster approach involves many actors whose roles are
always evolving, which makes the role of the state complex
and location specific. Roles of the public and private sectors
are becoming increasingly blurred. The private sector in
many developing countries is providing quasi-public
goods, such as training smallholders in the use of technology, instituting quality control, or providing finance
(Larsen, Kim, and Theus 2009). Cooperation and collaboration schemes have been implemented in virtually all
spheres that originally might have been the domain of the
public sector (see the discussion of PPPs later in this note).
Three broad areas of investment are commonly needed
to support the development of agricultural clusters. They
include investment in infrastructure and the policy environment, investment in a regulatory framework, and
investment in formal and informal institutions (and their
coordination).
Importance of improved infrastructure
and policy environment

Cluster programs and investments are effective only where
minimum conditions of macroeconomic and physical stability, hard and soft infrastructure for doing business, and basic
institutions for supply-side functions are met. Government
plays an important role in this regard, often supported by
donors. Economic reforms such as deregulation of domestic
markets, removal of explicit and implicit trade barriers,
ending distortions in exchange rates and taxation, as well as
the development of a sound property rights regime are some
of the measures that need to be taken. For instance, the
Kenyan cut flower cluster succeeded owing to the enactment
of legislation setting up promotional schemes (such as manufacturing under bond, export compensation, and export
promotion zones for horticultural exports), protecting intellectual property rights, and enforcing quality standards
(Zeng 2010). The public good character of infrastructure—
especially the transport, hygiene, and cooling facilities critically important for many food products—makes government and donor involvement imperative.
Regulations, quality assurance, and standards

Local governments often try to improve services and regulations in ways that help to generate business, enable clusters
to operate normally, and maintain dynamic growth. In
addition, governments enact specific regulations, especially
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related to types of investments, product quality, and standards to ensure that products made in clusters have a market future.
Persistent capacity constraints can cause standards and
quality management regimes to fall short of implementation, however. Targeted assistance to governments has
proven successful in removing this constraint. In the Ugandan fish cluster, the government provided leadership and
coordination to develop local standards and, through its
fisheries inspection service, regular monitoring. The development and enforcement of standards helped sustain the
pressure on the clusters to keep up with improved processrelated standards (the same could be done for product
upgrading) (Kiggundu 2005).

Institutions are crucial in agricultural clusters (figure 5.2).
They may be public (state agencies, regional entities on
competitiveness and innovation, and educational institutions, among others) or private (banks, business organizations, and companies) and formal or informal (networks,
learning through transactions with local and external
agents, and so on).

services forestalls process and product upgrading and cluster development. The high risks, uncertainty of collateral,
informality of many SMEs, and high transaction costs
limit financial services in rural areas. Where financial services are available, banks often provide expensive credit
under stringent repayment schedules. Financing innovators and startups becomes extremely difficult under these
conditions.
Developing capacity in financial service providers as well
as their cluster clients (firms) can be an important step in
reducing information asymmetries and risk. Banks benefit
from capacity building to improve credit checks. Firms, on
the other hand, benefit from expertise in developing business plans. The list of mobilizing co-investments may
include commercial bank financing, equity financing, development bank financing, an industry tax or levy, venture
capital investment, government investment, and voluntary
industry investments3 (see the discussion in TN 6 on risk
capital). The approach should factor in the consideration
that venture capital, as cases such as Silicon Valley show,
generally lags behind cluster formation. Venture capital
firms are attracted to new clusters once they show substantial economic activity with the expectation of future profits
(Braunerhjelm and Feldman 2007).

Generating and accessing financial resources.
Throughout developing countries, the lack of financial

Learning and training. Various industry-specific modes
of learning and training—formal and informal—are

The crucial role of institutions

Figure 5.2 Institutions with Crucial Roles in Agricultural Clusters
Public institutions

Private institutions

Line ministries

Business
associations

Business
registrar

Lawyers
Export
promotion

Arbitrators

Investment
promotion

Training institutes
Business service
providers
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IPRs

Innovation and
technology foundations
R&D
Industrial zones

Source: World Bank 2009.
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Market research
agencies

important means of acquiring and disseminating knowledge and technology in clusters, because they influence
the clusters’ potential for innovation and competitiveness.
Modes of learning and training generally include:
apprenticeship, on-site training at suppliers’ factories, onthe-job training, expert contracting, support mechanisms
provided by public institutions, learning through transactions with local and external agents, and learning-bydoing in the areas of production and maintenance
(Zeng 2006).
On-the-job-training, a major mode of learning for hightech-intense clusters, is often absent or insufficient in agroclusters in developing countries. Support programs for
training institutes, expert contracting, and training of masters are means to strengthen training and learning capacity.
For example, in the South African wine cluster, capacity
was improved through the newly created Elsenburg Training Institute, with vineyards and a cellar. Most established
producers exchanged production knowledge through this
institute, which performed a function similar to viniculture
forums and root stock associations (Wood and Kaplan
2006). (See box 5.22.)
Governments can also strengthen major educational
institutions to meet cluster needs. A critical element of curriculum design is to foster links with the private sector so
that the skills of graduates meet the agribusiness requirements of the cluster (see examples in module 2). The same
point applies to research institutes and universities involved
in R&D: They need to focus on applied research and areas
of prime importance for the respective cluster. Finally, location is key to cluster development. As major sources of technology and knowledge spillovers, as well as technology commercialization, agricultural universities and possibly their
incubators are major sites of innovation and thus significant
for cluster development.

Institution(s) for coordination and strategy. Nurturing a coordinating body may be important. Forming competitive clusters requires collaboration among multiple levels
of government, companies, teaching and research institutions, service providers, standard-setting bodies, and private
organizations. A strong coordinating body, usually a public
agency, is needed for that role. Through unambiguous policy
and with the involvement of all relevant actors, a national
competent authority on technological upgrading may provide leadership in organizing background research across
carefully selected sectors, developing standards and performance targets for technological change, and developing
reward systems and support and enforcement mechanisms.
An example is the South African Wine and Brandy Company, which was formed to represent the local wine industry
cluster and to implement the vision of innovation-driven
and market-oriented production and exporting of wine.
After restructuring, it incorporated divisions focusing on
basic and applied research, international market development, and social and political transformation (Wood and
Kaplan 2006).
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Evidence from rural industry clusters in the United States
shows that clusters contribute positively to regional
economic growth and higher wages for rural workers
(Henry and Drabenstott 1996; Gibbs and Bernat 1997).
Because of their proximity, cluster constituents enjoy the
economic benefits of several location-specific externalities
and synergies. A well-developed concentration of related
agribusiness spurs three important activities:
■

■

Institutions of technology transfer, knowledge
generation, and sharing. Progress in technology,
innovation, and product diversity are linked to institutions of technology transfer, knowledge generation, and
sharing, mostly supplied or supported by the public sector or by donors (TN 5). A prime example of best practice and long-term development of such institutions is
Fundación Chile, the key institution enabling technology
transfer to Chile’s renewable natural resource clusters.
Fundación Chile started out as a specialized service
provider and began to incubate companies to nurture a
demonstration effect for new technologies (see module 1,
IAP 3).

■

Increased productivity (through specialized inputs, access
to information, synergies, and access to public goods).
More rapid innovation (through cooperative research
and competitive striving). Nothing sparks productive
innovation better than competition in proximity—
whether technological innovation, as seen in the IT clusters of Bangalore or Korea, or creative innovation, as in
the fashion design clusters in New York and Paris.
New business formation (filling in niches and expanding the boundaries of the cluster map). In clusters, new
businesses form as a consequence of competition,
demand for services, and the attraction of investors; this
dynamic in turn spurs innovation.

The cluster and its location-specific externalities and
synergies accrue a range of benefits:
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■

■

■

■

■

Better and more efficient access to infrastructure, specialized human resources, and inputs, including capital. Firms readily obtain access to vital inputs such as
suppliers, information, technology, financing institutions, and institutions of higher education.
Reduction of costs. Transaction costs are considerably
lowered because of proximity in the cluster. Proximity
offers vital advantages for the agricultural sector in
developing countries, in particular for SMEs. Often
firms can source products and services from inside the
cluster and forgo the (greater) cost of having to
develop or produce the product or service. Costs are
also being reduced through economies of scale and
scope, as in the case of joint marketing and bulk purchasing. Costs related to hiring talented employees are
reduced as well, provided talent is made available in
the cluster.
Access to information and services. Being in a cluster
provides members with preferred access to extensive market, technical, and competitive information that accumulates in the cluster. For example, through a close relationship with sophisticated buyers within a cluster, suppliers
are more attuned to their specific needs. Business organizations and also business fairs function as information
and service hubs; informal day-to-day contact with similar companies plays an equally important role.
Attraction of foreign investment. If clusters are leading
centers for their industries, they will attract all the key
players from home and abroad. In fact, foreign-owned
companies can enhance the leadership of the cluster
and contribute to its upgrading, as experienced in the
Ugandan fish cluster where this function was played by
European firms.
Better recognition and marketing. For small and developing businesses, locating in a cluster near competitors
and related industries may help them to grow, gain
recognition, and attain status more rapidly within the
market. The South African wine cluster is indicative.
Only when a company was established to market wine
for a pool of producers did they gain the clout to export
and market on a large scale. One producer alone could
not have done it.

One cluster often seeds or enhances others as it disperses
activities in the value chain to reduce risk, access cheaper
inputs, or better serve particular regional markets. Exportoriented clusters usually generate above-average wages,
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productivity, and innovation.4 The South African wine cluster demonstrates those benefits and shows how the development of a cluster can spur innovation and economic growth
in an industry (box 5.22).
POLICY ISSUES

With regard to agricultural cluster projects, the most prominent policy issues concern power imbalances, social and
environmental issues, as well as a need to define public versus private sector roles.
Some actors in clusters and innovation systems, such as
SMEs and their associations, can encounter enormous difficulties in trying to grow (Parrilli 2006). The strongest
agents use the market to maintain control over resources
and decision-making and invest in innovative and costly
activities (such as R&D or promotion campaigns) that
strengthen their position compared to weaker competitors. Leaders are needed for a cluster, but programs and
projects need to guarantee equal opportunity of access and
competition with a view to sustaining the cluster. The
commercial interests of a cluster can infringe upon local
communities and their way of life, leading to social tensions and hampering the cluster’s prospects. For example,
social tensions with local residents erupted after cut flower
farms privatized the public beaches used for public recreation around Lake Naivasha (Bolo 2006). Horticulturists
and fishers around the lake have come into conflict over
diminishing fish numbers (Bolo 2006) (box 5.23). Potential externalities have to be factored into policies and programs and should reflect the interests of all potential
stakeholders.
Clusters whose productive processes rely heavily on
natural resources encounter challenges arising from their
side-effects on the production base, growth, or changing
environmental conditions (such as climate change). At the
onset it is difficult to predict the size, concentration, and
output a cluster might attain, but the environmental implications can be severe (box 5.23). A common analytical tool
is an environmental impact study. Scenario-based forecasting is an additional tool to hedge against the potential
problems outlined in an impact study (see module 7, TN
3). A specific challenge to agriculture relates to commonpool resources, in which exclusion of beneficiaries through
physical and institutional means is especially costly and
exploitation by one user reduces the availability of the
resource for others (Ostrom et al. 1999).
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Box 5.22 The Wine Cluster in South Africa: Outcomes and Success Factors

The South African wine industry has grown significantly since the early 1990s in an extremely competitive
global market. Exports rose from 20 to 177 million liters
between 1992 and 2002. Over the same period, table
wine production increased by 33 percent. This phenomenal change came about through a combination of institutional, structural, and market factors.
Two policy initiatives underlay the wine cluster’s
success. First, the abolition of the quota system precipitated a shift toward varieties for which global demand
was increasing. Incentives promoted extensive new
planting and replanting. In 2002, 37 percent of vineyards were less than eight years old, and grape quality
had increased. Second, broad macroeconomic policies
aided the growth of the cluster, including the liberalization of agricultural trade, deregulation, land reforms,
reduction of direct subsidies, and the introduction of a
minimum wage for farmers.
South Africa’s wine producers can be divided into
four segments: established producers, new producers,
cooperative producers, and wholesalers (some of which
produce wine in addition to their primary role of marketing, sales, and distribution). Technical support came
from the Agricultural Research Council (ARC), which is
partially funded by the state. The Wine Industry Network for Expertise and Technology (Winetech) plays

a key coordinating role as the hub of an extensive
network of industry actors and scientists and technicians from the universities and ARC. Winetech serves as
an advisory council to the South African Wine and
Brandy Company (SAWB), a nonprofit company that
represents wine producers, workers, and wholesalers. It
has an explicit commitment to enhance the competitiveness of every aspect of the industry through innovation. SAWB designated the private organization Wines
of South Africa (WOSA) to act on behalf of some 320
South African wine exporters to promote South African
wines internationally. The competitive realities of the
global market reinforced the roles of SAWB and WOSA,
because marketing the country’s brands had become
too big of a job for individual firms.
Greater cooperation and collaboration among producers and other institutions increased innovation and
helped to overcome market imperfections and inefficiencies. Innovation altered marketing, wine-making
processes, the choice of varieties, and production
practices. Producers exchange knowledge through viticultural and vinicultural forums, a root-stock association,
two varietal associations, Winetech, and the Elsenburg
Training Institute. Extensive use of local and international consultants and information about international
market trends was a key component of success.

Source: Wood and Kaplan 2006.

Box 5.23 Environmental Challenges for Cluster Development: Examples from Kenya and Tanzania

Kenya cut flower industry (a scale challenge). Kenya’s cut
flower industry needs water, but the extent to which the
cluster around Lake Naivasha would evolve was not foreseen. Horticultural farms in the lake region have
encroached on riparian ecosystems, leading to pollution
and excessive withdrawals of water from Lake Naivasha.
The lake continues to recede, with a concomitant loss of
aquatic life, threatening the livelihoods of local fishers
and the food supply. The challenge is to guarantee the
necessary inputs into production on a sustained basis
while limiting environmental externalities.
Lake Victoria fisheries (a common-pool resource
challenge). A combination of poverty in the fishing com-

munity, heightened competition, and an ineffective regulatory regime threatened to transform Lake Victoria into
an open-access resource, with dire consequences for fishers’ livelihoods, fish populations, and the quality and
quantity of lake water. Through efforts by the government, international organizations, and civil society, all
stakeholders have been involved in managing the fisheries
resource. Fishers have been involved in planning and
managing fisheries, which is expected to increase their
access to Lake Victoria fisheries and help reconcile the
potentially conflicting goals of sustainable fishery management and the livelihoods of communities that catch
fish using improper gear and methods.

Sources: Bolo 2006; McCormick and Mitullah 2005.
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LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SUPPORTING CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT

In developing a cluster initiative and identifying supporting
investments, practitioners need to know which emerging
clusters have potential and which analytical tools they will
need to develop a program or project. Successful clusters
develop on the basis of specific combinations of capabilities, incentives, and opportunities. It is hard to predict
which of the locations identified in the first phase of this
process will become the dominant location in the final
phase. Policy makers and development practitioners should
promote clustering in sectors that already show comparative advantage (Rodriguez-Clare 2005) rather than distorting prices by promoting the development of sectors with
high clustering potential. It is important to include several
key clusters in the long list of candidates for inclusion in
the initiative. This limits the danger of trying to create clusters where none exist (World Bank 2009).

Identifying emerging clusters with potential

Before selecting specific clusters for intervention, industry
specialists should carry out broad cluster mapping at the
national level. The regional economies in a country are specialized, with each region exhibiting competitiveness in a
different mix of industry clusters. It is very important not to
ignore interdependencies between regions and between
clusters. Cluster mapping will help assemble a detailed picture of the location and performance of industries with a
special focus on the dynamics, linkages, or externalities
across industries that give rise to agroclusters.5
The analysis of emerging clusters begins by identifying
either a driving, export-oriented industry or a fast-growing
“emerging” industry. Export-oriented industries can be identified using the Employment Concentration Factor, an InputOutput model, Cluster Dependency Factors, Specialization
analysis, and the San Diego cluster analysis.6 All are described
in detail in SANDAG (2005) and Goetz et al. (2004).

analyses, which offer more rigorous approaches to the question of where to compete (for details on all of these tools,
see World Bank 2009).
It often is vital to the success of a cluster for a donor
program to help assess the potential of target markets, in
particular those in developed countries. Focus first on
existing export contacts and identify specific buyers.
Include detailed monthly pricing information from United
States and European markets to develop a strategy to enter
market segments offering the greatest opportunities. Focus
initially on customer demand and work back to what value
chains and clusters produce and how they must change to
meet customers’ needs. Agro-industries may have different
market segments, with different demands and competitors; ensure that demand exists not only for the industry in
general but also for the specific product and its value
chain. Demanding markets can also be local markets,
which can serve as an essential first step in the cluster’s
development.7
Benchmarking of the sector is used to examine gaps
between the performance standards of domestic firms and
the standards required by multinationals, new markets, and
new buyers. Cost benchmarking improves the awareness of
internal costs and enables comparisons with competitors. It
also helps in determining which niches may need less
improvement than others and therefore inform product and
market differentiation.8
Value chain analysis can contribute to strategic decisions about which products to target in cluster development. The analytical framework is based on three major
functions in the value chain: source, make, and deliver. In
addition, the chain’s performance is measured, benchmarks
established, and performance gaps analyzed, taking into
account government and market failures.9 Finally, institutional mapping can identify which public and private institutions exist in the cluster and determine which institutions
may be reformed, abolished, or strengthened.10

An incremental approach to supporting and
designing cluster development: some lessons
Analytical tools for developing a cluster
initiative and informing investments

Once potential clusters are selected for inclusion in an initiative, several analytical tools can guide cluster initiatives
and investments. Product and market segmentation will
identify the products and markets in which each cluster
competes. These products and market segments can give
direction to Porter’s five-forces and competitiveness position
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The initial phase of cluster development involves sowing the
seeds of institutional reform, creating new forms of property rights, and setting out strategic programs. It also
involves establishing trust among key stakeholders and convincing them to collaborate (which will also be a continuous
activity). In subsequent phases, the focus shifts to providing
incentives to assist startups, attracting entrepreneurs from
the diaspora abroad back to the country, and developing
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regional clusters, in some cases around special economic
zones (Braunerhjelm and Feldman 2007; Zeng 2010). Many
agricultural clusters might be remote from urban centers,
and linking them to support structures such as banks or
universities will be difficult.
Financing is another major issue in subsequent phases of
cluster development, once startups and investors consider
the basic framework conditions to be in place. As access to
capital and finance increases for firms, they can increase
their activity and productivity. Often, new investors such as
venture capital firms cause new businesses to form, which in
turn may alter the cluster.
A common learning trajectory among firms in developing countries starts off with process upgrading, followed by
product upgrading. For this reason, an incremental
approach to investments and programs seems promising. It
may also be worth focusing first on local markets, if their
potential is high enough, as a first step in upgrading. Early
accomplishments are essential in fostering trust and need to
be incorporated in early action plans. To create such trust,
the project and the cluster should focus on a series of
smaller value chain initiatives that create confidence in cluster activities while addressing constraints to innovation and
competitiveness in various segments of the value chain.
These initiatives may include technical assistance on lowcost production and postharvest handling, observation trips
to see best practices in other countries, technical assistance
for packaging, and trade missions to major international
markets to meet potential clients.
Sequencing, prioritization, and the inclusion of
lead firms. Given limited resources and the ambition to
achieve the biggest impact for the competitiveness of the
agricultural cluster, the major and most urgent areas of
public investment must be identified. The analytical information mentioned above should be combined with market
trend and segmentation analysis to address major shortcomings in ways that support the strategic development of
the cluster.
A parallel dialogue with major industry agents needs to
be initiated, their feedback factored in, and a common
vision built. The outcome should be an informed decision
on where to invest and under what time frame, in line with
the vision for the cluster. It is pivotal to identify stakeholder
leaders when the project is being designed or first implemented and to identify lead firms and make them central in
efforts to improve the value chain and develop the cluster.
Lead firms in successful clusters often spearhead collaborative efforts, interact with government, and attract follower

firms. In projects where lead firms were missing, cluster
development and value chain enhancement encountered
serious obstacles.
In agriculture, most lead firms are major buyers with a
stake in ensuring quality and price competitiveness and thus
an important stake in the production process. Obtaining
strong commitment from a lead firm is not always possible
at the outset, and the implementation team will need to
assess how much can be done to improve the value chain
without cooperation from a lead firm. In successful cases
that exhibited these characteristics, the cluster identified
segments of the value chain where it could work without
active participation from a lead firm, such as promoting
micro or small and medium enterprises or dealing with
environmental issues (USAID 2008). Ultimately, however,
the support of lead firms is required for cluster promotion
and value chain enhancement to be effective.
Guiding principles on targeted public-private partnerships. In agricultural innovation and clustering, PPPs
(discussed in detail in TN 1 and in module 4, TN 2) can be
seen as arrangements that assemble partners with different
skills to generate, adapt, and/or diffuse innovation, build
infrastructure, export and market products, and pool financial resources. Usually PPPs are formalized through contractual agreements specifying the partners’ commitments and
sharing of benefits. Potential partners include regional
industry promotion agencies, research institutes, universities, extension agencies, market promotion agencies in the
public sector, producer associations, and businesses and
individual producers in the private sector. PPPs must satisfy
the condition that overall benefits outweigh the overall costs.
Without this synergy, there is no justification to partner.
Agents that promote PPPs, such as donor agencies, play
a crucial role in motivating potential partners, building
trust among partners, and providing credibility for PPPs in
general (box 5.24). Matching grants are a successful mechanism for making these partnerships work, especially if the
objective is to foster links between markets and the public
sector (see TN 2, the discussion in the module overview,
and World Bank 2010).
Direct and indirect ways of facilitating and inducing cooperation. When collaboration and joint action
provide obvious benefits to all major stakeholders, as in the
South African wine cluster, they may arise spontaneously.
In most cases, cooperation among competing firms and
producers does not occur naturally; it is likely to require
deliberate and sustained action (Wood and Kaplan 2006).
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Box 5.24 Public-Private Partnership Supports Cluster Development in Uganda’s Fish-Processing Industry

After fish exports from Uganda were banned by the
European Union owing to concerns about bacterial
contamination, the government, donor agencies, fishprocessor association, and private firms worked
together closely and swiftly to help the industry improve
its processing practices. Standard operating procedures
were devised for inspectors, and a voluntary code of
conduct on good manufacturing principles for fishprocessing firms was established through the Uganda
Integrated Program of the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UIP-UNIDO) and the
Uganda Fish Processors and Exporters Association. UIP

provided technical assistance to the government for
timely and effective communication with the European
Commission. It identified and paid private consulting
firms (based in Europe) to strengthen the audit systems
of the government’s Department for Fisheries Resources
and train fisheries inspectors as well as quality assurance
managers across all firms that processed and exported
fish. The Lake Victoria Environmental Management
Program, supported by the World Bank, provided duty
allowances, transportation, and other logistical support
critical to implement the revitalized inspection and law
enforcement system.

Source: Kiggundu 2005.

Both the provision of incentives and direct facilitation
(often funded and implemented by the public sector) seem
to be of value in cluster development.
Incentives for joint action can take the form of tax
deductions for dues paid to business associations, access to
infrastructure, or financial resources for firms agreeing to
work together. In Cambodia, a PPP for food processing supported by GIZ enabled five companies producing mineral
water, ice, and soy sauce to upgrade their manufacturing
facilities, machinery, and technology. To receive financial
and technical support, the companies agreed to invite interested SMEs to visit to exchange knowledge, skills, and experiences. As a result of this induced knowledge sharing, there
was more demand than available spots to function as lead
companies, and collaboration in the cluster and industry
intensified.11
Creating value along the supply chain and enhancing collective efficiency in the cluster requires trust among all stakeholders. Direct facilitation by the government and other organizations, including donors and NGOs, is often needed to
stimulate and sustain joint action among key cluster agents
(box 5.25). The “honest broker” role is essential, especially for
uniting small producers and linking buyers and sellers. On the
other hand, project staff must ensure that stakeholders eventually assume this role themselves in the interest of sustainability. Experience indicates that trust can be established more
effectively by creating a flow of successful small activities
(training, initial transactions between small and large producers, and so on) that lead to more significant transactions, such
as joint exporting (USAID 2008).
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Developing capacity in relevant institutions
through technical assistance. As the discussion has
indicated, institutions, public and private, are crucial in
agricultural clusters (figure 5.2). Through targeted programs, training (including study tours), and sharing international best practices, donors play a vital role in strengthening institutions and promoting cluster development. For
example, donor support can improve the capacity of state
agencies in monitoring and enforcing quality standards, as
seen in the example from Uganda in box 5.24. Donors’
involvement may be necessary to help incipient producers
meet complex international standards. Buyers cannot play
this role, because the standards embody specialized knowledge that most buyers do not possess (McCormick and
Mittulah 2005). Adding capacity to an enforcing institution,
and making sure the respective officers (and possibly some
critical buyers) gain the necessary knowledge of sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, appear to be vital components
of cluster development and value chain enhancement in
developing countries.
Donors can also strengthen the intermediary institutions (such as professional and business organizations) that
act as important mechanisms for tapping into foreign
knowledge, coordinating activities in a cluster, and lobbying government. Successful efforts to build capacity have
focused on creating a service mentality, training staff,
establishing proper financing schemes (such as a fee structure), and providing key business organizations with the
necessary infrastructure (including a website). In extension
systems, donors add capacity by training officers to use new
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Box 5.25 A Joint Action Project in Paraguay Improves Competitiveness of a Sesame Value Chain
through the Cluster Approach

Successful joint action for cluster development and alleviating rural poverty occurred under the United States
Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s)
Vende (“Sell!”) project in Paraguay. In 2003, sesame
processors in north-central Paraguay were receiving
orders from Japan and Korea that they could not fill,
because regional suppliers could not provide the right
quantity and quality of raw, industrial-grade sesame.
The processors required a type of sesame that could be
harvested only by hand. Some processors considered
moving their facilities to other countries. Although
sesame farmers and processors distrusted one another
and had never collaborated closely, Vende brought them

together. The project helped them to set clear expectations and develop a realistic understanding of the financial returns to cooperation. It educated participants
about the value chain and players involved. Its emphasis
on increasing sales constantly reminded people that they
were working toward a mutually rewarding goal. After
two years, sesame production had doubled in Paraguay.
Exports for the four processors involved in the program
rose by approximately US$8 million. Thousands of
farmers in Paraguay’s impoverished north-central zone
and elsewhere increased their incomes by growing a
more viable cash crop. Vende technicians are building
local capacity to ensure that these efforts are sustained.

Source: USAID 2008.

methods to explain and demonstrate appropriate technology for cluster firms. In credit institutions, donors can add
capacity by improving credit checks; the financial capacity
of firms will improve if they learn how to write business
plans. Donors may also assist in developing innovative
financial services and credit schemes for banks.
Technical assistance has strengthened institutions and
promoted cluster development by establishing national
standards based on international food standards such as
GlobalGAP. A cluster’s competitiveness and capacity to
innovate particularly benefits from programs that link firms
within value and supply chains in ways that benefit all actors
involved, including small-scale, geographically scattered
producers. Subcontracting schemes are a particularly successful way to link small-scale producers with processors
and buyers. They ensure reliable, better-quality production
for buyers and access to credit, training, and economies of
scale for producers.
Monitoring and evaluation. Cluster M&E begins by
mapping three main areas that require monitoring: the
resources of the cluster (natural resources, firm absorptive

capacity, linkages, and human capital, for example), the
activities to support the cluster (these can be private or
public initiatives or donor programs), and the finance and
funds available. The evaluation should also be designed to
capture lessons on process. Results of cluster initiatives may
not mature for a long time. To deal with the inherent challenges, it could be useful to devise an M&E assessment
similar to the management effectiveness tracking tool used
by the Global Environment Facility.12 The tool categorizes
indicators by context, planning, inputs, processing, outputs, and outcomes, all of which are relevant to agricultural cluster projects. Instead of absolute values, a score is
used, so results can be plotted to facilitate comparison
(for example, across agricultural clusters). The tool can be
applied as a self-monitoring and external monitoring
tool, and it gives immediate feedback and suggestions for
improvement.
Apart from tracking process and results through a sound
M&E system, a good governance framework is needed to
minimize the risks associated with government failure
related to misinformation or capture by the industry/
cluster.
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Technology Transfer Offices: Facilitating Intellectual
Property Protection for Agricultural Innovation
Alan B. Bennett, University of California, Davis
Riikka Rajalahti, World Bank
Andrea Pape-Christiansen, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

echnology transfer is a critical process in transforming agricultural research innovations into
applications for end users. The vast majority of
agricultural innovations in developing countries arise from
publicly sponsored research centers or universities, which
typically are unprepared to engage in formal mechanisms of
technology transfer. These mechanisms may require intellectual property protection and/or legal agreements for
transferring intangible and tangible property rights to other
public, commercial, or international partners. A sustained
investment in capacity building is essential for technology
transfer programs to have an impact. It is critical to assess
whether an institution has a broad base of research assets
and a culture that will support a technology transfer program. If so, investment in a technology transfer office
requires paying attention to: (1) identifying an appropriate
business model, (2) establishing an institutional policy
framework consistent with national laws to clarify responsibilities of the institution and its employees, (3) building the
capacity to address intellectual property protection and to
negotiate legal agreements to transfer intangible and tangible
property, (4) gaining experience to develop business strategies to effectively disseminate technology and work with private partners, and (5) communicating both internally and
externally the aspirations (building appropriate culture) and
successes of the institution in technology transfer.

T

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Agricultural innovations reach farmers largely through
direct transfers of knowledge, agricultural practices, devices,
or seed from research centers to farmers. Extension services
in many countries aim at bridging the gap between public
researchers and farmers. These traditional approaches are
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insufficient in strong market economies and for advanced
technologies that may require a more formal hand-off to
permit commercial development or may require regulatory
approval from governmental authorities. Increasingly, more
formal mechanisms of technology transfer are required,
involving intellectual property (IP) protection and legal
agreements to transfer both intangible and tangible property
for further development and distribution. These new technology transfer requirements prevail within and between
developed and developing countries.
Although it is clear that public research organizations
play important roles in all countries, more developed countries have a strong private innovative sector that is virtually
absent from developing countries. For this reason, public
research organizations in developing countries remain a
primary source of local innovation and are likely to play a
role further along the innovation pipeline. They require
internal capacity to deliver innovations to commercial partners either for further development or for dissemination
through market channels. In most cases, public research
institutions (centers, universities) have focused their programmatic development on scientific research capacity and
not on the development of expertise to engage in the legal
transactions needed to translate their research into applications. Moreover, many public research institutions have historically managed their technology transfer programs by
passively waiting for potential licensees to knock on their
door and seek out new technology.
International technology transfer can be particularly
complex and is highly bi-directional. Advanced genetic technologies are increasingly transferred from multinational private companies to public research centers in developing
countries, at the same time that germplasm or other genetic
resources move in the other direction. These transfers
require carefully balanced agreements to ensure that the

partnership achieves its objectives and that both parties
receive appropriate recognition for their proprietary contributions. Developing this capacity is not easy and typically
requires both educational as well as institutional investment.
This thematic note explores the steps in developing that
capacity in public research institutions by establishing a
technology transfer office (TTO) to assist in the legal transfer of technology. Investing in and building institutional
capacity for technology transfer within a public organization may cover a broad range of activities. These activities
may include the protection and licensing of IP but are more
likely to focus on the support of public/private partnerships,
the development of business strategies, or the transfer of
tangible property directly to commercial channels such as
seed companies or agricultural or veterinary product suppliers. These activities share a range of skills and experience
related to an understanding of intangible and tangible property rights and transfers, of legal contracts and agreements,
and of business activities and strategies that are relevant for
the local region.
The technology transfer function may be addressed in
different manners and must fit local needs and resources.
The four main business models for TTOs are summarized
in table 5.7. For developing countries, a TTO operated
jointly among many institutions (a consortium/network
TTO) may be the best solution to attain economies of scale

as well as a critical mass of research assets and expertise in
technology transfer.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

An effective technology transfer program or department,
based on a proper assessment and policy alignment (see
“Lessons Learned”), requires major investments. The most
important are staff, infrastructure, capacity, and governance.
Staff and site

A TTO will require a general director or manager (usually a
scientist with extensive business experience rather than a
lawyer) who is at a minimum responsible for business development, communication, and negotiation. The office will
also require administrative personnel. The physical assets
associated with a TTO can range from office equipment (IT,
furniture, and so on), an IP library with access to online
legal databases, to real estate encompassing sufficient space
for the TTO.
Minimum training and core skills

Table 5.8 describes the minimum training requirements
for different groups in the institution and IP management

Table 5.7 The Four Main Technology Transfer Office (TTO) Business Models
Independent TTO
department within
an institution
When?

Key benefits
associated
with the
option

Disadvantages

Network-based TTO

When prospects for
technology transfer and
commercialization are
high within one institution
and sufficient resources
allow establishment
– Alignment with institutional
objectives
– Revenue to institution

When individual institutions
lack resources and critical
mass (research base)
but institutional culture
is conducive for
entrepreneurial activity
Sharing of costs and
expertise

Investment requirements per
institution may be high

Requirement for shared
procedures and
agreements on revenue
sharing often challenging

Subsidiary company

Outsourcing

When research and resource
Suitable particularly when
base are sufficient but
institution(s) generate
institutional culture is not
technology suitable for
conducive for entrepreneurial
high-value, income
activity
generating opportunities
– May encourage a positive
perception of technology
transfer and demonstrate
seriousness
– More operational flexibility
and the ability to structure
staff remuneration packages
Lack of alignment with
institutional objectives and
unresponsive to policy
constraints of the institution
such as publication or
conflict of interest

– Minimizes investments and
risks for the institution
– More operational flexibility
and the ability to structure
staff remuneration
packages
Overhead costs (fees) reduce
revenue to institution
Less geared toward
technology transfer for the
broader public good

Source: Authors, adapted from Campbell 2007.
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Table 5.8 Generalized Intellectual Property (IP) Training Needs of Different Groups of Staff in a Technology
Transfer Office (TTO)
Group
Researchers

Research managers
and institution
directors

IP managers

Operations

Minimum training requirement
– Maintaining good laboratory records
– A basic understanding of the types of IP agreements, especially in the context of exchanging research material and
information
– The importance of confidentiality, especially with respect to publishing and delivering academic presentations
– When to disclose IP guidelines and procedures
– The importance of IP management and management functions
– IP protection processes and procedures; the investments required to manage IP effectively (including decisions
required at different stages of IP and research development)
– Implementing IP policies, processes, and procedures
– An appreciation of the role of technology in addressing socioeconomic needs
– Overview of IP management from the generation of IP property to its exploitation and application
– Awareness building
– Understanding of science (understanding of certain fields of science an added benefit)
– Finance: Understanding IP policy guidelines, namely, systems and processes to handle IP payments and receipts
(for example, royalties); the administration of benefits to researchers and the institution
– Human resources: IP policy guidelines and interface with other institutional policies such as conditions of service,
recruitment, conflicts of interest and commitment, and contracting with clients
– Legal services: IP policy guidelines, IP contracts and agreements, understanding what constitutes IP and the different
forms of IP protection, and IP negotiation
– Grant and contract research: IP contracts and agreements, especially clauses regarding IP ownership, and IP policy
guidelines

Source: Pefile and Krattiger 2007.

office. Technology transfer programs will need the
capacity to develop business strategies around new technologies. These strategies can serve as a tool to market
innovative technologies to existing companies or become
the basis for starting new companies to implement the
strategy. The secondary role of a TTO is to establish and
maintain connections to national and international
investment communities as well as to other providers of
services for business development. These connections
facilitate the development of startup companies to
commercialize technology. The TTO will also need the
ability to communicate—internally and externally—its
aspirations and successes in technology transfer. Consistent communication within the TTO is critical to develop
and sustain a culture of entrepreneurship and engagement
in the technology transfer process.
The TTO must have the core skills to manage IP protection and the capacity to negotiate and execute legal agreements to transfer intangible and tangible property. The
main functions of TTO staff include: (1) evaluating invention disclosures and deciding whether to file patents or
other forms of IP protection, (2) managing or monitoring
patent prosecution, (3) developing, with business development staff, a commercialization strategy, (4) negotiating and
executing technology transfer agreements ranging from
options to licenses, and (5) once an agreement is concluded,
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monitoring technology developments and compliance with
the terms and conditions of the option or license.
Reporting and governance structure

A TTO requires reporting and governance functions. The
TTO management will be accountable to a governing body
that may consist of faculty or research center members,
administrators, and external business leaders. An advisory
group from inside and outside the institution is expected
to bring new experience to the organization and act as
internal and external champions.
Often a departmental TTO reports to a senior university
staff member, whereas a TTO company will be responsible
to a board, which may be chaired by a university senior staff
member. Because the TTO represents a linking function
between a university or research institute and business,
governance and advisory arrangements to support both its
internal linkage to the university or research institute and
its external linkage to the business community are important. The TTO can also become the “face” of the research
organization to the business community and as such needs
to have strong governance and advisory relationships to
ensure that it maintains a high degree of integrity and
credibility with the outside. The TTO will be expected to
produce at least annual reports of activity which provide
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financial information to its governance board(s) and also
provide accounts of nonfinancial public benefits that may
have been realized, such as development of a new medicine
or SME.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Investment in technology transfer and IP management
capacity for public research institutions and universities
will almost certainly have an impact on the way the institution looks at its research outcomes and the extent to which
it can partner with companies to either codevelop or commercialize its research results. In developed countries
where universities have adopted robust technology transfer
programs, the resulting impact of those universities on the
adoption of new technologies, rise in entrepreneurship,
synthesis of new medicines and other products, develop-

ment of jobs, and increased prosperity through regional
and national economic development is legendary.
In contrast to developed countries, where most research
capacity resides in private companies, the vast majority of
the research capacity in developing countries resides in public research institutions and universities. For this reason, one
might expect an even greater relative impact of technology
transfer from the public sector in developing countries.
Within universities (see box 5.26 on China), robust technology transfer programs also have many important benefits that are quite separate from royalty income, such as
(Campbell 2007):
■

Productive interaction with the industrial community.
Ideas shuttling back and forth between the academy/
research institute and private sector often increase the
quality of research.

Box 5.26 Intellectual Property Management at Tsinghua University, China

Intellectual property (IP) is a relatively new legal and
social concept in China. Formal legislation was introduced in the 1980s and subsequently strengthened.
Universities now usually own the IP emanating from
government-funded research, but technology transfer and commercialization remain low. Most universities lack IP policies and independent offices for IP
management.
Tsinghua University is an exception. Its IP Office
develops IP policies and manages university IP, which
includes patents, trade secrets, know-how, trademarks,
copyrights, and any related rights. The university’s IP
policy clearly states what constitutes employee work.
The policy requires an investigator to disclose all results
of a finished project to the administrative department,
which then decides whether to apply for a patent. If
results appear to have commercial value but are not
suitable for a patent, they remain a trade secret. An
industry-sponsored research agreement must have a
clause on ownership of resulting IP, allocation of patent
costs, and sharing of revenue made from the IP, among
other arrangements, and the IP Office examines the
contract before it becomes effective. When a faculty
member or other employee goes to another domestic
or foreign university or institute to conduct research,
any resulting IP should be assigned, or at least jointly

assigned, to Tsinghua University, unless another agreement takes precedence. Under the university policy, at
least 25 percent of revenue generated by a piece of IP is
shared with the inventor(s) as cash or equity.
Tsinghua University spared no effort to educate its
faculty members and students about IP and the university’s IP policy. It implemented procedures for examining collaborative research agreements and sponsored
research agreements between the university and other
institutions or companies, for which it designed a standard contract. A special fund covers patent costs, including application fees, examination fees, agency fees, and
maintenance fees for the first three years after a patent is
issued.
Together, these measures caused Tsinghua University to own more patents than any other Chinese university. From 1985 to 2000, Tsinghua University filed
1,587 patent applications. Since 2001, the average
annual growth rate of the university’s patent filings has
been 26 percent. In 2004, the university filed 43 foreign
applications (including Patent Cooperation Treaty filings). The numbers of patents issued to the university
rose from 121 in 1999 to 537 in 2004. Other universities
with a similar level of IP management include Peking
University (University of Beijing) and the Chinese
University of Technology.

Source: Heher 2007.
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■

■

■

■

Increased industrial support of research at universities
or public research facilities.
More willingness from central and local governments to
support research for economic development.
Students’ or public researchers’ exposure to the world of
industry and the commercial opportunities of research
(including training in entrepreneurship), which influence their career aspirations and the national economy.
Financial support from grateful alumni and other entrepreneurs who have grown wealthy from companies
started from university/institute research.

POLICY ISSUES

A critical and well-understood caveat is that the positive economic and public benefits of technology transfer programs
take many years or even decades to be fully realized. Sustained investment in capacity building is essential to achieve
the potentially broad impact that technology transfer programs are very likely to have, and sustained support—fiscal
and otherwise—is needed from senior administration to set
the program’s mission, policies, and priorities.
Technology transfer is a multifaceted process with
important policy, economic, and managerial ramifications.
The public sector’s role is particularly to address issues
related to the enabling environment, such as the removal of
technical, legal, and administrative barriers to technology
transfer, sound economic policy, regulatory frameworks,
and transparency, which have implications for transferring
private and public technology and the success of a TTO. A
public subsidy to establish a TTO may also be an appropriate incentive in developing countries where experience is
limited (Fernandez 2007).

LESSONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

The general lessons for implementing TTOs have evolved in
many contexts. They involve the need for long-term institution building, the prerequisite of a robust research base, the
choice to develop a TTO for a single institution or adopt a
network approach, the value of an institutional framework
for technology transfer, and the skills, cultural environment,
and incentives to support a TTO.
Long-term institutional building

Building capacity for technology transfer requires serious
programmatic planning and a long-term institutional commitment to the activity. The early investment may yield
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financial returns, but only after several years. The immediate returns are measured in terms of increased PPPs, an
enhanced capacity to engage international partners, and an
enhanced capacity to deliver research results to commercial
channels. Nelson (2007) describes five economic “lessons”
for institutions to consider before deciding to establish a
technology transfer program:
■

■

■

■

■

Technology transfer will not make your university rich.
A successful program will make a small profit but will
not support the university. It will, however, provide many
other benefits to the institution and the community.
Building a robust technology transfer program takes sustained financial investment. Investments are required
to develop a patent portfolio, attract expert talent, and
train office professionals.
It will likely take eight to ten years before your program
stops losing money—and it may never make your institution any substantial amount. It takes time to build an
IP portfolio, establish contacts, and develop skills in
technology transfer. Once these conditions are met, the
TTO may begin to make money.
It may take two decades or more before a university
technology transfer program (including entrepreneurial
spinouts) substantially affects the local and regional
economy. Expecting substantial returns in a few years
leads to underinvestment and disappointment.
The ultimate impact may be very large, however—both
economically and culturally—for the university, its graduates, and the community.

A robust research base

Technology transfer programs require a robust research
base, with the capacity to develop new technologies with
significant commercial applications. As mentioned, a good
practice prior to investing in technology transfer programs
is to assess the research assets. This assessment should
include the research assets and research capacity to supply
a steady stream of innovations to be “transferred.” This
assessment should consider the scientific staff of the institution, its laboratories and facilities, its existing and potential base of research funding, and its existing or potential
international collaborations. In addition, this assessment
should look at the culture of the institutional leadership,
its scientists, and students (if applicable). If measured only
by royalty income, an institution with a smaller research
base will have a more difficult time breaking even. Less
research means fewer inventions. An example of successful

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

TTO at a large university with a large research base is Unicamp Brazil (box 5.27).
Individual or network-based technology
transfer office

If an institution has sufficient research assets to develop a
steady stream of innovations and a culture that would support an active technology transfer program, it can move forward and establish a TTO. If the research base or institutional culture is weak, it may be useful to broaden the
assessment to encompass a set of regional research institutions. Building a technology transfer program to serve a
cluster of institutions is the more difficult option, however,

and requires several institutions to agree formally on strategies. In many cases it may be the only way to assemble a sufficiently large research base to justify the investment. An
assessment in Chile concluded that an effectively staffed
technology transfer office should receive somewhere
between 20 and 30 innovation disclosures per year (Fernandez 2007). In Chile, this level of activity could be achieved
only if TTOs served a cluster of universities.
An institutional policy framework

Another good practice, following the research base assessment, is to assess and to develop an institutional policy
framework for technology transfer. The framework must

Box 5.27 From University to Industry: Technology Transfer at Unicamp in Brazil

Brazil has dramatically increased technology transfer
and innovation through Inova, the technology transfer
office established by the State University of Campinas
(Unicamp) in 2003 and the first technology transfer
office established in a Brazilian university. A multidisciplinary university with more than 31,000 students and
20 research units, Unicamp pursues a variety of technologies in many fields. By 2007, Inova had become the
most frequent patentor and licensor in Brazil. In only
two-and-a-half years it signed 128 technology transfer
agreements, licensed 45 technologies to private companies and the government, and applied for 153 new
patents, 22 trademarks, and 24 software registrations.
Its technology transfer agreements will last for more
than ten years, and they have already generated
royalties for the university ranging from 1.5 percent to
10 percent of the net income from the licensed technology. Unicamp grants inventors 33 percent of royalty
and licensing income. The greatest contributor to the
patent and licensing portfolio is the Chemistry Institute
(48 percent); the corresponding figure for agribusiness
and food is 16 percent. Inova’s patent database is available online.
Under Brazilian law, Unicamp owns 100 percent of
its professors’ and researchers’ results. The law permits
public institutions to give up ownership to the inventor, but Inova has not taken this route; its inventors
lack commercial expertise and find it more attractive
for Inova to commercialize the technology and give
the inventor part of the licensing fee. Unicamp also

commonly practices sponsored research. In such cases,
ownership rights are normally split 50/50.
Factors in Inova’s success include:
■

■

■

Inova is driven by market demand. Instead of
selecting Unicamp’s technologies and offering them
to the market, Inova examines market demand and
seeks solutions inside the university.
The technology transfer team comes from private
institutions and has business skills. They are not
researchers.
The government provides many incentives to companies, such as tax benefits to companies that pay
royalties; tax benefits to companies that invest in
research and development, within or outside the
company; compensation for taxes on royalties paid
abroad during the execution of technology transfer
contracts; tax exemptions for fees paid to maintain
patents, trademarks, and cultivar registrations
abroad; and sponsorship/subsidy of 60 percent of
the salary of a scientist hired by a company.

These coordinated efforts will increase patenting
and technology transfer in Brazil, strengthen the relationship between public institutions (where Brazilian
research is mainly concentrated) and private companies, and contribute strongly to innovation. Other public universities and research centers have been studying
Inova’s model to emulate it.

Source: Di Giorgio 2007.
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be consistent with national employment and IP laws and
any exemptions that may exist for public researchers or for
universities and their faculty. This framework can clarify the
responsibilities of the institution and its employees prior to
investing in the TTO.
The first step is to assess the national legal framework,
including the IP policy, and ensure that the institution’s IP
policy and objectives for its technology transfer program are
consistent with the national legal framework as well as its
own mission and policies. The institution’s IP policy should
provide the basis for structuring the technology transfer
program as well as the basis for transferring tangible property developed within the institution.1 Support from senior
administration is critical (Nelson 2007). Clear mandates
will help technology transfer professionals choose among
competing priorities and the ever-present trade-offs
between private sector and public sector values. A wellunderstood review and appeal process needs to be put in
place early.
In addition to establishing the broad aspirations and
objectives, an institutional IP policy must address several key
issues (box 5.28). (See module 6, TN 3). These issues are
ownership, researchers’ obligations, the institution’s obligations, and administrative responsibilities.

Importance of core skills to manage IP protection
and capacity to manage legal agreements

The required expertise is complex. Technical knowledge is
needed to clearly understand a range of new innovations
and how they might meet standards of patentability; legal
skills must be sufficient to craft complex legal agreements.
Many TTOs have found that technical expertise is indispensible and difficult to learn, whereas legal knowledge can be
acquired “on the job” and supported by the judicious use of
external legal counsel. Many staff members are not needed
to support this activity, but their skills should reflect the
major scientific disciplines of the institution.

results of its activities to the institutional stakeholders,
including its leadership and sponsors. The profile for staff
in this area includes business training, such as a master’s
degree in business administration, significant work experience in business development in private companies, and
preferably experience in starting a company. Overall, staff
in this area must have the interpersonal skills to interact
easily with a range of business professionals and have experience in selling new ideas in a wide range of contexts. The
number of staff needed in this area is small. For most operations, one person is enough, but that person must be
skilled and experienced.

Culture and incentives for technology transfer and
commercialization

A passionate interest in technology transfer within the institution, the TTO management, but particularly the most
senior management of the university or institute is a prerequisite for success. An essential ongoing activity is to identify and foster relationships with stakeholders, including
academics, representatives of the business and user community, and regional and governmental offices. The most
important group at the outset is the internal community
that must be supported and encouraged to engage in technology transfer and entrepreneurial behaviors (Campbell
2007). Faculty reward systems such as professional advancement or revenue for engaging in technology transfer, along
with removing cultural barriers and staffing the TTO, are
key factors for success in technology transfer (Campbell
2007). For details, see Siegel et al. (2003).

Critical steps in establishing a TTO

The following minimal activities should be undertaken once
a decision is taken to establish a new TTO (Young 2007):
■

Importance of business skills and communications
strategy and skills

The long-term success of the TTO will depend on its ability to expand the impact of the institution’s research by
effectively transferring technologies (either intellectual or
tangible property) to commercial partners and by supporting new research partnerships. Its long-term success will
also depend on its ability to effectively communicate the
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■

Assist researchers in identifying results that have commercial value and document the discoveries through a
disclosure process. The disclosure-of-invention form
should be simple (a complex form deters disclosure).
More detailed information can be obtained through subsequent interviews with the inventor.
Evaluate the commercial potential of disclosed innovations. A TTO exists to find commercial applications for
technology and partners to realize the commercial
potential, not to judge the value of the science. Such evaluations may be the most difficult of all tasks for a TTO.
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Box 5.28 Key Issues to Be Addressed by an Institution’s Intellectual Property Policy

Ownership. An institution’s intellectual property (IP)
policy should clearly address who owns IP developed in
the institution (for example, the inventor/researcher
owns the IP; the research institution owns it; a company
providing research funds owns it; the government agencies providing research funds own it; or no-one owns it,
and all IP is committed to the public domain). In most
cases, institutions cannot manage IP effectively unless
they own all IP developed within their walls regardless
of funding source, but this condition may not always be
possible. Whatever is decided regarding IP ownership, it
must be very clear to prevent any ambiguity over who
has the legal ability to transfer technologies.
Researchers’ obligations. The policy needs to clearly
describe the obligations of research staff. When the institution owns all IP, its researchers typically are required to

disclose possible inventions before publication, to assign
ownership to the employer/institution, to assist in evaluation and patenting, and to report potential conflicts of
interest.
The institution’s obligations. The policy also needs
to clearly describe the institution’s obligations in managing IP. When the institution owns the IP, it typically
is required to manage IP effectively, to pay patenting
costs, and to share revenue with inventors. Of particular interest to researchers is the actual share of revenue
that will go to the inventors, which can range widely
from place to place but is typically 25–50 percent of net
revenue after expenses.
Administering the policy. The policy should identify
who in the institution is responsible for administering
the policy and procedures for compliance.

Source: Authors.

■

■

There are many approaches to invention evaluation. The
evaluation process lays the foundation for future decisions about IP protection and marketing.
Determine whether to protect IP in the innovation. If
needed, secure funding for filing patent, trademark, or
copyright applications, and manage the protection
process. The challenge of securing funding for IP protection internationally—especially when seeking protection
in highly industrialized countries, where the primary
markets for the expected products lie—is often overwhelming and perhaps even impossible in many developing economies because of the tremendous expense. Yet
there may be very small or nonexistent commercial markets for the innovation in the country of origin, which
can present a serious dilemma. The only solution in
many cases is to secure protection in the country of origin first, thereby “buying time” under the requirements
of the Patent Cooperation Treaty to find a corporate
partner to pay the patent costs internationally as a business expense in the license agreement.
Conduct market research to identify potential industry
partners, and then market the innovations. Research has
shown that in the United States, the primary source for
identification of licensees is the inventor. In industrialized countries, inventors typically are familiar with the
marketplace in their area of scientific expertise; through

■

■

■

professional networking, they may even know their
counterparts in industry (potential licensees) on a personal basis.
Once one or more industry partners are identified for
an innovation, negotiate legal contracts (license agreements) with these industry partners to transfer IP rights
in the innovation in exchange for royalties or other considerations. The goal is to negotiate a fair arrangement
that facilitates and assists the commercial partner in successfully developing and marketing the product, rather
than simply seeking to negotiate the absolute highest fees
and royalties in the agreement. Developing industry
partnerships can lead to many unexpected benefits, such
as sponsored research, student employment opportunities, consulting opportunities, and even philanthropic
donations to the institution.
Maintain and manage administrative functions in support of the primary functions of IP protection and technology transfer. These functions can include accounting,
royalty distributions, licensee performance management,
and patent application management.
If the TTO decides not to pursue IP protection and commercialization of an innovation, implement a process to
ensure that others have an opportunity to pursue protection and commercialization if they choose. The “others”
will most often be inventors.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 6

Risk Capital for Agriculture in Developing
and Middle-Income Countries
Alistair Brett, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

isk capital is money explicitly available for investment into a high-risk business or a security of some
type—typically those which are not publicly traded
on any national stock exchange. In this note, “risk capital”
refers to investment in a company or project at an early or
high-risk stage. Because interest in agricultural risk capital
investment is relatively new (although investment at other
stages is already in place), many of the investment vehicles
cited in this note are still relatively unproven. This note
draws on lessons from using risk capital in other sectors,
especially in innovative technology. It describes current and
possible future investment models, their benefits, and
potential applications in agricultural investment. Global lessons from developing investment vehicles and investments
in both agriculture and other asset classes are presented
with recommendations for policy makers and practitioners.
Because capital for investment does not exist in isolation, an
enabling environment must be in place or under development. Traditional venture capital is not appropriate for
countries lacking essential features for venture funding,
such as a strong flow of investable opportunities (which can
be stimulated by the public and private sectors), access to
domestic or foreign stock markets, a large business sector
for trade sales of companies, and an entrepreneurial culture
where risk and failure are acceptable. It is always critical to
ask the question: What problems are to be solved or needs
to be met? Only then can it be known whether the provision
and use of investment capital could help accomplish the
expected outcomes.

R

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Investment in agriculture is growing because of improved
profitability projections and the interest of development
agencies and governments to increase investment in the
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sector to achieve food security and economic growth. Investment is essential for the agricultural sector to grow; it is estimated that net investments of US$83 billion per year must
be made in the agricultural sector in developing countries
if there is to be enough food to feed the world population
of 9.1 billion in 2050. Private investors need to be the
major sources of this capital. Public investment cannot
meet the needs, but it can be effective in stimulating and
leveraging private investment in the sector. “...[A]gricultural investment growth has not only been spurred by
increased agricultural prices and food security concerns,
but also importantly because of innovation and experience
in risk mitigation of investment. One manifestation of this
phenomenon is the proliferation of funds set up to target
the agricultural sector—agricultural investment funds”
(FAO 2010, xv).1
Investing in agricultural innovation is an important part
of overall agricultural investments. Increasingly agricultural innovation is seen as a sector that offers profitable
investment opportunities for private investment funds as
well as alleviating poverty and increasing food security
(World Bank 2007). Investments are being made in SMEs
that are developing innovative agricultural technologies to
improve the quality of crops, reduce risk and losses, and
improve efficiency to increase competitiveness. It is expected
that the level of innovative technology used in agriculture in
developing countries will significantly increase through new
applications of biological and information technologies. The
availability of “risk capital,” money explicitly intended for
investment into a high-risk business or a security of some
type (typically those which are not publicly traded on any
national stock exchange), is warranted. Gaps in the provision of finance for agriculture and agricultural innovation
for SMEs and early-stage firms are evident, however, as
illustrated by data on Africa, which show that the “mesofinance stage financing is the most difficult to obtain”

(table 5.9) (the finance gap for small enterprises is also
noted in TN 3). The choice of a risk capital investment
model depends on the growth stage of the project or company that will receive the funds.
Innovation funds, including competitive grants or matching grants as described in TN 2, may be used to make a small
enterprise in the early stages of development “investmentready” for the types of investment shown in figure 5.3.2
Innovation funds may, for example, support moving an idea
through the feasibility and proof of concept phased to a stage
that is much more attractive to angel and seed capital. Incubators (TN 3) may provide similar support.
Typical equity investment levels, which do not have clearly
defined boundaries, are:

concept and perhaps a plan for growing the business.3
Angel investors may group together to form angel investment pools or come from the category referred to as FFFs
(friends, family, and fools—see figure 5.3).
2. Seed fund investment. A pool of money used to back
companies that are too small to attract venture firms but
require too much money for angel investors. For example, a business may have a prototype product or service
but few sales.
3. Venture capital fund investment. Venture capital funds
pool and manage money from institutional investors, such
as pension funds and insurance companies, as well as from
other venture funds and wealthy individuals. They take
equity stakes in SMEs with strong growth potential.

1. Angel investment. An angel investor provides backing to
very early-stage businesses or business concepts. For
example, a business may have little more than a business

This note focuses on the venture capital model of risk
capital and pre-venture capital. Because much of the interest in risk capital investment for agricultural innovation is
relatively new, although investment at other stages is already
in place, many of the investment vehicles discussed here have
a limited track record for investment in agricultural innovation and are consequently unproven. For this reason, the discussion that follows draws on lessons learned in the use of
risk capital in other more traditional investment sectors,
especially in innovative technology.

Table 5.9 The Gap in Access to Enterprise Finance
in Africa
Funding level

Funding category

US$10 million
US$1–10 million

Availability

Project financing
Venture capital/private
equity
Startup/seed capital/growth
capital/meso-finance
Microfinance

US$50,000–1 million
US$100–50,000

Yes
Some
No
Yes

RISK CAPITAL INVESTMENT MODELS

Source: Adapted from Ashley, Warner, and Romano 2005.

Figure 5.3 Typical Financing Stages for Company Growth
Startup financing cycle
Angels, FFFs

Secondary
offerings

VCs, acquisitions, mergers,
strategic alliances

Seed capital

Revenue

Early stage

Later stage
Mezzanine

Public
market

3rd
2nd
Break even

Valley of death

IPO

1st

Time

Source: Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Startup_company),
accessed September 2011.
Note: FFFs = family, friends, fools; VC = venture capital; IPO = initial
public offering.

The elements needed to provide risk capital for innovation
are: (1) an adequate number of opportunities for investment (referred to as “deal-flow”); (2) a structured vehicle
that provides a source of funds; (3) defined criteria for
investments made by the investment vehicle; (4) a methodology for evaluating and selecting projects to be supported
according these criteria; and (5) a fund management entity
and governance to monitor and manage funded projects.
Venture capital in agriculture:
The venture capital fund model

A suitable investment model is required.4 Although traditional venture capital may not always be appropriate for
many developing countries, it is a helpful model to which
alternative financing models such as angel, seed, or mesolevel investment can be compared. Venture capital5 is a
form of private equity provided for early-stage and more
mature companies with substantial market potential.
Returns on venture capital investment are from a trade sale
(sale to, or merger with, another company) or an initial
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public offering (IPO) in which the company becomes
authorized to sell its stock to the general public on a stock
exchange. Venture capital funds will not only provide
money but will mentor their investee firms. Venture capital
funds are very selective in making investments and may
review many hundreds of business plans before investing in
one opportunity. By their nature, venture capital investments are high risk and investments may fail. On average,
about one in 10 venture capital investments will provide a
substantial return on investment. Others may fail or provide insufficient returns to justify the investment. Venture
capital funds usually invest at several stages of a business’s
development: startup (funding for businesses at the early
stage of product or service development), first-round
(funding for businesses that have initial sales), secondround (working capital for early-stage companies that are
selling product, but not yet turning a profit), third-round
(expansion funds for a profitable company; also called
mezzanine financing), and fourth-round (financing for exit
preparation such as a trade sale or an IPO).

assessments on potential investments (known as “due diligence”); representation of the fund to the potential investment’s board of directors or equivalent; defining exit strategies; monitoring investments and taking corrective action
when needed; and communication with all investment parties. An advisory board composed of independent members
and investor representatives should: provide guidance on
the implementation of the fund’s investment strategy;
ensure adherence of the fund to its investment charter; and
resolve conflicts of interest. An investment committee composed of fund representatives and/or other investors should:
approve all investment decisions of the fund, on the basis of
reports of evaluations and due diligence performed by the
fund manager; conduct postinvestment monitoring; and
review progress of the fund’s portfolio and fund manager
performance.

Funding criteria

Key criteria may include the following:
■

The venture capital fund management structure

Venture capital firms are typically structured as limited
partnerships (“limited” because they limit the liability of
investors in the fund, who are referred to as the “limited
partners”). Limited partnerships have “general partners,”
which serve as the managers of the venture capital fund and
investment advisors for the venture capital funds raised. The
limited partners have no decision-making authority for the
investments being made. These limited partnerships are
legal entities, which hold the funds from the limited partners and have a limited lifetime, typically around ten years.
This means that the fund must cash in (exit) their investments in, say, five to seven years, and this need will be a factor in selecting opportunities in which to invest.

Venture capital fund management team

Venture capital fund management teams receive a combination of management fees and a share of the profits. Compensation in the form of a percentage of the fund’s capital
means that there is a lower limit on the amount of capital
necessary to support qualified management teams. Thus
this venture fund model cannot function if only small
amounts of capital are available (for example, seed funds
have to consider other compensation systems).
The fund manager is responsible for the overall financial
and administrative management of investments, including:
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■
■
■
■

■

■

A strong and committed core management team with
a demonstrated performance track record, commitment, enthusiasm, and energy, although in some cases a
reason to invest may be to grow the potential of new
businesses.
Sales of products or services locally or in other markets.
Potential for scaling up the business.
Potential for sustainable high growth for the business.
Expectation of sustainable long-term competitive
advantage.
A viable business model (overall business concept) followed by a viable business plan (a detailed plan for growing the business) delivering an attractive return on
investment.
A clear strategy for a cashing in their investment within
a reasonable time period (known as the investment exit).

A selection of agricultural investment funds and the type of
instrument and investment preferences is shown in table 5.10.
A few of these funds, mostly the new ones, support agricultural innovation, but overall they focus on agribusiness, value
chain development, and food processing. Box 5.29 describes
one representative fund in more detail.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The impact of providing risk capital for investment in innovative agricultural ventures will depend on the reasons for
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Table 5.10 Representative Agricultural Investment Funds
Fund (founding date)
Purpose and capital base

Countries/target investments

Financial instruments

Actis Africa Agribusiness Fund (2006) www.act.is
US$92.7 million private equity. This is a specialized fund
from Actis, a leading private equity investor with
sixty years of experience in emerging markets.

Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, South Sudan,
Tanzania, Zambia
Agribusiness across the supply chain.

Equity and quasi-equity investments
Deal size: US$5–15 million.

African Agricultural Capital (2005) www.aac.co.ke/web/
Venture Capital Fund (US$8 million), which is fully
invested in 16 ventures. In response to the absence of an
investment facility that focuses on the development of
private initiatives in agriculture in East Africa, the
Rockefeller Foundation, the Gatsby Charitable
Foundation, and Volksvermogen NV set up the fund to
invest in agriculture-related SMEs in East Africa.

Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
– Small and medium-sized agricultural
enterprises.
– Provision of risk capital to seed
companies operating in agricultural
value chains.

Equity, quasi-equity, and debt investments
– Most likely there are no investments
below US$100,000.
– Objective is to earn a minimum gross
return of 12%/yr on funds invested.

African Agribusiness Investment Fund (2008)
www.agrivie.com/index.html
US$100 million private equity.

Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda
Agribusiness sector across sub-Saharan
Africa along the value chain.

Equity and quasi-equity investment.

Agribusiness Partners L.P. (United States of America/Russian
Federation)/Agribusiness Partners International Fund
partnership (1995) www.burlingtoncg.com/api.shtml
US$100 million. The fund had an initial guaranty
from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russian
Federation, Ukraine
Agribusiness and food-processing
companies.

Private equity, venture capital

Omnivore Capital (2010) The Godrej Group
US$50 million (target). Investment in scientists and
entrepreneurs who are innovating to improve
agricultural productivity. Investment in small and
medium-sized companies focused on agricultural
innovation.

Canada, India, USA

Seed and venture capital

Source: FAO (2010, 164 ff).

Box 5.29

African Agriculture Fund

The African Agriculture Fund was established in 2009
by AfDB, AGRA, BOAD, IFAD, and AFD. The fund has
an initial target size of US$150 million and expects to
raise additional commitments up to an aggregate capital amount of US$500 million. Investment objectives of
the fund, chosen because they are assessed as future
high-growth sectors, include:
■

■

■

■

Food production industries (or provide financial
services to small agribusiness operators).
Invest in the value chain to reduce transaction costs
of producers/processors and in storage/marketing.
Grow their markets within the region or develop
export opportunities.
Main investment sectors: cereal production, roots
and tubers, livestock and dairy products, fruit products, seed production and fertilizers, fats and oils,

investment financing, equity, and quasi-equity
products, Technical Assistance Facility (TAF).
The fund has two windows of financing for enterprises. A small–medium company financing window
offers investment between US$0.15 million and
US$4 million to help bridge the typical early-stage
financing gap. A large company financing window is
designed for investment up to US$15 million for more
mature firms.
Fund terms and exit strategy are: a five-year commitment period; seven- to ten-year investment maturity;
the exit strategy shall be, as the case may be, to provide
for the option for local agricultural producers to acquire
interests in the targets; and average Internal Rate of
Return per target shall be around the mid-teens.
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 5.29 African Agriculture Fund (continued)

African Agriculture Fund Structure
Institutional investors

Category A/B

Category C

Technical Assistance Facility (TAF)
Sponsors

Private sector,
commercial
investors seeking
profits

Fund Manager – Management Agreement

ADVISORY BOARD
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE
Source: www.phatisa.com.
Note: AFD = Groupe Agence Française de Développement; AfDB = African Development Bank; AGRA = Alliance for a Green Revolution in
Africa; BOAD = Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement; IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development.

investing: Is the intention to earn a financial return on the
investment, support innovation, create economic development, or promote social good? For typical venture capital
investments, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is used as a
measure of the cash return on an investment. The IRR can
be thought of as the effective rate of interest earned by the
investment.6 A project may be a good investment if its IRR
is greater than the rate of return that could be earned by
alternative investments of equal risk. A venture capital fund
in a developed country has traditionally expected an IRR of
at least 20–25 percent (before the 2008/09 crisis).
The African Agriculture Fund cited in box 5.29 is an
example of a mix of public and private funds. The presence of public support can be attractive to private
investors. Although agriculture may have a lower IRR than
other types of investment, the fund is designed to reduce
risk where possible by adhering to strict investment criteria. Funds that provide training and technology transfer to
farmers further reduce investment risk. Another benefit is
the provision by some funds (such as African Agricultural
Capital) of equity investment with possible debt financing
in cases where taking an equity position in a business is not
inappropriate (for example, when there may be too much
dilution of value for the shares held by existing investors).
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POLICY ISSUES

Sustained innovation and commercialization need consistent policies for the long term. Obtaining early-stage
financing for SMEs with science- and technology-based
products or services remains difficult even in developed
markets. Investment capital is moving to later stages to
avoid risk in developed markets and even in some developing markets such as India. SMEs do not have the tangible assets required by banks and other lenders as collateral;
their assets may be intangible, in the form of patents or
know-how. These firms may also have an unreliable revenue stream and inexperienced management. Before
investment capital can be deployed effectively and efficiently, it may be necessary to make improvements in a
country’s IP regime and improve the support ecosystem.
But it is also necessary to be realistic about what improvements can be made in the short term. Waiting until there
is a fully functioning support system in place will mean
delaying action indefinitely.
The frequent public policy response is (Hodgson 2009):
■

The creation of some venture funding entity that provides, often with public sector participation, risk capital
for new, knowledge-based businesses.
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■

Mentoring and training entrepreneurs in how to prepare their ideas to be investment-ready and thus attract
funding by the right presentation of evidence on the
opportunity and potential rewards to those looking to
make investments.

This response may be necessary, but it is not sufficient as
a capacity-building policy. For example, this note emphasizes the importance of creating the ecosystem for innovation, including the role of government policy in improving
existing systems, such as reducing barriers to success, as
well as making more radical changes. For agribusiness support this may include physical infrastructure such as transport systems as well as education.
Contributions of public and private sectors to both
finance and knowledge generation should be coordinated
to achieve maximum benefits. Public sector support in
reducing barriers to business, for example, by easing the
process of business registration and creating a more favorable tax regime and tax inspection systems, can help combine public and private sector investments. A related issue
is to assure that foreign investors will be able to transfer
their capital gains out of the country.

government officials or representatives from large enterprises do not have the skills to carry out the duties of an
advisory board.
Even more important, the investment committee, which
must approve all investment decisions of the fund as recommended by the management, must be fully informed
and experienced in such decision making, which is not
always the case in developing countries. There is a need to
provide training for advisory boards and investment committees working with agricultural innovation projects.

Challenges for a developing country or region

The challenges specific to developing countries or regions
include:
■

■

IMPLEMENTING RISK CAPITAL SYSTEMS:
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PRACTITIONERS

Although the provision of risk capital equity investment
funds for agricultural innovation is a new trend, lessons
have been learned from both agricultural investment and
from investing in nonagricultural sectors.

■

Investment fund management

The fund management (general partners and support staff)
must have the necessary skills to carry out the management
functions described earlier, including in-country experience
of working under the constraints of a frequently underdeveloped ecosystem to support the selection and growth of
the fund’s investments. Experience has shown that nonresident management teams and lack of experience in the country or in similar environments may lead to failure.
Advisory boards, which are responsible for guiding the
fund’s investment strategy and making sure that the fund
adheres to its investment objectives, all too frequently
in developing countries do not in fact provide effective
advice, owing to a lack of experience or understanding
of investment processes. Advisory boards composed of

■

■

■

■

Setting the right balance between (1) investing in technology commercialization and (2) investing in technology absorption and adaption, together with investment
in building the capacity to support technology translation and development.
Understanding that capital for investment does not exist
in isolation. It is critically important to have an ecosystem
(enabling environment) that includes but is not limited to
such features as: provision of advisory services, a supportive IP regime, access to markets, an effective governance structure, availability of investment exits as a way
to realize a return on investment, and the existence of the
rule of law to provide investor confidence.
Recognizing that traditional venture capital is not
appropriate for many countries lacking the features necessary for venture funding, such as a strong flow of
investable opportunities, stock markets, a large business
sector for public listing or trade sales of companies, and
an entrepreneurial culture where risk and failure are
acceptable.7
Building the ability to provide small amounts of funding quickly for very early-stage technology development
or technology translation funding, and knowing how to
invest these funds in a “smart” fashion, to attract private
sector participation and resources needed to scale up
investments.
Maintaining close contacts with the private sector and
other investment funds in regions as well as globally.
Finding partners to provide access to public and private
financing outside the country when only limited financing is available within the country.
Having a locally based investment fund manager (that
is, one who resides within the country).
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A cautionary lesson from developing countries is that
investment decisions can be distorted by political influence.
Government officials typically lack the experience to evaluate and manage investment opportunities. In India, for
example, the selection of government-funded projects that
were candidates for further investment was contracted to a
private sector group.

■

Practical issues for risk capital use in early-stage
development

Policies should focus on the practical rather than the ideological. A practical problem for many developing countries
in negotiating financing agreements to either acquire a
technology or license IP to others is that someone has to
take the first step and agree to provide initial funding,
which could be matched later by others. Sometimes this
funding can be in the form of a grant for early-stage development, as noted. Should these grants take too long to be
approved (as is often the case), the deal may be lost.
Note that usually angel and seed funding rely on the availability of later-stage capital to get a return on their investment
by having their shares bought out. Of special interest to developing countries is that some investment models specifically
attempt to address the “investment gap” (also referred to as the
“Valley of Death”) which occurs when private and public
funding are either unavailable in the first place or run out, and
where the company’s net cash flow does not close the funding
gap. Many businesses—frequently those based on research
discoveries—continue to reside in the Valley of Death because
they lack the financial support and skilled management teams
to progress into the “proof of relevancy” phase.
Recommendations for practitioners

A few recommendations should be considered:
■
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Ask the question: What problems are to be solved or needs
to be met? The answer will determine if the provision and

■

■

■

■

■

use of investment capital will help accomplish the expected
outcomes. Businesses and governments often believe that
what they need most is investment capital when in fact it
may not be the immediate critical need; a more pressing
need might be finding business partners or gaining access
to markets.
Set the right balance between (1) investing in technology
commercialization and (2) investing in technology
absorption and adaption, together with investment in
building the capacity to support technology translation
and development.
Determine the financing objective. Is it to earn a financial return on the investment, to foster economic development or social welfare, or achieve another purpose?
The purpose of an investment or investment strategy
should be decided and made clear to all involved at the
start of the process.
No investment can be made without a sufficient “deal
flow”—a continuous source of investment possibilities. The public and private sectors can stimulate deal
flow.
When developing an investment fund or other investment vehicle, decide how much money will be dedicated
to the fund or other vehicle and under what conditions
or constraints. This decision is critically connected to the
question of what is the purpose and investment strategy
of the fund. Some public investment funds have sizeable
amounts of money but have not succeeded because of a
poorly conceived or implemented investment strategy.
Other funds, with limited capital, have not been able to
support businesses to become self-sustaining.
Structure public funding to attract private funds, either
initially or later (for example, as matching funds or a
guarantee for the private investment).
A majority of nongovernment representatives should be
appointed to management boards of investment programs using government funds. Government representatives should provide guidance but may want to create
maximum good by funding too many projects.
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Developing Entrepreneurs through an
Agribusiness Incubator at ICRISAT
Kiran K. Sharma, International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)
S.M. Karuppanchetty, ICRISAT
S. Aravazhi, ICRISAT

SYNOPSIS

he Agri-Business Incubation (ABI) Program at
ICRISAT, launched in 2003, is an initiative of the
International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in partnership with India’s
Department of Science and Technology (DST). ABI promotes agricultural technologies developed by ICRISAT,
other R&D centers of excellence, universities, and other
institutions, separately and jointly. Its approach features a
dual service and outreach strategy. The service strategy
focuses business development on five strategic areas, building on the expertise of ICRISAT and its partners: seed, biofuels, ventures to develop particular innovations (products
or services), farming (high-value crops), and agricultural
biotechnology. The outreach strategy involves collaborative
business incubation to bring a wider range of expertise and
resources to bear on business development to foster agricultural development in other regions.

T

CONTEXT: INCUBATORS IN INDIA AND
AGRIBUSINESS

Business incubators are gaining a foothold in India. A recent
survey found that their numbers had grown from 10 in 2000
to 30 business incubators and science and technology parks
involved in the commercialization of software and other
engineering technologies in 2009 (NSTEDB and ISBA
2009). Of the 495 ventures that graduated from the business
incubators in India, 387 remained in business. More than
10,000 jobs were created through these ventures. These
incubators have stakeholders in government agencies,
financial institutions, and venture capital operations. Only
three were involved in agribusiness in 2008, although various government departments, which recently created entrepreneurship promotion programs, have expressed an interest in establishing agribusiness incubators.

Agribusiness incubators can take the form of comprehensive occupational schools, offering rural producers and
workers sufficient knowledge, experience, infrastructure, and
means to become agribusiness entrepreneurs. This endogenous movement can have far-reaching effects, promoting the
overall modernization of primary production, industrialization, and marketing and development of rural areas.
More specifically, however, an agribusiness incubator creates a mechanism to assist in the identification, adaptation,
and commercialization of products from public and private
agricultural research institutions and universities. From a
development perspective, the goal of agribusiness incubation
programs is to develop and commercialize new products,
technologies, and services to improve productivity in
farmers’ fields and increase the practical impact of research
conducted in India’s academic and research institutions.
Incubators provide a means of leveraging the significant
resources invested in R&D and infrastructure, generating
employment and income in India’s rural areas, and ultimately creating wealth to support the livelihoods of the poor.
AGRI-BUSINESS INCUBATION PROGRAM
OBJECTIVE AND DESCRIPTION

The Agri-Business Incubation (ABI) program, launched in
2003, is an initiative of the International Crops Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in partnership with the Department of Science and Technology
(DST), Government of India. ABI promotes agricultural
technologies developed by ICRISAT, other R&D centers of
excellence, universities, and other institutions, separately
and jointly. The incubator was set up as part of ICRISAT’s
Agri Science Park (later the Agribusiness and Innovation
Platform). ABI is governed by a board of advisors headed by
the Director General of ICRISAT and by a standing advisory
committee that counsels the board on strategy and client
intake and exit.
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ABI represents a new resource to promote enterprise
development in agriculture and facilitate business among
entrepreneurs and technology developers. The pillars for
high-performance incubation are R&D, business planning,
business development, and access to capital (figure 5.4). The
framework encompasses all the services and support systems offered to an agribusiness venture, such as technology
transfer, business facilitation, and technical guidance, especially those in ABI’s focal areas of seed, biofuel, and farm
systems. ABI also facilitates the commercialization of services that benefit farmers.

■

■

■

■

INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

ABI is the only incubator with an inclusive, market-oriented
development plan that seeks to improve farmers’ livelihoods
through business incubation. Based on the experience
gained in the years since ABI’s inception, the approach has
evolved to benefit the farmers through a vertical strategy
(service strategy) and a horizontal strategy (an outreach
strategy based on partnerships in collaborative business
incubation).
The service strategy focuses development on strategic
areas related to the mandates of ICRISAT and its partners:

■

Seed ventures. Rural entrepreneurs receive support in
developing a seed business to meet the demand for highquality seed of open-pollinated crops. Through partnering with public and private entities, entrepreneurs are
assisted in seed production, processing, and marketing
(box 5.30).
Biofuel ventures. ABI promotes industries involved in
producing ethanol from sweet sorghum and other agricultural materials.
Innovative ventures. Innovative agribusiness ventures
are based on proprietary products or novel services with
good market potential.
Farm ventures. Contract farming, organic farming, and
precision farming are among the commercial farming
ventures promoted through ABI.
Agribiotech ventures. ABI enables seed companies to
engage in the emerging area of agricultural biotechnology by developing genetic transformation protocols for
commercial crops, molecular markers for traits of interest for seed producers, and tissue culture methods for
producing medicinal, horticultural, and tree crops.

The outreach strategy of ABI is to collaborate with
organizations globally in business incubation (cobusiness

Figure 5.4 Framework for Business Incubation in ABI
Access to R&D networks
Specialized facilities

IP identification and
protection strategies
R&D

State-of-the-art
marketing best
practices

Access to capital

Capitalization

High-performance
incubation

Business planning
Access to services

Networks and
alliances
Business development
Champions

Value proposition
development

Sales and distribution
channel strategies

Strategy
Development
Exchange of ideas
Source: ABI Strategic Business Plan 2008–13.
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Box 5.30 Aakruthi Agricultural Associates: An Incubator Graduate

Aakruthi Agricultural Associates of India (AAI) was
launched in 2004 as a commercial alternative to government agricultural extension services in Anantapur
Province of Andhra Pradesh. AAI joined forces with
Agri-Business Incubation (ABI) in 2005 and in 2006
became the second venture to graduate from the
incubator.
Through the incubator, AAI developed a successful
business model based on partnership with seed
providers like ICRISAT, national and state agricultural
research centers, and farmer franchisees. AAI designed
replicable seed business ventures and proprietary
methods for recruiting farmer entrepreneurs for local,
low-cost, high-productivity seed multiplication. These
ventures create seed delivery systems that offer an alternative to government-supported channels and allow
more rapid introduction of superior varieties. AAI has
built a network of 70 farmer entrepreneurs in Andhra
Pradesh. These entrepreneurs pay franchise fees and
receive working capital advances. They engage more
than 300 farmers in seed multiplication and currently
have 4,000 acres under production.
The target crops include groundnuts, chickpeas,
pigeonpeas, and rice. Oil and legume seeds, in particular, offer limited commercial opportunity for multiplication and distribution due to their inherent low
multiplication ratios. Through its franchise concept,
AAI can sell seed of these crops in markets where
demand significantly exceeds supply. Demand for
groundnut seed in Anantapur, for example, exceeds

supply by 80 percent. The gap for chickpeas is 30 percent; for pigeonpeas, 70 percent.
When AAI graduated from the incubator in 2006, it
became a full business partner with ICRISAT for distributing ICRISAT seed in Andhra Pradesh. AAI has
compressed the time between the release of new seed
and market acceptance in Andhra Pradesh from eight
years to less than three years. The advantage of more
rapid market penetration is significant for both
ICRISAT and farmers. In 2009 the company generated
revenues of 27 million rupees. Its net profit margin was
2 percent and is expected to reach 20 percent.
ABI assisted AAI with several critical elements of its
development, including the creation of a business plan;
provision of technical knowledge and seed science
backstopping; introductions to multiple stakeholders
and potential sources of financing; and introductions
and links to the national research system and other
public providers of technology. Arguably the most significant assistance that ABI provided to AAI consisted
of increasing its credibility with government officials.
Despite these achievements, AAI’s growth is constrained by a lack of external financing. In this area of
development, ABI has not been able to assist its clients
as successfully as it would wish, although it helped to
secure financing for the company’s seed processing
plant, and 12,000 square feet of warehouse capacity was
provided by the Department of Marketing. ABI has also
assisted AAI in renting numerous local seed storage and
distribution centers.

Source: AAI Annual Report 2009 (unpublished document).

incubation). The benefits of cobusiness incubation are that
it provides enhanced support and services to a greater number of entrepreneurs; enables complementary business and
technology development in a greater number of regions;
fosters cross-border ventures and business development;
provides access to a greater range of physical, technical, and
other facilities for clients; improves access to a greater range
of markets; offers common branding that can make clients’
businesses more marketable; and maintains an inclusive,
market-oriented development strategy.
Cobusiness incubation services with other institutional
partners include: planning, development, and implementation of a business incubator; facilitating coordination

and operations; capacity building in business incubation
operations; business consultancy support services; access
by Technology Development Board entrepreneurs to seed
capital; development and implementation of incubation
services in the focal areas (seed, agricultural biotechnology, biofuel, other innovation, farms, and potentially
other areas); and making the system successful and selfsustaining through M&E. To date, key partners for
cobusiness incubation have come from the Network of
Indian Agri-Business Incubators (NIABI) and from
Mozambique.1 ABI is the coordinating body for NIABI,
which is implemented by ICAR under the World Bankfunded NAIP project.
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IMPACT: TECHNOLOGIES COMMERCIALIZED

ABI has supported more than 158 ventures in agribusiness
since 2003. Among ABI’s clients, 62 percent are seed entrepreneurs, 13 percent are incubatees located on site, 30 percent are cobusiness incubatees, and 4 percent are biofuel
entrepreneurs. To date, agribusiness products and technologies incubated through ABI have included sweet sorghum
for ethanol production; insect-resistant transgenic cotton
(box 5.31); a biofermentor for biopesticide production; a
drought-tolerant groundnut variety; better-yielding chickpea varieties; biopesticide formulations; and organic farming methods. Businesses supported by ABI are estimated to
have benefited 40,000 farmers.
In Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, 4,000 acres have
been brought under sweet sorghum cultivation for ethanol
production. (See other details in module 4, box 4.29 in IAP
2.) The drought-tolerant groundnut variety is used by 1,500
farmers on more than 5,000 acres; a new chickpea variety is
Box 5.31 Agri-Biotech Incubation with Bioseed
Research India

planted in 100,000 acres in Anantapur District by 20,000
farmers.
LESSONS LEARNED

ABI has chosen a fairly risky strategy of combining new
entrepreneurs with new technology—a risk that is partly
offset by close linkages with world-class scientists. ABI’s
access to capital and commercial expertise is also somewhat
less developed than that of most other incubators. Some
observations on sustainability and challenges follow.
Sustainability

ABI operates as a business. An initial startup grant of
US$444,444 as capital for infrastructure and US$111,111 as
a recurring grant was provided by the National Science and
Technology Entrepreneurship Development Board (NSTEDB). On average, ABI is generating US$250,000 per year;
its annual operating expenses are around US$2 million.
Since its inception in 2003, ABI’s average annual growth rate
has been 30 percent. ABI works on two financial models:
■

In 2003, Agri-Business Incubation (ABI) client
Bioseed Research India licensed Bt gene technology from Monsanto to develop and commercialize
insect-resistant cotton varieties. ABI provided its
client with training in Bt breeding techniques,
biosafety consultancy, and lab and greenhouse
facilities. These services helped the mid-level seed
company to enter the high-end seed business and
gain a strong market share through early entry
into the market for Bt cotton seed. The incubation
service benefitted from commercialization of
Bioseed’s Bt technology. About 525,000 packets of
Bt cotton seed were sold during the past two years.
The company’s varieties are grown by 200,000
farmers on 500,000 acres.
Source: ABI.
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■

Under the capital gains model, ABI takes an equity share
in companies it incubates. This model is useful for
startup companies with highly proprietary technologies
and strong entrepreneurship capabilities. It requires less
management support, but the new technology must be
very strong.
The revenue-generation model is a franchisee model in
which revenue for ABI is generated through service fees,
royalties, rental fees, and one-time fees. It is useful for
small-scale entrepreneurs who need significant management support but do not require strong technology
inputs; their business is based on incremental technologies or pure services.

Challenges in business incubation

Table 5.11 summarizes challenges that ABI has encountered
since its inception and strategies and solutions used to deal
with them.
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Table 5.11 Challenges Faced by Agri-Business Incubator Since Its Inception and Solutions
Segment

Challenge

Strategy/solution

Goal and
objectives

– Balancing technology commercialization and
agricultural development.
– Profit or nonprofit entity.

Target segments

Identifying and retaining innovators is difficult.

– Focus on incubating enterprises oriented to commercializing
technology for agricultural development.
– Nonprofit status ideal under society or section 25 clause of
Indian Companies Act, 1956.
Target niche areas to retain clients.

Agricultural
technology

– Availability of technology limited to what ICRISAT can
provide.
– Appropriate technology not available at right time.

Provide incentives to scientist at ICRISAT for technology
transfer to increase the pool of technology.

Innovations

– Limitations to innovations in R&D institutes because
right enabling environment is lacking.
– Individual innovators handicapped by ICRISAT’s
intellectual property (IP) policy.

– Organize regular innovation camps and motivational
programs to scout innovations in the institute.
– Encourage individual innovators through official innovation
camps and recognition in a public forum by employers.

Markets

– Low pricing of end products limits attractiveness of
market for envisaged enterprises.
– Ag-biotech market segment is not buoyant and is
constrained by ICRISAT IP policy.

Work for alternative end products to increase market
opportunities.

Enterprise
initiatives

– Risk inherent in technology-based businesses deters
entrepreneurs and incubation.
– Rural enterprises have less risk-taking ability and need
high amount of management support.

– Provide entrepreneurs internships on innovation and
incubation with part-time options.
– Provide rural enterprises a high level of management support
and a service package that includes risk coverage.

Organization
and policy

– ICRISAT’s intellectual property right (IPR) policy and
standard material transfer agreement (SMTA) deter
technology commercialization and incubation.
– Stringent entry and exit procedures limit intake of
incubatees.

– Liberalize IPR and SMTA policies.
– Offer single-window clearance mechanism for incubation.

Operations

– Security systems prevent private clients from working
late at ICRISAT and limit client retention.
– Access to facilities and services for the incubatees
is not always available.

– The security systems need to be flexible for private clients.
– The host institute can allocate and list the facilities and
services available for enabling effective service to clients.

Human
resources

Limited availability of incubation professionals reduces
opportunities to incubate successful ventures.

Certified short-term incubation training program offered by
acclaimed universities.

Financial

– Capital investment provided by the donor must not be
redundant. Allow flexible fund transfers across cost
centers to fund utilization as required by industry.
– Rent must be billed to incubatees on full-cost rather
than partial-cost recovery basis.

– Donors’ capital investment can be more flexible (confirmed
clients can then request the facilities they need).
– Rental revenues need to sustain the incubator.

Sustainability

– Innovative agricultural entrepreneurs mostly cannot
pay for incubation services.
– Institutional realignments and changes will erode the
sustainability of ABI.

– Revenues from innovators must be packaged in the
investment, either upfront or based on margin of profits.
– Maintain a reserve of 12 months of operating funds.

Leadership vacuum and poor follow-up/initiative of
national agricultural research systems (NARSs),
primarily in Africa (Mozambique).

– Strategize with non-NARS organizations along with NARSs
as consortium partners.

Cobusiness
incubation
partnerships
Source: ABI.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 2

The China Technology Transfer Project
Josef Ernstberger, Consultant

SYNOPSIS OF PROJECT DATA

Country:
Project:
Financing:
Implementing
agency:
Dates:

Includes
support for:

China: Shaanxi, Anhui, Hunan, Heilongjiang Provinces
Agricultural Technology Transfer Project
About US$207 million, of which US$100
million is a World Bank loan
State Office for Comprehensive
Agricultural Development
Approved April 28, 2005; original closing
date (December 31, 2010) extended to
December 31, 2011
About 120 subprojects.

CONTEXT

ince the end of the 1990s, China’s agricultural sector has entered a phase of urgent and challenging
structural transformation dictated by five major
developments:

S
■

■

■
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Lagging agricultural output and incomes. Farm income
growth had fallen alarmingly behind overall income
growth. Policy priorities have shifted from concerns over
food self-sufficiency and low consumer prices toward
serious concerns about income growth for the farming
population and the widening disparity in rural and
urban incomes.
Natural resource pressure. As agricultural output
expanded rapidly in the 1990s, production encroached
into more and more fragile ecological environments, and
farmers adopted unsustainable production practices.
Changing demand and consumer preferences. Rapid
growth in the nonagricultural economy and growing
urbanization caused changes in food preferences and consumption patterns. Demand for meat, fruit, vegetables,

■

■

and other high-value commodities, including “green” and
organic food, rose rapidly.
Demand for advanced food processing and marketing.
Increasing urbanization and differentiation of the food
consumption structure demanded an advanced processing, marketing, and catering industry. Enterprises in this
sector have mushroomed throughout the country. Most
of these enterprises were naturally competing with
small-scale farmers on profit margins, or entirely new
agricultural markets emerged in which smallholders
often had a relatively weak position.
New market challenges and opportunities. China’s
accession to the World Trade Organization required
rapid liberalization of trade practices and further opening up of the border. Internal production and food
quality standards had to be improved and adjusted to
international standards.

A critical bottleneck for the transformation required in
the agricultural sector was the slow transfer and adoption
of modern science, technology, and knowledge-intensive
agriculture. The prevailing farming environment in China
was characterized by a highly fragmented production
structure dependent on a multitude of very small farms.
This farm structure made it difficult: (1) to expand the use
of new technologies and/or supply high-value markets that
need a critical mass, farm size, or contain other critical elements to reach economies of scale, (2) to reach farmers by
the traditional extension system, because the national
extension system model is poorly suited to reach large
numbers of farmers and meet their increasingly individualized demand for knowledge and information, and (3) for
farmers to know about and respond effectively to market
signals. The government-based research and extension system was not sufficiently responsive to the new challenges
and opportunities presented by agricultural technologies,
markets, and farmers’ demands. It was supply-oriented,

engaged in extending the government’s programs and production targets, and had no effective means of dealing with
the constraints small-scale farmers encountered in adopting new technologies.
The Technology Transfer Project responded to strategic
concerns in China’s agriculture by providing a learning platform for developing innovative models for public sector
facilitation and support, including fostering better PPPs in
agriculture. The primary addressee of the project was the
public sector’s agricultural support and development system, in particular the State Office for Comprehensive
Agricultural Development (SOCAD), which is China’s
main funding institution, disbursing about US$2 billion
each year for agricultural development in the country.
A significant amount of this budget supports agribusinesses. Any improvements in targeting these funds and
improving funding modalities would therefore have a
tremendous impact.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

The project’s overall development objective was to develop
and test innovative models for agricultural technology
transfer and application aimed at generating additional
farm income with potential for scaling up. In this way the
project sought to give poor farmers a chance to participate
in high-value agricultural markets, domestically and internationally. This objective was to be achieved by supporting
viable models for restructuring and modernizing agricultural production, processing, and marketing through
various forms of vertical and horizontal integration, the
introduction of innovative technologies, and new institutional arrangements and PPPs.
Since mid-2005, the project has been underway in four
provinces (Anhui, Hunan, Heilongjiang, and Shaanxi),
which includes the Yangling High Technology Agricultural
Demonstration Zone. The initial closing date of December
2011 was extended by one year to provide more time for
analysis and to learn from experience. The main components of the project are:
1. Technology transfer and information markets and services, which includes the building of technology transfer
markets and exhibition and demonstration facilities.
2. Promotion of commercially attractive key technologies
and new institutional arrangements, including
(1) researcher-investor-farmer technologies, which
involved the partial financing of typically tripartite joint
ventures with the objective of designing successful

investment models in which researcher-investor-farmer
partnerships are tested; (2) targeted technology transfer,
which financed technology transfers targeting farmer
groups who did not have adequate access to information,
capital, or decision-making power to adopt technologies
on their own; and (3) public support programs, which
involved financing activities that enabled the private
sector to realize its role in commercializing innovative
technologies (such as food testing and certification or
use of IPRs) and technologies that did not appeal to the
private sector on commercial grounds but had a clear
public good nature (such as water-saving technology or
waste treatment).

PROJECT INNOVATIONS

The first innovation of this project was that, unlike traditional public sector support projects, it combined public
funding for research, extension, training, and institution
building with private investment. The government funded
the development and dissemination of public goods, but
these activities were implemented by the private sector to
foster the integration of public and private investments
(World Bank 2010).
The second innovation of this project was to focus on
technologies that increase smallholders’ incomes. Often
public investments in agricultural research raise smallholders’ productivity but not necessarily their incomes (World
Bank 2010).
The third innovation was to develop and fund institutions
such as farmer associations as part of the “technology package,” provided they would improve the dissemination of new
technologies.1 In addition, under all subproject proposals
involving commercial enterprises it was made mandatory
that at least 50 percent of the subproject funding would be
used to directly support farmers in providing the raw material for the enterprises (production base or farm outreach).
The fourth innovation was to design this project specifically as a learning platform. Recognizing that a single project could have only a limited impact in a country as big as
China, the project was designed as a stepping-stone to
improve the effectiveness of public investment and partnership arrangements by partnering with private players. For
this purpose a framework for M&E was designed to extract
and disseminate lessons from this project, particularly in
two areas: (1) the understanding and rationale for public
funding (why and in what areas is it justified to use public funds for agricultural development) and (2) the
improvement of procedures for the use of public funds (such

MODULE 5: INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY PROFILE 2: THE CHINA TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROJECT

427

as contracts with private partners, working with farmer
cooperatives and associations, and similar arrangements)
(World Bank 2005–10).
BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

Many subprojects supported under the project generated
remarkable benefits in terms of value added, additional
income, or entire new lines of business with new products
and markets. These achievements were based on: (1) innovative institutional and partnership arrangements (for
example, public sector research with companies or farmer
organizations or research-farmer or research-company
arrangements); (2) innovative funding arrangements; and
(3) innovative technologies fostered by these new partnerships. However, the project was designed as a learning
project. As such its achievements in terms of value-added
or additional income cannot be seen as an end but provide
only the tool for learning and drawing more generic lessons.
The project developed an analysis and lessons learning
framework (World Bank 2005–10), but the evaluation
process continues, with a consolidation of results yet to
come. Even so, some key outcomes have been identified.
National and provincial agricultural support programs
have already adopted several design elements tested under the
project. A number of policy documents have been prepared,
which influenced SOCAD’s funding policies, including:
■

■

■

■

The combination of company and farm outreach support under a joint investment.
Importance of farmer associations as new and valuable
partners in PPPs.
PPP arrangements to be guided by a clear understanding
of public good outcomes to be specified in contractual
arrangements with objectives, indicators, and milestonebased targets.
Monitoring of PPP contracts and performance as a crucial success factor.

Models have been developed with innovative management approaches and technologies for women farmers. The
outmigration of male labor from many rural areas in China
increases not only the demand for technologies suitable for
women but the need for women to develop their managerial
skills as farm operators and entrepreneurs. The project
developed a model partnership with the All-China Women’s
Federation that successfully addressed these needs.
Technology barriers caused by fragmented production
and small farm size were overcome by partnerships between
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companies and farmers or farmer associations. For example,
organic food production or integrated pest management
technology were difficult for individual famers to adopt
because their small holdings prevented them from exploiting
commercial opportunities. However, in groups and in combination with a strong processing or marketing partner, smallholders could be linked with commercial opportunities.
New products and markets, which require the commitment of multiple stakeholders over time to develop and
reach, were opened by involving the public sector as a broker. A typical example was the development of camphor
production in one area, where an investor used the support
of the local government and the project to organize farmers
to plant sufficient trees and build a critical mass of production required for a viable processing facility.
Many subprojects show that organizing farmers into associations or under company-farmer arrangements enables
them to enter into higher-value production through branding, product certification (green or organic certification, for
example), or accessing new markets (especially export markets). In some instances, farmers were organized because
companies were the driving force, but in others farmer associations alone achieved these objectives.
Contractual arrangements between the government and
private entities introduced under the project showed that
private institutions could successfully deliver public goods
and services. Many subprojects involve farmer associations
or companies providing animal health services, training
farmers, or providing other extension services. Most project
proposals target poor farmers or disadvantaged groups. Several proposals have involved innovative technologies and
environmental services, such as the treatment of manure,
waste, or crop residues.
Although the private sector is assuming many functions
traditionally performed by government institutions, the
project has demonstrated that the government remains central to areas such as food safety, protection of property
rights, regulations, and policy direction. Project investments
in those areas (for example, in food quality standards testing and certification in Yangling, or testing for the presence
of genetically modified ingredients and certification in
Anhui) show the importance of the government in relation
to the private sector in agricultural development.
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

The summary of impact and experience gives some indication of the lessons that the project has already provided.
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The sections that follow explain some of these lessons in
greater detail. They concern the importance of aligning
project objectives to the context, supporting multiple stakeholders at the same time to attain such goals as a more equitable sharing of benefits, and the importance of assessing
and matching potential partners with care.

■

■

Importance of objective and context

One of the most critical success factors for this project was
that it was based on a critical analysis of the sectoral context and a vision for the sector’s development. For example,
the decision to aim for income and value generation versus
quantity and productivity increases had far-reaching implications for the design and approval of individual subprojects. Similarly, the decision to emphasize farmer-based
investments for farmer groups or in combination with
enterprise investments was based on the recognition that
farm incomes had high priority given the wide urban–rural
income disparity.
Supporting multiple stakeholders under
one investment

Traditionally a kind of a “trickle-down” effect was expected
when either companies or research institutions were supported through project funding, with the expectation they
would have a positive influence on farm incomes. In many
cases, this effect did not occur. The project has taken a
probably unique approach in combining funding for different groups of stakeholders in a single investment, often
under a joint business plan. Different arrangements such as
company-farmer, research-farmer, or research-companyfarmer were supported. The main advantages of this
approach were as follows:
■

It reduced the risk that companies would use public
funds to crowd out farm production and important
sources of farm household income for high-value products (for example, that a meat processor would run its
own pig farm). In line with the overall rural development
objective, the project forced companies to enter agreements with farmers or farmer organizations to source
their raw material from farm households and allocated at
least the same amount of funding to support farmers
(with technical and management training, basic infrastructure, and other resources).

It controlled the sharing of benefits. Supporting companies and farmers under a joint investment makes it possible to monitor and control the distribution of benefits.
It facilitated the commercialization of research results.
Linking public research (individuals as well as institutions) with companies or farmer groups and associations
in a joint business undertaking helps to ensure that
research results are directly relevant to business. Different arrangements have been tested successfully, such as
contracts between researchers and companies or farmer
associations, or participating researchers and research
institutions as shareholders.

Another lesson from the project is that the Chinese political and administrative environment made it difficult to
select proposals based on competitive procedures. A matching grant system was chosen as the preferable approach to
select private partners and suitable proposals. The selection
and approval of proposals was often combined with a
“negotiation process,” in which many proposals were modified to sharpen the public good outcomes and develop them
into PPPs (in other words, elements of a solicitation process
were incorporated).

Choice of companies and private partners

Initially several companies applying for support perceived
the project as an opportunity to receive public funds to
resolve a difficult business situation—startup companies or
companies that could not obtain additional commercial
financing. Many of these companies could not afford to wait
until their proposal had been vetted and funds became
available, so they dropped out of the process. The key lesson
from this experience is that a project needs to provide sufficient design clarity on whether it aims to act as a business
support and development project or a project aimed to support PPPs, in which case:
■

■

■

Private partners need to be thoroughly appraised for
their financial capacity, management skills, technical
know-how, and experience.
The PPP should not be the primary determinant of a
partnering company’s financial success.
Companies with a track record of successful businesses
in a field relevant to the PPP objective provide the highest chance for a successful partnership.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 3

Agricultural Cluster Development in Nicaragua
Nuria Ackermann, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

SYNOPSIS

his Austrian-funded UNIDO project (total project
budget of approximately €1.5 million) was implemented between 2005 and 2008 in Nicaragua to
foster the sustainable development of 14 agricultural and
agro-industrial clusters. The project’s innovative element
was its strategy for delivering technical assistance, in which
local institutions were subcontracted to act as cluster brokers. This approach considerably reduced the risk that cluster activities would falter after project closure because the
capacity to sustain such activities was lacking. Support institutions can more easily cater to the needs of a well-organized
cluster than of isolated actors, because the cluster enhances
the effectiveness and client orientation of their services. In
Nicaragua, cluster development turned out to be a strong
catalyst for mobilizing additional resources for private sector
development, especially for infrastructure and the strengthening of local productive capacities and organizations.

T

CONTEXT

Small and medium-sized agricultural and agro-industrial
production units account for a significant share of employment and income in Nicaragua, but their small size and limited resources trap them in a vicious circle of low productivity, cutthroat competition, and low or even decreasing
incomes. UNIDO’s current strategy to overcome these
problems is to promote clusters, which are geographically
defined business systems where producers specialize in the
same or related production activities. UNIDO’s entry point
for fostering systemic competitiveness in a specific cluster
was to facilitate the generation of trust and social capital.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

UNIDO’s approach placed particular emphasis on the role of
cluster brokers, who could mediate between stakeholders
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and trigger synergies between various territorial initiatives,
such as infrastructure development, capacity building and
skill development, adjustments of the regulatory framework,
access to capital, technology transfer, and promotional activities. Technical assistance sought to facilitate partnerships as
well as to link existing or planned initiatives so that they
would not be implemented in a parallel or uncoordinated
manner.
In the project’s first phase (2003–05), 11 pilot clusters
received assistance. Best practices identified during this
period helped adapt the cluster development methodology
to the Nicaraguan context. In the final phase described here
(2005–08, with €1.5 million from Austria), the project
focused on strengthening participatory processes in target
clusters, defining joint strategies, and implementing actions
that contributed to competitive growth and the exploitation
of market opportunities. More strategically, it reinforced
local stakeholders’ capacity to lead cluster development and
provide continuity once the project ended. It also helped to
increase the application of the knowledge of productive
linkages gained through the project by developing a critical
mass of academics and policy makers to apply this learning.
Indirect assistance to clusters through
brokering institutions

The innovative element in this phase of the project was that
UNIDO personnel stepped back from direct intervention as
cluster brokers and selected a local civil society entity to
assume this role in each cluster. UNIDO provided comprehensive classroom and on-the-job training based on its cluster development methodology to the employees of these
brokering institutions. In this way, the brokering institutions could obtain the skills required to continue their work
as facilitators after the project ended.
Clusters were selected for development based on field
surveys that gathered information about the concentration

of enterprises in the cluster, existence of a local identity and
shared culture among cluster stakeholders, the degree of
organization within the productive sector, the motivation of
entrepreneurs and local institutions, the existence of complementary projects in the locality, the potential for thirdparty funding for cluster activities, and market demand and
trends for products produced by the cluster, among other
criteria. The 14 clusters eventually selected belonged to a
number of subsectors, including the cocoa, dairy, livestock,
coffee, and banana subsectors.
Brokering institutions were selected through competitive
bidding. Selection criteria included being active in the cluster
but perceived as neutral by stakeholders, having strong ties
with or a good understanding of the productive sector, and
having qualified, experienced human resources. After training
in the cluster development methodology, the brokering institutions implemented it in their respective clusters. UNIDO
provided backstopping throughout this on-the-job training,
which was critical to capacity building and to adapting the
approach to the local context. Brokering institutions were
enabled to take stock of parallel activities to support the SMEs
in the target clusters and align actors and activities in ways
that would enhance each cluster’s performance.
UNIDO mainly financed activities to facilitate collaboration and synergies in territorial initiatives. In a few cases it
cofunded competitiveness-enhancing activities to trigger
imitation effects. The search for public and private funding
was a key responsibility of the brokering institutions. An
advantage was that UNIDO could draw on or leverage a

number of complementary initiatives in the target clusters
(box 5.32).
Capacity building for representatives of political
and academic institutions

UNIDO organized specific seminars for university teachers
and political actors at the national level to increase their
awareness of the importance of fostering systemic territorial
competitiveness. The aim was to ensure that a critical mass
of opinion and decision makers would take ownership of
the cluster approach and continue promoting activities after
the project’s closure. Between June 2006 and November
2007, UNIDO organized seven seminars on theoretical
aspects of cluster promotion for 25 professors of the economics departments of 8 prioritized universities and 20 representatives of the public sector. The training topics were
established in a participatory manner with the academic
counterparts, since the main objective was to build the
capacity of university professors to lecture on cluster development and motivate them to establish closer links between
the universities and the productive sector.

BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

The benefits, impact, and sustainability of indirect assistance with brokering and capacity building for academicians and policy makers are described in the sections that
follow. The discussion is supported by case studies.

Box 5.32 Complementary Cluster Development Activities Reinforced the UNIDO Project

■

■

■

A conducive policy framework, including a National
Development Plan focused on sector-specific and
territorial enhancement of competitiveness and the
Presidential Competitiveness Commission, an executive body for public-private dialogue.
Infrastructure development, including transport,
water, and electricity infrastructure developed by
the National Energy Commission, Inter-American
Development Bank, and the Government of Japan.
Institutional strengthening, including the establishment or development of local cooperatives
as well as the strengthening of national producer
organizations.

■

■

Other technical or financial assistance projects,
focusing on upgrading quality, facilitating market
access, and strengthening design and technological
capacities among producers and local authorities
(variously funded by Germany, Finland, the United
Kingdom, and European Union).
Activity by nongovernmental and civil society
organizations engaged in strengthening local cooperatives, production processes, and product quality
(through training and diagnostics) as well as market
access (promotional activities), including Oxfam,
HORIZONT3000, and the Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation.

Source: Author.
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Indirect assistance to clusters through
brokering institutions

The brokering institutions performed their new roles well in
the 14 clusters. Although the activities varied by cluster, the
UNIDO methodology was generally followed. In most clusters, the brokering institution conducted a participatory
diagnostic study to identify the main bottlenecks of the cluster. By involving all of the main local stakeholders, this exercise helped to create an initial base of trust. The brokering
institution usually went on to promote the establishment of
a cluster commission or territorial governance board that
integrated public and private actors. The brokering institution also provided training and backstopping to members of
the cluster commission and helped them design and implement a joint action plan to improve cluster performance.
Most brokering institutions started promoting joint
activities among cluster stakeholders even before the commission had been set up to achieve “quick wins,” to sustain
the actors’ sense of motivation, and to increase social capital

over time. Examples include the establishment of joint
farmer sales networks, vertical networks between primary
producers and processors, the organization of local trade
fairs, the adaptation of financial services to smallholders’
needs, and the introduction of environmentally and economically sustainable irrigation systems (boxes 5.33 and 5.34
provide specific examples).
After the project ended, public-private collaboration
continued or increased in 8 of the 14 clusters. In the other
clusters, communication between stakeholders remained
fluid, and levels of trust were preserved, but the cluster commissions/governance boards and brokering institutions
stopped performing their leading roles and the cluster lost
momentum.
Beyond the specific assistance provided under the project,
cluster initiatives unlocked a number of investment and economic opportunities. By engaging in business partnerships and
networking, firms could pool assets, increase their advocacy,
and mobilize local, national, and international stakeholders

Box 5.33 The Livestock Cluster in Chontales

In the Nicaraguan department of Chontales, around
5,350 producers raise livestock for meat on a small
scale. The brokering institution for this cluster was the
Center for Entrepreneurial Management (CEGE),
which belongs to the National Union of Agriculture
and Livestock Farmers (UNAG). UNAG had around
3,000 members in Chontales alone and was very active
in supporting farmers both technically and financially.
In 2006, after a participatory diagnostic study, CEGE
facilitated the creation of a cluster commission, which
was composed of representatives of the various cattle
farmers’ associations, local universities, the biggest local
slaughterhouse, various municipalities, the police, and
other public institutions. Under CEGE’s guidance, these
representatives prepared a joint action plan and implemented concrete activities to overcome the bottlenecks.
Project participants achieved the following results:
■

Small-scale cattle farmers were struggling with the
nontransparent grading and pricing system applied
by local slaughterhouses. CEGE helped to mediate a
stable supply agreement between five producers’

■

■

associations and the biggest local slaughterhouse.
The agreement specified the quality standards and a
premium for cattle meeting those standards. Producers raised their incomes; the slaughterhouse
gained a consistently good source of supply.
Cluster actors collaborated against widespread livestock theft. Three municipalities engaged livestock
guards (typically volunteers trained by the local
police and financed by the collaborating producers).
The largest slaughterhouse (87 percent), UNIDO
(7 percent), and the local university (6 percent) sponsored research by three university students on slaughtering and boning capacities. The results motivated
the slaughterhouse to fully finance the expansion of its
slaughtering capacity from 350 to 550 cattle per day.

CEGE continues to operate as the local brokering
institution. The cluster commission remains active and
has expanded its scope. Because most cattle farmers in
Chontales are also milk producers, CEGE and the cluster commission are fostering public-private linkages in
both the local livestock and dairy sectors.

Source: Author.
Note: CEGE = Centro de Gestión Empresarial, Universidad Centroamericana de Nicaragua; UNAG = Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos.
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Box 5.34 The Banana Cluster in Rivas

A significant share of Nicaraguan banana production is
concentrated in the department of Rivas, where around
4,000 small-scale banana producers operate. The
Banana Producers Association in Rivas (APLARI) was
the brokering institution for this cluster. APLARI provided assistance to its 500 members to improve production and marketing. In this case the cluster commission
included members of banana producer organizations,
local representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture and
Transport, the police, the army, local universities, financial institutions, and international cooperation agencies
operating in the area. APLARI helped the commission
members prepare a joint action plan, in which the value
of the planned activities amounted to US$850,000. Of
this, 5 percent was financed by UNIDO and the remainder came from APLARI, the government, the European
Union, the United Kingdom, Inter-American Development Bank, and others. Some of the main results
included:
■

■

APLARI helped institutions to adapt their support
services to producers’ technical requirements. One
result of this realignment was that producers started
to use the local university’s soil testing service.
The Ministry of Agriculture had tried to introduce
“best agricultural practices” among banana producers in Rivas but had failed because of a lack of
direct communication with the productive sector.
Thanks to APLARI’s intervention and European
Union support, 18 leading producers agreed to invest

■

■

in these practices on their farms. APLARI and the
Ministry of Agriculture provided training and technical assistance to the farmers. These producers
received higher prices for their bananas and served as
a model for other farmers.
APLARI supported four small producer cooperatives to establish a sales network to increase their
supply volume and bargaining power. The cooperatives started selling jointly to a Honduran banana
chip company and a high-end supermarket chain in
the capital. The incomes of producers involved in
these sales agreements had increased by up to 50
percent by the end of the project.
Banana producers on the lake island of Ometepe
found it difficult to sell to clients on the mainland.
The only private boat company charged extremely
high fares for transportation and did not respect
the time schedule. Intervention by public authorities (in particular the National Port Operator)
fixed transportation fees and restored adherence to
schedules. Port facilities were upgraded and
expanded. The improved boat connection with the
mainland benefited not only the producers in
Ometepe but facilitated the arrival of tourists to
the island.

When the project ended, APLARI and the cluster
commission continued promoting public-private activities in Rivas to strengthen the performance of the
banana cluster.

Source: Author.
Note: APLARI = Asociación de Plataneros de Rivas.

whose support would be out of reach to individual stakeholders. The agglomeration of local private enterprises
around a clear set of development objectives facilitated publicprivate dialogue, as it provided the private sector with a clear
agenda and legitimate leaders. Support institutions could
more easily cater to a well-organized cluster than to isolated
actors, so the effectiveness and client orientation of their
services improved.

Capacity-building for representatives
of political and academic institutions

At the cluster level, municipalities and other public actors
were actively involved in cluster commissions and began to

implement activities with the productive sector to foster systemic competitiveness. At the national level, however, newly
elected authorities preferred terminology associated with a
value chain approach, which may alter perceptions of the
cluster approach.
It had been envisaged to target university headquarters
for seminars on the cluster approach, as they could establish
the curriculums of their regional branches and foster wider
dissemination of the approach. In practice, the regional university branches were much more receptive to the cluster
approach, mainly because as cluster members they felt more
committed to local economic development.
Several regional branches of universities trained by
the project established links with the productive sector
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in their territory by becoming active members of the
cluster commissions. Seven of eight universities participating in the seminars included cluster topics in their
curriculums and had introduced 683 undergraduate and
121 graduate students to the cluster approach by the end
of the project.

■

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

A key lesson was that when the brokering institution was a
local producer association, facilitation continued after the
project ended. These types of organizations were well
embedded in the local context and benefited from a high
level of legitimacy with those they represented. Producer
associations sustained their role as facilitators because they
perceived it as beneficial to members and organizational
objectives. In contrast, brokering NGOs often stopped
working once the subcontract with UNIDO had ended and
funds to continue their work were not forthcoming. Unlike
the producer associations, the NGOs had a broader scope of
objectives, and their missions were less linked to a specific
territory and its producers.
Other lessons include:
■
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UNIDO’s long-term engagement in Nicaragua, combined with its wide-ranging experience in business network and cluster development in Nicaragua and the
region, were instrumental in developing a tailor-made
training methodology and ensuring an innovative and
sustainable project implementation strategy.

■

■

■

Given the limitations of time and funding, cluster
development must target a limited number of clusters
that become instrumental for showcasing the benefits of
the approach and transferring competencies to local
institutions that can replicate the approach. The selection of target clusters—based on clearly specified and
agreed upon criteria—is critical, because they can have a
demonstration effect extending beyond their immediate
concerns. Careful selection of the brokering institutions
and the specific employees that would act as brokers on
the ground also contributed significantly to success.
Social capital can develop in a cluster only if its stakeholders clearly perceive the advantages of joint action. It
is important to focus from the very beginning on identifying and implementing “quick win” joint actions to
increase motivation and expand cooperation.
The combination of classroom training, learning by
doing, and mentoring proved crucial for learning the
approach and adapting it to specific local needs. Training
in fund raising was not sufficient to guarantee sustainability once the project ended, however.
The involvement of local university branches helped to
disseminate the cluster development approach and
helped universities form an integral part of the cluster.

A final lesson is that the UNIDO approach (based on the
generation of trust, establishment of business linkages, and
formation of PPPs) can unleash a cluster’s growth potential
but cannot create potential where none exists. Social capital
can help to leverage limited resources, but local development will still be hampered if a territory lacks sufficient
funds to mobilize.
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SYNOPSIS

pecific grant programs—referred to here as
“Farmer Innovation Funds”—can be designed to
provide direct, fairly simple competitive access to
small grants or loans for individual farmers or farmer
groups, businesses, or other stakeholders who wish to
adapt, develop, or adopt innovations and business initiatives on topics and issues of their own choosing. Access to
such funding allows a wide range of innovations to be
tackled, and under proper conditions may expand enthusiasm and innovation capacity among smallholders, other
rural stakeholders, and those who support them. Different
funding schemes have been tested and adapted in several
countries throughout Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe,
with specific objectives, types of farmers, setups, grant
sizes, and screening and support mechanisms. The funding schemes are highly dynamic, evolving in response to
changing circumstances and experience gained. Farmer
Innovation Funds work better if and when decentralized
settings are used and when support institutions have the
necessary skills and experience to implement them. Funding mechanisms can be made more sustainable by linking
them with savings and credit schemes and structures
(should they exist) and/or by embedding them within
existing agricultural R&D institutions and mechanisms for
fostering innovation. Farmer Innovation Funds are most
powerful when they are not implemented in isolation but
as part of systemic, long-term efforts to promote and
strengthen sustainable farming, participatory innovation
development, and dynamic innovation systems and
processes, in which the roles and skills of various stakeholders (particularly smallholders) are recognized and
supported.

S

CONTEXT: WHY PROVIDE INNOVATION FUNDS
DIRECTLY TO FARMERS?

Although efforts have been made to provide public funding
to foster innovation among a diverse group of stakeholders
through competitive bidding (see, for example, World Bank
2010), such funds still tend to be allocated primarily to
research and extension institutions or other formal actors
in the agricultural sector (such as large NGOs), partly as a
result of the high administrative and technical requirements for accessing the funds. Consequently, such institutions and actors retain an overwhelming influence and
control over the main decisions related to who should benefit from such funding, how the innovation process is
organized, what types of activities are implemented, and by
whom. Conversely, farmers and other stakeholders
involved rarely have direct access to (and hence have little
to say about) funding to implement their own ideas about
which innovations o explore. In most cases, farmers receive
limited financial support to compensate them for the cost
of their participation in specific activities being funded
(such as working on experiments, linking with other actors,
and so on) or to motivate them to try out new technologies
developed by others.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

This profile examines how funding schemes to support
farmer innovation (“Farmer Innovation Funds,” FIF) can be
designed and what lessons can be drawn, based on two sets
of experiences:
■

Local Innovation Support Funds (LISFs) were initiated
under the Prolinnova1 network to test if and how
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■

research and innovation funding could be channeled to,
governed by, and accessed by small-scale farmers
through small grants (typically a few hundred dollars or
less) for developing innovations of their own choosing.
LISFs specifically target poor and vulnerable households
and focus more (but not exclusively) on local ideas and
technologies (existing or new), depending on what farmers actually want to achieve. LISFs have been operating
on a pilot basis in several low-income countries in Africa
and Asia over the past five years.
Competitive Grant Programs (CGPs) focus on commercially oriented, small- to medium-size farmer groups and
small rural businesses. Although CGPs work with poor
farmers, they prioritize commercially oriented ones. The
CGP focuses on business and market-oriented activities
and emphasizes adapting and adopting existing technologies (but not exclusively). CGP grants are generally
much larger than LISF grants (typically US$10,000 or
more). Grants include funding for investments to set up
the innovative activity, for external technical assistance,
and for technology transfer and demonstration to other
farmers and stakeholders. A CGP initially operated in
Albania, and similar schemes are being implemented in
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.

Both funds have some generic features. They are both
designed to provide a diverse spectrum of beneficiaries or
clients (including farmers, land-users, and rural businesses,
either as individuals or as members of groups) with easy
access to relatively modest grants or loans allowing them to
develop, invest in, and strengthen initiatives and innovations that they consider worth pursuing and which also
have the potential to produce public goods such as economic growth and rural employment, social equity, and
ecosystem services.
The funds can be used for various purposes and types of
innovations, including technical ones (natural resource
management, for example, or improved production, processing, or transformation of produce), organizational ones
(such as better access to input, service, and produce markets), and institutional ones (such as creating new institutions and rules or transforming existing ones). To fulfill this
purpose, funds may be used for implementing diverse types
of activities: experimenting on a smallholder’s own farm,
engaging in joint experimentation and other activities by
farmers and other stakeholders (researchers, extension
agents, and so on), transferring existing technology, or sharing and disseminating successful experiences. In doing so,
the aim is also to strengthen the individual and collective
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capacity of the fund recipients to innovate and to increase
their overall contribution to and participation in the innovation process.
Funds are administered by small multistakeholder committees or secretariats (usually with 5–10 members but no
more than 2 or 3 in the case of the CGPs) in charge of
organizing the calls for proposals and creating sufficient
awareness about the fund, clarifying the funding modalities
(grant size and cofunding share, interest rate if a loan is
involved, and so on), screening applications in a formalized
and transparent way, and overseeing the effective disbursement of funds (adapted to the financial services and circuits
available to the applicants).
In most cases, field days or innovation fairs and/or commercial radio or TV programs (in the case of CGPs) are
organized to share the results obtained by farmers through
their fund-supported activities. The intention is to increase
awareness about the funds and motivate more farmers to
apply for the next cycle of funding.
Other key activities typically include capacity building
for those who handle the fund at the local level as well as
representatives of organizations supporting farmers’ innovation. A typical fund program also seeks to establish an
enabling environment for implementing grants, allowing
careful M&E, and ensuring effective learning and sharing
with members of the FIF committees and with relevant
agricultural R&D institutions and policy makers. These
efforts are aimed at creating awareness and support for the
fund program’s longer-term sustainability.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

Farmer innovation funds present a handful of innovative
elements:
■

■

■

■

They are designed to be easily accessible to small-scale
farmers and other stakeholders through simple application forms and procedures, simple fund disbursement
modalities, support provided to farmers to fill in application forms and meet eligibility criteria, and the possibility of applying as individuals or groups.
They are meant to solve problems and to test innovations
defined and chosen freely by the applicants themselves.
Some FIFs (such as LISFs) strive to give farmers a prominent role in fund governance, including setting up criteria for selecting applicants, screening proposals, and
M&E.
FIFs have a relatively light administrative structure, so
that over time the corresponding costs are reduced and
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bureaucracy is minimized, allowing timely response to
applicants and disbursement of grants.
BENEFITS AND IMPACTS

The funds have reached several thousand farmers to date.
Table 5.12 summarizes information on numbers and
amounts of grants made in several countries in 2005–10.
Impact assessments of the LISF program are being carried
out. Initial evidence in Ghana and Ethiopia indicate that

many “new” innovations are emerging as a result of LISFs.
Not only the farmer innovators but also other farmers who
benefitted from sharing results are reporting higher crop and
livestock productivity and increased savings and incomes. In
both Ethiopia and Ghana, different stakeholders state that
more use is being made of participatory approaches to extension work in the zones where the LISFs operate. For examples
of innovations explored through FIFs, see box 5.35.
CGPs have proven effective in supporting farmer groups
and emerging rural businesses to introduce, test, and

Table 5.12 Key Characteristics of Farmer Innovation Fund Grants Made in Several Countries, 2005–10
Country
LISF scheme
Cambodia
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Nepal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
CGP scheme
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan

Period
covered

Applications
received

Percent
approved

Loan or
grant?

Award size (US$)

Who are the applicants?

2005–09
2005–09
2008–09
2008–09
2004–09
2005–09
2008–09
2005–08

193
109
80
103
63
65
25
98

69
43
43
22
38
23
64
68

Loan
Grant
Grant
Grant
Grant
Grant
Grant
Mostly loan

10–100
<100–300+
30–300
50–250
50–750
700–2300+
500–1000
25–120

Individuals filtered by group
Both individuals and groups of 4–5 persons
Mostly individuals
Mixed/unisex groups and individuals
Mostly individuals
Mixed/unisex groups and individuals
Group applications only
Initially groups, later also individuals

2002–08
2006–09
2007–10

656
276
279

22
20
22

Grant
Grant
Grant

3,000–15,000
Up to 20,000
10,000–30,000

Groups and associations
Groups, associations, small businesses
Groups, associations, small businesses

Source: Authors.

Box 5.35 Innovation Themes Explored in the Local Innovation Support Funds and
Competitive Grant Programs

Crop and animal husbandry. Examples include
devising inexpensive animal rations by replacing
externally bought feed with locally available feed,
treating animal disease with local plants, selecting
germplasm adapted to local conditions, controlling
bacterial wilt in enset (false banana), devising effective water-harvesting methods, improving apple and
peach production technologies, and using plastic
mulches in vineyards.
Processing and storage. Examples include vegetable
preservation, improved sheep cheese production and
brand marketing, and improved onion storage.
Improved quality and marketing. Examples include
collection and standardization of olive oil, improved

lean-meat pig production and marketing, improved
packaging of aromatic and medicinal herbs, and
improved packaging and marketing of honey.
Development of niche markets. Examples include
production of honeybee feed, production of saplings
for forest and ornamental trees, and production of aromatic and medicinal plants.
Sustainable natural resource management. Examples include increasing biodiversity and combating
deforestation through regeneration of an endangered
native tree species of economic value.
Social innovation. Examples include organization
of groups for developing innovations and improving
savings and credit schemes.

Source: Compiled from several LISF and CGP reports.
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demonstrate innovative technologies to a broader audience
of potential rural entrepreneurs and beneficiaries. About 85
percent of the direct grantees (for example, 700 farmers in
Albania) experienced an increase in yearly income and were
likely to continue their activities after completion. Over
20,000 farmers were directly exposed to new technologies
through the technology transfer activities, with an estimated
3–5 emulators per grant at completion and an additional
number likely to adopt and possibly adapt the technologies
in subsequent years (boxes 5.36 and 5.37 provide examples
of a CGP and an LISF case).

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

A number of lessons from the Prolinnova experience with
FIFs may be useful in designing similar interventions. They
are summarized in the sections that follow.
Ensure that funds are used for their intended
purpose

Farmer funds are meant to support innovation or promote
the adoption of new, relevant technologies (rather than

Box 5.36 An Example of a Competitive Grant Program Grant: Improved Onion Storage and
Marketing in Albania

A local farmer association asked for a competitive grant
to build a small onion storage facility to lengthen the
marketing period and obtain higher prices during the
off-season. During the grant period, the association
increased from 7 to 32 members, each with about 0.15
hectares of onions and total production of around 350
tons per year, and signed a contract with a trader in
Tirana to purchase the onions. Around 37 tons could
be stored at a time, with further investments planned to
increase storage capacity and to purchase a vehicle for

distributing the produce. Other activities included purchase of a sprayer and irrigation pump for use by members and drying onion seed for planting. During the
grant period, dissemination included two workshops,
five training days, three publications, and a local TV
broadcast focusing on various aspects of onion production and marketing. This grant eventually resulted
in linking production with markets and contributed
substantially to the development of a viable farmer
association in a remote corner of Albania.

Source: World Bank 2011.

Box 5.37 An Example of a Local Innovation Support Fund Grant: Propagating Podocarpus in Ethiopia

In the highlands near Ambo in Ethiopia, communities
rear livestock, produce crops, and plant trees for food
and income. One tree genus of socioeconomic importance is Podocarpus, a conifer that produces good timber. These trees are becoming extinct because of high
demand and the long dormancy of the seed, which
takes up to a year to germinate. A farmer, Jifara
Workineh, applied for and obtained an LISF grant to
test various germination methods with the aim of
shortening the dormancy period and regenerating the
tree population in his community. The LISF grant provided him with the required material inputs. Jifara
eventually developed a successful method of reducing

the dormancy period by placing seed mixed with soil in
a polybag, burying it in a hole, and providing sufficient
regular water. The method resulted in a high germination rate (85 percent) and reduced the dormancy
period from over a year to three weeks. Based on these
results, Jifara received an award from the government,
which raised his self-esteem; his income increased from
selling seedlings; and the community’s stocks of
Podocarpus have increased. In addition, researchers’
and especially extension workers’ attitudes towards
farmers changed, as they now recognized the contributions of local farmers to local solutions using mostly
local resources.

Source: Prolinnova–Ethiopia, personal communication.
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purchasing inputs alone). They generally achieve the
intended objective if good overall management of the program is ensured, local community-based organizations and
farmer organizations are strongly involved, proposals are
selected according to clear criteria and procedures, and
grants are formalized through signed contracts.
With respect to LISF schemes, greater clarity about fund
use emerged gradually, after some initial confusion about
whether LISF grants could cover input costs. With respect to
CGPs, three elements are taken into consideration in the
grant: investment, technical assistance, and technology
transfer. Operating costs and purchase of inputs are normally part of the beneficiary’s contribution, unless they are
clearly related to the demonstration function of the grant.

adequately resourced. It may result in delayed implementation of activities and “hijacking” of the process by researchers
or extension agents, which may lower the motivation of the
farmers. But provided things are done properly, that the
diverse stakeholders perceive the value of working together,
and that trust develops among the parties, several advantages emerge as the potential synergies between these actors
come into play. Farmers, scientists, extension agents, and private business owners learn and improvise together—which
is the full expression of an effective innovation system. Joint
innovation also usually implies improved research design,
more rigor in implementation, and better documentation of
results, all of which increase the prospects of wider application and dissemination of innovation.

Target the funds carefully

Costs associated with implementing
an effective FIF program

The best results are observed when funds are set up to target preexisting community-based organizations, farmer
groups, and institutions that have prior experience with
participatory approaches, and when good support institutions or service providers are selected.
Support institutions often face significant challenges in
terms of their ability to provide sufficient initial mentoring
to farmers and other grantees and then to step back and
allow fuller appropriation of the scheme by local actors. Support institutions also need to develop the capacity to attract
and involve major “conventional” agricultural R&D actors,
a recurrent challenge for NGOs engaged in FIF schemes. In
particular, it is critical to bring local and national extension
and research partners on board to facilitate the scaling-up
of the process and the results of such schemes.

Value added of farmer innovation compared to
joint innovation by farmers and agricultural R&D

Localized innovation with minimal support from outside
generally yields results that can be readily understood and
available to neighbors of farmers benefitting directly from
FIF grants. It is also a good way of empowering farmers and
strengthening their capacity to engage with the formal agricultural R&D environment.
For its part, joint (multistakeholder) innovation deriving
from structured and systematic interactions between farmers, researchers, and other actors in agricultural R&D is
geared more toward generating results that can be scaled up
with greater certainty. It is more costly and riskier than local
(farmer) innovation, as it invariably takes time to assemble
the right mix of partners and skills and to ensure it is

One key objective in establishing a fund program is to keep
administrative, support, and supervision costs as low as possible, compared to the amount invested in experimentation
by grantees. Given the fairly experimental nature of the LISF
and CGP programs profiled here (implying that new mechanisms and setups had to be designed), and the fact that
some expenses are fixed (such as those for M&E or for establishing and operating committees), the relative amounts
devoted to such costs versus the amount of the grants themselves may be quite high, especially in the initial stages.
Experience with LISFs over the past five years indicates
that, in the start-up phase, about two-thirds of the program
costs are associated with capacity building for farmers and
support institutions, operational costs (making calls,
screening proposals, reviewing progress, and so on), creating awareness about the fund, technical external backstopping by service providers and research, sharing and disseminating process and results, and M&E and impact
assessment. About one-third of program costs are for the
grants themselves. Over time, the costs associated with running an FIF gradually decrease relative to the cost share of
the grants, to about two-thirds grants and one-third running
costs. Overall, the absolute costs for the grant component in
the FIFs vary greatly according to size of awards, scale of the
program, and level of cofunding by grantees.

Effectiveness and dynamics of fund setups

The appropriate setup (local versus institutional, decentralized versus centralized) for governing and managing the fund
depends on the specific context, experiences, opportunities,

MODULE 5: INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY PROFILE 4: PROVIDING FARMERS WITH DIRECT ACCESS TO INNOVATION FUNDS

439

and the scale at which implementing a FIF program makes
the most sense. FIF programs have generally been moving
towards more farmer-led governance mechanisms and
structures. This shift requires support organizations to move
away from managing funds directly and to become more
involved in building the capacity of farmer groups to manage funds autonomously. Support institutions also play an
increasingly important role in ensuring the quality of proposals and integrity of fund use. The case from Cambodia
(box 5.38) illustrates the evolving nature of the setup.
Ideally, both local and central approaches could be
implemented at the same time. This strategy would speed
the learning process and the way the entire agricultural
R&D system operates and responds to farmers’ needs and
desires.

Sustainability and scaling up of FIF programs:
Advances and challenges

At the community level, considerable progress has been
achieved in giving farmers access to innovation resources

and in building their capacity to collaboratively manage
funding schemes at their level through specific training and
mentoring by support organizations. In financial terms, sustainability and a sense of responsibility can be enhanced by
putting payback arrangements into place within community organizations, as done in the case of the LISF Cambodia and Uganda. Not all stakeholders are keen on a loantype mechanism for funding research and innovation,
however, as this approach is easily confused with a classic
microcredit or loan scheme.
At a higher level, efforts to institutionalize the FIF concept within the country’s agricultural R&D systems are
incipient. In Tanzania, a local government has agreed to
help replenish the LISF in one district. In other countries,
some government agencies participate actively in implementing LISF pilots. In Cambodia, the government and
donors are interested in supporting the recently established central institution running the LISF over the long
term (box 5.38). In Albania, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Food and Consumer Protection built on the initial CGP
approach by creating an investment grant model in the

Box 5.38 Dynamics of the Local Innovation Support Fund Setup in Cambodia, 2006–10

An initial structure for the Local Innovation Support
Fund (LISF) in Cambodia was designed based on a feasibility study carried out in 2005–06. From the start, it
was decided to operate the LISF as a revolving fund.
Farmers could apply to the LISF for a loan, on which
interest was charged. This setup was seen as the best
way to make farmers feel more responsible for carrying
out LISF activities and to replenish and expand the initial fund, linking it to existing community-based savings and credit schemes. From 2005 to 2008, LISF pilots
were established in three provinces, each with a different organization playing the leading role, overseen by an
LISF National Steering Committee coordinated by the
Cambodian Center for Study and Development in
Agriculture (CEDAC), which also coordinates Prolinnova–Cambodia. Although LISF operations were
highly decentralized in operational terms, the three
provinces followed a common procedure. Fund
requests by individual farmers were first sent to a
farmer association, which compiled and forwarded

them to the lead LISF partner in the province. After a
preliminary review of the proposals, this partner forwarded them to the LISF National Steering Committee
for a final decision.
In 2008, the LISF scheme was expanded to 11
provinces involving a total of 20 NGO members of Prolinnova–Cambodia, but it proved too difficult to ensure
the necessary capacity building and the quality of the proposals and ensuing experimentation. It was also challenging to handle the varying degree of ownership by farmers
and local support institutions as well as to monitor the
results. Moreover, it was difficult to attract funding from
the national government and from international donors.
In response, starting in 2011, a new structure was
designed to implement the LISF through a farmergoverned, centralized national fund under an existing
farmer organization at the national level, Farmer and
Nature Net (FNN). CEDAC and other Prolinnova–
Cambodia partners play solely an advisory role to the
FNN.

Sources: Vitou 2008; FAIR workshop reports 2009, 2010.
Note: CEDAC = Centre d’Etude et de Développement Agricole Cambodgien.
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official government agricultural support program. In
Central Asia, CGP-like schemes have been set up to emulate the success obtained in Albania.
When integrating innovation funds into a wider framework, is it highly desirable to implement parallel activities
contributing to farmer empowerment and capacity
strengthening. When such integration has been achieved,
the scope and opportunities for an effective and sustainable
funding scheme are greatly expanded, at least in contexts
where poverty and serious social and economic problems
prevail.
With respect to choosing the appropriate grant size, small
grants are extremely relevant for very poor, risk-averse
farmers working with little outside help and little need for
investment in equipment or infrastructure, and on innovations that have a strong location-specific character or an
inherently small niche. They may also be a good way to start
and experiment with the FIF concept and process, before
institutionalization takes place.
Larger grants are relevant for better-off farmers, for group
applications, when costs of external research and advisory
services are factored in, and for supporting increased commercialization in rural areas. If and when actors from formal
agricultural R&D are ready to integrate FIFs into their activities, they will usually be more willing to go with bigger
grants than with small grants.

CONCLUSIONS

FIFs are a valuable, vital component of a wider approach to
strengthening innovation capacities and systems. By making
innovation funds more readily available to farmers and
other relevant stakeholders, FIFs, as illustrated by the LISF
and CGP experiences, are performing an essential role in
strengthening innovation and promoting a greater role and
voice for farmers and other rural stakeholders in governance
of agricultural R&D.
FIFs are most powerful when they are not implemented
in isolation but form part of systemic, long-term efforts to
promote and strengthen sustainable farming, participatory innovation development, and dynamic innovation
systems and processes, in which the roles and skills of various stakeholders (particularly smallholders) are recognized and supported. An FIF program should be complemented with investments in a number of related areas that
create an enabling environment for agriculture: improving
research and extension (to make them more responsive to
demand), nurturing the emergence and consolidation of a
vibrant private sector capable of providing services and
inputs and processing the produce, establishing effective
coordination mechanisms among these stakeholders,
designing and funding policies that will favor rather than
restrain innovation, improving education and training,
and favoring market linkages, among others.
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NOTES
Module 5 Overview

1. See the infoDev Monitoring, Evaluation, and Impact
Assessment study at http://www.idisc.net/en/Page.MEIA
.Study.Overview.html.
2. For example, through intellectual property rights (IPRs)
to promote greater impact of the research and innovations
emanating from an institution (for example, by licensing
technology to partners).
3. Financing instruments for agricultural innovation are
discussed in module 6.
4. See World Bank (2009b), which suggests this approach
for cluster evaluation; with some modification, it is suitable
for various business development programs.
Thematic Note 3

1. The Agribusiness Community of Practice recently
launched by infoDev (www.infodev.org) raises awareness of
the utility and need for agribusiness incubation. For more
details on agribusiness incubators, see infoDev (2011).
2. Examples of incubator models included in this section
are drawn from infoDev (2009), which assesses the best
international practices for ICT incubators and includes
case studies from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Jordan, and
South Africa.
3. This section is drawn from infoDev’s Incubator Toolkit
(www.idisc.net).
4. This section is drawn from infoDev’s Toolkit on Business Incubation. The forms noted in the section can be
accessed via the infoDev site: www.idisc.net.
5. Sally Hayhow, referenced in infoDev’s Incubator Toolkit
in the section on “The Role of the Incubator Board”
(http://www.idisc.net/en/Article.163.html).
6. Patient capital is long-term capital invested without
expectation of a quickly realized profit.
Thematic Note 4

1. For details on a cluster policy approach, see World Bank
(2009).
2. For details on a value chain approach, see FIAS (2007).
3. For a concise but detailed discussion, see World Bank
(2009).
4. For analytical work on this issue see Guiliani,
Pietrobelli, and Rabelotti (2004, 2005) and World Bank
(2009).
5. For a detailed description of advantages and disadvantages of the cluster mapping method, see World Bank
(2009).
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6. Another method would be to look at trade statistics.
7. See in particular USAID (2008).
8. World Bank (2009) provides a data-capture template
that helps to implement this diagnostic tool.
9. For further information on value chain analysis, see
FIAS (2007) and World Bank (2009).
10. For further information on institutional mapping, see
World Bank (2009).
11. This project continues; the preliminary results described
here were transmitted in an interview with the author.
12. See GEF (n.d.) and Negeli-Ganz (2008).
Thematic Note 5

1. Many published IP policies can provide guidance for
developing these policies; Kowalsky (2007) addresses the
role and structure of institutional policies.
Thematic Note 6

1. This report, based on research into 31 agricultural
investment funds, is a more general overview of investment
than this thematic note and is a useful and up-to-date
source of trends. It also contains seven case studies and
models of agricultural investment funds. The report
focused primarily on sub-Saharan Africa and transitional
economies and identified over 80 investment funds working
in agriculture and rural development.
2. Probably the best known example, which has been replicated by many countries, is the US Small Business Investment Research program. See http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK9607/.
3. For examples of angel and seed investing in agriculture,
see de Kleene (n.d.) and the presentation “Angel Investing in
Agriculture” (docstoc. www.docstoc.com/docs/10759/AngelInvesting-and-Agriculture).
4. An important model is Yissum Technology Transfer at
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which is responsible for
commercializing an array of successful products that generate over US$2 billion in worldwide sales every year. See
http://www.yissum.co.il/.
5. There are many descriptions of venture capital; see, for
example, Wyse (2007).
6. The technical definition is that the IRR of an investment
is the discount rate that makes the Net Present Value (NPV)
of the investment’s cash flow stream equal to zero. There are
many ways to measure economic development and social
good which are beyond the scope of this note.
7. There is a persistent myth that a large percentage of
new businesses in the developed world receive bank loans
and venture capital funding. In the United States, the
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Kauffman Foundation’s New Firm Longitudinal Study
estimates that 5 percent of new firms obtain business
bank loans. Venture capitalists invested in 440
startup/seed-stage companies; angels invested in 20,000
early stage firms (“Funding for the Rest of Us Entrepreneurs,” http://www.nyew.org/2010/05/funding-for-therest-of-us-entrepreneurs/, accessed August 2011). That
leaves approximately 95 percent of all new businesses not
funded by these entities. Interest in venture capital continues because venture-backed firms have generated enormous economic impact.

Innovative Activity Profile 1

1. Institute of International Agriculture, Mozambique
(IIAM); STEP, Thapar University, Patiala, India; NIABI
members: Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (TNAU),
Coimbatore, India; Anand Agricultural University (AAU),
Anand, India; Birsa Agricultural University (BAU),
Ranchi, India; Central Institute of Fisheries Technology
(CIFT), Cochin, India; Central Institute for Research on
Cotton Technology (CIRCOT), Mumbai, India; CCS
Haryana Agricultural University (CCS HAU), Hisar,
India; Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), New
Delhi, India; Indian Veterinary Research Institute (IVRI),
Izatnagar, India; Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa
Vidyalaya (JNKVV), Jabalpur, India; National Institute of
Research on Jute and Allied Fibre Technology (NIRJAFT),
Kolkata, India.

Innovative Activity Profile 2

1. World Bank (2005), in particular Annex 4, describes the
important role of farmer organizations in this project.

Innovative Activity Profile 4

1. Promoting Local Innovation in ecologically oriented
agriculture and natural resource management (www
.prolinnova.net).
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Creating an Enabling Environment
for Agricultural Innovation

OV E RV I E W

Johannes Roseboom, Consultant

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

he “enabling environment” for agricultural innovation encompasses factors that influence agricultural innovation positively but are controlled by
policy domains other than agricultural innovation policy.
An agricultural innovation policy seeks coordination with
these other domains to ensure that together they enable
agricultural innovation. Cross-cutting policy issues affecting agricultural innovation include policies to reduce
poverty and sustain the environment, to foster collaboration
between the public and private sectors, and to build social
capital more generally.
Three clusters of enabling factors for agricultural innovation appear to require attention and investment in most
developing countries: (1) innovation policy and corresponding governance structures to strengthen the broader framework for agricultural innovation policies; (2) regulatory
frameworks that stimulate innovation directly (such as IPRs)
or indirectly (standards that stimulate trade) or steer innovation towards certain preferred outcomes (safer food); and
(3) accompanying agricultural investments in rural credit,
infrastructure, and markets.
Innovation policy is a new area, and in most countries
the governance structure for innovation is only starting to
emerge. A particular challenge is where to assign responsibility for innovation policy within the government structure. Some countries delegate this task to the ministry in

T

charge of science and technology, while others establish a
higher-level entity that brings relevant ministries together
to coordinate national innovation policy. In most countries, the overall objective of the national innovation policy
is to facilitate the transition toward a knowledge economy,
resulting in increased competitiveness and sustainable economic growth. A national innovation policy defines the
roles and functions of actors and stakeholders within the
national innovation system (NIS), provides an overall
framework for innovation policies specific to particular
sectors, and sets priorities across sectors and technologies.
It creates positive conditions for innovation by investing
in public goods essential for an innovative knowledge
economy.
Regulatory frameworks important for agricultural innovation include those for IP; biosafety; and standards and
technical regulations related to agricultural health and food
safety and quality aspects. Countries will need assistance to
develop legislation, assess the options from which they can
choose, develop their regulatory agencies, and invest in
standards-related infrastructure.
Better coordination of agricultural innovation investments with accompanying rural investments should lead to
greater synergy and impact. Investments in rural financing
systems will adopt a more holistic approach to financial services, including credit, savings, money transfers, leasing, and
insurance. Investments in roads and market institutions and
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infrastructure help to improve agricultural productivity,
reduce marketing costs, increase profit margins, and open
up new opportunities for innovation.
These policies, investments, and regulatory reforms will
trigger significant changes, such as improving the access of
agricultural products to foreign markets, increasing private
investment in agricultural R&D, and fostering the use of
more sustainable agricultural practices. Policy measures will
be needed to ensure that people are not left behind and
make the transition to more promising economic activities.
RATIONALE FOR INVESTMENT

A key characteristic of the innovation systems approach is
its holistic perspective on innovation as a multifaceted, iterative process that is very much shaped by the context within
which it takes place. For that reason, national innovation
policies are usually formulated as overarching policies trying to coordinate a wide spectrum of policy domains—
science and technology policy, education policy, economic
policy, industrial policy, infrastructure policy, taxation policy, and justice policy, among others—in such a way that
together they create an environment that enables and stimulates innovation in the most positive way. Such overarching coordination is only possible with strong, high-level
political support, often in the person of the prime minister
or president chairing the council in charge of national innovation policy.
Sector-specific innovation policies (such as the policy
for agricultural innovation) more or less replicate the
national innovation policy’s overarching and coordinating
nature, but they will often have considerably less political
clout to influence policies outside their domains. For example, a sector-specific innovation policy will have little influence over the adoption of a tax regime for R&D. Such a
matter is more often dealt with at the national level.
One problem with the holism of the innovation system
approach is that it tends to incorporate its enabling environment. Because innovation systems (or for that matter
any soft system) do not exist “out there” as objective entities
or realities but rather exist only “in the minds of those who
define them” (Daane 2010), there is no natural delineation
between what is core to an innovation system and what
should be considered its enabling environment. An artificial
but potentially practical solution to this problem is to define
the “enabling environment” as those factors that influence
agricultural innovation positively but that are controlled by
policy domains other than the domain of agricultural innovation policy per se. An agricultural innovation policy will
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have to interact and seek coordination with these other policy domains to ensure that together they enable agricultural
innovation in the most positive way. This interaction may
possibly lead to collaboration in the form of joint projects
or programs, although not necessarily.
The agricultural innovation policy landscape

Figure 6.1 sketches the most relevant policy domains shaping agricultural innovation. At the most aggregate level,
political stability is by far the most critical, overarching factor for any innovation system. Without such stability,
investments in innovation activities (particularly those with
long time horizons, such as plant breeding) are too risky to
be attractive. Moreover, war and civil unrest often affect the
knowledge infrastructure (research stations are destroyed,
libraries plundered, and so on) and, by uprooting people,
lead to a loss of knowledge and experience of agricultural
practices and trade relations.
At the same time, it is important to realize that innovation in itself can be very destabilizing, because it comes with
what Schumpeter labeled “creative destruction.” New products and new production methods take over from old ones
and in that process destroy old jobs, vested interests, and
sometimes whole industries. As a result, innovations may
encounter much opposition and catalyze social unrest.
Creating new opportunities for those who lose their jobs
Figure 6.1 Policy Spheres Shaping the Environment for
Agricultural Innovation
Political
stability

Macroeconomic policies

Agricultural
policy

Infrastructure
policy

Agricultural
innovation

Science,
technology, and
innovation policy

Source: Author.
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(for example, by offering training to acquire new skills) is
one of those measures that should accompany innovation to
help reduce friction.
At the next level, macroeconomic policies dealing with taxation, exchange rate, market, and trade policies and similar
matters can have an important impact on the relative competitiveness of agriculture in regional and global markets. In
developing countries, many of these policies work against
agriculture. They result in a net taxation of agriculture that
hampers agricultural growth and innovation. Economic
reform programs for the past twenty-five years have
addressed this macroeconomic imbalance with some success (World Bank 2007b), but it remains a cause for concern
and policy attention, especially considering that developed
countries heavily subsidize agriculture to the detriment of
developing countries. Consensus is growing (amid concern
over rising food prices) that agriculture has been relatively
neglected in developing countries by both donors and governments and that agricultural budgets have to be raised.
The economic reform agenda focused initially only on
improving the productivity and competitiveness of the agricultural sector. Over the years, however, poverty reduction
and environmental sustainability have become equally
important objectives. This expanded policy agenda also
affects public investment decisions related to agricultural
innovation. The big challenge for policy makers is to decide
how to handle trade-offs between the different objectives.
At the meso level, four policy domains have the most
direct influence on agricultural innovation: (1) agriculture;
(2) science, technology, and innovation (STI); (3) education; and (4) infrastructure. These domains overlap considerably, and it is not always clear which domain should lead
when it comes to investments. For example, agricultural
research can be paid out of the agricultural budget or the
science and technology budget. The scope of these different
policy domains is also usually broader than agricultural
innovation per se. An important task for an agricultural
innovation policy is to influence and coordinate these policy domains (including investment decisions in those
domains) so that they create the best environment for agricultural innovation to prosper. Each policy domain is
described in detail in the sections that follow.
Agricultural policy. An agricultural policy usually
comprises a wide range of topics, including agricultural
health, research and extension, input supply, rural credit,
land reform and improvement, rural infrastructure,
market regulation and development, trade promotion, and
sector organizations (farmer organizations, cooperatives,

commodity boards, and the like). Some of these topics fall
fully within the agricultural innovation policy orbit—
agricultural research and extension, for example—whereas
others partially overlap. Coordination between these various
topics is important, because many of them complement
each other. For example, the lack of rural credit often
restrains the exploitation of market opportunities and new
technologies.
A crucial element in agricultural transformation is farmers’ integration into markets. With farmers’ increasing integration into markets, market institutions (commodity chain
organizations are one example) and regulations (such as
product and health standards) become more important and
require attention and investment. While agriculture-based
economies depend on self-sufficiency for food security,
urban economies depend on markets (including international markets) for food security.
Education policy. Agricultural education and training are
core components of an AIS (see module 2), but they are also
part of a broader national education policy that plays an
enabling role. There is a strong positive correlation between
primary education enrollment rates and agricultural
productivity. The effectiveness of agricultural extension and
training programs depends strongly on the basic skills that
farmers acquire through primary education. At the same
time, basic educational skills are important for those who
seek employment outside agriculture.
In many developing countries, vocational education at the
secondary level is virtually nonexistent (UNESCO education statistics),1 and job specialization starts only after secondary school. Elsewhere a long tradition of vocational
education at the secondary level equips the next generation
of farmers with skills and knowledge. Despite the considerable debate about the disadvantages of forcing young people
to make career choices early in life, the problem with waiting too long is that most students never reach the tertiary
level. Tertiary education usually targets the more specialized
jobs in agriculture, which may not necessarily be the best
preparation for an all-round farmer (module 2). Promoting
the introduction or expansion of vocational training in
agriculture at the secondary level should advance agricultural innovation, but it will require many countries to
rethink their national education policies.
Science, technology, and innovation policy. In recent
years, many developing countries—especially middleincome countries—have started to recognize the crucial
role of innovation in economic growth and are aiming to
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make the transition toward a knowledge economy. As a
consequence, STI policy is rapidly gaining importance in
these countries.
This new emphasis on STI significantly affects the public
agricultural research and extension services that pre-date
STI initiatives by several decades. After many decades of relative isolation within ministries of agriculture, these agencies must now interact with new STI agencies that have a far
wider scope that requires agricultural research and extension to compete with nonagricultural topics for resources.
Infrastructure policy. Innovation opportunities often
depend strongly on infrastructure such as roads, railways,
utilities, and irrigation systems. High transportation costs
are notorious for cutting heavily into the prices farmers and
agribusinesses receive for their products and raising the costs
of the agricultural inputs they purchase. When farmers and
agribusinesses find it unprofitable to produce for the market,
agricultural production often remains below its potential. It
is affordable access to markets that makes it worthwhile and
feasible to adopt new technologies, specialize, and raise
production. The economic impact of lower transportation
costs and improved market access can be quite dramatic (see
box 6.2 later in this overview). As illustrated in IAP 1 for
Zambia, investments in improved feeder roads can be an
essential component of efforts targeted at enhancing
agricultural innovation, value addition, and competitiveness.

Key enabling factors

The agricultural innovation policy landscape depicted in
figure 6.1 comprises a wide range of enabling factors that
are critical to agricultural innovation. It is impossible to
cover them all, but the more important ones can be clustered as follows:
■

■

■

452

Investments in innovation policy and corresponding
governance structures that strengthen the broader
framework for an agricultural innovation policy.
Investments in regulatory frameworks affecting agricultural innovation, such as IPRs, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and biosafety regulations, aim to
stimulate private actors to invest in innovation, improve
the quality and safety of their products, and/or facilitate
trade.
Accompanying rural investments such as investments in
rural credit, rural infrastructure (irrigation, roads, and
utilities), and agricultural markets.

PAST EXPERIENCE

Experiences with investments in enabling factors have been
quite mixed. Some types of investment have been around
for decades (if not centuries—witness rural infrastructure),
whereas others have emerged only very recently (biosafety
regulations). Hence these interventions have quite different
track records, as discussed next.
Innovation policy and governance structures

Investment in a national innovation policy and corresponding governance structures strengthens coordination across
policy domains on innovation issues, addresses issues relevant across sectors (such as IPRs or tax deductions for innovation), provides a framework for more sector-specific
innovation policies (including an agricultural innovation
policy), and, not unimportantly, prioritizes public innovation investments across sectors. In many instances, national
innovation policy has generated a substantial influx of new
ideas and instruments into the agricultural innovation
domain, including such concepts as business incubators and
risk capital (see module 5). Embedding agricultural innovation policy in the national innovation policy may provoke
inevitable complications and frictions, but at the end of the
day it should result in a stronger AIS.
Innovation policies were first implemented in developed
countries in the 1990s and have been emerging in developing
countries only in the decade since then. In most countries,
innovation policies and their accompanying governance
structures are still very much in flux; in fact, the large majority of developing countries, particularly the smaller ones, still
lack an innovation policy. In this sense, the historical record
of innovation policy is still very short, both in developing and
developed countries.
Regulatory frameworks

Except for environmental standards, the other three regulatory frameworks (IPRs, SPS standards, and product standards) have been around for decades, if not centuries. The
international standardization and mutual recognition of
these frameworks have been on the political agenda for
quite some time. The Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, launched in 1883, was one of the first
international treaties on IPRs. It has been revised many
times and gained numerous signatories since then. Globalization and intensified trade have put increased pressure on
countries to adopt these frameworks; the international
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community supports them strongly, and several international initiatives provide technical assistance and build
capacity to implement them.2
One type of IPR that is quite specific to agriculture is
plant variety rights (PVRs). In developed countries in particular, PVRs have been instrumental in developing a private
seed industry and enabling public plant breeding to be
funded through royalties. Only 68 countries are currently
members of the International Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)3, indicating an absence of
PVR legislation consistent with UPOV standards. Membership is especially weak in Africa and Asia.
Considerable debate surrounds the introduction of PVR
legislation in developing countries, many of which are
under pressure to introduce legislation to meet the deadline

(originally 2005, now 2016) set by the TRIPS4 agreement.
The debate focuses particularly on two issues. The first issue
is farmers’ rights in relation to breeders’ rights: To what
extent can farmers re-use, exchange, or sell PVR-protected
seed? The second issue is the role of farm communities as
custodians of genetic diversity: Should seed companies
compensate communities for their services? With respect to
the second issue, UPOV takes the position that farmers’ customary role as curators of genetic resources is best regulated
separately from PVR legislation. On the issue of farmers’
rights, UPOV has moved over time toward a more restrictive standard favoring plant breeders. The criticism of developing countries is that UPOV is pushing for the adoption of
developed country standards that are not necessarily adequate for developing countries (box 6.1).

Box 6.1 Plant Variety Rights Legislation in Africa

In 1998, the Heads of State of the African Union (AU)
adopted the “African Model Law for the Protection of
the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers, and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological
Resources.” This watershed document addresses two
issues—plant variety protection and access to biological resources—based on the premise that both issues
are closely linked. The AU model law strongly favors
farmers’ rights over breeders’ rights: PVRs can be withheld or nullified for reasons such as food security,
health, biological diversity, and any other requirement
of the farming community for propagation material of
a particular variety. The model law also emphasizes the
protection of Africa’s biological resources and traditional knowledge.
The model law was criticized heavily by UPOV and
WIPO.a Discussions between the AU, UPOV, and WIPO
in 2001 did not reconcile their differences. Yet the AU
member states did not hold a unified position on the
issues. Some members (Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and
Tunisia) belonged to UPOV many years before the AU
developed its model law. In 2002 the African intellectual
property organization OAPI,b comprising some 16

Francophone African countries, approved a plant variety protection (PVP) chapter largely in line with UPOV
standards as part of the 1999 Bangui Agreement. This
decision was taken despite major opposition by international nongovernmental organizations.
In more recent years, the discussion in Africa
regarding PVP has moved from the AU to the subregional economic communities, such as ECOWAS,
SADC, and EAC.c Their strategy is to harmonize the
(emerging) seed regulatory frameworks within their
communities to facilitate trade and to join forces where
possible to reduce regulatory costs. For example,
ECOWAS and SADC each recently adopted the idea of
setting up a common variety release system in their
respective communities. Both communities have initiatives to work toward an integrated, regional PVP system. SADC, for example, developed a draft protocol for
national PVP legislation. In other developing regions,
regional economic communities are keen promoters of
standardizing PVP systems. Most African countries
seem to be moving toward adopting a PVP system that
is compatible with the international UPOV standard—
but only after much heated debate.

Source: Author.
a. UPOV is the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants and WIPO is the World Intellectual Property
Organization. b. OAPI (Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle) was created in the early 1960s to replace the French
institute in charge of IPRs prior to independence. It manages a single IPR system across 16 countries. c. Economic Community
of West African States, Southern African Development Community, and East African Community.
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Accompanying rural investments

Most countries have a long history of addressing enabling
factors such as rural credit, rural infrastructure, and agricultural markets. In many instances, government interventions
in these factors in the form of direct investment or facilitating private or mixed investment have been far from adequate
and often rather fragmented, lacking attention to coherence
among interventions. To cite a recent World Bank evaluation
report on agricultural investments in sub-Saharan Africa):
...the lending support provided by the Bank has not reflected the
interconnected nature of agriculture activities. Rather, the lending has been “sprinkled” across an array of activities in rural
space, including research, extension, marketing reform, drought
relief, seed development, and transport, but with little recognition of the relationships among them and the need for all of
these areas to be developed at the same time, or at least in an
optimal sequence, to effectively contribute to agricultural development. While the Bank’s broader rural focus from the mid1980s was justified, an unintended result was that it led to less
focused attention on the need for various activities that are critical for agricultural development in rural space to come together
at the same time or to take place in some optimal sequence.
(World Bank 2007a, xxv)

Rural credit. The lack of working capital and access to
affordable credit often prevents farmers and agribusinesses
from buying modern inputs and equipment and fully
benefiting from proven technological opportunities.
Despite many attempts to address this issue, lack of
affordable rural credit remains a major bottleneck in many
countries. The formal banking sector is still largely absent
from rural areas, because it perceives the risks and
transaction costs to be too high to make business attractive.
Popular rural credit schemes run by governments from the
1950s to the 1980s did little to attract commercial banks and
proved unsustainable because of poor management and
high default rates. The microfinance movement that
emerged in the late 1990s tried to bridge the rural finance
gap through self-help groups, which absorb the high costs
inherent in small transactions and use social control to
reduce risks (IAP 4). This approach has its limitations, and
the model has not succeeded everywhere.
What is needed is a more active involvement of commercial banks in agriculture. Previous approaches tended to isolate financing for agriculture from the development of the
wider financial system and overemphasized credit as
opposed to savings and other financial services. Within a
financial systems approach, however, financing for agriculture is viewed as part of the wider rural finance market.
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Underpinning this approach is the fact that institutions
adhering to commercial principles are more likely to achieve
outreach and sustainability. The public sector’s role is to
concentrate on ensuring that the environment is conducive
to the emergence and growth of such institutions (World
Bank 2006).
For example, the Innovative Finance Initiative of the
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa tries to mobilize
commercial banks to provide more credit to the agricultural
sector through a loan guarantee scheme. By absorbing some
of the risks that commercial banks run when lending to agriculture, the initiative has managed to leverage some US$4
billion from commercial banks in the form of affordable
loans for farmers and agribusinesses (www.agra-alliance.org).
Another practice that has fallen out of favor is to use subsidized credit to introduce new technologies. Such schemes
have often undermined farmers’ repayment discipline
because farmers considered the subsidies to be gifts rather
than loans. Jump-starting the introduction of a new technology is best done through a direct subsidy (starter packets
at reduced costs, for example).
Rural infrastructure. Early research on economic
growth illustrated the importance of infrastructure,
provided that: (1) a good balance was maintained with
other investments and (2) infrastructure and related
services were run efficiently. More recent econometric
research suggests that infrastructure investment and
improvement may have received too little attention in the
lowest-income countries. There are also signs that rapidly
growing middle-income countries have underinvested in
infrastructure, leading in some cases to geographic patterns
of development that hamper economic growth (Willoughby
2002). Other recent studies of infrastructure investments
conclude that:
■

■

■

Institutional reforms are needed to strengthen the
capacity of local and regional governments to formulate
and implement an infrastructure policy and to
strengthen the capacity of infrastructure organizations to
provide customer-responsive services.
Institutional reforms in the more advanced countries
led to greater involvement of the private sector in
investing and managing infrastructure, which requires
improved capacity at the government level to run
transparent tender procedures and maintain open
competition.
Decisions to invest in infrastructure should focus on
regions that lag in economic development.
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Box 6.2 Economic Impact of Rural Roads in Bangladesh

A detailed econometric study of the impact of investments in rural roads in Bangladesh found substantial
savings in household transport expenses, averaging
about 36 percent in villages participating in the Rural
Development Project (RDP) and 38 percent in villages
participating in the Rural Roads and Market Improvement and Maintenance Project (RRMIMP). Road
improvement also significantly affected men’s agricultural wages (which rose by 27 percent in RDP villages),
fertilizer prices (which fell by about 5 percent in RDP
and RRMIMP areas), and aggregate crop indices (prices
increased by about 4 percent in both project samples,

whereas production increased by about 38 percent in
RDP and 30 percent in RRMIMP villages). The road
effects are substantial for adult labor supply in RDP villages and schooling of both boys and girls. The overall
effect of road improvement on per capita consumption
was estimated at 11 percent in both project areas.
This study clearly shows that investment in rural
roads unleashes the agricultural production potential
of rural areas. The supply response to what looks like
modest input and output price changes is quite dramatic in the study areas. Much of this additional production found its way to the market.

Source: Khandker, Bakht, and Koolwal 2006.

Despite broad agreement about the importance of rural
roads for linking farmers with markets, surprisingly little
statistical evidence exists on the size and nature of the benefits of rural roads or their distributional impacts. Isolating
the impact of investments in rural roads on agricultural
productivity from other enabling factors is not only challenging (Walle and Cratty 2004), but many other benefits
must be considered—higher wages, better access to schooling and health services, and so forth (see box 6.2).
Another rural infrastructure investment, irrigation, is
considered an innovation in its own right as well as an
important enabler of agricultural innovation more generally.
A key reason cited for the limited impact of Green Revolution technology (improved varieties in combination with
modern inputs) in sub-Saharan Africa is the very limited
area under irrigation in comparison to other regions, particularly Asia. The underlying problem is that investment costs
per irrigation unit are many times higher in sub-Saharan
Africa than in Asia. Irrigation investment projects also tend
to fail more often in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank’s
Operations Evaluation Department identified specific weaknesses in irrigation investment projects, including irrigation
system design, operation and maintenance, cost recovery,
and user groups. For example, cost-recovery schemes did not
improve operation and maintenance because revenues went
into the general treasury. Despite these weaknesses, World
Bank irrigation projects report good returns on average, but
these projects require above-average preparation and oversight because of their complexity.

Market institutions and infrastructure. Investment
in market institutions and infrastructure was greatly
affected by the market liberalization ideology that
dominated the economic policy debate during the 1980s
and 1990s. During the 1960s and 1970s, many governments
played an active, direct role in agricultural markets, and
donors provided significant direct investment in stateowned companies, government-controlled cooperatives,
and public marketing agencies. When these governmentdominated systems fell into disgrace because of their poor
performance, donor support for them evaporated. Difficult,
lengthy, and sometimes disruptive processes of privatization
and market liberalization marked the ensuing transition to
private market-based systems. It took some time to realize
that well-functioning markets would not inevitably emerge
(and foster agricultural innovation); some form of
government assistance is often needed. Attention has
recently focused on strengthening a new architecture for
agricultural market institutions and incentives, promoting
private commercial activity, and reorienting state activity to
providing enabling regulatory and physical infrastructure;
as a result, donor investments in market institutions have
begun to increase again (World Bank 2006).

KEY POLICY ISSUES

Aside from the more thematic policies that shape agricultural innovation, discussed previously, several cross-cutting
policy issues affect agricultural innovation. They include
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policies to reduce poverty and sustain the environment, to
foster collaboration between the public and private sectors,
and to build social capital more generally.

Poverty reduction and environmental sustainability

The impact of investments in agricultural innovation has
been measured mainly in terms of improvements in agricultural productivity (see the numerous rate-of-return
studies). Over the years, however, environmental sustainability and poverty reduction have assumed equal importance as outcomes of agricultural innovation. This changed
perspective affects not only the orientation of investments
in agricultural innovation but investments in enabling factors. An environmental sustainability assessment is standard
procedure for major investment projects in most countries.
The poverty alleviation impact of new technologies is often
difficult to assess ex ante, however. In this sense, innovation
in itself is a rather crude poverty alleviation instrument, in
contrast to enabling factors such as investments in rural
infrastructure or rural credit, which can be targeted far
more specifically to the poor.

Social capital

When it comes to strengthening the various enabling factors
that stimulate agricultural innovation, social capital (the
institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality
and quantity of a society’s social interactions) often stands
out as critical to success. Examples of social capital’s important role include the management of irrigation schemes,
self-help groups in microfinance initiatives, communal road
maintenance, the establishment of value chains, and similar
efforts.
NEW DIRECTIONS, PRIORITIES, AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR INVESTMENT

The previous section described the policies that shape the
enabling environment for agricultural innovation, which
can range from the very generic to the very specific. This
section explores concrete investments that will stimulate
agricultural innovation by creating a more positive enabling
environment.
Investments in innovation policy and
governance structures

Public-private collaboration

With widespread adoption of the market-economy model,
many governments are minimizing direct intervention in
the economy and, where possible, leaving things to the private sector. When government intervention is unavoidable,
governments are delegating or contracting implementation to the private sector as much as possible. For example,
in closing the rural finance gap, the preferred approach
now is to involve commercial banks (often by subsidizing
them to take on less profitable rural loans) or microfinance schemes rather than to establish government-owned
rural banks. The construction of rural infrastructure is
contracted out to the private sector, which is increasingly
contracted to handle infrastructure operations and maintenance as well.
A primary objective of many national innovation policies is to create the right incentives for private investment in
innovation. Governments can use five important instruments to stimulate private investment in innovation: (1)
IPR legislation; (2) tax deductions and subsidies for R&D;
(3) antitrust legislation (because a competitive environment
stimulates innovation); (4) subsidized risk capital (either
directly or through tax deduction facilities) and business
incubators; and (5) restraining bureaucratic procedures for
introducing new products and technologies.
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A national innovation policy should:
■

■

■

Provide guidance to actors and stakeholders within the
NIS regarding their roles and functions in the system,
and give a sense of direction (in other words, describe
what they want to achieve together).
Provide an overall framework within which innovation
policies specific to particular sectors—agriculture,
health, energy, and so on—and particular technologies—
ICT, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and so on—should
fit. The national policy sets priorities across sectors and
technologies (and the public resources allocated to
them), whereas the more specific policies set priorities
within a particular sector or technology field.
Create the best possible conditions for innovation by
investing in a range of public goods essential for an
innovative knowledge economy. A functional analysis of
the NIS is a good starting point to identify which functions of the system are particularly weak and require
additional attention and investment. Aside from the
more traditional investments in the generation and
exchange of scientific knowledge, investments are needed
to support the application of scientific and industrial
knowledge throughout the economy. Although this
responsibility primarily belongs to the private sector,
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government can stimulate innovative behavior in the
business sector by providing incentives for private
innovation (subsidies, tax breaks, and recognition, for
example) and by stimulating the startup of new, knowledge-intensive companies using business incubators,
venture capital, and similar measures (module 5).
Since innovation policy is such a new area, in most countries the governance structure for innovation has only very
recently started to emerge. “Governance” concerns the systems
and practices that governments use within their NISs to set
priorities and agendas, design and implement policies, and
obtain knowledge about their impacts (OECD 2005).
A particular challenge is where to assign responsibility for
innovation policy within the government structure. A considerable number of countries have delegated this task to the
ministry in charge of science and technology, while others
have opted to establish a higher-level entity that brings relevant ministries together to coordinate national innovation
policy. TNs 1 and 2 discuss investments in innovation policy
and innovation governance structures in greater detail.

Investments in policy and regulatory frameworks
that affect agricultural innovation

The most important regulatory reforms underway at present that affect agricultural innovation include:
■

■

IPRs. Like PVRs and patents, trademarks, certification
marks, and geographic indications are IPR instruments
that, applied correctly, support private investments in
product quality and distinctiveness that go beyond minimum standards. The TRIPS agreement places considerable pressure on countries to comply. These issues are discussed in TN 3 and IAP 3.
Biosafety. Frameworks (including instruments and
activities) that analyze and manage risks in the sectors on
food safety, animal life and health, and plant life and
health, including associated environmental risks (which
came together under the so-called biosecurity framework). For example, the establishment of proper legislation and enforcement capacity regarding genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) is a prerequisite for regulating their adoption (or prohibition). Signatories to the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety assume the obligation
to put the necessary legislation and enforcement capacity
in place.5 A large number of countries in Africa and Asia
have yet to adopt biosafety legislation and enforcement
regimes. Investments are needed to put regulations in

■

place, establish oversight structures, and train personnel.
TN 4 discusses the ins and outs of biosafety regulation.
Technical regulations and standards. TN 5 explores the
introduction and upgrading of technical regulations and
standards related to food safety, animal life and health,
plant life and health, and quality-related attributes. The
past several decades have seen a tremendous expansion of
the number of technical regulations and standards emerging in these areas. This momentum reflects the intensification of regional and global trade and heightened concerns
over accompanying threats to food safety and animal and
plant health, as well as consumer concerns on the environmental impacts of agriculture production. It also reflects a
wider set of innovations in science and technology that
permit very sensitive detection and analytical methods, as
well as improved knowledge of the quality and associated
health hazards of agrifood products. But these emerging
technical regulation and standards are also defining the
focus of agricultural innovation. For example, plant
breeding can be steered toward developing products that
attain a preferred quality attribute (size, color, taste, and so
on), while the prohibition of certain pesticides (due to
stricter regulations) will induce research on alternatives
for the control of pests and diseases.

For some time, countries may need assistance to develop
the necessary legislation and assess the options from which
they can choose. They will also need support to build and
strengthen the related regulatory agencies and invest in
standards-related infrastructure.
The regulatory reforms currently being implemented are
expected to trigger all kinds of changes, such as improving the
access of agricultural products to foreign markets (because
they will meet higher SPS standards), increasing private
investment in agricultural R&D (because IP is protected), fostering the adoption of more sustainable agricultural practices
(because of the introduction and enforcement of environmental standards), and increasing the adoption of GM crops
(because biosafety legislation and enforcement are in place).
Accompanying rural investments

Systems-thinking increasingly permeates approaches to economic development, including agricultural development.
Criticism of earlier agricultural investments has focused on
their tendency to operate as relatively isolated interventions
that fail to develop any synergies. The current trend within
the World Bank is to formulate bigger and more holistic
agricultural development projects with longer time horizons. This module describes examples of the three types of
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rural investment that have strong synergies with agricultural innovation investments:
■

■

■

Rural financing systems. To eliminate the lack of affordable credit as a constraint on the adoption of agricultural
innovations, it is better not to look at credit in isolation,
but to take a more holistic approach to financial services,
including credit, savings, money transfers, leasing, and
insurance. Microfinance initiatives can be an important
intermediate step toward a more mature rural financial
system. IAP 4 provides an innovative example of microfinance in Andhra Pradesh.
Rural infrastructure. IAP 1 provides an example from Zambia of how investment in improved feeder roads enhances
agricultural innovation, value added, and competitiveness.
Market institutions and infrastructure. There is a strong
synergy between market development and agricultural
innovation, as both tend to take a value chain approach
and emphasize the importance of markets and market
institutions. Investment opportunities in market development include market infrastructure (such as distribu-

tion and collection points, storage facilities, and market
and auction facilities), market institutions (such as supply chain organizations and information systems), and
the capacity to explore and develop new markets.

MONITORING AND EVALUATING AN ENABLING
ENVIRONMENT FOR AGRICULTURAL
INNOVATION

How can a country’s progress in creating an enabling environment for agricultural innovation be monitored and evaluated? This section identifies indicators corresponding to the
various enabling factors discussed in this module (table 6.1).
The indicators can monitor progress through time and, by
benchmarking with other countries, give an idea of a country’s relative position in establishing an enabling environment. The list of indicators is just an illustration, but a pretty
good one to make a start. Other factors and indicators can be
added later, and some may not be feasible in all instances
because reliable statistical information may be lacking.

Table 6.1 Enabling Environment Factors and Indicators
Cluster

Enabling factor

Macroeconomic Political and socioeconomic stability
policies

Education

• Political instability index (the Economist) or consult www.countryrisk.com for various
stability indices

Favorable macroeconomic policies

• Net taxation of agriculture
• Difference between the official and the market exchange rate
• Impact of trade agreements on the agricultural sector

Increased public investment in
agriculture

• Agricultural expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure
• Share of public goods in agricultural expenditure

General education

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Agricultural education

Agricultural higher education
Innovation
policy and
governance

Indicator(s)

A comprehensive national
innovation policy in place

Literacy rate (urban/rural)
Enrollment in primary education (urban/rural)
Enrollment in secondary education (urban/rural)
Enrollment in higher education (urban/rural)
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores
Enrollment in agricultural schools at secondary level
Enrollment in on-the-job agricultural training schemes (such as farmer schools,
extension courses)
• Number of agricultural graduates
• Presence of an innovation policy
• Presence and use of innovation policy instruments

Innovation governance structure in
place

• Existence of a governing body at the governmental (highest political) level for STI
• Involvement of key stakeholders of the STI system in the governing body (composition
of the governing body)
• Existence of a national strategy (priorities) for STI
• Main activities for the implementation of the national strategy
• Intensity of interaction in the STI system vertically and horizontally
• Participation and commitment of the private sector in policy preparation and
implementation

General “innovativeness” of a
country

• Composite innovation indices such as the World Bank Knowledge Economy Index, the
UNCTAD Innovation Capability Index, or the UNDP Technology Achievement Indexa

(Table continues on the following page)
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Table 6.1 Enabling Environment Factors and Indicators (continued)
Cluster
Regulatory
reforms

Accompanying
rural
investments

Enabling factor

Indicator(s)

IPR legislation and regulatory regime • Status of IPR legislation (patents, PVRs, trademarks, certification marks, geographic
in place and operating effectively
indications)
• Capability of the IPR registration system (e.g., average time to complete a registration)
• Capability of the legal system to handle IPR disputes
• Patent statistics (number of newly registered patents, broken down by local and foreign)
• PVR statistics (number of newly registered varieties, broken down by local and foreign)
• Use of certification marks and geographic indications
Biosafety legislation and regulatory
regime in place and operating
effectively

•
•
•
•

Policy and regulatory frameworks
and capacity for managing
agricultural health, food safety
and associated environmental
risks in place and operating
effectively

• Legislative and regulatory frameworks upgraded
• Institutions operating under clear mandates
• Effective mechanisms in place for coordination and collaboration among the entities
performing SPS and quality-related functions (including private actors)
• Prioritization of investments and short-, medium-, and long-term plans in place to
ensure that identified capacity needs (for example, in terms of skills, physical
infrastructure, institutional structures, and procedures) are met
• Incentives in place to support private sector compliance
• Set of sustainable agricultural practices developed and promoted

Well-functioning rural financial
system
Good rural infrastructure

•
•
•
•
Well-functioning agricultural markets •
•
•

Biosafety legislation in place
Biosafety regulatory system in operation
GMO research trials allowed
Introduction of genetically modified crops

Domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP
Agricultural credit as a percentage of total domestic credit
Road density per square kilometer
Percentage of agricultural land under irrigation
Percentage of agricultural production sold in the market
Share of exports in total agricultural production
Presence and strength of supply chain organizations

Source: Author.
(a) UNCTAD = United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 1

National Innovation Policy
Johannes Roseboom, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

ational innovation policies tend to be overarching, attempting to coordinate a wide range of
more specific policies (for science and technology, education, IPRs, the economy and industry, trade, and
taxation) and foster optimal conditions for innovation. A
national innovation policy (based on NIS ideas and concepts) enables the formulation of an agricultural innovation
policy in two ways. First, its economy-wide perspective
makes it possible to address issues that should be dealt with
at the level of the national economy rather than individual
sectors. Second, it promotes innovation system thinking at
the sector level. This note describes the steps and tools in
this policy-making process.

N

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The recent rise of innovation policy around the world has
been strongly influenced by the NIS school of thinking. NIS
thinking has been picked up by national and international
policy makers remarkably quickly throughout the world,
partly because the OECD was an early promoter of the concept but more importantly because countries are looking for
ways to respond to increased global competition. How can a
country improve its competitive edge? This question is
arguably even more important for the world’s poorest countries than for wealthy ones. However, the NIS concept does
not provide a simple blueprint for organizing innovation. It is
foremost an analytical tool for policy making and planning.
A national innovation policy is not just an extension of
the science and technology policy. It is a higher-level policy
integrating science and technology, economic, industrial,
infrastructure, taxation, trade, labor, and education policies
(to name the most relevant). For this reason, it is not limited
to one particular ministry or agency. It requires substantial
coordination and consensus building among ministries as
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well as socioeconomic partners such as the business sector,
trade unions, and value chain organizations. The mix of
policies for innovation depends on the country’s political
orientation and objectives, and different forms of innovation require different policy instruments and responses
(OECD 2010). One developing country with a very articulate innovation policy and strategy is Chile (box 6.3).
ACTIONS NEEDED

The role of an innovation policy is to create the best possible
conditions for innovation by developing a range of public
goods that are essential for an innovative knowledge economy. The best possible conditions will vary significantly from
one country and sector to another, depending on the development phase, economic structure, and national priorities.
Five key functions have been identified and are recommended
as the primary targets of a national innovation policy.1
First, organize and implement a national innovation policy. Such a policy should mobilize and engage the various
actors and stakeholders within the innovation system, provide guidance regarding their roles and functions within the
system, and give a sense of direction, explaining what they
want to achieve together. Important steps in this process are
described in box 6.4. In most countries, the overall objective
of the national innovation policy is to facilitate the transition toward a knowledge economy, resulting in increased
competitiveness and sustainable economic growth. As noted
in the module overview, a national innovation policy should
provide an overall framework within which sector-specific
and technology-specific innovation policies should fit. This
approach may require improved coordination and coherence of policies and different layers of government. The
national policy sets out overall priorities across sectors and
technologies (and the public resources allocated to them),
while the more specific policies set the priorities within a
particular sector or technology field.

Box 6.3 Chile’s Innovation Strategy

Following a long period of stagnation from the mid1950s to the mid-1980s, Chile’s economy started to take
off, and for the past twenty-five years, it has been one of
Latin America’s better-performing economies. The
opposition parties elected to government after 1988
continued the free-market policies introduced by the
military junta to a substantial extent but with a greater
appreciation of government’s role in economic development, including its role in stimulating innovation.
Chile’s economy has been booming partly because of
high revenues from copper exports. To invest those revenues wisely, the government decided to invest heavily
in moving away from a predominantly resource-based
economy (agriculture and mining) toward a knowledgeintensive economy. For this purpose, it created a national
innovation fund for competitiveness (FIC, Fondo de
Innovación para la Competividad), funded by a new tax
on mining, in 2005. A newly created national innovation
council for competiveness (CNIC, Consejo Nacional de
Innovación para la Competividad), in which the various
sectors and interest groups are represented, advises FIC
on how to allocate its resources, while an interministerial committee on innovation (CMI, Comité de Ministros
para la Innovación) is responsible for implementation.
As part of this new initiative, CNIC has formulated
a national innovation strategy. After extensive study
and consultation, CNIC selected five economic clusters
on which to focus science, technology, and innovation
(STI) investments: agro-food, aquaculture, mining,
tourism, and global services. For each selected cluster, a

strategic board with public and private representation
has been created to set cluster-specific priorities. The
Strategic Board of the Agro-Food Cluster has identified
the following subclusters as the most promising for further development and knowledge intensification: fruit,
wine, processed food, pigs and poultry, and red meat.
These priorities have been passed to the various STI
funding agencies, which are organizing calls for proposals for these priorities or giving the selected clusters
priority in more generic calls for proposals. Moreover,
despite their name, competitive funding schemes are
being used to cement stronger links within the innovation system by promoting cross-institutional collaboration between universities and research institutes and by
promoting public-private partnerships in the form of
“technology consortia.” The latter instrument not only
cements collaboration between a research agency and
the private sector but between companies that share a
common technology platform.
Since FIC’s creation in 2005, public STI investments
in Chile have more than doubled in real terms (reaching US$530 million in 2009). Public STI investments
are projected to continue to grow by 10–15 percent per
year over the coming ten years.
Parallel to the STI initiative, the Chilean government
established a major scholarship scheme (Becas Chile)
in 2008, which will allow some 30,000 Chileans to study
abroad over the next ten years. The budget for this
scheme is some US$6 billion and is also financed out of
mining royalties.

Source: Author.

Second, improve the regulatory framework for innovation. Given the many actors within the innovation system
and their often conflicting interests, a set of rules and regulations is needed (on dealing with IPRs, fair competition, technical standards, health, and environment,
among others) to create a playing field that is transparent
and fair.
Third, foster innovation through education. Innovation
depends on the level of education in the general population, including the knowledge and skills that people will
need in the future and strategies to keep knowledge and
skills up to date (in other words, to develop a capacity for

lifelong learning). Innovation also depends on the education of science and innovation specialists more specifically,
which may involve among other things motivating students
to specialize in science.
Fourth, facilitate the creation, exchange, and diffusion of
knowledge. This is the core business of an innovation system.
Knowledge should not be limited to knowledge generated
only by research organizations (and as such codified in
scientific publications and patents) but should include
the knowledge (a large part of it tacit) accumulated
within the economy of a country. It is important to make
sure that knowledge (both scientific and industrial) is
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Box 6.4

Developing an Innovation Policy

Many of the steps or components of developing an
innovation policy do not occur chronologically but
simultaneously or in reverse order. They include:
■

Policy analysis. This step requires a thorough
understanding of existing policies and their influence on the innovation system (in other words, their
interaction with institutions and actors). A functional analysis may be a useful input in grasping the
strengths and weaknesses of the policies in place.

■

Formulating policy advice. To a large extent, the
political context determines whether policy makers
are sensitive to evidence and how evidence reaches
them. Knowledge of the political context and entry
points for evidence and dialogue are essential. Influencing policy through research requires good data as
well as credibility of the institution presenting the
data. For new ideas to be embodied in policies, it is
critical to prove that those ideas provide a solution
to a real problem. In presenting such evidence, communications skills are highly important, and using a
diversity of communications methods increases the
chances of success compared to relying on a single
method or pathway. Through links with media,

■

■

intermediary organizations, and networks advocating for policy change, policy makers can be pressured from different angles to change policies in a
certain direction.
Policy making. Policy makers need to get involved
actively in the multistakeholder exchanges and
activities that occur to facilitate and realize innovation. When policy makers are immersed in a subject,
evidence-based policy making becomes experiential
policy making. Policy makers learn, through interaction and engagement with other system actors, how
policies influence the system and what changes
would be required.
Policy implementation. Often the job ends for policy makers when the policy is written down and
made official, yet stating the policy is only the starting point for change, not the end. An inclusive policy-making process makes it more likely that the
policy will actually be implemented. When different
stakeholders understand the need for policy change,
have invested in it, and stand to benefit, there is
pressure on the one hand to enforce the policies and
on the other hand there is a greater likelihood that
stakeholders will abide by the implemented rules
and regulations.

Source: Author, drawing on KIT 2011.

adequately stored and accessible. An important variable in
this context is the quality of a country’s ICT infrastructure and the density and quality of its Internet connections. It is also important to stimulate the exchange of
knowledge beyond national borders, which may involve
measures to improve the language capabilities of knowledge workers, stimulate attendance at international scientific conferences, and create exchange programs and
industry-specific study tours.
Fifth, mobilize and allocate resources for innovation activities. Funding of innovation activities can range from fully
public to fully private and everything in between, depending on the type of industry and activity. The national innovation policy should: (1) define which innovation activities
require public support; (2) define the tax base for public
funds (general versus specific taxes; see box 6.5); (3) define
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the type of funding instruments to be used (subsidies, tax
breaks, patents, procurement, and so on); and (4) prioritize
and allocate public resources across the various innovation
activities.
These principal functions of an NIS also remain relevant
at the AIS level, but many of the policies shaping these
functions at the AIS level are formulated as part of the
national innovation policy. For example, most investments
in education affect all sectors, and the same is true for many
regulatory issues, such as IPR legislation and environmental standards. At the same time, the agricultural innovation
policy may opt for sector-specific policies if the situation
requires. For instance, it may choose to support plant
breeders’ rights or agricultural advisory services. For this
reason, it is important to coordinate the development of an
agricultural innovation policy with the development of a
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Box 6.5 The Creation of Sectoral Science, Technology, and Innovation Funds in Brazil

While Brazil has invested substantially in science and
technology since the 1970s, the economic impact of
these investments has been modest and uneven. In the
1990s, the Brazilian science and technology system was
criticized for being too science oriented, placing little
emphasis on innovation, and lacking stable funding
because of economic problems. The Ministry of Science
and Technology (MCT, Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia) introduced major restructuring of the funding of
the science and technology system in 1999. It set up
sector-specific science, technology, and innovation (STI)
funds (in part replacing older funds), which are financed
through levies to be negotiated within each sector. In this
way a substantial amount of new and more stable
“private” resources were mobilized to finance STI of relevance to each specific sector. For sectors in which a levy
was not feasible, the government increased the levy on
foreign technology transfer payments from 15 percent to
25 percent. The increase finances 4 out of 15 funds.
Of the 15 funds that have been established, 2 are
not sector-specific but focus on bottlenecks in the

STI system: the university-business fund and the
fund for science infrastructure. The infrastructure
fund is financed through a 20 percent levy on all of
the other sector funds. The sector funds have the
status of trust funds and are managed jointly by the
academic community, industry, and government.
The strong representation of industry in these funds
was a particular innovation for the Brazilian STI
system.
The sector funds serve four major government
objectives: (1) stabilize financial resources for mediumand long-term R&D; (2) improve transparency in
funding decisions, merit reviews, and evaluations; (3)
reduce regional inequalities; and (4) promote interaction between universities, research institutes, and
companies. The selection of strategic sectors, their
respective shares of the funds’ resources, the blend of
basic and applied research, the required overall
budget, and sources of support are all jointly decided
by the academic community, private sector, and
government.

Source: IAC 2003; Roseboom 2004.

national innovation policy and make sure that they are
consistent.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The development of a national innovation policy usually
reflects the priority that a country assigns to knowledge as
an important (if not the most important) source of future
economic growth, especially as capital accumulation levels
off and the transition toward a capital-intensive economy is
complete. A national innovation policy helps shift the
emphasis in macroeconomic policy from physical capital to
human and social capital.
A national innovation policy can also help to create more
coherence in a broad range of government policies dealing
with issues such as economic development, education, competitiveness, trade, and R&D investment. More coherent
policies should help to improve the overall effectiveness of
the NIS.
The more prominent role attributed to knowledge in
economic development has sparked renewed interest in

agricultural innovation and how to improve and modernize
it. At the same time, NIS thinking is influencing AIS thinking in important ways:
■

■

■

■

■

Far greater emphasis is placed on private R&D and innovation activities by private firms. Agricultural research
and extension were traditionally viewed as government
responsibilities. Relatively little attention was given to
involving the private sector.
Education receives greater emphasis as an important
enabling factor in agricultural innovation, both on the
farm and in research and extension agencies.
The regulatory framework’s importance in shaping innovation is more widely recognized; for instance, biofuel
targets play an important role in shaping the biofuel
innovation agenda.
Innovation driven by market demand and market
opportunities is given greater emphasis.
More attention is paid to improving the mobilization,
inclusion, and coordination of innovation actors and
stakeholders.
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POLICY ISSUES

A national innovation policy in a developing country will
need to address a number of important policy issues. For
example, it will need to define the roles of the public and private sector in innovation; ensure that institutions and incentives are in place to govern and coordinate innovation; determine the priorities for innovation; come to terms with the
environmental and social implications of innovation; and
acknowledge the informal economy’s role in innovation.
Defining public and private roles in innovation

From a market economy perspective, innovation is first and
foremost a task of private entrepreneurs. Government policy should focus on creating an enabling environment for
private innovation to take place. Some of these policies,
such as well-functioning markets, sound corporate governance, and sound financial institutions, may not be specifically aimed at fostering innovation but are nonetheless
important. Other policies, such as IPRs, the setting of technological standards, science education, and basic research,
may enable private sector innovation more directly. When it
comes to innovation, however, a great deal of market or systemic failure requires more direct government intervention
or support (Edquist 2001). In primary agriculture, for
example, the extreme fragmentation of production into
small family farms has traditionally been a legitimate reason
for the government to intervene directly.
Governance and coordination

A country’s innovation performance depends in part on the
strength of the institutional arrangements and incentive
structures that govern innovation. Innovative activity is not
governed by government alone. Actors from research and the
business sector, as well as other stakeholders, play important
roles. TN 2 provides a detailed discussion of governance in
formulating innovation policy and coordinating innovation.
Making strategic choices

Most countries are too small to excel in all sectors and technologies. One has to be selective and make strategic choices to
concentrate innovation investments in specific technology
fields and sectors. Spreading resources too thinly will be
counterproductive. How to make such strategic choices is a
major policy issue and requires sound analysis of the options.
Chile offers a good example of an innovation policy that
makes clear strategic choices (box 6.3). Many countries avoid
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setting these priorities because they are highly sensitive from
a political standpoint, but a characteristic shared by successful innovators such as Finland and the Republic of Korea is
that they have restructured their economies strategically
toward more knowledge-intensive industries (see TN 2).

Environmental sustainability

Many current production and consumption patterns are not
sustainable in the long run. They deplete natural resources
and are so polluting that they may cause climate change, with
far-reaching repercussions for life on earth. Aside from raising overall productivity, innovation must meet increasingly
stringent criteria for environmental sustainability and offer
green solutions. It is virtually imperative for a national innovation policy to address this overwhelming challenge that
faces humankind over the next few generations. Some countries are seeing the environmental crisis as an economic
opportunity and positioning themselves as champions of
green technologies (a small country like Denmark, for example, is a world leader in windmill technology). In agriculture,
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is one of the major environmental challenges, along with developing strategies to
cope with the effects of global warming.

Social considerations

The flipside of innovation is creative destruction. Jobs disappear to low-income countries or are replaced by more
efficient production methods requiring less labor. Policy
measures are needed for people to make the transition to
more promising economic activities and new jobs. Education plays a major role in this process, including the concept
of lifelong learning. Agriculture is a classic example of how
innovation often results in fewer jobs. The exodus of labor
from agriculture is characteristic of economic development
and coincides with the transition from an agricultural to an
industrial economy and from rural to urban life. This transition has never been easy, but it seems to have become even
more difficult as innovation in industry has also reduced the
demand for labor. Industry’s capacity to absorb labor is far
lower than it was one hundred or even fifty years ago. China,
for example, still has a very large rural labor surplus despite
rapid industrialization over the past three decades.

Informal economy

Many developing countries have a very significant informal
economy within the overall economy. The informal economy
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is something of a blind spot for government policies, including innovation policy. Even the most comprehensive concept
of NISs has yet to fully address innovation that takes place in
the informal sector—yet disregarding the role of the informal
sector can produce misleading, asymmetrical, and ineffective
innovation strategies (Kraemer-Mbula and Wamae 2010).
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PRACTITIONERS

A dynamic NIS does not emerge overnight. Such a system is
built and continuously improved only through a sustained,
long-term commitment by government and the private sector. A national innovation policy should guide this process.
In most countries, particularly in the difficult institutional

context of developing countries, implementing an innovation policy can be challenging. A long-term strategy to
develop a national innovation policy should be inspired by
a philosophy of “radical gradualism,” which suggests a
sequence of finely tuned, small, specific reforms and successful outcomes that paves the way for broader institutional changes (World Bank 2010). One of the first issues to
tackle is the fact that in most developing countries the
capacity to formulate and implement an innovation policy
is usually scarce and must be built over a considerable
period. An example of the radical gradualism approach is
Argentina’s Unleashing Productive Innovation Project,
which comprises a wide range of interventions to eliminate
critical bottlenecks within Argentina’s innovation system
(box 6.6).

Box 6.6 Unleashing Argentina’s Productive Innovation

The Unleashing Productive Innovation Project is a
major World Bank effort (its total budget is US$223
million for five years, of which US$150 million is loan
money) to assist Argentina to become more innovative,
promote diversification into more knowledge-intensive
economic activities, and stimulate economic growth.
The project, which strongly reflects a national innovation system approach, consists of the five components:

■

Developing human capital for productive innovation (US$28 million). This component fills critical
human capital gaps in the national innovation system by developing training programs for “technology brokers” and “technology managers” to professionalize and improve innovation processes. It also
offers scholarships to pursue studies in information
and communication technology (ICT) and reduces
Argentina’s shortages of qualified personnel.
Support for new knowledge-based companies (US$
54 million). This component promotes the development of new knowledge-based companies through
two complementary activities. The first is a pilot of
an early-stage venture capital fund. The second is the
creation of a proactive, market-driven incubation
cycle—from the initial idea to a commercial project,
through early-stage venture capital investment—by
establishing “deal flow” promoters that are mainly
remunerated on a fee-for-success basis.

■

■

■

■

Fostering sector-specific capacity for productive
innovation (US$85 million). This component will
develop critical capacities in three priority areas:
biotechnology, nanotechnology, and ICT. Resources
will be allocated through competitive funding
schemes designed to foster public-private and
private-private collaboration. The private business
community will play a lead role in these funds, both
in specifying the research agenda and funding it.
Upgrading research infrastructure (US$36 million). Funds will be allocated on a competitive basis
using predefined selection criteria, such as the
extent to which the beneficiary is connected with the
productive sector.
Strengthening the policy and institutional framework for innovation (US$20 million). This component will strengthen the policy-making capacity of
the Ministry of Science and Technology, strengthen
the capacity of the National Agency for the Promotion of Science and Technology in selected areas,
and support dissemination of project activities.

Although the project does not target the agricultural
sector specifically, the sector can benefit from it in various ways, especially through the biotechnology fund
included in component 3. Indirect spillins from the
other components are likely as well.

Source: World Bank 2008.
(a) See module 5, TNs 3 and 6, for discussions of how incubators and risk capital are used to support agricultural innovation.
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Pay attention to scale and scope

Innovation systems can be considered at different scales,
from a national scale to smaller geographic or political units
(states, regions, provinces), and with different scopes, from
economy-wide to sector- or commodity-specific innovation
systems. From the point of view of policies for improving
the enabling environment for innovation, the issue of scale
and scope is relevant. Policy objectives must be explicit with
respect to the scale and scope of the system they intend to
influence. At the same time, a balance needs to be struck
between centralized and decentralized political decisionmaking in terms of scale and scope. A national innovation
policy should provide the basic architecture for who is
responsible for what.
Another challenging issue is where to situate responsibility for innovation policy within the government structure.
Many countries have delegated this responsibility to the
ministry of science and technology, while others have opted
to establish a higher-level entity that brings the various relevant ministries together to coordinate innovation policy
(see the Chilean example in box 6.3 and TN 2 on innovation
system governance). As noted in the module overview, the
latter option seems to be preferred.2
A criticism of national innovation policies is that they
tend to ignore opportunities for supra-national collaboration in the innovation sphere. They are often too inward
looking and ignore opportunities for regional or international collaboration. Regional economic communities are
becoming more active on innovation policy issues, however.
They often press hard for product and technology standardization within their communities to create the optimal conditions for a single market. The EU is by far the most
advanced regional community in terms of having a regional
innovation policy in place (known as the Lisbon Strategy).
In addition, various industry-specific or technology-specific

innovation platforms in Europe enable European industries
to work together on new technologies.
Mobilize a broad spectrum of actors in making
innovation policy

An important factor in successfully setting and implementing an innovation policy agenda is the ability to mobilize a
broad spectrum of innovation actors. Successful mobilization of these actors depends on factors such as persuasive
arguments and incentives, as well as the autonomy of the
actors in the institutional landscape, the nature of existing
linkages (social capital), and the effectiveness of leadership.
The policy agenda for STI is sometimes dominated by narrow scientific elites with considerable influence, particularly
in countries with a less mature innovation system (OECD
2010). One way of getting a better overview of the innovation landscape is to conduct a functional analysis of the
actors that make up the landscape (box 6.7).
Evaluate and measure innovation performance

Continuous monitoring and evaluation of a country’s innovation performance should be an important component of
any national innovation policy. Do the various policy
instruments and interventions yield the expected results?
Benchmarking is a much-used tool at the international level
to identify best innovation policy practices, while composite
innovation indicators help to monitor innovation performance across countries and through time (box 6.8).
Foster interaction between the national innovation
policy and the agricultural innovation policy

The introduction of a national innovation policy often
has an important impact on the public agricultural

Box 6.7 A Functional Analysis of a National or Sectoral Innovation System

A functional analysis is useful to rapidly assess a
national or sectoral innovation system.a It can help to
identify the principal actors within an innovation system and the linkages and interactions between them.
Weaknesses identified in such an analysis can form a
good starting point for formulating specific innovation

policy interventions. The standard steps in a functional
analysis of an innovation system are:
1. Define the boundaries of the innovation system in
focus. The level of aggregation in a functional
appraisal can vary substantially. For example, one
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 6.7 A Functional Analysis of a National or Sectoral Innovation System (continued)

can deal with the business sector as one entity or differentiate it by sector, size, innovation profile, or
some other feature. This process will enrich insights
into how the innovation system functions and hence
help to fine-tune policy interventions.
2. Identify and engage the principal actors in each of
the stakeholder groups within the innovation system,
including (1) the business sector, (2) the government
sector (including the principal policy-making, coordinating, financing, and regulatory agencies for science,
technology, and innovation), (3) the research sector
(research organizations, universities, and others),
(4) technology transfer and other intermediary organizations, (5) organized civil society (nongovernmental organizations, consumer groups, trade unions, and
the like), and (6) possible foreign innovation partners;

3. Define the primary functions that the innovation
system needs to perform. The “Actions Needed” section proposes five key functions that an innovation
system needs to perform. These functions are not set
in stone but can be reformulated to match the specific context to which they apply.
4. Bring steps two and three together and map in a
matrix format how the different stakeholder groups
and their specific actors contribute to the different
key functions. This exercise should help identify
possible missing actors or weak links between actors
or stakeholder groups. Such mapping is best done
on the basis of interviews with the various actors
involved in the innovation system. An alternative
is to make the map based on brainstorming sessions
with key experts.

Source: Author.
a. See Paterson, Adam, and Mullen (2003) and Ivanova and Roseboom (2006) for practical examples of applying a functional
analysis approach to national innovation systems.

Box 6.8 Benchmarking National Innovation Systems and Policies

Since the mid-1990s, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has conducted
an array of studies on national innovation systems and
policies, covering its member and nonmember countries (including leading developing countries such as
Brazil, Chile, China, and South Africa).a The OECD
methodology, based on the Oslo Manual: Guidelines for
Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data (issued in
1992 and updated in 1997 and 2005), has been copied
frequently by other innovation system studies. The latest edition of the Oslo Manual includes specific guidelines for the implementation of innovation surveys in
developing countries, based largely on experience with
the methodology in Latin America.
In 2000, the European Union adopted its “Lisbon
Strategy,” which aims to “make Europe the most
competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world.” As part of this strategy, the

European Union publishes an annual European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) to monitor the innovation performance of individual member nations as well as the
performance of the European Union in relation to other
economies such as the United States, Japan, China, and
Brazil. The EIS methodology comprises seven innovation dimensions, grouped into three blocks:
■

■

Enablers: Captures the main innovation drivers that
are external to the firm and comprises two dimensions: (1) human resources (measures the availability of highly skilled and educated people) and (2)
financial resources (measures the availability of
finance for innovation projects and the support of
governments for innovation activities).
Firm activities: Captures innovation efforts that
firms undertake and comprises three dimensions:
(1) investment in innovation by firms (multiple
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 6.8 Benchmarking National Innovation Systems and Policies (continued)

■

variables); (2) linkages and entrepreneurship
(captures entrepreneurial efforts and collaboration among innovating firms and also with the
public sector); and (3) throughputs (IPR registration and balance of payments regarding technology royalties).
Outputs: Captures the outputs of firm activities
and comprises two dimensions: (1) innovators
(measures the number of firms that have introduced innovations onto the market or within their
organizations) and (2) economic effects (captures
the economic success of innovation in employment, exports, and sales arising from innovation
activities).

In addition to EIS, several other international innovation indices are produced, including the World Bank
Knowledge Economy Index, the UNCTAD Innovation
Capability Index, UNDP Technology Achievement Index,
the RAND Science and Technology Capacity Index, the
WEF Global Competitiveness Index, the INSEAD Global
Innovation Index.b The indices use different approaches,
but rankings are reasonably stable across indices. Incomplete and poor data cause the rankings of countries at the
bottom to be considerably less stable, however. One criticism of current measurement frameworks is that they
often fail to measure the social impacts of innovation (on
well-being and poverty reduction, for example).

Source: Pro Inno Europe 2010; World Bank 2010; OECD 2010.
(a) The OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy comprehensively assesses innovation systems in individual OECD members and
nonmembers, focusing on the role of government. The reviews provide recommendations to improve policies affecting innovation performance, including R&D policies. Each review identifies good practices from which other countries can learn
(www.oecd.org/sti/innovation/reviews).
(b) UNCTAD = United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme;
WEF = World Economic Forum; and INSEAD = originally Institut Européen d’Administration des Affaires (European Institute
of Business Administration).

research and extension services established decades earlier. These agencies are required to interact more vigorously with STI agencies that have a far wider scope and
compete with nonagricultural agencies for resources from
STI funding schemes. National innovation policies also
tend to introduce new instruments to promote innova-
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tion that are not designed specifically for agribusiness but
which agribusiness can use. Business incubators, risk capital, technology consortia, technology parks, technology
subsidies, and private R&D incentives (subsidies or tax
deductions) are examples (many of which are discussed in
module 5).
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 2

Governance of Innovation Systems
Christopher Palmberg, ADVANSIS Ltd.
Tarmo Lemola, ADVANSIS Ltd.

SYNOPSIS

nvestments in developing an NIS should give governance particular attention, especially the systems and
practices for setting priorities and agendas, designing
and implementing policies, and obtaining knowledge about
their impacts. This note provides examples of the roles that
innovation policy and its governance have played in the
development of innovation systems in Finland, Republic of
Korea, and South Africa. Based on these cases, the note identifies governance activities relevant to innovation systems
for agriculture in developing countries and discusses the
related policy issues, lessons, and recommendations emerging from the case studies. A key issue arising from the cases
is that well-functioning innovation systems critically
depend on how well governments can bring together and
coordinate the activities of the various actors and stakeholders fundamental for advancing science, technology, and
innovation in various sectors of the economy.

I

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Governance concerns the mechanisms by which decisions are
made in an organization, whether public, private, or nonprofit. Governance has several dimensions, including power,
culture, incentives, leadership, and coordination. In governance of an NIS, the systems and practices for setting priorities and agendas, designing and implementing policies, and
obtaining knowledge about their impacts receive special attention (see OECD 2005). A number of factors impinge on the
efficiency of the governance of an NIS—in other words, the
extent to which policy processes have the greatest effect with a
given use of resources (OECD 2010). Evidence indicates that
efficient governance depends on certain qualities, including:
■

Legitimacy. The policy actors and approaches adopted in
policy processes have to be widely appropriate and
accepted for the tasks at hand.

■

■

■

■

Coherence. The different strands of innovation policy
and associated policy instruments must fit together.
Stability. Innovation requires sufficiently stable framework conditions, institutions, and policy.
Ability to adapt. As the environment for innovation
evolves, and innovation evolves along with it, governance
actors need to be able to adapt.
Ability to steer and give direction. A related capability is
the governance system’s ability to provide direction to
actors and steer the innovation system as a whole. The
ability to provide direction requires commitment and
leadership from policy makers at the highest level.

Governance of innovative activity is not provided by
government alone. The research and business sectors as well
as other stakeholders such as NGOs play important roles in
many aspects of the governance of an NIS. For example, a
society’s accumulated social capital can make an important
contribution to innovation by increasing trust among the
actors, which makes joint innovation efforts as well as communication and sharing of knowledge between the actors
easy and successful.
Innovation system governance at the sectoral level is an
important part of overall innovation system governance. In
the agricultural sector, the earliest attempts at coordinating
AIS were centered on strengthening agricultural research
coordination. A number of developing countries have established research governance bodies, but they tend to represent only a narrow range of AIS stakeholders, consisting primarily of ministerial representatives or researchers. They
have often lacked a consistent, rigorous process for setting
priorities. The current movement to improve the representativeness of these governance bodies and their mode of
operation is encouraging, however (for example, seeking to
represent a wider range of stakeholders and regions,
improving transparency, and using diverse prioritization
tools). The overall trend is toward strengthened research
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governance and multidisciplinary NIS governance (as discussed in this note), wherein agriculture is one sector
among many. Some countries have made specific efforts in
AIS governance, however. Typically these efforts center on
subsectoral governance and coordination—for instance,
through commodity boards and subsector networks—
rather than on national agriculture/rural innovation governance structures (like Chile’s FIA and Australia’s Rural
Research and Development Council). Module 1 discusses
innovation coordination in agriculture in greater detail and
provides examples of AIS coordination and governance at
the macro, meso, and micro levels.
Although this TN discusses NIS governance, benefits,
policy issues, and lessons primarily from developed countries, it can help identify relevant issues and lessons for
developing countries and their AISs. Finland, Korea, and
South Africa have been chosen as examples because, in different ways, they represent NISs in which government actors
and agencies play an important role. They also represent
NISs at different phases of development to illustrate governance challenges from different viewpoints. A separate note
in this module discusses overall innovation policy issues.
Finland

Finland began to apply the NIS concept before many other
countries, and its NIS has a relatively streamlined governance structure, developed in the mid-1980s and early
1990s. The Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and
Innovation (Tekes, teknologian ja innovaatioiden kehittämiskeskus), was established in 1983, and R&D programs
soon followed. A key characteristic of the Finnish system is
that high-level government officials (prime minister,
finance minister) as well as representatives from universities, public research organizations, and industry participate
in the Research and Innovation Council, which develops
national guidelines for innovation. Operational responsibility for policies is delegated to the Ministry of Education and
Culture (for basic research), the Ministry of Employment
and the Economy (for applied research and the enabling
environment for innovation), and other ministries.
A second important characteristic of the Finnish NIS is
that the main funding agencies (Academy of Finland for
basic research and Tekes for applied research) enjoy considerable autonomy in implementing programs, introducing
new policy instruments, and managing these programs and
instruments on a day-to-day basis. A third characteristic is
the strong tradition of collaboration and coordination
throughout the NIS, both across the main ministries and
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agencies involved as well as down through the various
decision-making levels. There is a strong element of consensus building among the main stakeholders in the design
and implementation of policies. Companies and the
research community are often involved in policy discussions
as experts or through their branch organizations. Innovation policy also explicitly aims to support collaboration and
networking between industry, universities, and public
research agencies. For example, the R&D programs commissioned by Tekes require collaboration by industry, universities, or public research agencies.
Republic of Korea

Korea’s government has taken an active approach to NIS
governance, especially since the mid-2000s. As in Finland, in
Korea the NIS involves high-level government officials
(ministers and other key stakeholders) in designing STI policy through the Presidential Advisory Council for Education, Science, and Technology (with representatives from
industry, academia, and research) and the National Science
and Technology Council (formed by government ministers). The role of ministries in implementing policy down to
the level of individual R&D programs and projects is noteworthy, especially within the Ministry of Education,
Science, and Technology (MEST).1
Unlike Finland, in Korea the NIS has a complex governance structure. Government science and technology policies have long roots, and the government’s overall role has
been pronounced. A key challenge for Korea is to govern its
rapidly growing portfolio of policy measures (OECD
2009b), and Korea is responding with efforts to improve the
coherence of its policies through horizontal coordination
(between advisory councils and ministries) and vertical
coordination (between ministries and the government
research institutes).
A third characteristic of the Korean system is the duality in
corporate structures. Large conglomerates or multinationals
(chaebols, literally “business families”) dominate research,
development, and industrial transformation, whereas SMEs
remain relatively underdeveloped. In this sense, Korea is still
a mixture of an advanced and developing country. This duality has crowded out entrepreneurship and may have hampered technology diffusion and knowledge spillovers
throughout the system. Especially compared to Finland, collaboration and networking in Korea between companies, universities, and research institutes is less pronounced, though
collaboration within chaebols is extensive. A central challenge
for the Korean NIS is to encourage more collaboration and
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networking, both nationally and internationally (OECD and
World Bank Institute 2000; OECD 2009b).
South Africa

In the mid-2000s, South Africa became one of the first developing countries to adopt an NIS approach. South Africa is
emerging as a global player in STI in certain fields but faces a
range of challenges in developing its NIS amid difficult
socioeconomic conditions and weak government coordination. Responsibilities for science and technology have been
fragmented among numerous ministries, departments, and
agencies. Private R&D has been concentrated in a few large,
diversified companies with established links to government
departments, research organizations, and universities. The
innovation system has been virtually disconnected from black
communities (Hausman and Klinger 2006; Lingela 2004).
Since 2000, science and technology have been under the
purview of the Department of Science and Technology
(DST). The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Science
and Technology oversees DST; the National Advisory Council on Innovation and a large group of stakeholders at the
National Science and Technology Forum provides advisory
support. Other key STI ministries include the Department
of Education, Department of Trade and Industry, and sectoral departments such as minerals and energy, agriculture,
water, and forestry. These departments steer their activities
through sectoral agencies, foundations, and other funding
organizations (OECD 2007b).
South Africa has made remarkable progress in a short
period, as evidenced by STI indicators such as a more diversified industrial structure and increasing GDP per capita.
Nonetheless, huge social inequalities remain. The limited
involvement of the “second economy” of black communities
in entrepreneurship and innovation remains a primary
characteristic and challenge for the NIS. One source of this
problem may be the continued, poor horizontal coordination across the main ministries, agencies, and funders of
R&D (OECD 2007b). This lack of overall government coordination is a second characteristic of the South African
innovation system.
Limited technology transfer and networking between
academia and industry is a third characteristic of the NIS,
caused in part by the lack of mental models for how an
innovation system functions beyond the public sector. The
enabling environment for entrepreneurship is also underdeveloped, as reflected by the limited collaboration between
large and small companies, the poor availability of venture
capital funding, and an outdated IPR regime.

In 2009, the government established the Technology
Innovation Agency (TIA) to improve coordination of innovation funding (Nordling 2009). The new agency is responsible for administering a handful of existing innovation
schemes: the Biotechnology Regional Innovation Centers,
the Innovation Fund, the National Advanced Manufacturing Technology Strategy, and the Tshumisano Trust.
ACTIVITIES AND CAPABILITIES NEEDED

Good governance is manifested in the degree to which
capabilities in the following areas can be developed and
supported: perception of and responses to challenges, setting policy priorities and coordinating agendas, implementing and managing policies on a day-to-day basis, and
obtaining and processing intelligence.2 These capabilities
are associated with different levels of governance in an
innovation system and depend on how interactions and
coordination are governed (vertically and horizontally)
throughout the system (Nelson 2003; OECD 2007b, 2008,
2009a, 2009b, 2009c). Figure 6.2 depicts typical decisionmaking levels, key public (or semipublic) organizations,
and avenues through which an innovation system can be
governed to develop and sustain these capabilities. The figure highlights the key governance capabilities within the
institutional and organizational framework of an NIS.
Strengthening policy makers’ capacity to perceive
and respond to challenges

The ability to perceive and respond to challenges is important
for an NIS to be agile and proactive. In other words, these
capabilities are vital for developing innovation policy guidelines. These capabilities are embedded in the NIS as a whole, at
all levels of governance, although councils, advisory committees (consisting of diverse stakeholders), and similar groups
subordinate to the government or parliament often play an
important role in responding to these challenges by creating
a common vision, or consensus, of how to address them.
Finland, Korea, and South Africa illustrate different ways
in which the ability to perceive, and respond to challenges
plays out in practice. While the Finnish capabilities to perceive challenges are embedded in the NIS in a decentralized
way (box 6.9), the Korean innovation system has tended to
respond to challenges through a more top-down approach
(box 6.10). South Africa’s response to the challenge of developing policies to reconfigure the NIS in the years immediately following apartheid can be described as a decentralized
as well as top-down NIS (box 6.11). In this case, there was
considerable concern about the poor socioeconomic context
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Figure 6.2 Typical Governance Structure of a National Innovation System
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Source: Adapted from OECD 2005.

Box 6.9 Finland Responds to the Challenges of Globalization

The ability of Finland’s innovation system to perceive
and respond to challenges is best seen in the way that
innovation policy reacted to globalization. The impact
of globalization was felt most acutely in the business
sector, as R&D increasingly moved to foreign locations
and price competition became tight, especially in traditional industries. The emergence of countries such as
China and India as increasingly competitive locations
for manufacturing, research, and development raised
concern among labor unions and other national innovation system stakeholders. Public research organizations felt building pressure to compete globally for the
best students and become more engaged internationally. In 2004, the government launched a project to

assess how globalization would affect various sectors
and their employment prospects in Finland and to
develop corresponding policies to respond to those
challenges by altering the business environment. The
final report was based on numerous background studies commissioned from national think tanks and
experts, over 20 sectoral dialogues between employers
and employee unions, and the work of the high-level
steering group appointed by the project. The project
was intended to feed into the ongoing, decentralized
process to formulate a globalization strategy for Finland which subsequently influenced various areas of
policies, such as taxation, R&D programs, and internationalization schemes to support companies.

Source: Prime Minister’s Office, http://www.vnk.fi/julkaisukansio/2004/j19-26-osaava-avautuva-uudistuva-suomi/pdf/en.pdf.
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Box 6.10 Korea Responds to the Asian Crisis of the Late 1990s

The Korean experience following the Asian financial crisis highlights the importance of capabilities to perceive
and act on challenges to innovation at the national level.
The crisis caused significant downsizing among large
companies, mass layoffs of highly skilled personnel, and
large reductions in spending on R&D. Aside from
increasing its expenditures on education, the Korean
government responded by increasing its R&D budget, to
offset the decline in corporate spending. It also used the
crisis as an opportunity to develop technology-based
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), using the
Special Law to Promote Venture Firms enacted in 1998.

A coordinated mix of policy measures was put in place:
regulations to improve the environment for venture
startups and their growth; government-backed venture
funds and tax incentives for investors; and measures to
support research. Among other things, these measures
fuelled rapid expansion in the number of corporate
R&D labs, with SMEs accounting for much of this
increase. This success cannot be explained by policy
intervention alone, as it was aided by rapid innovations
in digital and other technologies, but government
action shaped an environment that enabled new businesses to seize emerging opportunities.

Source: OECD 2009b.

Box 6.11 A White Paper and Foresight Exercises Facilitate Changes in South Africa’s Innovation Policy

In 1996, a White Paper on Science and Technology laid
down the new, post-apartheid government’s priorities
in science, technology, and innovation. Foresight exercises followed at the end of the 1990s and acknowledged South Africa’s many socioeconomic challenges.
These combined efforts clarified the challenges to government officials, highlighted weaknesses of the
emerging national innovation system, and suggested
actions to address these challenges and weaknesses.
Human resource issues related to poverty, education,

and absorptive capability were singled out as a key
constraint on technological developments and innovation. The preparatory work on the White Paper
resulted in a national R&D strategy, endorsed by the
government in 2002. It propelled an innovation system
approach to the forefront in policy design and highlighted the importance of moving toward an innovation policy with a broad mandate to meet socioeconomic needs through science and technology as well as
innovation.

Source: OECD 2007b.

(poverty, segregation, one-sided industrial and company
structure) and the narrow science and technology focus of
the apartheid regime. These challenges prompted the South
African government to adopt a broader and more holistic
innovation system approach to policy that could better
direct activities toward common socioeconomic goals.

Establishing and/or strengthening capacity in
coordination bodies to set policy priorities and
coordinate agendas

Capabilities to set policy priorities and coordinate agendas
are important to economize on scarce resources (especially

in developing countries) and to align policies with existing
structures and framework conditions. These capabilities are
usually embedded in ministries (or department equivalents),
which typically also design policies and steer funding to sectoral agencies or directly to public research organizations.
This level of governance is often vertically linked to the government through various councils and advisory committees.
Ministries also frequently establish dedicated coordination bodies to ensure better coordination between ministerial and other agendas, especially in broad technology areas
such as nano-, bio-, or environmental technologies. These
areas require the involvement of many stakeholders and consultation processes to elicit their views. These coordinating
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bodies facilitate more horizontal, “‘whole-of-government”
approaches and policy mixes to respond to an innovation
policy agenda that is widening because of globalization, new
technologies, and new forms of innovation (open innovation, nontechnical innovation, user-driven innovation, and
others) (see discussions in OECD 2005 and EC 2009).
The fact that a high-level policy council plays a central
role in research, development, and innovation policy does
not mean that the resulting policy favors centralization. For
example, the Finnish Research and Innovation Council,
chaired by the Prime Minister, does not allocate resources
for research, development, and innovation. The Council is
very much an advisory body responsible for the strategic
development and coordination of Finnish science and technology policy as well as the NIS as a whole. The implemen-

tation of policy (including the allocation of resources) is
delegated to various ministries, public funding agencies,
and ultimately companies, universities, and public research
institutes.
In all three countries, certain organizations play a critical
role in addressing challenges proactively by setting priorities
and coordinating agendas for action. They are described in
box 6.12.
Strengthening the capacity to implement and
manage policies on a day-to-day basis

Policy design, prioritization, and agenda setting alone will
not respond to socioeconomic needs and deliver innovation
and growth; policies must be implemented. Implementa-

Box 6.12 Organizations Involved in Prioritizing and Coordinating Policy in Finland, Korea, and South Africa

Research and Innovation Council, Finland. The strategic development and coordination of science, technology, and innovation (STI) policies in Finland are the
responsibility of the Science and Technology Policy
Council, an advisory body to the government. The
composition of this council is distinctive in some
respects and underlines its capacity to perceive challenges, draw overall policy guidelines, and facilitate
coherence, consensus-building, and coordination
throughout the system. It involves a wider range of sectors than similar councils. The chairmanship is held by
the Prime Minister, emphasizing its top-level status,
and involves key ministers (for employment and the
economy, education, and finance, for example). The
council also includes representatives from academia,
industry, and labor organizations. It dates to 1963, and
its mandate for technology was added in 1986.
Ministry of Science and Technology and National
Science and Technology Council, Korea. The Ministry
of Science and Technology (MoST), which became the
Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology
(MEST) in 2008, was established in 1967. Its importance
grew along with Korea’s increasing emphasis on
research, development, and innovation in the 1980s and
1990s and the broadening of the innovation policy
agenda in the 2000s. It commanded a large budget and
had a broad mandate for policy design, coordination,
and evaluation of science and technology in Korea, as

well as the formulation of programs and projects. It also
promoted public awareness of science and technology.
In the 1980s and 1990s, a range of ministries
launched R&D programs, sparking demand for better
coordination. The National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC), established in 1999 and chaired by the
president, has since been Korea’s highest decision-making body on STI. As a cross-ministerial body, NSTC has
a central role in working across ministries to coordinate
the expanding policy priorities and agendas. Its strong
links to MEST are underlined by the fact that MEST
provides the NSTC with a secretariat. The NSTC’s horizontal scope at the sectoral level is strengthened
through five subordinate expert committees on key
industrial technologies, large-scale technologies, stateled technologies, cutting-edge converging and interdisciplinary technologies, and infrastructure technologies.
Department of Science and Technology, South
Africa. The case of South Africa’s Department of Science and Technology (DST) is interesting because this
department gained responsibility over STI just as
South Africa’s policy makers endorsed an innovation
system approach. The shift toward innovation
occurred in response to the enormous socioeconomic
challenges of post-apartheid South Africa. Subsequently DST has played an important role in setting
priorities and agendas based on white papers and forecast exercises.

Source: Lemola 2002; Dahlman et al. 2006; OECD 2007b, 2009b.
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tion is an essential element of good NIS governance, but it
has often failed owing to competing rationales between
ministries, lack of political will and funding, changing
external developments (an economic crisis) or other complications (for example, see OECD 2005).
Policy implementation and the management of R&D
funding and other schemes are often delegated to the level of
agencies, for example to R&D agencies (such as Tekes in
Finland or TIA in South Africa) and research councils (the
Academy of Finland or the Research Council for Fundamental Science and Technology in Korea). Delegation of these
responsibilities implies a need either to strengthen the capacities of these agencies or to establish a new agency. It also
highlights the need for ministries to strengthen their steering
capacity. Delegation of managerial authority is usually
accompanied by stronger requirements to report outputs and
outcomes and thus increase accountability at lower levels.
The day-to-day management capabilities of NISs are
reflected in the routines and procedures that (for example)
ministries and agencies use to interact with companies,
researchers, and other target groups of R&D programs and
policy schemes. These agencies also collect intelligence on
technological and market trends to support decision making, as discussed later. Key issues are to avoid unnecessary
bureaucracy and red tape, strike a good balance between
transparency and secrecy in R&D projects, and ensure policy continuity amid political change and external events.

Aside from vertical coordination of innovation policy,
more attention should be paid to horizontal coordination. Horizontal coordination occurs across the boundaries of distinct policy domains and sectors. The development of a horizontal innovation policy involves
placing a broader strategic approach above departmental
goals by integrating priorities and objectives across various policy sectors. Horizontal governance of innovation
policy requires the integration of innovation-oriented
thinking into other policy domains and greater attention
to interfaces with policy sectors that use and apply science and technology.
The Finnish innovation system offers a good example of
the role that agencies such as Tekes can play in implementing policy (box 6.13). In this case, the relatively clear separation between responsibilities for designing innovation policy (occurring at the governmental and ministerial level)
and implementing it (occurring at the agency level) has
been important for a flexible and proactive innovation policy and for avoiding political deadlocks that block implementation. Overall, this division of labor and the strong vertical and horizontal connections existing throughout the
Finnish innovation system have been important preconditions for the relatively short time that elapses between policy design and implementation, which in turn strengthens
Finland’s capacity to respond quickly to emerging challenges. These preconditions may have been easier to meet in

Box 6.13 Tekes as an Implementer of Innovation Policies in Finland

Tekes, founded in 1983, is based in the Ministry of
Employment and the Economy. It has relative autonomy to set priorities and agendas in specific technology areas, following guidelines developed at higher
levels (the Science and Technology Policy Council and
ministries). Tekes’ role eventually expanded to include
channeling the bulk of public funds for R&D to industry and public research agencies, with the exception of
basic research agencies. Its major funding instruments
include R&D grants and loans for companies and
applied research grants for public agencies. Research
grants are typically allocated via technology programs
planned and implemented with companies and
research institutes. Although the themes of programs

are planned with companies, public research organizations, and other agencies, the funding is competitive,
and companies must contribute complementary funds
(usually around 50 percent). The idea is to stimulate
collaboration between program partners and maximize benefits from knowledge spillovers. Each program has a coordinator, a steering group, and a manager from Tekes. Funding for programs ranges from
€20–150 million, generally over three to five years.
Hundreds of programs have been initiated since 1983;
29 operated in 2009. These programs have played an
important role in promoting entrepreneurship,
introducing new areas of technology, and renewing
industries.

Source: Ylä-Anttila and Palmberg 2007; Tekes (www.tekes.fi).
Note: Tekes = Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation.
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Finland than elsewhere because of its small size and the high
level of trust between the main actors in the system.

Establish/strengthen capacities to obtain
and analyze intelligence

A well-functioning NIS must have the capabilities and
related governance structures to obtain and analyze intelligence on the impacts of innovation policy as well as future
technological and market trends. These capabilities relate to
technology and innovation studies, development of STI
indicators, evaluations of R&D programs, and other types of
policy instruments and interventions, as well as technology
foresight and assessment. These capabilities are often spread
out in the NIS; for example, ministries and agencies typically
have their own research and analysis units (box 6.14). For the
sake of objectivity in impact assessment, however, the most
viable arrangement is for independent expert organizations
(think tanks, consultancies, public research organizations,
universities, and so forth) to gather and analyze intelligence.
In the case of public research organizations, the problem
may be that many research groups receive R&D funding and

may have vested interests. Transparency and objectivity
should be the key criteria in impact assessment.
Capabilities to obtain and analyze intelligence are also
often built in collaboration with transnational think tanks
such as the World Bank and OECD. Both organizations
develop STI indicators and impact assessment methodologies and standards; they also undertake assessments and
evaluations of innovation systems.
Evaluations of the inputs, activities, outputs, and impacts
of research, development, and innovation are essential to
enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness, and
accountability of policies to foster innovation and improve
social welfare (see module 7). For this reason, they are integral to improved innovation intelligence. Aside from
improving accountability, the main strength of evaluation
may reside in its capacity to provide insight, learning, and
understanding.
Evaluation usually includes priority setting, an ex ante
impact appraisal, monitoring of progress (interim evaluation), and an ex post evaluation of results and impacts.
These cumulative assessments aim to measure performance,
support target or performance-based management and

Box 6.14 Strategic Intelligence Capabilities and Activities in Finland, Korea, and South Africa

Finland. Tekes monitors results and assesses the impacts
of projects it funds. For monitoring, Tekes collects project effectiveness information at the beginning and end
of each project and three years after its conclusion. An
impact assessment is done to gain feedback on how the
project attained its objectives, how effective the project
was, and what could be learned from the project to
improve Tekes’ future operations and strategies. Tekes
also follows international comparisons and reports,
such as comparisons commissioned by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, European Union, and others, and conducts peer reviews of
innovation activities in various countries.
Korea. The Korean Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP) is the nation’s
main STI planning agency and supports the Ministry
of Education, Science, and Technology’s policy planning and coordination. Its specific functions are to formulate, coordinate, and support major science and

technology policies by, for example, forecasting science
and technology development trends; analyzing and
evaluating science and technology programs by all
ministries; conducting research into domestic and
overseas research planning, evaluation, and management systems; and disseminating R&D policy information and data.
South Africa. South Africa has also been developing
its capacity to undertake policy assessments and analysis. These capabilities have been developed within the
main ministries, agencies, and advisory bodies. Of particular importance is the Centre for Science and Technology and Innovation Indicators (CeSTII), which is
responsible for national R&D and innovation surveys
based on a memorandum of understanding between
the Department of Science and Technology and Statistics South Africa in 2004. Several universities also host
research groups with a focus on technology and innovation studies.

Source: OECD 2007b, 2009b; Tekes, www.tekes.fi.
Note: Tekes = Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation.
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budgeting, enhance accountability and transparency, and
improve communication of outcomes to policy and decision makers and sponsors.
In Finland, the evaluation of research, development, and
innovation comprises meta-evaluation and system reviews
(Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2010), evaluations of scientific and technological fields and programs,
and evaluation of universities, research institutes, and other
R&D institutions. Using information from evaluations to
inform policy has remained a challenge in Finland, however,
despite the numerous evaluations undertaken in the past
ten to fifteen years.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The benefits of an innovation system approach and good
governance of an NIS should ultimately be visible at the
macroeconomic level through increasing innovation and
economic growth. As noted, OECD and others have developed a range of innovation input and output indicators,
although the relative role of some factors, such as governance, is virtually impossible to assess through indicators.
The most relevant indicators for measuring the benefits
of an innovation system approach capture knowledge flows
and collaboration or knowledge distribution throughout the
system (under the assumption that they generate innovation
and growth). Some of these indicators are available—for
example, information on the mobility of researchers and
personnel, innovation surveys on R&D collaboration, data
on interfirm collaboration, rates of technology diffusion—
but it is beyond the scope of this note to apply them to the
case study countries.3 Instead, the experiences of Finland,
Korea, and South Africa will be used to highlight some of the
more subtle and intangible benefits of an innovation system
approach in general.
As emphasized throughout this note, an innovation system approach can focus the policy debate—create consensus and a common vision—on issues of key importance
for sustaining innovation and growth, especially in
response to emerging challenges and in times of crisis.
Examples described here include globalization (Finland),
economic crises (Finland, Korea), and poverty and segregation (South Africa).
An innovation system approach to policy thinking and
analysis can highlight latent potential for knowledge flows and
collaboration across the various fields of science, technology,
and industry and achieve “new combinations” as a source of
innovation. To do so, countries will require good capabilities in obtaining and processing intelligence on the structure

and development of different sectors of the economy (as in
Finland and Korea).
Similarly, well-governed innovation systems can bring
previously disconnected actors together and create new nodes
and platforms for innovation. Finland and Korea have
implemented explicit coordination schemes and policy programs to achieve this goal, such as the Tekes programs. Policy in South Africa has focused on integrating the “second
economy” with activities at the traditional core of the innovation system.
The success of an innovation system depends considerably on the extent to which it engages private companies in
research, development, and innovation. The innovation system concept can extend the policy mix from supply-sided
schemes (such as R&D funding) toward a large array of more
demand-oriented schemes (such as standardization, public
procurement, and regulations). (For examples from the
three countries discussed here, see Dahlman, Routti, YläAnttila 2006 and OECD 2007b, 2009b). Nonetheless, an
important consideration for governance of the innovation
system is that a delicate balance must be struck between
relying on market forces and more interventionist policies,
such as regulations.
Finally, although an NIS generally focuses on developing
national innovation capacity, it does not lose sight of the
value that the innovation system approach places on knowledge flows and collaboration, including internationally generated knowledge flows and collaboration. Knowledge flows
and collaboration extend beyond national borders, and an
innovation system approach can help to identify opportunities
and bottlenecks of critical importance (see Edquist 1997 for a
review of innovation system approaches that emphasize the
international dimension).

LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons related to innovation system governance are relevant to developing and sustaining governance
in an AIS.
A step-by-step process, building on existing
structures and contexts

The development of an innovation system approach to
innovation policy may take significant time (decades rather
than years) and should be pursued systematically and iteratively so that emerging challenges and feedback from the
research community and private sector can be addressed in
a flexible way. Core governance structures for innovation
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systems often are based on existing policy structures such as
ministries, but they also typically involve the establishment
of dedicated ministerial departments, councils, agencies,
think tanks, and other entities.
Most developing countries have little room to maneuver in
research, development, and innovation. Consequently their
only strategic choice is to stick to incremental innovations—
for example, to improve existing products, services, and
processes. All countries will need monitoring and governance
arrangements that allow sufficient adaptability to reverse
unwise decisions quickly. Countries with relatively small
research systems, such as small countries or economies in the
initial phases of development or recovery, have a particular
need to concentrate their efforts. Many countries have established various prioritization practices in recent years. Korea, for
example, uses a mix of instruments for priority setting, including technology foresight and technology road-mapping. These
processes are distributed across ministries and agencies and
create a diversity of competing priorities and visions (which
ideally are reconciled in the national innovation policy). For an
example from Thailand of a national innovation council, see
the overview in module 1.
An innovation system approach should acknowledge
existing industrial structures (ICT and Nokia in Finland),
company distributions (Korea’s chaebols), and the overall
socioeconomic framework (the lack of involvement of South
Africa’s “second economy”). Properly applied, the innovation system approach will facilitate collaboration and
knowledge flows across actors and stakeholders whose
efforts to innovate were previously separate or who were
excluded from innovation altogether.

Mobilizing actors and resources

For policy to be more relevant and effective, it must embody
clear visions, strategies, and priorities. Leadership in the
governance of research, development, and innovation are
also vital to mobilize actors and resources. Leadership is best
undertaken by distinguished individuals (a president, prime
minister, minister of finance), ministries, or innovative
agencies and enterprises. These leaders have a broader perspective on policy agendas for research, development, and
innovation and can help to maintain their coherence.
Coordinating bodies

The role of coordinating bodies in setting priorities and coordinating agendas is increasingly important owing to challenges arising from globalization, emerging technologies,
new forms of innovation, and a range of global issues such
as energy and climate change, poverty, health care, and
access to clean water. Coordinating bodies benefit from
links to the highest levels of government (vertical coordination) but must also include decision makers and other
stakeholders from diverse areas of the economy (horizontal
coordination). The councils in Finland and Korea are two
examples of such coordinating bodies. Governance of innovative activity is not provided by government or the public
sector alone. It is important that representatives of the private
and third sectors actively participate in formulating and
implementing policy through various forms of publicprivate partnership.
A clear role for high-level councils

Strong, visible commitment at the highest level

A common feature of countries that have successful
research, development, and innovation policies is strong and
visible commitment at the highest political level to long-term
development of financial and human resources for research,
development, and innovation. Other key factors are the
integration of key ministries (finance, education) in planning and implementation processes, broad-based consensus
on the basic elements of research, development, and innovation policy, and wide agreement that investments in
research, development, and innovation are needed over the
long term. In Finland and Korea, a high-level policy council
with representatives from ministries, government, R&D
agencies, and the private sector turned out to be an efficient
mechanism for overall coordination of research, development, and innovation policies.
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High-level councils can and often do play important roles in
setting priorities and agendas and as overall policy coordination platforms, but it is evident that simply establishing a
council is not enough (OECD 2009a,b,c). Their needs and
tasks must be well-defined in the specific context, with
attention to the strategic needs of the country’s innovation
system. The council’s composition, too, needs to be considered in view of the strategic tasks. It must be open to newly
emerging actors in innovation in the country.
Horizontal coordination

A broader understanding of innovation and innovation
policy means that more attention should be paid to horizontal coordination, which refers to the crossing of administrative and cultural boundaries between policy domains
and sectors.
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Autonomy to implement

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

An innovation system approach can aid both policy design
and implementation; policies also need to be implemented
to deliver innovation and growth. In particular, policy
implementation may best be facilitated at the level of relatively autonomous agencies rather than ministries and
departments where political and other issues may be inhibiting factors (Tekes is one example; TIA in South Africa may
be another).

Innovation systems emerge gradually and organically if the
enabling environment is favorable. Knowledge flows and collaboration cannot be created by policy, but policy can create
suitable conditions for them to happen. Good governance is
central to the performance of an innovation system, and
policies can strongly influence good governance. Practical
recommendations for establishing governance structures
include the following general and tentative “steps”:

Transparency

Innovation policies benefit from transparent schemes and
the avoidance of bureaucracy and red tape. Programs for
R&D can be efficient for focusing activities on predefined
areas (for example, the specific technology areas represented
by Tekes’ R&D programs). Care should be taken to include
elements of competitive tendering. Policy continuity is also
important to stabilize the innovation horizon (of private
companies in particular).
Learning and evaluation

The ability to obtain and analyze intelligence on market and
technological developments and trends is of key importance
for a well-functioning, proactive innovation system. Finland, Korea, and (to an increasing extent) South Africa conduct foresight exercises and impact assessments. These
capabilities are preferably spread out throughout the innovation system and strengthened through international collaboration and related forums. They should be actively
promoted and maintained.
Improved means of evaluating the inputs, activities, outputs, and impacts of research, development, and innovation
are needed to manage R&D organizations and instruments and provide important feedback for policy making.
The development and implementation of monitoring
and evaluation require intervention from the upper levels of innovation policy. Many countries are finding that
evaluations of research organizations, research and technology programs, and other policy instruments are an
effective and indirect way to control and manage research
organizations. Although evaluations are increasingly
used to improve the design and implementation of the
instruments of research, development, and innovation
policy, they are not always readily available or communicated to policy makers at the strategic decision-making
level.

1. Develop awareness of innovation systems concepts and
identify good practices in similar sectoral, regional, and
national contexts. Engage in international dialogue.
2. Communicate the viability and challenges of implementing an innovation system approach. Probe the possibilities for seeking, and achieving, consensus and a
common vision on key issues.
3. Analyze structural and institutional preconditions for
governance structures related to innovation systems.
Involve companies, public research agencies, and other
relevant stakeholders (main ministries, regulators,
NGOs) in policy design, consultations, and strategizing.
4. Consider the suitability of existing institutions to handle
STI matters. Consider the need for new, STI-dedicated
agencies and other institutions.
5. Assess the economic, legal, and political viability of
introducing STI issues and the innovation system concept at various levels of governance. Ensure that mechanisms for priority setting and coordination can be put in
place.
6. Develop existing institutions to support STI or establish
new STI institutions if required. Ensure that they have a
clear mandate and specific roles to avoid overlap. Be
ready to divest obsolete schemes and institutions if necessary to foster the growth of new ones.
7. Ensure relative institutional autonomy in policy implementation. Ensure that sufficient capabilities and
resources are in place for day-to-day management of policy schemes and initiatives, now and in the long run (to
ensure policy stability and predictability).
8. Implement policy schemes (at the agency level or below)
and initiatives as considered relevant, based on an assessment of societal needs. Consider which policy mix is
most suitable to the context. Ensure that schemes and
initiatives are transparent, nonexclusive, and predictable,
and support both networking and competition.
9. Ensure that institutions and capabilities remain in place
(compare with the third step) to analyze and assess technological and market trends, as well as to assess the impacts of
policy schemes, initiatives, and the innovation system as a
whole. Continue to engage in international dialogue.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 3

Managing Intellectual Property to Foster
Agricultural Development
Sara Boettiger, University of California, Berkeley
Robert Potter, Consultant
Stanley Kowalski, University of New Hampshire

SYNOPSIS

ver the past decades, consideration of IPRs has
become increasingly important in many areas of
agricultural development, including foreign direct
investment, technology transfer, trade, investment in innovation, access to genetic resources, and the protection of traditional knowledge. The widening role of IPRs in governing the
ownership of—and access to—innovation, information, and
knowledge makes them particularly critical in ensuring that
developing countries benefit from the introduction of new
technologies that could radically alter the welfare of the poor.
Failing to improve IPR policies and practices to support the
needs of developing countries will eliminate significant development opportunities. The discussion in this note moves
away from policy prescriptions to focus on investments to
improve how IPRs are used in practice in agricultural development. These investments must be seen as complementary
to other investments in agricultural development. IPRs are
woven into the context of innovation and R&D. They can
enable entrepreneurship and allow the leveraging of private
resources for resolving the problems of poverty. Conversely,
IPRs issues can delay important scientific advancements,
deter investment in products for the poor, and impose crippling transaction costs on organizations if the wrong tools are
used or tools are badly applied. The central benefit of pursuing the investments outlined in this note is to build into the
system a more robust capacity for strategic and flexible use of
IPRs tailored to development goals.

O

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT FOR
ACTION AND INVESTMENT

As public funding for agricultural research has fallen relative
to private sector investments, for many countries the era in
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which agricultural development often depended on public
goods and the unchecked sharing of research results has
come to an end. Countries have entered a new era in which
innovation, R&D, and the sharing of knowledge occur at the
same time that global IPRs are on the rise. The current IPR
climate demands a nuanced and strategic use of IPRs to
enable innovation and support agricultural development,
but the shift toward this scenario is proving challenging, and
many donors, governments, institutions, and individuals are
struggling to respond.
There are good reasons for the hesitant progress in
understanding the use of IPRs in agricultural development. First, other priorities upstage IPR issues in environments where limited resources must be allocated across
formidable needs. Second, expertise in IPR issues often
cuts across many fields, including law, business, science
and technology, as well as development policy. Even the
range of IPR instruments in agriculture is diverse. In addition to patents, other forms of protection, such as trademarks and geographical indications, can create value in
agricultural value chains in developing countries; copyright laws can limit access to agricultural research journals, databases, and software code; PVP certificates, utility
models, and sometimes even trade secrets are also relevant
to agricultural development (World Bank 2006).1 Third,
the international landscape for IPRs is changing rapidly.
Policy makers in developing countries now operate within
a system of bilateral, regional, and multilateral treaties that
govern a wide range of IPR issues (box 6.15); protection of
genetic resources and traditional knowledge (box 6.16);
and, in debates about food security and developing countries’ capacity to respond to climate change, the increasing
importance of the role of IPRs in technology transfer. This
note argues, however, that IPR-related investments are

Box 6.15 Beyond TRIPS

The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) came into effect in 1995, stipulating
that all signatories to the agreement should introduce
a minimum amount of legislation to protect IPRs.
This international obligation triggered a widespread
introduction of IPR legislation in developing countries in recent years, as it became a requirement for
entry into the World Trade Organization. More
recently, in addition to TRIPS, developing countries
operate in a landscape increasingly dominated by preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These agreements

often contain obligations relating to domestic intellectual property policies that exceed the minimum standards set forth in TRIPS. Collectively, agreements with
intellectual property obligations comprise a landscape
referred to as “TRIPS-plus.” A recent report estimated
that close to 400 PTAs were in force by 2010, governing more than half of global trade. Not only is the
number of agreements growing, but IPR provisions
are also occurring in increasingly diverse types of
agreements, from customs standards to anticounterfeiting agreements.

Source: Heydon and Woolcock 2009; Frankel 2009.

Box 6.16 IPR Issues in Genetic Resources

Ownership of genetic resources and traditional knowledge is an area where IPRs are increasingly considered
a serious issue. R&D in crop improvement, for example, depends on the wealth of genetic material held
in farmers’ fields and national and international gene
banks. Both the conservation of genetic resources and
access to them are critical for our future capacity to
address global food security issues, including drought
tolerance, yield improvements, and resistance to diseases and pests.
Maintaining a balance between the preservation of
genetic resources and ensuring widespread access
depends on finding solutions that can work within a
complicated cross-section of national, international, and
institutional policies. For example, in 2006 the research
centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) that maintained ex situ collections of plant genetic resources signed agreements
with the Governing Body of the International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (“the
Treaty”), which placed the collections they hold under
the Treaty, and adopted a “Standard Material Transfer
Agreement.” Exchanges of genetic resources involving
the CGIAR centers are now governed by this agreement,
which includes IPR obligations.

Further questions over rights to genetic resources
are raised by the increased capacity for large-scale
DNA sequencing. Currently, many projects to sequence
plant genomes promise benefits to agricultural development. The data and associated knowledge hold the
potential to assist in breeding for improved yields, disease resistance, and countless other traits. There has
been continuing concern, however, in genome
sequencing about the optimal use of IPRs that does
not impede innovation based on the new data.
Some argue that without the ability to patent, the
investment in further R&D is not warranted; others
argue that allowing proprietary ownership allows
for blocking patents that can slow or halt innovation. While it is becoming increasingly difficult to
patent DNA sequences in the United States, a large
number of patent applications still contain claims
to sequences in bulk. For example, CAMBIA’s
analysis indicates that approximately 74 percent of
the rice genome is claimed in United States patent
applications.
As this brief discussion indicates, future investments
in policies and programs involving genetic resources
must include considerations of IPRs to support the
donors’ intended impacts on agricultural development.

Source: CAMBIA (“Mapping of Rice Patents and Patent Applications onto the Rice Genome”); Pollack 2010.
Note: The Standard Material Transfer Agreement can be accessed at this link: http://www.planttreaty.org/smta_en.htm.
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critical if developing countries are to benefit sufficiently
from advances in STI over the next decades.
MAJOR IPR-RELATED DRIVERS OF
DEVELOPMENT

Three main interrelated paths characterize mechanisms
through which IPRs impact global poverty: (1) trade and
foreign direct investment; (2) national capacity for innovation and development of local commerce; and (3) technology transfer. These paths are discussed in the sections that
follow with full recognition of the oversimplification of this
framework.2 Nonetheless, it serves as a useful compass for
the analysis that follows.
Trade and foreign direct investment

Box 6.15 showed how trade issues often drive IPR legislation, with varied impacts. Studies of the relationship
between IPRs, trade, and foreign direct investment in developing economies have covered a wide range of potential
paths of interaction in an attempt to determine whether
stronger IPR policies in developing countries are likely to
produce benefits for the world’s poor. While a significant literature illustrates positive implications of stronger IPR policies on trade and foreign direct investment, there are
caveats. Strict enforcement of IPR, for instance, may drive
up the costs of imitating or copying inventions, which may
reduce growth in very low income countries that rely on
these approaches and do not yet have the infrastructure to
accept foreign direct investment. Other work has shown
that stronger IPR policies can exacerbate income inequalities in developing countries and that the flows from trade
and foreign direct investment do not sufficiently impact the
very poor (Adams 2008). In short, the empirical work on
IPR policies, foreign direct investment, and trade in developing countries leaves unresolved questions about how the
poor are affected over time, and debates will continue with
further exploration of the issues.3

National innovation climate

IPR legislation is one component of the climate for innovation in a country, but legal instruments are not enough on
their own to encourage investment in innovation. Without
the active involvement of national researchers, there will be
little appreciation of the role of IPRs, and thus other investments will do little to encourage innovation. Interventions
that focus on protecting inventions in public institutions
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can be a way to jump-start a cycle in which increased protection of IP increases awareness of the value of innovation.
Box 6.17 shows an approach to increasing locally focused
R&D in Botswana, coupled with measures to raise public
awareness of new inventions and designs.
Types of IPRs differ in their influence on the innovation
climate within low-income countries. Patents can be important IPR instruments for discrete inventions, as seen in box
6.18, which shows how a machine to prevent frost damage
in fruit orchards was exported from Chile to important
overseas markets. Other forms of IPRs offer greater opportunities to influence the domestic innovation and business
development climate, however. Trademarks, geographical
indicators, plant breeders’ rights, and seed registration laws
may garner comparatively less attention than patents in the
international press, but as noted, they often have more practical potential to affect agricultural development in lowincome countries. Box 6.19 describes how a trademark was
initially used to build a brand around Colombian coffee and
how geographical indicators have been employed more
recently to maintain this brand. The success of this
approach led other countries to similarly distinguish their
local produce in an international market, such as Pinggu
peaches from China. In this case, the agreement between
China and the EU on geographical indicators for peaches
from this region of China opened an export market for
high-quality fruit previously recognized only within China.4
Technology transfer

The transfer of technology and knowledge remains perhaps
the most influential of the three drivers listed here in terms
of IPR investments contributing to poverty reduction. Most
well-capitalized engines of innovation are in developed
countries, but increasing numbers are found in emerging
economies. There is a real need to improve international
capacity for agricultural R&D targeted at poverty reduction
as well as the flow of knowledge and technologies to benefit
developing countries. Whether the “technology” that is
transferred refers to a novel plant variety, the tacit knowledge of how to improve a food-processing practice, or an
innovative business model for giving smallholder farmers
access to microirrigation, making technology and knowledge available to improve the lives of the poor has both
direct impacts (for example, by improving health, food
security, or access to water and sanitation) and indirect
impacts (such as economic development). IPRs are an
important factor in public-private partnerships transferring
technologies, in the formalization of the knowledge and
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Box 6.17 BOTEC Harnesses Innovation in Botswana

Botswana Technology Centre (BOTEC) in Gaborone is
a research and technology organization established by
the Botswana government in 1979. Operating under the
Ministry of Communications, Science, and Technology,
BOTEC has pursued the government’s policy objective
of technology promotion and innovation as a tool for
developing the economy and improving the quality of
life in Botswana. To strengthen research and development capacity, BOTEC has a longstanding involvement
and active participation with a number of local organizations, including the University of Botswana, Botswana
Institution of Engineers, Botswana Export Development and Investment Authority, Botswana Innovation
Hub, and some nongovernmental organizations.
Botswana’s Industrial Property Rights Act (1996)
provides a legal framework for the country’s innovators
to seek intellectual property protection for their intellectual property. BOTEC has worked to improve intellectual property awareness in Botswana to assist inventors
to be more creative and benefit from their innovations.
BOTEC’s intellectual property policy seeks to address a
number of issues, including Botswana’s increased participation in international treaties related to intellectual
property, access to information on inventions related to
BOTEC activities, and dealing with new technology that
has been transferred to companies. BOTEC initiated the

National Design for Development Awards in 1999 to recognize inventions and innovations that can offer solutions to some of the problems faced by Botswana. As of
2010, three award ceremonies have been hosted. The
World Intellectual Property Organization and African
Intellectual Property Organization supported the award
ceremonies by sponsoring special awards for outstanding innovations in Botswana. BOTEC is contributing to
efforts to protect Botswana’s traditional knowledge by
chairing an Indigenous Knowledge Task Force, which is
drafting the indigenous knowledge section for the
Industrial Property Rights Act.
BOTEC’s solar-powered hearing device was developed through a collaborative scheme with Motse Wa
Badiri Camphill, a nongovernmental organization
that conducted field tests, raised funds for design
improvements, branded the device with the SolarAid
name, and took it to market. SolarAid generated considerable interest and was used in many developing
countries. BOTEC assisted Motse Wa Badiri Camphill
to set up a separate organization, the Godisa Technologies Trust, to develop the promising pilot project
into a genuinely successful product. The recharger,
now successfully marketed under the SolarAid brand,
requires only 6–8 hours of sunlight to maintain a full
charge for a week.

Source: Quoted with slight adaptations from WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=2623.

innovation that lies in the public sector, and in the creation
of specific technology transfer offices (TTOs) in such institutions (see module 5, TN 5 for examples of TTOs for individual institutions or a network of institutions). TTOs are
one example of policies promoting technology transfer, but
they are not the only such policy.
Understanding where to make strategic IPR-related
investments, given the diverse pathways of potential impact
listed above, requires a closer look at the current context of
international IPRs and agricultural development. Investments in this space must take into account (1) the international obligations related to IPR and the rapidly expanding
use of IPRs in agriculture and (2) the continuing disparity
in capacity between the public sector and the private sector
in the strategic use of IPRs. Although biotechnology is playing an increasing role in agricultural development and is
one area where the private sector has made large invest-

ments, IPR policies should not be driven by individual technologies. Similarly, the desire to encourage public-private
partnerships should not—by itself—drive IPR policies,
although clearer understanding of IPRs at both the national
and institutional level will help these partnerships flourish.

Disparity in the capacity to manage IP in public
and private R&D

Despite increasing opportunities to engage the private sector, the public sector continues to be the primary driver in
agricultural R&D for most developing countries. Globally,
agricultural investment in the public sector is double that
of the private sector, and one-third of the worldwide agricultural R&D budget is spent in developing countries.5
The lack of capacity for IPR management in public research
organizations, and the disparity in IPR management
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Box 6.18 Patenting a Chilean Invention to Protect Crops from Frost

In 1991, severe frost decimated Florencio Lazo Barra’s
fruit orchards. He lost all of his table grape production
and 80 percent of his plums. He also incurred high fuel
costs for oil burners, which he used in the failed
attempt to protect his orchards from frost. After years
of experimentation, in 1996 a working prototype of the
Lazo Frost Control Machine (“Lazo FCM”) was tested
successfully. The Lazo FCM is a powerful centrifugal
fan with a heater, which is trailed across the field by a
tractor. The insertion of a layer of hot air in the cold air
mass surrounding the plants protects fruits and vegetables from frost.
Following successful tests with the prototype, Mr.
Lazo applied for assistance from Innova Chile, a government agency tasked with promoting innovation. He
obtained funding to convert his business idea into reality and produce more machines. Orders from Chilean
farmers soon followed, and in 1997, with assistance
from an intellectual property expert, he began obtaining a patent abroad. The United States was the first
country to grant his invention a patent in 1999. In
Chile, patent No. 41776 was granted in 2002 by the

Industrial Property Department. The invention is also
protected by patents in Argentina, Australia, China, and
the European Union.
In 1998 the Lazo FCM technology was exported to
the United States by granting a manufacturing license
to Agtec Crop Sprayers (now “Superb Horticulture”),
who sold the product under the name “Lazo Frost
Dragon.” In the first three years, over 500 machines
were sold in South America and the United States. In
2000, sales and distribution started in Europe through
Agrofrost N.V., a company based in Belgium selling and
distributing the machines throughout Europe under
the “Lazo Frostbuster” name. More recently, the technology was exported to New Zealand and Australia.
Without the support of Innova Chile, which
enabled the inventor to file for patent protection, little
of this development would have taken place. Government agencies charged with supporting innovation are
often criticized for supporting projects that do not
come to fruition, so it is important to recognize cases
where they have been successful to balance this
impression.

Source: Quoted with slight adaptations from WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=2448.

capacity between the public and private sectors, are therefore important considerations for investments in agricultural development.
ACTION AND INVESTMENT NEEDED

This section describes a set of investments related to IPR
and agricultural development that can improve activity in
this sector. Opportunities exist to improve policies at the
institutional level and to develop institutional capacity, as
well as to increase knowledge sharing between the public
and private sectors and, through these advances, increase
capacity for technology transfer.
It is not possible to provide a template for particular laws
or IPR regimes that will benefit all countries; IPR legislation
must be tailored to the national context. This issue is discussed extensively in World Bank (2006), which recommends a dialogue with conscious consideration of needs
and priorities prior to enacting IPR legislation for plant
breeding. For example, staple crops may be treated differently from crops grown for export. Where a particular
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species is considered to be of national importance, exemptions from PVP have been incorporated in some national
legislation. Furthermore, as countries develop, needs for
protection may change, particularly as they move from
industries that exist by copying products produced elsewhere to innovating to develop their own products. IPR
regimes continue to evolve even in developed economies
and must be flexible enough to cope with changes in
national requirements.
Promote the establishment of specific IP
policies in public organizations

Establishing institutional policies on the ownership, protection, and dissemination of inventions will have a big impact
on enabling technology transfer among public organizations. Institutional IPR polices are critical to the impact of
public research, can open an institution to new partners,
and create incentives for changing the innovation climate.
One of the biggest improvements in technology transfer
between public and private organizations in the United
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Box 6.19 Colombian Coffee: Trademarks and Geographical Indicators Protect a Valued Brand

Coffee from Colombia has retained a significant price
premium over coffee from Brazil (the world’s largest
producer of Arabica coffee) for many decades, largely
owing to a branding strategy that emphasizes the high
quality of Colombia’s product. The National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia (FNC, Federación
Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia) was created in 1927
by Colombian farmers. Today, it represents over half a
million coffee growers, the majority of whom are
smallholders. The Juan Valdez® brand strategy is an
excellent example of continuing creativity in IPR management to promote agricultural development.
Television commercials shown in North America in
the 1960s featured Juan Valdez® in the coffee fields with
his faithful mule, painstakingly selecting and handpicking the ripest beans. Consumers began to respond
to the message that Colombian beans are grown and
harvested with great care, with little help from
machines, in ideal climatic conditions with plenty of
rain, sun, and fertile volcanic soil. Demand grew. Many
coffee roasters began marketing their products as
Colombian coffee. A number launched high-end products consisting exclusively of Colombian coffee.
The Juan Valdez® logo was licensed to coffee roasters that used only high-quality Colombian coffee. Not

all coffee roasters responded to this initiative, however,
and another IPR instrument was included in the strategy: certification. “Colombian” was registered in relation
to coffee as a certification mark in North America in the
1980s. The formal standards attached to this certification
mark provide a guarantee that the actors in the marketplace are meeting minimum quality standards when
selling “Colombian” coffee, thereby protecting its hardearned reputation. Enforcing and protecting this certification turned out to be expensive but worthwhile, given
the premium that Colombian coffee now demands in the
market. The continuing expansion of the Juan Valdez®
brand also included opening branded coffee shops,
which have had varying degrees of success, as well as a
partnership with Coca-Cola FoodService to offer a
branded liquid coffee system.
“Café de Colombia” was registered as a geographical
indicator in Colombia in 2004 and the European Union
in 2006. Unlike trademarks and certification marks,
geographical indicators are intrinsically linked to
attributes and quality standards related to origin.
They need to be recognized by governments, so delays
can arise in establishing such a system, but the value of
these treaties in promoting quality brands is now
recognized.

Source: Fridell 2007; March 2007a, 2007b.

States was legislation mandating IPR policies for institutions that receive federal funds. By clarifying ownership of
inventions and the responsibility of the institutions to protect them, IPR policies became an integral part of research
activities. Without necessarily mandating the use of IPRs
through legislative means, in individual organizations the
establishment of policies related to ownership and responsibilities for protecting and disseminating inventions will
have a big impact on enabling technology transfer.

Well-trained IP practitioners are critical for a country to
represent national interests and negotiate IPR provisions in
multiple international forums and for a country to develop
national IPR policies that promote development within
complex international obligations. Likewise, managers,
engineers, and scientists in public and private institutions
must be able to understand IP and how to use it if countries
are to play an increasingly competitive role in global agricultural development.

Create a global corps of trained IPR practitioners

Support the creation of TTOs

The impact of new IPR legislation in the wake of TRIPS
cannot lead to positive cultural shifts in the use of IPRs
without sufficient numbers of trained, in-country practitioners. The success of continuing investments in creating
patent offices, improving judicial systems, and opening
TTOs depends on the quality of the professionals engaged.

An effective way to achieve institutional understanding of
the value of IPRs may be through the creation of specific
TTOs with a mandate to identify and protect innovation use
and to use IPRs to promote greater impact of the research
and innovations arising within the institution (for example,
through licensing technology with other partners). Such
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offices provide direct opportunities for the professionals
targeted in training activities to gain experience and also
demonstrate to researchers the value of IPRs in enabling
further development of their innovation (for additional
information, see module 5, TN 5).
Revisit the importance of nonpatent frameworks
and opportunities for agricultural development

Trademarks, PVP, seed laws, and geographical indications
are a few of many IPR-related nonpatent instruments that
may have an impact on agricultural development.6 In lowincome countries where patenting is limited and mechanisms for enforcing patents are not well developed, these
alternative forms of IPRs can be critical instruments in AISs.
The PVP system, for instance, granting plant breeders exclusive rights to market new varieties, is implemented in a
number of industrialized and developing countries (World

Bank 2006). UPOV remains active in promoting harmonization as traditional approaches to PVP are challenged by
advances in plant breeding and genetics (Janis and Smith
2007). Trademarks and related brand equity strategies are
considered by some scholars to be underutilized as a form of
creating value for developing countries’ agricultural products. A wide variety of opportunities exist for improving
nonpatent, IPR-related instruments at both the policy and
practitioner level; for examples, see boxes 6.19 and 6.20.
Encourage donors to require strategic IPR
management in development investments

Private foundations, governments, aid agencies, and other
donors can influence the outcomes of investments across
many fields by instituting internal grant-making requirements that demand a higher level of strategic IPR management. As one example, requiring grantees to provide a plan

Box 6.20 Hagar Soya Co., Cambodia: Multiple Benefits from an Innovative Social Business Model

Hagar Soya Co. Limited (HSL) is a small enterprise in
Phnom Penh created in 1998 by Hagar, a nongovernmental charity based in Switzerland. In the mid-1990s,
Hagar began an income-generation, training, and
employment project for abused and abandoned
women in postconflict Cambodia. The project led to
the incorporation of HSL as one of Hagar’s small businesses. HSL’s first commercially successful product was
a soya milk drink sold under the brand name “So!
Soya.” The product is nutritious, affordable, and tastes
good—all important qualities in helping local children
increase their protein intake in a country with very
high malnutrition. Following the success of the soya
milk drink, the company added more soya-based items
to its product line.
Initially, the commercialization of Hagar’s soya
milk was done in a rather informal way; women from
Hagar’s programs produced 300 liters of fresh soya
milk per day and sold it on the streets of Phnom Penh
from push carts. By 2003, HSL was ready for largerscale production and the “So! Soya” trademark was
registered with the intellectual property Department
of the Ministry of Commerce of Cambodia.
Subsequent HSL products such as “So! Soya kids,” “So!
Soya Gold,” “So! Yo,” “So! Yumme,” “So! Milk,” and

“So! Choco” have also been protected by registered
trademarks.
The company’s intellectual property strategy focuses
almost entirely on trademarks and aims at increasing
the competitiveness of HSL’s products. The company
considers trademarks to be effective for preventing
unauthorized use of HSL’s marks and guarding against
counterfeiting. The competitive edge also arises from
registering a trademark to protect and increase its
value, then publicizing it through a good marketing
and business strategy to enlarge the company’s market
share and stimulate the development of new products.
The success of HSL’s trademark strategy is reflected in
the company’s achievements, first, in marketing its
brand name through brand development of both the
company and its products, and second, in ensuring
lasting brand impact through quality products.
The company benefited from Hagar’s initial ability
to identify the right path to incorporate income-generating activities within a development project, taking
into consideration the social needs of Cambodia. HSL
is an example of an efficient social enterprise model,
which, according to the International Finance Corporation, can be replicated by nongovernmental organizations worldwide.

Source: Quoted with adaptations from WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=2563.
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demonstrating that IPR has been considered in all aspects of
the proposed activities will drive demand for building
capacity in IPR management, highlight the impact of specific IPR-related policy needs, set important standards, and
ultimately benefit donors by reducing the risks of their
investments. Furthermore, requiring a consideration of
product development beyond the research stage has the
advantage of identifying other technologies that may need
to be licensed and other partners who will need to be
involved to deliver the products to the target population.
IPR-related investments must be made, however, with
the recognition that IPR is only one of many factors that can
foster or impede technology transfer. While there are key
opportunities to address IPR issues in technology transfer,
practitioners often find that risks unrelated to IPR are more
challenging. These risks concern stewardship, products
flowing back into commercial markets, and liability issues.
It should also be noted that, particularly for technology
directed toward rural populations, some form of extension
services will be critical for disseminating the technology to
the target population (World Bank 2006).
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Investments in IPRs play a facilitating role, influencing the
potential impacts of many other investments in agricultural
development. The impacts of improved handling of IPR
issues, therefore, are unlikely to be directly measurable. Benefits to R&D activities in the public and private sectors
should include improved transfer of technology from public organizations, improved linkages between industry and
academic or public research institutions, and improved
access to private sector technologies. For example, Unicamp
created productive linkages between the university’s own
R&D and industry once it established a specific TTO (module 5, TN 5).
In individual cases, benefits can often be attributed
directly to the particular steps taken to protect the IP within
a particular project, such as the patenting of the frost control machine (box 6.18), which allowed the inventor to enter
licensing agreements with overseas developers. This connection can also be seen in commercial enterprises, where success is determined by the creation of a particular brand
associated with a certain quality of product. Box 6.20
described how a small NGO in Cambodia became a successful enterprise by trademarking its products. Although
the success of this enterprise depended on a wide range of
factors, trademark protection was an enabling part of the
business strategy.

POLICY ISSUES

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) recognizes a number of policy issues related to IPRs for developing countries and has adopted 45 related recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda.7 The
recommendations are grouped in the following clusters and
cover a number of issues relevant to this discussion, including: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building; Normsetting, Flexibilities, Public Policy, and Public Domain;
Technology Transfer, Information and Communications
Technologies (ICTs), and Access to Knowledge; Assessment,
Evaluation, and Impact Studies; Institutional Matters,
including Mandate and Governance.
Coordination of IPR policies with other
innovation policies

Policies seeking to encourage innovation for development
are inherently dependent on many other areas of policy and
law. Sound policies on education, trade, agricultural input
subsidies, farmers’ extension services, functioning court systems, and many other elements are integral to the impact of
IPR policy on agricultural development (World Bank 2006).
Given the interconnectedness of IPR policies with other
national policies, and given the wide variety of IPRs affecting agriculture, it is difficult to provide specific policy recommendations. Countries have considerable flexibility
(even within TRIPS) to adopt IPR policies that support
their own specific needs, and resources exist for them to
engage advice on policy changes.
While the appropriate policies will be as diverse as the
range of developing countries adopting them, there are
common goals for IPR policy supporting agricultural
development. These goals support benefits for the poor in
access to technology as well as economic development, and
they include creating incentives for local innovation,
encouraging foreign direct investment, increasing connections between industry and universities or research institutes, facilitating better public-private partnerships, and
improving the impact of public agricultural research for
the poor.
A functional legal system and extension service

The major precondition for any development of IPRs is a
functional legal system under which IPRs and other legally
binding agreements, especially contracts, can be enforced.
IPRs are a property right, and developing respect for property rights further contributes to social justice and the rule
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of law in a country (Cavicchi and Kowalski 2007). As noted,
extension services are another precondition; introducing
technology and innovation into research is pointless if the
outcomes are not transferred to farmers and have no
impact on poverty (World Bank 2006). Access to improved
products is a major equity issue that must be addressed
within individual projects, but for products that have a
direct commercial value and will be marketed through the
private sector, high royalties may have detrimental effects
on access. In this case, IPR legislation can include compulsory licensing mechanisms to increase access and/or reduce
the market price.
Environmental issues

Given the wide-ranging impact of IPRs on rural development, it is difficult to provide specific policy recommendations with respect to environmental issues. In most cases,
access to improved technologies is expected to improve
rural productivity. Productivity improvements may have
both positive and negative environmental implications, but
the major factor in environmental damage is often the lack
of better alternatives. If farmers have better alternatives to
current practices, they may be able to take better care of
their land, use other resources more efficiently, and contribute to greater environmental sustainability.
Roles of public and private sectors

Since the major rationale for a society to develop IPRs is to
provide an incentive for individuals and organizations to
invest in innovation by increasing the likelihood of a
return, IPRs will directly affect the private sector’s involvement in agricultural development. IPRs help connect countries to the global innovation marketplace, which includes
both private and public actors. At the same time, giving
public institutions responsibility to protect their inventions
(as well as license them) increases technology transfer. For
this reason, there is a major role for the public as well as the
private sector in developing an IPR system that is relevant
to national needs.

LESSONS LEARNED

As discussed, a wide range of actions and investments can
support the management of IPRs to promote agricultural
development. The following sections summarize lessons
learned over the years as new strategies in IPR management
were used to achieve specific socioeconomic goals.
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Legislation has to be passed and enforced but is
not sufficient on its own

For low-income countries, the impact of IPR policies is
often dwarfed by other factors that have a far more direct
effect on innovation, including lagging investment in education, institutional and infrastructural challenges, limited
access to financing, and the effects of a range of other business development policies. In response to TRIPS, most
countries have passed IPR legislation, but few have gone on
to create a culture of innovation. To take this next step, the
value of protecting and using innovation must be understood within a society. Government support for innovation
(box 6.18) that leads to the development of specific products is one way to demonstrate the value of IPRs to a wide
cross-section of society.
Investments related to IPRs are focusing on legal systems
of developing countries, based on the understanding that the
ultimate impact of any IPR depends on how it is enforced.
IPR legislation must be supported by well-functioning institutions (courts, patent offices, and the like) if IPRs are to
provide any incentive for innovation, but these critical
investments in institutional capacity will have more impact
if they are designed to support the interactions of institutions
and staff with a rapidly changing IPR environment. Examples
include investments in improved capacity to negotiate international treaties, increased support for connections to international networks of professionals, and improved access to
research and expertise specifically targeted at IPR issues in
developing countries.
Managing property rights in public institutions
is critical

In agricultural development, public institutions are central
to the development and adoption of innovations that will
benefit the world’s poor. The role of the public sector in agricultural development has shifted considerably over recent
decades: grants are for shorter terms and focus more tightly
on projects; engagement with the private sector is increasingly a necessity; and organizations operate in a complex
web of IP and regulatory law frameworks. The public sector
has lagged considerably in understanding how IPR policies
and practices affect its role in development goals.
In public organizations, capacity for IPR management is
often a low priority due to resource constraints, limitations
on available expertise, and a lack of receptivity among
some managers to embrace IPRs as an important component of their development work. This lack of capacity can
lead to mistakes and missed opportunities in licensing,
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partnership agreements, and strategic management of
innovations. From the donors’ perspective, lack of IPR
management can lead to delays, potentially reduced
impact, or sometimes the halting of a project altogether.
Conversely, good capacity for IPR management reduces the
risk for donors’ R&D investments.

to promote a local industry. Often these are temporary
measures used to assist in strategic development, because
they may be considered to be in breach of trade rules, but
where a case can be made for a special need, exemptions are
an important option to consider.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

Humanitarian licensing models need more work

Licensing language that supports “humanitarian uses” of
proprietary technologies permits them to be used for applications important to international development while preserving the technology owner’s commercial market, yet such
language is not widely used. Much work remains to be done
to move from “model language” to language integrated into
working licenses. In addition to IPR provisions, humanitarian use licensing has not yet adequately addressed key issues
that repeatedly arise in public-private partnerships, such as
liability.
Emerging markets represent a further licensing challenge. So far, many models of humanitarian licenses depend
on territorial distinctions. This strategy can leave countries
like Brazil, India, and China out of a geographically defined
region for humanitarian use, despite the large populations
of very poor people in these countries. Legal strategies must
be improved to allow the poor in these countries to benefit
from technologies that are accessed under humanitarian use
licenses.
Flexibility is crucial for future success

One-size-fits-all solutions to IPR management work in limited situations to reduce transaction costs, but over the
years it has become clear that most IPR management at the
institutional level requires project-specific consideration of
the partners, technologies, countries, and many other
details. Patent pools, patent commons, clearinghouses,8
and model licenses do have great value, but the standardized approach must be complemented with (1) the flexibility to modify the IPR strategy and (2) access to resources to
support good strategic management. At the policy level,
similarly, the complex differences among countries necessitate careful assessment of tailored IPR policy solutions. As
noted, the level of development of a particular industry
may warrant some kind of special exemption, particularly
if the industry is considered of strategic importance. Such
exemptions have most often been seen in the pharmaceutical industry, where exemptions from patent protection for
certain drugs or even whole classes of drugs have been used

The recommendations that follow are intended for policy
makers as well as practitioners (researchers, managers, and
experts who encounter IP issues at the institutional or project level). The recommendations complement the earlier
section on “Actions Needed,” which identifies key areas for
investment, and should be kept in mind by practitioners as
aspects of IPR arise in projects.
Create diverse opportunities for IPR training

Policy makers as well as those at the institutional level can
articulate the need to raise awareness of IPR issues across
many fields of science and technology. Scientists, engineers, IP managers, government officials, administrators,
and many others can benefit from improved understanding of the role of IPRs in agricultural development. The
roles that IPRs play, however, and the levels at which they
may be encountered are highly diverse, which suggests
that a broad range of training options should be considered. For example, box 6.21 details the development of a
small enterprise from an NGO-led project to generate
income. In this case, IPR awareness training was incorporated into the business planning for the project so that
participants would understand the options for protecting
any IP. Where a producer organization is involved, such as
the Colombia Coffee Federation (box 6.19), the organization’s needs may best be served by identifying specific
individuals to receive more specialized training in legal
aspects of managing IPRs.
In addition, practitioners can work to ensure that training for particular professionals continues—for example,
through engagement with an international community.
Training within a South–South context can be particularly
valuable for professionals to compare the challenges and
solutions related to IPRs in developing countries. Where the
establishment of technology transfer offices is being considered, exchange programs with existing offices can be highly
beneficial and help to forge long-term links between institutions. Box 6.21 includes examples of investments in training IP professionals with funding from national agencies
and donors.
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Box 6.21 Country and Donor Investments in Intellectual Property Training for Professionals

In-depth training. Since its founding in 1998, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
Academy (http://www.wipo.int/academy/en/) has
offered a wide range of courses on intellectual property
and intellectual property management. In addition to
short workshops, the academy provides key support for
degree and certificate programs in many developing
countries. For example, in 2010 Zimbabwe’s African
University (in collaboration with WIPO and the
African Intellectual Property Organization) graduated
the first class of students with a master’s degree in intellectual property.
South–South training. The International Intellectual
Property Training Institute (IIPTI, http://iipti.org/),
part of the Korean Intellectual Property Office, trains
professionals from Malaysia, Vietnam, and other developing countries within the region. India, South Africa,
and Brazil play key roles as regional leaders with the
capacity to share IPR knowledge specific to the challenges faced by developing countries.
Targeting diverse professionals. Singapore’s Mentorship Funding Scheme brings in qualified patent
agents from overseas to mentor and train professionals

at locally based organizations. The Intellectual Property
Office of Singapore (IPOS, www.ipos.gov.sg) funds the
costs of the program jointly with local organizations.
India’s National Institute of Intellectual Property Management (NIIPM, www.ipindia.nic.in), in the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry, provides training to R&D
managers, scientists, legal professionals, patent agents,
researchers, doctors, engineers, and others.
Practical knowledge. As part of its bilateral development assistance, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA, www.sida.se) offers
around 100 Advanced International Training Programmes every year targeted at practitioners in the
field. These programs frequently cover various IPR
issues, including topics such as genetic resources and
IPRs, industrial property in the global economy, and
intellectual property for least developed countries. The
Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture
(PIPRA, www.pipra.org) provides training and educational materials (see the ipHandbook, www.iphandbook.org) to developing-country scientists, intellectual
property managers, and policy makers, with a focus on
providing tools for practicing intellectual property.

Source: Authors.

When developing training programs, it is essential to
consider that the trained professionals will need some form
of employment in a setting where they can use the skills they
have learned. Significant resources have been wasted by
training people who have no opportunities to apply their
knowledge; these misdirected efforts further erode the
impression that IPRs should be taken into account. TTOs
provide a focus for training individuals and can also employ
them in a role that enables them to maintain their involvement in this field.
Promote collaboration among public
and private partners

Practitioners working at the institutional level should seek to
ensure that institutional IP policies support partnerships
between public and private organizations. Such policies might
include, for example, a clear set of principles to govern legal
relationships with partners, processes to assess risk in partnerships, transparency mechanisms to enable good governance,
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clarity around confidentiality issues, and the flexibility for
management to implement a strategic IPR management plan.
EMBRAPA9 in Brazil has created such policies, which enabled
it to make licensing deals with a number of multinational
companies as well as local seed producers and assume a significant role in soybean variety development (Fuck and Banacelli
2009). Policy makers should continue to explore IP policy
options through the lens of creating incentives for public and
private collaboration in agricultural development.
Balance in-house capacity with prudent use of
external services

The IPR management capacity needed to meet the challenges
of coming decades does not exist in sufficient depth, even in
industrialized countries. In the private sector, due diligence,10
the negotiation and drafting of agreements, and strategic IPR
management are all regular practices (see IAP 2). Universities,
nonprofits, governments, international aid agencies, and
philanthropic foundations have excellent expertise in IPRs.

AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: AN INVESTMENT SOURCEBOOK

Yet the capacity for both strategic management of IPRs and
the day-to-day work of IPR practitioners is not as common as
it needs to be. In such cases, external sources are commonly
employed for a number of specialized tasks, such as legal
opinions on freedom to operate and drafting of patent submissions. Practitioners should consider this option when
dealing with specific investments that may have detailed
requirements for IPRs. The use of external services may be a
much more cost-effective option for certain tasks.
One investment discussed earlier was the creation of a
TTO in an institution to serve as a focal point for protecting

IP as well as for licensing. In module 5, TN 5 addresses the
role of TTOs in agricultural development, where the creation of a TTO represents an opportunity to foster an
enabling environment for innovation and provide opportunities for training (including raising awareness of IPR
among scientists and administrators). For some institutions, the costs of creating and managing a technology
transfer office, investing in a portfolio of IPRs, and (importantly) having the resources to enforce those IPRs, may not
be feasible, and they will need to explore other options for
developing capacity in IPR management and training.

MODULE 6: THEMATIC NOTE 3: MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO FOSTER AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 4

Biosafety Regulatory Systems in the Context
of Agricultural Innovation
Morven McLean, ILSI Research Foundation

SYNOPSIS

Biosafety regulation is a multidisciplinary, multifunctional
endeavor that should take into account the broader context
of agricultural production and innovation. Investments
needed to operationalize a biosafety regulatory system
should promote interministerial cooperation, sound and
pragmatic policy development, scientifically defensible risk
assessment and risk management, rational inspection and
enforcement activities, and meaningful stakeholder consultation and public participation. Efficiencies can be gained
through the cross-utilization of national or regional expertise, regional harmonization, and ensuring that the design
of a biosafety regulatory system takes into account programmatic and operational costs, including opportunity
costs that may arise from overregulation.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

To date 22 countries have approved genetically engineered
(GE) plants for cultivation or consumption (CERA
2010a). In 2010, 148 million hectares (366 million acres)
were planted to GE crops, largely soybeans, cotton, maize,
and canola (James 2010). Common to all countries where
GE crops are cultivated is a system to regulate these products and especially to ensure that they are evaluated with
respect to human health and environmental safety (commonly referred to as biosafety) prior to their commercial
release.
The regulation of products of agricultural biotechnology, particularly GE crops, has been identified as a constraint to innovation in this sector, largely because of the
costs of meeting information and data requirements prescribed by regulatory authorities for assessing the safety of
GE plants (Cohen and Paarlberg 2004; Kalaitzandonakes,
Alston, and Bradford 2007; Matten, Head, and Quemada
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2008) but also because of inadequate capacity to enforce
regulatory compliance (Pray et al. 2006).
The converse may be argued as well, however. A welldefined biosafety regulatory system that is consistent in its
application (that is, the assessment, decision-making, and
enforcement processes are not arbitrary) can be a powerful stimulus for investments in this area. For example,
Brazil has seen public and private investments increase in
agricultural biotechnology since it passed the Biosafety
Law in 2005 (BrBiotec 2010). The new law clarified the
regulatory remits of various ministries and clearly defined
the roles and responsibilities of the two regulatory authorities, the National Biosafety Council (CNBS, Conselho
Nacional de Biossegurança) and the National Biosafety
Technical Commission (CTNBio; Comissão Técnica
Nacional de Biossegurança).
The law ended a five-year moratorium on approvals of
GE crops that arose from differences in governmental and
judicial interpretation of pre-2005 legislation (Cardoso
et al. 2005). The moratorium, in turn, contributed to widescale cultivation of illegal (unapproved) GE soybeans. Since
2005, Brazil has approved 20 GE cotton, soybean, and maize
lines for commercial cultivation; prior to 2005 it had
approved only 1 (CERA 2010a).
A functional biosafety regulatory system is a prerequisite
for realizing the benefits that agricultural biotechnology can
(and does) provide to poor producers and poor consumers in
developing countries (World Bank 2007). Ultimately, environmental and human health protection is the overarching
priority of any biosafety regulatory system, and confidence in
the decisions that governments make on behalf of the public
is a precondition for public acceptance and adoption of agricultural biotechnology products. Strategic investments in
programs that foster adaptability, transparency, clarity, and
workability in the development and implementation of
regulatory systems also foster agricultural innovation.

INVESTMENT NEEDED

■

Investments in support of biosafety regulation may be
needed for any or all stages in the typical progression of
events that lead to the development and implementation of
a regulatory system. Key issues and policy options for these
stages were described in a conceptual framework for
biosafety regulation (McLean et al. 2002); World Bank
(2003) presented examples for individual countries. In summary, the key stages are:

■

■

Elaborate a national policy consistent with other objectives related to economic, social, and rural development,
natural resource management, and environmental protection and sustainability.

■

■

■

Conduct an assessment and gap analysis of national
development priorities, agricultural policies, existing
regulatory regimes, and national and regional scientific
and technical means necessary for a biosafety regulatory
system to function.
Build a strong base of scientific knowledge in support of
the regulatory system and the development of core competencies in biotechnology product evaluation (box 6.22).
Develop biosafety regulations to effect specific public
policy goals (as articulated in a national biosafety or even
biotechnology strategy).
Implement regulations through the operationalization
of the biosafety regulatory system.
Address cross-cutting issues that are common to each
stage in the development and implementation of a

Box 6.22 Building Human Resource Capacity for Biosafety Risk Assessment

The type of human resource capacity needed to implement a biosafety regulatory system generally, and its
risk assessment function specifically, is particular to
each country. No standardized lists of human resource
requirements specific to individual disciplines exist. It
can be instructive, however, to examine how other
countries have approached this issue.
In India, the Risk Assessment Unit of the proposed
Biotechnology Regulatory Authority of India will be
permanently staffed by a multidisciplinary team of scientists responsible for undertaking science-based risk
assessments of specific products. The Risk Assessment
Unit will comprise thematic cells. The expertise for the
two cells pertinent to the regulation of genetically engineered crops is:
■

■

Core characterization: Molecular biologist, toxicologist, microbiologist, biochemist, bioinformatics
specialist, biostatistician.
Plant biotechnology: Plant physiologist, plant
pathologist, entomologist, agronomist, and plant
breeder.

In Brazil, the National Biosafety Technical Commission (CTNBio, Comissão Técnica Nacional de Biossegurança) provides technical support and advice to the
federal government “in the formulation, updating, and

implementation of the National Biosafety Policy for
GMOs and derived products, and for establishing technical safety standards and technical opinions regarding
the authorization of activities that involve research and
commercial use of GMOs and derived products.”
CTNBio is comprised of 27 members:
■

■

■

Twelve specialists (PhDs recommended by scientific
organizations).
Nine government officials appointed by the following agencies: Ministry of Science and Technology;
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply; Ministry of Health; Ministry of the Environment; Ministry of Development, Industry, and
Foreign Trade; Ministry of External Relations; Ministry of Agrarian Development; Ministry of Defense;
and Special Office of the President for Aquaculture
and Fisheries.
Six members appointed as follows: one specialist in
consumer rights by the Ministry of Justice; one specialist in human health by the Ministry of Health;
one specialist in environment by the Ministry of the
Environment; one specialist in biotechnology by the
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply; one specialist in family agriculture by the Ministry of Agrarian Development; one specialist in
worker’s health by the Ministry of Labor.

Source: DBT 2008; Government of Brazil 2005.
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national biosafety system, especially the human, financial,
and infrastructure resources to: develop and implement a
national biosafety system; support the infrastructure
required (such as buildings, equipment, and computers);
facilitate communication and public participation; train
scientific and regulatory personnel; and foster the research
required to assure that risk assessments are sound.

unanticipated events, such as trade disruptions that can
occur as a result of accidental (or sometimes deliberate but
illegal) transboundary movement of GE commodities into a
jurisdiction where there is no approval for that GE crop or
derived food. For example, continued delays in the deployment of pro-vitamin A rice (“Golden Rice”) have been
attributed exclusively to biosafety regulation by the product
developer (Potrykus 2010).

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

POLICY ISSUES

Investments in support of developing biosafety regulatory
capacity have the potential to provide many positive
spillovers into related areas. These areas include public agricultural research, extension services, and plant health and
quarantine programs.
Private developers of GE crops, particularly multinational
companies, are generally disinterested in entering markets,
even where there is farmer demand for these crops, unless an
operational (and predictable) biosafety regulatory system is
in place. More critically, publicly funded and donor-funded
initiatives that focus on improving the productivity of staple
crops using biotechnology will be unsuccessful unless there
is a clear path forward that ensures improved crop varieties
will actually move from laboratory to field trials to farmers.
(Although when the technology does reach farmers, the
impact can be significant; see box 6.23.)
Highly precautionary regulations may be the most significant barrier to innovation in agricultural biotechnology,
as they price the technology out of the hands of the public
sector and SMEs. These costs include the direct costs of regulatory compliance as well as indirect costs associated with

Key policy considerations include:
■

■

■

■

■

Coordination of biosafety laws and regulations with
existing legislation related to environmental protection,
human health, agricultural production, IP protection,
and trade.
Interministerial coordination to ensure that concerns
and remits are carefully considered during the establishment of a biosafety regulatory system. Responsibilities
and mandates of all involved ministries should be clearly
communicated.
Multilateral environmental agreements, particularly the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, must be considered
during the development or revision of biosafety legislation (box 6.24).
Trade: Biosafety legislation should not promote practices
that may be considered or may result in impediments to
trade.
Resources—financial, human, and institutional—need
to be considered before developing the regulatory system
because they can, and should, influence its construction.

Box 6.23 Who Benefits from Agricultural Biotechnology?

It is difficult to quantify the benefits of regulating products of agricultural biotechnology, but the economic
impact from commercializing many genetically engineered crops has been studied. Brookes and Barfoot
reported that in 2007, the total cost farmers paid for
genetically engineered soybean, maize, cotton, and
oilseed rape was equal to 24 percent of the technology
gains (inclusive of farm income gains plus the cost of
the technology payable to the seed supply chain, comprised of sellers of seed to farmers, seed multipliers,
plant breeders, distributors, and the providers of

genetically engineered technology). According to this
study, farmers in developing countries paid 14 percent
of technology gains, whereas farmers in developed
countries paid 34 percent of their gains. The higher
share of total technology gains accounted for by farm
income gains in developing countries relative to the
farm income share in developed countries reflected factors such as IPRs in developing countries and the
higher average level of farm income gain on a perhectare basis derived by developing country farmers
relative to developed country farmers.

Source: Brookes and Barfoot 2009.
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■

Regional coordination and harmonization of elements
of the regulatory system should be considered and/or
pursued, as harmonization has the potential to: reduce
regulatory disparities between countries; reduce the regulatory burden on national governments and the regulated
community; and facilitate trade within region (see IAP 3).

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PRACTITIONERS

The previous sections have described the often complex
interface between agricultural innovation and biosafety regulations. Lessons related to developing and implementing
biosafety regulations can be summarized briefly:
■

■

■

■

■

Building capacity to develop and implement biosafety
regulatory systems requires a multiyear commitment.
Interministerial coordination is a prerequisite for successful development of a biosafety regulatory system.
Investments in biosafety regulatory capacity can be strategically applied to benefit other regulatory programs.
Biosafety regulatory systems should incorporate provisions for change.
Investments to develop biosafety regulatory systems
should accompany investments in agricultural biotechnology research.

■

Biosafety regulation can be rationalized through the promotion and acceptance of international risk assessment
standards.
The next sections address each of these points in detail.

Building capacity to develop and implement
biosafety regulatory systems requires a
multiyear commitment

Workshops, symposia, and conferences can be valuable in
raising awareness or catalyzing discussions that may
inform the development of strategic programs, but they
cannot replace continued and meaningful engagement
with those who are tasked with the responsibility of actually developing and implementing the regulatory framework (a task requiring considerable time, coordination,
and expertise; see box 6.24 for an example from India).
Identifying in-country partners and investing in longerterm capacity building for key individuals, including policy makers and opinion leaders, contributes to systemic
versus transient gains. Experience has shown that the willingness of these individuals to understand the impact of,
and provide an enabling environment for, (cost)effective
biosafety regulation is critical (see box 6.25 for an example
from Uganda).

Box 6.24 The Development of Genetically Engineered Food Safety Assessment Guidelines in India

The South Asia Biosafety Program (SABP) has assisted
the Governments of Bangladesh and India to further
strengthen their institutional governance of biotechnology since 2004. In India, the program started with stakeholder consultations and a gap analysis of the current
biosafety regulatory system. The analysis identified the
need for comprehensive safety assessment guidelines for
foods derived from genetically engineered plants and
for technical training in conducting food safety assessments according to international standards.
The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR),
the technical arm of the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare, in partnership with SABP, undertook a series of
activities over the next several years aimed at meeting
this need. It began with an international conference on
safety assessments for foods derived from genetically

engineered plants. The conference offered an opportunity for stakeholders and technical experts from a number of sectors to exchange experiences and views.
ICMR then hosted a multisectoral stakeholder consultation that achieved consensus on making the safety
assessment of genetically engineered foods in India
consistent with the internationally accepted Guideline
for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods
Derived from Recombinant-DNA Plants adopted by
the Codex Alimentarius in 2003. ICMR formed a
drafting committee with representation from several
ministries and departments and formulated draft
“Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Foods Derived
from Genetically Engineered Plants.”
The draft guidelines were circulated to technical
experts for input and reviewed by India’s Review
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 6.24 The Development of Genetically Engineered Food Safety Assessment Guidelines in India (continued)

Committee on Genetic Manipulation and Genetic
Engineering Approval Committee before being
posted for public comment. Stakeholders’ comments
were addressed, and the guidelines were reviewed
once again by both committees before their final
adoption in 2008. The end result is a guidance document that is consistent with internationally accepted
practices for assessing the safety of genetically engineered food.
ICMR also collaborated with SABP to conduct technical workshops providing in-depth, hands-on training
about key requirements for the safety assessment of
foods derived from genetically engineered plants. The
training ensured that scientists and regulators, as potential risk assessors and science advisors, understood the

concepts and principles of genetically engineered food
safety assessment and the methodology outlined in the
new guidelines.
From inception to completion, the process of developing new food safety guidelines and ensuring their
implementation under existing authority in India took
four years. The long-term collaborative relationship
between ICMR and SABP contributed to the success of
this endeavor. SABP, particularly through strong incountry partnerships, supported ICMR’s commitment
to developing new guidelines by providing not just
technical expertise on food safety assessment, but also
institutional support to ICMR and Indian regulatory
committees as they took the guidelines through review,
adoption, and implementation.

Source: McLean 2010; CERA 2010b.

Box 6.25 Advancing Agricultural Biotechnology in Uganda: It Takes More Than Good Science

Uganda has spent almost fifteen years working to develop
a functional biosafety regulatory system that will promote
an enabling environment for research, development, and
deployment of genetically engineered crops. The country
was an early recipient of Global Environment Facility
support to develop a National Biosafety Framework. The
process started in 1998, three years before Uganda ratified
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and five years before
the Protocol came into force.
Since then, the Ugandan regulatory and science communities have benefitted from significant national and
international investments that have supported both
human and institutional resource development, such as
enhanced technical capacity for product development,
management of confined field trials, and premarket risk
assessment. The incremental gains achieved through
these interventions have been confounded by continued
delays in operationalizing the regulatory system, particularly the passage of national biosafety legislation.
Uganda provides an all too common example of a
country where innovation in agricultural biotechnology
is not necessarily limited by science but by political,
social, and market barriers. It is generally accepted that

product commercialization will not advance in Uganda
until the national Biosafety Bill is promulgated. The
process of preparing the Biosafety Bill began in 2003.
The Bill was finalized in 2007, approved by the Cabinet
in 2008, and currently awaits submission to Parliament.
An analysis of the reasons for this protracted process
found that a combination of market, policy-political,
and sociocultural factors are hindering progress, such as:
■

■

■
■
■

Lack of sustained and coordinated political champions to move the bill forward.
Lack of clarity among ministries regarding regulatory roles and responsibilities.
Influence of antibiotechnology organizations.
Complex and diverse institutional players.
Poor product development strategies, leading to
delays in driving the operationalization of the
biosafety regulatory system.

The last bullet may now be a significant catalyst
for movement on the Biosafety Bill. Using existing
legislation, Uganda has approved confined field
trials of genetically engineered cotton, banana, and
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 6.25 Advancing Agricultural Biotechnology in Uganda: It Takes More Than Good Science (continued)

cassava. These and other pipeline products such
as drought-tolerant maize are all considered important for Uganda’s agricultural productivity and sustainability. Having farmer-supported, genetically

engineered crops approaching commercialization
may be the incentive needed to achieve multistakeholder, and consequently political, support for the
Biosafety Bill.

Source: Horna et al. 2012, forthcoming; AATF 2010.

A shortcoming of many capacity-building projects is that
they support the drafting of biosafety frameworks, legislation, or related documents but do not provide the follow-on
support to finalize, adopt, and then implement the system(s) prescribed in these documents (Chapotin, McLean,
and Quemada 2009). For example, 123 countries participated in the Project on Development of National Biosafety
Frameworks sponsored by the United Nations Environment
Programme and Global Environment Facility (UNEP-GEF).
Designed to help countries comply with the Cartagena Protocol, the project was active from 2001 to 2009. Of the 38
African countries that completed their national biosafety
frameworks under this project, only three have regulatory
systems that can be considered operational: Tanzania and
Nigeria have authorized confined field trials (although Tanzania’s approvals pre-dated their National Biosafety Frameworks project) and Burkina Faso has assessed and approved
a GE plant for commercial release (insect-resistant cotton in
2008). The transition of countries from the framework
development projects to the follow-on UNEP-GEF Project
on Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks was
limited to 19 countries.
Interventions should be tailored to country needs, but
many large capacity-building programs, such as the
National Biosafety Frameworks project, implement a common project model. Investments should first support a
comprehensive needs assessment and gap analysis to identify and prioritize interventions that will further the operationalization of a functional regulatory system. In addition
to evaluating the national situation, it is important also to
critically consider capacity building or related initiatives
that may be happening regionally or internationally and
whether these may assist or constrain follow-on activities.
The needs assessment should also take into account the
broader context of agricultural production and innovation,
because biosafety regulation is but one part of that larger
system.

Interministerial coordination is a prerequisite for
successful development of a biosafety regulatory
system

International support for the establishment of biosafety regulatory systems has favored the creation of new regulatory
entities under ministries other than agriculture. Particularly
influential in this regard is the Cartagena Protocol. Because
of its relationship to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
the Protocol has largely been implemented through ministries
of environment. Agricultural biotechnology regulation
intersects the mandates and interests of multiple ministries,
especially agriculture but also ministries of science and
technology, environment, health, and trade.
Investments in the development of biosafety regulatory
systems should explicitly require meaningful interministerial
consultation and a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between competent authorities. Otherwise, different
ministries develop parallel and often redundant or conflicting regulatory requirements that ultimately increase the regulatory burden on product developers. Rational regulation is
achievable if the overarching purpose of biosafety regulation
(that is, human and environmental safety) drives the development of the regulatory system and is not tied to political
or financial gain by specific ministries.
Interministerial coordination, while necessary, is difficult
to obtain in practice. As indicated during the 2003 SubRegional Workshop for Latin American Countries on the
Development of a Regulatory Regime and Administrative
Systems, the primary conflict identified for the implementation of national biosafety frameworks was coordination of
the administrative tasks and competencies of the institutions involved in them (UNEP 2003a). This issue was also
stressed in a similar workshop for Asian countries, where it
was noted that “much of the administrative system seemed
to be in place in many countries, and that coordination was
the major challenge where different agencies were working
separately” (UNEP 2003b) (box 6.26 presents an example
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Box 6.26 Interministerial Coordination in the Biosafety Regulatory System of Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, the biosafety regulatory system is still in
a developmental stage, although institutional procedures cover R&D and the review and approval of foods
derived from transgenic plants. The system is based on
a National Biosafety Framework document, developed
with UNEP-GEF funds in 2004–06, which draws on a
set of Biosafety Guidelines initially published by the
Ministry of Science and Technology in 1999. With the
ratification of the Cartagena Protocol by Bangladesh in
2004, responsibility shifted to the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), and the Biosafety Guidelines
were redrafted to incorporate certain obligations of the
Cartagena Protocol. The revised guidelines were published in 2007.
Under the Biosafety Guidelines, the competent
authority is the interministerial National Committee
on Biosafety (NCB). The subordinate Biosafety Core
Committee operates as a scientific review body and so
far has been asked by the NCB to provide input into all
its decisions. To lend enforcement power to MoEF, a
Biosafety Rule has been drafted that incorporates the
Biosafety Guidelines and brings them under the formal
jurisdiction of the Environment Conservation Act. This
Biosafety Rule was prepared by a drafting committee
convened by MoEF that sought to proactively include

inputs from key ministries. Because of this action, no
further government debate is considered necessary for
approval.
Guidelines for confined (experimental) field trials
of genetically engineered plants have also been prepared through the cooperative efforts of the Department of Environment (DoE in MoEF) and the
Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council, Ministry of
Agriculture (MoA). The guidelines include procedures
for applications, standard operating procedures, and a
guide for inspections of confined field trials by officials
appointed by MoEF. These guidelines have been
approved by the NCB and published as an annex to the
Biosafety Guidelines. In 2009 guidelines for genetically
engineered food safety assessment were prepared that
are consistent with Codex (2003). NCB approved them
in 2010, and they will be published as an appendix to
the Biosafety Guidelines.
Bangladesh’s biosafety regulatory system, while still
young, has made significant progress. Confined field
trials are now being approved and applications for
commercial release are considered imminent. Interministerial cooperation, particularly between DoE of MoEF
and the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council of
MoA, has been integral to the success achieved to date.

Source: Author.

from Bangladesh). For the majority of countries, both
developed and developing, internal coordination between
competent authorities remains a significant issue that has
yet to be resolved.
Investments in biosafety regulatory capacity
can be strategically applied to benefit other
regulatory programs

The shared nature of many of the regulatory functions of
plant health and quarantine programs and biosafety programs (such as risk assessment, monitoring, and inspection)
means that there is an opportunity to apply investments for
biosafety regulatory capacity building to strengthen plant
health and quarantine systems (and vice versa) so that the
objectives of both can be achieved without building redundant administrative and operational services. For example,
the Government of Canada recently combined the risk
assessment functions for GE plants and plant health into a
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single Plant and Biotechnology Risk Assessment Unit. This
action was taken to align biosafety and phytosanitary risk
assessments, leverage complementarities in the scientific
expertise required for both, and improve procedural consistencies (P. Macdonald, personal communication).
Investments should strengthen the scientific and knowledge base in ways that will provide benefits that extend
beyond biosafety risk assessment and decision making. Many
developing countries have only a transient need for biosafety
risk assessment per se, because regulatory authorities may
receive an application for a field trial or premarket approval
only once a year or once every few years. Investments in education and research in the scientific disciplines that support
biosafety risk assessment and regulation, especially in the
agricultural sciences, will have wide-reaching payoffs, however. Efficiencies can be gained through the cross-utilization
of expertise within a country or even through pooling human
resources with neighboring countries.
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Biosafety regulatory systems should incorporate
provisions for change

The regulation of products of modern biotechnology is a
relatively new arena for governmental oversight. Advances
in biotechnology processes and products, experience gained
in regulatory operations over time (both nationally and
internationally), the globalization of agricultural trade, and
the influence of multilateral agreements and international
standard-setting bodies require biosafety regulatory systems
to accommodate change (box 6.27). For example, embedding detailed technical provisions about risk assessment
into laws versus guidance impedes regulators’ ability to
accommodate new knowledge or advances in risk assessment approaches, as revising legislation is considerably
more burdensome than amending guidance.
Investments to develop biosafety regulatory
systems should accompany investments in
agricultural biotechnology research

Implementation cannot be meaningfully initiated unless
applications related to GE products are ready to “prime the
Box 6.27 Adaptability in Biosafety Regulation:
The Gene Technology Act in Australia

In 2001, the Gene Technology Act, 2000 introduced a national scheme for the regulation of
genetically engineered organisms in Australia. It
included a statutory requirement (Section 194) for
an independent review of the operation of the act,
including the structure of the Office of the Gene
Technology Regulator (the OGTR), by the fifth
anniversary of the act coming into force. The
review was based on issues raised during extensive
national public and stakeholder consultations,
submissions made in response to the terms of reference for the review, site visits to laboratories and
field trials, experience gained by OGTR personnel
during the first four years of the act’s implementation, international developments in biotechnology,
and related reports and literature. The review
found that the act’s flexibility to deal with changing circumstances and emerging technologies was
sufficient but that the act should be reviewed again
in five years to ensure that it continues to accommodate emerging trends.
Source: GTRS 2006.

regulatory pump,” such as applications for R&D activities in
laboratories, field trials of experimental GE products (transgenic plants, insects, or fish, for example) or applications for
environmental, food, and/or livestock feed safety assessments prior to marketing a product. Of the 38 African
countries mentioned previously, few have substantive public research programs in agricultural biotechnology, and
many are not considered priorities for private biotechnology investment.
The lack of substantive private or public R&D, even more
than resource constraints, may explain why so few countries
have implemented national biosafety frameworks. In effect,
there is an absence of demand to drive regulatory development (or reform) forward, and policy makers’ attention is
redirected to existing priorities (with notable exceptions, as
in Burkina Faso; see box 6.28). Another definite requirement is the political will to move the regulatory system forward so that decisions, particularly about product-specific
approvals, are actually taken.
Biosafety regulation can be rationalized through the
promotion and acceptance of international
risk assessment standards

The building of sufficient risk assessment capacity is a particular problem in countries that do not have a base of scientific expertise in biosafety. The development of a
regional or subregional approach to risk assessment may
be the most practical and cost-effective option in such
cases. This approach can be facilitated by the active participation of competent authority representatives in international forums such as the Codex ad hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology and
the OECD Working Group on Harmonization of Regulatory Oversight of Biotechnology, where criteria for risk
assessment harmonization are discussed and guidance or
standards established. Vietnam developed its own practical
approach (in this case to assess risks of GE food), based on
a review of risk assessments conducted in other countries
(box 6.29).
Rationalization can also be achieved during the design of
a biosafety regulatory system. Policy options should be evaluated to take into account not just the government’s overarching human health and environmental protection goals
but also the costs of sustaining a system that can realistically
achieve those goals. These costs include the opportunity
costs associated with overregulation. Identifying the funding mechanisms required to sustain a regulatory system can
be an effective tool in rationalizing its complexity.
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Box 6.28 The Approval of Bt Cotton in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest cotton producer. Cotton accounts for 30–50 percent of the country’s export earnings and is the main source of foreign
exchange. In many rural areas where poverty is high,
the sale of cottonseed is the main or only source of cash
revenue for Burkinabe farmers. Insect control is a key
factor in cotton yield; insect infestations can damage
up to 90 percent of the crop. Farmers typically apply
6–8 applications of insecticide per growing season, but
yield losses of 30–40 percent persist.
An alternative insect management approach is to
plant insect-resistant, transgenic cotton varieties (Bt
cotton). Transgenic varieties from the United States
were evaluated in confined field trials in Burkina Faso
from 2003 to 2005. These Bt varieties had significantly
reduced larval populations of cotton bollworm and
cotton leafroller, with a commensurate improvement in
seed cotton yields and lint quality. After the insect resistance trait was bred into local varieties, further field trials were planted in 2006–07. Precommercial seed production began in 2008, the same year two transgenic

cotton varieties were approved by Burkina Faso’s
National Biosafety Agency (ANB, Agence Nationale de
Biosécurité) for commercial release. Comparisons in
2008 and 2009 showed that Bt cotton yielded 30 percent higher than conventional varieties, and only two
insecticide applications were necessary.
Burkina Faso’s biosafety regulatory system has
developed relatively quickly and smoothly compared to
those of other African countries such as Kenya,
Uganda, and Nigeria. In 2005 Burkina Faso completed
its National Biosafety Framework with resources from
the United Nations Environment Programme and
Global Environment Facility. In 2006 the ANB was
established under Law No. 005-2006 “Pertaining to the
security system in regard to biotechnology in Burkina
Faso.”a However, it was the joint commitment of the
Ministers of Environment and Agriculture, who publicly championed the economic benefits of Bt cotton to
the Bukinabe economy, that effectively catalyzed the
rapid operationalization of the ANB, which was
achieved in only two years.

Source: Héma et al. 2009; D.J. MacKenzie (personal communication).
(a) Loi N° 005-2006/AN, Portant régime de sécurité en matière de biotechnologie.

Box 6.29 Practical Regulation of Genetically Engineered Foods in Vietnam

In June 2010, the Government of Vietnam issued
Decree No. 69/2010/ND-CP on Biosafety for Genetically Modified Organisms, Genetic Specimens, and
Products of Genetically Modified Organisms. With
respect to the use of genetically engineered organisms
as food or animal feed, the Decree permits a written
certification of eligibility for use as food if the subject
of the application satisfies “either of the following
conditions: 1. The dossier of application for a written
certification of their eligibility for use as food has been
appraised by the Genetically Modified Food Safety
Council, which concludes that such genetically

modified organisms have no uncontrollable risks to
human health. 2. They have been permitted by at least
five (5) developed countries for use as food and no risk
has been seen in these countries.”
This approach to regulatory approvals is both practical and scientifically defensible. It recognizes that the
Vietnamese Ministry of Health considers the biosafety
regulatory systems of certain other countries to be consistent with that of Vietnam and that the risk assessment
and approvals undertaken by those countries may be
considered equivalent to and therefore sufficient to
obtain a certificate of eligibility by the Ministry of Health.

Source: Government of Vietnam 2010.
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SYNOPSIS

he current landscape of technical regulations and
standards related to agriculture and agrifood is
complex and rapidly evolving. Standards represent
major challenges for the targeted sectors and industries, yet
they also present opportunities to catalyze innovations
while achieving public health, trade, environmental, and
social objectives. Standards can help to reduce information
asymmetries and externalities and promote fair competition. Some agricultural export industries in developing
countries have used compliance with standards to gain an
important competitive advantage; compliance required not
only innovation in production and processing but in collective and organizational behavior. In an evolving landscape
of standards, however, individual, one-time innovations
offer limited opportunities to leverage long-term benefits.
What is required instead is a process of strategic planning,
supported by continuous innovation and improvement, to
take on new challenges and opportunities as they emerge.
Approaches to harmonizing standards across countries or
industries can reduce transaction costs by reducing duplicative functions of conformity assessment, including testing
and certification. National policy makers need to strike a
balance between domestic and international trade interests
and, as much as possible, maintain close involvement in
regional and international standard-setting efforts.

T

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

A “standard” is a document approved by a recognized body
that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines, or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods. Compliance with standards is
not mandatory. “Technical regulations,” on the other hand,
specify product characteristics or their related processes
and production methods, including the applicable

administrative provisions, with which compliance is
mandatory. Technical regulations include import bans
(total or partial), technical specifications (process and
product standards), packaging standards, information
requirements, and requirements for labeling and claims.
Standards and technical regulations for agriculture and
food have become increasingly important in recent decades,
but they date to ancient times. Assyrian tablets, for example,
describe the method to be used in determining correct
weights and measures for food (FAO and WHO 2005).
From the late 1800s to early 1900s, countries started to enact
national agrifood standards. The ensuing proliferation of
requirements complicated the landscape for international
trade to such an extent that the first international standards
began to be adopted in the early 1900s. Over the course of
the century, but especially in the latter half, broader efforts
to enact agriculture and food standards at the international
level prompted important innovations in the international
institutional framework for setting standards (see box 6.30).
The number of agriculture and food-related issues subject to standardization has grown tremendously in the past
several decades.1 This momentum reflects the intensification
of regional and global trade and heightened concerns over
accompanying threats to food safety and animal and plant
health. It also reflects a wider set of innovations in science
and technology that permit very sensitive detection and analytical methods, as well as improved knowledge of the quality and associated health hazards of agrifood products. Many
standards and regulations relate to naturally occurring hazards, such as foodborne pathogens and toxins, while others
have been introduced by innovations in agricultural technologies to increase productivity (such as the use of pesticides, veterinary drugs, and other chemical compounds).
Changes in consumers’ concerns and perceptions, as well
as pressure from civil society and the enactment of international agreements,2 have been critical in expanding the
range of desirable attributes associated with the quality of
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Box 6.30 International Framework for Setting Quality and Sanitary/Phytosanitary Standards

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are taken to
protect: (1) human or animal health from risk arising
from additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease organisms in food, drink, and feedstuffs; (2) human life from
risks associated with diseases carried by plants or animals;
(3) animal or plant life from pests, diseases, and diseasecausing organisms; and (4) a country from other damage
caused by the entry, establishment, or spread of pests.
The need to fight animal diseases (zoonoses) at the
global level led to the creation of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) through an international
agreement in 1924. An international agreement on
plant health was reached in 1952 through the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). The
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), focusing on
food standards in relation to safety risks, was created in
the early 1960s. These international organizations have
become even more relevant since the mid-1990s, when
they were recognized as the international reference for
settling disputes and for international trade under the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.a
Under the agreement, countries are encouraged to
present their concerns to the WTO regarding measures
adopted by trade partner countries that do not follow
the stated principles. According to WTO, of 312 SPSrelated trade concerns raised by countries to the SPS
committee over 1995–2010, 28 percent related to food
safety, 25 percent to plant health, and 41 percent related
to animal health and zoonoses. Animal health concerns
mainly included foot-and-mouth disease (24 percent of
concerns), transmissible spongiform encephalopathy
(35 percent of concerns), and avian influenza.

The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) deals with product standards. It aims to prevent
national or regional technical requirements or standards in general from being used as unjustified barriers
to trade. The agreement covers standards relating to all
types of products, including industrial and agricultural
products. Food standards related to SPS measures are
not covered. Codex decisions recognized by the TBT
Agreement include those on food labeling, decisions on
quality, nutritional requirements, and analytical and
sample methods.
The International Organization of Standardization (ISO) also enacts international standards; those
applicable to agricultural industries and enterprises
include standards for quality, safety, and environmental management (series ISO 9000, ISO 22000, and ISO
14000, respectively). The agricultural sector also benefits from standards dealing with conformity assessment that apply across sectors (ISO 17000 series).
Other international organizations setting global standards relevant to agriculture include the International
Seed Testing Association (ISTA) and the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
(IFOAM).
A plethora of private initiatives also seek to have a
global reach. GLOBALG.A.P. enacts standards on
good agriculture practice, and the Global Food Safety
Initiative (GFSI) focuses on Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP)-based standards
with application in agrifood industries. Still other
private initiatives apply to particular agricultural
subsectors, for example export crops such as coffee,
cocoa and tea.

Source: Authors; WTO 2011.
(a) For zoonoses, the International Health Regulations enacted in 2005 are an international legal instrument with the purpose
and scope to prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways
that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international
traffic and trade. Another international agreement related to biological risks is the Convention on Biodiversity Cartagena
Protocol, discussed in TN 4.

agrifood products. Demands go beyond a product’s characteristics (product standards) to include specifications on the
conditions under which products are produced and packaged (process standards, which now often include sustainability considerations). Table 6.2 lists examples of the broad
range of standards and technical regulations applied to food
and agricultural products. The demand for such standards
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has induced innovation at many levels in the agricultural
sector (box 6.31).
ACTIONS AND INVESTMENTS NEEDED

The capacity of standards and technical regulations to achieve
their intended outcomes and also catalyze agricultural
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Table 6.2 Examples of Standards and Technical Regulations Applied to Agriculture and Agrifood Products
Food safety
• Pesticide residue
limits
• Microbiological
standards
• Traceability
requirements
• Hygiene
requirements
• Vet. Drug
residues
• Chemical &
other
contaminants
(e.g., mycotoxins)
• Code of good
agricultural
practices

Animal/plant health
• Plant material
quarantine
• Pest risk analysis
needs
• Fumigation
requirements &
restrictions
• Bans/restrictions on
antibiotic use in
aquaculture
• Disease-free areas
• Disease surveillance
• Restrictions on
veterinary drugs
• Traceability of animals
• Plant material
quarantine
• Phytosanitary
certificates
• GMO varietal
approval

Quality or technical
attributes
• Quality grades
• General labeling
requirements
• Packing standards
• GMO labeling
• Restrictions on
animal feed
ingredients
• Nutritional labeling

Environment

Social

• Pesticide use
restrictions
• Regulations on
water/soil
contamination
codes for organic
• practices &
certification
• Protection of
specific species
• Fish catch
restrictions
• Regulations on
animal waste
effluent
• Water efficient
regulations
• Chemical use
restrictions
• Biosafety
regulations (for GMOs)
• Codes to limit
biodiversity loss

• Monitoring of
child labor
• Occupational
health
standards
• Animal welfare
monitoring
• Right to
association
• Minimum
wage

Source: Adapted from Jaffee et al. 2005.

Box 6.31 Standards Induce Innovation throughout the Agriculture Sector

Innovation along agricultural supply chains. The serious effects of mycotoxins on human and animal health
following consumption of specific contaminated products (such as groundnuts and maize) have led many
countries to enact technical regulations establishing
maximum permitted levels of mycotoxins. In subSaharan Africa, where the problem is especially serious,
numerous collaborative research initiatives have been
undertaken to identify cost-effective management
options to reduce the threat to trade and human health.
Research has emphasized on-farm technologies such as
biological control, resistant/tolerant varieties, agronomic practices, cost-effective diagnostic tools, and
practices and technologies for drying, storing, and processing food and feed.
Innovation in alternative control methods. Bans on
hazardous pesticides and other chemicals for treating
pests and diseases are a major incentive for innovations. Methyl bromide, used especially in quarantine
operations for controlling pests affecting plants and
plant-derived materials, has been recognized as an

ozone-depleting substance under the Montreal Protocol. Since 2010 the European Union has banned its use
for most purposes, including quarantine and preshipment fumigations, boosting the search for alternative
control mechanisms.
Innovation in supply chains. Record-keeping and
traceability requirements have been incorporated into
public and private standards, leading to innovations in
supply chains that include simple tracking methods
(pen and paper) as well as more sophisticated systems
based on barcodes, radio-frequency identification,
wireless sensor networks, and mobile devices and
applications.
Innovation in standards themselves. The past two
decades have seen the emergence of tremendous innovations in the way standards are developed and implemented. For example, the move toward system
approaches to food safety regulation has been influenced by two major developments: (1) the introduction
of scientific risk analysis as the basis of establishing
food standards and regulatory measures and (2) the
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 6.31 Standards Induce Innovation throughout the Agriculture Sector (continued)

adoption of food safety management systems, such as
the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) system, and the subsequent move from testing end-products to preventive approaches. At the primary production level, HACCP-based approaches are
being implemented, complementing a set of preventive
measures packaged under good agriculture practices
(GAP) programs.
Innovation in certification. The preponderance of
system approaches and process standards has fostered
the emergence of systems for assessing conformity
based on third-party certification. This development
opens opportunities for coregulatory approaches by the
private and public sector (a combination of legislation
and self-regulation by private operators). The movement toward self-regulation in the private sector
has been pushed by the incorporation of concepts
such as “due diligence” in regulations; due diligence

emphasizes the private sector’s specific obligations in
supplying agrifood products to consumers.
Innovation by private actors. Private “codes of practice” and standards related to sustainability (food safety,
environmental and social criteria) are also proliferating,
especially in horticultural and export crops (coffee, tea,
cocoa, bananas), forestry, aquaculture, and livestock.
Tremendous innovations have been put in place by the
private sector and NGOs, not only for the development of
voluntary standards—with a set of prescribed criteria for
ensuring compliance—but also in terms of compliancerelated infrastructure (such as the innovative auditing
and certification systems described earlier). Innovation
has extended to methods for ensuring that certification
schemes include farmers of differing capacities. In this
regard, the emergence of group certification has been a
tremendous innovation, allowing engagement with
organized groups of small-scale producers.

Source: Authors.
Note: In the United States, for example, the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) expands the powers of the Food and
Drug Administration; among other provisions, it empowers the FDA to create a system for recognizing bodies that accredit
third-party auditors to certify eligible foreign facilities.

innovation is influenced by policy and regulatory frameworks and by the mechanisms enabling stakeholders to interact and collaborate to prioritize needs and investments, share
costs, and perform specific functions related to SPS and quality. Action and investments are especially important for (1)
aligning policy and regulatory frameworks to enable standards to contribute to specific policy goals (such as institutional reform) and (2) enhancing capacities to perform the
wide range of roles and functions related to standards.
The alignment of policy and regulatory frameworks

Policy frameworks vary in accordance with specific national
or subnational needs and circumstances. To understand how
technical regulations and standards can contribute to policy
goals, it is essential to clearly define the overarching goals of
SPS and quality regulations. The legislative and regulatory
process is one of an array of tools that government can use
to achieve policy goals, but often it is only in the course of
analyzing and discussing concrete legislative actions that
outstanding policy questions are identified and resolved. In
recent years, government awareness of the importance of
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SPS and quality issues at the policy level appears to be
increasing; for example, many governments have enacted
specific food safety or organic production policies.
The alignment and harmonization of policy and legislative frameworks is often the first stage in creating an efficient system for SPS and quality standards. Harmonization
addresses the complex, inefficient regulatory frameworks
emerging from overlapping institutional roles, identifies
outdated regulations and standards, and promotes interagency coordination and communication, among other
institutional reforms.
For example, several countries have merged multiple
laws related to SPS in new food laws and have updated regulations to reflect new institutional arrangements and competencies. Another trend is to promote integrated policy
and regulatory frameworks for managing certain risks
together. FAO has developed an integrated “biosecurity
approach” for managing biological risks to animal, plant,
and human health and life (including associated environmental risk), because they all involve systems and procedures
for risk assessment and management, food contamination
notification, and exchanging information.3
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Strengthening institutional arrangements

Once the specific rights and obligations of stakeholders
involved in the SPS and quality-related system are defined
through the legislative process, the challenge is to create
mechanisms enabling the relevant parts of government to
collaborate. Major barriers to adopting more effective systems for SPS and quality standards are erected by bureaucratic divisions of responsibility. These barriers can arise
from budgetary constraints, unequal institutional capabilities, differing cultures, limited communication of information, the absence of a shared vision, and/or disincentives to
working horizontally. Actions and investments to overcome
such barriers and achieve greater efficiencies are illustrated
in box 6.32.

Enhancing capacities to perform the assigned roles
and functions

Along with putting effective policy and regulatory frameworks into place and defining the roles and mechanisms for
actors to work together, a third critical area for action and
investment is the development and enhancement of the
wide range of skills, physical infrastructure, institutional
structures, and procedures that ensure that the organizations and individuals can perform SPS and quality-related
functions effectively, efficiently, and sustainably. Table 6.3
provides examples of those functions.
Most functions listed in table 6.3 require broader oversight and/or some level of collective action. The foundations
of an effective system for SPS and quality standards lie in the
broad awareness among stakeholders that standards are

Box 6.32 Institutional Arrangements for Improving Systems for SPS and Quality Standards

Develop mechanisms for interagency and stakeholder
coordination. Examples include memorandums of
understanding among public agencies to clarify roles
and responsibilities in specifies areas (such as inspections), the establishment of task forces/working groups
to respond to disease outbreaks or emergencies, and
identifying liaison staff in each agency to facilitate communication and exchange of information. In many
developing countries, task forces have emerged under
the leadership of public or private entities, bringing
public and private actors together to discuss actions to
deal with challenges emerging from SPS and qualityrelated standards.
Coordinate functions under a lead agency. An example of this approach is ACHIPIA—the Chilean Food

Safety Agency—which defines food safety policy and
coordinates the work of institutions with food safety roles.
Merge SPS functions into a single independent
agency. An example of this type of arrangement in
developing countries is the Belize Agricultural Health
Authority (BAHA), established in the early 2000s.
BAHA integrates food safety, quarantine, and plant and
animal health functions into a single entity.
Consider costs and capacity. Implementation of any
of these approaches will involve considerations of cost
and capacity. In establishing a new agency, consider the
leadership, facilitation, time, and resources required.
All options need to be assessed in the context of existing capacities in the public and private sectors, the
investments required, and the expected benefits.

Source: Authors.
Note: ACHIPIA = Agencia Chilena para la Calidad e Inocuidad Alimentaria.

Table 6.3 Organizational Functions Related to Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Quality Standards
Functions related to SPS and quality standards
Registering and controlling feed, agrochemicals, veterinary drugs
Conducting basic research, diagnosis, and analysis
Accrediting laboratories, veterinarians, and other third-party
entities
Developing/applying quarantine procedures
Conducting epidemiological surveillance
Inspecting/licensing food establishments
Inspecting and approving consignments for export

Developing/maintaining pest- or disease-free areas
Testing products for residues and contaminants
Establishing/maintaining product traceability
Reporting possible hazards to trading partners
Providing metrology services
Notifying the World Trade Organization and trading partners of new
SPS measures
Participating in international standard-setting

Source: Adapted from World Bank 2005.
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integral to the competitiveness of their country, sector, or
firm and that they have particular roles to play in the system
(World Bank 2005). For example, educated consumers,
entrepreneurs, and others can contribute significantly to
setting standards at the national level and push for improvements and efficiencies in the public sector.
It is also through the specific actions of individual producers and processors that compliance with SPS and qualityrelated standards is achieved. The private sector often
invests heavily in compliance with SPS and quality standards (such as the use of HACCP or testing and certification
at the farm level). Creating awareness and enabling the private sector to innovate through standards is an important
dimension of capacity development. Along with the enactment of standards and regulations, the provision of incentives for private investment can be complementary and
serve as a much-needed tool to support innovation. These
incentives can take the form of quality promotion policies,

national quality awards, national productivity awards, and
matching grant programs (to cite some examples).
Given the significant capacities needed to perform SPS
and quality-related functions, the investments required to
strengthen and develop those capacities can be considerable, particularly in developing countries (box 6.33). The
first step in developing this capacity is to identify specific
needs. Tools have been developed to support countries in
assessing their capacity needs related to standards. For
example, FAO has developed guidelines for assessing needs
in food safety and biosecurity capacity (FAO 2007a, 2007b).
OIE developed the Performance, Vision, and Strategy (PVS)
tool as the basis for evaluating performance against international standards published in the Terrestrial Animal Health
Code. The World Bank assists countries to perform needs
assessments and develop action plans, some of which now
include estimates of the costs associated with improving
operational capacities (World Bank 2010).

Box 6.33 Actions and Investments for Uganda’s Fish Export Industry to Comply with Standards
and Technical Regulations

Hazards of a poorly performing regulatory system.
Uganda’s fish export industry burgeoned in the 1990s,
largely because private investments in fish-processing
facilities led to strong export performance in European
markets. Public investments in food safety policy and
regulatory frameworks and enforcement capabilities
did not keep pace with private investments in the
industry, however. At the end of the 1990s, the weak
regulatory system exposed Uganda to three safetyrelated bans on its fish exports to Europe. Scientific
proof that the fish were unsafe never materialized, yet
the poor performance of Uganda’s public regulatory
and monitoring system was used to justify the ban.
Investing and innovating to reposition the industry.
Public and private actors made a series of innovations
and investments to lift the ban and regain the markets.
Innovation and investment were favored by high
demand in Europe, technical and financial assistance
from development partners, the government’s open and
decisive leadership; and access to finance for private
companies. Specific actions included: (1) streamlining
regulations and strengthening the government authority that would implement them; (2) developing a new

fishery policy; (3) improving monitoring and inspection systems (drafting inspection manuals and standard
operating procedures and training inspectors); (4) initiating regional efforts to harmonize handling procedures
in the countries bordering Lake Victoria; (5) upgrading
a (small) number of landing sites and plans for upgrading a substantial number of others; (6) upgrading processing plants’ procedures and layouts; (7) opening up
the U.S. market, which requires HACCP compliance;
(8) installing two local laboratories and improving the
quality of laboratory services provided to the industry;
(9) increasing the number of processing plants and
improving export performance; and (10) forming an
Association of Quality Assurance Managers to address
problems and concerns among industry players.
The fixed investment in upgrading factories, management systems, and other infrastructure between 1997 and
2001 was equivalent to about 6 to percent of the FOB value
of exports over that period. The innovations were beyond
those required to achieve compliance, such as the adoption of ISO 9000 and even ISO 14000 quality systems. In
general, the process enhanced cooperation and relations
between the regulatory agency and the industry.
(Box continues on the following page)
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Box 6.33 Actions and Investments for Uganda’s Fish Export Industry to Comply with Standards and
Technical Regulations (continued)
Continuously innovating to meet new challenges
and opportunities. Despite some lingering food
safety issues, the larger challenge for the industry is to
deal with the depleted waters and fisheries of Lake
Victoria and more general environmental degradation, which have spurred negative campaigns against
the industry in Europe. Regulatory controls, complemented by self-regulation and voluntary efforts to
gain environmental and sustainable certification,

have been adopted to manage market risks. The volume of fish exports to the European Union has not
returned to previous levels, partly because of the
depletion of fish stocks and competition from other
types of white fish from other countries. For the
Ugandan fish industry, the capacity to learn from its
experience, innovate in response to evolving market
demands, and sustain its resource base will be critical
to future viability.

Sources: Ponte 2005; Ponte, Kadigi, and Mitullah 2010; Jaffee et al. 2006.

The use of economic analysis to drive policy decisions
related to SPS is often emphasized, but the complexity of
current methods is driving efforts to find more flexible and
practical methodologies. An innovative framework based
on multi-criteria decision analysis is being validated by the
Standards Trade and Development Facility.4
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

In the agriculture and agrifood sectors, standards fulfill a
broad range of objectives. A general objective of standardization is to facilitate flows of information between consumers
and producers (particularly information on unobservable
characteristics, such as the use of GM ingredients) to facilitate
trade and spur economic activity. For government, standards
allow authorities to achieve several objectives, such as the protection of animal, plant, and human life and health; the protection of the environment; and the incorporation of social
and sustainability considerations into agricultural production. Through standards, information imbalances and externalities can be addressed and fair competition promoted.
Compliance with standards is crucial for countries to
participate in international trade, because it ensures the
compatibility of components and traceability of products
and raw materials from different places. Approaches to harmonizing standards between countries and/or industries
can reduce transaction costs by reducing duplicative functions of conformity assessment, including testing and certification (Jaffee 2005).
From the perspective of the private sector, standards are
a means of transferring technology and diffusing technical

information concerning products and processes. They
provide incentives to local firms to improve the quality and
reliability of their products. They can also be used as a risk
management instrument, as a product differentiation tool,
or as a cobranding strategy.
Several agricultural export industries in developing
countries have used compliance with standards to gain an
important competitive advantage. Examples include horticultural industries in Peru (Diaz and O’Brian 2003; Diaz
Rios 2007) and Kenya (Jaffee 2003); the groundnut industry
in Argentina and Nicaragua (Diaz Rios and Jaffee 2008);
and the Brazil nut industry in Bolivia (Coslovsky 2006). In
all cases, success required the incorporation of innovations
in production and processing but, perhaps most important,
in collective and organizational behavior. Examples of collective and organizational innovation include the formation
of the Fondation Origine Sénégal—Fruits et Legumes; the
collective self-regulation of Bolivia’s Brazil nut industry; the
collaborative arrangements and interactions between Peru’s
Commission for Export Promotion (PROMPEX, Comisión
Para la Promoción de Exportaciones) and several subsectoral associations.
Clearly the impacts and distributional effects of noncompliance with SPS standards can be devastating for a
company or an entire industry.5 The World Bank (2005)
presents several examples of associated distributional effects
across agricultural export industries resulting from the
imposition of bans or export restrictions following noncompliance with these critical standards. Compliance with
standards and the prevention of foodborne illnesses and
animal/plant diseases also reinforce a country’s reputation
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as a reliable supplier. Outbreaks can lead to huge costs for
governments and the public resulting from diagnosis and
treatment of illness, production losses, outbreak investigations, and product tracebacks and recalls.6
POLICY ISSUES

Standards and technical regulations are used by governments
as a tool to achieve broader policy objectives. The sections
that follow discuss the need for a balanced approach to policy
and decision making that takes domestic and international
trade interests into account. Related issues involve the chaotic
proliferation of private standards and their implications for
national policy, the strategic uses of standards, and the question of who should provide services related to standards.
Balancing divergent policy goals and dealing with
the proliferation of private standards

Policy makers often have to choose between conflicting policy goals with respect to standards and technical regulations.
For example, a desire to protect human health may conflict
with the desire to facilitate agricultural trade or to develop
an industry or sector. The goal of expanding export markets
may also conflict with the desire to conserve water or reduce
pesticide use (Vapnek and Spreij 2005).
Policy making at the national or local level can be highly
influenced by the international environment. Government
policies should be consistent with obligations under international agreements as well as with national food security
and development goals. It is generally recommended that
countries adopt international standards, although their
effectiveness depends on their suitability to specific national
contexts. The harmonization of regional standards for raw
milk in Eastern Africa is one example. Debate revolves
around a desire to harmonize with Codex standards,
although they do not reflect handling and consumption
practices in the region (Jensen, Strychacz, and Keyser 2010).
Trade has become a driving force behind increased public
and private investment in SPS and quality systems, but at the
same time, many stakeholders are concerned that increasingly stringent trade standards are having adverse effects on
the costs to and competitiveness of developing-country suppliers, particularly from LDCs. Consequently, in many countries, compartmentalization of production and adoption of a
system of “dual standards”—one focusing on compliance with
export market demands and one for local consumption—has
been seen as a solution. Another concern is that the heavy
emphasis on the trade benefits regarding SPS and quality
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systems tends to overshadow (at least in the policy discussions) the other benefits of improved standards, such as
reduced production losses and improved public health
impacts on domestic populations. The challenge for policy
makers is to find the right balance between these different
interests and options when formulating policies and investment plans.
Another area of concern from a policy perspective is the
emergence of private SPS standards. Concerns about their
proliferation, prescriptive nature, legitimacy, transparency,
potential to undermine public action, as well as their potential economic development impacts, have coalesced around
an intense debate within the SPS committee of WTO. Concerns related to the proliferation of private social, environmental and sustainability standards are emerging as well.
Discussions in several forums are intensifying over the scope
of harmonization and collaboration and the need for a better understanding of intended impacts at the ground level.
Compliance with standards as a strategic issue

Some view the imposition of stricter SPS and quality
requirements as a barrier to trade, especially if they entail
costly, highly technical requirements or complex administrative procedures. Such requirements erode the competitiveness of industry players and further marginalize small
countries, traders, and farmers.
Others view the same standards and requirements playing
a catalytic role in innovation and modernization. Demands
for compliance with increasingly stringent standards can
expose the fragile competitiveness of an industry (or individual players) and the lack of institutional arrangements for
collective action and clarify the need for action, as in Uganda’s
fish industry (box 6.33). This experience illustrates that innovation in response to agricultural standards and regulations is
not a one-time event but part of a continual process of anticipating and responding to emerging challenges.
In several cases, industry players and governments have
responded effectively to prevailing standards and have consolidated or improved their market position. In some countries, the response has involved a proactive, forward-looking
strategy that seeks to reinforce their competitive advantage, as
in the groundnut industry in Argentina and the horticultural
industries of Peru (Diaz Rios 2007) and Kenya (Jaffee 2003).
In other cases, the response has been essentially reactive, seeking to adjust in the face of adverse trade events. (see box 6.34).
The World Bank has advocated for compliance with
standards to be viewed as a strategic issue, highlighting the
multiple strategic options available to countries (table 6.4).
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Box 6.34 Innovating to Quickly Respond to Adverse Trade Events

India’s fish and fishery products: An export market
lost and regained. In 1997, the European Union
banned all fish and fishery products from India due to
noncompliance with hygienic standards. The Indian
government improved hygiene by requiring measures
such as integrating preprocessing operations with processing facilities and imposing strict limits on approved
output according to plants’ capacities for water, ice
making, and effluent treatment. The government
implemented programs to support improved hygienic
controls in fish processing, including subsidy programs
for upgrading processing facilities and training managers and workers throughout the supply chain. Fish
exporters acted collectively to establish infrastructure
that would link preprocessing units to common water,
ice, and effluent facilities. The new facilities include
modern laboratories that perform all microbial and
chemical tests required by importers. These measures
led the European Union to lift the ban on imports.

Peruvian asparagus exports: Success through standards. In 1997, when Spanish health authorities
asserted that consumption of canned Peruvian asparagus caused two cases of botulism poisoning, the resulting public scare in European markets created large
market losses for Peruvian asparagus exporters. Seeing
that even one careless exporter could disrupt the markets, the government and industry decided to take
action to bring Peruvian agricultural standards in line
with international norms. In 1998, the Peruvian Commission for Export Promotion convinced the asparagus
industry to implement the Codex code of practice on
food hygiene. Government specialists worked with the
companies to ensure proper implementation. In 2001,
national fresh asparagus norms were published. They
provided a quality and performance baseline for the
industry that allowed many firms and farms to generate the necessary skills and experience to gain certification under the stringent international standards.

Source: World Bank 2005.

Table 6.4 Strategic Choices and Responses with Respect to SPS and Quality Standards
Strategy
Voice

Compliance

Reactive

Wait for standards and
give up

Complain when standards
are applied

Wait for standards and
then comply

Proactive

Anticipate standards and
leave particular markets

Participate in standard
creation or negotiate
before standards are
applied

Participate in standard
creation or negotiate
before standards are
applied

Nature of the response

Viability
Size of firm or industry
Share of target market
Reputation
Suitability of legal/regulatory framework
Leadership/coordination within value chain
Private sector management/technical capacity
Public sector administrative/technical capacities
Clarity of institutional responsibilities
Geographical/agro-climatic conditions
Prevailing challenges
Nature of the measure

Exit

Exit
–
–

+
+
–/+
++

Voice
++
++
++
++
+
+
++
+
–
–/+

Compliance
+
+
+
+
++
++
++
+
–/+
–/+
–/+

Source: World Bank 2005.
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Those options will vary for each country, depending on its
economic, political, and social systems and norms, institutional structure, size and location, and so on.
Who provides services related to standards?

Perhaps the most important decision to be made with respect
to building capacities related to standards is whether capacity
building should be done by the public or private sector. There
is certainly an increasing recognition of the critical role that
the private sector can play in providing services traditionally
viewed as the responsibility of the public sector. In countries
where demand for certain standard-related services is high,
the private sector may have an opportunity to provide them.
Before building, equipping, and maintaining laboratories and
other standard compliance-related services, public actors need
to consider alternatives. In some instances public authorities
have delegated compliance services to private organizations,
particularly accreditation, testing, and certification services
(for example, public authorities certify compliance on the
basis of testing services provided by private laboratories).

LESSONS LEARNED

Standards represent major challenges for developing countries, yet isolated improvements and innovations offer limited opportunities to leverage long-term benefits. A key lesson is that countries must be strategic and proactive. What is
required is a process of strategic planning, supported by
continual innovation and improvement, to successfully
overcome challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. A proactive stance rests upon public and private awareness of the issues and strong governance.
Quite often, developing countries have a long list of needs
for capacity development. Efforts to develop capacity related
to standards should aim at maximizing the strategic options
available, consider costs/benefits, speed of implementation,
sustainability, complementarities between the public and
private sectors, and the possibilities for regional collaboration. Certainly one of the “nonregrettable” investments in
this domain would be to invest in creating broader public
and private awareness of SPS and quality management
issues. The sections that follow expand on these points.
Priority setting is essential for effectively managing
standard-related challenges and opportunities

Pragmatism is needed when examining the state of a country’s SPS and quality-related capacity, and realism is needed
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to determine the immediate and long-term scope for
enhancing that capacity. Prioritization can begin with identifying the most immediate and/or significant risks as well
as opportunities for competitive or welfare gains. Policy
makers need to weigh the different objectives and their
potential distributional impacts, but all too often priorities
are driven by the benefits associated with competitive repositioning of industries/sectors or access to remunerative
export markets. As challenging as it may be, it is fundamental to consider holistic approaches that merge domestic and
trade perspectives, perhaps through strategic prioritization
at the national, sectoral, or industry level with stakeholders.

Effective regulatory and voluntary
interventions require public and private
involvement

The development and enforcement of policies related to
standards are enhanced by leveraging support from the private sector and/or creating an enabling environment
(incentives) for private investments in capacity related to
SPS and quality standards. The conditions for effective
coregulatory approaches should be analyzed and explored,
as they represent a potential opportunity for public and
private collaboration.

Assess the gaps between local and international
standards to determine the investments needed
to bridge them

From a market perspective, the structure and maturity of an
industry should drive the design of public and private interventions related to standards. The first step is to assess the
gaps that need to be bridged. The product and the type of
market provide a good indicator of the standard-related
challenges. Public and private actors will need to make distinct adjustments and investments to meet stricter food
safety, quality, and other requirements. Time, significant
investments, and incremental upgrades are all needed for an
industry to become an effective and competitive supplier in
more demanding markets.
Consider the needs of vulnerable groups

New or more stringent standards are likely to pose compliance problems for firms and farms operating under less
favorable conditions. An awareness of the distributional
effects of standards and their influence on poverty is critical
for understanding the strategic choices available to different
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actors and identifying the most appropriate tools to support
them in implementing those choices.

Learn from others, cooperate nationally and
regionally, and search for funds to develop capacity

Given the complexity of standards, it is fundamental for policy makers from developing countries to engage in activities
where they can influence the setting of public and private
standards. Leadership and proactive involvement in initiatives at the regional level are critical. Regional initiatives to

harmonize standards addressing common (and crossborder) SPS issues should receive strong consideration from
policy makers. Involvement in communities of practice, networks, and forums that promote common learning and
information sharing is essential. Examples include the activities undertaken by the Standards Trade and Development
Facility, other development partners, and international
standard-setting organizations. For voluntary standards in
agriculture and agrifood, new spaces for knowledge
exchange and learning are emerging, such as the Trade Standards Practitioners Network.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 1

Developing an Enabling Environment to Improve
Zambian Smallholders’ Agribusiness Skills
and Commercial Orientation
Indira Ekanayake, World Bank

SYNOPSIS OF PROJECT DATA

Country:
Project:

Zambia
Agricultural Development Support
Project (ADSP)
Cost:
US$37.2 million (total project cost
US$39.6 million)
Component cost: Support to Farmers and Agribusiness
Enterprises (US$33.2 million); Institutional Development (US$3.9 million);
Project Management and Coordination
(US$2.6 million)
Dates:
FY 2006–14
Contact:
Indira Ekanayake, World Bank, Zambia
CONTEXT

Agriculture has become a major driver of growth and a significant source of export earnings and diversification in
Zambia as a result of rising mineral prices. Notwithstanding Zambia’s abundant and fertile land and water and economic growth (exceeding 5 percent for the past seven to
eight years), small-scale farmers have seen little change in
their quality of life. Smallholders’ productivity is very low
compared with that of Zambia’s commercial farmers and
farmers in other parts of the world. Productivity is partly
constrained by the lack of title to land, limited financial
resources, and insufficient infrastructure, but much of the
problem arises from the unfavorable policy environment
for small-scale farmers.
Starting in the 1990s, consecutive investments by the
International Development Association (IDA) have sought
to raise productivity in Zambian agriculture in line with
government strategy to support the commercialization of
smallholder agriculture. This strategy aims to reduce
poverty by expanding contract farming and outgrower
schemes that link smallholders with commercial farmers or
agroenterprises.
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In 2006, the government initiated the World Bankfunded Agricultural Development Support Project (ADSP).
Through support to Zambia’s Ministry of Agriculture and
Co-operatives (MACO), the ADSP fosters the commercialization of smallholder agriculture by developing a network
of competitive value chains in selected high-quality, highvalue commodities (such as cotton, horticultural crops,
honey, and dairy). Interventions provide better technology
(improved seed, microirrigation), strengthen institutions
(public-private partnerships, outgrower schemes), and
develop well-maintained rural roads in high-potential agricultural areas. The objective is to ensure that the selected
value chains operate efficiently to increase value addition,
improve smallholders’ access to markets, and improve the
competitiveness of their agricultural commodities.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

As noted, the ADSP was designed to increase the commercialization of smallholder agriculture by improving the productivity, quality, and efficiency of value chains in which
smallholders participate. The project funds three investment areas: (1) matching grants to promote innovative
agribusiness activities that build synergies to develop value
chains, (2) rural feeder roads, and (3) public institutional
support for market development.
The Market and Innovation Facility (MIIF) provides
matching grants to fund innovative activities in which
agribusinesses interact with smallholders or businessoriented farmer groups and cooperatives. The activities
match the business development needs of each subsector,
emphasize technical assistance, and fall into three categories: (1) technology, training, capacity-building, and agricultural services in production, processing, and marketing
in value chain development; (2) information, research, and
studies associated with value chain development; and
(3) services and capacity-building in business management

and development, product promotion, and acquisition of
technical and market information.
The Rural Roads Improvement Facility (RRIF) provides
resources to rehabilitate and maintain rural and district roads
to link selected high-potential agricultural areas to markets as
a means of improving incomes and livelihoods. Target roads
are in five districts (Choma, Chongwe, Katete, Chipata, and
Lundazi) in two provinces (Southern and Eastern). RRIF
investment is expected to provide the essential rural road network for improved market access and associated product
delivery efficiencies and benefits. The road facility supports
the ADSP’s general aims, because value chain development is
superimposed within the rural road grid. To date, 642 kilometers of critical feeder roads have been rehabilitated (57 percent achievement of the target of 1,129 kilometers).
The Supply Chain Credit Facility (SCCF) was originally
designed to provide credit, on a demand-driven basis, for
investments to improve the supply chains of existing and
emerging outgrower schemes and enable agroenterprises,
traders, or nucleus and commercial farmers working with
smallholders to finance capital investments, seasonal inputs,
and export activities. Following implementation delays,
SCCF was modified to improve the productivity of outgrower
schemes, scale them up, establish new contract farming enterprises, and upgrade processing and marketing capacity.
Under the project’s institutional development component,
ADSP builds capacity in selected departments of MACO to
provide the core public services for enhancing smallholders’
productivity, quality of produce, and access to markets. For
example, the project has enabled the Cotton Development
Trust (a public-private trust) to provide seed and technical
assistance to smallholders and increase its production of
foundation seed for cotton through improved irrigation
facilities. The project has also helped to build and equip a
biotechnology laboratory at the Seed Control and Certification Institute (SCCI) and improve the SPS services of the
Zambia Agricultural Research Institute.
The Project has multi-institutional and innovative institutional arrangements for implementation. For example,
the National Coordination Office is based in MACO. MIIF
is administered by Africare, an international NGO, and
coordinated and managed by an independent, outsourced
secretariat. Independent technical reviewers assess the technical and financial feasibility of proposed subprojects. A
multistakeholder subcommittee of the National Project
Steering Committee (with representatives of the Bankers
Association of Zambia, the agribusiness sector, MACO, and
a member of the secretariat) is responsible for final funding
decisions. The project’s rural road component is imple-

mented by the Road Development Authority (RDA) and the
National Road Fund Agency (NRFA). The institutional
development component is managed by the respective
MACO departments.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

The innovative feature of ADSP’s design is a demanddriven, value chain approach that facilitates smallholders’
participation in key value chains. Innovative features of
ADSP’s implementation include the demand-led innovation fund, matching investments by agribusiness to finance
a sustainable rural road network (crucial for innovation by
agribusiness), and the piloting of an improved market
information system. Rural road improvements are procured
through Output and Performance-based Road Contracting
(OPRC). A spatial approach is used to ensure that technological interventions in the selected value chains are compatible with the improved rural road grid.
Under MIIF, matching grants support innovative interventions by agribusiness that add value to agricultural products,
improve agricultural productivity, and improve smallholders’
links to markets. The MIIF Innovation Categories in agricultural value chains include new products, new technologies or
processes, new markets, new strategic partners or organizational arrangements, and new geographical locations.
The innovative element expected of SCCF is that it
would enable entrepreneurs to make the capital investments
that are vital to stronger and more competitive value chains
with or without scaling up while reducing risk absorption.

BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

Value chains strengthened through the project include
dairy, cotton, horticultural crops, paprika, honey, biodiesel,
and tobacco, among others. Some of the key benefits and
outcomes associated with the project are described next.
An innovative matching grant scheme is under way

In its three-plus years of implementation, MIIF has
funded 17 subprojects (for which the total budget exceeds
US$2.6 million) involving more than 28,800 smallholder
beneficiaries. Six additional subprojects are under review,
and 20 or more proposals are under development. MIIF
subprojects have generated 22 technologies and innovations for a range of value chains, including dairy, groundnuts, honey, biofuels, and fisheries. The grant scheme has
leveraged an additional 85.6 percent cofinancing,
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illustrating the considerable buy-in and commitment by
agribusinesses. It is too early to project the outcome of the
subproject grants, but initial assessments by beneficiaries
have been very positive.
To date, the grant scheme has funded high-quality proposals that are demand led and innovative. One lesson from
the experience with MIIF, however, is that it is vital to maintain the number of high-quality subprojects that enter the
funding pipeline. Awareness of the facility is spread through
continuous publicity; a variety of field days, symposia, and
workshops; and word of mouth in the business community.
Another lesson is that a favorable external business environment (especially exchange rates for commodity exports and
inputs for production and value addition) is essential for
strong participation in an innovation grant scheme such as
MIIF that attempts to increase competitiveness.
MIIF’s implementation has faced several challenges. Initially agribusinesses were reluctant to participate because of
their limited awareness of and low interest in the need to innovate for greater competitiveness. The high transaction costs
(time, resources) and lack of experience in developing concept
notes, proposals, follow-up documentation, and cofinancing
commitments also presented a challenge for some participants. The private sector was wary of engaging with what it
perceived to be NGO- and government-“driven” activities.
Similar issues of limited trust and experience in working with
the private sector impeded collaborative arrangements
between private and nonprivate actors. Another challenge that
must not be underestimated is that the effort involved in
working with smallholders in outgrower schemes can limit the
private sector’s interest in submitting proposals.
Although it is too early to point to specific benefits arising from the project’s various kinds of support to specific
value chains, the adoption of more productive and favorable technologies has increased. A baseline study in two
provinces where rural road work is taking place was completed, and an impact study is being undertaken in the
same areas.

project had rehabilitated 583 rural district and feeder roads
in the national road network. It is actively encouraging the
use of MIIF grants in contracting for road rehabilitation
and maintenance to create synergies between improved
crop production and marketing in the value chains. The
socioeconomic targets of the OPRCs in selected catchment
areas (3,136 households were surveyed as a baseline) are
mainly related to process impacts (income-generating
opportunities from road rehabilitation), access impacts
(associated with providing the road infrastructure), and
mobility impacts (on transport services or growth in traffic
volumes), but they are still too early to quantify.

An agricultural market information system piloted
in an integrated project activity zone

As noted, the project used a spatial approach to target the
technology interventions for the selected value chains
within the improved rural road grid in Southern Province,
where a market information system has also been successfully piloted in three districts. Given the popularity of radio
broadcasts of commodity market prices, this program is
being scaled up to include all districts in Southern Province
and will also be introduced to Eastern Province, where the
OPRC rural road work is taking place.
Short-, medium-, and long-term loans to support
investment

Loans provided through the SCCF are an important complement to the matching grants provided through MIIF, and
access to short-, medium-, and long-term agricultural
finance remains critical to the project’s success. This aspect of
the project has been implemented more slowly than
expected, however. Responsibility for implementation has
been transferred to the Development Bank of Zambia, where
institutional capacity strengthening has been initiated.
Serving the public goods agenda

Performance-based contracts for rural roads
successfully implemented

As noted, the project uses a new method of road contracting called OPRC, in which the contractor rehabilitates the
roads under the contract and maintains them for five years.
This agreement ensures that project participants in rural
areas that are far from markets have consistent access to
those markets. Spillover benefits include improved access to
health facilities and primary schools. By its third year, the
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The outcomes of ADSP far exceed the cost of the public
investments. Aside from reinforcing the private sector’s
capacity to increase the competitiveness of Zambian agriculture and improve smallholders’ participation in lucrative
value chains, the project strengthens the public goods delivery agenda through targeted institutional development,
with long-term benefits for the agricultural sector. Examples of these public goods include wider availability of good
quality seed for multiplication by private and public
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agencies, more skilled human resources in public institutions, and development of the rural road network.

Projects similar to ADSP under way in
other parts of the world

Productive partnership projects funded by the World Bank
in Colombia and Vietnam also use matching grants to facilitate partnerships and build capacity in value chains. These
projects and ADSP are demonstrating the challenges of
engaging and retaining the interest of a diverse group of private actors, such as traders, processors, exporters, wholesalers, and retailers. Such projects often require greater
attention to entrepreneurial skills than to farming practices.

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

To date, the ADSP approach has yielded three key lessons.
First, the development of market institutions is not in synchrony with development of other parts of the value chains.
There is need to consistently identify areas, themes, and
issues that can contribute to activities that strengthen value
chains. Second, alliances and partnerships for agribusinesses
do not “just happen” in projects of this nature. They must be
actively facilitated and nurtured and benefit from early technical and financial support. A conducive political economy is
essential for success. Third, owing to its demand-driven
design, MIIF responded to greater and more varied demand
from more diverse businesses than originally anticipated.
The focus of the grant scheme became fragmented as a result
and increased the administrative burden. Other lessons are
discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow.

Engage private sector grantees/actors for dialogue
and innovative enterprise development

A project such as ADSP, which seeks to promote innovation
in value chains and involve smallholders in commercial agriculture, must engage the private sector when it is first developed and designed. ADSP carefully engaged the private sector as the project was prepared, but a more consistent effort
was warranted later, during the project’s implementation.
Matching grants under ADSP did not automatically
strengthen value chains and develop agribusiness. Midway
through the project, it was realized that consultative
processes (multistakeholder platforms, forums for value
chains, sector associations, and field days) were useful instruments to support development of the agricultural sector.

These platforms help to develop a shared understanding of
challenges, opportunities, and intervention that may guide
the support services and matching grant program. They can
also foster collaboration, including partnership between
public and private agencies.

Establish a high-caliber secretariat with private
sector experience

The secretariat or fund administrator has a key responsibility in implementing a grant scheme. Selection of the grant
administrator requires significant effort, and often special
capacity building is warranted. Deficiencies in management
capacity and leadership could cause delays or even the failure of the scheme. As noted, under ADSP this function was
outsourced to an NGO. This option is useful when a project
requires autonomy, experience in working with participants
at the grassroots level and in decentralized projects, as well
as experience with donor requirements (reporting, procurement, and fiduciary issues). NGOs also come with challenges, however, including the potential for greater overhead
costs, problems with long-term institutional sustainability,
and a greater risk that they will lack business understanding.
The essential features for a secretariat to succeed are the
available capacity, institutional sustainability, overhead
costs, separation of the funding and implementation of the
grant fund, potential for political interference, and the
interests of the key stakeholders.

Strengthen aspects of the matching grant scheme

The matching grant scheme could be strengthened in a number of ways. The activities and value chains supported by the
facility could be adjusted to focus more on high-priority
value chains and on moving away from activities involving
technology, extension, and studies toward a wider set of
business-promoting activities. Stronger, direct communication with actors in the agricultural sector is vital to increase
awareness of the facility. The grant application and review
process should be streamlined. The MIIF administrator
requires greater capacity to interact with private sector stakeholders, train clients, and manage the overall program.
One final lesson from the experience with MIIF is that
the grants have been quite useful for building institutional
capacity in public organizations at the provincial and district level. In other words, participation in grant schemes
that strengthen agribusinesses can benefit not only
national goals but provincial and district institutions and
economies.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 2

Intellectual Property Management in Livestock Veterinary
Medicines for Developing Countries
Josef Geoola, GALVmed
Sara Boettiger, University of California, Berkeley

SYNOPSIS

he Global Alliance for Livestock Veterinary Medicines (GALVmed) is a nonprofit organization that
makes livestock vaccines, diagnostics, and medicines accessible and affordable to the very poor. GALVmed
coordinates research, development, and deployment
(RD&D) among multiple partners, from identifying candidate technologies to manufacturing sustainable supplies of
market-ready products. GALVmed uses a wide range of
resources to ensure that IP supports innovation for the
poor, such as due diligence for accessing upstream technologies, the implementation of IP strategies that work
toward development goals, the use of IPRs as incentives to
engage partners, and the negotiation of contracts that support the translation of research into products accessible to
the poor. GALVmed’s IP management system benefits its
pro-poor mission by addressing broader issues that prevent
innovations from becoming sustainable, market-ready
products. Experience with public-private partnerships has
taught GALVmed to leverage its interests while providing its
partners with the opportunity to achieve their own internal
mission.

T

CONTEXT

The Global Alliance for Livestock Veterinary Medicines
(GALVmed, www.galvmed.org) is a nonprofit organization
with a mission to make livestock vaccines, diagnostics, and
medicines accessible and affordable to the millions for
whom livestock is a lifeline. The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, the United Kingdom Department for International Development, and the European Commission are
major sponsors of GALVmed’s work.
The impact of livestock in addressing poverty continues to
be underappreciated, particularly livestock’s role as living
assets for the very poor. Data on the impact of livestock diseases are limited, but four of the many major and unaddressed
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livestock diseases (East Coast fever, Rift Valley fever, Porcine
cysticercosis, and Newcastle disease) cause estimated annual
economic losses upwards of US$350 million. Losses on this
scale affect the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of poor
households in the developing world.
GALVmed currently works on nine disease-control technologies for those four livestock diseases. Many diseases
afflicting livestock in developing countries are preventable
and well understood from a research perspective. Until
recently, however, the developing world has lacked the
resources for moving the science out of the lab and into the
field to prevent and contain livestock diseases. One reason
for this impasse is that disease-preventing and diseasecontrolling technologies often emerge from R&D in
advanced laboratories and are subject to one or more forms
of IP protection.
For GALVmed to achieve its mission, the organization
must constantly exercise (and review) its IP policies and IP
management strategies. Through effective IP policies and
management strategies, GALVmed can identify and circumvent IP risks early in the commercialization pathway, therefore avoiding potentially serious and costly downstream
impediments to GALVmed projects.
GALVmed is unusual in that it operates across the entire
commercialization pathway to make technological solutions
accessible to the poor. GALVmed does not have in-house
capacity for the research, development, and deployment
(RD&D) of products. Instead, its role is to facilitate the
entire RD&D process, from identifying candidate technologies to manufacturing sustainable supplies of market-ready
products. Managing RD&D activities among multiple partners and under pro-poor obligations requires the organization to consider the use of IP strategically to ensure that
upstream technologies do ultimately result in downstream
products accessible to those who need them most.
By addressing a wide range of IP strategy issues,
GALVmed has gained experience that has value for many

Box 6.35 Tailoring Intellectual Property Strategies for Public and Private Partners
in Technology Deployment
The vaccine that GALVmed is currently deploying for
East Coast fever has a commercial market, primarily
among the Masai in East Africa, and potential for sustainable private sector production and distribution.
Protection against East Coast fever adds significant
value to Masai calves, and the Masai are willing to pay
for the vaccine within a certain price range. With the
help of the Public Intellectual Property Resource for
Agriculture (PIPRA, www.pipra.org), GALVmed first
approached the IP strategy for the vaccine by characterizing the opportunities and risks. The vaccine was
nearly ready for the market and would not require substantial further development. PIPRA reviewed the IP in
the technology. It determined that the technology and
related know-how, although enormous in value, were in
the public domain and had no associated IP rights.
The lack of formal IP meant that manufacturers
would have less of an incentive to invest in producing
the vaccine. GALVmed needed to explore other types
of leverage, such as forward market commitments or
other assurances of supply channels. Eventually
GALVmed learned that deregulation of the vaccine in
each country in East Africa was linked to an exclusive
marketing authorization that offered some leverage. To
create a commercialization strategy for sustainable
delivery of the vaccine to East Africa, information on
marketing authorizations needed to be integrated with
information on the profit incentives of manufacturers
and distributors as well as consideration of the transfer
of know-how. In summary, even though IP did not
play a role in the eventual commercialization strategy,
formulation of an IP management strategy was critical

to determine: (1) whether in-licensing was required
and which partners might need to be engaged in the
process due to IP ownership and (2) what incentives
could be derived, either with IP or other levers, to
ensure that partners also had incentives to comply with
GALVmed’s pro-poor obligations.
While commercialization of the East Coast fever
vaccine involved private companies as partners in manufacturing and distribution, another vaccine in
GALVmed’s portfolio, the Porcine cysticercosis vaccine,
involves virtually all public partners. In this case,
GALVmed recognized that the lack of a private market
for the Porcine cysticercosis vaccine (government procurement was anticipated) meant that incentives to
engage manufacturers and distributors would need to
be different. PIPRA conducted due diligence over relevant technologies and ascertained that, while formal
IPRs existed in some countries, it was tangible property
rights that would provide GALVmed with both challenges and opportunities in its development of a propoor commercialization strategy. GALVmed was then
able to employ licensing language to create incentives
for partners, whereby a selected partner would gain
geographical exclusivity in developing, manufacturing,
and distributing the vaccine. As was the case with the
East Coast fever vaccine, developing an IP management
strategy involved critical due diligence to determine
GALVmed’s risks and opportunities, and then careful
consideration of how to use the available leverage to
ensure that partners had incentives that aligned with
GALVmed’s obligations to deliver products to the very
poor.

Source: Authors.

organizations that develop technology for the poor.
GALVmed has made crucial IP decisions, observed their
implications, and employed IP strategies suitable for both
public and private partnerships (see box 6.35).
Through broad involvement with the RD&D process,
GALVmed addresses IP and contractual challenges, including accessing and transferring proprietarily owned technologies, resolving the distribution of rights, and strategically using IP to promote deployment. The remainder of
this profile focuses on the processes and resources

GALVmed has employed to address IP issues, such as due
diligence, strategy implementation, and conscious leveraging of IP, as well as some of the challenges involved (for
example, negotiating contracts).
GALVMED’S INNOVATIVE APPROACH

As it has grown, GALVmed has developed a systematic
approach that anticipates IP hurdles and mitigates IP risks
that arise during RD&D (box 6.36). These IP management

MODULE 6: INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY PROFILE 2: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN LIVESTOCK VETERINARY MEDICINES

517

Box 6.36 Internal Capacity Building for Strategic Intellectual Property Management

As GALVmed has expanded, its needs for managing IP
have evolved. During its startup phase, to ensure that
IP issues were addressed from the onset of projects
with utmost diligence, GALVmed outsourced IP management issues to a group such as PIPRA, with a
proven track record and the expertise for managing IP
within agriculture. Five years after its founding,
GALVmed now manages an ever-growing number of
technologies in the RD&D pipeline. The related complex IP challenges demand timely attention and therefore in-house expertise. GALVmed’s growing internal
capacity for IP management has been achieved
through three changes:
■

■

■

Creating a new management role within the organization to deal with IP and agreements. This role
provides for focused, consistent management of
the drafting of time-sensitive agreements and delicate negotiations as well as critical accountability for
IP management. Moreover, internal expertise allows
for IP management strategies that fit the organization’s risk tolerance, encompass organizational culture, and can more easily be adapted to changing
information of the technical and socioeconomic
realities of the RD&D pathway.
Contracting the services of a local attorney from a
top-tier law firm to provide weekly and as-needed
support in drafting and negotiating complex legal
agreements. A local attorney a provides the organization with an external opinion, identifies legal issues

that could be missed internally, and provides insight
on regional laws and regulations. The execution of
contracts requires expertise in local law, and nonprofits often require legal opinions from local attorneys on risks such as exposure to liability. Most
important, a local attorney is essentially local
enough to meet individuals in the organization and
understand the nuances of issues that would otherwise be missed through a phone call.
Improving utilization of external IP expertise to
address the resource gaps that almost always exist
internally. External expertise, in the form of contracted services from organizations or individual
consultants, can provide experience-based, impartial advice that would be difficult to gain otherwise.
External expertise (in GALVmed’s case, from
PIPRA) has access to the knowledge and expensive
toolsets that small nonprofits may struggle to purchase. These experts have access to a global network
of attorneys that can provide regional legal advice
that can be valuable, for example, when questions
of law arise in countries where GALVmed’s partners practice. Lastly, external experts have the latest
specialized insight on IP. They are capable of breaking down technologies, conducting highly detailed
assessments, acquiring legal insight, and converting
a mass of information into one thorough, meaningful report that GALVmed’s internal expert can
then integrate into a larger commercialization
strategy.

Source: Authors.
a. Andy Harris, associate at Maclay Murray & Spens LLP, Edinburgh.

measures are critical to GALVmed’s ability to efficiently
transform upstream disease-preventing technologies into
safe, effective, and accessible downstream products.
The sections that follow provide more detail on
GALVmed’s four-stage, systematic approach to managing
IP. The approach was designed to balance the organization’s
nonprofit, pro-poor mission with the need to integrate and
address a variety of challenges arising throughout the commercialization pathway of the products GALVmed seeks to
deliver to the poor.
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Stage 1: Technology landscaping

GALVmed’s initial step of conducting a technology landscape requires using IP and other sources of information to
scout for preexisting and emerging technologies. Technical
and scientific value of individual technologies are assessed
as well as potential IP risks. In one instance, scientists at
GALVmed learned of a number of technically promising,
but proprietarily owned, vaccine stabilization technologies.
Upon IP review, GALVmed learned of related ongoing
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patent disputes. The uncertainty and risk associated with
these disputes, and the potential impact these risks may
have on downstream partners for technology development,
were considered in conjunction with technical issues, and
the risk was deemed unacceptable. The review of IP issues
allowed GALVmed to avoid pursuing a technology that
could have potentially led to delays or the expense of latestage shifts in research strategy. Early identification of technologies that exhibit scientific merit and withstand IP
review paves the path to a more resource-efficient commercialization process.
Stage 2: IP due diligence

As candidate technologies are identified from Stage 1, an IP
due diligence process is used. This due diligence (or IP
auditing) is a resource-intensive process involving indepth research into the patent landscape surrounding
each selected technology (for example, individual investigations of vectors, genes, promoters, markers, and signal
sequences of a vaccine). When a patent is particularly
important to GALVmed’s commercialization strategy or
when use of a technology is suspected to infringe existing
patents, freedom-to-operate (FTO) assessments may be
carried out with the help of attorneys. The information
gained from IP due diligence allows GALVmed to identify
potential partners, understand in-licensing obligations, and
review potential opportunities for the use of IPRs in further
development of the technology.
While some large companies employ internal IP legal
expertise, it is usually more efficient for small companies
and nonprofits to outsource this level of patent landscaping
and analysis. For these analyses, GALVmed collaborates
with PIPRA. In this stage, GALVmed also incorporates a
review of issues of tangible property rights1 (examining, for
instance, material transfer agreements as well as IP licenses);
existing claims to both tangible property and IP are mapped
to understand the full implications for commercialization.
Rights to ownership and the terms of use for technology
providers, partners, and GALVmed must be clearly documented for any background (existing) and foreground
(future) IP used or generated throughout RD&D. Finally, a
review of rights and obligations of relevant existing legal
agreements is also conducted at this stage.
The importance of due diligence for RD&D is often
underestimated in agricultural development; as a consequence, organizations operate in an environment of uncertainty and risk. Sponsors who invest in organizations like
GALVmed are incurring unnecessary risk if they fail to

make this type of due diligence a part of their grant-making
process. The due diligence task for technology development
is undoubtedly complex and requires substantial resources,
but there is great value in high-quality IP analysis. Integrating IP analysis with technical information permits decisions
to be made based on the evidence and reduces risk.
Stage 3: Technology-specific IP management strategy

The insight gained and information generated through IP
due diligence is used for creating a Disease Intellectual
Property Plan (DIPP). The DIPP is used to advise
GALVmed staff and to address questions from external parties, such as stakeholders, regarding GALVmed’s intended IP
management strategy for a specific disease-control technology. Aside from presenting the results of the IP due diligence
process, DIPPs map the flow of technology from providers
to development partners, manufacturers, and so on. This
map allows GALVmed to identify the contractual arrangements needed for effectively governing IP transactions
between the actors involved in a way that supports pro-poor
sustainable delivery of technology. Moreover, by building
upon the results of the due diligence process, GALVmed can
make informed decisions on critical issues such as ownership and rights allocations as they relate to background and
foreground IP.
Issues of ownership and rights allocation are often not
straightforward where nonprofit organizations are engaged
in technology development. There is, first, the question of
whether the coordinating organization should own IP itself.
Some would say there is an inherent discord between owning IP and being an “honest broker” that coordinates incentives among partners. However, the ownership of IP allows
a facilitator organization to have more leverage in pushing
for pro-poor outcomes. GALVmed does not seek to own IP,
but it does not rule out the possibility of a future instance in
which claiming ownership to IP rights could be critical to
achieving the development and deployment of products for
the poor.
Stage 4: Contracting

The strategy articulated in a DIPP is ultimately implemented through a set of contracts among partner organizations. Contract drafting and negotiations are among the
most challenging and resource-consuming activities that
GALVmed undertakes. Some contracts govern straightforward IP transactions. Under other circumstances, contracts
need to capture more sophisticated strategies that deal with,
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for example, issues of pro-poor performance obligations,
geographical exclusivities, and activities for which a high
degree of uncertainty exists. GALVmed’s position as a facilitator in the RD&D process further complicates what might
otherwise be a simple contract. As a facilitator, GALVmed
engages multiple parties, often playing the role of an intermediary or broker (see module 3, TN 4, for a discussion of
innovation brokers). GALVmed must structure contracts to
ensure that there is a potential for leveraging to meet propoor goals, certain obligations from technology providers
are integrated, and an effective recourse process is in place
(should obligations be broken) with minimal impact on
goals and milestones. In addition, GALVmed must ensure
that the expectations of the technology provider and sublicensee are in compliance with one another. It is in
GALVmed’s interest to release market-ready products as
soon as possible. Therefore it becomes GALVmed’s responsibility to manage challenging negotiations with all involved
parties in a timely and efficient way.
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purely humanitarian, private partners, who are crucial in
ensuring that a technology becomes a successful product,
are likely to have different ambitions, which must also be
considered.
The need to foster stronger public-private partnerships
has taught GALVmed to leverage the organization’s interests
while providing its partners with the opportunity to achieve
their own internal mission. This understanding has served
GALVmed enormously well while dealing with contentious
IP issues and creating conditions for relationships and
products conducive to success.
Another benefit GALVmed has enjoyed from its
approach to managing IP is the ability to rapidly produce,
negotiate, and secure agreements with different partners.
The development of core IP principles and more attractive
conditions for engaging partners have allowed the organization to significantly increase the rate at which it can negotiate contracts.

BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

As this profile has illustrated, IP management processes in the
private sector are highly relevant to nonprofits working to
develop technology for the poor. IP management in the private sector minimizes risks and contributes key components
to a commercialization strategy that supports the organization’s goals. GALVmed, through its systematic approach to
IP management, is better able to circumvent and/or minimize IP risks that could adversely affect downstream development and deployment operations (see the sections on IP
landscaping and IP due diligence) and can use IP management to support its organizational goals. In the wider
scheme of things, GALVmed’s IP management system has
benefited the organization pro-poor mission by addressing
some broader issues that often delayed milestone deliverables, namely, the growth of innovation to sustainable,
market-ready products.
One main point highlighted through GALVmed’s experience in strategic IP management is that organizational missions and related policies, including IP policies, must be
aligned with the ambitions of partners engaged in the
RD&D process. Ultimately, the availability of GALVmed’s
products should not depend on the existence of GALVmed
itself. For innovations to become meaningful products with
wide adoption, partners, preferably private, must be incentivized to support the existence and availability of a product,
throughout and beyond the existence of GALVmed. While
GALVmed’s facilitation in the development of a vaccine is

GALVmed’s experience in IP management (including its
interaction with public and private partners) provides many
lessons. A key lesson is that superficial surveys of IP are
insufficient. All organizations working in the knowledge
economy, in the public sector or otherwise, need to proactively address IP matters. Systematic IP management will
improve efficient progress, reduce risk, and support the
organizational mission, ultimately creating greater impact
on livelihoods of the very poor.
The resources needed to implement IP management require
organizational decisions to develop certain capacities in-house
and determine which elements should be outsourced. Some
have suggested that basic understanding of IP and access to
patent information (such as information in public patent
databases) is sufficient for most public sector operations. As
demonstrated here, however, IP issues require significant
expertise in analysis and the ability to develop solutions tailored to each project’s goals. Public patent data require
interpretation, informed analysis, and then translation into
a sound IP strategy that serves the organization and its
development goals.
GALVmed has found that a hybrid approach to IP capacity building, in which IP expertise is available both in-house
and externally, serves the organization best. Internal sources
are in closer contact with staff overseeing the RD&D process
and can better capture and communicate the organization’s
needs and wants. External expertise, on the other hand, is
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impartial, can provide in-depth analysis, and can highlight
issues the organization may fail to see internally. External
expertise has given GALVmed high-quality analysis and
access to top-tier attorneys.
One of the most challenging issues GALVmed has experienced is that of contracting. GALVmed’s facilitation role
entails the development of multiple contracts and often
lengthy negotiations. GALVmed is working toward a new
approach that employs significantly simplified contracts fit
for multiple purposes. The intention is to decrease the time
between drafting and signing contracts, while still effectively
integrating the necessary rights and obligations. In addition
to benefits for GALVmed, simplified legal contracts benefit
developing country partners without good access to legal
expertise.
GALVmed has learned that building in-house capacity to
manage IP is only half of the equation. IP management plays
an integral role in achieving a desired result; many related
factors, such as business development strategies, go handin-hand with IP management practices. Regardless of the
diligence GALVmed puts into managing IP, a sustainable
endeavor ultimately relies on a partner’s ability to interpret
GALVmed’s knowledge of IP issues and integrate that
knowledge into a sound business model for downstream
application.
In GALVmed’s case, this challenge can prove difficult to
meet. The majority of the organization’s partners for downstream deployment are from the developing world, and
many suffer capacity constraints (either in financial or other
resources) or lack experience with IP, complex contracting,
the creation of business plans, and other key business tools.

Consequently, GALVmed has recognized that the second
half of the equation for success in commercializing technologies
for the poor is to build capacity in its downstream partners.
GALVmed now hires business consultants to work alongside
partners to create business plans and strategies that take
advantage of the IP knowledge GALVmed holds. In some
instances, GALVmed assists its partners by taking the lead in
drafting and negotiating complex agreements between partners. This intervention provides the partners with practical
experience for dealing with IP issues, while providing
GALVmed with the opportunity to impart its knowledge
and experience in IP management for pro-poor purposes.
Capacity building on a project-specific basis has made related
processes, such as contracting, simpler. GALVmed can now
engage with partners who have a clearer understanding of
the needs, steps, risks, costs, and inputs required for a sustainable venture.
In conclusion, GALVmed provides an example of how
nonprofits engaged in research, development, and deployment of technologies for the poor can benefit from systematic IP management. IP management plays a key role in
reducing risks and improving the organization’s capacity to
deliver on its mission. Most nonprofits do not have sufficient in-house capacity, and this profile illustrates how the
balance of outsourced services and internal capacity can
change as an organization grows. Lastly, GALVmed’s experience indicates the importance of integrating capacity building in IP management; even where a nonprofit is challenged
itself in IP management capacity, there are opportunities to
share knowledge and continue to foster improvements in a
partner’s IP management skills.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 3

Developing a Subregional Approach to Regulating
Agricultural Biotechnology in West Africa
Morven McLean, ILSI Research Foundation
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Michigan State University (MSU),
Agriculture and Biotechnology Strategies
(AGBIOS), and the Donald Danforth
Plant Science Center (DDPSC)
US$2 million
USAID FY 2006–09
Dr. Saharah Moon Chapotin, USAID

CONTEXT

In 2004, the Sahel Institute (INSAH, Institut du Sahel)
completed a stock-taking exercise in the member countries of the Interstate Committee for Drought Control in
the Sahel (CILSS, Comité Inter-états de lutte contre la
sècheresse au Sahel) plus Ghana to gain a better understanding of the structure of the seed sector in each. During the country consultations, stakeholders provided the
following justifications for establishing a subregional regulatory body for conventional and transgenic seed in the
Sahel: (1) extending national seed markets that are considered limited; (2) formalizing an ancient transborder
seed route; (3) ensuring the quality of the varieties
released; and (4) monitoring the release of GE products in
particular.
This insight led to the development of the “Framework
Convention Introducing a Common Biosafety Regulation
for the Prevention of Biotechnological Risks in the CILSS
Countries” and the “Framework Convention Instituting
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Common Regulations for Conventional and Transgenic
Seeds in the CILSS Area.” The preambles to the conventions recognized both the benefits and potential risks of
modern biotechnology. It stated that a subregional
approach to biosafety regulation should be undertaken as
“each country is neither able to individually take advantage of the known and potential benefits of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), nor cope with their known
and potential risks.”
In 2005, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) published an action plan with three operational
objectives for the development of biotechnology and
biosafety in the subregion, one of which was to develop a
subregional approach to biosafety regulation (ECOWAS
2005). The plan was critical of the slow progress in achieving
a subregional biosafety framework in West Africa, which it
attributed to “an absence of political support in the field of
biotechnology and biosafety; lack of communication
between stakeholders, even within the same country; lack of
coordination between the concerned ministries in the member countries; and poor subregional cooperation on the subject.” The subregional approach to biosafety advocated by
ECOWAS was to develop and implement a common regulatory framework that would be binding on all ECOWAS
member countries.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

The primary objective of the Short-Term Technical Assistance in Biotechnology (STTAB) project was to work
cooperatively with regulatory officials to develop practical, needs-driven policies, directives, guidance, and review
procedures to address the regulation of confined field trials and eventual commercialization of GE crops in West
Africa. The project’s components are described in the sections that follow.

Technical assistance to INSAH for the review
and adoption of technical annexes to the CILSS
biosafety convention

The project worked in partnership with INSAH (the technical arm of CILSS) and the West and Central African
Council for Agricultural Research and Development
(WECARD, referred to more commonly by its French
acronym, CORAF)1 as well as representatives from national
environment and agriculture ministries to improve the
Framework Convention Instituting Common Regulations
for Conventional and Transgenic Seeds in the CILSS Area.
During a series of four subregional meetings and with
additional bilateral inputs from CILSS country representatives, the CILSS Convention was substantively rewritten in
an effort to address the activities of the subregional process
consistently and without duplication. The contained, confined, and unconfined uses of GE organisms were clearly
differentiated. The regulatory responsibilities for each of
these activities were defined. The technical annexes, which
describe the technical information required for applications to the regional scientific review panel, were more
clearly aligned with the types of applications that will be
received in the subregion and with international standards and guidance related to the regulation of GE organisms established by Codex Alimentarius, OECD, and the
Cartagena Protocol.

Establishing a Procedure for the Review and Authorisation
of Products of Modern Biotechnology within the
ECOWAS.”
Technical assistance to enhance the environmental
risk assessment capacity of the national biosecurity
agency, Burkina Faso

The STTAB project also endeavored to work with national
agencies and authorities to build institutional and human
resource capacity in risk assessment, risk management, and
decision making at the national level. When the project
began, Burkina Faso was the only country in West Africa to
have approved confined field trials of a GE crop, insectresistant (Bt) cotton. To approve these trials, Burkina Faso
had promulgated biosafety regulations and established
ANB, its national biosafety agency reporting to the environment ministry (Ministère de l’Environnement et du Cadre
de Vie). While the ANB, which has a legal mandate for the
coordination and monitoring of all activities pertaining to
the implementation of biosafety in Burkina Faso, was
already active in the field, budgetary and technical capacity
constraints limited its effectiveness. Preserving and building
on the advances in Burkina Faso required building significant and sustainable capacity within the ANB.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS
Technical assistance to INSAH to develop and
implement an ECOWAS regulation on biosafety

In August 2008, the Experts Group Meeting on ECOWAS
Biosafety Regulation, attended by environment and agriculture representatives from 14 ECOWAS countries, concluded
with a request to INSAH-CILSS to extend the CILSS Framework Convention to all of the ECOWAS member countries.
Building on the STTAB project’s support to INSAH for the
development of a regional biosafety framework within West
Africa, this initiative aimed to extend the CILSS Biosafety
Convention under the ECOWAS mandate.
Specifically, the objective was to develop an ECOWAS
Regulation governing the importation, development, manufacture, and use of GE organisms and products derived
thereof within ECOWAS Member States and to facilitate a
consultative process leading to the adoption of the Regulation. The ECOWAS Biosafety Regulation was to be consistent with the spirit of the CILSS Biosafety Convention,
incorporating the best elements of that framework, including its technical guidance on risk assessment procedures.
The resulting document was “Regulation C/Reg.1/12/08

The innovative elements of STTAB were its regional
approach to what was initially perceived as a national priority. The approach proved flexible enough to be developed
into a novel model for subregional harmonization of
biosafety regulations.
Identifying and responding to a national priority
with positive regional spillovers

Initially, the STTAB project focused most of its technical
capacity-building in Burkina Faso. This strategic decision
was based on the fact that: (1) Burkina Faso’s government
had clearly indicated its support for the commercialization
of Bt cotton and, to that end, had made significant steps
toward establishing a biosafety regulatory system (see box
6.28 in TN 4 in this module) and (2) farmers expressed significant interest in cultivating Bt cotton, generated by promising results from field trials conducted from 2003 to 2006.
Environmental risk assessment training was provided to
ANB personnel and other scientists so that a premarket
environmental risk assessment of Bt cotton could be
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undertaken. The assessment was a prerequisite for the decision to approve Bt cotton.
A novel but feasible model for subregional
harmonization

Given the ease of transboundary movement of seed between
countries in West Africa, the impending commercial
authorization of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso was an important catalyst for countries to work toward implementing a
subregional approach to biosafety regulation. From prior
stock-taking exercises and subregional consultations, it was
apparent that the project should direct regional harmonization to the development of a mechanism whereby the
science-based risk assessment would be undertaken by a
subregional body but all decision-making would remain at
the national level. A subregional body responsible for
undertaking risk assessments for specific types of applications (such as confined field trials, food safety assessments
for GE food, environmental risk assessment of GE plants)
and providing scientific opinions to the member countries
was considered the most achievable form of harmonization.
This model differed from the only other examples of subregional harmonization that have been implemented internationally. In the EU, national decisions about cultivating GE
crops are delegated to a subregional body, but this model
has been ineffective. In Canada and the United States, harmonization of technical requirements for risk assessment
has not resulted in appreciable gains in the efficiency or
effectiveness of their representative regulatory systems.
The revised CILSS Convention and follow-on ECOWAS
Regulation provide a practical and achievable approach to
biosafety regulation in a subregion where national governments have limited scientific resources (human, financial,
and institutional) to draw upon. An essential element of this
project was to build capacity among the country representatives involved in drafting these documents so that the
implications of specific policy choices and regulatory
approaches could be considered.
BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE

This STTAB project has resulted in both direct and indirect
benefits in the subregion. Building the capacity of Burkinabe risk assessors and regulators to undertake the environmental risk assessment of GE cotton was one of the factors
contributing to its eventual approval. This effort has
strengthened the ANB nationally, promoted its visibility
within West Africa as a regional resource for risk assessment
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training, and serves as a potential model for other countries
in the subregion (or elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa).
The commercial cultivation of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso
contributed to an increase of about 16 percent of overall
production in 2009/10. It is anticipated that 95 percent of
harvested area (442,900 hectares) in 2010 will be planted to
Bt cotton compared to the 2009/10 season (106,000
hectares). This expansion is expected to contribute significantly to national cotton production.
The ECOWAS regulation has not been submitted for
approval, so it remains to be seen how implementation will
proceed. The West Africa Regional Biosafety Project,
launched in June 2009 by the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU) with funding from UNEP-GEF
and the World Bank, has a component to strengthen institutional capacity for preparing regional laws and regulations on biosafety and creating an institutional framework
to accompany the dissemination and implementation of the
regional biosafety framework in WAEMU countries. A joint
CILSS-ECOWAS-WAEMU committee is currently reviewing the ECOWAS Regulation to determine how it may be
best incorporated into the WAEMU project. The end result
may be that the ECOWAS Regulation will become a joint
ECOWAS-WAEMU Regulation.
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

The lessons from this experience are summarized in the
sections that follow. They focus on the factors that
contribute to successful collaboration, including a clear
appreciation of the stakeholders involved, the potential
incentives for collaboration, and the capacity-building
requirements that must be fulfilled if collaboration is to
yield useful results.
Understand who the key players are and engage
them early in the process

The INSAH-CILSS process that led to the development of
the first draft of the Framework Convention was criticized
because the Convention was developed by Ministries of
Agriculture without representation or input from national
biosafety focal points or Ministries of Environment. The
process to revise the Convention under the STTAB project
deliberately included representation from a broader range
of ministries. This more inclusive approach was an important step in correcting the apparent absence of prior interministerial engagement.
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Collaboration with like projects should begin early
and continue through the life of the project

Deficiencies in cooperation and coordination between the
CILSS-ECOWAS initiative to develop a subregional
approach to biosafety risk assessment and the West Africa
Regional Biosafety Project under WAEMU led to early concerns that two competing approaches to regional biosafety
regulation would develop. This concern may have been
resolved with the CILSS-ECOWAS-WAEMU committee
mentioned previously. Other capacity-building initiatives
have also been launched in West Africa since the STTAB
project began, notably the African Network of Biosafety
Expertise, established by the African Union/New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Office of Science
and Technology, with a specific mandate to improve technical capacity in biosafety regulation and risk assessment.
Collaboration between all of these projects will be essential
if subregional harmonization is to be achieved.
Subregional harmonization is unlikely unless there
is an imperative for countries to engage
meaningfully in the process

In the case of West Africa, the commercial release of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso was a pivotal event. While there had
been efforts to promote a subregional approach to
biosafety regulation prior to the impending approval of Bt
cotton, the expectation that Bt cotton seed would move to
other countries within the subregion provided a real-world
example of why a subregional approach to risk assessment
was desirable and even necessary. Given that most West
African countries have very limited capacity in biosafety
risk assessment and risk management, a subregional risk
assessment of Bt cotton under the process described in the

ECOWAS Regulation would be more efficient and costeffective than if each country performed its own assessment.
It might also help mitigate potential trade disruptions that
can occur when trading partners have asynchronous product approvals.

Building national biosafety capacity is necessary for
subregional harmonization

It is difficult for policy makers to support efforts to develop
subregional approaches to biosafety regulation, let alone
determine the appropriate model to advance, unless some
national capacity in this area has been achieved. A national
government does not need to have established and operationalized a biosafety regulatory system before engaging in
such discussions, but it requires at least some expertise in
biosafety (or related) regulation and/or risk assessment to
ensure that national interests can be met.

Identify how project outcomes can be sustained

Neither the CILSS Convention nor the ECOWAS Regulation
identifies provisions for funding the subregional activities
described in each (such as convening the subregional scientific panel). Funding for biosafety capacity building in West
Africa, including support for the development of national
and subregional biosafety regulatory approaches, has come
from the EU, United States, and Japanese donor agencies, as
well as foundations and international financial institutions
such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
McKnight Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the
World Bank. Mechanisms for sustainable funding of a subregional biosafety regulatory system by West African governments have not been established.
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I N N O V AT I V E A C T I V I T Y P R O F I L E 4

The Supply Response to New Sources of Demand for
Financial and Other Services in Rural Andhra Pradesh
Gunnar Larson, World Bank
Melissa Williams, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

elf-help groups and their federations at the village,
subdistrict, and district levels represent a new, selfaware client base for providers of financial and
other services. By forming groups that effectively demand
services, these clients acquire fundamental financial literacy and other competencies (thrift, savings, inter-lending,
bookkeeping, and management skills) that strengthen and
sustain their capacity to innovate. Government agencies,
NGOs, and private companies have designed products and
interventions to answer their demand and fulfill their
needs in a number of sectors, including agriculture,
finance, nonfarm employment, health, and education. Perhaps the most significant practical lesson from this experience is that stronger institutions for the rural poor enable
several positive factors to converge. Public agencies gain a
new partner capable of collectively asserting its needs,
business gains a promising new market for services, and
the wider economy gains a foundation for more pro-poor
growth and innovation.

S

CONTEXT

India is one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, yet
translating rapid economic growth into reduced poverty
remains a persistent challenge, particularly in rural areas.
Throughout India, only 23 percent of 200 million rural poor
are organized into various forms of groups. Individuals who
are not in groups can find it challenging to obtain the credit,
other services, and market access that offer the means to
increase their incomes. The Government of India estimates
that it will need to invest about US$20 billion over the next
eight to nine years to tackle poverty but plans to invest just
over US$10 billion.1 Over the same period, the poor are
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projected to require about US$40 billion–US$50 billion in
credit.2
Self-help groups (SHGs) are the primary source of credit
for the rural poor, including small and marginal farmers. In
2007–08, an estimated US$1.7 billion in credit was disbursed
to 1.3 million SHGs, but at this rate of flow, a major credit
gap is expected. Per capita credit access is equivalent to
US$111, which is less than 40 percent of the average expenditure by small and marginal farmers who cultivate their
land (US$286).3 As a result, countless poor people are left
with no recourse other than informal moneylenders, who
charge usurious interest rates, sometimes as high as 600 percent annually.
Module 1, IAP 4 described social mobilization among
SHGs in Andhra Pradesh to develop a new source of effective demand in that state’s rural economy. For rural entrepreneurs and other service providers, the size of this new
clientele is sufficient in scale to command substantial attention. As of November 2010, nearly 11 million women had
organized themselves into SHGs through Indira Kranthi
Patham, creating a new, self-aware client base.4 The potential returns from serving so vast a population of customers
are self-evident.
As noted in the overview of this module, accompanying
investments in rural finance show strong synergies with
investments in agricultural innovation. SHGs have proven
highly effective in bringing rural financial services into areas
that are traditionally poorly served. They do so by helping
commercial lenders to manage risk through joint liability,
which brings tremendous pressure to bear on the respective
group members to repay loans on time. The SHG strategy
lowers transaction costs and addresses lenders’ concerns
over the potentially high risks of default in poor, remote
rural areas (World Bank 2011). The organization of SHGs
into larger aggregates at the village, subdistrict, and district

levels was designed intentionally to meet sellers and service
providers halfway.
OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

Aside from eliminating some of the barriers that prevented
commercial banks from offering services in rural areas, a
major goal of linking organized rural groups to formal
credit and other services is to accommodate the constraints
typical of SHG members, including time constraints. A
premium is placed on convenience and on enabling the
individual customer to conduct multiple transactions in a
single visit. A closely related goal is to provide them with a
relatively complete menu of financial services, including
credit, insurance, and instruments for poor households to
swap burdensome informal debt obligations for new obligations in the formal sector with more stable and reasonable interest rates (a high priority among the poor in the
state). The insurance instruments are designed to protect
vulnerable clients from the financial effects of events that
often leave people in poverty, including pensions that provide security in old age. Figure 6.3 shows how SHGs and
their federations create an enabling environment for innovation by empowering the rural poor to acquire the capacities, services, market access, and social safety nets that pave
the way for innovation.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS

As the rural poor have organized, saved, accessed credit,
and built skills and assets, they have more effectively voiced
their demand for goods and services. In response, government agencies, NGOs, and private companies have
designed products and interventions to answer their
demand and fulfill their needs in a number of sectors,
including agriculture, finance, nonfarm employment,
health, and education.
In many instances, these service providers use a coproduction model in which the institutions of the poor become
agents or franchises of an agency or business to extend its
outreach and deliver services more cost-effectively. This
practice not only provides services but generates employment within rural areas. In some instances, the Village Organization operates a commodity procurement center where
agricultural inputs are sold. The approach builds capacity in
the institutions, provides employment, and helps poor
clients become more integrated with the value chain (for
example, the procurement center will buy their produce and
sell them inputs to improve yields in the next cycle).
In other instances, the poor have innovated by developing their own enterprises in response to program-supported
activities. Some community members sell biopesticides and
biofertilizers to farmers in response to the community-

Figure 6.3 Self-Help Groups Constitute a Rural Institutional Platform That Enables the Rural Poor to Acquire the
Capacities, Services, Market Access, and Social Safety Nets That Pave the Way for Innovation
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managed sustainable agriculture initiative (see module 1,
IAP 4). Others provide public services that have not reached
their location, such as preschools or nutrition centers for
pregnant women and young children. These services are
especially important in the tribal areas.
The foundation of this entrepreneurial innovation is
access to financial services. These services enable the poor to
accumulate assets and create a less risky environment in
which they can capitalize on livelihood opportunities.
BENEFITS AND IMPACTS

The benefits and impacts of providing formal financial services to clients previously regarded as too risky to serve have
ranged from the tangible benefits that people obtain from the
services themselves to less tangible effects such as financial
discipline or the sense of security derived from savings and
insurance plans. Commercial banks have benefited from
innovative business models that make it possible to tap into a
vast and underserved rural market. The successes of the program in Andhra Pradesh and other states, and the benefits of
the products, services, and new models developed expressly
for a large base of very poor clients, inspired the Government
of India to establish a National Rural Livelihoods Mission.
The Rural Livelihoods Mission will apply the strategies developed through this program at the national level.
Building a bridge to formal credit

The savings, thrift, and inter-lending activities around
which SHGs are organized provide members with experience in financial discipline, money management, and in
conducting transactions and repaying loans. Over time,
these competencies enable people to establish a history of
repayment, obtain a credit rating, and then engage with
banks or microfinance institutions. As a result, bank lending
has increased from Rs 1.97 billion (US$48 million) in
2001–02 to Rs 65 billion (US$1.6 billion) in 2009–10. By
early 2010, banks had extended loans of Rs 251 billion
(US$6 billion) to SHGs without any collateral.
Total financial inclusion

As banks began to see the rural poor as customers, they
altered their business model to accommodate this new
source of demand. Rural households generally require
working capital to support their current activities, capital to
invest in new income-generating activities, and cash to meet
basic consumption needs and social obligations, such as
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health, marriage, and home repair. The banks offered products and services in all these areas, including support for
long-term investment in land. Because escaping from debt
has been a major priority for many rural households in
Andhra Pradesh, banks also arranged debt swaps and provided credit with which to retire costly informal loans. Even
better, the new services enabled poor people to avoid the situations that had made them easy prey for informal moneylenders. Lending is based on household investment plans
that are vetted by the SHGs and Village Organizations.
Community-based recovery mechanisms ensure repayment
rates of 95 percent or higher to the banks.
Insurance services to reduce vulnerability

Illness and death can plunge or further entrench a family in
poverty. Private companies had often viewed the transaction
costs of providing health, disability, and life insurance as
prohibitive in rural areas, but community-managed structures dramatically reduce those costs by taking on tasks such
as enrolling members and verifying, documenting, and
processing claims. In Andhra Pradesh, community resource
persons (bima mithras) are trained to fulfill these responsibilities on behalf of the Life Insurance Corporation of India
(more information on community resource persons appears
below). District federations have established call centers and
developed a web portal to process transactions. The resource
persons and call center make insurance services far more
economical to provide and far more accessible to the rural
poor, reducing the time to deliver insurance benefits by half.
Throughout Andhra Pradesh, more than 1.5 million SHGs
were organized during the first ten years of the Indira Kranthi Patham program. During that period, SHG members
accessed more than US$6 billion in credit from commercial
banks. More than 11 million members and their families paid
for death and disability and health insurance coverage, and
over US$100 million worth of claims have been settled. Over
1 million SHG members have a separate health savings
account, and as many as 3,000 villages have dedicated health
risk funds to mitigate the shocks of health emergencies. More
than 3,000 villages have nutrition centers for pregnant and
lactating mothers and children under five.
The use of procurement center

Procurement centers operated through Indira Kranthi Patham
are an important convening venue for small-scale producers
and prospective investors. Small-scale producers, whose sales
were previously dispersed widely among informal buyers,
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command better prices for their produce and buy inputs at
lower prices. Procurement centers offer a forum for learning
about new crops and growing methods, some of which have
been developed locally. Producers are also better positioned to
learn about developments in consumer and other markets,
because they interact directly with buyers in the value chain.
These venues also reduce the costs of outreach to interested
investors by assembling a critical mass of potential clients
whose purchasing power offsets any discounts they may negotiate. Linking producers to corporate and cooperative partners
such as ITC Ltd., APMARKFED, and Olam International
became one of the great legacies of Indira Kranthi Patham,
and the quest for additional partners continues.
Co-contributory pension scheme

The government of Andhra Pradesh devised a co-contributory pension scheme targeting SHG members over 18, all of
them women. The members contribute Re 1 per day, which
is matched by the government. The Life Insurance Corporation of India invests the contributions in the market to get
higher returns. When the member turns 60 she receives a
pension of Rs 500 a month and health insurance coverage.
Thus far, about 4.5 million SHG members have individual
co-contributory pension accounts, and more than 400,000
are receiving pensions.
Other benefits

In addition to these specific instruments, Village Organizations bundle entitlements from public distribution systems,
grain banks, and bulk purchases from the open market in a
food security system that benefits as many as three million
households. Village Organizations also operate “bridge
schools” that offer incentives to ensure high levels of enrollment among girls. Among the more than 600,000 farmers who
adopted community-managed sustainable agriculture in its
first four years, the use of nonpesticide management caused a
dramatic resurgence in local biodiversity in addition to reducing input costs and enabling farmers to escape from debt.

relate to institutional development. When institutions of
the rural poor become strong, they establish the basis for
a convergence of factors. Public agencies gain a new partner that articulates the aspirations and concerns of its
membership. Private businesses gain clients capable of
collectively asserting demand as a market. The wider
economy gains a foundation for more inclusive, pro-poor
growth and innovation based on improved capacities and
access to services. In the case of community-managed sustainable agriculture, stronger institutions for the rural
poor create a foundation for dialogue on alternative agriculture in India’s semiarid tropics.
The cost advantages of using coproduction models to
deliver insurance services and agricultural inputs offset
many of the disincentives of investing in rural areas. The
organization of a new client base provides businesses with
local partners capable of assuming many functions that
were once centrally performed. The reduced costs greatly
extend the reach of government services and private companies. The transaction costs for poor rural clients also
fall dramatically through the use of one-stop shops where
they can conveniently conduct multiple transactions.
Located close to home, these service points provide complete “end-to-end” financial services including credit,
insurance, procurement of inputs, and marketing of
produce.
Like most problem-solving efforts, the experience
described here has cautionary as well as positive lessons.
In seven districts of Andhra Pradesh, the easy availability
of credit from commercial banks and microfinance institutions encouraged borrowing well in excess of households’ ability to repay, and about 20 percent of participating households began accumulating serious debt. The
resulting microfinance crisis points to the ongoing need
for building financial literacy among the poor and for discipline in lending. The abusive collection processes
employed by some of these institutions emphasizes the
need for discretion in selecting which institutions may
participate in rural livelihoods programs and to the need
for well-defined channels for recourse when borrowers
default.

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR
WIDER APPLICATION

Some of the most significant practical lessons to emerge
from the rural livelihoods program in Andhra Pradesh
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NOTES
Module 6 Overview

1. Of 145 countries for which data were reported for the
years 1999/2000 and 2000/01, about one-third reported that
more than 95 percent of secondary school students were
enrolled in general programs and less than 5 percent in
vocational or technical programs. Most European countries
reported 20-40 percent enrollment in vocational/technical
programs at the secondary level.
2. IPRs: World Trade Organization (WTO) and World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); PVRs: International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV); Biosafety: Global Environmental Facility (GEF);
and SPS standards: Standards and Trade Development
Facility (STDF), World Animal Health Organization (OIE),
and International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).
3. Union internationale pour la protection des obtentions
végétales, established in 1961.
4. TRIPS is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, signed in 1994 as part of the Uruguay
round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The TRIPS agreement obliges all members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to have some form of IPR
legislation in place. Low-income countries are given additional
time to fulfil this obligation but eventually must comply.
5. The Cartagena Protocol, which is part of the Convention on Biological Diversity, was signed in 2000.
Thematic Note 1

1. See, for example, Johnson (2002), Paterson, Adam, and
Mullen (2003), Ivanova and Roseboom (2006), Hekkert et
al. (2006), and World Bank (2010).
2. Innovation policy calls for a “whole-of-government”
approach. It depends on the establishment of efficient government machinery able to ensure the needed coordination.
Although its mechanisms must be adapted to existing institutional frameworks and to cultural backgrounds, models
that place a powerful coordinating body at the center of
government allow innovation policy to have a pervasive
influence (World Bank 2010).
Thematic Note 2

1. Formerly MoST, the Ministry of Science and Technology.
2. This taxonomy of key governance capabilities is based
on numerous studies undertaken by Advansis. Compare
also with findings of the OECD Monitoring and Implementing National Innovation Policies (MONIT) project
(OECD 2005).
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3. See Benoit (2007) for a good overview of indicators relevant to assessing innovation systems.

Thematic Note 3

1. World Bank (2006) discusses this issue for many highly
relevant country-level investments related to plant
breeding.
2. For example, it does not adequately emphasize the
importance of IPRs in access and benefit sharing, in which
“access” refers to accessing traditional knowledge and
genetic resources, and “sharing” refers to sharing the benefits (commercial and otherwise) arising from the use of
traditional knowledge and genetic resource.
3. For a thorough exploration of these issues, see Maskus
(2000).
4. See http://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id
=2595.
5. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2003).
6. “IPR-related” here refers to a broader definition of IP as
creations of the mind or value added by innovative thinking. Even a hybrid plant variety, then, can be considered in
some sense a form of IPR in agriculture, because control
over the parents prevents others from profiting from the
fruits of the breeder’s investment.
7. See http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-develop
ment/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf.
8. Patent pools, patent commons, and clearinghouses are
essentially joint marketing systems in which a number of
agencies agree to market their IP as a common entity, making
it simpler for a licensee to obtain access to a number of different pieces of IP in a single transaction. Patent commons
are typically free to access, although this is not always the case.
9. Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, Brazil’s
national agricultural research organization.
10. For example, assessing whether the researchers’ rights to
use technologies, materials, and data are aligned with the
project’s activities and evaluating potential related risks.

Thematic Note 5

1. The CAC initially formulated international commodity
and product standards, but this role has expanded to
include commodity-related guidelines and codes of practice; general standards and guidelines on food labeling; general codes and guidelines on food hygiene; guidelines on
food safety risk assessment; standards, codes, and guidelines
on contaminants in foods; standards, guidelines, and other
recommendations on sampling, analysis, inspection, and
certification procedures; maximum limits for pesticide
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residue; food additives provisions; and maximum limits for
veterinary drugs in foods (FAO and WHO 2005).
2. For example, the 1992 Rio Declaration set a foundation
not only for government action but for all stakeholders to
integrate sustainable development considerations within
their consumption and production decisions (Rio Declaration, Principle 8). Other agreements include the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002).
3. For animal diseases, there has been a call for an integrated and global approach under the concept “One World,
One Health.”
4. STDF is a global program established by FAO, OIE, WHO,
WTO, and the World Bank (www.standardsfacility.org),
which also offers grants to support specific investment in SPS
capacity. The proposed multi-criteria framework aims to
enhance the economic efficiency of SPS capacity-building
decisions to meet a country’s economic development, poverty
alleviation, public health, and other objectives (Henson and
Masakure 2011).
5. See Calvin (2003) and Calvin et al. (2003) for examples
related to raspberries from Guatemala (contaminated with
an intestinal parasite) and green onions from Mexico
(hepatitis A).
6. In the United States alone, recent data estimate the economic impact of foodborne illness nationwide in US$152
billion annually (Scharff 2010).
Innovative Activity Profile 2

1. Tangible property rights are the set of rights defined by
law that relate to a physical object, for example plasmids or
vectors.

3. The US$286 figure is based on NSSO (2003).
4. Andhra Pradesh has 10,978,982 women in 975,362
SHGs, organized into 38,334 village organizations, 1,099
subdistrict organizations, and 22 district organizations,
representing all 22 rural districts.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

he rationale for investing in assessment, priority
setting, monitoring, and evaluation within an
innovation system is that practitioners require
information for short- and long-term decision making and
for managing limited resources effectively within complex,
nonlinear processes of technical and institutional change
that seek to achieve social, economic, and environmental
goals. Change is rarely managed by following a set plan.
Instead, information on technical adaptations (what gets
done) as well as institutional adaptations (policy and organizational changes) involving how things get done must be
continuously sourced, shared, analyzed and used to inform
decision making at multiple levels of the system.
This module examines processes to inform decision making and manage innovation at four generally defined levels of
the innovation system for agriculture: policy, investment,
organization, and intervention. The module identifies methods relevant at each level for assessing, prioritizing, monitoring, and evaluating innovation processes. For example, at the
policy level, international and cross-sectoral comparative
analyses may be used (such as benchmarking) and combined
with multistakeholder policy dialogues and foresighting
studies to inform on future development issues or subsectors. At the organizational level, methods include multiinstitutional and organizational performance assessments

T

involving innovation surveys and network mapping. At the
level of specific programs or interventions, assessment tools
for strengthening the involvement of end-users or farmers in
value chains include gender analysis and support for selforganizing networks, among others. Still other methods are
relevant at all levels of the innovation system for effective
performance management, accompanied by reporting
arrangements that ensure accountability.
RATIONALE

In innovation systems, managing depends on informationrich tasks such as assessment, monitoring, and evaluation,
which are vital to maintaining learning, performance, and
accountability (box 7.1). Decision makers, including
investors, public service managers, entrepreneurs, scientists, and primary producers, easily understand the need
to identify technical information that can be used to create new products and services. Equally essential—but far
more difficult to obtain, analyze, and make accessible—is
information about institutional adaptations (organizational and policy changes) that are being made or need to
be made within the innovation system before technical
innovations can be realized. For this reason, individuals
and organizations who are concerned with performance
management, learning, and accountability within the AIS
will need to learn how to obtain and use information.
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Box 7.1 Main Terms Used in This Module

Accountability. A transparent management system that
ensures participation and open communication and
reporting on results obtained and inputs used to
achieve the results.
Assessment. Making decisions about innovation to
know why investment is necessary to transform modes of
production and consumption. Assessment is also done
to speed the search function within innovation systems
(for example, to identify new, more sustainable, and
more equitable routes to value creation in agriculture).
Decision making. Decision making is not centralized
but occurs throughout the system. Rather than limiting
the focus to any single line of inquiry or information
source, interactive learning feeds decision making and
requires individuals and groups to be open to different
and imaginative ways of thinking as well as to be receptive to new ideas and directions that match the context.
Priorities. The areas to which internal and external
resources will be allocated to address problems or take
advantage of opportunities.
Performance. Results in the form of productivity
(outputs), outcomes, and impact, measured (for

example, with indicators using quantitative or qualitative data) in relation to mandate, strategy, objectives,
and client needs.
Theory of change or intervention logic. The underlying assumptions in an intervention that link intervention inputs with expected outcomes.
Monitoring. Tracking progress in stimulating
changes in the policy and institutional environment;
internal to an intervention and learning-based.
Evaluation. Performed on behalf of the investor to
gauge the effectiveness of the design and execution of the
intervention supported by the investor and the observed
impacts associated with it. Evaluation is also done to
inform the intervention logic of new investments.
Information gathering. The collection, communication, analysis, and reporting of quantitative and qualitative data by various stakeholders, which makes it
possible to assess: priorities, capacities, and performance; components within the system, such as institutions, partnerships, and interventions; or the system’s
resources (human, financial, physical, and other
resources).

Source: Authors.

Tasks such as assessing, prioritizing, monitoring, and evaluation will be widely used across the system and by a range
of stakeholders. For instance, donors and community leaders may be concerned with tasks such as evaluating social
and economic outcomes from past agricultural innovation.
Scientists and public planners compile data and analyses of
future trends and priorities and monitor indicators of
change within the system. Entrepreneurs may track returns
to current project investments and farmers may assess
value chains of specific interest to them as producers.
Efforts are also made to connect all types of decision
makers within the system to meet their shared need for
information and intelligence about their current context.
No single organization or type of organization can provide
the knowledge needed to inform policy, set priorities, or
propose interventions. Monitoring can facilitate midstream adjustments, while evaluation at the final stages of
an intervention enables outcomes and impacts to be thoroughly investigated to inform future investment decisions
and negotiation among stakeholders.
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Today, the responsibilities of decision making and managing innovations are spread across a range of actors at different levels of the innovation system. It is important to recognize that each of these levels requires different investments,
and while coordination may still occur, it is rare for a single,
centralized agency to be responsible for assessment, priority
setting, monitoring, and evaluation within the AIS. These levels, which are useful for organizing the discussion in the rest
of this overview, include the following:
■

■

Policy level. At this level, the actors are responsible for
creating the enabling environment for innovation (see
module 6). At this level, decision making and management emphasize coherence across sectors, scenario development, and benchmarking innovation capacities.
Investment level. At this level, the actors are responsible
for designing and prioritizing interventions that support
innovation. Decision making and management emphasize evaluating the performance of investments and testing the underlying assumptions that shed light on the
“why” question for new investments.
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■

■

Organizational level. At this level, the actors are responsible for ensuring relevance to the wider innovation
system. Decision making and management emphasize
assessing organizational performance and understanding
the shifting landscape of other organizations and networks in the innovation systems.
Intervention level. At this level, the actors are responsible for managing and implementing innovation
processes and resources to achieve desired social and economic goals. Decision making and management emphasize efforts such as monitoring the effectiveness of
actions in achieving intervention goals, understanding
the dynamic context in which interventions take place
and planning around it, and understanding unexpected
outcomes.

The “how to” approach for identifying innovation priorities and assessing performance described in this module
includes tasks that are familiar to policy makers and managers of science, technology, and innovation, including
strategic planning and foresighting, organizational performance assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and impact
assessment. These familiar management processes and tools
are being adapted to the new demands of a multistakeholder
innovation system, however, and being supplemented with
interactive learning to gather information on the institutional dimensions of innovation processes and capacities.
Examples of these adapted and new tools are discussed
throughout this module.
PAST EXPERIENCE

Past agricultural R&D systems traditionally placed great
emphasis on gathering information about inputs into or
outputs from the agricultural research process, prioritizing
where those input investments should be made, listing outputs produced, and gathering information about the outcomes of research that typically combined different outputs
and led, for example, to changes in an important agricultural commodity’s yield and wider social and economic
impact. Investments to gather information on inputs and
outputs made it possible to validate technology adoption,
investigate the economic surplus generated by research and
compute rates of return, and inform economic studies of
the contribution of research to impact (Pardey, Alston, and
Ruttan 2010).
Historically innovation was oriented toward a linear
“technology push” model that focused heavily on R&D, and
decision making and management largely were orchestrated
by centralized bodies. In agricultural development, national
governments predominantly made decisions—constituted

as public policies—that directed investment into priority
areas (often commodity research programs). In the era that
preceded AIS thinking, policy and planning tools
commonly resulted in R&D programs and projects that
operated with defined resources and specific time scales
(table 7.1). Centralized public R&D planning was challenged, however, to respond to constant changes in
demand-driven value chains, where decision making and
management were decentralized. Entrepreneurs and
primary producers became key to processes of assessing
existing policy and managing performance within the system. This evolution suggests that innovation systems for
agriculture are increasingly more difficult to design, plan,
and implement without mechanisms to ensure that rapid
adjustments can be made in “game-changing” situations,
such as the emergence of new fundamental information,
dramatic shifts in resource availability, or demands from
new or different stakeholders.
While the basic elements of policy making and planning
have not disappeared altogether in an AIS, the need to adapt
to uncertainty and appreciate complexity have given rise to
greater skepticism about causality and control in policy and
planning cycles (Edquist 1997). In an AIS, decision makers
are required to be strategic and not just fund and operationalize strategic plans, then monitor and evaluate them.
Rather than determining a final set of priorities, planning
becomes an iterative process that continuously identifies and
(re)prioritizes actions in response to the rapidly changing
environment. In an AIS context, the conventional notion of
a fixed-purpose or time-bound plan of action must anticipate new information and learning generated through stakeholder interactions, monitoring, and eventually evaluation
of results. The move beyond past agricultural policy making
and planning methods is most evident when it comes to
monitoring and evaluation, which are now understood
within the AIS to be distinct tasks with different responsibilities, tools, and time frames (TNs 4 and 5).

KEY POLICY ISSUES

For policy making, priority setting, and performance management in the AIS, key policy issues involve allocating
sufficient resources to information gathering and assessments. These activities will help identify opportunities
that impinge on the AIS (including those that are nonagricultural) and strategies for ensuring that learning from
very localized as well as large-scale interventions can
become more useful to individual stakeholders as well as
to the AIS as a whole.
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Table 7.1 Conventional Agricultural Policy Making and Planning Tools
Tool

Description and time frame

Strategic planning Defines direction of change and
operational objectives (4–8 years);
emphasis on efficiency and relevance.
Master planning
Define long-term investments and
activities (10 years).
Program planning

Prioritized actions to address
constraints (3–5 years).

Project planning

Define efficient and sufficient set of
activities to overcome a “problem”
(1–3 years).

Experiment
planning

Develop best option to obtain insight
into a scientific question (1 year or
less).

Financial planning

Match financial availability to needs
(variable).

Human resource
and training
plans

Efficiently manage and develop human
resources (variable).

Priority setting

Final stage of planning that defines an
investment portfolio that is consistent
with national policy and development
goals, organizational mission, and
program objectives.

Advantages

Disadvantages and challenges

Creates sense of direction that aligns
the organization to its environment.

Operational demands may detract from
strategic planning.

Determines major system and
organizational activities in relation
to financial investment.
Systematically analyzes constraints and
identifies priorities before resource gaps
analyzed and projects developed, which
is relevant to request funding and
negotiate with investors.
Identifies and prepares an integrated
plan to resolve a “problem.” This
integration translates a project idea into
a proposal and also ensures that
planning integrates monitoring and
evaluation operations.
Identifies the most efficient and effective
option, in the form of research
proposals, for achieving research results.

Limited with respect to redefining the
organization in relation to changes in its
environment.
Investors may impose new priorities on
existing programming, making it difficult
to fulfill original program objectives.

Develops annual budgets and strategies
to identify and develop alternative
sources for an organization’s core and
operational funding.
Analyzes capacity-building needs and
prepares to develop knowledge,
attitudes, and skills of individuals in an
organization.

Needs to ensure a link to project
monitoring and evaluation to respond
to low-performing activities and
rebalance resources with programs.
Needs to ensure a link to project
monitoring and evaluation to respond
to low-performing individuals, redirect
training efforts, and rebalance human
resources with programs.
Implementation can deviate from agreed
priorities. Priorities set without explicit
support of key stakeholders and
program staff can lead to conflict in the
organization.

Rationalizes investment in relation to
limited resources, external demands for
transparency, and focus on client needs.

Lack of necessary resources challenges
project planning, monitoring, and
evaluation. Proposals may have
immutable deadlines.

Research ideas often arise and become
proposals to respond to investor calls
or changing stakeholder demands
without sufficient attention to fair and
equal treatment within the organization.

Source: Authors; Gijsbers et al. 2000; Alston et al. 1995.

A supportive fiscal environment that values
assessing, prioritizing, monitoring, and evaluating
AIS and ensures information access

Within public institutions, management tasks associated
with information, knowledge, and learning are often
squeezed into already tight budgets for financing R&D and
innovation (Hall and Learner 2010). Allocating sufficient
funding for information management should also ensure
access to more and better information. For example, production data in developing countries are notoriously unreliable, and food stock data around the world are highly
secretive. Releasing research results or making information
such as price and market data widely accessible using a
range of communication strategies and media can facilitate
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access to information that could otherwise be scanty or
overwhelming and difficult to sort out. Information accessible to one stakeholder group may not necessarily benefit
another, so resources are also needed to assess users’ information needs.
It is also appropriate for the public sector to play a key
role in mobilizing information for policy, priorities, and
performance management in AIS and making this information as widely accessible as possible. Public agencies, such as
universities, research institutes, and government departments, can collect, analyze, and communicate information
about the AIS, making it available not just to their own networks but to wider professional or producer associations,
media agencies, private sector groups, and others. An exam-
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ple of such an initiative is the use of foresighting and scenario planning exercises (TN 3). Furthermore, governments
can encourage participation by the private sector, recognizing that proprietary rights may be associated with information sharing among enterprises. Efforts to make as much
information publicly available as possible have led to
important contributions to technical and institutional
innovations (module 5 discusses incentives and resources
for innovative partnerships and business development;
module 6 covers intellectual property management; and
module 1 focuses on coordination and collective action
among AIS stakeholders.)

Information on agricultural and nonagricultural
opportunities

Although policy making, priority setting, and performance
management in an AIS depend on information about interventions with the expected links to agriculture (such as
interventions that will raise agricultural productivity),
information about the productivity of crucial nonagricultural sectors and linkages to new product markets is also relevant to information-gathering efforts in the AIS. Innovation policy (see TN 1 in module 6) generally needs to
include a link between agricultural and nonagricultural economic strategies for resource-poor households—for example, by supporting sustainable agricultural intensification
while developing manufacturing and services that will
expand nonagricultural employment.
Balancing potentially competing priorities within the
wider innovation system requires dedication to information-intensive tasks such as benchmarking. The identification of multipurpose infrastructure or multitasking capacities that are useful to agriculture and transferable to
nonagricultural sectors will provide a wider set of options in
the innovation system. One example of multipurpose infrastructure is rural infrastructure for information and communication technologies, which can improve flows of agricultural information within and among organizations in
addition to performing a multitude of other functions (for
an overview, see World Bank 2011).
End-user participation and scaling up information
from the local level

Within an AIS, an end-user perspective in processes such as
assessment and priority-setting is developed by bringing
innovation users’ collaboration, behavior, and perceptions
of change to bear on the analysis of the system. Baseline data

about end users, including farmers, is essential to identify
indicators of future performance and impact. Participatory
methods of problem analysis such as Most Significant
Change (TN 4) or mapping exercises (IAP 2) supplement
baseline data and provide end users’ critiques of their own
situations and past interventions. Such information collection and exchange ensures that all stakeholders are better
informed as decision makers by developing intelligence on
key information and trends.
Even so, analysis generated about technical and institutional innovations at the end user or local level is often difficult to combine and compare across different temporal, spatial, and need-specific contexts. This requires generic tools
for assessing, prioritizing, monitoring, and evaluating innovation processes to be carefully selected and adapted to fit as
closely as possible with prevailing social, cultural, political,
economic and environmental contexts (see the cases of India
in IAP 4 and Chile in IAP 5). For the same reasons, within a
country, planning efforts and results from monitoring and
evaluating local innovations are not necessarily easily scaled
up to constitute national priorities or policy. Policy making
and setting priorities will have limited success unless the
complex of local circumstances and decision making among
stakeholders is taken into account. Rather than trying to
gather and compare information about all local interventions, strategies for assessment that compare selected cases of
local adaptation and innovation, preferably involving
regional or international benchmarking, can be used (see TN
1). The key point is for the end user or local innovation
processes not to be overly generalized, and for all stakeholders to be active collaborators within AIS assessment, priority
setting, monitoring and evaluation to ensure learning, performance management, and accountability.
NEW DIRECTIONS, PRIORITIES,
AND REQUIREMENTS

Innovation systems are developing new management
processes which question underlying assumptions and theories of action to reconsider the sustainability of systems
that were perhaps no longer effective and relevant in the
changed context. Managers within innovation systems now
must be equipped to deal with change and not simply
administer under changing circumstances. As a result, new
emphasis is placed on, for example, defining alternate scenarios and strategies that could influence or create opportunities for technical and institutional innovation. Such methods seek to redefine organizational mandates while ensuring
participation and open communication about results
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obtained from past inputs used to achieve the results. Over
the long run, high-performing innovation systems establish
internal management processes that can define objectives
and indicators of success and can achieve and communicate
results while being attentive to resource constraints. In contrast to the past, especially in agricultural R&D, when priority-setting exercises and planning instruments (and their
requirements for M&E) were largely mandatory and often
static exercises, management tasks within the innovation
system are ineffective and irrelevant unless they are established as dynamic processes.
The thematic notes and innovative activity profiles in
this module provide more depth on the processes and methods undertaken at these four levels. The overlap among the
levels is substantial, but it is useful to highlight the purpose
and roles of each level, what is being assessed, and what
tools are used for setting innovation priorities and assessing
performance (table 7.2).
Examples of key directions for future assessment,
priority setting, monitoring, and evaluation at different
levels of the AIS include the following:

■

■

Policy level: Benchmarking innovation capacity.
Managers and investors increasingly need to benchmark
the performance of sectors and subsectors in terms of the
capacity developed for innovation through innovation
system interventions. International investors may also
use benchmarking to make international comparisons to
track macro-level progress and help target subsectors,
sectors, and countries for investment in capacity
strengthening or for other investments that are conditional on certain levels of capacity. Methodological challenges need to be addressed, however, in measuring and
comparing context-specific and systemic capacities of
this sort. (See TNs 1 and 4 in this module and TN 1 in
module 6.)
Investment program level: Foresighting. Investment
implies committing support to a program of activity to
gain a desired return. Projections of future investments
needed within an innovation system will benefit from collaborative diagnostic tools such as foresighting. Stakeholder engagement and learning that can lead to technical and institutional changes are facilitated through

Table 7.2 Decision Making and Management Processes and Tools at Different Levels
of an Agricultural Innovation System
Stakeholders
involved

Level

Key management processes

Policy

National policy
makers, sector
committees

–
–
–
–

Investment
program

Finance ministry,
donors, private
sector, technical
team leaders

–
–
–
–

Organization Executive
officers, board of
directors,
research
organizations,
extension
organizations

–
–
–

Intervention

–
–
–

Nongovernmental
organizations,
private sector,
research and
extension
program leaders,
project managers

–

–
–
–

Track progress of the national system and its functions
Coordinate agriculture with other sectors (modules 1 and 6)
Inform global or regional public policy networks
Design an enabling environment (intellectual property,
banking, pricing, and tax regimes) (module 6)
Prioritize and allocate resources
Identify new investment opportunities or bottlenecks
Review effectiveness of past investments
Improve underlying theories of change (intervention logic)
of new investments
Assess organizational performance (TN 2)
Set organizational policy and program priorities
Enable organizational and institutional learning and change
(module 4, TN 5)
Respond to changing innovation landscape

– Diagnostic studies with a commodity or
subsector focus (TN 3, IAP 5)
– Benchmarking (TNs 1 and 4)
– Evaluation and impact assessment (TN 5)

Performance indicators (TN 2)
Innovation surveys (TN 2)
Self-organizing networks (IAP 4)
Evaluation and impact assessment (TN 5)
Institutional histories (TN 4)
Network mapping (IAP 2)
Reflexive monitoring in action (TN 4)
Causal process tracing (TN 4)
Accountability to investors
Participatory impact pathway analysis
Managing effectiveness of program/project implementation
Outcome mapping (TN 4)
Managing innovation processes, including effectiveness of
Gender analysis of value chains (IAP 3)
networks, interactions, and ways of working
Rapid appraisal of agricultural knowledge
Testing and reframing theories of change (intervention logic)
systems (TN 4)
Responding to unexpected outcomes
– Stakeholder analysis (IAP2)
Responding to changing innovation environments
– Most significant change analysis

Source: Authors.
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Tools (related TN/IAP)
– Benchmarking (TN 1)
– Innovation surveys (TN 2)
– Foresighting and scenario planning
(TN 3, IAP 1)
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–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

■

■

foresighting processes. Foresighting involves systematically looking at the long-term horizon of science, technology, and institutions within dynamic economic, political, and social contexts to identify strategies that will
yield the greatest benefits. (See TN 3 and IAPs 4 and 5.)
Organizational level: Institutional assessment. Investment in an AIS anticipates technical innovation as well as
institutional changes involving policy, program, and
project implementation (how and when) and resources
employed (who, what, and where) to obtain the highest
possible potential for impact. Institutional assessments
use multiple methods to capture existing and potential
changes within and among organizations and their
strategic activities. (See TN 2.)
Intervention level: Interactive visualization methods for
learning, action-oriented planning, monitoring, and
evaluation. Actors and organizations in innovation systems are drawing on information from a wide range of
sources, often using multiple methods. Tools that involve
interaction, such as outcome mapping or Net-Map, are
used to gather and synthesize information and generate
new knowledge. These methods generate qualitative data
and are used together with more traditional quantitative
analysis and diagnostic case studies to enable learning
that will improve the prospects for interventions to provide the best possible return on investment. Monitoring
allows for mid-stream adjustments that can optimize performance while evaluation leads to better accountability

reporting and negotiation for future decision making.
These two crucial innovation management processes can
inform one to the other, but they are distinct processes
with respect to learning, performance management, and
accountability. (See TNs 4 and 5 and IAPs 6 and 7.)
MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The development of an AIS requires continuous decision
making and management to obtain critical information to
answer critical questions. For example, how have policy
and investment in innovation processes achieved or surpassed their objectives? How do stakeholders know that
resources for innovation are being allocated and managed
effectively? What lessons about institutional adaptations
are informing new technical changes? And finally, how can
assessments strategically inform future decision making
and interventions?
In effect, the act of assessing, prioritizing, monitoring,
and evaluating within the AIS is a reflexive practice that
catalyzes the experience-based learning that underlies all
technical and institutional innovation. Aside from the
more detailed discussion of M&E in this module, the
notion of revitalizing the way in which monitoring and
evaluation are distinctly needed to inform learning, performance management, and accountability is a common
thread in all of the themes covered by the modules in this
sourcebook.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 1

Assessing Innovation for Prioritizing Investments
Helen Hambly Odame, University of Guelph

SYNOPSIS

rom an AIS perspective, approaches to assessment
and priority setting must consider both the complexity and unique context of agricultural innovation.
The design of agricultural policies and investment programs
requires more than analysis of the agricultural sector and its
subsectors; it requires information on links with other sectors to which agriculture may contribute or from which agriculture may benefit. Priorities are determined through
deeper and wider sets of data, often involving ongoing
synthesis through interaction and learning with many stakeholders. Three analytical methods are recommended for
assessing innovation system investments and thereby helping
to allocate resources for investments: (1) theory of change
and flexible planning; (2) measuring the functions of
innovation systems; and (3) making comparisons across
innovation systems (benchmarking). To develop an effective
assessment and priority-setting process for agricultural
innovation, public policy makers and donors must insist
on the allocation of sufficient resources, perhaps through a
unit or platform that would be closely involved with data
access, data linkages, and the adoption of interdisciplinary approaches to assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.
Stronger individual and organizational capacity is needed to
assess change within and across individuals, organizations,
and networks or systems. Much work needs to be done to
ensure that data collected with stakeholders at the local level
feeds into both ex ante and ex post assessment and priority
setting. Input from the local level is tremendously important, and participation requires time and commitment to be
done well.

F

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Investing in innovation systems for agriculture has become
one of the most important global and national policy efforts
546

of the 21st century,1 even as most nations face urgent,
emergent, and often competing needs for investment in
education, health, energy, and telecommunications and
transportation infrastructure. Assessment guides decision
makers in the allocation of scarce resources (financial,
human, and physical) to areas showing the greatest potential for benefit, a process referred to as priority setting.
Prior to the application of the innovation systems concept
to agriculture, priority setting largely entailed defining a
portfolio of public R&D programs and projects that was
consistent with national development goals, national agricultural policy, and the objectives of public research institutes and technology transfer services (Contant 2001).
From an AIS perspective, approaches to assessment and
priority setting must consider the complexity and unique
context of agricultural innovation. The design of agricultural policies and investment programs requires more than
the analysis of the agricultural sector and its subsectors; it
requires information on links with other sectors to which
agriculture may contribute (for example, biofuels for the
energy sector) or from which agriculture may benefit (for
example, innovations within human health sciences that
benefit animal health). Priorities are determined through
deeper and wider sets of data, often involving ongoing synthesis through interaction and learning with many stakeholders. As described below, new and modified assessment
methods are being used to supplement traditional prioritysetting principles and practices in agricultural R&D.2
Monitoring and evaluation are crucial for feeding information and intelligence back into assessment and priority
setting by, for instance, identifying bottlenecks in the innovation system or recommending new investment opportunities. Instead of relying on linear input-output-impact
models, this kind of M&E relies on integrating policy and
investment priorities much more closely than before. It uses
more flexible forms of planning to feed lessons learned from
monitoring—and subsequently from evaluation and impact

assessment—back into decision-making processes for
investments in innovation.
Regardless of whether the AIS is mature and operating
within the context of an established national innovation
policy, assessment and priority setting for policy and investment program levels are relevant to any system.3 Module 6
describes national innovation policy and discusses how the
development of innovation priorities across sectors and
technologies (and the public resources allocated to them) is
coordinated with specific policies and priorities for innovation within a particular sector or technology domain. IAP 4
(India) and IAP 5 (Chile) in this module describe foresighting processes that contribute to overall innovation policy
processes, the assessment of policies for innovation, and prioritizing areas for investment. This note focuses on specific
methods for exploring the underlying theory of change,
measuring the functions of the AIS to identify capacity and
resource gaps, and using policy and investment-level benchmarks and indicators to make comparisons across countries
and sectors.
ASSESSMENT METHODS

In general, assessment has two major dimensions: ex
ante (prior to implementing an investment intervention) and ex post (after implementing an investment
intervention) (table 7.3). Each type of assessment seeks
to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of past investments while ensuring transparency and accountability
for new investments.
Like the other processes discussed in this module—organizational assessment (TN 2), foresighting (TN 3), monitoring (TN 4), and evaluation (TN 5)—in the context of an
AIS, the assessment of innovation systems and associated
investments recognizes that the dynamics of the innovation
system change constantly, that stakeholders throughout the
Table 7.3 Roles of Ex Ante and Ex Post
Assessments
Ex ante assessment
– Analyzes the likely impact of
a proposed intervention.
– Identifies the optimal portfolio
of investments according to
specific programs or projects.
– Establishes a baseline or
framework to collect and
compare information for ex
post evaluation.

Ex post assessment
– Assesses impact.
– Supports accountability
reporting to investors.
– Justifies allocation of resources.
– Generates lessons.
– Identifies recommendations
for future interventions.

AIS must participate, and that projections of the potential
impact of policies and investments are fundamental elements of assessment.
Three analytical methods are recommended for assessing
and prioritizing investments in agricultural innovation: (1)
understanding the theory of change; (2) measuring the
functions of innovation systems; and (3) making comparisons across innovation systems. Each is discussed in the
sections that follow.
Theory of change

The process of assessment is one of judging and making
decisions. As a lens through which innovation is understood, a theory of change is the set of hypotheses, as developed by stakeholders, of how policy and investment priorities, and the resulting programming and projects, plan to
achieve their intended goals and objectives, including
social, economic, political, and environmental change
objectives. This kind of assessment is sometimes referred
to as the causal model. The assessment team works with
actors and networks having a stake in the innovation
process to identify the underlying assumptions, values,
and definitions of individuals and organizations. Box 7.2
lists the kinds of questions raised in a theory of change discussion to inform an analytical process that will lead to
complementary methods, such as organizational assessment (TN 2), foresighting, building scenarios, and vision
statements (TN 3 and IAPs 4 and 5).

Box 7.2 Questions for Assessing the Theory
of Change in Innovation Systems

■ What is the definition of innovation in the
given context?
■ How do innovations emerge and develop in the
given context?
■ Who are the innovation actors (organizations)
in the given context?
■ What policies and investments exist to support
innovation in the given context?
■ What policies and investments do not exist to
support innovation in the given context?
■ How are innovation trends, processes, and
products measured in the given context?
■ What are the key sources of data on innovation
in the given context?
Source: Author.

Source: Author.
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An example of assessing the theory of change is DFID’s
Research Into Use (RIU) program (see IAP 7), which introduced the method to assess developmental impacts and
inform future priorities for investment by DFID and its partners. The RIU assessment explored assumptions of the program and their causal relation to activities, outcomes, outputs, and impact. Information is fed back into policy and
investment decision making. Specific attention was given to
determining whether the intervention’s theory of change was
altered during implementation, why this change was important in relation to impact, and why the investors (DFID and
its partners) needed to be made aware of the change.
Exploring the theory of change is a relevant activity
throughout the management cycle. The theory of change
can be developed at the outset of assessing innovation and
prioritizing investments; it can later be revisited during
monitoring, evaluation, and impact assessment. Analyzing
the theory of change contributes information to accountability reporting and is also a useful tool for proposing recommendations for future investment.
Analyzing the theory of change for innovation processes
helps to identify expected outputs, outcomes, and impacts
for a plan of action. Commissioned surveys or reviews of
relevant literature as well as case studies can compile data
on conditions of path dependency for technical and institutional innovations. This information may also help to
identify stakeholders’ participation in identifying complementary and conflicting areas of innovation and document
their ideas regarding the theory of change and how it may

differ from policy makers’ and investors’ conceptions. The
process also benefits from participants testing their
assumptions against the available data and identifying
where data to address those assumptions are missing. The
conclusions from these discussions inform decisions on
which methods will be used in the next stages of policy and
investment planning or evaluation. In Sierra Leone, for
example (IAP 1), discussions on the theory of change led to
greater clarity in self-organizing networks and their investment processes, including the use of social media for continued discussions and information gathering.
Measuring the functions of an innovation system

Decision-making processes such as ex ante and ex post
assessment, the identification of investment priorities, and
organizational performance assessment rely on identifying
the key functions of innovation systems. Table 7.4 identifies
these functions and sources from which data are collected
and analyzed.
Case studies

Case studies (including ex ante innovation histories) are especially useful for profiling specific functions of the innovation
system or for examining specific sectors or technology
domains. Case studies are a powerful assessment tool because
innovation systems are highly contextual, and specific technical and institutional innovations are path dependent:
Beyond the level of its basic functions, an innovation system

Table 7.4 Ten Functions of Innovation Systems and Related Data Sources
Key functions
1. Providing R&D and creating new knowledge.
2. Building competence in the labor force (includes education,
training, creation of human capital, production and reproduction
of skills, and individual learning).
3. Forming new product markets.
4. Forming new quality requirements arising from the demand for
new products.
5. Creating and changing organizations for the development of new
fields of innovation.
6. Networking through markets and other mechanisms, including
interactive learning among different organizations.
7. Creating, changing, and abolishing institutions that influence
innovating organizations by providing incentives or removing
obstacles to innovation.
8. Incubating activities for new innovating efforts.
9. Financing innovation processes and other activities that can
facilitate the commercialization of knowledge and its adoption.
10. Providing consultancy services relevant to innovation processes.

Main sources for data or cases
International or government sources, R&D dialogues, end-user surveys.
International or government sources; student performance measures;
employer surveys on education, vocational training, and other variables.
International, government, and industry sources, including new market
surveys.
International, government, and industry sources, including product
surveys or consumer studies.
International, government, and industry sources; policy dialogues;
actor-network analysis; innovation surveys.
Government and industry sources, policy dialogues, actor-network analysis,
innovation surveys.
International, government, and industry sources; policy dialogues; innovation
surveys.
Industry, government sources, R&D dialogues, innovation surveys.
International, government, and industry sources; policy dialogues;
investment surveys; and impact assessment.
Government and industry sources, professional association surveys.

Source: Author, based on Edquist 1997.
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is difficult to describe in generalities. The socioeconomic, cultural, and geographic contexts tend to define the specific
organizations and institutions within an innovation system
and the interactions among its actors. Case studies can capture some of this detail, and meta-analysis of case studies can
inform comparisons across commodities, institutions or
countries (Larsen, Kim, and Theus 2009; Wenninck and
Heemskerk 2006; World Bank 2006).
Often case studies begin with a general profile of an innovation system that describes its two basic and related elements: organizations and institutions. Organizations (TN 2)
are the group structures that have staff, facilities, equipment,
and funding to conduct activities related to innovation.
Examples include public research institutes or advisory services. Institutions are the established formal and informal
practices, values, norms, rules, or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between and within organizations.
Examples of institutions in an innovation system are tax laws
and R&D incentives that encourage innovating organizations. Using tools such as innovation surveys and focus
groups, case studies will often elaborate on the range of possible functions performed by a range of possible actors. The
identification of key networks or alliances (see IAPs 1 and 4
in module 4) among actors as well as the knowledge base for
innovation are also discussed in innovation case studies.

Benchmarking: making comparisons across
innovation systems

Benchmarking uses input indicators (investments in the
functions of an innovation system) as well as output/
outcome indicators (products and processes and trends
emerging from an innovation system) to identify disconnects within the system—among institutions and in relation
to government policies—that hinder innovation. If indicators are difficult to establish, it may be that the theory of
change was not sufficiently developed.
At the policy and investment program level, innovation
benchmarks and indicators are used to compare current and
historical measures and trends within the same country or to
compare the innovative capacity of actors in the system
(firms, for example), particularly their relative ability to identify and absorb technologies to enhance innovative performance and overall competitiveness. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been
especially influential in providing guidelines for the systematic collection of innovation data. Table 7.5 summarizes best
practices for benchmark data collection (OECD 1997; Bloch
2007; Kraemer-Mbula and Wamae 2010).
Spielman and Birner (2008) identify AIS-oriented benchmarks and indicators. They recognize that agricultural

Table 7.5 Guidelines for Benchmarks and Indicators for Innovation Systems
Key measurement
considerations

Key techniques for
assessment

– Interactions among enterprises (e.g., joint research activities; technical collaboration).
– Interactions among enterprises, universities, and public research institutes (e.g., joint research, joint patenting, joint
publications, network analysis of informal linkages).
– Diffusion of information, knowledge, and technology to enterprises (e.g., industry adoption rates for new technologies;
consumer data; strengthened competencies; skills training).
– Human resource flows (e.g., movement of highly qualified personnel within and between the public and private sectors).
– Institutional assessments for analyzing human resource flows; institutional linkages; industrial clusters and innovative firm
behavior (TN 2).
– Innovation surveys question enterprises on their sources of knowledge most relevant to innovation and allow a comparative
ranking of sectors/industries and national systems, including regional and global comparisons; surveys used by OECD are
typically based on OECD’s Oslo Manual (first developed in 1990 and currently in its third edition; see OECD 2005).
– Cluster analysis (see also TN 4 in module 5) focuses on the interactions between particular networks of enterprises across
and within specialized sectors and even internationally; tools may include social network analysis and deliberative mapping,
among others.
– Evidence-based management focuses on obtaining the best facts. Even less-than-favorable evidence is accepted during the
assessment to “learn by doing.” This technique cautions against complacency in achieving benchmarks set by comparing
one country to another, perhaps within the same region, and by avoiding dialogue about mistakes, risks, and uncertainties.

Key investment and – Upgrading competencies in individual organizations; incentives and recognition for innovative work in individual enterprises
financing
and clusters.
considerations
– Investing in higher education; R&D in public institutions; access to public research.
– Private-public research initiatives; improved intellectual property and knowledge management; investing in information and
communication technology.
– Competitive or matching grants or low-interest loans; science/trade fairs; new business incubators.
– Facilitate the national system to engage in international knowledge flows, including knowledge acquired abroad as capital
or intermediate goods; foreign direct investment; purchases of foreign patents/licenses; establish learning alliances; trade in
services such as technical consultancies; aid-for-trade; internationally coauthored publications and R&D.
Source: Author; OECD 1997, 2005.
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benchmarks and indicators have to be attentive not only to
measures of sectoral performance but to processes that
underlie sectoral performance and the contribution of innovation to performance. Table 7.6 presents examples of the
wider scope of benchmarks and indicators for assessing an
AIS at the level of policy and program investments.

countries, sectors, institutions, and commodities.
Together, these methods support the ongoing design,
monitoring, and evaluation that enable technical and
institutional innovations.

POLICY ISSUES
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Assessment and associated priority setting direct scarce
resources towards the best possible return on innovation
activities. Assessment compiles a vast range of data on key
functions in the system. These data include both quantitative and qualitative information supporting the analysis of
policy effectiveness, enabling adjustments in the resource
allocation as needed, and ultimately enabling the nonlinear
feedback loops expected of planning, monitoring, and evaluation in complex adaptive systems (Pant 2010).
Opening up discussions with a wide range of stakeholders on the underlying theory of change catalyzes a
process of planning strategically and transparently, versus
mechanistically setting out a strategic plan (TN 3). It
improves the chances that stakeholders will reach consensus on the action plan. With this method, questions about
the objectives of the innovation system, the resources
available, and alternatives for allocating those resources
are addressed. Specific strategies to bridge the gaps within
and among the functions of innovation systems can be
developed, such as strategies for empowering people to
innovate, unleashing innovation in firms, creating and
applying knowledge, applying innovation to address key
development challenges, or improving policies influencing
the governance of innovation systems. Benchmarks and
indicators provide a means for comparative assessments of

Assessing and setting priorities for innovation involves
information and learning-intensive processes. These
processes constitute an organized way of thinking about
how and why innovation takes place and how the key functions of an innovation system can be identified, understood,
and assessed. Approaches to assessing innovation and prioritizing investments are still evolving, given the relatively
recent application of the innovation systems concept to
agricultural development. It is clear, however, that two
important policy issues for assessing innovation and prioritizing innovation investments include appropriate financing and organization of priority setting within the public
sector and the need for inclusiveness in assessment and
priority-setting processes.
Supporting public sector innovation
assessment and priority setting

To develop an effective assessment and priority-setting
process for agricultural innovation, public policy makers
and donors must insist on the allocation of sufficient time,
human resources, and funding. Such a process would gain
greater visibility if a unit or platform responsible for this
analysis were established within the national system (see
TNs 1 and 2 in module 6). This platform or unit, and assessment teams linked to it, would be closely involved with
sourcing data, ensuring access to the data, and adopting

Table 7.6 Examples of Classic Indicators for Policy and Program Investments Compared with Indicators for
AIS Policy and Program Investments
Classical indicators
Agricultural GDP and GDP growth rate

AIS indicators

Share of farmers who have tried/adopted some new agricultural
production practice (e.g., new crop variety or livestock breed)a
Total agricultural factor productivity
Share of farmers who have tried/adopted some new agricultural marketing
practice (e.g., pre-production contracts, collective marketing)a
Yields per hectare of major food staple and high-value crops/livestock Share of farmers who have tried/adopted some new natural resource
management technique (e.g., conservation tillage, soil erosion controls,
water harvesting)a
Share of cultivable land under modern varieties
Share of agricultural firms that have tried/introduced some new product or
process innovation
Source: Spielman and Birner 2008.
a. Includes use of sex-disaggregated data and disaggregated by income group (poverty).
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interdisciplinary approaches to assessment, monitoring,
and evaluation. International bodies such as OECD and
the World Bank can enable national systems to share
methodologies and knowledge. Regional forums are providing a similar opportunity (CPR, CRISP, and LINK
2011; SWAC 2005).

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PRACTITIONERS

The approaches described here continue to develop. The following lessons and recommendations have emerged so far:
■

Policies to support inclusive priority setting

To ensure that priority setting for innovation actually
happens and that it yields the widest possible range of
benefits, policy makers must promote mechanisms to
help farmers and other actors articulate demands, build
public/private sector dialogue, and increase accountability to the local level (Sulaiman 2009; Spielman and Lynam
2010). For instance, AIS benchmarks and indicators can
integrate the analysis of poverty and gender issues
(Spielman and Birner 2008). Decentralized methods for
assessing innovation and investment priority setting are
being explored by OECD, among others (box 7.3) (see
also module 1).

■

Box 7.3 The Local Economic and
Employment Development Project

National systems of innovation are sometimes
challenged by consultation at the local level
when assessing institutional capacities, negotiating targets, and establishing multistakeholder
processes such as boards and panels, which allow
a wider group of actors to have input into
national programs. Such efforts are vital, however, for ensuring incremental responsibility and
decentralized decision making that strengthen
local economies.
The Local Economic and Employment
Development (LEED) Project (supported by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) has tracked experiences in
national systems of innovation with multistakeholder processes at the local level. LEED has
found that flexible funding schemes and special
funds for local innovation help to build stakeholder involvement and that multistakeholder
action learning enables the innovation process
to continue after external funding ends.
Source: Potter 2008.

■

Recognize supportive norms for assessment and priority setting. Assessment that involves interactions
among multiple stakeholders (such as learning alliances
or communities of interest or practice) requires spending time and material resources on creating environments in which values and attitudes that complement
the innovation process can thrive. Incentives and recognition activities as well as communication strategies are
often useful to convey innovation values and attitudes.
Creating an environment for presenting, discussing,
and reviewing priorities is integral to the process of
innovation itself.
When selecting tools for assessing innovation and prioritizing investment in AISs, determine which tools are
already being used and why. Introduce new methods such
as theory of change, analysis of innovation functions, and
benchmarking on an experimental basis. Gaps in data will
become apparent; they should be addressed through an
action plan to collect the missing data or by focusing on
the data that are available (a larger assessment suffering
from a lack of data would be ineffective). When selecting
tools, use experience developed by stakeholders within the
system and seek recommendations from communities of
practice.
Develop competencies for assessment and priority
setting. Capacity for assessing innovation and prioritizing investments is considered essential for the future
of global agriculture (G20 2011b). Priority assessment
of commodity innovations has received methodological attention, but technical skills for econometric
analysis and participatory research can be lacking
(Raitzer and Norton 2009). Human capacities are best
built through effective curriculums and learning in
action. The teaching of assessment and priority-setting
methods cannot follow a blueprint, because valuable
learning comes from working within different contexts
to identify relevant concepts, definitions, and methods.
Collaborative projects for sharing tools and using
assessment and priority-setting methods in AISs are
encouraged. In this respect, competencies such as willingness to communicate, learn, and interact with multiple stakeholders will be essential. In the end, such
efforts are more likely to create engaged individuals,
organizations, and networks.
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Continue to strengthen the integration of the end-user/
farmer perspective in assessment and priority-setting
processes. The Agricultural Science and Technology
Innovation systems work by CTA, KIT, CABI, and the
Free University of Amsterdam is a case in point. It integrates different perspectives into a more comprehensive
framework that encompasses end-user/farmer-led innovation processes, the private sector’s role in value chain

development, and the facilitating role of public research
and extension organizations. In low-income countries,
end-users may not be literate or may be marginalized in
other ways. For contextual reasons, they may be difficult
to engage in participatory processes. Much work needs to
be done to ensure that data collected with stakeholders at
the local level feeds into both ex ante and ex post assessment and priority-setting activities.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 2

Methods for Organizational Assessments in Agricultural
Innovation Systems
Regina Birner, University of Hohenheim

SYNOPSIS

his note presents methods that can be used to
assess individual organizations within the innovation system, such as agricultural research and
extension organizations. These assessments are not only
useful diagnostic tools for planning AIS interventions but
important components of monitoring, evaluating, and
assessing the impact of AIS interventions. If time and
resources are limited, assessments can be based on secondary data and expert interviews. More detailed assessments
may involve surveys among staff of organizations in the AIS,
farm household surveys, and participatory methods. From
an implementation and policy perspective, it is important to
create demand for assessment data to achieve sustainability.

■

T

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
FOR INVESTMENT

Investments to improve the overall performance of an AIS
often include components to improve the functioning of individual organizations, often in conjunction with components
to improve the coordination between organizations and to
create an enabling environment for them to innovate. For
planning, managing, and evaluating investment projects to
support agricultural innovation, it is essential to have diagnostic tools for assessing the organizations within the system. This
note describes such tools and methods (methods for assessing
an AIS in its entirety are discussed in TN 1).
Assessments can support AIS investment projects in the
following ways:
■

Diagnostic assessments (ex ante). In the planning phase
of development interventions, assessments can be used
to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations involved in an AIS, to identify entry points for
reforms, and to assess the feasibility and expected costs
and benefits of planned investments.

■

Monitoring. During the execution of development interventions, assessments are needed to monitor changes
over time. In particular, assessments can help to reveal
whether organizational reforms are proceeding as
intended.
Evaluation and impact assessment. After completing an
intervention, such as a reform of a country’s research
organization, assessments are required to evaluate the
effectiveness of the investment, to quantify its impact,
and to derive lessons for future interventions.

Since the AIS approach is comparatively new, project
managers face a lack of clarity about the methods that can
be used for these purposes. Existing methods for organizational assessments can be adjusted, however, to take the role
of organizations within the innovation system into account.
This note describes a set of assessment methods and gives
specific advice on how they can be used in assessing investment projects that reflect an AIS approach.
THE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK, OBJECTIVES,
AND REFERENCE SITUATION

Since an AIS is a theoretical construct, it is important to use
an assessment framework that defines the elements and relations of the AIS in which a given organization is to be
assessed. Several assessment frameworks are available (see
TN 1). This note uses the framework developed for the
World Bank by Spielman and Birner (2008) for illustration,
because it identifies the types of organizations involved in
an AIS and their relations (figure 7.1). Although this note
focuses on one framework, the methods discussed can be
applied to other assessment frameworks.
In the context of investment projects, assessments may
be carried out (1) at the level of the AIS as a whole, (2) at the
level of the innovation system for specific commodities or
value chains, or (3) at the level of different organizations
553

Figure 7.1 Conceptual Diagram of a National Agricultural Innovation System
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Source: Spielman and Birner 2008.

within the innovation system (organizational assessments).
In conducting an assessment at the organizational level, a primary task is to clarify the objectives of the assessment. Box 7.4
presents a number of questions related to the performance of
an organization within an AIS. The questions illustrate the
range of objectives that an organizational assessment may
need to consider to gain a comprehensive understanding of
that performance.
In addition to clarifying the objectives of an assessment,
it is also important to identify who will use the results.
Assessments may be carried out by organizations that fund,
or intend to fund, organizations within the innovation system. However, assessment results need to be fed back to the
management of the organizations involved to stimulate
institutional learning and change. Moreover, as discussed
below, assessments benefit from the involvement of staff
members as well as users of innovation-related services.
Another primary task is to select the standard or reference
situation against which an organization’s performance
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within the innovation system can be assessed. The following
options may be considered:
■

■

■

Benchmarking. One approach is to compare the organizations within the system in a particular country with
those of other countries, typically countries in the same
region or countries that are otherwise comparable. If
quantitative indicators are used, this approach is known
as “benchmarking.”
Changes over time. Another approach (which can be
combined with benchmarking) is to compare the performance of the organization at different points in time and
determine whether it improved or deteriorated.
Policy goals, organizational objectives, or standards.
A third approach is to compare organizations against
goals that have been set by policy makers, by managers of
the respective organization, or by another entity, such as
a donor organization or certification or accreditation
agency.
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Box 7.4 Questions That Illustrate the
Range of Objectives in an
Organizational Assessment

A number of questions illustrate the varied objectives of an assessment to understand how well a
certain organization—for example, the public
research institute responsible for a certain commodity—performs within an AIS:

quantities of inputs distributed, numbers of trainees or students receiving instruction, and so on. The assessment will
need to generate much of its own information, however, and
much of it will be qualitative. Examples include information
on the organization’s patterns and strength of collaboration
with other organizations in the AIS, the relevance of the
organization’s roles, and the existence of learning-based
performance management arrangements.
Criteria for selecting assessment methods

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

What internal management factors influence
the organization’s performance?
Which factors in the organization’s environment influence its performance?
What are the most promising types of interventions to improve the organization’s performance and its contribution to the innovation
system?
Is the evolving nature of the agricultural sector
placing new demands on the organization?
What is the role of the organization within the
innovation system? Is this role still relevant?
How may it need to change?
Are the organization’s patterns of partnership
and collaboration sufficient to maintain its relevance in the evolving agricultural sector? What
new linkages might be required?
What learning-based mechanisms for enhancing organizational performance are in place?
How can the organization’s contribution to the
overall innovation system be improved?
Source: Author.

SELECTING ASSESSMENT METHODS
AND OBTAINING DATA

Planners, analysts, researchers, and evaluators can use a
variety of methods to assess organizations within an innovation system. Assessments may be based on quantitative or
qualitative methods and may be derived from different disciplinary backgrounds, such as economics and its branches
(public economics and New Institutional Economics, for
example), organizational sociology, public administration,
and political science. The assessment can call upon existing
data and statistics to develop a picture of the national context and the main contours of the innovation system in
which the organization is situated. Data may also be available on the organization’s performance in relation to specific indicators, such as the number of staff publications,

Before describing assessment methods in detail, it is useful
to consider the criteria that influence the choice of an
appropriate method:
■

■

■

The scope of the assessment. Even though the assessment
is looking at the performance of an individual organization, from an innovation systems perspective it is important to take into account specific linkages and coordination mechanisms.
The existing data and knowledge. The data and knowledge about an organization that are available (and accessible) have a large influence on the choice of the assessment method and the amount of primary data that must
be collected. Organizations in the innovation system for
agriculture, such as extension organizations, typically
have their own reporting systems. It is helpful to examine
whether the data generated from such reporting systems
will be useful for the assessment.
The time and resources available. The choice of an assessment method is also determined by the time and the
resources available for the assessment. Ideally, there should
be a match between the purpose of the assessment—for
example, to determine the level of the planned investment—and the time and resources available for ex ante,
ongoing, and ex post assessments.

The role of preliminary AIS assessments

Before embarking on an organizational assessment, it is also
useful to develop an understanding of the AIS in which the
organization operates. It is important to keep these preliminary assessments of the AIS (mapping the AIS and reviewing
expert opinion about the AIS) in proportion to the main task
that lies ahead, which is the organizational assessment. These
system assessments provide context, “locate” an organization
within the wider innovation system, and highlight its relationships throughout the system. A further function of these
system assessments is that they engage system stakeholders
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in a dialogue about the role and performance of a specific
organization with the innovation system.
Mapping the AIS. Even if an assessment ultimately focuses
on only one organization within an AIS, an organizational
mapping of the AIS as a whole is useful to gain a clear
understanding of the environment in which the focus
organization operates (for example, it can help to answer
some of the questions raised in box 7.4). The outcome of
organizational mapping is a diagram that displays the
essential organizations in the innovation system and their
relations to each other. The mapping process may take
different forms, but it needs to be based on an assessment
framework. If time and resources are limited, the major
organization within the AIS usually can be identified by
compiling information from the documents and literature
available and interviewing experts based on a semistructured
questionnaire.
For example, if the goal is to map the national innovation
system for dairy production and the assessment framework
displayed in figure 7.1 is used, the analyst will have to compile information on the following questions:
■
■

■

■

■

Which research organizations deal with dairy production?
Which education organizations provide training for
dairy production at different levels (diploma, graduate,
postgraduate)?
Which extension organizations provide advice on dairy
production?
Who are the major players in the value chain (dairy processing companies, for example)?
Which organizations of dairy farmers, such as dairy
cooperatives, exist?

The analyst can construct a diagram based on the information collected and use it to collect further information on
innovation system actors and organizations, especially their
roles and interactions. Some mapping techniques make it
possible to visualize the innovation system during the interview process; for an example, see the description of NetMap in IAP 2.
Conducting expert surveys. The collection of
information from experts is useful for gathering valuable
information about an innovation system in a comparatively
short period. It allows the analyst to draw on the
comprehensive knowledge gained by professionals who have
long experience in the AIS. The list of experts to interview
can be derived during a mapping exercise (discussed
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previously) and by using the “snowball system”—that is, by
asking respondents to identify other persons who should be
interviewed.
Information can be collected from experts in different
ways. One alternative is to conduct semistructured interviews, using an interview guideline. It is also possible to use
a questionnaire for an expert survey and ask respondents to
score the various actors in the innovation system on a scale
(of one to four, for example) regarding their effectiveness,
responsiveness, accountability, organizational performance,
and other criteria. Even though the scoring results will reflect
a subjective assessment of the actors involved, this approach
yields useful information. Similarly, governance indicators
are often based on expert assessments, and if a standardized
approach is applied, such data can be used as indicators to
monitor changes over time or make comparisons across
countries. For an example of how an expert survey was used
in Ethiopia, see Spielman and Kelemework (2009).
METHODS FOR ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONS
WITHIN AN INNOVATION SYSTEM

This section introduces methods that can be used to assess
a specific organization within an AIS, such as an agricultural research institute, agricultural training center, or agricultural extension organization. The methods include staff
and farm household surveys as well as methods derived
from business administration to assess organizational
performance.
Organizational performance assessment

The business administration literature describes a wide
range of methods that organizations can use to assess and
manage their performance. One approach that is particularly relevant for innovation systems is the Organizational
Performance Assessment (OPAS), developed for agricultural research institutes by the former International Service
for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) (Peterson,
Gijsbers, and Wilks 2003).
OPAS was first tested in 1996–97 at the research institutes of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) in Ghana and later adapted and used by national
research organizations in Benin (Institut National des
Recherches Agricoles du Bénin) and Uganda (National
Agricultural Research Organisation) (Peterson, Gijsbers,
and Wilks 2003, 8).
In OPAS, organizational performance is defined as “the
ability of an organization to use its resources efficiently and
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to produce outputs that are consistent with its objectives and
relevant for its users” (Peterson, Gijsbers, and Wilks 2003, 1).
Box 7.5 displays the elements of OPAS and explains the relations between them.
OPAS has been designed for assessments conducted by
managers and staff of the respective research organization
with the assistance of one or two external facilitators. The
assessment has two major elements: an output assessment and

a management assessment. Each component follows a number
of clearly defined steps. Scores (which may be weighted
according to organizational priorities) are applied, making it
possible to monitor progress over time. An assessment of the
output trends of research organizations shows that the organization considerably increased its public services such as dissemination and training events but that its technology output
fell (Peterson, Gijsbers, and Wilks 2003, 18).

Box 7.5 Elements of the Organizational Performance Assessment

Agricultural research organizations use resources and
inputs (funds, personnel, equipment, and facilities) to
undertake their research operations in order to produce outputs (agricultural technologies and services)
for the benefit of farmers, agro-industries, and other
users. The outcomes (or consequences) of adopting or
applying these outputs are measured by their effects,
positive or negative, on such factors as production
costs, yields, and use of natural resources. In this
sequence of events, which is illustrated in the upper
part of the diagram, performance assessment and

feedback mechanisms are required at different levels to
ensure that research organizations plan their resources
efficiently and produce relevant and useful outputs. . . .
An underlying assumption in organizational performance is driven by a number of critical management
factors, as indicated in the lower part of the diagram.
Through a periodic assessment of these factors, managers can determine if appropriate mechanisms and
procedures are in place and functioning, and can take
steps to correct management deficiencies that contribute to poor (or lower) organizational performance.

Figure B7.5 Diagram of Organizational Performance Assessment
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Mandate

Users
– farmers
– industry
– NGOs
– academia

Outcomes
– adoption
– increased production
– cost reduction
– profits
– employment
– improved NRM
– achievement policy objs
– organizational learning

Operations monitoring & feedback
Periodic output assessment
Outcome assessment and feedback

Periodic management assessment
1. Assessing context and organizational responsiveness
2. Planning strategy and goals for the organization
3. Selecting program objectives and priorities
4. Planning research projects
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CRITICAL MANAGEMENT AREAS

Source: Reproduced directly from Peterson, Gijsbers, and Wilks 2003, 6.
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Box 7.6 displays sample questions for human resource
management (management area 6 in figure B7.5 in box
7.5). As in the output assessment, scores can be applied to
each question, which makes it possible to monitor changes
over time.
From an innovation systems perspective, it is useful to
expand the OPAS approach and include indicators that capture the relation of the organization to be evaluated with
other organizations in the AIS, both at the level of the output assessment and the level of the management assessment.
For example, at the output level, research organizations may
include scores for collaboration with agricultural extension
and education organizations, and vice versa. At the management level, critical management area 9 already refers to
“managing dissemination and partnerships” (critical management areas are listed in figure B7.5, box 7.5). Indicators
in this area may be expanded to include all types of partners
in the innovation system, as indicated in figure 7.1. Such
data could then also be used as measurable indicators of the
performance of different AIS members. These indicators
could also be considered in external evaluations, which may
increase the incentives for organizations not only to
improve their individual performance but to improve their
performance as a member of a wider innovation system.
To reflect more of an innovation systems perspective, the
OPAS can also be modified in the area of learning-based
performance management. Successful organizations continuously update and reframe their relationships with the rest

of the system and the competencies, roles, and ways of
working that the wider system demands. Organizations use
a suite of methods, referred to as “institutional and organizational learning” (see also module 1 and TN 4 in module
4) to enable this continuous adaptation and updating to
take place (box 7.7).
Surveys among the staff of organizations

Another organizational assessment method, which can be
combined with OPAS, is a survey of an organization’s staff
members. These surveys are particularly useful in organizations that have large numbers of field staff, such as public
agricultural extension systems. They can provide in-depth
information about the organization’s capacity and staff
incentives, but they need to be carefully planned, as they
require genuine support from management. As in other
surveys, the anonymity of the respondents has to be
ensured, and interviewers have to be careful to create an
atmosphere in which respondents are willing to talk freely
about their assessments, especially when sensitive issues are
raised, such as issues of political interference. Moreover, it
is important to pre-test the survey instrument with a group
of respondents who reflect the diversity of the AIS. This
step is important not only to test the suitability of the
instrument but also to build confidence among staff. In
designing the questionnaire, the trade-off between simplicity and capturing all relevant details must be considered.

Box 7.6 Sample Question Set for Assessing Human Resource Management Performance

■

■

■

■

■

To what extent does the organization maintain and
update staff information (e.g., biodata, publications,
projects)?
To what extent does the organization plan and
update its staffing, recruitment, and training
requirements?
How effectively are staffing, recruitment, and training plans linked to program and project needs?
How effective are selection procedures (for management, scientific, and support posts) in terms of
objectivity and transparency?
To what extent is training based on merit and on
organization and program objectives?

■

■

■

■

■

How effective are mechanisms to promote a good
working environment and high staff morale?
How effective is the performance-evaluation process
for research staff?
How effective is the performance-evaluation process
for nonresearch (management, administrative, and
support) staff?
How effective are reward and sanction processes, in
terms of motivating staff?
How effectively does the organization compete with
the private sector in providing salaries and benefits
that attract and retain quality staff?

Source: Reproduced directly from Peterson, Gijsbers, and Wilks 2003, 22.
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Box 7.7 Organizational Learning and Institutional Change

Institutional or organizational learning is the deliberate and ongoing process in which information from
research and evaluation activities and outcomes feeds
into a reflective analysis of what has worked and not
worked in an institution. In turn, the lessons from such
reflective analysis inform decisions about future directions for the organization. Leadership, incentives,
resources, and flexibility within the organization’s routines are required for this process to work.
The Institutional Learning and Change initiative
defines a learning organization as an organization
with a culture that supports this kind of analysis and
change. The term “institution” is used instead of
“organization” when referring to the learning process
that takes place across organizations and among a
diverse set of people involved in research and evalua-

tion activities. Shambu Prasad, Laxmi, and Wani discuss an “unusual coalition” between an international
research center (the International Crops Research
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics) and a private
Indian donor (Tata), in which the research center
established new institutional mechanisms, both
internal and external. The internal mechanisms
involved new ways of organizing work among site
coordinators and activity coordinators who have to
seek input from each other. External mechanisms
included a new steering committee as well as state
and district committees with multiple stakeholders
who were engaged in the use of new tools such as
actor-linkage mapping. Module 3 examines additional cases of organizational learning and institutional change.

Source: Author; Watts et al. 2003; Shambu Prasad, Laxmi, and Wani 2006.

In designing staff surveys, it is also useful to take gender
into account. For example, a survey may include specific
questions on career opportunities and constraints for
female staff. Moreover, the data for male and female
respondents can be analyzed separately. Box 7.8 describes
the constraints to agricultural innovation that were identified in a survey of agricultural extension agents in six districts of Ghana. (See IAP 3 for an example from Peru.)
Farm household surveys

For organizations that deal directly with farmers, such as
agricultural extension organizations, surveys among
farmers—the clients of the organization—are essential
for an ultimate assessment of organizational performance. At the same time, farm household surveys can
provide important information about the performance of
the AIS as a whole, which means that they can also form
an important component of a system-level assessment.
Farm household surveys are the most expensive and timeconsuming approach to collecting data about agricultural
innovation, but they provide particularly relevant information, especially if secondary data on farm households
that capture aspects of agricultural innovation are not
available. Box 7.8 describes how this assessment method
was used in Ghana.

If a survey that includes agricultural households is
planned for another purpose, it may be possible to include
questions on the performance of the organization to be evaluated and on other aspects of agricultural innovation. If a
survey is planned specifically to collect information on the
assessment of an organization in the AIS, it will be useful to
include questions on outcome indicators, such as the adoption of innovations, as well as questions on household access
to the services provided by the organization (such as extension services) as well as household satisfaction with those services. It may also be useful to include information on other
aspects of the innovation system, such as access to agricultural inputs and complementary services as well as marketing
opportunities. It will often be useful to collect such data separately from male-headed households, female-headed households, and female spouses in male-headed households.
When farm household surveys are not possible and secondary data are limited, Participatory or Rapid Rural
Appraisal methods will be useful, since assessments of
organizations in the AIS, or of the system as a whole, should
take the farmers’ perspective into account.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The key challenge facing agricultural research institutes,
development organizations, and enterprises is to maintain
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Box 7.8 Using Staff Surveys in Assessing Agricultural Extension Services in Six Districts of Ghana

To assess the performance of the organizations providing agricultural extension services in Ghana, a team
from the University of Ghana–Legon and the International Food Policy Research Institute carried out an
assessment that involved surveys among agricultural
extension providers (70 interviewees) as well as agricultural household heads (1,168) and their spouses (613).
The assessment showed that the public extension
service remained the main provider of extension information (an important finding, given the crucial role of
advisory services in agricultural innovation). Only one
respondent had received a visit from a nongovernment
organization providing extension services, and nongovernmental organizations organized only 4 percent
of group meetings on extension.
The assessment also showed that female household
heads as well as female spouses in male-headed households had very low access to agricultural extension services even though women play an important role in
Ghana’s smallholder-based agriculture, and even
though Ghana has a special program for Women in
Agricultural Development.

The survey also showed that less than 12 percent of
household heads and less than 6 percent of spouses
had adopted a new technology in the previous
two years. The implication is that considerable constraints prevent male and female farmers from
innovating.
The survey among agricultural extension agents
revealed that female extension agents were more effective in reaching female farmers than male extension
agents, but only 14 percent of extension agents were
women. Extension agents as a group identified the lack
of transport and access to credit as major constraints
on farmers (see the figure). An inadequate number of
extension staff was seen as the least important
constraint.
The assessment revealed management problems as
well. Extension agents had limited incentives to perform, priorities and targets were not set, and training
opportunities were limited. The assessment identified
entry points for interventions to improve the performance of this key organization in Ghana’s agricultural
innovation system.

Source: World Bank and IFPRI 2010.

their relevance and performance in the rapidly evolving
agricultural sector. Organizational assessments provide a
way of investigating the capacities and outcomes of an organization and identifying ways of strengthening different
aspects of capacity to improve relevance and performance.
These actions improve the effectiveness of both public and
private investments in the development of organizations
within an AIS. If similar assessment tools are used in different countries, additional benefits can be realized from crosscountry comparisons and benchmarking.
POLICY ISSUES

Policy issues related to organizational assessments range
from ensuring that assessments are properly resourced, that
local capacity to conduct assessments is developed and sustained, that assessments reflect environmental and social
considerations, and that wide support develops for using
the results to improve performance. Policy responses to
these concerns include the following:
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■

■

■

Commit resources to organizational assessment. The
benefits of organizational assessments are realized only if
they are conducted on a regular basis to maintain an
organization’s relevance in the AIS and to monitor
progress over time. Conducting assessments regularly
can be a considerable challenge, especially if organizations rely on external donors to fund this activity.
Build local ownership for assessment. The sustainability
of an assessment regime can be improved by generating
buy-in from local organizations, such as the ministries in
charge of agriculture, science, and technology.
Build local capacity for assessment. The sustainability
of an assessment regime can also be improved by building and institutionalizing local capacity for conducting
organizational assessments. It may also be useful to
involve regional networks of agricultural research
organizations, such as the Forum for Agricultural
Research in Africa (FARA), or regional economic communities, such as the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), in the use of assessment
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■

■

tools, especially if benchmarking approaches are used
(see the final point).
Emphasize social and environmental considerations in
designing assessment methods. For example, assessment
methods can be designed to capture the extent to which
individual organizations in the system are biased towards
large-scale farmers. As shown in box 7.8, assessment
methods are also useful to assess the gender dimensions
of the innovation system.
Create regional guidelines. International and regional
organizations may take on the role of developing guidelines for harmonizing assessments and publishing
results, especially if benchmarking approaches are used.

■

■

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

To some extent, implementation issues for organizational
assessments reflect the policy issues just mentioned:
■

Timeliness. It is important to conduct organizational
assessments regularly and in a timely fashion, as they are
a key mechanism for organizations to maintain their relevance within an innovation system. It is preferable to use
frequent organizational assessments to encourage continuous incremental change rather than to rely on infrequent major organizational reforms (see, for example, the
CGIAR as an example of major reform; www.cgiar.org).

■

Resource implications. As with all assessments, in organizational assessments carefully consider the resources
and capacity required to undertake the assessment.
Assessments involving household surveys are particularly resource-intensive. Depending on the country and
region, the costs may range from US$25 to US$120 per
household. Yet certain types of data about an organization’s performance in the innovation system can be collected only through surveys, such as data on male and
female farmers’ access to extension services.
Inclusiveness. To create “buy-in,” it is important to generate “demand” for assessment data at the organizational,
national, and regional level. It may be useful, for example, to work with parliamentary committees in charge of
agriculture or science and technology. In democratic systems, such committees may have considerable latitude to
use assessment tools to hold the government accountable
for the performance of an innovation system and its
organizations. Likewise, it may be useful to involve
farmer organizations, which can also play an important
role in creating accountability.
Choosing local partners for assessments. As indicated,
it is essential to build local capacity for assessments.
Potential partners may include analytical units within
the ministries in charge of agriculture or science and
technology, university departments that work in this
field, as well as think tanks and local consulting
companies.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 3

Foresighting Investments in Agricultural Innovation
Anthony Clayton, University of the West Indies

SYNOPSIS

ndividuals, firms, and governments have a common
interest in gaining a more accurate sense of the future to
identify potential achievements, successes, and failures;
discern new opportunities; or reduce risk. New, future-oriented evaluation methods are needed to complement current methods, which are largely ex post—in other words,
they account for past outputs, outcomes, and impact. Given
the impossibility of seeing into the future, the only solution
is to gather and analyze information to think about and prepare for the future. Tools such as foresighting can make an
important contribution to this process by clarifying a country’s position with regard to strengths, weaknesses, threats,
challenges, and opportunities, focusing attention on longerterm issues (including difficult institutional and political
issues), and securing a sufficient level of commitment from
stakeholders to enable the necessary processes of reform,
restructuring, transformation, and change.

I

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Most decisions are based on implicit assumptions about the
future. People depositing funds with a bank assume that they
will be able to withdraw their capital when it is required.
Investors fund a new business venture because they anticipate profits. When farmers expect good demand for their
crop, they may plant an extra field. Assumptions such as
these are both rational and functional; few decisions can be
made without assuming that a significant degree of stability
and continuity will prevail. Because it is also true that these
assumptions sometimes prove incorrect, it is important to
assess the balance between risk and reward involved in each
decision and to gauge the reliability of the individuals and
the strength and trustworthiness of the institutions on which
the plan depends.
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Individuals, firms, and governments therefore have a
common interest in gaining a more accurate sense of the
future, either to improve their chances of making a successful investment or to reduce the risk of loss. The problem is
that the future for any given sector, nation, or individual will
be determined by a complex combination of interacting
variables that cannot be anticipated with precision. The
response is to identify better ways to think about and prepare for the future (Postrel 1998). Foresighting is a means of
gathering and using information to think strategically about
the future, including the future of agriculture (de LattreGasquet 2006). Foresighting assumes that the future is not
predetermined or even predictable but that it will be influenced by choices made today.
FORESIGHTING TOOLS AND APPLICATIONS

Foresighting is a strategy for change, rather than a strategic
plan, although it often feeds into a strategic planning process.
Foresighting is both a process and a set of tools for managing
and communicating knowledge, setting priorities, coordinating goals, and encouraging innovation in science and technology. It involves an iterative and interactive process of
systematically exploring possible future economic and social
dynamics, including factors such as science, technology, institutions, environment, and development options. The aim is
to identify strategic areas of investment that will yield the
greatest economic and/or social benefits (Rutten 2001). From
an innovation systems perspective, organizations pursue
foresighting exercises to (Popper et al. 2007): encourage
strategic and future-oriented thinking; support innovation
strategies and priority setting; identify research/investment
opportunities; generate visions and images of the future; cope
with “grand challenges” facing the economy, society, and
environment; and promote public debate and trigger necessary actions.

Box 7.9 Foresighting to Transform Ireland’s Agrifood Sector (Teagasc 2030)

Teagasc, established in 1988, is the national body providing integrated research, advisory, and training services to Ireland’s agriculture, food industry, and rural
communities. The Teagasc 2030 foresight exercise
(launched in 2006, ending in 2008 with an international foresight conference) sought to establish a
broadly shared vision for the Irish agrifood industry
and rural economy in 2030. That vision would enable
Teagasc to meet science and technology needs in the
short, medium, and long term.
The foresighting process. Teagasc 2030 was overseen
by a steering committee of national and international
representatives from government, industry, and universities. The committee was assisted by a foresight panel
of experts from Teagasc, other government departments, state bodies, universities, farming and rural
organizations, and food industries. A foresight working
group from Teagasc’s research, advisory, and training
directorates completed background papers on drivers
of change and possible future scenarios and handled
day-to-day running of the project. The knowledge base
was developed in workshops, other events, and consultations with stakeholders and international experts.
The scenarios. Involving elements of imagination
but drawing on likely developments in the agrifood
sector, rural economy, and world over the next 20 years,
Teagasc 2030 developed five scenarios and described
their effects on the organization:
1. Ireland—The Food Island. The value-added food
sector in 2030 has many new elements such as convergence of the food and pharmaceutical industries.
2. Globally Competitive Farming. In 2030, a diversified agrifood sector competitively produces milk,
beef/sheep, and tillage crops.

3. Energy Squeeze Fuels Agriculture. With oil production declining steadily, agriculture is vital to global
food and energy security.
4. A European Agriculture. This scenario addresses
the socioeconomic aspects of the rural economy and
the consequences of a European economy partly isolated from the rest of the world by tariffs and
restricted trade.
5. Sustainable and Rural. Sustainability, climate
change, and environmental security have precedence: The 2030 bioeconomy delivers competitive
agri-environmental products and services.
Lessons and response. Based on the scenarios,
strategic and operational responses emerged:
■

■

■

For the sector: Promote knowledge generation and
dissemination, learning, and problem solving. Policy
drivers at the European Union and national level
create new markets and opportunities.
For farms, firms, and policy makers: Adapt quickly
to changing circumstances, generate added value,
and support innovation.
For Teagasc: Address the new challenges and
needs facing the Irish agrifood knowledge system.
Excellence in supporting science-based innovation will depend on building organizational capabilities in leadership, partnership, and accountability. Teagasc will establish a new technology
transfer service for food companies, strengthen
investment in biosciences, enhance the depth of
its scientific effort, and continue upgrading its
educational programs to the highest international
standards.

Source: Teagasc, www.teagasc.ie.

The next sections of this note describe elements of the
foresighting process, how to select an appropriate foresighting tool, the use of complementary tools, and the development of alternative scenarios. They conclude with examples
of how these processes unfolded in agricultural foresighting
in Ireland (box 7.9) and Jamaica (box 7.10).

Foresighting process

Foresighting is often spearheaded by individual organizations or collaborating groups who have a stake within the
innovation system (for example, by strategic partnerships
or innovation councils, among others). The organization
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Box 7.10 Foresighting for Jamaica’s Sugar Industry

Objective and process. Jamaica’s sugar industry was the
largest employer of agricultural labor and used the most
(and much of the best) arable land, but it depended on a
European Union trade regime that was being phased
out. Jamaican sugar was not competitive and would have
to undergo profound restructuring to survive. A research
program at the University of the West Indies attempted
to address these issues through linked foresight exercises
involving government, academics, and industry from
2003 to 2010. Following a 2003 Delphi study that identified drivers of change and a 2004 foresight workshop to
identify land-use scenarios, by 2009 public and private
partners had developed an integrated assessment that
generated more accurate predictions than official forecasts. An integrated policy development project in
2010–11 identified options for improved policies, using
geographic information system mapping as the basis for
a national spatial plan. The cost of the seven years of
foresighting was an estimated US$150,000.
The scenarios. In early 2008, a diversification plan
involving privatization and the manufacture of ethanol
presented three scenarios:
1. Diversification would succeed. The area used to
produce cane for ethanol would increase significantly. The contribution to mitigating climate
change would offset probable negative consequences
for river and coastal water quality.
2. Diversification would fail. Much land would
become available for other purposes (housing,
tourism, forestry) or revert to scrub. Some options
would be environmentally positive, but much

would depend on how the change process was
managed.
3. Multi-objective optimization demonstrated a
possible solution that could achieve a range of
developmental goals. Extensive, low-value agriculture would shift to intensive, high-value agriculture, increasing revenue, profits, and skill transfer
while reducing environmental impact.
Outcomes and lessons. Following the withdrawal of
Brazil’s plan to invest in Jamaica’s ethanol industry and
an even more acute budgetary crisis in 2010–11, the Government of Jamaica chose to sell the sugar industry to a
foreign company. This outcome illustrates how pressing
short-term needs, in conjunction with international
uncertainties and domestic politics, often entail the loss
of strategic direction and potential future prosperity.
The foresighting exercises resulted in three significant
advances. First, the identification of future scenarios
helped to establish that better future outcomes were possible. Second, the process helped to identify the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in current policies. Third, the
dialogue between officials, academics, and industry representatives was genuinely useful. Yet the exercises could
not resolve deep core weaknesses in governance. Most
decisions are still taken on a sectoral basis without considering cross-sectoral effects. Ministry officials participated in the debates, but not ministers. No sufficiently
powerful group exists to address the large disparities in
wealth, influence, and power in Jamaica and arrive at an
optimal outcome. Vested interests continue to dominate
the informal networks where key decisions are made.

Source: Author.

initiating the foresighting exercise does not necessarily facilitate the process. A common procedure is to establish a
steering committee for the exercise and a foresight working
group to manage implementation. This approach was used
for a foresighting exercise for agriculture in Ireland (box
7.9). For the Jamaican sugar industry, a team of foresight
experts was contracted to help users define the steps and
tools in a foresighting exercise to meet the needs of different
users (in general, users might include firms, industry associations, multinationals, or governments).
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Rutten (2000) explains that there are no blueprints for
organizing a foresighting exercise. The process itself has
four key stages, however:
1. Bring together a wide range of information resources
and key stakeholders to discuss and define the core
objective(s) of the foresighting exercise.
2. Identify and engage a wider group of stakeholders (typically involving both public and private sector organizations) in the process.
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3. Establish a foresighting task force (or a steering committee with an implementing working group) with key
stakeholders represented, ideally with the support of a
foresight expert.
4. Design and develop the foresighting exercise. Select the
tools for the strategic analyses, and set the timelines for
completion.
This process is not a linear series of steps. At each of these
four stages, new information may be injected, additional
stakeholders may become involved (they can sometimes
include criminal or vested interests), and organizational
changes may affect the level of human and financial
resources allocated to the exercise. The exercise will need to
remain sufficiently flexible to respond to these challenges
and changes while remaining productive. The outputs of the
process should include the following:
■

■

■

Determining the economic, social, environmental, and
institutional factors that might encourage or inhibit
innovation (either in a particular country, or among
firms, or in government).
Clarifying the position of a country (or firms or government) with regard to its strengths, weaknesses, threats,
challenges, and opportunities, usually by focusing attention on the longer-term issues.
Securing a sufficient level of commitment from stakeholders to enable the necessary processes of strategic
reform, restructuring, transformation, and change.

Selecting the appropriate foresighting tool

As summarized in table 7.7, three key strategic planning
tools are used to develop future-oriented analyses in the
foresighting process:
■

■

■

Technology roadmapping identifies key trends in the
market and clarifies those trends and their relation to
organizational goals; then technological and managerial decision-making occur to achieve the preferred
future.
Delphi studies review significant trends in relevant areas
(such as emerging scientific and technological opportunities, needs for education and training, and so forth)
and identify the most plausible outcomes, plus any
associated threats and opportunities.
Foresighting and backcasting exercises identify organizational and institutional drivers of change plus their

interactions, clarify “known unknowns,” assess vulnerability to events, identify possible outcomes, backcast to
the present day, and build a strategy for managing
change.
Examples of online toolkits for foresighting are listed in
the “resources” section of this note, following the references.

Complementary tools in the foresighting process

Aside from the three major foresighting tools, complementary methods of information gathering can be used in the
process, depending on timelines and tasks assigned within
the task force or to the foresight expert:
■

■

■

A horizon scan examines the external environment for
potential threats and opportunities or early signs of disruptive technological change.
A decision tree is developed by constructing a logical
sequence of pertinent questions, such as “If this plan
fails, what are our other options?”
User requirements capture. When a particular group
(such as consultants or a local elite) has all of the relevant information, they may be able to control the
agenda and determine the answers. A user requirements
capture process helps to forestall elite capture and
information asymmetries. The information base for all
users is developed, displayed, discussed, and modified
in an iterative process, often using graphic-rich software that allows data to be overlaid in layers (a GIS is
one example).

Foresighting and defining alternative scenarios

Scenarios (different possible visions of the future) can be
used to formulate long-term policy, institutional strategy,
and research programs (Johnson and Paez 2000). In a foresight exercise, a process of defining and describing scenarios
is used to explore the way that choices made today will lead
to alternative futures. Scenarios are usually encapsulated in
brief, illustrative descriptions of possible future states of a
system. A common technique is to develop a small set of
alternative scenarios, which is helpful for imagining, structuring, and analyzing different possible futures. Scenarios
can range from the probable (most likely) future to possible
best-case and worst-case futures. The storylines are discussed
widely and critiqued.1 Ideally, like the overall foresighting
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Table 7.7 Foresight Tools
Foresight tool
Roadmapping

Delphi

Purpose

Identify key trends in market, clarify
organizational goals, make technological and
managerial choices to achieve preferred
future

Typical user
Typical time
horizon examined
(years)

Individual firms
1–10

Review significant trends in relevant areas and identify
most likely outcome, plus any associated threats and
opportunities; can be more accurate than individual
consultation and more reliable than statistical groups
made up of noninteracting individuals whose
judgments are aggregated
Industry associations
5–20

Large multinational corporations, governments
10–50⫹

People involved
and numbers
Type of process

Experts and decision makers; 10–20

Experts (different disciplines); 30–100⫹

Experts and stakeholders; 20–50

1 day introduction, 1 day run-time, monitoring
and implementation

Facilitated discussion, present “what-if” challenges and
counterfactuals, 3 months’ preparation, 2 days’ runtime; a large national exercise will require 1 year’s
preparation, 2 years’ run-time

Role of foresight
expert
Key challenges

Introduce concept

Coordinated, iterative discussion of expert judgments
on defined issues; responses are kept anonymous but
fed back to group, clarified, ranked and reevaluated in
a minimum of 3 rounds, 3 months’ preparation,
3 months’ run-time
Coordinate, derive scenarios
Identifying and recruiting the panels, managing the
process
– What is the issue to be addressed?
– What is important about the issue?
– What are possible future scenarios for this issue?
– What views create tensions on the issue?

Identifying and recruiting key stakeholders, facilitating
the process, maintaining momentum
– What are the key assumptions underlying this plan?
– What is the “worst case” situation?
– What if this plan doesn’t work?
– What is the contingency plan?

Rikkonen, Kaivo-oja, and Aakkula (2006) described the
use of Delphi expert panels in the scenario-based
strategic planning of agriculture in Finland; Stewman
and Lincoln (1981) conducted a Delphi study on the
likely timeframe for expected breakthroughs in the
biological sciences from recombinant DNA (RDNA)
research, with emphasis on basic knowledge and three
applied areas: agriculture, industry, and medicine

De Lattre-Gasquet (2006) examined three case studies
on the use of foresighting in agricultural research
and development priorities: one at the commodity
level (cocoa), one at the level of a national system
(Dutch agriculture), and one at the level of an
organization (the International Food Policy Research
Institute’s 2020 Vision)

Characteristic

Key questions to
guide information
gathering /
analysis

Examples

Source: Author.

Getting experts and decision makers to engage,
overcoming organizational inertia
– What are our core technologies?
– Could we use them more effectively?
– Could an innovation make our technology
obsolete? How quickly could we adapt?
– What are the trends in our sector? Could a
new competitor or a new market emerge?
– What is our competitive advantage?
– What are the priorities for maintaining,
upgrading, or replacing our core
technologies?
– What resources will be required to update
our technologies and upgrade our skills?
Institute of Grocery Distribution (UK) used
roadmapping to identify food production
issues that could affect the food chain and to
facilitate a more considered introduction of
new technologies in the future on behalf of
its members, who were major retailers and
food and agricultural research institutes (IGD
2003)

Foresight/backcasting
Identify drivers of change plus interactions, identify
“known unknowns,” assess vulnerability to events,
identify possible outcomes, backcast to present day,
build strategy for managing change

Facilitate, challenge, manage process

exercise, scenarios are updated with further assessments of
the environment, drivers of change, and likely interactions
between system variables in the progression from current
conditions to a future state. Boxes 7.9 and 7.10 provide
examples of scenarios developed within wider foresighting
in Ireland and Jamaica; IAPs 4 and 5 provide examples from
India and Chile.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Attempts to prepare for the future can generate a range of
benefits. The general advantages of a strategic planning
process are that it can help any organization assess its threats
and opportunities, clarify the issues, determine its priorities,
and integrate all of the important variables into a single
coherent plan. This is true irrespective of the quality of the
plan that results. A strategic planning process also helps to
identify any weaknesses (such as insufficient capital, inadequate technical capacity, inappropriate management, or
gaps in the supply chain) that will have to be addressed and
thereby clarifies the priorities for borrowing and investment, hiring and firing, and R&D.
The advantage of future-oriented strategic planning is
that it facilitates more objective consideration of today’s real
problems. The foresight exercises may depoliticize and
decontextualize the problems, which then allow the problems to be addressed more realistically. Thinking about
forces that will shape the future, such as demographic
trends, can indicate the future pattern of market demand
(for example, for food, energy, water, and housing) and the
need for investments in new technologies to meet that
demand (see, for example, Clayton and Staple-Ebanks
2002). A foresight approach, using techniques such as scenario planning and integrated assessment to incorporate
social, economic, and environmental factors, can ultimately
identify and present the best available, optimal, or even winwin outcomes, which different organizations and interest
groups may find acceptable. Finally, many planning exercises are flawed because of information asymmetries. A possible solution to this problem is a user requirements capture
process, which can be built into a strategic planning exercise. This process involves two or three iterations in which
users are shown possible outcomes, give their feedback, and
refine the model.
POLICY ISSUES

The chief policy issues related to foresighting are related to
reducing the risk of failed policies; addressing cultural,

institutional, and political barriers; providing sufficient
resources to implement the results of foresighting exercises;
and ensuring that policy change can be sustained.
Reduce the risk of costly policy failures

For poor and developing countries, the primary policy issue
in foresighting and strategic planning is that these exercises
can reduce the risk of policy failures with high human and
developmental costs. One of the most important differences
between rich and poor countries is that the cost of a policy
failure in a rich country is usually in terms of its opportunity cost—the loss of the wealth that might have otherwise
been generated. Although poor and developing countries
have a greater need to prepare for the future, most have just
a small fraction of the capacity (the skills, knowledge base,
access to information networks, and so on) that rich countries deploy on such exercises. For this reason, it is exceptionally important for poor countries to use policy tools
that are effective, robust, and cost-effective.
Address barriers to progress and provide
sufficient resources for foresighting

Strategies for change, including the use of foresighting, usually have to address issues such as institutional culture and
local politics. As the example of the Jamaican sugar industry
suggests, it is often important to address the political, cultural, or economic factors and institutional policies that
seriously impede progress, because development trajectories can become locked in by the real or perceived cost of
developing alternatives, the reluctance to write off sunk
expenditures, or a lack of relevant skills.
Managing in the present while preparing for the future
often involves gathering new sources of information, establishing where and when change is needed, building a consensus, and mobilizing people and institutions around the
new strategy. Commitment, time, and financial resources
are essential to support foresighting, especially the implementation phase.

Link foresighting with institutional change
to ensure sustainability

A policy issue especially relevant to innovation systems is
that innovation cannot usually be imposed. A solution that
is not widely understood, or which cannot be easily assimilated or at least accommodated by local cultural and political systems, generally will not gain wide support and will fail

MODULE 7: THEMATIC NOTE 3: FORESIGHTING INVESTMENTS IN AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION

567

once external funding and/or pressure are withdrawn. Foresighting exercises can inform innovation at the policy and
investment levels, but to ensure sustainability, they must be
linked to assessment and change processes within the
organizations involved in the innovation system (see TN 2).
Ultimately, the dynamics of innovation and change cannot
be understood without a broad concept of knowledge,
including competencies and capabilities, practices and routines, and meanings, beliefs, and perceptions (Williams and
Markusson 2002). A foresight exercise takes all of these factors into account to map out a development plan which may
be visionary but is also practical and realistic, so that it
ensures immediate and long-term benefits for the economy
and society.

and wider economic restructuring, provide the economic
impetus to support a widening skill base, attract and retain
human and financial capital, and make a decisive move
along the value chain, thereby escaping from low-growth,
low-margin markets.
Key recommendations for practitioners include the
following:
■

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Foresighting cannot, by itself, solve all problems. Other factors
must be addressed, as seen in the example from Jamaica and
discussed throughout this sourcebook. These factors include
the role of multistakeholder collaboration for good governance (modules 1 and 6); sensible macroeconomic and regulatory policies (module 6); investments in education, advisory
services, and research capacity (modules 2, 3, and 4); and an
innovative, entrepreneurial private sector (module 5). All have
an important role to play in encouraging technological
dynamism, investment, and associated processes of economic
diversification and growth, as well as a move into higher-value
products and services that meet market demands.
Experience with foresighting exercises suggests that foresighting is a best practice for formulating a long-term
strategic plan that enables reform and encourages innovation. The foresighting process and associated tools provide a
structure for assessing factors that are internal (internal
strengths and weaknesses of the science, technology, production, and institutional base) and external (changing
global markets and other critical factors in the external environment). A foresighting exercise also lays the groundwork
for a review process to anticipate key market opportunities
by updating findings with information on new and emerging technologies in conjunction with an analysis of the current restructuring of key sectors of the global economy in
relation to science, technology, and production. The identification of such market opportunities could, with good
management, create demand for a process of institutional
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■

■

■

Many policy advisors, planners, and donor agencies
find it difficult to talk openly about political problems
that can undermine innovation processes, such as vested
interests and corruption. They often prefer to talk about
technical issues as if they could be addressed in isolation.
Transparency is sacrificed and the exercise loses credibility with stakeholders. In fact, the real impediments to
progress are often the political, cultural, or economic factors that determine which solutions are adopted and
supported and how and when this occurs. It is useless to
present an analysis of technological choices as if the final
decision is value-free. The only way to map out a potentially viable solution is to engage with and understand
the political and cultural issues.
For these reasons, it is extremely important that participants in foresighting exercises understand that a systematic examination of the possibility of failure and an
honest discussion of the pattern of previous failures are
the only ways to improve the chances of success. Wellorganized feedback to the client and participants enables
the process to tolerate the dissent, complexity, and uncertainty that is typical of strategic analyses.
Foresighting is a process, not a one-time activity. The
time required may have to be extended in light of new
information or significant changes in the external environment (such as a recession). A national process can
take several years and cycle over a longer period. Regular
interaction with participants at all stages of the process is
needed to ensure that the exercise does not suffer from
stagnation or “groupthink” as well as to ensure that new
stakeholders are identified, recruited, and fully involved.
Ideally a foresighting exercise should be commissioned
formally so that it is clearly accountable to client
demand. It is recommended that a foresighting expert be
contracted as a facilitator, but the expert does not replace
the need for a steering committee and working group to
implement the exercise.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 4

Monitoring Agricultural Innovation System Interventions
Andy Hall, LINK Ltd.
Kumuda Dorai, LINK Ltd.
Trish Kammili, National Institute for Agricultural Research, France (INRA)

SYNOPSIS

his note deals with strategies for monitoring AIS
interventions. Innovation system interventions
make explicit assumptions about the nonlinearity
of change and innovation in their design, and in doing so,
they place specific demands on monitoring arrangements.
These assumptions hinge on the recognition that innovation usually involves simultaneous technical adaptation and
changes in the way things are done—in other words, institutional (and policy) adaptation—and that the final
impacts will occur only when institutional adaptation has
been achieved. Process-oriented monitoring methods that
can cope with learning-based interventions have been
around for some time; innovation system interventions
should rediscover and adapt these methods rather than
reinvent them. These types of monitoring methods include
Outcome Mapping, Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems (RAAKS), the Most Significant Change (MSC)
approach, and Participatory Impact Pathway Analysis.

T

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

In common with all interventions, good practice in agricultural innovation interventions requires effective performance management accompanied by reporting arrangements that ensure accountability. This thematic note deals
with monitoring—the effective management of performance by implementers so that they can achieve desired outcomes and report their progress to investors. A separate thematic note (TN 5) deals with evaluation—the assessment of
impacts and the generation of lessons for future interventions by investors and planners. Traditionally, monitoring
systems in interventions have focused on tracking performance against a set of milestones agreed with the investor at
the intervention’s inception. In reality, agricultural development interventions—particularly those related to innovation

systems—are rarely this simple, and the underlying assumptions often prove to be unrealistic. Monitoring practice has
for some time recognized this nonlinearity of agricultural
and other development interventions, accepting that outcomes and impacts are achieved following constant iterations of an approach based on experience emerging from the
intervention itself. This awareness is evident in the range of
learning-based interventions that have emerged in recent
years, such as adaptive collaborative management techniques
in natural resource management (Colfer 2005; Guijt 2007)
or techniques such as project Outcome Mapping (described
in box 7.12 later in this note).
Innovation system interventions make explicit assumptions about the nonlinearity of change and innovation in
their design and, in doing so, place specific demands on
monitoring arrangements. These assumptions hinge on the
recognition that innovation usually involves simultaneous
technical adaptation and changes in the way things are
done—institutional (and policy) adaptation. A related
assumption is that final impacts such as changes in yield,
incomes, food availability, or environmental sustainability
will occur only when institutional adaptation has been
achieved. The intervention logic of innovation system interventions is that while technological adaptations have the
potential for immediate impacts, institutional and policy
adaptations strengthen capacities for innovation that
remain and continue to develop beyond the life of an intervention. These capacities lay the foundation for future technical adaptations and lead to social and economic impacts.
This focus on institutional adaptation highlights the
need for those implementing an intervention to monitor
how effectively their actions stimulate new ways of doing
things. Often this kind of change involves stimulating the
adaptation of informal institutions—for example, by developing links between research, enterprise, development, and
(sometimes) policy players and then finding ways in which

569

these networks can work effectively. Sometimes it involves
stimulating changes in formal institutions, such as land
tenure arrangements, regulatory regimes, pricing policies,
or the roles of certain organizations. This process, in turn,
requires interventions to facilitate negotiations about
change between different stakeholders. Both types of institutional change need to be tracked.
Because the environments in which institutional changes
must take place have highly specific features, the process of
stimulating change can rarely follow a set plan. Instead an
experimental approach is needed. This means that interventions must be learning based and reflexive, which is why
monitoring is so critical: It assumes the role of helping to
determine whether the intervention’s chosen approach is
resulting in desirable outcomes and whether the intervention needs to respond to other (often unexpected) changes
in its environment.
Since the nature of institutional bottlenecks may become
apparent only during the course of an intervention, indicators of performance will need to be developed on a case-bycase basis and constantly revised. Recording unexpected
institutional changes is an additional way of alerting an
intervention’s investor that progress is being made.
Interventions also will need to monitor progress toward
final social, economic, and environmental impacts. Such monitoring implies a set of assumptions about the relationship
between these institutional outcomes and final impacts. Interventions need to test these assumptions by monitoring outcomes farther down the results chain toward final impact to
verify whether the institutional changes that have been
enacted are likely to lay the foundation for those final impacts.
This monitoring provides information that can feed into
adjustments in the intervention; it also acts as a means of
reporting on progress and remaining accountable to investors.
The monitoring of innovation system interventions also
emphasizes the need to make information accessible to all
stakeholders involved. Information collection approaches
will need to be inclusive and transparent, and information
management systems must provide open access to all, not
just those involved in designing monitoring arrangements.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

Practitioners have become better equipped to manage the
performance of learning-based, institutional adaptation
processes and the complex impact chains that are likely to
be encountered in innovation system interventions. The
challenge of monitoring innovation system interventions is
therefore to learn how current good practice and principles
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are best deployed to meet the demands of this type of intervention. Process-oriented monitoring methods have been
around for some time, and innovation system interventions
might need to rediscover and adapt those methods rather
than reinvent them. Boxes 7.11 and 7.12 illustrate two such
methods: Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems (RAAKS) and Outcome Mapping.
Principles for selecting monitoring methods

Several principles from good practice stand out and make a
useful guide for selecting monitoring methods from among
the many that are being adapted to the learning orientation
of innovation system interventions. These principles are
particularly useful at a time when experience of monitoring
innovation system interventions remains limited. They
include the following:
■

■

■

Balance accountability and learning. Aside from collecting the data required for reporting to the investor,
implementers will need to collect monitoring data that
will help them manage the performance of their intervention. All of the methods summarized in table 7.8 support learning-based monitoring for interventions.
Make assumptions explicit, and revisit theories of
change. The greater learning orientation of monitoring
implies a need to make assumptions about change
processes explicit in planning interventions and a need
to revisit and test those assumptions. Previously practitioners tended to regard such assumptions as a given.
By exploring and responding to the validity of the
assumptions on which an intervention is based, however, implementers can improve the intervention’s
effectiveness. All of the learning-based approaches in
table 7.8 involve testing underlying assumptions. If an
intervention’s theory of change must be altered, it is
important that the investor be made aware of the
change in accountability reporting.
Incorporate different stakeholders’ perspectives. The
shift to address the question of how things happened and
to track unexpected outcomes requires a much stronger
emphasis on widening the scope of participation in
monitoring. Wider participation helps to capture the
perspectives of the poor (and other stakeholders) on the
actual effects of an intervention (social, economic, and
institutional). It also makes it possible to develop a fuller
understanding of the process through which those effects
came about. Different stakeholders may have different
interpretations of cause and effect. It is now good
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Box 7.11 Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems

A Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems
(RAAKS) focuses primarily on knowledge and information systems. The appraisal is a structured inquiry into
the social organization of innovation, based on
the inputs of those involved: the way the actors
behave, how they interact and form networks, how they
go about cooperating and communicating, what stimulates them to learn, and what blocks them from learning. Actors gain a shared understanding of their performance as innovators—their perceptions, judgments,
understanding, and capacity to take decisions and act—
and learn to contribute more effectively to innovation.
The main elements of RAAKS are as follows:
■

■

■

Strategic diagnosis. Joint definition of useful strategies through an appraisal of opportunities and
obstacles.
Creative tension. Compare and contrast the multiple findings that represent the various analytical
perspectives.
Design of solutions. Participants are encouraged to
analyze, interpret, and, based on these steps, design
potentially useful solutions.

■

■

■

■

■

Strengths
Provides insights into the social organization of
innovation and people’s values, motivations, and
reactions.
Improves the generation, exchange, and use of
knowledge and information for innovation.
Builds capacity among the actors involved by
making them conscious of their performance as
innovators.
Weaknesses
A complex methodology with a series of steps, exercises, and tools to be implemented.
A strong focus on rural activities; does not consider
the wider setting of the innovation system (actors
other than those involved in activities in the rural
domain).
Best use or application

■

Together, actors develop a common understanding
of their performance as innovators.

Source: Kammili 2011; Salomon and Engel 1997.

■

practice in monitoring to recognize these divergent perceptions. This principle extends to the need to draw on
perspectives from a wider range of stakeholders in developing the theory of change that will guide an intervention’s implementation and learning. Box 7.13 illustrates
one approach for widening participation in monitoring;
others are included in table 7.8.
Mixed methods. Expanding views of monitoring require
quantitative methods (to measure outcomes) to be combined with qualitative methods (to understand and learn
from institutional and process changes). To understand
institutional and process changes, and to establish their
causal links to outcomes and impact, monitoring will
need to place much greater emphasis on qualitative methods such as Innovation and Institutional Histories (box
7.14) or Causal Process Tracing (table 7.8). Rather than
measuring levels of income and social variables, it may be
more appropriate to use proxy indicators of changes that
will lead to these impacts in the future (for example,

changes in yields or quantities of fertilizer sold), although
these indicators contain their own assumptions about the
causal chain to impact. Data collection techniques for
tracking outcomes include small sample surveys, participatory appraisal techniques, and longitudinal household case
studies. It is important to keep these activities in proportion to the task of managing the intervention, however.
Costly and time-consuming baseline surveys do not lend
themselves to learning-based interventions for the simple
reason that they do not generate information quickly
enough to inform how an intervention is managed (see
the examples from IAPs 6 and 7).

Available monitoring methods

Table 7.8 presents the strengths and weaknesses of a range
of monitoring methods that have relevance to innovation
system interventions. These methods have a number of

MODULE 7: THEMATIC NOTE 4: MONITORING AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEM INTERVENTIONS

571

Box 7.12 Outcome Mapping

Outcome Mapping reflects the idea that development is
done by and for people. The central concept of Outcome Mapping is that development is achieved through
changes in the behavior, actions, relationships, and
activities of people, groups, and organizations with
which an intervention works directly (the “boundary
partners”). The originality of this approach stems from
the fact that there is a clear shift from measuring the
outputs of an intervention (poverty alleviation,
reduced conflict, and so forth) toward trying to assess
changes in behaviors, relationships, and actions of the
people and the organizations directly involved. By
emphasizing behavioral change, Outcome Mapping
aims to assess “contributions” to impacts rather than
claim “attribution” for impacts.
The boundary partners are identified, as are
strategies for equipping them with tools and
resources so that they can contribute to the development process. An intervention thus facilitates
changes but does not cause or control them directly.
Outcome Mapping maps how an intervention influences the roles partners play in development through
a set of graduated indicators of changed behavior. It
monitors and evaluates three elements of the intervention: behavioral changes, the strategies used by
the intervention to stimulate change among the
partners, and how the intervention functions as an
organizational unit. Through these three elements,
Outcome Mapping unites process and outcome monitoring and evaluation.

■

■

■
■

■

■

■

■

Strengths
A robust methodology that can be adapted to a
wide range of contexts. Outcome Mapping’s very
flexible approach allows it to be used as a planning or replanning tool and at the beginning or
midway through an intervention. Outcome Mapping can also be used as a monitoring approach
throughout an intervention or as a framework for
evaluation.
It complements standard approaches and thus
can be used in combination with other methodologies.
It unites process and outcome evaluation.
Monitoring provides the space for critical selfreflection and learning.
Weaknesses
Most assessment data are generated by the intervention, raising the question of whether the data are
objective (for example, failures may be whitewashed).
Uncertainties about combining Outcome Mapping
data with more quantitative data.
Lack of clarity about how to deal with and integrate
new boundary partners.
Best use or application
Satisfies the need for accountability as well as learning about the change process.

Source: Kammili 2011; Earl, Carden, and Smutylo 2001.

characteristics, discussed below, that make them different
from conventional milestone-based monitoring techniques.
The discussion provides a flavor of the new approaches to
monitoring that will be seen in the coming years in innovation system interventions.
The value added by the new monitoring techniques
reviewed in table 7.8, compared to conventional milestonebased techniques, may be summarized as follows:
1. Explanatory. A focus on reconstructing events in an
attempt to understand why a particular course of action
led to the outcomes observed or failed to achieve
expected outcomes. This understanding is important for
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innovation system interventions, in which experimentation and action learning are the main routes to success.
2. Inquisitive. Recognition of the importance of unexpected
outcomes and the need to record and learn from them.
This perspective is particularly useful in innovation system
interventions, because their process-driven nature can
lead to unanticipated outcomes that have significance.
3. Communicative and accessible. Monitoring approaches
as ways of sharing results and lessons and building a joint
understanding of events that have taken place. Making
information accessible to all stakeholders is important in
innovation systems, because it is a way that organizations
learn and improve their performance.
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Table 7.8 Overview of Methods for Monitoring AIS Interventions
Method
Innovation and
Institutional
Histories

Purpose/use

Strengths

– Understand past innovation
– Fosters discussion among stakeholders and leads to
processes and identify
reflection and learning.
institutional factors that foster – Helps build a shared vision of the future.
or hinder innovation.
– Forge a shared vision of the
future among stakeholders.
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– Guide project management,
Participatory
especially in complex
Impact Pathway
situations where innovation is
Analysis
seen as emerging from a
network.

Weaknesses

Major references

– Written accounts are based on recollections and
could be biased.
– Need skilled facilitators to help collect and analyze
the information.
– Usually takes a very long time for significant lessons
to emerge.

– Involves staff and key stakeholders of an intervention – A relatively new approach that needs to be further
in constructing impact pathways.
implemented to gauge its weaknesses.
– Includes both (1) causal chain of activities, outputs,
and outcomes that shed light on how an
intervention achieves its goals and (2) network maps
that show evolving relationships between
participants.
– Underlines the fact that innovations emerge from a
network and not a linear “pipeline.”
– Promotes reflection, self-evaluation, and learning.
– Provides a framework for carrying out actionresearch.

Douthwaite and
Ashby (2005);
Shambu Prasad,
Hall, and
Thummuru
(2006)
Douthwaite et al.
(2003)

– Regarded as not very strong for wider generalization George and
but more suited to narrow specification of the reach
Bennett (2005);
of causal propositions.
CoS-SIS (2009);
– Takes a great deal of time.
Walters and
– Not conducive to parsimonious theory and leads to
Vayda (2009)
partial, middle-range theory. It is easy to miss causal
complexity.
– Easy to lose sight of the broader context.

Causal Process
Tracing

– Well suited for complex and
long-term interventions with
systems learning goals.

– Places data and theory in close proximity. One
quickly sees what works and what does not in an
intervention’s lifetime.

Reflexive
Monitoring in
Action

– Best suited for long-term
interventions with systems
learning built into their
mandates.

– Mechanisms built into the intervention permit all
– Works in theory for long-term interventions
van Mierlo et al.
participants to contribute to learning by reflecting
oriented to systems learning, but most development
(2010)
on the relationships between key aspects and
interventions do not have the luxury of long-term
ambitions of the intervention as well as the practices
learning as the sole goal and need to demonstrate
and institutions in which they are embedded.
(developmental) impacts throughout the life of the
– Monitoring is integral to the intervention, so insights
intervention.
gained are built into and experimented with in new – A coherent set of tools and principles, but in
activities.
essence the approach is still being developed and
– Encourages investigators to look for creative
not in widespread use, so experiences from the field
solutions.
are few.
– Reflexive monitoring in an intervention ensures that
those involved develop new ways of working to
keep up with changes in the intervention’s
institutional context.

(Table continues on the following page)
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Table 7.8 Overview of Methods for Monitoring AIS Interventions (continued)
Method
Appreciative
Inquiry

Purpose/use
– Identify positive changes and
look for unexpected
outcomes.

Strengths
– Fosters learning from past and contemporary
situations.
– Opens up the possibility of looking at different
things in new places/ways.
– Interviews allow for deep connections, unexpected
learning, and a sense of empowerment.

Weaknesses
– Like Innovation and Institutional Histories, this
method can suffer from bias or incorrect reporting.

Outcome
Mapping

– Satisfy the need for
accountability as well as
learning about the process of
change.
– Especially useful for assessing
what causes change in
behavior, relationships,
activities, or actions of the
people, groups, and
organizations with whom an
intervention works directly.
– Well suited for complex and
long-term aspects of
interventions with outcomes
that are intertwined and
difficult to segregate.

– A robust methodology that can be adapted to a
wide range of contexts. Its flexible approach allows
it to be used as a planning or replanning tool, at the
beginning or midway through an intervention. It can
also be used as a monitoring approach throughout
an intervention or as a framework for evaluation.
– It can complement standard approaches and can be
used in combination with other methodologies.
– Unites process and outcome evaluation.
– Monitoring provides the required space for critical
self-reflection and learning.

– Does not replace but complements logical
Smutylo (2005);
framework analysis.
Earl, Carden, and
– Most data is self-assessment data generated by the
Smutylo (2001);
intervention, which raises the question of objectivity.
IDRC n.d.
– Unclear how to combine resulting information with
more quantitative data and how to deal with and
integrate new boundary partners.

– Enhances capacities of stakeholders (at the
organizational and individual levels) and fosters
learning.
– Helps identify unexpected changes or outcomes.
– Large amounts of information are processed, from
which negative and positive changes are deduced.
– More accessible than traditional M&E techniques; no
specific skills required to participate.

– A subjective expression of the values and concerns
of the stakeholders designated to select the stories.

Most Significant – Make sense of an
intervention’s impact and
Change
foster learning.
– With the help of all primary
stakeholders, identify the most
significant changes that have
occurred as a result of an
intervention.

Major references
Biggs (2006); Acosta
and Douthwaite
(2005); Hall,
Sulaiman,
Bezkorowajnyj
(2007)

ECDPM (2006);
IFAD (2002); Davies
(1996); Davies
and Dart (2005)

– Provides insights into the social organization of
Rapid Appraisal – Help actors as a group to
– Complex methodology with a series of steps,
innovation and people’s values, motivations, and
of Agricultural
understand their performance
exercises, and tools to implement.
reactions.
Knowledge
as innovators.
– Strong focus on rural activities does not consider
– Improves the generation, exchange, and utilization of
Systems
the wider setting of the innovation system (actors
knowledge and information for innovation.
other than those involved in activities in the rural
– Enhances capacity building of the actors involved by
domain).
making them conscious of their performance as
innovators.
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– Exchanging stories builds trust between participants; – Biased; depends on the perspective of the person
in some cases may lead to an environment
telling the story.
conducive to learning and stimulate change.
– An effective way to deal with passions and emotions
of individuals involved.
– Has the potential to stimulate change if told
correctly.
– Individual focus can translate into organizational
development.
– Not hierarchical.

Stories and
Narratives

– Shed light on the changes that
have occurred at the
individual, organizational, or
institutional level.
– Uncover intangible factors
(qualities, values, culture, and
so forth) that determine the
organization’s character.

Performance
Indicators

– Used to assess innovations for – Effective means to measure progress towards fixed
which cause and effect are
objectives.
known and can be linked
– Facilitates benchmarking comparisons over time.
through predetermined
performance indicators.

Source: Authors.

– Definition of indicators guarantees success. When
indicators are defined poorly, they are not good
measures of effectiveness.
– Predetermined indicators do not allow for
measuring unexpected changes.
– A risk that the intervention will need too many
indicators; data for some indicators may be
inaccessible or costly and impractical to measure.

Salomon and Engel
(1997); ECDPM
(2006)

Asif (2005)

World Bank (2004)
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Box 7.13 Most Significant Change: A Form of Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation

Most Significant Change (MSC) is a form of participatory monitoring and evaluation that involves many
participants in an intervention to decide what kinds of
changes need to be recorded and to analyze the information collected, which can be used to assess the intervention’s performance and impact. The approach
focuses on collecting significant change stories that
emerge from the field. Significant changes can include
changes in people’s lives and participation levels as well
as changes in the sustainability of people’s institutions
and their activities.
Together, stakeholders decide what is going to be
monitored. MSC process managers identify broad
domains of change that they assume to be important
and that should be evaluated. These domains of change
are deliberately wide and inclusive. Stakeholders identify significant changes in a particular domain of
change and justify why they think these changes are the
most significant. The stories are analyzed by stakeholders at every level (field, organization, investor, and so
on). This approach is a fairly simple way to make sense
of a large amount of information. The central aspect of
the technique is not the stories themselves but the
deliberations and dialogues surrounding their selection. If implemented successfully, MSC causes whole

teams of people to focus their attention on the intervention’s impact.
Strengths
■

■
■

■

Enhances capacities of the stakeholders (at organizational and individual levels) and fosters
learning.
Helps identify unexpected changes or outcomes.
Processes large amounts of information, from which
negative and positive changes are deduced.
More accessible than traditional techniques for
monitoring and evaluation, and requires no specific
skills to participate (everyone can tell a story).
Weaknesses

■

■

■

The approach is a subjective expression of the values
and concerns of the stakeholders designated to
select the stories.
Best use or application
To make sense of an intervention’s impact and foster
learning.
To identify the most significant changes that have
occurred as a result of an intervention, with the help
of all primary stakeholders.

Source: Kammili 2011; Davies 1996; Davies and Dart 2005.

4. Inclusive. A focus on the inclusiveness of the monitoring
process. Inclusiveness can help diffuse tensions around
the change process associated with innovation system
interventions. It is also a way of helping to build the linkages that these types of interventions need.
5. Rapid. These methods generate information quickly.
This consideration is important for innovation system
interventions, which must be nimble in responding to
unfolding events.
6. Nonexpert/open access. Methods are designed to be
used by all those involved in interventions—that is, for
self-assessment—rather than by monitoring experts.
These methods are also designed to promote access to
the information generated. Open access is important in
innovation system interventions, because managing
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performance and achieving results is the responsibility
of all those involved.
7. Tailor-made. A number of methods involve the use of
institutional change indicators. The emphasis is on developing these indicators based on the nature of the intervention being monitored. Approaches accommodate the
fact that indicators of performance are a moving target
and need to be revised constantly. Tailoring indicators in
this way is particularly suitable to the learning-based
characteristic of innovation system interventions, in
which the specific nature of the institutional change being
sought rarely can be predicted, aside from generic terms
such as the degree of participation, the strengthening
of links between stakeholders, or the inclusiveness of
decision-making processes.
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Box 7.14 Innovation and Institutional Histories

The Institutional History method helps people involved
in the innovation process construct a shared understanding of how innovation has occurred. Institutional
histories are narratives written jointly by people who
have been involved in an innovation. The history records
changes in institutional arrangements (new ways of
working) that evolve over time and facilitate the achievement of goals.
This approach highlights the importance of institutional innovations. The main idea behind these histories is to introduce institutional factors into the
legitimate narrative of success and failure in research
organizations. Histories can be written by using
interviews to construct a timeline, gain a clear understanding of roles and relationships, inquire into what
triggers or hinders successful innovations, and reflect
on failures. Lessons drawn from the analysis can be
used to improve performance.
The dialogue that is promoted between the actors
during the preparation of institutional histories can
promote learning and capacity building. The conclusions drawn can be used in subsequent planning and
help to formulate a shared vision that can catalyze

change. These experiences can then be scaled out by
disseminating the findings of the innovation
process.
Strengths
■

■

Fosters discussion among stakeholders and leads to
reflection and learning.
Helps build a shared vision of the future.

Weaknesses
■ Written accounts are based on recollections and
could be biased.
■ Skilled facilitators are needed to help assemble and
analyze the information.
■ It usually takes a long time for significant lessons to
emerge.
Best use or application
■ To understand past innovation processes and identify
institutional factors that foster or hinder innovation.
■ To forge a shared vision of the future among
stakeholders.

Source: Kammili 2011.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF MONITORING
APPROACHES

In common with all interventions, well-executed monitoring arrangements are central to the performance of innovation system interventions. Investments in developing such
arrangements will strengthen the effectiveness of investments
in achieving developmental goals and, in doing so, improve
value for money.

POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO MONITORING

A number of policy issues are important for ensuring that
monitoring delivers some of the benefits that have just been
described.
A primary concern is to improve the demarcation of
responsibilities for monitoring and evaluation. A lack of clarity on the part of investors as well as intervention implementers about the different purposes of monitoring and

evaluation and about who is responsible for each task causes
monitoring systems to underperform and results in badly
executed evaluations (see IAPs 6 and 7). These wasted
resources lead to ineffective interventions and prevent
investors from learning vital lessons for designing future
interventions. This issue is addressed easily by simply clarifying roles, responsibilities, and time frames for the separate
tasks of monitoring and evaluation.
Strengthen the capacity to implement learning-based performance management approaches. Within the agricultural
research and innovation profession such expertise is
limited. Although these skills are better developed in the
general development and rural development communities,
particularly in the nongovernmental sector, training in these
methods is needed urgently, because monitoring is the
lynchpin of effective innovation system interventions.
As a central performance management tool, monitoring
must be integrated and mainstreamed in innovation system
interventions rather than exist outside of them. Isolating
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monitoring as a specialist domain simply to satisfy the
investor, without all the intervention’s personnel taking performance management seriously, defeats the objective of an
innovation system intervention.
Investors will need to modify their expectation of accountability reporting, accepting the process nature of interventions and becoming more comfortable with institutional
change outcomes. This changed perspective places additional responsibility on the investor to ensure that impact
evaluation is undertaken in a timely fashion and in a way
that recognizes the nature of these interventions.

to adapt them to best match the performance management
demands of innovation system interventions. Practical lessons for doing so include:
■

■

LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PRACTITIONERS

Innovation system interventions demand an expanded suite
of monitoring arrangements that respond to the learningbased nature of these interventions and their primary focus
on using institutional adaptation as the foundation for
future impacts. A wide range of tools and approaches is
available; the challenge is to know which to select and how

Negotiate accountability reporting with the investor.
Learning-based monitoring generates mainly qualitative
information on processes and institutional arrangements, including unexpected outcomes. Investors may be
unfamiliar with this kind of information in accountability reporting, so it is important to discuss reporting
expectations beforehand.
Ensure that the indicators of institutional change are
specific to the particular intervention and revised
as needed. Generic institutional change indicators, such
as the degree of participation or the strengthening of
links between stakeholders, can act as guidelines for categories of institutional change that are likely to occur. In
managing the performance of an individual intervention, however, more case-specific indicators are needed.
Since the nature of institutional bottlenecks may become
apparent only as the intervention unfolds, performance

Box 7.15 Developing Institutional Change Indicators

Institutional change encompasses a very wide range of
changes, from new ways of doing things to formal policy
changes. Developing indicators can be difficult, because
decisions need to be made about what types of institutional change are important to help understand the
progress of a particular innovation system intervention.
At the same time, it is important to capture the range of
changes that an intervention is helping to stimulate,
some of which may not be expected. This last objective is
important when reporting outcomes to investors. The
DFID-funded Research Into Use program (see www
.researchintouse.com) faced this challenge. The program
recognized that institutional change would be the main
route through which it would achieve long-term
impacts, but it had no systematic mechanism for capturing evidence of those changes, nor did it have an accessible way of reporting institutional changes to its investor
other than through lengthy case studies. For this reason,
the program’s Central Research Team developed an
inventory of all institutional changes observed (IAP 7)
and categorized them as follows:

■

■
■

■
■
■
■
■
■
■

Changes in the poverty relevance of actions and
interventions.
Market-related institutional change.
New types of organizations playing new types of
roles.
Old types of organizations playing new roles.
New forms of rural credit.
Changes in agricultural research practice.
Changes in the policy-making process.
New network configurations.
Formal policy changes.
Changes in donor practice.

This practice helped identify categories of institutional change where limited progress was being
made—changes in donor practice and changes in the
policy-making process. It also helped to improve communication of the program’s progress in stimulating
institutional change, which had previously been difficult for an external audience to see.

Source: Authors and Adwera et al., forthcoming 2012.
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■

indicators will need to be revised constantly (box 7.15
illustrates institutional change indicators developed in an
innovation system intervention).
Collect data on outcomes in a timely way to contribute to
the intervention’s learning cycles, with due attention to
the approach and scale of data collection. Quantitative
methods are likely to play a role in collecting outcome or
proxy outcome information to understand the effectiveness of process changes brought about by an intervention.
The approach and scale of this data collection need to
be in proportion to implementers’ need to manage the

■

performance of the intervention and ensure that it is on
track to achieve its agreed outcomes. Implementers should
guard against collecting impact evaluation data. This timeconsuming activity will not necessarily provide data at the
appropriate time to manage an intervention successfully.
Revisit milestones and expected outcomes. Learningbased interventions may evolve. Their evolution will lead
to unexpected outcomes and modified theories of
change. It is important to make the investor aware of
these changes and negotiate how new milestones and
outcomes will be reported.
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T H E M AT I C N O T E 5

Evaluating Agricultural Innovation System Interventions
Andy Hall, LINK Ltd.
Kumuda Dorai, LINK Ltd.
Trish Kammili, National Institute for Agricultural Research, France (INRA)

SYNOPSIS

he evaluation of innovation system interventions is
linked to the monitoring of interventions but is a
separate function. Evaluation is usually performed
on behalf of the investor by independent evaluators and not by
those responsible for implementing the intervention. A welldesigned evaluation is particularly important for innovation
system interventions, as their process-driven nature means
that the result chains are complex, dynamic, and not amenable
to simple linear and anecdotal evaluation. Great care is needed
in making judgments about the relationship between the
effectiveness of the design and execution of the intervention
and the observed impacts associated with it. Evaluation good
practice is better equipped than ever to deal with this complexity. This note outlines key good practice principles relevant to evaluating innovation system interventions: a stronger
learning orientation in evaluation, the use of counterfactuals,
the use of mixed (quantitative and qualitative) methods, and
incorporating the perspectives of different stakeholders. The
example of Theory-Based Impact Evaluation (TBIE) illustrates how these principles work together. Experience with
applying evaluation approaches and principles to agricultural
innovation system interventions is currently in its infancy. A
policy priority is to develop the capacity for this type of evaluation, which will help to improve the long-term effectiveness
of innovation system interventions.

T

Monitoring—the effective management of performance
by implementers to achieve desired outcomes and report
progress—is covered in TN 4.
Three critical features of AIS interventions influence
how they are evaluated. First, they focus on strengthening
capacity; second, they use a learning-based process; and
third, they require a distinction to be made between
impact, shared impacts, unexpected impacts, and unrelated
impacts. Each of these issues is discussed next.
A focus on strengthening capacity

An innovation system intervention is an investment to
improve how change and innovation take place. Although
such an investment is made ultimately to achieve certain
social, economic, or environmental impacts, the immediate outcome is improved ways of doing things—usually
referred to as institutional change. For example, the
National Agricultural Innovation Project in India established research, development, and private sector consortia
around selected themes to introduce a new way of working that would achieve wide-scale impact in the future
(see module 4, IAP 2). An innovation systems research
project addressing fodder scarcity in West Africa and
India (the Fodder Innovation Project, described in IAP 6)
experimented with ways to induce institutional change
that would enable innovation leading to social and economic impacts.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The effectiveness of innovation system interventions lies
in their outcomes and impacts being investigated thoroughly and the resulting lessons applied to future investments. This process contributes to accountability as well
as future investment performance. This note focuses
on the evaluation of innovation system interventions.
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A learning-based intervention process

Improvements in how change and innovation take place will
depend on the specific circumstances of each intervention.
For this reason, ways of achieving those improvements are
hard to design in advance. Innovation system interventions
address this issue by adopting a learning-based approach,

in which the intervention continuously tests the assumptions on which it is based (its intervention logic). Over the
course of the intervention, investors’ expectations of what
the intervention is going to achieve, and how it will do so,
often need to evolve significantly. For example, an intervention in Sierra Leone (IAP 1) designed to help put agricultural
research results into use began by trying to establish innovation platforms around commodity chains. It soon found that
the main bottlenecks to research use and innovation were
policy issues in the enabling environment for innovation.
Distinguishing impact, shared impacts, unexpected
impacts, and unrelated impacts

By definition, innovation system interventions operate
within an often complex web of activity. Much of this wider
set of events is beyond the control and influence of the
intervention, but the performance of the intervention itself
is often greatly influenced by this context. While the immediate outcomes of an intervention—for example, the establishment of innovation platforms (see module 4, particularly TN 1)—can be evaluated easily, it is more difficult to
attribute impacts to those platforms. The causal chain from
intervention to impact is often complex, may take time to
mature, and might be geographically removed from the
point of intervention. As a result, tracing and attributing
impact are difficult.
In India, for example, the Fodder Innovation Project (see
IAP 6) introduced an institutional change, in which an
NGO helped the National Department of Animal Husbandry use its resources to hold livestock health camps in
villages. Can the resulting impact be attributed solely to the
intervention that supported the NGO to explore institutional change? In Nigeria, the Fodder Innovation Project led
to an unexpected outcome: An NGO and the local livestock
research institute collaborated on animal disease surveillance, an activity that was outside the scope of the project’s
mandate to focus on fodder but was likely to lead to important future impacts. Finally, since complex impact chains
can often mask underlying causal processes, there is the
danger that impacts may be attributed to an intervention
when in fact they arose from unrelated events.
INVESTMENT NEEDED

Viewed from the perspective of traditional approaches to
assessing the impacts of agricultural research investments
(see box 7.16), designing approaches for evaluating innovation system interventions seems daunting. Traditional

approaches relied on (1) technology adoption studies, (2)
investigation of economic surplus generated by research and
computation of rates of return, and (3) economic studies of
the contribution of research to impact. While these
approaches are powerful (see Evenson, Waggoner, and Ruttan 1979; Pardey and Beintema 2001; Alston et al. 1995), a
persistent critique is that they have weak diagnostic value.
Their inability to elucidate underlying causal processes and
account for institutional change are particular weaknesses
(Hall et al. 2003; Horton and Mackay 2003; Watts et al. 2003).
In contrast, the wider development evaluation tradition
is well equipped to deal with the investigation of causal links
between dynamic theories of change and impacts of the sort
likely to be encountered in innovation system interventions
(see, for example, the guidance on impact evaluations in
NONIE, Leeuw, and Vaessen 2009). The challenge is mainly
to understand how current good practice in the wider development evaluation community can be more widely
deployed in the evaluation of innovation system interventions. Of particular relevance is the recent focus on evaluations that link the assessment of outcomes and impacts
(what were the end results) with learning (what processes
and practices brought about those results) (Savedoff,
Levine, and Birdsall 2006; White 2009a).
Principles for evaluation

Emerging from this trend is a set of principles that practitioners can draw upon in evaluating innovation system
interventions. These are now general principles for all types
of evaluations.
■

■

Situational responsiveness influences the design of the
evaluation. Referred to as “situational responsiveness,”
the key principle involves matching the design to the
needs, constraints, and opportunities of the particular situation rather than one particular method. The application of this principle rests on understanding the characteristics of an intervention or parts of it and determining
where the underlying change processes are simple, complicated, or complex.
Seek a stronger learning orientation in impact evaluation. A number of new initiatives—notably the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3IE) but also
others—have stressed the need to combine accountability and learning objectives. Learning is important for
identifying what worked or did not work and why, and
this information is valuable for designing future investments. While this perspective emphasizes the need for
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Box 7.16 Limitations of Traditional Methods for Evaluating Innovation System Interventions in Agriculture

■

■

■

■

Ex post impact assessment
Although it addresses the accountability imperative
for funders of interventions, it does not help in
drawing the institutional lessons required to understand the innovation process. Does not cover
noneconomic dimensions.
Difficult to develop credible counterfactuals and
establish definitive causalities.
Focuses on intended positive results and frequently
ignores unexpected and negative results.
Not appropriate in more complex areas such as natural resource management, policy and biodiversity
research, and training and capacity building.

■

■

■

■

■

Cost-benefit analysis
Calls upon significant financial and human
resources.
Benefits are estimated in advance based on assumptions that may not always be correct.
Not all costs and benefits can be quantified (social
and environmental costs/benefits, for example);
results obtained do not reflect all benefits.
Items included in the analysis reflect the bias of
whoever performs the analysis; coverage and quality
thus vary greatly.
Given its complexity, involves only economists and
project designers and does not engage other primary
stakeholders.

Randomized control trials
■

■

■

Weak in external validity (or generalizability) and in
identifying the mechanisms responsible for differences observed in the experimental and control situations.
Rarely appropriate in complex situations where outcomes arise as result of interactions of multiple factors that cannot be “controlled.”
Limited in their ability to deal with emerging and
unanticipated outcomes.

Economic surplus approach and rate of return
studies
■

■

■

Requires substantial resources for collecting, processing, and interpreting technical and economic
data.
Simplistic assumptions about lags, costs, and supply
shifts have biased rates of return (usually upwards).
Not suitable for ranking noncommodity research
such as socioeconomic and interdisciplinary research.

Source: Kammili 2011.

■

■
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rigor in measuring impact, it also explicitly acknowledges the need to test interventions’ assumptions and
theories of change (White 2009a). For details, see the
example of Theory-Based Impact Evaluation in box 7.19.
Make assumptions explicit and revisit theories of
change. Adopting a greater learning orientation in evaluation means making assumptions about change
processes explicit when planning interventions and
revisiting and testing those assumptions at the time of
evaluation. By exploring the validity of the assumptions,
evaluators can learn critical lessons for designing future
interventions (box 7.19).
Use counterfactuals in impact evaluation. A stronger
learning orientation has also been accompanied by
demands for greater rigor in the quantitative methods
used to measure impacts, as well as for methods that better establish what would have happened without a par-

■

ticular intervention—the counterfactual. The best way to
achieve this goal is still a point of debate (see box 7.17 for
details on the challenges involved). Box 7.18 provides an
example of Propensity Score Matching, one approach to
developing a counterfactual case.
Mixed methods. Quantitative methods (to measure
impacts) clearly are central to investigating impacts,
but they must be complemented by a range of qualitative methods (to understand and learn from institutional and process changes) that can help to understand
the context in which the intervention took place and
the process to which the intervention contributed that
brought about those impacts. Practitioners can draw
upon a very wide array of qualitative methods, and the
combination of methods selected depends considerably on the nature of the intervention and the precise
demands of evaluation functions. (For a discussion of
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Box 7.17 Challenges of Developing Counterfactuals

The origins of counterfactuals can be traced to scientific experiments conducted with a control, the classic
example being the randomized control trials used in
drug testing. This approach poses ethical and operational problems that make it impractical for development interventions.
Another approach, “before” and “after” comparisons, struggles to account for changes that would
have happened despite the intervention. Variants of
this approach have been developed, however, which
compare the effects of an intervention that starts in
different places at different times. “With” and “with-

out” comparisons appear more promising for capturing the counterfactual case, particularly when used in
conjunction with statistical techniques that account
for differences between the starting conditions in
comparator sites.
The establishment of counterfactuals remains an
evolving science for the evaluation community. Despite
the challenges, mechanisms for establishing what
would have happened in the absence of an intervention
should be built into the overall design of interventions
and the monitoring and evaluation arrangements that
are put into place for them.

Source: Authors.

Box 7.18 Propensity Score Matching

Propensity Score Matching is a tool for identifying
a suitable group with which the recipients of an
intervention (the treatment group) can be compared. Evaluators find a comparison group comprising individuals who did not, in fact, receive the
intervention but who, given their observable characteristics, had the same probability of receiving it
as individuals in the treatment group. The intervention’s impact is the difference in outcomes
between the treatment and comparison group.
Source: World Bank 2004.

■

mixed methods in Theory-Based Impact Evaluation,
see box 7.19.)
Incorporate different stakeholders’ perspectives. Greater
participation is needed to capture the perspectives of
the poor (and other stakeholders) on what were the
actual results of the intervention (social, economic,
and institutional). Similarly, wider participation is
needed to more fully understand the process through
which these results came about. Different stakeholders
may have different interpretations of cause and effect.
It is now good practice in evaluation to recognize these
divergent perceptions. This principle extends to the
need to draw on perspectives from a wider range of

stakeholders in investigating the intervention’s theory
of change.
Evaluation approaches

Table 7.9 presents a comparative overview of evaluation
approaches appropriate to the demands of innovation system interventions. In different ways and with different
emphases, these methods use the principles discussed in this
note. They should be viewed as a menu of approaches which
practitioners can draw upon to ensure that evaluations
achieve the correct balance between learning and accountability. There are a number of points that need to be highlighted about these methods. Only the first method mentioned, Theory-Based Impact Evaluation, explicitly makes
provisions for measuring outcomes and investigating
underlying process. In reality, Theory-Based Impact Evaluation is an evaluation framework rather than a specific
method, and it relies on a suite of qualitative tools.
The other methods outlined in table 7.9 are specific tools
for qualitative investigation of what happened and what
processes lead to the outcomes observed. While these methods for learning lessons are powerful, practitioners must
recognize that there is an appetite among investors—public
and private—for the quantification of outcomes and
impacts. The nascent approaches to evaluating innovation
system interventions will need to satisfy this demand.
The least developed of the methods presented in table 7.9
is benchmarking of innovation capacity. An important area
of methodological development is to find measures of
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Box 7.19 Theory-Based Impact Evaluation

Theory-based Impact Evaluation (TBIE) is advocated
for understanding why an intervention has or has not
had an impact. The approach calls for examining and
mapping the causal chain of an intervention—from
inputs to outcomes and impact—to test the underlying
assumptions and shed light on the “why” question.
TBIE involves six steps:
1. Map the causal chain. The causal chain links inputs
to outcomes and impacts. It is the intervention’s theory of change, which explains how the intervention is
expected to have its intended impact. Testing assumptions is central to a theory-based approach. One criticism of the causal chain approach is that it is static
and does not account for an intervention’s ability to
adapt and evolve—an important consideration for
innovation system interventions. This criticism is
addressed in TBIE by suggesting that the intervention
theory should reflect the new design, and the evaluation should document the learning process that
resulted in the new design. In this way, the intervention theory remains dynamic. Another criticism is
that it misses unintended consequences, which is
addressed by identifying those consequences through
a careful application of intervention theory, fed by
thorough preliminary fieldwork, and using the resulting information to develop new theories of change.
2. Understand the context. Clearly, understanding the
context is crucial to understanding its impact and in
designing the evaluation, as context influences how
the causal chain plays out.
3. Anticipate heterogeneity. Understanding the context also makes it possible to design the evaluation
to anticipate possible variation in impacts (arising
from how the intervention is designed, the characteristics of the beneficiaries, varied socioeconomic
settings, and so on).
4. Conduct a rigorous evaluation of impact using a
credible counterfactual. The appropriate counterfactual is most usually defined with reference to a
control group, which has to be identified in a way
that avoids selection bias, meaning the use of either
experimental or quasi-experimental approaches.
Panel data help to strengthen the design, so baselines
are encouraged. Where they are not available, they
might be recreated using existing data sets or recall.
In addition to selection bias, important issues to

consider in the design are the possibility of spillover
effects (the control is affected by the intervention)
and contagion or contamination (the control is
affected by other interventions).
5. Conduct a rigorous factual analysis. The counterfactual analysis of impact needs to be supplemented
by rigorous factual analysis of various kinds, given
that many links in the causal chain are based on factual analysis. Targeting analysis is the most common
form of factual analysis: Who benefits from the intervention? To the extent that there is a defined target
group, then what is the extent of the targeting errors?
Such errors can be quantified and their source identified. Factual analysis often highlights a crucial
break in the causal chain and explains low impact.
6. Use mixed methods. A major step toward mixed
methods is to increase the use of rigorous quantitative methods in qualitative studies (quantitative
analysis informed by qualitative insight) or the use
of qualitative data in quantitative studies. Without
qualitative methods, the danger is that researchers
will conduct impact studies with no exposure at all
to the intervention.
■

■

■

■

■

■
■

■

Strengths
The combination of counterfactual impact estimates with detailed exploration of causal links and
theories of change has the potential to provide compelling lessons and evidence.
Lessons gleaned from TBIE are valuable in trying to
understand what works in development.
Far more valuable lessons for policy are obtained
through the insights on what doesn’t work in interventions.
Weaknesses
Not yet in widespread use, so experiences are
limited.
Construction of a robust counterfactual can be
challenging.
Data-intensive.
Expensive, although good value for money if well
executed.
Best use or application
An evaluation tool best suited to investigating
impacts and undertaking policy learning in largescale interventions.

Source: White 2009b and authors.
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innovation system performance at the macro level that rely
on indicators of system behavior and functions rather than
on input indicators such as research spending.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Effective evaluation is central to improving the performance of investments in current and future innovation system interventions. Well-designed evaluations of innovation
system interventions are particularly important because
their process-driven nature means that the result chains are
complex, dynamic, and not amenable to simple, linear,
anecdotal evaluation. Great care is needed in making judgments about the relationship between the effectiveness of
an intervention’s design and execution and the observed
impacts associated with the intervention. Consequently the
evaluation of innovation system interventions is likely to be
expensive but will be an important investment in strengthening the long-term performance of these interventions.
POLICY ISSUES

Policy issues related to the evaluation of innovation system
interventions are partly but not entirely similar to those
for monitoring (see TN 4).
One similarity is the need to build capacity in evaluating
innovation system interventions. Experience with these
sorts of evaluations remains limited, because innovation
system interventions are relatively recent. Nor are many
investors familiar with the evaluation principles and
approaches applicable to those interventions. Professional
evaluators from the wider development community do
have experience in applying these principles, but there is a
need to develop a new cadre of evaluators with experience
in applying them to AIS interventions.
A second policy priority is to clearly demarcate responsibilities for monitoring and evaluation. Investors need to make
a very clear distinction between evaluation and monitoring
and not be tempted to include the collection of impact evaluation data within the intervention. This point is particularly important for innovation system interventions, because
the ultimate impacts may not emerge until some time after
the intervention ends.
Third, sufficient resources must be available to use a combination of evaluation methods. The evaluation of innovation system interventions requires greater rigor in measuring impacts, investigating result chains, and testing the
validity of theories of change. Inevitably, evaluations will
take longer and cost more. Investors need to plan ahead and

put sufficient money aside for evaluation when planning
new innovation system interventions.
Finally, over and above the evaluation of individual
interventions, investors will increasingly need to benchmark
innovation capacity developed in sectors and subsectors
through innovation system interventions. International
investors may also wish to use benchmarking to make international comparisons. These comparisons are needed to
track macro-level progress and to help target subsectors,
sectors, and countries for investments to strengthen innovation capacity or for other investments that require certain
levels of innovation capacity as a precondition. A number of
methodological challenges in measuring and comparing
context-specific and systemic capacities of this sort remain
to be addressed, however.
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PRACTITIONERS

The main lessons and recommendations for practitioners
mirror the principles of good practice outlined earlier. A
description of Theory-Based Impact Evaluation (box 7.19)
illustrates how these good practice principles and the methods associated with them work together to ensure that the
evaluation of innovation system interventions contains
accountability and learning dimensions.
The evaluation of innovation system interventions
should give particular attention to the following:
■

■

■

Timing of evaluations. While many innovation system
interventions will have quick wins, most impacts will
emerge only much later as institutional change kicks in,
creating new capacities for innovation. While process
and institutional change evaluation can take place
shortly after the completion of an intervention, impact
evaluation can take place only after sufficient time has
passed, often 3–5 years later.
Looking widely for impact. The evolving nature of interventions means that outcomes and impacts can be
unpredictable, both in the types of impact observed and
their geographical and social location. Evaluation needs
to be sensitive to this unpredictability.
Investigating unexpected outcomes. Since innovation
system interventions operate in dynamic environments, changes and unexpected outcomes can occur
that have significance for impacts or can provide
opportunities for new investments. These unexpected
outcomes need to be recorded and investigated for any
lessons they provide.
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Table 7.9 Evaluation Approaches Relevant to Innovation System Interventions
Method

Purpose/use

Strengths

Weaknesses

Major references

Theory-based
Impact Evaluation

– Helps in understanding why a
program has or has not had
impact.
– Best suited to investigating
impacts and undertaking policy
learning in large-scale
investments.

– A combination of counterfactual-based impact estimates
with a detailed exploration of causal links and theories of
change has the potential to provide compelling lessons and
evidence.
– Lessons gleaned from such an exercise are valuable in
trying to understand what works in development.
– Offers far more valuable lessons for policy through its
insights on what doesn’t work in development.

– Not yet in widespread use, so
experience limited.
– Construction of a robust
counterfactual can be challenging.
– Data-intensive.
– Expensive, though good value for
money if well executed.

White (2009b)

Innovation and
Institutional
Histories

– Understand past innovation
processes and identify
institutional factors that foster
or hinder innovation.
– Forge a shared vision of the
future among stakeholders.

– Fosters discussion among stakeholders and leads to
reflection and learning.
– Helps build a shared vision of the future.

– Written accounts are based on
recollections and could be biased.
– Need skilled facilitators to help
collect and analyze the information.
– Usually takes a very long time for
significant lessons to emerge.

Douthwaite and
Ashby (2005);
Shambu Prasad,
Hall, and
Thummuru
(2006)

Participatory
Impact Pathway
Analysis

– Guide project management,
especially in complex situations
where innovation is seen as
emerging from a network.

– Involves intervention staff and key stakeholders in
constructing impact pathways.
– Includes both (1) a causal chain of activities, outputs, and
outcomes that sheds light on how an intervention achieves
its goals and (2) network maps that show evolving
relationships between participants.
– Underlines the fact that innovations emerge from a
network and not a linear “pipeline.”
– Promotes reflection, self-evaluation, and learning.
– Provides a framework for carrying out
action-research.

– A relatively new approach that needs
to be further implemented to gauge
its weaknesses.

Douthwaite et al.
(2003)

Causal Process
Tracing

– Well suited for complex, longterm interventions with
systems learning goals.

– Places data and theory in close proximity. One quickly
sees what works and what does not in an intervention’s
lifetime.

– Regarded as not very strong for
wider generalization but more suited
to narrow specification of the reach
of causal propositions.
– Takes a great deal of time.
– Not conducive to parsimonious
theory and leads to partial, middlerange theory. It is easy to miss causal
complexity.
– Easy to lose sight of the broader
context.

George and
Bennett (2005);
CoS-SIS (2009);
Walters and
Vayda (2009)
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Most Significant
Change

– Make sense of an intervention’s
impact and foster learning.
– With the help of all primary
stakeholders, identify the most
significant changes that have
occurred as a result of an
intervention.

– Enhances capacities of stakeholders (at the organizational
and individual levels) and fosters learning.
– Helps identify unexpected changes or outcomes.
– Large amounts of information are processed, from which
negative and positive changes are deduced.
– More accessible than traditional M&E techniques; no
specific skills required to participate.

– A subjective expression of the values
and concerns of the stakeholders
designated to select the stories.

ECDPM (2006);
IFAD (2002);
Davies and
Dart (2005)

Stories and
Narratives

– Shed light on the changes that
have occurred at the individual,
organizational, or institutional
level.
– Uncover intangible factors
(qualities, values, culture, and
so forth) that determine the
organization’s character.

– Exchanging stories builds trust between participants; in
some cases may lead to an environment conducive to
learning and stimulate change.
– An effective way to deal with passions and emotions of
individuals involved.
– Has the potential to stimulate change if told correctly.
– Individual focus can translate into organizational
development.
– Not hierarchical.

– Biased; depends on the perspective
of the person telling the story.

Asif (2005)

Benchmarking
Innovation
Capacity

– More than just evaluating
individual interventions. Can
help investors benchmark the
performance of sectors and
subsectors in terms of capacity
built for innovation.

– Can be useful in tracking macro-level progress and to help
target subsectors, sectors, and countries for investment in
capacity strengthening or for investments that require
certain levels of capacity as a precondition.

– Methodologies still being developed.

CPR, CRISP, and
LINK (2008);
Kraemer-Mbula
(2012
forthcoming);
Spielman and
Birner (2008)

Source: Authors.
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Acting on evaluation lessons. Investors must be willing
to act upon the lessons that emerge from evaluations of
their innovation system interventions. This can be easier
said than done when lessons point investors away from
traditional approaches and the interests of stakeholders
associated with them. One approach that investors
increasingly use to bolster their confidence in emerging
lessons is to use systematic reviews of similar projects to
test key assumptions about suggested ways forward.

The principles outlined in this module and the evaluation approaches summarized in table 7.9 are well known to
professional evaluators in the wider development evaluation community. What is important is that investors commission evaluations that embody these principles and select
evaluators with experience in applying them. In the short
term, they probably must look beyond the pool of evaluators who have undertaken traditional assessments of the
impact of agricultural research investments.
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Self-Organizing Networks in Policy and Planning:
Experience from Sierra Leone’s Partnership for
Agricultural Innovation and Development
Steen Joffe, Innodev Ltd.
David Suale, Research Into Use (RIU)
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SYNOPSIS OF PROJECT DATA

Project name:
Established:

Incorporated:
Launched:

Sierra Leone Partnership for Agricultural
Innovation and Development (SL-PAID)
July 2008 by Memorandum of Association, in a process facilitated by the DFIDfinanced Research Into Use Programme
August 2008 in Sierra Leone as Company
Limited by Guarantee
January 2009

Many research agencies in sub-Saharan Africa have
evolved little over recent decades, are institutionally hidebound, and have little accountability to other elements of
the innovation system. Priority-setting mechanisms that
shape investments in the AIS still tend to be formal, generally top-down exercises. They lack the sort of broad-based,
“many-to-many” problem-solving exchanges that are essential drivers of innovation.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

For Sierra Leone, the period of rapid change following the
disastrous 1991–2002 war has provided opportunities to
rebuild and reinvent institutional frameworks supporting
agriculture. The country’s new vision for agriculture
requires the sector to shift toward a pluralistic and competitive rural service economy, with agribusiness acting as an
engine of socioeconomic growth and development. For that
vision to become a reality, a stream of new policy, process,
and technological innovations must be created. Although
inside or outside of Sierra Leone there is no shortage of
knowledge relevant to Sierra Leone’s current needs, this
knowledge is not yet used on any scale for innovation,
because the conditions to use it are lacking.
In a well-functioning AIS, knowledge flows between all
the principle domains, underpinning myriad investment
decisions and behavior changes that collectively drive productivity and growth. In Sierra Leone, as in many lowincome development contexts, these flows and interactions
around problems and opportunities are weak and have historically taken place within a limited institutional context.

Within the Research Into Use Programme (IAP 7), a
country strategy team worked with local stakeholders in
Sierra Leone to develop an innovative strategy for an
autonomous, self-organizing group to develop as a platform for improving policy and practice related to agricultural innovation (Joffe et al. 2008). This open, inclusive
network would be a medium for creating new productive
alliances and creating value.
As a first step, the team worked through a local secretariat
to bring key actors together in a series of workshops, ensuring participation across the innovation system. Participants
included farmers, farmer-based organizations, and representatives of rural communities; agribusiness and market
actors (processors, wholesalers, retailers, input companies,
equipment suppliers, and financial service providers);
knowledge intermediaries, including technical advisory and
business development services; communications services
and the media; knowledge generators (research, education,
and other widely used sources); and policy makers, decision
makers, and regulators with influence over “framework
conditions.”
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The participants used innovation system mapping techniques to visualize the main elements and actors in the AIS
and the strength of the linkages and knowledge flows
between them. More specifically, they assessed and mapped
knowledge flows between elements of the system and the
factors influencing these flows in relation to rural and nonrural livelihoods and routes out of poverty. They also identified key drivers of change in the context for agricultural
policies and programs and determined where investments
and other economic activities were likely to create new challenges and demands for knowledge. This process required
participants to develop an initial map of the key institutional elements and organizations relating to the AIS, which
was transposed into a more formalized innovation system
domain structure. Next, the participants worked in groups
to map linkages between those domains. The subsequent
analysis and discussion highlighted a number of findings:
■

■

■

■

■

Weak or ineffective knowledge flows from markets into
the small-farm sector resulted in asymmetries that led to
exploitive behavior.
Very unidirectional and supply-driven knowledge flows
from intermediaries and from policy processes into the
small-farm sector led to coordination problems and high
transaction costs (see the next point).
Formal policy processes were poorly linked with other
key innovation system elements. Weaknesses at the center and coordination problems limited the public sector’s
effectiveness.
Weak links between financial institutions and other elements of the AIS meant that formal lenders lacked information to support credit flows to rural entrepreneurs.
The research system had poor links with all other actors
in the AIS. It did not deliver knowledge oriented towards
value addition in the market chain, and a lack of trust
persisted between researchers and actors in the production and agribusiness “side” of the sector.

As a result of the workshops and related meetings, a core
group of actors decided to organize and form a partnership.
Through flexible alliances, members would engage in innovative activities and build a better business environment to
foster and scale out those activities. The Partnership for
Agricultural Innovation and Development (PAID), established in Freetown in 2008, now operates autonomously as
a “partnership of service-providers,” open to all who subscribe to its vision and mission.
Under a Memorandum of Association, PAID has a
general assembly of all members, a board (elected by the
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members and mandated to manage the affairs of the partnership), and a secretariat (responsible for day-to-day operations, coordination, and administration). In summary, the
association’s defining features are that it is self-governing,
membership-based and has a broad, representative membership; it is financed through subscriptions; it receives
broad support from the Government of Sierra Leone and
principal agencies; and it is embedded in key policy forums.
BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE TO DATE

PAID is a young organization but already operates successfully in a number of key respects. PAID members have formulated and voted on appropriate governance structures,
rules, norms, and the interaction mechanisms required for
PAID to operate effectively as a vehicle for delivering innovations in the agricultural sector. Under rules established by
the membership, “formal” interaction in PAID is collective
and consensual. Strategic decisions are made or endorsed by
the general membership at the annual general meeting.
Operational decisions are taken at the district level and at
events held at the platform level.
The organization has also launched two fast-track, commodity-based innovation platforms. These initial platforms
were selected based on information from field assessments
by or with the participation of PAID member organizations:
■

■

Solar drying in fruit and other horticultural value
chains. Twenty solar drying units operate in communities in four districts in the Northern Province; early
reports indicate that they are used successfully.
Poultry feed production and marketing. Maize is being
grown on 110 acres (46 hectares) across locations in Bo,
Kenema, and Kailahun Districts for a seed multiplication
drive and eventual use for feed in intensive poultry production systems.

The platforms have spun off active partnerships with
other actors who want to adopt platform technology,
including CARE International, MADAM-Sierra Leone, the
Sierra Leone Centre for Agribusiness Development, and the
Nehemiah Project. To guide future priorities for developing
platforms, PAID has documented a more structured
approach consisting of open calls for proposals, concept
screening, investment events, and small grants for opportunity development.
Membership in PAID makes it easier for people and organizations to obtain information to guide choices, gain support
for their decisions, and build alliances. Typically, information
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flows informally among the wide range of stakeholders present at key events and meetings, including stakeholders from
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, other central and district government agencies, FAO, DFID, the Sierra
Leone Agricultural Research Institute, banks, farmer organizations, civil society and nongovernmental organizations, producers, processors, traders, and transporters.
PAID also has a place on the Agriculture Advisory Group
and Technical Committee, a formal, policy-making standing
committee that was involved in developing Sierra Leone’s
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme compact and National Sustainable Agricultural
Development Plan, linked to the national poverty reduction
strategy. PAID has also brought together actors in extension
to form the Sierra Leone Forum for Agricultural Advisory
Services. Stakeholders in this process identified gaps in
extension services; as a result, a policy on extension in Sierra
Leone is being developed. Finally, PAID members in Bo District raised concern over the activity of a fraudulent actor in
their region. This concern was channeled to the secretariat
and brought to the notice of ministry officials. The situation
was corrected.

collective intelligence around investment decisions.
Within the social business paradigm, boundaries between
public, private, and third sector roles begin to break down
for practical purposes. Similarly, boundaries between policy and practice and between planning and delivery are no
longer necessarily institutionally or organizationally distinct; these activities are undertaken instead by individuals
and groups applying creative and flexible solutions to
common problems across organizational boundaries, representing particular interests and competencies in pursuit
of value-creating opportunities. These approaches are
already driving transformational change in more advanced
economies and may be equally transformational in developing country contexts.

LESSONS AND ISSUES FOR WIDER
APPLICATION

Within the PAID network, a number of early decisions were
highly influential in building social capital and reducing
transaction costs.
Network membership and the role of facilitation

INNOVATIVE ELEMENT: SOCIAL BUSINESS
NETWORKS FOR INNOVATION SYSTEMS

From a public policy perspective, the means to foster innovation often focus on improving linkages and flows of
information between actors and interests. For this reason,
governments offer incentives for innovative businesses to
locate in clusters (see TN 4 in module 5), where their close
association can generate a variety of spillover benefits and
externalities. Governments also subsidize interactions by
organizing events and meetings around key policy areas in
which the state wishes to drive innovation that the market
alone may not deliver.
These strategies are valid but require complementary
approaches to enable the “conversation” that will support
policy and practice. The new frontier for agencies wishing to
support the AIS—rather than supporting priority-setting
processes alone—is to foster self-organizing social business
networks (see TN 2 in module 1). Such networks respond to
the interests of a diverse group of stakeholders and can
operate flexibly and dynamically in light of demands and
opportunities identified by their membership.
This general model is well established as a way to organize innovation in industry, where social business design
approaches, increasingly underpinned by new social media
tools and engagement strategies, are used to harness

Members decided that the partnership would be
autonomous and establish its own secretariat, membership would be open to those who subscribed to the partnership’s vision, and organizations would be represented
by senior representatives with decision-making power.
Membership also would be open to service providers of
various kinds, in agriculture and agribusiness. An elected
executive would represent the partnership between general meetings, a general code of conduct would be
drafted and agreed, and the network would be financially
independent and sustainable. In addition to charging
registration and annual subscription fees, the network
would raise financing independently and develop revenues from innovative activities. Revenue would not only
sustain the partnership but serve as an incentive for
membership.
The network was able to come to these decisions because
of the initial investment by key actors in facilitating a core
understanding and common vision of the network’s role.
Members’ early involvement in decisions on structure and
governance increased confidence and promoted engagement. Higher levels of trust and reduced transaction costs
have enabled PAID to rely more on signals through the
internal “knowledge market” and less on formal prioritysetting mechanisms.
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Existing sector frameworks are still needed

Networks for innovation are not a replacement for or an alternative to existing sector-wide and/or vertical subsector frameworks. Such frameworks are still needed to provide the formal process and democratic accountability around policy
and practice. Networks like PAID bridge such frameworks,
providing an opportunity for more flexible and less formal
interaction within a different institutional paradigm.
For networks like PAID, engagement with government is
important but should be balanced to avoid prejudicing the network’s independence and openness in decision making. Attaining such a balance can be tricky. For example, Rwanda’s
National Innovation Coalition is restricted to a few public
sector bodies. Plans to establish another separate and more
open agricultural innovation network attracted no highlevel support and were never implemented. In Bolivia, the
Natural Resources Information and Knowledge Network
(SICTAF, Sistema de Información y Conocimiento Tecnológico Agropecuario y Forestal) explored establishing
itself as a self-governing, socially inclusive knowledge network. The responsible ministry was unable to engage
productively with such a network other than as its apex
institution, however; it never accepted that the network
could operate within a self-defined governance framework.
This lack of formal support was a key reason why the initiative foundered.
One lesson from this diverse experience is that the open,
“flat,” nonhierarchical structure that favors innovation is not
always consistent with established ways of doing government
business. Indeed, where coalitions are facilitated to promote
AIS they can end up reinforcing existing networks rather
than bringing in new voices and influences on policy.
Financial sustainability

As always, financial sustainability remains a major consideration. The facilitation, coordination, and “market research”
underpinning the creation of PAID in Sierra Leone were
financed by DFID, along with the core administration and
personnel costs. This initial subsidy is very likely to be a
generic requirement for such networks, but it should be
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provided only in the context of a strategy and path towards
financial independence. As noted, PAID’s member organizations pay a registration fee and annual subscription
(approximately US$30 and US$150, respectively) to support
core network costs.

Improving linkages and working relationships
between research and the business sector

Many networks dissolve because members perceive little
real value in participating. A key lesson from Sierra Leone
and elsewhere is to provide pathways to see initiatives
through and gain the rewards of participation, both professional and financial. In practical terms, this means that the
network should offer a framework for adaptive research,
enterprise development, and scaling out innovations.
“Pull” mechanisms such as innovation-financing events
and competitions and related processes will help to seed
ideas and new enterprises out of the network. For one of its
members, the Sierra Leone Agricultural Research Institute,
PAID acts as a new framework for improving linkages and
working relationships between research and the business sector. The network also serves as a channel to bring technologies already developed by the institute into use and for the
institute to “plug in” to the new priorities emerging from
innovation platforms.
PAID’s continuing heavy reliance on transmitting information directly through meetings and field operations
raises costs and is one area where improvement is needed.
The value of face-to-face interaction will never be replaced,
but social networks for AIS can and should develop strategies
to apply mobile and web-based social media. These technologies permit information and knowledge to be exchanged at
a low cost, both “internally” and with other stakeholders
and influencers locally and globally. PAID is exploring these
avenues through the African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services, which is piloting the Innodev platform
(www.innodev.org) in Sierra Leone and Uganda to support
problem solving through networks, enable groups to form
around opportunities, and attract support for entrepreneurs
through mentors and investment partners.
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Using Net-Map to Assess and Improve
Agricultural Innovation Systems
Eva Schiffer, Consultant

SYNOPSIS

ractitioners require methods that capture the complexity of an AIS and structure it in a way that
allows actors to use the detailed information
rapidly. Net-Map is a participatory influence network mapping method based on social network analysis and power
mapping. This pen-and-paper method helps those involved
in or observing agricultural innovation to determine and
discuss who the actors are, how they are linked, how influential they are, what their goals are, and what the crucial
bottlenecks and opportunities are. Net-Map is useful for
understanding complex, dynamic situations in which multiple actors influence each other and the outcome. It can be
used for an initial assessment of an innovation system and
can also help to monitor the innovation system’s development over time.

P

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: REQUIREMENTS
FOR AN AIS ASSESSMENT TOOL

The AIS approach, instead of focusing on specific actors,
appreciates that an innovation involves multiple partners
who have formal and informal ties, have different goals, and
use their influence in various ways to further or block the
innovation. Practitioners increasingly require methods that
capture this complexity and structure it in a way that allows
actors to use the detailed information rapidly.
AIS assessment tools ideally need to capture a specific
range of complex data and to do so under particular logistic conditions. The following data are needed to understand
an AIS:
■

Who are all the actors involved (impacting on and
being impacted by the innovation, formally and informally involved, supportive and unsupportive of the
innovation)?

■

■

■

■

■

How do these actors interact (including formal and
informal links, material flows such as funding or seed,
nonmaterial flows such as ideas, policy pressure)?
What are their goals with regard to a specific innovation
or the general innovativeness of the system (are they supportive, unsupportive, or neutral)?
How strongly do they influence the innovation system’s
ability to innovate?
What are the crucial strength and weaknesses of the
innovation network? Where are bottlenecks and coalitions? What links are missing? What strategies are successful?
How does the innovation system change over time?

With regard to the logistics of the method needed, it is
crucial for it to be straightforward and easy for people to
apply in the field; provide results quickly; allow for exploring and understanding systems with many unknowns;
structure the complexity but leave room for in-depth explanations; support users in developing strategies for improving the AIS; and collect data that are comparable between
sectors, countries, and over time.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

Net-Map, a participatory social network mapping approach
(Schiffer and Hauck 2010), is based on social network
analysis (Hanneman and Riddle 2005), power mapping
(Schiffer 2007), stakeholder analysis (Grimble and Wellard
1997), and participatory action-research (Kindon, Pain, and
Kesby 2007). This method helps those involved in or
observing agricultural innovation to determine and discuss
who the actors are, how they are linked, how influential they
are, what their goals are, and what the crucial bottlenecks
and opportunities are (Schiffer and Hauck 2010; http://
netmap.wordpress.com).

593

HOW NET-MAP WORKS

Net-Map can be used in planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating interventions. The following step-bystep description briefly explains how it works.
1: Getting started

Net-Map is a pen-and-paper method that involves drawing
networks together with participants (individuals or groups)
to capture their complex knowledge of a system and make
implicit or tacit knowledge explicit. Net-Map can be used as
a tool by external actors, such as donors or researchers, to
acquire a better understanding of the situation and monitor
its development. It may also be used internally (for example,
by an implementing NGO or ministry) to help decision
makers and implementers improve stakeholders’ involvement, strategic planning, monitoring, and evaluation. NetMap sessions are typically facilitated by a trained Net-Map
practitioner.
Before starting the activity, it is important to determine its framework and goal: Net-Map can be used as a
one-off activity for planning or as a startup tool to get an
activity on track. For monitoring and evaluation, a baseline Net-Map at the beginning of the intervention and
one or more follow-up Net-Maps are recommended (for
example, after one, three, or five years). It is possible to do
a string of individual interviews or one (or more) group
meetings.
The first step is to develop the overall question. It normally has the format: “Who influences XY?” XY can be specific (“Who influences farmers’ adoption of this new rice
variety in this area within the next five years?”) or more general (“Who influences the innovativeness of the agricultural
sector in this country?”).
Often the more specific questions provide more specific
and therefore useful answers. For example, one might
learn that network structures that encourage the adoption
of a new rice variety might be similar to those for other
crops.
2: Who is involved?

The people attending the session normally consist of the
host (the person/organization who is looking for answers),
the facilitator (expert in the Net-Map method, neutral
in the content question), participants from different areas of
the innovation system, and a note-taker. Choosing the right
participants is crucial, because the knowledge of the people
interviewed is the core source of information. For example,
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a broad set of perspectives could be gained by including
people from: the private sector, NGOs, donor agencies, government, and civil society (farmers, consumers); the
national, regional, district, and local level; different ethnic
groups, nationals and foreigners, different ages and genders;
and agriculture, trade, finance, and industry. The ideal
group is between 6 and 12 people. Larger groups should be
split into (equally diverse) subgroups.
The participants are asked to name all actors (individuals, groups, organizations) involved. Actors include not only
those who are involved in formal decision making but
everyone who can influence or is influenced by the issue.
3: How are they linked?

A link is something that flows from one actor to another
(like money) or connects two actors (like friendship). Typical links in an innovation system are flows of money, ideas,
innovative products, political pressure, and formal lines of
command.
4: How strong is their influence?

This question focuses on how strongly the different actors
can influence the specific issue at hand (not in the country
at large)—for example, “How strongly can this actor influence whether farmers use this new rice variety?” Actors’
influence is defined as their ability to achieve their goals in
a social setting, despite resistance (Weber 1922).
The level of influence is represented by an “influence
tower” (using some small, stackable objects). The greater
the influence, the higher the tower. The influence tower is
used to assess an actor’s actual influence on a given issue;
the actor’s influence can be based on a number of attributes, such as money, formal position, persuasiveness,
informal ties, and so on. The influence tower does not
measure the actor’s formal position or how influential the
actor should be.
5: What are their goals?

The next step focuses on understanding the actors’ goals. In
some cases it makes sense to ask who actively supports the
innovation or innovativeness, who is passive, and who
actively hinders it. In other cases, actors might follow two
competing philosophies or goals.
6: Discussion (what does this mean)?

In this step, the map is drawn, and any issues that came up
with the mapping are discussed. The discussion can include
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looking at bottlenecks, conflicts, coalitions, future strategies,
missing actors, or links that should be developed in the
future. It is not important to reach agreement on every point
but to explore and understand different points of view, why
people hold them, and how these different views can affect
the innovation system. For example, if a representative from
the agriculture ministry and one from the environmental
protection agency disagree on a crucial issue, that information, in and of itself, can be important for shaping a future
strategy of engagement with these two agencies.

■

■

■

7: Results
■

The Net-Map session yields the map and discussion notes.
The network map can be entered into social network analysis
software (such as VisualyzerTM or UCINETTM), which produces a computerized network picture and also allows for
some quantitative analysis, such as identifying bottlenecks or
boundary spanners. While the network structure provides the
bones, the discussion adds the meat, giving concrete information about how and why the network performs or fails.
Less tangible (but sometimes even more relevant) outcomes of a Net-Map session are the learning and energy
shared by the people attending. Participants regularly report
that they have gained enthusiasm for a common cause, have
resolved misunderstandings, and have a clearer vision and
shared strategy after attending Net-Map sessions. The intangible effects are especially powerful if participants discover
blind spots together (see box 7.21 in the next section) or if a
diverse group develops a common understanding. To make
the most of these process results, it is crucial that the host
is seriously committed to using them and continuing to
collaborate with the participants.

BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND TWO CASE STUDIES

Since its development in 2007, Net-Map has been used in a
variety of ways, within and beyond agriculture, in Africa, Asia,
Europe, and the United States (for detailed case studies and
methodological development, see http://netmap.wordpress
.com). The uses have been as diverse as the following:
■

■

Developing benchmarks and indicators for chicken and
maize innovation systems in Ethiopia (box 7.20); see also
Spielman and Birner (2008); Spielman and Kelemework
(2009).
Assessing communication channels concerning avian
influenza in Ghana (box 7.21), Ethiopia, and Nigeria; see
also Schiffer, Narrod, and von Grebmer (2008).

Engaging stakeholders in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Uganda
in developing bisosafety legislation under the International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI’s) Program
for Biosafety Systems; see http://programs.ifpri.org/pbs/).
Understanding and improving regional water governance
in northern Ghana; see Schiffer and Hauck (2010).
Understanding fisheries management in small reservoirs
in northern Ghana; see Hauck and Youkhana (2008). The
Net-Map exercise revealed that overlapping governance
systems (traditional and modern, top-down and bottomup) were one reason for unsustainable management
practices and poor enforcement of rules.
Increasing the impact of agricultural research on policy
making in Malawi and Nigeria; see Aberman et al.
(2010). By looking at concrete case studies (such as studies of fertilizer policy), this project aims to understand
when and how research can enter policy-making
processes. Follow-up Net-Map sessions in Malawi will
track changes over time.

Typically, the goals of a Net-Map intervention are
twofold—to understand and to improve a situation. Two
case studies provide more detail on how Net-Map was used
in analyzing an innovation system in Ethiopia (box 7.20)
and developing strategies to prevent the spread of avian
influenza in Ghana (box 7.21). General lessons from the use
of Net-Map are provided in the concluding section.
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

Net-Map is a useful tool for understanding complex,
dynamic situations in which multiple actors influence each
other and the outcome. It can be used for an initial assessment of an innovation system in a country or sector and can
also help to monitor the innovation system’s development
over time.
A Net-Map facilitator needs to be good at working with
groups and individuals, giving them room to express
themselves but also guiding them when the discussion
goes off on a tangent. It helps if the facilitator is able to
think in structures and discover patterns in complex maps.
Prior knowledge of social network analysis is a plus but
not necessary.
The Net-Map steps are normally taught in a learningby-doing approach. After a brief (one-hour) session, new
Net-Map facilitators are able to draw their first Net-Map on
an issue of their choice. In five to eight days, with the help
of an experienced Net-Map practitioner, a new Net-Map
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Box 7.20 Net-Mapping a Poultry Innovation System in Ethiopia

The Debre Zeit-Mojo corridor in the Addis Ababa market shed is an exceptionally innovative area for poultry,
where new breeds and methods are embraced much
more rapidly and widely than in other areas of the
country. Could Net-Map discover the network conditions that encouraged agricultural innovation? What
lessons could be learned for other geographical areas
and other agricultural products?
Net-Maps were drawn with researchers, extension
agents, and poultry farmers. The links that were mapped
included: production inputs and equipment (embodied
knowledge); knowledge and information (disembodied
knowledge); credit and financial services; regulatory
oversight; and coordination and cooperation.
Through this process, participants discovered an
innovation cluster of strongly interlinked private and
public sector actors who had facilitated the development of a small commercial poultry farm sector. The

analysis showed that this innovation cluster was inextricably bound to the specific location (the Addis
market shed, with a market for white-fleshed chicken)
and the collaboration between large-scale poultry
producers and an agricultural research center. This
context-specificity meant that the Debre Zeit-Mojo
innovation cluster did not deliver a blueprint for
poultry innovation systems in more remote areas of
the country. Further research, for example through
Net-Maps of poultry systems in less-privileged areas,
would be needed to understand how innovation could
be fostered under different conditions.
This experience shows how Net-Map can tease out
which innovation conditions are specific to a given
context and which can be transferred as general lessons
for other areas. The method also helped colleagues who
had worked in the country for a long time to see aspects
of the innovation system of which they were unaware.

Source: Author; Spielman and Kelemework 2009.

Box 7.21 Net-Mapping to Reduce the Risk of Avian Influenza in Ghana

Net-Map was used in kick-off workshops for a project on pro-poor strategies to reduce the risk of avian
influenza (http://www.hpai-research.net). Stakeholders from different areas of poultry production, marketing, and government oversight mapped all of the
actors involved, focusing on two links: (1) flows of
information about suspicious bird deaths and
(2) flows of intervention if avian influenza was confirmed.
Group mapping allowed participants to exchange
knowledge about this network and highlight specific
bottlenecks. In Ghana, mapping revealed critical issues
that had not been clear to the participants or
researchers beforehand. The Net-Mapping session
indicated that if there was an outbreak on a small farm,
considerable information would be exchanged at the
village level (including among teachers, opinion leaders, and other actors unrelated to the poultry subsector). Only one actor, however, bridged the gap between

the community actors and district administrators: the
animal health technician. The relatively low number of
animal health technicians in the system increased the
risk that reports of suspicious bird deaths would be
delayed.
An even more crucial insight was related to the neglect of market actors in avian flu compensation
schemes. Farmers were compensated for every bird
culled by the government in an outbreak, but no such
compensation was available to live bird traders. Participants diagnosed a potential corruption hot spot at the
national border: Suspicious bird deaths in a trader’s
flock would give the trader strong incentives to bribe
border veterinarians, cross to the neighboring country,
sell the birds, and leave as soon as possible. This kind of
activity sets the scene for a regional pandemic. The network figure shown here represents flows of information about suspicious bird deaths in Ghana, indicating
the corruption hotspot at the border.

Source: Author.
Note: More information including illustrative Net-Map examples can be found at http://netmap.wordpress.com.
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intervention can be developed with a team of facilitators
with no prior training in the method. The basic process is
taught; the proposed question and links are pretested with
a number of interview partners; the questions are adjusted;
and the new facilitators learn how to enter the data. A particular challenge in every Net-Map intervention is to ask
the right general question.
Following this preparation, the group of facilitators will
either invite participants to a group mapping session or
conduct a series of individual interviews. Group mapping
sessions are especially powerful for getting consensus and
buy-in, developing strategic plans, and getting answers
rapidly, without much additional analysis. If possible, plan
one full day for a group session to allow for discussion and
avoid rushing participants. It is possible to do a group NetMap in half a day, however, and make it part of a bigger

event, such as an inception workshop or annual planning
meeting.
In some cases, however, individual interviews are more
convenient. Actors may be geographically spread out or
otherwise difficult to reach; interview partners may speak
more truthfully about sensitive issues, especially if there is
a great power difference between stakeholders or a history
of conflict.
As noted, it is beneficial to have a time series; for example, Net-Mapping could be done at the beginning of a
project, halfway through, and at the end. During each session, discuss what is useful, identify any underutilized
opportunities, and identify bottlenecks. Develop strategies
accordingly and use the next mapping session to see how
the network changed, which strategies were successful, and
what still needs to happen.
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Gender Analysis for the Assessment of Innovation Processes:
The Case of Papa Andina in Peru
Silvia Sarapura, University of Guelph

SYNOPSIS OF PROJECT DATA

Project name:
Country/region:

Starting date:
Closing date:
Project financing:

Implementing agency:

Website:

Box 7.22 New Market Niches and Value
Addition for Small-Scale Growers
of Native Potatoes in the Andes

Papa Andina
Papa Andina works through a
range of strategic local partners
in each country: the PROINPA
Foundation (Bolivia); the
National Potato Program, INIAP
(Ecuador); and the INCOPA
Project (Peru)1
Papa Andina (1998); Peru
PMCA (2001)
Ongoing
Initially Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; also
New Zealand Aid Programme,
McKnight Foundation
Partnership Program hosted by
the International Potato Center
(CIP)
http://www.papandina.org/

Papa Andina led to the creation of T’ikapapa, the
first commercial brand that supports the sale of
native potatoes under strict quality standards.
T’ikapapa connects small-scale potato farmers in
the Andes with high-value niche markets in urban
centers, exports its products to other countries
within the region such as Venezuela, explores
potential European markets for high-end potato
products, and partners with an increasing numbers of nongovernmental organizations and private operations to further promote native crops.
Source: Author.

■

CONTEXT

Across the Andean region, small-scale farmers face the challenge of gaining access to dynamic new markets for highvalue produce while remaining resilient amid the forces of
climate change and globalization. The Papa Andina regional
initiative, anchored in the International Potato Center
(CIP), promotes innovation that leads to the development
of market niches and value addition, particularly for the
native potatoes grown by poor smallholders in Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru (box 7.22). The assessment of gender
issues plays a critical role in Papa Andina’s two principal
approaches to engage market chain actors: the Participatory
Market Chain Approach (PMCA) and stakeholder platforms (see also TN 1 and IAP 1 in module 4):
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■

The PMCA is based on the participatory approach to
stakeholder collaboration in agricultural R&D known
as Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems
(RAAKS; see also box 7.11) (Engel and Salomon
2003). The PMCA fosters commercial, technological,
and institutional innovation through a three-step
process that builds interest, trust, and collaboration
among participants, improves farmers’ links to markets, and stimulates pro-poor innovation.
Stakeholder platforms (see also TN 2 in module 1) are
spaces and events where public and private stakeholders
interact, share reciprocal interests, build trust, and join in
common initiatives. Often such platforms are developed
as a result of PMCA and continue after the approach has
been implemented; in other cases, the PMCA works
through platforms that already exist.

Both the PMCA and stakeholder platforms facilitate the
articulation of demand and supply for innovation-linked
services and reduce transaction costs in marketing the produce of many small farmers (Bernet et al. 2008). In the
Andes, PMCA has been validated in two complete cycles,
both in Peru and Bolivia (2003–04). The method has been
shared with other organizations in these countries, which
has led to further testing. In Peru, the Intermediate Technology Development Group, an international NGO, subsequently used the method in the cheese, coffee, and cacao
subsectors. Starting in 2005, PMCA was introduced and
tested in potato, sweet potato, and vegetable commodity
chains in Uganda.

Through the PMCA, women’s involvement and the involvement of different groups of women are systematized in the
following ways:
■

■

OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

A key feature of Papa Andina is that it brings together many
participants in the AIS, including smallholders, market
agents, and agricultural service providers, many of whom
did not know one another or who actively distrusted one
another, and helps to identify new opportunities for all of
these stakeholders to collaborate and innovate. Papa Andina
recognizes that gender analysis and female farmers’ active
involvement in assessing innovation processes and systems
are central to developing sustainable, profitable agricultural
market chains that are well integrated into the wider innovation system. In turn, this system-level integration is
important for gender equality and the empowerment of
resource-poor women and their families.
Each phase of the PMCA incorporates specific genderrelated assessments and activities (table 7.10). Flexibility in
the duration of each phase and in the use of specific tools
(quantitative surveys, focus groups, and so forth) is necessary
(Bernet et al. 2008).

■

Representation. Smallholders, female and male, representing their communities at events return to their communities and share their findings and innovative ideas.
Replication. Initial farmers, now acting as representative farmers, work with R&D partners to replicate
knowledge-sharing events and activities with more
farmers in their area who grow native potatoes. For
example, a woman farmer in Puno shared information
with representatives of 12 communities in the Lake Titicaca basin. In this way, innovative ideas for making
coffee from dried potato and adding value to freezedried potato products spread to at least 10,000 farmers
in those areas.
Communication and recognition. Native potato product
ideas and technologies were also shared between women
farmers in Peru and women’s groups and R&D institutions in Uganda, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Horton 2008;
Kaganzi et al. 2009).

The third innovative element is that Papa Andina purposefully demonstrated the value of women’s involvement
in the AIS. The initiative showed that it is possible to involve
resource-poor women farmers as key stakeholders in the
potato value chain; the participating R&D institutions
demonstrated the value added by gender analysis and
investing in women’s innovation; and the donor agencies
played an important role in establishing the need for gender
assessment and the integrated involvement of women farmers in R&D as key stakeholders.

BENEFITS, IMPACT, AND EXPERIENCE
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

From a gender perspective, Papa Andina has three innovative elements. The first innovative element is that the PMCA
and stakeholder platforms enable women to share their
findings and customs with other members of the AIS
through events and activities that highlight women’s knowledge of genetic diversity. When women participate in events
such as family competitions, their roles in the farming
household, the wider community, the market chain, and the
AIS are recognized and reinforced (box 7.23).
The second innovative element is that the empowerment
of women farmers has resulted in systemic changes.

A number of gender-related benefits, impacts, and experiences are linked to each of the three phases of the PCMA
and to the stakeholder platforms. In phases 1 and 2, experiences with gender assessment and gender-related activities
in organizing the PMCA and stakeholder platforms have
shown how to foster the organization of female and male
farmer groups based on common interests and resources.
Organizing enables farmer groups to consider the economic feasibility of production and marketing issues
beyond the household level. The groups can build their
human and social capital to access platforms where support
is available from R&D and government institutions as well
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Table 7.10 Phases of the Participatory Market Chain Approach and Gender Assessment and Related Activities in Each Phase
Phase
Stakeholders identified
Phase 1: 2–4 months

Stakeholder platforms engaged
Phase 2: 3–5 months

Implementation of joint
market innovations
Phase 3: 4–6 months

Overall activitya
– Get to know the market chain actors and other
stakeholders—their activities, interests, ideas,
problems, and so forth:
Step 1: Conduct a 3- to 6-week rapid assessment
of the market chain and identify key
stakeholders.
Step 2: Hold a one-day workshop to define impact
groups using the impact filter.
Step 3: Hold a final event for phase 1 to share
information and secure stakeholders’
continued involvement.
– In a participatory manner, analyze potential
business opportunities; work in thematic groups of
10–20 persons; establish new stakeholder
platforms or strengthen existing stakeholder
platforms; R&D organization involved provides
facilitator to assist groups.
– Using the following tools, each thematic group
analyzes potential business opportunities: rapid
market appraisal; quantitative market survey; focus
groups.
– Implement joint market innovations: work in
thematic groups of 10–20 persons; R&D
organization involved provides facilitator to assist
groups.
– Each thematic group uses marketing concept
development and business plan to test or
implement, monitor, and evaluate their innovations.
If necessary, phase 2 activities can be revised (for
instance, by adding focus groups to clarify
consumer preferences).

Gender-related assessment and activity
– Integrate gender sensitivity training into R&D organizations as they begin their
stakeholder identification activities.
– Include women farmers as a stakeholder group in the rapid assessment of the market
chain. R&D partners, including investors, reinforce the need to address women’s
specific needs in PMCA.
– Initiate family and community competitions for innovation to recognize women’s
contribution to the value chain (box 7.23).
– Among the stakeholders, identify women’s groups and male and female leaders who
support gender equity and empowerment; encourage them to highlight or discuss
issues and benefits for women farmers in workshop events.
– Platforms bring together female and male small-scale farmers from different
communities in the region, market agents, and agricultural service providers to share
findings and customs, with support from R&D institutions. Many of these stakeholders
will be unfamiliar with each other.
– Identify and involve NGOs engaged in related gender analysis and women’s
empowerment programs. Their involvement may be the key to the success of these
platforms.
– Gender equity (participation of women representing different ages, classes, and ethnic
groups) is included in the platforms and in the selection criteria for the thematic
groups.
– Analyze continued knowledge sharing by women farmers and gender roles and
relations within the stakeholder platforms for further technical and institutional
innovation at the national and international levels.
– Women and men continue to participate in fairs and events outside their communities
(regional and national) to demonstrate their knowledge and stimulate participation in
stakeholder platforms.
– R&D partners monitor/evaluate how individual women farmers have gained
confidence to join new and extended networks and to exchange varieties cultivated in
other areas of the Andes.
– R&D partners monitor/evaluate how male and female farmers have gained individual
and collective capacities and skills for communication, negotiation, facilitation, and
teamwork.
– Encourage ongoing discussion within the project of how market chains empower
disadvantaged farmers who otherwise have little opportunity to participate and make
decisions.
– Encourage ongoing discussion within the project of how women have the chance to
interact with other market chain actors and professionals from R&D organizations,
thereby increasing their access to knowledge, innovation, contacts, and selfdevelopment.

Source: Author.
a. The activities in each phase of the PMCA (described in detail in the “User Guide”; see Bernet, Thiele, and Zschocke 2006) occur consecutively over 9–15 months.

Box 7.23 Innovation Fairs to Assess and
Recognize Women’s Contributions to
Market Chains and the Agricultural
Innovation System
Every family and community in the high Andes
has developed its own varieties of native potato.
Seed of native potato varieties is usually obtained
by inheritance, barter, or as a gift. The PMCA partners support local, provincial, regional, and even
national fairs—public events where farmers (men
and women) have a chance to demonstrate the
varieties they prefer to select, store, cultivate, harvest, process, consume, and market. These fairs are
opportunities for communities and farmers to
highlight the enormous diversity of potatoes they
use and explain how they have managed this native
potato biodiversity over time. The participants
may exchange seed or buy tubers from one
another at these fairs.
Fairs represent an excellent opportunity for
farmers to obtain information from one another
as well as from R&D partners. In most cases, wives
accompany their husbands to the fairs, because
women are the farm household members with the
best knowledge of the morphological and qualitative characteristics of each potato variety. Family
collections can be extensive: A small-scale farming
family at one fair presented more than 600 varieties. Women farmers report that the fairs enable
them to feel rewarded and recognized for their
efforts in preserving and maintaining the extraordinary biodiversity of native potatoes.
Source: Author.

as NGOs. This support can also entail technology transfer
to farmers and opportunities to fine-tune technologies to
specific conditions.
In phases 2 and 3, thematic groups use communication
and collaboration to address and break down traditional
gender roles, divisions of labor, and power relations. Recognizing women’s role in the selective breeding of native
potato varieties in different ecosystems and their detailed
knowledge of different potato phenotypes helps to counteract gender bias. Communication activities, including the
innovation fairs, focus on how Andean women have cultivated native potatoes. These activities enable women to

bring their large store of knowledge to bear on the innovation process for native potato.
In recent years, women farmers in some regions of Peru
have established profitable businesses supplying native
potatoes to national and/or international markets. Messages
about women’s advancement in marketing chains and innovations have been highlighted in public-private R&D partnerships and corporate social responsibility commitments
involving such companies as Pepsi-Co and its subsidiary,
Frito Lay.2 New products marketed by some companies have
used the image of an award-winning female farmer. These
examples have been reported to the author as motivating
female producers to participate in the native potato market
chain.
LESSONS AND ISSUES FOR WIDER APPLICATION

Several gender-related lessons have emerged from Papa
Andina. Donor priorities were an important contextual
consideration for incorporating gender assessment in the
native potato innovation system. Donor agencies’ initial
proposal development and planning criteria for gender,
empowerment, and working with NGOs stimulated the
requirements for gender assessment and the integrated
involvement of women farmers in R&D as key stakeholders.
As a result, “researchers and NGOs that have worked with
Papa Andina are more aware of gender issues and the need
to achieve impact at farmer level” (Devaux et al. 2010).
In some cases, the benefits of traditional and newly
developed innovations generated by the stakeholder platforms remain highly localized. For example, with support
from USAID, one farming community sold a local variety
of potato known as “Capiro” to Frito Lay to produce
potato chips for the domestic market (the company had
previously imported potatoes from Colombia). Farmers
earned more than US$1.6 million in sales, but this success
cannot be replicated easily because the domestic market
for snack foods is limited. Farmers are also cautioned not
to regard this success story as an inducement to grow just
one variety of potato. The maintenance of potato diversity remains central to the innovation system and its
stakeholder platforms. Although female farmers, especially indigenous women farmers, have brought a wealth
of experience to market chains and agricultural innovation, women farmers often struggle to ensure that their
knowledge benefits themselves, their families, and their
communities. Investment strategies that establish networks of information and knowledge sharing can increase
the impact of locally developed and innovative practices
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and strengthen the abilities of women and their communities to meet their agricultural and economic needs in a
culturally appropriate and environmentally sensitive
manner.
Despite women’s critical role in the potato market chain,
subsistence production, in which women are usually
involved, receives less institutional support than cash crop
production. The number of female extension officers in
public extension systems is very limited (although the only
NGO working in the high Andes, Fovida, provides a few
female agents). As a result, resource-poor women farmers
are less likely than their male counterparts to receive agricultural extension services. Forming links to NGOs within
phases 2 and 3 of the PMCA is important to strengthening
the innovation system in this regard.
Aside from these relatively specific lessons, Papa Andina
offers a number of more general considerations about the
successful integration of women into any AIS:
■

■
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Assess the entire system and individual agrifood value
chains using a mainstreaming approach that includes
the use of gender analysis to recognize women’s role and
gender relations in production and decision making.
Indispensable tools for gender analysis in innovation
assessment are gender-disaggregated data; analysis of
women’s and men’s access to resources such as labor,
land, capital, and knowledge; and the engagement of
women in capacity-building activities.
Ensure that the full range of women’s and men’s activities, resources, and benefits is reflected in the assessment

■

■

■

of the innovation system and the continuing activities of
the stakeholder platforms.
Through networking provided by the stakeholder platforms, identify suitable technological and institutional
innovations. In particular, review the suitability of technologies or institutional arrangements available in other
market chains that have become successful and sustainable for women farmers.
Identify and respond to socioeconomic factors that may
affect the adoption of proposed technological or institutional innovations (for example, security of resources; tenurial arrangements for land or water; access to inputs such
as credit, seed, and fertilizer; and membership in producer
groups). Identify activities that are particularly timeand/or energy-consuming for women and address them
with targeted investments and supporting interventions.
Increase and sustain the supply of information, technologies, and facilities that women may fail to access
because of social exclusion (examples include market
information, transport, appropriate tools and equipment, and so forth).

Papa Andina illustrates the centrality of gender issues in
sustainable and inclusive agricultural development and the
effectiveness of the AIS as a whole. Gender assessment and
strategies to ensure the participation of women in value
chains are important tools to identify the strengths and
diversity of actors in innovation systems. R&D institutions
play an especially important role in ensuring that innovation benefits small-scale male and female farmers.
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Scenario Planning to Guide Long-Term Investments
in Agricultural Science and Technology in India
Riikka Rajalahti, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

n Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR)
and World Bank team engaged in scenario planning from September 2004 to June 2006 to assess
critical policy and institutional challenges for agriculture and
corresponding reforms that would enable the research system to meet them. ICAR management evaluated the likely
benefits and impact of alternative reform scenarios and
determined which specific reforms to support through the
National Agricultural Innovation Project (NAIP). This
process increased the government’s ownership of the
reforms and its commitment to implement them. This profile summarizes key elements of the process and its findings.
The cost of the scenario planning in India involved several
components: external facilitators (US$100,000); preparatory
studies (US$30,000); workshops (US$60,000); peer reviewing (US$5,000); and dissemination (US$20,000). Funding
came from the budget for preparing NAIP (US$155,000) and
a US$60,000 grant from the World Bank’s Agricultural and
Rural Development Department (ARD) to support knowledge generation. The investment of staff time was also substantial for ICAR and the World Bank, on the order of 30
weeks for each institution.

A

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

To address the challenges facing agriculture in India and
consolidate the gains under the completed National Agricultural Technology Project, the Government of India and
the World Bank agreed to undertake a new National Agricultural Innovation Project (NAIP) (see IAP 2 in module 4).
In preparing the project, it became clear that many uncertainties faced agriculture and agricultural science and technology in India. For example, how would global warming
affect the production characteristics of Indian agriculture?

How would the technology system embrace the growing
importance of the private sector? Would Indian agriculture
remain competitive in the global marketplace? What would
be the fate of the small-scale farmer?
Scenario planning may help address such questions

Scenario planning is a structured process of thinking about
and anticipating the future that helps to break the mindset
that the future will be a continuation of the past (van der
Heijden 1996). It entails the development and collective
analysis of a set of scenarios, which are narratives of alternative environments that show how different interpretations of driving forces can lead to different plausible futures
(Ogilvy and Schwartz 1998; van der Heijden 1996).

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

Scenario planning was used to explore the uncertainties surrounding Indian agriculture and identify the key decisions
that would need to be taken to ensure that India’s agricultural technology system was prepared for the future. The
assessment included a wide range of stakeholders and
enabled participants to develop a shared perspective on a
future that was not necessarily a continuation of the past.
The scenario development and analysis were conducted in
parallel with the design of NAIP.
For these parallel efforts to succeed, they required the
participation of high-level officials, farm leaders, senior
leaders from the public and the private sectors, NGO leaders, donor representatives, experts on agricultural development, and some “remarkable people” (a term used in the
scenario planning literature to describe lateral thinkers).
The process was managed jointly by the regionally and
centrally based staff of the World Bank’s ARD. An Indian
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co-leader was invited, and experienced scenario planning
experts facilitated the process, which was organized around
seven information-gathering and knowledge-sharing steps:

fields may require further assessment to understand
how the impact of change on these variables can be
managed.

1. Identify driving forces for future change, taking into
consideration political conditions, economic developments, social developments, environmental trends, and
technological changes.
2. Identify predetermined factors. Which future developments will take place in any scenario?
3. Identify critical uncertainties—in other words, critical
areas in which the future is uncertain.
4. Develop scenario plots. A scenario is defined by a combination of two critical uncertainties, drawn out and shown
as axes on which the scenarios are plotted. Then a comprehensive description of how the future will look under
this scenario is developed. These futures must be plausible.
5. Consult with those having relevant expertise. The scenarios are presented to a large number of people who
have relevant expertise; their comments are collected and
incorporated in the scenarios. Consultation helps to
identify knowledge gaps and guides decisions on whether
and what additional knowledge must be gathered.
6. Assess the implications of different scenarios. The best
possible responses of the client organizations to each of
the plausible future scenarios are assessed.
7. Compare possible responses to the scenarios. Two elements in the comparison require special attention. First,
there are those actions that can be found in all responses
and tend to be low risk. Second, there are the responses
that differ strongly among scenarios. Responses in these

As hoped, the scenario project co-evolved with the NAIP
project (table 7.11), enabling NAIP to benefit from the
understanding emerging through the scenario work. In this
way, the NAIP model was tested in various “environmental”
conditions specified by the scenarios—a process sometimes
referred to as “wind tunneling.”
The main steps included the following:
1. An initial workshop at World Bank headquarters in
Washington, DC, to introduce the scenario planning
concept and process and to receive wider buy-in among
staff for the process that would unfold (figure 7.3).
2. Interviews with “remarkable people” to explore the
issues and concerns for future agricultural development
in India (van der Heijden 1996; box 7.24).
3. A workshop in India to launch the process and obtain
input from participants.
4. A scenario analysis and design workshop to identify
the key scenarios that would be developed (following
the steps described earlier to identify the critical elements of each scenario: driving forces, predetermined
factors, and main uncertainties). The scenario plots
(figure 7.3) had two main dimensions. The first was
economic management, which could be strongly market
based and liberalized but also more government controlled and centrally led. The second was the social fabric of the countryside and the country in general, which

Table 7.11 Timing for Preparing the National Agricultural Innovation Project (NAIP) in Relation to
Scenario Development
Timing

NAIP

September 2004

Scenario project
Internal planning workshop in the World Bank

April 2005

Start of project preparation

Scenario agenda workshop at Indian Council for Agricultural Research

July 2005

Draft Project Appraisal Document (PAD)

Scenario building workshop; development of first-generation scenarios

August 2005

Polished PAD

Research on the validity of first-generation scenarios

October 2005

Quality enhancement review

December 2005

Project appraisal

February 2005

Negotiations

Second-generation scenarios concluded and circulated for comments

April and June 2006

Board approval

Workshops in India and at the World Bank on the implications of the
scenarios

July 2006

Project becomes effective and
implementation begins

Source: Rajalahti et al. 2006.
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Figure 7.3 Final Scenario Plots Developed during the Scenario Design and Consultation Processes
The Four Scenarios

1. In the valley
India goes it alone
Social progress but economic stagnation
Only limited agricultural reform

Concern for
inclusive
growth

4. Through the hills
Focus on investment climate
public-private partnership
Enabling of agricultural reform

Social

Interventionist

Economic management

Liberalized

texture

3. Over the mountains
Centrally planned economy
Freedom reined in
Agricultural reform by compulsion

Reliance on
personal
incentives

2. Along the edge
Market forces given free rein
Rich/poor divide
Agricultural reform by economic necessity

Source: Rajalahti et al. 2006.

could be strong, with rural people well organized in villages that are able to take care of their problems, or
weak, in which case the poor would be more marginalized. Using these two dimensions as the axes of a 2 x 2
matrix, 4 combinations emerged that can serve as perspectives on the future of Indian development. One of
the combinations introduced a third dimension of
rapid global warming.
5. Finalization and presentation of the scenario storylines,
including the development of full scenario stories (see
Rajalahti et al. 2006) and their validation.
6. Scenario analysis results workshops were organized to
define the way forward in relation to NAIP and ICAR.
The specific goal was to identify how the scenarios could
help to identify which critical decisions needed to be
made to maximize the future role and impact of India’s
technology system.

INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

Scenario planning was done to build consensus and elicit
outside-the-box thinking among diverse stakeholders
that traditionally did not engage with each other in
science and policy discussions. The results were used for
designing a long-term investment project in science and
technology.

BENEFITS TO NAIP AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION

Scenario analysis contributed to the design of NAIP in many
ways. The process truly engaged people in thinking outside
their everyday domains and resulted in four very different
but plausible scenarios. The process led ICAR to think about
the issues beyond its own technical competence and to
strengthen the realization that the world it serves requires
new approaches, including social organization and institutional innovation.
The scenarios were considered very useful for envisioning long-term science and technology needs. Scenario development clearly revealed two major needs: to work on institutional arrangements for R&D (farmer organizations,
sector boards, cooperatives) and fully explore the potential
of nonfarm rural employment.
The scenario process also helped the project design team
to define the scope of NAIP’s components, particularly the
institutional development needed for the AIS to evolve. It
highlighted the importance of enhancing the capacity for
dialogue and interacting with other stakeholders in the
innovation system. Flexibility, rather than the pursuit of one
reform strategy, was considered a key trait for a successful
organization in a rapidly changing world.
The client organizations used the national scenarios to
strengthen their visioning capacity and strategy development
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Box 7.24 Key Issues Raised by “Remarkable
People”—Including Opinion Leaders
and Policy Makers—in the Scenario
Development Process, India
The key question posed to the interviewees was,
“When thinking of the future of Indian agriculture, what keeps you awake at night?” Four main
themes emerged from these interviews:
■

■

■

■

Will there be enough water for future generations? How can water be managed sustainably?
What will drive Indian agriculture in the future:
government or the market? What is the right
balance?
How will rural communities change? How fast
will rural–urban migration proceed, and what
is the future of small-scale farming?
How can rural stakeholders voice their
views––women, farmers, the private sector?

Source: Rajalahti et al. 2006.

LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

Scenarios provided a neutral space for building consensus
about critical decisions surrounding the future role and
impact of India’s technology system. The following recommendations, suggested adjustments, and limitations should
be kept in mind by those engaged in a similar exercise:
■

■

■

■

■

at the level of specific regions and products, such as rice, dairy
products, and medicinal plants. For this purpose, groups of
stakeholders were asked to develop the national scenarios for
the product or region of their interest.
The national competitive fund for research consortiums,
managed by ICAR, subsequently was aligned with the issues
identified by the scenarios. These consortiums have been
the main means of reforming India’s agricultural research
system and enabling it to move toward a more demanddriven, multistakeholder approach in addressing innovation
needs. See module 4, IAP 2.
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■

Adapt scenario analysis to specific planning tasks,
such as the development of a country assistance strategy, sector strategy, project, or regional plans. Applying the analysis to larger, global issues is far more challenging.
Implement the scenario process ahead of project preparation because scenario analysis requires a significant
time commitment, particularly for consultation and
validation.
Allocate sufficient time and resources for clients to
understand and come to own the process.
Form a multidisciplinary scenario team, led by an experienced scenario leader(s).
Draw participants from many disciplines and representing a range of views (India’s scenario-building
process, for example, included people from outside the
agricultural sector). It is also essential to include participants representing the groups that the process aims to
influence.
Pay close attention to the following: the need for a fulltime manager to oversee the process; the availability of
research capacity with adequate resources; the need to
manage and guide research performed by third-party
institutes; the coordination required to operate a virtual team over long distances; and managing political
sensitivities.
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A Vision for Agriculture in Chile in 2030 and the
Implications for Its Innovation System
Willem Janssen, World Bank
Ariani Wartenberg, World Bank

SYNOPSIS

n 2009, Chile’s Ministry of Agriculture commissioned the
World Bank to identify the long-term changes required
for its AIS to be more effective. The World Bank collaborated with Chile’s Foundation for Agricultural Innovation
(FIA) to design a participatory process combining an analysis
of major trends with input from opinion leaders, sector representatives, and others. The two major outcomes were (1) a
vision statement that expresses Chile’s agricultural potential
and aspirations and (2) an action plan outlining changes for
the innovation system to achieve that vision. The Ministry of
Agriculture financed the study through a fee-based service
agreement with the World Bank. The service cost US$250,000
(US$150,000 to develop the vision and US$100,000 to prepare the implications for the innovation system). FIA invested
US$175,000 in the study and made a staff member available
full time for the two years that the study required.

I

to information and technology, logistics, and trade agreements, to mention just a few. It may be preferable for a
country to overestimate such threats and be overly prepared
than to underestimate them and be marginalized. Investments in innovation that respond to those challenges are a
key ingredient in ensuring the future global competitiveness
of Chilean agriculture and in meeting the increasingly
sophisticated domestic demand for agricultural products.
This profile describes collaboration between Chile’s Fundación para la Innovación Agraria (FIA, Foundation for
Agricultural Innovation) and the World Bank to develop a
vision for Chilean agriculture in 2030 and a corresponding
action plan for the innovation system to realize that vision.
For additional information on Chile’s agricultural technology consortiums, see module 4, IAP 3; for a discussion of
FIA and its activities, see module 1, IAP 3.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION
CONTEXT

Chile is a leading player in regional and global agricultural
markets and regards itself as a food and forest powerhouse.
Despite substantial development in the agricultural sector,
agricultural growth has leveled off in Chile over the past
decade, signaling that Chile’s innovation system was more
effective in the past and that changes are needed to forestall
future negative growth.
Changes in the innovation system should anticipate the
challenges of the future in addition to those that are apparent at present, because innovation is usually a slow process.
Many years are likely to intervene between an initial idea or
finding and its widespread application. Potential challenges
can be related to any number of variables: domestic and
international market factors, climatic and production conditions, competition with other sectors, social unrest, access

The project had two interlinked objectives. The first objective was to identify the main opportunities and challenges
that Chile needs to address if it wishes to reinvigorate agricultural growth and propose a vision for Chilean agriculture
toward 2030. The second was to identify the adjustments
required for AIS to contribute effectively to realizing this
vision. These objectives would be achieved through a
process combining analysis, multidisciplinary consultation
at different phases of the analysis, and synthesis of the
results. The process is detailed in the sections that follow.

Developing scenarios and building the vision

Four driver studies were commissioned to identify key trends
and driving forces of change that could be to be used for
defining and building the scenarios. The studies focused on
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markets and trade, rural policies and rural development, natural resource management and climate change, and science
and technology. The team produced short summaries of the
studies and shared them at the first workshop. Information
on seven subsectors (clusters) (fresh fruit, processed food,
wine, native forestry, dairy, red meats, and cereals) contributed to building scenarios and discussing their implications. Further input came from interviews with 11 opinion
leaders and “remarkable people” (lateral thinkers who could
bring alternative perspectives to the dialogue) representing a
wide range of views from the public and private sector, as well
as academia and civil society. These views helped in drawing
implications and identifying important elements of the vision
for 2030 (box 7.25).
A subsequent scenario building workshop, facilitated by FIA
and World Bank staff and external consultants in December
2010, convened 24 experts from the public and private sectors,
academia, and civil society. Four scenarios were outlined in a
series of plenary sessions and smaller working groups. The
core team then consolidated the scenarios, developing comprehensive descriptions that were submitted for validation to the
original workshop participants, the scenario team, other
experts in Chile (more than 70 people), and five external peer
reviewers. The team incorporated the feedback, emphasizing
scenario 2 (“Terra Calida”) and consolidating scenarios 1 and
3 in a “Business as Usual” scenario (figure 7.4).
Action planning and dissemination of results

The core team combined the analysis and proposals from
the position papers into an action plan. Box 7.26 summaBox 7.25 The Vision for Chilean Agriculture
in 2030

In 2030 Chile is a quality producer of a range of food
and fiber products. Its international image is marked
by the diversity that its geography allows it to produce. The sector has an emphasis on environmental
sustainability and wholesomeness, valued by both
domestic and international consumers. Through the
application of ICT, investments in agricultural technology and the training of its labor force, Chile has
been able to develop profitable value chains, well
integrated from production to final markets, and
able to remunerate its participants at comparable
levels to the rest of the Chilean economy.
Source: World Bank 2011b.
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rizes the main thematic recommendations. In the final step,
consultation and dissemination, the action plan was widely
shared in the country through presentations, press releases,
and web publishing. Feedback from these events concluded
the process and initiated the preparation of budget proposals.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT

The Chile exercise recognized the uncertainties of the
future, used this insight to understand the basic long-term
competitive advantages of its agricultural sector, and drew
the implications for change. Rather than diagnosing the
present situation and proposing remedies, the study formulated future ambitions and specified the action required to
get there. The proposed changes to the innovation system
were (rightly) perceived as the next step forward and not as
a recognition of past failure.
BENEFITS TO CHILE’S AIS

The benefits of the approach described here derive from its
constructive, creative, and collaborative features and from
the comparative strengths of FIA (local and national expertise) and the World Bank (international experience). The
involvement of former presidents, cabinet ministers, journalists, scientists, businesspeople, individual farmers, farmer
organizations, and many other individuals was highly productive. The discussion was conducted in simple, frank language.
Participants shared and developed considerable knowledge
and linked it to a specific plan for action. The plan recognized
that Chile has sophisticated ambitions in high-value markets
and is not satisfied with imitating wealthier countries.
Somewhat by chance, the approach proved politically
robust: The work was started by a left-leaning government and
finished by right-leaning government. Nor did the second
biggest earthquake in the history of the world derail the study.
The forward-looking nature of the study motivated
strong participation and interest in its results. By looking far
into the future, participants ensure that several issues that
had been forgotten or considered out of bounds (technology
transfer, the role of the ministry, the importance of qualified
human resources) regained relevance and received attention.
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

Briefly, lessons from this process include the following:
■

The local partnership was key to success. Vision building
is a very labor- and communication-intensive process.
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Figure 7.4 Scenarios for Chile’s Agricultural Innovation System
(a) Few climate variations
(b) High increase in demand of
meats and fruits
(c) No change in tariffs
(d) Regulations over use of
natural resources

High intervention of
public policies

1

2

BAU

Terra Calida

Low impact of
climate change

(a) Temperature increase and
lower precipitation rate
(b) Limited increase in demand
because of higher prices
(c) Tariffs on carbon footprint
(d) More regulations over use of
natural resources

High impact of
climate change
Liberal BAU

4

3
(a) Few climate variations
(b) High increase in demand of
meats and fruits
(c) No change in tariffs
(d) Few regulations over use of
natural resources

Low intervention of
public policies

Common Impacts:
(a) Price increase of oil and
fertilizers
(b) Increase in quality
requirements
(c) Biotechnology development,
ICTs

Source: Authors.
Note: BAU = Business as Usual; ICTs = information and communication technologies; “Terra Calida” is a reference to the effects of global warming.

Box 7.26 Summary of Action Plan
Recommendations in Six
Thematic Areas
■

■

■

■

■

■

Genetic improvement. Multidisciplinary teams;
biotechnology tools; intellectual property and
patents.
Farm management. Management of natural
resources and water; information and communication technologies; ecological inputs.
Harvest and postharvest. Proposals from competitive funds; shared funding between government and private sector.
Standards and quality. Private sector-led expansion of Chile GAP (good agricultural practice
standards); benchmarking of standards with
importers.
Qualified human resources. Collaboration
with Becas Chile (a national scholarship program); international exchange networks.
Labor resources. Basic and vocational education in rural areas; monitoring system.

■

■

■

■

Source: World Bank 2011a.

The many consultation and dissemination sessions could
have been organized only by the national partner. Identifying resource people (for background studies and work
days) requires in-depth understanding of the national
setting. The phone must be answered if someone (a journalist, entrepreneur, student) has questions.
The development of a vision that expresses an ambition
made the study interesting to the political players in the
sector. Politicians cannot easily sell the need for more
institutional integration or long-term research, but they
can piggyback those measures on the ambition for higher
farm incomes or less pollution.
The step from analysis to vision was smaller than
expected. The 10 workdays brought out similar ideas across
subsectors and remarkable agreement on how to pursue
them. The main difference is that vision cannot be based
on evidence alone; it requires some “structured dreaming.”
The use of simple language allowed everybody to contribute and to understand the goals that were being
pursued. This frank approach creates much wider
acceptance and better feedback.
Development of the vision created the room for change
needed to implement the action plan. If this willingness
to consider change is sustained during the implementation of the action plan, it will constitute a further achievement of the process described here.
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Monitoring and Evaluation in the Fodder Innovation Project
Andy Hall, LINK Ltd.1

SYNOPSIS

The rationale of the Fodder Innovation Project (FIP),
implemented in India and Nigeria in 2007–10, was that persistent fodder shortages arose from a scarcity of fodder
innovation capacity, not of technology. A diagnosis of the
limitations of networks and institutional arrangements
associated with specific fodder-related themes was done to
design activities to address those limitations. The project’s
monitoring system was designed to include a baseline survey of households, a map of current innovation capacity,
and an actor linkage matrix and scoreboard to track institutional change. The difficulties encountered with all of these
methods provide some cautionary lessons. First, an essential
foundation for M&E within any innovation system project
is to determine whether the expected outcomes are developmental or institutional, because this orientation directly
influences the kind of M&E approach required. Second,
data requirements and tools for monitoring must be
adapted to the realities of short projects. Third, collaborative development of tools for monitoring institutional
change helps to ensure that they are appropriate and owned
by the partners who need to use them. Finally, the evaluation of innovation system projects such as FIP, in which
socioeconomic impacts may become apparent some time
after the project ends, should include and adequately fund
strategies for learning how the project led to impacts.

CONTEXT

The innovation system perspective in the Fodder Innovation Project (FIP)2 built on lessons from an earlier project
(2004–07) that indicated the limitations of a technologytransfer approach in addressing fodder scarcity. The project
was implemented in India and Nigeria in collaboration with
five key partner organizations (KPOs), which formed the
nucleus for stimulating change in their local innovation
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environments. The KPOs were all NGOs, with one exception: the animal husbandry department of an agricultural
university (see module 4, IAP 1).

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

The project’s rationale was that the persistent fodder shortage
suffered by many poor livestock keepers did not arise from a
scarcity of technology itself but from a scarcity of fodder
innovation capacity (Hall, Sulaiman, and Bezkorowajnyj
2008). Fodder innovation capacity was defined as the networks of organizations that mobilized ideas and resources
and the institutional settings that framed the relationships
involved in innovation. The project used an approach
inspired by action-research to explore how these networks
and institutional settings could be strengthened, with the
expectation that they would drive fodder innovation.
The project’s implementation strategy was for the project
management team to help the KPOs select fodder-related
themes (challenges but also opportunities, such as new markets for milk), diagnose the limitations of current networks
and institutional arrangements associated with these
themes, and design activities to address those limitations.
The project management team then helped the KPOs monitor the effectiveness of their efforts in stimulating institutional changes and, where needed, helped them alter their
plans in light of information revealed by monitoring. The
project hired two research fellows to conduct diagnostic
studies, investigate which activities and processes were
enabling the development of fodder innovation capacity,
and identify any resulting developmental outcomes.
After three years (of which the first year was spent identifying suitable KPOs and introducing them to the project’s
rationale), some immediate outcomes became evident in
the project sites. They included more efficient veterinary
and input service delivery systems; changing collaborative

practices of actors; changing institutional arrangements to
make additional fodder produced available to women, the
landless, and poor livestock-keeping households; evidence
of demand being generated for fodder varieties and other
livestock-related knowledge and technologies; and the
KPOs institutionalizing and mainstreaming their approach
in their other activities or across different organizations.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENTS OF MONITORING
AND EVALUATING THE FODDER INNOVATION
PROJECT

Because FIP was inspired by an action-research approach,
the iteration and recasting of activities based on their
relative effectiveness in strengthening networks and institutional arrangements were regarded as central to exploring
how to develop innovation capacity. A monitoring system
was a critical element of this iterative process, but the issue
of how to design a monitoring system for FIP was contested
within the project’s management team.
Some felt that the project was a development project and
that monitoring should therefore focus on what they viewed
as the project’s major deliverable: household-level outcomes.
This view was reinforced by the donor’s desire to see tangible
results in areas planted to new fodder species and related livestock feeding practices adopted by poor households. Others
regarded the project as a research project. Their view was that
any developmental outcome would be on a relatively small
scale and at best a byproduct of an experiment attempting to
understand how to facilitate institutional change associated
with the development of innovation capacity.
Given the strongly held and often opposing views
about the types of outcomes against which the project
should monitor its performance, the team decided to proceed on two tracks. The first was an impact assessment
exercise; the second was to monitor changes in the institutional environment.
Impact assessment

The impact assessment involved designing and conducting
a household survey to collect baseline information about
animal feeding practices, cropping patterns, and household
incomes. Statistical expertise was brought into the project to
help design the survey instrument and develop an appropriate sampling approach. The design anticipated repeating
the survey at the end of the project to judge impacts.
The designers of the impact assessment recognized the
need for a counterfactual, although the means of developing

one was debated considerably. Finding comparator “without” sites was problematic, so the designers adopted a
“before-and-after” approach. Seventeen locations were
selected from the five project sites in India and Nigeria and
2,047 households interviewed. Data collection began six
months into the project, took over a year to complete, and
the initial analysis of the baseline data was incomplete at the
end of the project. The survey was not repeated at the end
of the project to develop the “after” scenario, as time and
resources were not available.
Monitoring institutional change

To monitor changes in the institutional environment, the
project team planned to develop an institutional baseline.
The baseline would have two functions. A diagnostic
function—identifying institutional issues that needed
attention—would form the basis for the initial set of project
interventions. A monitoring function would track progress
in facilitating institutional change.
To collect this baseline information, FIP investigated fodder innovation capacity using a methodology developed by
the World Bank (Hall, Mytelka, and Oyelaran-Oyeyinka
2006; World Bank 2006). The methodology involved exploring four main elements of innovation capacity: (1) actors
and their roles; (2) patterns of interaction among the actors;
(3) the institutions (rules that govern interactions); and (4)
the enabling policy environment. Using this framework,
project staff struggled to develop sufficiently detailed
accounts of the institutional dimension of fodder innovation capacity to inform implementation design. They
tended to develop more macro-level or generic accounts of
the weaknesses in innovation capacity—the missing links
between research and development actors—with a view to
publishing them as academic papers. It should be stressed
that the weakness was not in the method but in the guidance
given to those who were expected to use it.
Acknowledging that the diagnostic and institutional
baselines were not helping to develop action plans, project
staff held workshops with the implementing partners to
diagnose critical issues and develop plans to proceed. These
workshops relied on implementers’ knowledge of their own
operating environments; the role of the project was to facilitate them to identify key bottlenecks that needed to be
addressed in this environment. The question of how to
monitor institutional change remained open. The project
recognized that monitoring was the key to iterative learning
and thus a critical part of the experiment to investigate how
to facilitate fodder innovation capacity.
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The project also recognized that the primary institutional dimension of capacity that needed to be addressed
across all project initiatives was the pattern and quality of
linkages between players associated with fodder innovation.
The project selected two tools to discern these patterns. The
first was an actor linkage matrix (Biggs and Matseart 1999).
This tool draws up a list of organizations on the axes of a
matrix. In a workshop setting, the matrix can be used to
map patterns, linkages, and collaboration and identify
which missing links and relationships could be formed for
the change process to work more effectively. The second tool
was a scoreboard developed by the project to help partners
assess qualitative changes in the nature of relationships. For
each relationship identified in the actor linkage matrix, the
KPOs used the scoreboard parameters to specify the quality
of these relationships. The project team, partners, and other
stakeholders would conduct this scoring exercise periodically. The parameters were (1) embracing the project
approach; (2) openness and flexibility; (3) level of joint
actions; (4) the perceived value of interaction; (5) punctuality and commitment; and (6) use of own resources for project activities. Table 7.12 depicts a partial scoreboard.
EXPERIENCE TO DATE WITH MONITORING
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The project management team felt that these tools were well
conceived, yet the KPOs found them cumbersome, particularly the scoreboard. KPOs felt that the scoreboard could
not be used in a participatory way with their partners and
stakeholders, because it raised sensitive issues that could
undermine the relationship-building process (table 7.12
compares externally and internally generated scores). A
more worrying trend quickly became apparent: The KPOs
were using the actor linkage matrix and scoreboard mainly
to report back to project management rather than for their
own learning.
In fact, the KPOs were all well embedded in the prevailing institutional context. They had their own informal ways
of analyzing that context and identifying which partners
and stakeholders they needed to draw in to support their
intervention. They were well aware of the sorts of incentives
that different partners and stakeholders would require to
participate in particular project activities. When they were
given project resources to focus on this networking, they
were able to use their pragmatic knowledge of the context
and make good progress.
The single remaining monitoring issue was that the project still had to collect evidence that the interventions it put
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into place led to institutional changes, which led in turn to
changes in livestock feeding practices. The project team
searched for examples of institutional change and developed accounts of how they took place and their outcomes.
They learned that many of the institutional changes taking
place related only indirectly to fodder use. Instead, they concerned innovations in output markets for milk, disease surveillance, veterinary services, and conflicts over access to
land and grazing areas. Project partners had felt that these
issues needed to be addressed as a precondition for fodder
innovation.
Evaluation in FIP was external, independent, and commissioned by the donor. The approach was an output-topurpose review based on FIP’s logical framework. While this
exercise was adequate for accountability, it was not clear that
it generated project-level lessons that could be used in
future interventions.
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES
FOR WIDER APPLICATION

The experience with M&E in FIP yielded cautionary lessons
about mixed messages on expected outcomes and the risks
of using data-intensive monitoring methods in short projects. Greater collaboration in designing monitoring tools
and a greater emphasis on using evaluations as learning
opportunities would also have been valuable.
■

■

Clarify the nature of the interventions and expected
outcomes. An action-research project of this type—and
most innovation system interventions are going have an
action-learning orientation—runs the risk of sending
mixed messages to the donor and project partners about
the nature of the outcomes it is expected to deliver. These
mixed messages directly affect the monitoring strategies
adopted and set up internal conflicts about whether
developmental impacts or institutional changes are to be
monitored. Getting agreement on these issues right from
the start is an essential foundation for the M&E system
within any innovation system project.
Tailor data requirements and tools for monitoring
impact to the realities of short projects. Resources spent
on an elaborate baseline for a short project of this type
were probably misspent. The project did have a responsibility to track its contribution to developmental outcomes, but the team should have selected an approach
that was more appropriate for generating data that the
implementers could use in designing, redesigning, and
managing the intervention. Such an approach would
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Table 7.12 Partial Results of an Externally and Internally Generated Scoreboard for Monitoring and Learning in
the Fodder Innovation Project
1a

1b

JDPC/ILRI

Parameter
Embracing the project
approach, openness, and
flexibility (institutional)
Level of joint actions and
sharing resources
Interaction (5 marks)
Value of interaction (5 marks)
Sense of belonging as an
actor (individual)
Forum as platform for mutual
benefits
Punctuality and commitment
of actors
Use of own resources
(institutional)
Misunderstanding among
actors (drawn internally
for internal use)

2a

JDPC/ILRI

2b

3a

3b

Farmer Group

Farmer Group

EGSB

IGSB

EGSB

IGSB

EGSB

IGSB

EGSB

IGSB

EGSB

OSADEP
IGSB

EGSB

OSADEP
IGSB

AS

AS

AN

AN

AS

AS

AN

AN

AS

AS

AN

AN

3

3

6

6

0

1

5

4

0

0

5

3

4

6

8

8

2

4

5

6

2

4

6

6

4

6

8

8

2

4

4

8

2

2

6

4

2

3

7

7

2

2

6

6

2

1

4

4

2

4

7

6

2

3

4

6

2

1

5

4

3

5

7

7

2

2

6

7

2

1

6

4

3

4

8

6

5

2

8

7

0

1

2

3

*

0

*

0

*

0

*

1

*

0

*

0

Source: Author.
Note: Scores are 0 = lowest mark, 10 = highest mark; * = not determined; – = does not yet exist; AS = at start (January 2008); AN = at now (July
2009); EGSB= externally generated scoreboard; IGSB = internally generated scoreboard; JDPC = Justice, Development, and Peace Commission;
ILRI = International Livestock Research Institute; OSADEP = Osun State Agricultural Development Programme.

■

almost certainly have involved rapid, qualitative
appraisal methods. Another valuable approach would
have been to use Causal Process Tracing to help unravel
the underlying institutional (and other) causes of outcomes observed. This approach would have been particularly important in FIP, as many of the outcomes
recorded were either unexpected or tangential to the
original ambition to reduce fodder scarcity.
Collaboratively develop tools for monitoring institutional change. The institutional monitoring tools for
FIP were well conceived but failed largely because they
were “expert”-driven and not appropriate to or owned
by the partners who needed to use them. A more useful
approach would have been to develop monitoring tools
collaboratively with each partner, adapting existing
institutional-learning tools and principles to each partner’s specific management needs. In hindsight, the
scoreboard parameters appear ambiguous and poorly
framed.

■

Link impact measurement to learning. The evaluation of
FIP could have paid much more attention to learning how
a project like this could lead to impacts. The baseline survey conducted for FIP could be valuable for this purpose:
Repeating the survey some years after the project’s end
would provide valuable lessons about impact as well as
underlying processes of change. Donors could consider
providing projects with resources to commission baseline surveys, and donors could commission impact
assessment and evaluations to be done after the project’s
end. This approach would be particularly useful for
innovation system projects in which large-scale socioeconomic impacts are evident only some time after the
project is implemented. Caution would be necessary,
however, to (1) ensure that an adequate counterfactual
analysis could be done; (2) capture unintended outcomes
that may take place away from the original project site;
and (3) fully interrogate theories of change and investigate causal links to impacts observed.
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Monitoring and Evaluation in the Research
Into Use Program
Andy Hall, LINK Ltd.
Kumuda Dorai, LINK Ltd.

SYNOPSIS

he Research Into Use (RIU) program, designed with
an innovation systems perspective, emphasized
strengthening networks and partnerships and also
gave prominence to private sector and enterprise perspectives to drive research into use. The program pursued explicit
learning objectives, including drawing key policy lessons
about better strategies for putting agricultural research into
use. In RIU, the challenge for M&E lay in the need to track
developmental as well as institutional outcomes and the limited experience, confidence, and consensus in the use of
methods that could address those two outcomes together. A
key lesson from RIU’s experience with M&E is that it is critical to maintain the distinction between monitoring and
evaluation and to separate the timing and responsibilities for
these two functions. Monitoring progress toward institutional and developmental targets is challenging; programs
should have specific M&E expertise to help design integrated
monitoring strategies for each of their interventions (not to
collect data for M&E experts to analyze). Donors should be
realistic about the type and scale of outcomes likely to be evident in the action-to-impact results chain during the life of
an intervention. The final impact needs to be explored after
the program has come to an end, especially for a program
such as RIU, with its emphasis on achieving impact by stimulating institutional and policy change. Sensitive management of the interaction between evaluators and programs is
needed to deal with the tensions between accountability and
learning. This point is particularly important for innovation
system interventions, because theories of change are multidimensional, evolve, and are often difficult to articulate.

T

CONTEXT

A series of reviews funded by DFID indicated that investments in agricultural research often delivered excellent
614

research findings but that the findings produced more limited
social and economic impacts than expected. In July 2006,
DFID established a five-year flagship program, Research Into
Use (RIU). As its name implies, the program’s fundamental
purpose was to make better use of agricultural research.
OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION

Implemented in South Asia and Africa with a budget of
US$50 million, RIU drew inspiration from the innovation
systems perspective. It emphasized driving research into use
by strengthening networks and partnerships and giving private sector and enterprise perspectives more prominence. It
also pursued explicit learning objectives for internal purposes
and external policy audiences (for details, see www.researchintouse.org and Hall, Dijkman, and Sulaiman 2010).
RIU had three main elements:
■

The Asia Challenge Fund (ACF) supported 15 consortiums of research and development partners to scale out
previously developed technologies. Projects were located
in India, Bangladesh, and Nepal. The logic was that the
main task in putting research into use was the promotion
of technologies and other research products. The technologies dealt with in this way included new crop varieties developed through client-oriented breeding, fish
fingerling production techniques, crab and seaweed production, and new management and analytical techniques, including participatory floodplain management
and participatory market chain analysis. Over time,
many of the consortiums recognized that their main task
was not to promote technology per se but to marshal the
different players around existing value chains or to
develop new ones. Often this work involved bringing
additional partners with entrepreneurial expertise into
the consortiums. While the Asia Challenge Fund projects

■

■

certainly yielded direct developmental outcomes, they
were most noteworthy for the extensive institutional
changes they stimulated.
The Africa Country Programmes (ACPs) were established
in Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and
Zambia with the explicit agenda of brokering new clusters of organizations around selected R&D themes. This
agenda was based on the recognition that developmental
and market-based opportunities often arise and can use
research expertise and findings, but institutional inertia
often prevents an appropriate mix of organizations,
knowledge, and resources from assembling to innovate
in response to such opportunities. The ACPs used innovation platforms and other dialogue mechanisms as
starting points to identify opportunities and help organizations link with each other. Some of the initiatives
brokered in this way included a smallholder indigenous
poultry value chain in Tanzania, an improved fish fingerling supply chain in Malawi, and an integrated livestock
fodder and vet service arrangement in Nigeria. With the
ACPs’ broad, opportunity-driven agenda, many unexpected adaptations took place as organizations in the
consortiums found new ways of working with each
other, such as new financing mechanisms, new roles for
research partners, and new ways of influencing policy.
Existing research products (and research expertise) were
put into use in these initiatives, and their developmental
outcomes were recorded, but the main outcomes from
the ACPs were institutional.
The Best Bets. RIU envisaged that it would identify Best
Bet technologies for scaling up, but quickly it shifted to
identifying best bet business models and unique consortiums that successfully combined enterprise principles
(specifically, a focus on the poor as a market for products
and services) with science-Based innovation. The
approach proved useful for tapping the ability of entrepreneurs with social credentials to marshal research and
other knowledge, resources, and partners to create business innovations that addressed issues as diverse as sleeping sickness control, farm input supplies, and biological
control of an aggressive parasitic weed (Striga). Support
for these businesses created capacity for continuous
innovation around the themes covered. Having focused
on supporting existing enterprise-like organizations and
consortiums, the Best Bets were better placed than other
RIU interventions to achieve direct developmental outcomes. Institutional change was also anticipated, however,
as many of the organizations involved were encouraged
to assume new roles in the innovation process.

RIU incorporated two further elements: a communications and a research function. The research team, distributed across Asia and Africa, was mandated to draw key
policy lessons to inform national and particularly international development investors about better strategies for putting agricultural research into use.
INNOVATIVE ELEMENT: MONITORING AND
EVALUATING DEVELOPMENTAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

RIU set targets for development (outcomes measured in
terms of benefits to poor people) and institutional and policy change (outcomes measured in terms of changes in key
stakeholders’ behavior in the innovation process and
changes in policies that shape the national and international
innovation environment). The emphasis given to these outcomes shifted in the latter part of the project, when a 70 percent impact weighting was assigned to institutional and policy outcomes.
The challenge for RIU was to monitor institutional and
policy changes and direct developmental outcomes, even
though it was recognized that developmental outcomes
would not arise on a significant scale until after the project
ended. The task was even more challenging because the
interventions evolved a great deal to reflect the emerging
understanding of how to put research into use and to take
advantage of emerging opportunities to do so.
Part of the challenge lay in the tension over whether
RIU was a developmental or institutional change initiative. Management and staff changes brought differing
views on this point, which had implications for how M&E
was addressed. A consensus eventually emerged that RIU
needed to track developmental as well as institutional
outcomes. Because RIU was implemented before there
was much experience, confidence, or consensus in the use
of methods that could address those two outcomes
together, the M&E task was largely exploring new ground.
The next sections describe the resulting experience and
learning.
EXPERIENCE

Following advice from the donor, RIU initially set aside onethird of its budget for the combined task of monitoring
impact and learning (MIL). A specialist group was brought
in to design and implement an M&E plan, which had two
notable elements. The first was a baseline survey for the ACF
projects and ACPs to conduct (the Best Bet projects had not
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yet started). The second element was that projects were asked
to record the events unfolding around their interventions.
The data were sent to the UK-based MIL group for analysis.
A new management team and M&E strategy

A midterm and subsequent technical review of RIU were
critical of the MIL approach, noting that the baseline exercise was particularly burdensome and provided no clear
feedback to the ACF or ACPs. Following these reviews, a
new management team was brought into RIU at the beginning of year four of RIU’s five-year program. The MIL
group disbanded, a new M&E strategy was put into place,
and ACF projects and ACPs became responsible for monitoring their progress as they saw fit.
Some projects continued baseline and follow-up studies
and tracking. For example, a project promoting varieties
developed through client-oriented breeding found those
studies useful for targeting, because they identified agroclimatic zones where adoption patterns indicated that the new
varieties performed well and were acceptable to farmers.
Others found the approach less useful or did not see it as a
priority and stopped.

to find a suitable evaluator. An evaluator was finally identified and appointed early in 2010, when RIU had about 15
months left to run.
The impact assessment team (as RIU described it) would
assemble evidence about outcomes to substantiate lessons
that the research team was developing as well as to report to
the donor for accountability. Responding to the donor’s
demands, however, the impact team assumed a more
broadly conceived evaluative role, exploring the effectiveness of project cycle management and reporting its findings
to the donor.
The impact team also developed a learning approach,
drawing on the Theory-Based Impact Evaluation methods developed by Howard White and the 3IE group to
assess developmental impacts, explore RIU’s theory of
change, and revisit its assumptions (for a brief description of the methods, see box 7.19 in TN 5; see also White
2009a, 2009b). Information was collected through household surveys in selected countries and extensive interviews were conducted with RIU staff and stakeholders in
RIU focus countries. Box 7.27 summarizes key elements
of the evaluation framework.
Problems encountered

Impact assessment

The new M&E strategy specified that RIU would appoint an
independent team to assess impact. Initially RIU struggled

The impact team’s dual responsibilities for accountability
(judging the effectiveness of RIU’s implementation) and
learning (helping RIU to understand its impact over time)

Box 7.27 Key Elements of the Framework Used to Evaluate Research Into Use

The impact assessment team developed a series of
questions to examine the theory of change embedded
in the interventions of Research Into Use (RIU). The
following are the main categories of questions posed:
■

■

Overarching question. Has the underlying theory of
change—that “new forms of partnership will lead to
innovation (which in turn will contribute to poverty
reduction and economic growth)”—been shown to
be appropriate?
Relevance. Given its theory of change, was RIU’s
design appropriate to explore how to put research
into use? Was the program’s design appropriate to its
ambition to impact on poor people?

■

■

■

Efficiency. To what extent was the RIU’s information management system (including the M&E system) fit-for-purpose? How did RIU assess the
progress of innovations and their contribution
(both positive and negative) to building knowledge
and addressing market failures?
Effectiveness. What partnership arrangements were
most effective in understanding and addressing the
barriers to innovation, both nationally and locally,
and why? What partnership arrangements are effectively ensuring that the innovation process focuses
on the issues of gender and social exclusion? Was the
research monitoring system effective?
Impact. To what extent has RIU impacted poor people?

Source: Adapted from RIU project document.
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Box 7.28 Framework for Tracking Institutional Change
Research Into Use (RIU) recognized that it needed to
track institutional change, but what sort of institutional change should be tracked? Given that innovation
is embedded in a very wide range of relationships in
economic systems, the range of institutions that are
important in the innovation process is likely to be
equally large and varied. Some areas of expected institutional change are very obvious—for example,
changes in research practice or changes in patterns of
partnership—but because RIU operated in complex
development arenas, some institutional changes would
be difficult to predict from theory alone.
The broad categories of change listed below were
identified through a rapid inventory of institutional
changes observed in association with RIU’s activities.
Institutional changes were defined as things that were
being done differently as well as changes in formal policies and rules. The institutional changes in the inven-

tory were sorted into groups to arrive at broad categories of institutional change. Illustrative indicators of
each type of change were developed, and this framework was used for deeper investigation and documentation of institutional changes through case studies and
writeshops.
■
■

■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

New ways of financing rural innovation.
New, poverty-relevant ways of working or organizing things.
Market-related institutional changes.
Existing types of organizations playing new roles.
New types of organizations playing new roles.
Changes in research practice.
Changes in the policy formulation space/process.
Effects on donor/government investment behavior.
New network configurations.
Formal policy changes.

Source: Adwera et al. 2011.

were managed insensitively. The accountability function
was perceived as a policing exercise and tended to impede
the learning function, preventing the sharing of information and perspectives. Frequent changes in the impact team,
including its leader, exacerbated this problem.
The evaluators and RIU disagreed about the RIU’s theory of change. Evaluators articulated it as “partnerships lead
to innovation,” whereas RIU articulated it as “institutional
and policy change will enable innovation.” The evaluators
found that it was too early to collect the impact data needed
to satisfy the Theory-Based Impact Evaluation approach
that inspired the design of the evaluation. In other words, an
impact evaluation was premature.
A mechanism for systematically
capturing change

A more positive result of this experience was that the impact
team identified evidence that institutional change was
occurring as a result of RIU’s efforts. The team also called
attention to the fact that RIU lacked a mechanism for systematically capturing this information and using it in dialogue with policy makers and others to leverage wider policy and institutional change.

RIU responded to these findings in a number of ways. It
changed its quarterly reporting formats to include institutional change issues. It developed a framework to categorize
and track an expanding range of different types of institutional change (box 7.28; Adwera et al. 2011). Institutional
histories of the ACPs were commissioned to develop a
deeper understanding of how they promoted innovation
(box 7.29). Finally, writeshops helped staff implementing
interventions to record institutional changes and unexpected
outcomes and use the writeups to engage other stakeholders.
LESSONS LEARNED: WHAT COULD
HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY?

By the end of RIU’s initial five-year lifecycle in June 2011, the
impact team had not yet reported its findings (as of this writing, RIU has been extended to June 2012, partly to complete
the impact evaluations). Even so, from the work completed
so far, a number of lessons related to M&E stand out:
■

Separate responsibilities for M&E. It is critical to maintain the distinction between monitoring and evaluation
and to separate the timing and responsibilities for these
two functions. RIU started off collecting its own impact
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Box 7.29 Rationale and Approach for Innovation Studies Based on Institutional Histories
of Africa Country Programmes
The Africa Country Programmes (ACPs) of Research
Into Use (RIU) used innovation platforms as one means
of enabling innovation. RIU commissioned institutional
histories of the ACPs to understand the specific details of
how the various innovation platforms were designed and
functioned in each setting and to learn how each ACP
functioned as a broking or intermediary organization
within the wider innovation and development landscape. The decision to use institutional histories reflected
the fact that the arrangements and approaches used in
each program evolved significantly. All programs took
advantage of a range of opportunities; some approaches
were less effective than others, but all were instructive.
The resulting institutional histories contributed to innovation studies with the following elements:
■

■

■

■

prominence of core concepts and the way this evolution played out in RIU’s strategy, with particular
emphasis on the ACPs.
A detailed institutional history of the ACPs, emphasizing how they organized their work, learned along
the way, and evolved in response to the evolution of
RIU and the local development, political, and institutional environment.
A detailed account (in accessible language) of the
nature, role, and function of the intermediary/
brokering task, including the innovation platforms,
to explain what brokering involves.
Based on those accounts, develop guiding principles
for designing a program enabling intermediary
agencies/brokers to catalyze innovation and put
research into use.

A short institutional history of the evolution of RIU,
with a strong focus on understanding the changing

Source: RIU project document.

■
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data (an evaluation function) and, in the process,
impeded progress on the action part of its interventions.
The expectations of the donor were also important:
Donors should be realistic about the type and scale of
outcomes likely to be evident in the action-to-impact
results chain during the life of an intervention. This
statement does not mean that interventions should not
track their performance; it means that tracking and managing performance will require data different from the
data needed for assessing an intervention’s final impact.
A suite of well-executed qualitative methods and rapid
quantitative surveys would have been much more useful
to the ACF projects and ACPs as a way of monitoring and
generating feedback on the effectiveness of their actions.
Time the evaluation carefully. The impact team initiated
its activities prematurely. It could be argued that the
effectiveness of program cycle management could be
investigated only when the program was still on the
ground, but the final impact needs to be explored after
the program has come to an end. The nature of RIU, with
its emphasis on achieving impact by stimulating institutional and policy change, suggests that this time lag is
particularly important. Since this route to impact is complex, chains of causation will need to be explored care-

■

fully. In this sense, the baseline studies may yet prove
valuable for post-program evaluation, although a more
appropriate approach would have been for RIU to commission the design and execution of the baselines independently of the interventions. Then the evaluators
could have repeated the surveys after the program ended.
Develop a systematic monitoring plan. Monitoring
progress toward institutional and developmental targets
is challenging and requires technical backstopping so
that projects can perform this function as an integral
part of their management. Those who need to act on the
information generated should have ownership of the
monitoring role: Responsibility should lie with the individual projects rather than the central program. Programs should have specific M&E expertise to help
design integrated monitoring strategies for others to use
rather than to collect data for the M&E expert to analyze. A very large suite of techniques is available for
exploring institutional change and understanding relationships between process and outcome (TN 4). The key
is to have expertise that is sufficiently familiar with this
suite of methods to adapt principles and tools to the
specific monitoring needs of each project in the larger
program.
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■

Manage tensions between accountability and learning. Sensitive management of the interaction between
evaluators and programs is needed to deal with the
tensions between accountability and learning. This
point is particularly important for innovation system
interventions, because theories of change are multidi-

mensional and evolving and appear difficult for programs
such as RIU to articulate. One approach—viewed as a
good practice in the evaluation community—is to
employ conversational rather than interrogative information collection techniques with program staff and
stakeholders.
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NOTES
Thematic Note 1

1. See, for example, the G20 press release on its September
2011 Ministerial Meeting on Development (G20 2011a) and
progress on the Global Conferences on Agricultural
Research for Development process (http://gcardblog.wordpress.com/; FAO 2011).
2. For further information on conventional methods of
priority setting and investment in agricultural R&D see
Tabor, Janssen, and Bruneau (1998), Contant (2001), and
Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995).
3. World Bank (2007) identifies three main contexts for
innovation: (1) agriculture-based countries (mainly in
sub-Saharan Africa) where farmers lack access to wellfunctioning agricultural markets; (2) transforming countries (mainly in South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, the
Middle East, and North Africa) where agricultural markets
are developing and some farmers gain from good connections to markets; and (3) mature innovation countries
(most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and
many in Europe and Central Asia) where agricultural markets function relatively efficiently and farmers are effective
market players.
Thematic Note 3

1. For example, see the discussion of scenarios developed
under India’s National Agricultural Innovation Project on
the future of agriculture in India (http://www.naip.icar.org
.in/workshops2.htm).
Innovative Activity Profile 3

1. Fundación PROINPA (Promoción e Investigación de Productos Andinos) (www.proinpa.org/); Programa Nacional de
Raíces y Tubérculos rubro Papa (PNRT-Papa), Instituto
Nacional Autónomo de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
(INIAP) (www.iniap-ecuador.gov.ec/); and Innovación tecnológica y competitividad de la papa en Per (INCOPA)
(www.cipotato.org/papandina/incopa/incopa.htm).
2. See “A Quest for the Perfect Potato” (Newsweek 2008),
Mapstone (2010), and the August 2010 speech by Pepsi-Co
Chairperson and CEO Ms. Indra Nooys (http://www.pepsico
.com/assets/speeches/IndraNooyiPeruReception-2010.pdf).
Innovative Activity Profile 6

1. The author led the research in the Fodder Innovation
Project.
2. Funded by DFID between 2007 and 2010, RIU was led
by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in
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collaboration with United Nations University-Maastricht
Economics and Social Research Institute on Innovation
and Technology (UNU-MERIT), the International Center
for Crop Research in the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT),
and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
(IITA).
Innovative Activity Profile 7

1. The author was head of RIU’s Central Research Team.
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RESOURCES
Module 7 Overview

The CGIAR’s Institutional Learning and Change Program
(http://www.cgiar-ilac.org) brings together a group of
national and international partners who are committed to
strengthening the contributions of collaborative applied
R&D programs to pro-poor agricultural innovation.
Knowledge Management for Development (http://www
.km4dev.org/) is an internet portal and discussion group
on knowledge sharing and knowledge issues, including
reflective management, action-learning, and network
development.
At the United Nations University–Maastricht Economic and
Social Research and Training Centre, LINK (Learning,
INnovation, Knowledge) (http://www.innovationstudies.org/) provides policy-relevant resources on innovation for a new rural economy through concepts, lessons,
and guidelines.
The Pelican Initiative (http://dgroups.org/Community
.aspx?c=3c4b8b5b-d151-4c38-9e7b-7a8a1a456f20) is an
online community of practice for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and participatory inquiry.
ODI’s Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) program (http://www.odi.org.uk/Rapid/Index.html) aims to
improve the uses of research and evidence in development
policy and practice through research, advice, and debate.

Thematic Note 3

The European Foresight Platform (http://www.foresightplatform.eu/), financed by the European Commission
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DG Research, is part of a series of initiatives to provide a
knowledge sharing platform for policy makers in the EU.
The Foresight for Development initiative (http://www
.foresightfordevelopment.org/) is piloted in Africa by the
South Africa Node of the Millennium Project, with support from the Rockefeller Foundation.
The Global Food and Farming Futures 2011 Foresight
Project from the UK Departments for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and International Development (DFID) involved around 400 leading experts and
stakeholders from about 35 countries across the world.
More than 100 peer-reviewed evidence papers commissioned by the project are available at http://www
.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/publishedprojects/global-food-and-farming-futures.
iKnow (http://wiwe.iknowfutures.eu/) is one of six Blue Sky
foresight research projects funded by the European
Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme for
Research and Technology Development (FP7) under the
Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities (SSH) theme.
The project aims to interconnect knowledge on issues
and developments potentially shaking or shaping the
future of STI in Europe and the world.
Millennia2015 Foresighting Women’s Life in the
Knowledge Society (http://www.millennia2015.org/)
examines issues that will strongly influence women’s
life in the knowledge society in every country in the
future. It also examines responsibilities with regard
to how these issues evolve at a global level. The foresighting exercise has developed a methodology and is
analyzing 37 variables to build an action plan to
empower women.
Science and Technology Foresighting (http://www.techforesight.ca/tools.html) is an online community of
practice offering tools, templates, and links to various
foresighting and scenario planning initiatives around
the world.
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Action-research. An iterative process of diagnosis, planning,
action, evaluation, and reflection.
Adaptive management. “A structured, iterative process of
optimal decision making in the face of uncertainty, with
an aim to reducing uncertainty over time via system
monitoring” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adaptive_
management). Adaptive management functions as a tool
for learning as well as change within a system: As new
information emerges, the system uses it (actively or passively) to change its operations and improve outcomes over
the long term. The management process includes present
and future stakeholders, bases iterative decision making on
the results of monitoring (learning), and regards uncertainty as a means of improving understanding.
Advisory services. Agricultural advisory services can be
defined as the entire set of organizations that support
and facilitate people engaged in agricultural production
to solve problems and to obtain information, skills, and
technologies to improve their livelihoods and well-being.
See also agricultural extension.
Agricultural education and learning (AEL). A variation on
agricultural education and training that reflects a more
student-centered approach to formal programs.
Agricultural education and training (AET). Organized programs and activities that serve the need for information,
knowledge, and skills among those who work in various
parts of the agriculture sector and the broader rural space.
An AET system typically consists of tertiary educational
institutions (agricultural universities or faculties and col-

leges of agriculture within comprehensive universities) in
addition to the polytechnics, institutes, or colleges that prepare technicians at the diploma level (postsecondary, subdegree level). This second category of education, often
termed agricultural technical–vocational education and
training (ATVET), technical–vocational education and
training (TVET), or vocational education and training
(VET), prepares technicians in a variety of specializations
in agriculture subsectors. Some secondary schools offer
agriculture as an elective. Agricultural training, frequently
in training centers or training institutes, is offered to public employees as in-service training and/or to farmers as
farmer training. Although the various elements in the AET
delivery chain are often referred to collectively as a “system,” they do not necessarily form a robust system in which
communication and feedback flow between institutions
and allow for continuous improvements. Many countries
divide responsibility for AET between the ministries of
agriculture and education.
Agricultural extension. The entire set of organizations that
support and facilitate people engaged in agricultural
production to solve problems and to obtain information,
skills, and technologies to improve their livelihoods and
well-being.
Agricultural knowledge and information system (AKIS). A system that links people and institutions to promote mutual
learning and generate, share, and utilize agriculturerelated technology, knowledge, and information. The system integrates farmers, agricultural educators, researchers,
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and extensionists to harness knowledge and information
from various sources for improved livelihoods. Farmers
are at the heart of this knowledge triangle.
Agricultural innovation system (AIS). A network of organizations, enterprises, and individuals focused on bringing
new products, new processes, and new forms of organization into economic use, together with the institutions
and policies that affect their behavior and performance.
Agricultural technical–vocational education and training
(ATVET). See agricultural education and training.
Business development services (BDS). A range of nonfinancial services provided by public and private suppliers to
entrepreneurs, who use them to operate more efficiently
and expand their businesses. BDSs can include training,
consultancy, and advisory services, marketing assistance,
information, technology development and transfer, and
business linkage promotion.
Business incubators. Programs designed to accelerate the successful development of entrepreneurial activities through
an array of business support resources and services,
developed and orchestrated by incubator management
and offered both in the incubator and through its network of contacts. Incubators vary in the way they deliver
their services, in their organizational structure, and in the
types of clients they serve.
Central nodes. In the terminology of social network analysis,
well-connected partners who pull promising new entrants
into networks and collaborate with a wide assortment of
partners, exposing them to more experiences, different
competencies, and added opportunities. By linking clusters of network actors, the central nodes facilitate flows
of information and resources. Innovation brokers are particularly prepared to become central nodes.
Change agent. See innovation broker.
Commercialization or commercial services. A focus in the
agricultural research and extension system on commercial crops or the provision of services for specific cash
crops such as tobacco or cotton.
Commodity extension. An extension system focused on one
cash crop, for which advice and inputs are provided by
one institution.
Competitive research grants (CRGs). Grants that fund
research based on national competition and scientific
peer review. Transparent procedures are used to select
the proposals that will receive funding, based on rigorous
criteria. Well-designed grants can bring greater contestability to the innovation process; the funding may not
necessarily flow to the traditional recipients. Grants can
promote research partnerships, leverage research
resources, and help to develop a more efficient, demanddriven, and pluralistic research system by involving
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clients in setting priorities and financing, executing, and
evaluating research. See matching grants.
Contracting. When one organization contracts with another
to perform a function or service. Contracting in occurs
when research, extension, and other government agricultural services provide services for an external group, such
as a nongovernmental organization or a private organization. Contracting out is when government hires an
external organization to perform services.
Cooperative extension. An extension model developed in the
U.S. university system, in which universities, linked to the
extension system, produce research results that are disseminated to farmers.
Cost sharing. When users of services pay at least a partial
amount of the cost.
Decentralization. Moving responsibility and/or funding of
public governmental services to local administrative levels such as districts. Decentralization can take many
forms, such as deconcentration (accountability remains
within the Department of Agriculture), devolution to
local governments (accountability is transferred from
central to locally elected governments), or delegation to
semiautonomous services.
Demand articulation. Identifying the needs of different user
groups for the knowledge and information produced by
agricultural research organizations or the services
(credit, advice) provided by other types of organizations.
Downstream research. Usually refers to research that adapts
a technology (agronomic practice, new variety) to a particular country’s or locality’s needs. Sometimes called
applied or adaptive research.
Economies of scale. In agricultural research, economies of
scale occur when the cost per unit of research output falls
with the number of units of output produced, usually
through better use of major fixed investment or specialized skills.
Economies of scope. In agricultural research, economies of
scope occur when the cost of a desired output falls with
an increase in the number of different research outputs
being produced. These gains occur when there is crosscommodity or cross-disciplinary learning as an external
economy.
Embedded services. Companies provide information with
the inputs they sell or other products they market.
Enabling environment. The environment (political, regulatory, institutional, economic, and social) that supports,
promotes, and sustains a given outcome. For agricultural
innovation, an enabling environment comprises those
factors that influence agricultural innovation positively
but are controlled by policy domains other than agricultural innovation policy itself.

Farm business schools. Schools that facilitate learning on
production, management, business finance, and marketing skills. Farm business schools and cooperatives have
an important learning role in promoting entrepreneurship among farmers, but initially they require external
facilitation.
Farmer organization or producer organization. An organization constituted by farmers who seek solutions to production or commercial problems. Some agricultural services
focus on providing extension, conducting research, or
offering other services through these organizations.
Farmer field school. A participatory method of learning,
technology development, and dissemination based on
adult-learning principles such as experiential learning.
Typically groups of 20–25 farmers meet weekly in an
informal setting on their farms with a facilitator. The
defining characteristics of farmer field schools include
discovery learning, farmer experimentation, and group
action. This interactive, practical training method
empowers farmers to be their own technical experts on
major aspects of their farming systems. Farmers are facilitated to conduct their own research, diagnose and test
problems, devise solutions, and disseminate their learning to others.
Farmer field school networks. Networks of informal or formal groupings with a common interest that draw their
membership from all the farmer field schools within a
given geographic or administrative boundary.
Farming systems research and extension (FSRE). System of
research and extension that is focused on understanding
the farming systems of small-scale farmers through
applied, multidisciplinary, on-farm, farmer-centered
research.
Fee for service. The provision of services for a cost by government, nongovernmental, or private organizations.
Genetically engineered. A genetically engineered or modified
organism in which the genetic material has been transformed using the techniques of genetic engineering.
These techniques combine DNA molecules from different
sources into one molecule to create a new set of genes.
This recombined DNA is then transferred into an organism, giving it modified or novel genes. Transgenic organisms, a subset of genetically modified organisms, carry
DNA that originated in a different species. Examples
include cotton that has been genetically transformed to
resist a particular herbicide. Many countries strictly control the production, use, export, and import of genetically
modified plants and animals. (Based on http://en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki/Genetically_modified_organism.)
Going concern. An enterprise that is expected to generate
sufficient revenues and manage its resources in a manner

that will allow it to remain in business for an indefinite
period.
Governance. The systems and practices that governments
use to set priorities and agendas, design and implement
policies, and obtain knowledge about their impacts.
Also refers to any systems and practices performing
the same function at the subnational level (provincial
research institutes, input subsidy programs) and in
smaller institutions (farmer organizations, irrigation
schemes).
Green revolution. The enormous increases in cereal production resulting from the adoption of high-yielding wheat,
maize, and rice varieties, grown under irrigation with
fertilizer and other inputs, across large areas of Asia and
Latin America from the 1960s to 1980s.
Group-based approach. Extension programs that work with
farmer groups or other common interest groups.
Industry clusters. Agglomerations of strongly interdependent
firms (including specialized suppliers) linked to each other
in a value-adding production chain, service providers, and
associated institutions in a particular field. Some clusters
encompass strategic alliances with universities, research
institutes, knowledge-intensive business services, bridging
institutions (brokers, consultants), and customers. Cluster-based approaches for business development and
innovation have increased agricultural productivity,
innovation, and business formation.
Information and communications technology (ICT). The wide
and growing array of modern communications technology such as the Internet, e-mail, electronic databases,
mobile phones and telephones, computers, personal digital devices, radio-frequency infrared devices, and the
related infrastructure to support it (wireless networks,
fiber-optic cable, and so on).
Innovation. An invention that is used for the first time in a
product that reaches the market or produces a change in
a social process. An innovation that is well known elsewhere may still be regarded as an innovation if it is new
locally.
Innovation brokers. Teams of specialists that combine a
strong background in science with knowledge of business and commercialization and/or the creation of innovation networks. Innovation brokers are also known as
change agents or technology brokers.
Innovation capabilities. The skills to build and integrate
internal and external resources to address problems or
take advantage of opportunities. Innovation capabilities
depend not only on innovative individuals but also on
internal features of an organization, especially incentives,
cultures, organizational spaces for experimentation,
coordinating structures, and collective action.
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Innovation-led growth. Growth based on innovative technologies, processes, products, markets, or organizational
arrangements rather than on large additional uses of natural resources.
Innovation network. A diverse group of actors that voluntarily contribute knowledge and other resources (such as
money, equipment, and land) to develop jointly or
improve a social or economic process or product. Innovation networks are a special form of organization with
a nonhierarchical structure, a collaboration-based culture, consensus-based coordination (because members
are free to leave the network at any time), usually no legal
personality (especially in their early stages), and often
relatively fuzzy objectives (such as improving the management of natural resources). They evolve with market
opportunities and the technologies they develop. Innovation networks differ from farmer organizations in that
farmer organizations have a homogeneous membership
and more formal, stable relations. Innovation networks
differ from value chains in that the latter are more stable,
are focused on delivering a product or service, and are
coordinated by a central actor. Innovation networks are
also known as innovation platforms.
Innovation platform. See innovation network.
Intellectual property rights (IPRs). Intellectual property law
grants owners of intellectual property (creations of the
mind) certain exclusive rights to a variety of intangible
assets, such as musical, literary, and artistic works; discoveries and inventions; and words, phrases, symbols, and
designs. Common types of intellectual property include
copyrights, trademarks, patents, industrial design rights,
and trade secrets. See tangible property rights. (Based on
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_property.)
Intervention logic. The underlying assumptions in an intervention that link intervention inputs with expected outcomes.
Invention. The creation of knowledge. An invention
becomes an innovation only when it is first used in a
product that reaches the market or produces a change in
a social process.
Learning alliance. A process-driven approach that facilitates
the development of shared knowledge among different
actors. Learning alliances contribute to improved development outcomes because lessons are more quickly identified and learned and because stronger links among
research organizations and other actors in the AIS
improve the focus on research and development practices.
Local agribusiness development services. Services that
improve the performance of a small-scale enterprise
oriented to agricultural production, be it individual or
cooperative, in accessing markets, financial services, and
enhanced agribusiness environments. Examples of these
services include training and advisory services, market
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information services, technology, and business linkage
information. Also referred to as value-chain oriented
services, market-oriented agricultural advisory services,
and marketing extension.
Marketing chain. Modern marketing chains for agricultural
crops have many features of buyer-driven value chains:
an actor close to consumers (usually a supermarket or
broker) dominates, organizing many producers and
intermediaries, deciding who participates in the chain,
overseeing all the links from the farm to the shelf,
defining the nature of the interactions and commercial
conditions, and setting quality and safety standards.
Other important features of modern marketing chains
are that they focus on marketing specific products (such
as vegetables, fruits, meat), access to the chain is highly
restricted, verbal contracts based on trust are common
but informal transactions rare, and technologies are
generated mostly in developed countries and imposed
by the leading agent. Only farmers with strong capabilities for innovation (especially entrepreneurship,
physical and financial resources, and social capital) can
survive in the highly competitive environment of modern marketing chains.
Matching grants. The matching of funds from the granting
organization (usually a public agency) with funds from
the beneficiary. Matching grants increasingly promote
near-market technology generation, technology transfer
and adoption, private economic activity, and overall
innovation, often by including multiple stakeholders. By
focusing greater attention on demand and use from the
very beginning, basically by attracting users of technologies and knowledge in partnerships (and requiring a
matching commitment), matching grants may be more
effective than competitive research grants at enhancing the
use of technology and knowledge by farmers and other
entrepreneurs.
National agricultural research system (NARS). The entities
responsible within a given country for organizing, coordinating, or executing research that contributes explicitly
to the development of the country’s agriculture and
maintenance of its natural resource base.
National innovation policy. Overarching policies coordinating a wide spectrum of policy domains—science and
technology policy, education policy, economic policy,
industrial policy, infrastructure policy, taxation policy,
and justice policy, among others—in such a way that
together they create an environment that enables and
stimulates innovation. Sector-specific innovation policies (such as a policy for agricultural innovation) replicate the national innovation policy’s overarching and
coordinating nature but have considerably less political
clout to influence policies outside their domains.

Niche markets. A small, specific, and well-defined subset
of the market on which a particular product focuses.
Examples include markets for fair trade, organic, or other
products certified to have particular qualities; small-scale
growers of particular kinds of produce purchased directly
by consumers in a nearby city; a new market for a traditional product (quinoa, amaranth, and acai are three of
many kinds), or a new product derived from a traditional
crop. Some niches have more demanding quality and
commercial requirements than others, and farmers’ participation in these markets depends on whether they can
meet those requirements. Although niche markets have
had important impacts on local communities, they cannot expand beyond a certain size without becoming commoditized. For this reason, they can make only a limited
contribution to alleviating poverty. Niche markets can be
considered a form of innovation network.
Nongovernmental organization (NGO) extension. Extension
systems run by NGOs, often in a project mode and
focused on participatory methods.
No-till agriculture. An agronomic practice in which crops
are planted in previously unprepared soil by opening a
narrow slot or trench of the smallest width and depth
needed to obtain proper coverage of the seed. Conventional tillage practices involve multiple tractor passes to
accomplish plowing, harrowing, planking, and seeding
operations; no-till requires only one or two passes for
spraying herbicide and seeding. In addition to reducing
the number of operations, no-till requires less-powerful
tractors and reduces equipment depreciation. While
no-till principles are the same everywhere—entailing
minimal soil disturbance, keeping soil covered, and
using crop rotations—the actual packages differ greatly
by location.
Organization. A group of actors that collaborate over a sustained period. An organization can be either formal or
informal. Collaboration may take different forms,
including frequent exchanges of information, joint priority setting for policies and programs, and joint implementation of innovation projects.
Organizational capabilities for innovation. The abilities of the
organization’s members and the organization’s key characteristics. Organizational abilities for innovation include
maintaining specialized knowledge, creativity, and commitment to the organization; developing a long-term
vision for the organization; absorbing information generated by other agents (also called the absorptive capacity); creating new knowledge; and using this knowledge
to develop innovations that address commercial, social,
organizational, or technological needs or opportunities.
An organization’s key characteristics include its culture,
governance, and communications routines (whether

they are hierarchical or allow individual exploration of
opportunities and horizontal communication); learning
routines (the heuristics and methods used for collectively
accepting new ideas and procedures); the propensity to
interact and cooperate with other actors in the AIS; and
the availability of resources for the development of innovations (capital and specialized assets).
Organizational interface. Modalities that help to transform
knowledge and information produced by research
organizations into socially and economically relevant
goods and services. Examples include innovation platforms, value-chain approaches, and public-private partnerships.
Outgrower. A farmer operating under a formal or informal
agreement (often a contract) to grow produce for a commercial agricultural enterprise (for example, a sugarcane
processor) or a large-scale farmer. Outgrowers may
receive credit and advice from the processor.
Participatory or demand-driven approaches. Method of
research and/or extension focused on bottom-up
approaches and empowerment of clientele. These
approaches include methods such as farmer field schools
and farmer research groups.
Pluralistic extension. Extension system based on multiple
service providers, including public, private, and civil
society organizations, in which the focus is often on
demand-driven, participatory approaches.
Privatization. Full transfer of ownership (usually by sale)
from government to a private entity.
Privatized research or extension services. Services run for
profit, not necessarily for cash crops only.
Producer organizations. See farmer organization.
Public-private partnerships. At least one public and one private organization share resources, knowledge, and risks
to achieve a match of interests and jointly deliver products and services. In agricultural research, PPPs bring
together partners with different skills and knowledge to
contribute jointly to the generation, adaptation, and/or
diffusion of an innovation. Usually the partnership
agreement is in the form of a contract that establishes
each partner’s commitments and the distribution of benefits. PPPs in agricultural research can be set up not only
to generate knowledge via research but also to foster the
diffusion and application of knowledge among private
actors (agribusiness, farmers) and public actors (universities, research institutes, and extension agencies).
Qualitative growth. Growth associated with a range of additional public goods that especially reduce extreme
poverty, provide food security, narrow structural
inequalities, protect the environment, or sustain the
growth process itself.
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Risk capital. Money explicitly available for investment into a
high-risk business or a security of some type—typically
those that are not publicly traded on any national stock
exchange. In this sourcebook, risk capital refers to investment in a company or project at an early or high-risk
stage. Private investors are the major sources of risk capital; public investment cannot meet the needs, although
it can stimulate and leverage private investment in the
sector. See venture capital.
Rural productive alliance. An economic agreement between
formally organized producers and at least one buyer, which
specifies product characteristics (such as size and varieties
to be produced); quantity to be produced or bought; production modalities (such as how a product will be delivered, by whom, and when, as well as grading and packing
requirements); payment modalities and price determination criteria; and the buyer’s contribution (such as technical assistance, specific inputs, and arrangements for input
reimbursement—for example, at the time of sale).
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) protection. Measures,
including regulations and agreements, to protect:
(1) human or animal health from risk arising from
additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease organisms in
food, drink, and feedstuffs; (2) human life from risks associated with diseases carried by plants or animals; (3) animal
or plant life from pests, diseases, and disease-causing
organisms; and (4) a country from other damage caused by
the entry, establishment, or spread of pests. Such measures
include national control of contaminants, pests, and diseases (vaccination programs, limits on pesticide residues
in food) as well as international controls to prevent their
inadvertent spread (for example, the rejection of insectinfested food shipments that pose a risk to domestic food
production). See standards and technical regulations.
Social capital. The institutions, relationships, and norms that
shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is
critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. A narrow view of social capital
regards it as a set of horizontal associations between people, consisting of social networks and associated norms
that have an effect on community productivity and wellbeing. Social networks can increase productivity by reducing the costs of doing business. Social capital facilitates
coordination and cooperation. This quality is strong
within mature groups with strong internal institutions,
intragroup trust, altruistic behavior, membership in other
groups, and ties to external service providers.
Standard. A document approved by a recognized body that
provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines, or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not
mandatory. See technical regulations.
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Strategic alliances. Partnerships that usually involve longterm cooperation (10 or more years), multinational
companies, or groups of companies. Examples include
the development and introduction of minimum social
and environmental standards for agricultural or forestry
products, fair trade arrangements, and similar ambitious
programs.
Tangible property rights. The set of rights defined by law that
relate to a physical object, for example plasmids or vectors. See intellectual property rights.
Technical regulations. Regulations that specify product
characteristics or their related processes and production
methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. Technical
regulations include import bans (total or partial), technical specifications (process and product standards),
packaging standards, information requirements, and
requirements for labeling and claims. See standards.
Technology broker. See innovation broker.
Theory of change. The underlying assumptions in an intervention that link intervention inputs with expected outcomes.
Traditional extension system (general extension). Extension
focused on increasing agricultural productivity, run by
central government, using a top-down approach and
often emphasizing the transfer of technology.
Training and visit (T&V). A system of extension management with a focus on improving technical knowledge of
extension agents and regular visits to farms.
Transfer of technology (TOT). Programs focused on disseminating information and new technologies. Such programs
often include an integrated approach in which technology
is pushed as a package deal with the requisite institutional
support, such as credit and fertilizer facilities.
Value chain. The set of linked activities pursued by the different actors that a firm organizes to produce and market
a product. See also marketing chain.
Value-chain approach. Attention to improving efficiency
along the value chain for a particular agricultural commodity, often through applied agricultural research
integrated with institutional innovations in farmer
organization and marketing.
Venture capital. Venture capital is a form of private equity
provided for early-stage and more mature companies
with substantial market potential. Returns on venture
capital investment are from a trade sale (sale to, or
merger with, another company) or an initial public offering in which the company becomes authorized to sell its
stock to the general public on a stock exchange. Venture
capital funds will not only provide money but will mentor their investee firms. See risk capital.
Vocational education and training (VET). See agricultural
education and training.
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esearch, education, and extension investments, while usually necessary, are often
insufficient alone to bring knowledge, technologies, and services that enable farmers
and entrepreneurs to innovate. Efforts to strengthen research systems and increase
the availability of knowledge have not increased innovation or the use of knowledge in
agriculture at the pace or the scale required by the intensifying and proliferating challenges
confronting agriculture. Agricultural Innovation Systems: An Investment Sourcebook contributes to the
identification, design, and implementation of the investments, approaches, and complementary
interventions most likely to strengthen agricultural innovation systems (AIS) and to promote
innovation and equitable growth. The Sourcebook provides a menu of tools and operational
guidance, as well as good practice lessons, to illustrate approaches to designing, investing in,
and improving these systems.
Managing the ability of agriculture to meet rising global demand and to respond to the changes
and opportunities will require good policy, sustained investments, and innovation—not business
as usual. Experience indicates that aside from a strong capacity in R&D, the ability to innovate
is often related to collective action and coordination, exchange of knowledge among diverse
actors, incentives and resources available to form partnerships and develop business, and an
enabling environment. While consensus is developing about what is meant by “innovation” and
“innovation system,” no detailed blueprint exists for making agricultural innovation happen at a
given time, in a given place, for a given result. That said, the AIS approach, which looks at these
multiple conditions and relationships that promote innovation in agriculture in specific contexts,
has moved from a concept to a subdiscipline with principles of analysis and action.
Drawing on approaches that have been tested at different scales in different settings, this
Sourcebook emphasizes the lessons learned, benefits and impacts, implementation issues, and
prospects for replicating or expanding successful practices.
The Sourcebook reflects the experiences and evolving understanding of numerous individuals
and organizations concerned with agricultural innovation, including the World Bank. It targets
the key operational staff who design and implement lending projects in international and
regional development agencies and national governments, as well as the practitioners who
design thematic programs and technical assistance packages. The Sourcebook can also be an
important resource for the research community and nongovernmental organizations.
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